COMMENTARY FROM DAMASCUS TO KABUL: ANY COMMON GROUND BETWEEN TURKEY AND ?

From Damascus to Kabul: Any Common Ground between Turkey and Russia? Dmitri Trenin*

ABSTRACT Over the past two decades Turkey and Russia have man- aged to normalize their bilateral relationship. Trade is flourishing, and human contacts are multiplying. Turkey and Russia also share a vast neighborhood, over which the Ottoman and the Romanov empires used to fight in the past. Now, the region from the Black Sea to the Hindu Kush features a number of active and poten- tial conflicts. Could the happier relationship between Ankara and form the basis for their cooperation on regional issues or would the difference of interests turn them into rivals again?

he regional order of Western has turned Turkey into a model for Asia is being shocked and re- the region’s would-be modernizers, Tshaped by upheavals in much massively increasing Ankara’s soft of the Arab world; U.S. withdrawals power. With its numerous and well- from and, soon, from Afghan- equipped armed forces now firmly istan; the waning of the European under civilian control, Turkey’s mil- Union’s role as a result of the EU’s itary might is considerable. No won- internal crisis; China’s and India’s der that the Turkish government and growing interest and presence in the the Anatolian middle class, who backs area. However, the region has also it, exude new self-confidence. The witnessed the rise of a power, which Turkish parliament dared to say no has promised to serve as a model for to the United States’ request for using its neighbors and even a mediator in Turkish territory in the 2003 invasion * Director of their conflicts. Since 2000, Turkey has of Iraq, and six years later the Turk- the Carnegie demonstrated impressive economic ish government openly disagreed Moscow Center, DTrenin@ growth, which guaranteed it a place in with the White House on the poli- carnegie.ru the G-20 group, and a veritable explo- cy toward Iran. Counter-intuitively, Insight Turkey sion of its foreign trade. The tripling both actions eventually earned even Vol. 15 / No. 1 / of per capita GDP within a decade more appreciation in Washington of 2013, pp. 37-49

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Turkey and Russia, over the previous twenty years, appear to have buried their respective past hostility and have been able to cooperate pragmatically and productively on a bilateral basis

Ankara’s regional role. The moder- ate Islamism of AKP, Turkey’s ruling party since 2002, has encouraged those who believe that democracy in an Islamic setting is the future of the Muslim world. Rather than remain on the periphery of Europe and the West, A supporter of Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi and Turkey’s leaders redefined their coun- member of the Muslim Brotherhood holds a Koran and an try as a central power at the heart of Egyptian national flag during a rally in Cairo. Eurasia. In sum, Turkey has become REUTERS/Amr Dalsh more visible and more active on the international scene than at any mo- ment in the last one hundred years.1 ers it now primarily means denying Meanwhile, Russia, Turkey’s histor- others control over Russia itself. Yet, ical rival for several centuries, has even in its post-imperial mode, Mos- emerged from its immediate post-So- cow remains a major regional factor viet period as a different type of in- in the Black Sea/South Caucasus and ternational actor. It has managed the Caspian/Central Asia regions. It to keep itself in one piece after the is also a player in parts of the Mid- dismantlement of the dle East, in Iran, and Afghanistan – and the secession of the borderland thanks to Russia’s permanent seat on republics. Oil and gas have provided the United Nations Security Council; a useful cushion when Russia’s Sovi- its status as a major nuclear power and et-era industry collapsed and also al- one of the pillars of global strategic lowed the country’s economy to grow stability; its membership in the UN’s and raise the population’s standard of Middle Eastern Quartet; and its arms living. Crucially, Russia has largely trade with countries in the region. preserved its strategic independence. It insists on calling itself a great pow- As the successors to two great histor- er, but the meaning of the phrase has ical empires, Turkey and Russia, over changed. Instead of controlling oth- the previous twenty years, appear to

38 Insight Turkey FROM DAMASCUS TO KABUL: ANY COMMON GROUND BETWEEN TURKEY AND RUSSIA?

ciable degree of commonality and a measure of mutual respect. Now that both Russia and Turkey are intimate- ly involved in international relations along the line from the Bosporus to the Hindu Kush (and south and north thereof), it is important to discuss the prospects for their cooperation and conflict in the region. (The Balkans should be left aside, as an area where the EU has the leading role). The practical question for policymakers is how can the positives in the Turk- ish-Russian relationship be enhanced and the negatives minimized, for the sake of both countries’ interests and those of regional security?

This article will first assess the new quality of Russo-Turkish relations in order to establish how strong and re- silient the foundation is for broader regional cooperation between Mos- Russia’s President Vladimir Putin talks with Turkey’s Prime cow and Ankara. It will then proceed Minister Tayyip Erdogan during their news conference in to analyze Turkey’s and Russia’s ap- Istanbul. proaches to some of the regional is- REUTERS/Osman Orsal sues, from Syria to Afghanistan and from the Caucasus to Cyprus. Finally, the article will conclude with recom- have buried their respective past hos- mendations to the Russian and Turk- tility and have been able to cooperate ish policy communities as to the ways pragmatically and productively on a to enhance cooperation in pursuing bilateral basis. Due to the growing their common interests more effec- importance of energy trade, Russia tively and as to the means of narrow- has become Turkey’s second-largest ing and managing their differences. trading partner. Russian holiday- makers flock each year to Turkey’s Mediterranean beaches. Turkish con- New Quality of Russo-Turkish struction firms have been building Relations and renovating throughout Russia, including the State Duma. There are For two centuries, the Ottoman and serious differences of course between Russian empires were engaged in a the two countries’ policies and ap- seemingly never-ending contest for proaches, but there is also an appre- regional primacy. From the days of

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Peter the Great, rising Russia was lics, to form their own independent generally on the offensive and the states. Having long dominated the Ottomans, which by that very time Black Sea, Russia had now to be con- had entered their long and steady tent with a relatively short portion decline, were basically defending of its shoreline. The Black Sea Fleet’s their sphere of influence, only occa- historical base in Sebastopol eventu- sionally counter-attacking. The epic ally remained Russian, under a lease struggle also had a religious element, agreement with Ukraine, but the fleet with Orthodox Russia positing itself itself turned into more of a floating as the defender of Christians against museum of past glory than a major the Muslim Turks. Russia’s goals were fighting force. Nevertheless, Russia far-reaching and ultimately included did become involved in ethnic con- wrestling control over the Turkish flicts, which resulted from the col- Straits and over the Ottoman capital lapse of the Soviet state, in Moldova, itself, which the Russians called Con- the North and South Caucasus, and stantinople or Tsargrad and claimed Tajikistan, but its military forces could as part of their historical patrimony. no longer be conceived as threatening The simultaneous collapse of the two by the neighbors of the former Soviet empires, as a result of World War I, Union, including by Turkey. The bi- and the subsequent internal chang- zarre warning by Air Marshal Evgeny es in Russia and Turkey ushered in Shaposhnikov, the last Soviet defense a more stable period in the bilateral minister, who in September 1991 relationship. However, these rela- called on Turkey not to provoke World tions became more distant as the two War III through its involvement in countries became more inward look- the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh ing. The outcome of World War II sounded anachronistic. turned Soviet Russia into the might- iest power of the Old World. Stalin’s Certainly, there were fears at the time attempts to extend the Soviet zone of in Russia of a Turkish revanche in influence to Turkey pushed Ankara the former Soviet south. Four new- into the American camp at the start ly formed states in Central Asia and of the Cold War. As a NATO member Azerbaijan were all Turkic speaking. with the largest conventional force The diplomatic and rhetorical activity after America’s, Turkey remained, for of Presidents Turgut Ozal and Suley- the duration of the 40-year confron- man Demirel led some Russian ob- tation, a frontline state on the Cold servers to discuss the potential – and War’s southern flank. dangers - of Pan-Turkism. The sym- pathy that segments of Turkish soci- Things began to change with the ety and some Turkish officials felt for dismantlement of the Soviet Union. the Chechen separatists, who fought Moscow’s policy vector radically Russia by various means, including changed.2 It allowed the borderland terrorism, did not endear Russia’s regions of the former empire, nomi- policymakers and its military and nally constituted as federated repub- security communities to Turkey. Yet,

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those concerns did not crystallize into ists come to Turkey’s Mediterranean a new trend. A decade after the end resorts every year generally taking of the USSR, Turkey began its own back home an image of a warm and fundamental internal change, suc- friendly country. The Turkish de- cessfully managing to re-invent itself cision to allow visa-free travel with once again. The Turks began to focus Russia is certainly paying off. Impor- on the economy, building a “trading tantly, close relations have been estab- state,” in which it soon excelled. lished over the past decade between the essentially pragmatic leaders of Trade became the new principal cur- Russia and Turkey, Vladimir Putin rency of Russo-Turkish relations. By and Tayyip Recep Erdogan. Looking the early 2010s, trade turnover ex- towards the future, an expanded and ceeded $30 billion, which made Rus- more structured dialogue between sia Turkey’s second biggest trading the two countries’ leading intellectu- partner. Energy flows are responsi- als and experts is also on the way. ble for much of that increase and for Turkey’s deficit in the bilateral trade. The Blue Stream gas pipeline from On Syria and the Arab Russia to Turkey became the symbol of the new relationship and part of Awakening more broadly, President Vladimir Putin’s strategy of Moscow’s and Ankara’s views creating direct energy links with Rus- and policies appear to differ sia’s key partners in North-Central () and South-Southeastern fundamentally () Europe. Besides Gazprom with its pipelines, Rosatom is actively pro- moting a $20 billion-worth project However, how resilient is the thicken- of a nuclear power station in Turkey. ing web of Russo-Turkish relations? Recently, Sberbank, Russia’s largest The last 20 years have not been exactly state-owned financial institution, without challenges and adverse events has acquired Denizbank, Turkey’s are perfectly capable of causing the ninth-largest bank. deterioration of the relationship be- tween Moscow and Ankara. The con- In sum, Russo-Turkish economic re- tinuing Azeri-Armenian conflict over lations have progressed a long way Nagorno-Karabakh, in which Rus- since the 1990s, when its champions sia and Turkey are strategic partners were numerous entrepreneurial shut- and allies of the warring parties; the tle traders who carried Turkish wares long Chechen war and the short Rus- to Russian wholesale markets and so-Georgian one; the conflict in and Turkish construction workers who over Syria have all tested the depth built business centers and apartment and strength of the Russo-Turkish blocks around Russia. This is not to reconciliation. So far, despite the oc- underestimate the value of human casional tensions, the new relation- contact, as. 3.5 million Russian tour- ship has largely withstood those tests.

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A Turkish Navy cost guard boat escorts the Russian Navy At least on the Russian side, there is and India in Asia. It also seeks histori- destroyer Smetlivy in the Bosphorus in a tendency to respect Turkey’s inter- cal reconciliation with newly import- Istanbul. ests and hear its views out, even when ant neighbors, such as Poland. Clear- REUTERS/ they are not in sink Russia’s. ly, Turkey finds itself in the group of Murad Sezer Moscow’s priority partners and rela- The key to understanding this phe- tions with it are no longer subsumed nomenon lies in the post-Cold War, within Russia’s relations with the post-imperial nature of Moscow’s for- West. There are no illusions about An- eign policy. Unlike the Soviet Union, kara in Moscow, but no deep-seated the Russian Federation does not as- phobias either. The Turkish perspec- pire to control or dominate others, tive on the long-unfriendly imperial/ however it strongly rejects the pres- Soviet Russia may be somewhat dif- ence of the U.S. power too close to its ferent, but Moscow appears ready to borders. From the mid-1990s, it has start dealing with Turkey not merely committed itself to the concept of a as a trading nation, but also as a geo- multipolar world and an indepen- political partner in the shared neigh- dent-minded and assertive Turkey borhood of Western Asia. fully fits within this policy. To create a more stable international environ- ment in the multipolar setting, Russia Regional Security Issues reaches out to partners who are strong in Russo-Turkish Relations and sufficiently independent as well as economically attractive, such as Ger- There is no shortage of issues to be many and France in Europe, or China dealt with jointly in the region, but

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tus; fear of an Arab Spring coming to Moscow; and simply by a penchant to When the Russians act as a spoiler to damage U.S. and its look at Syria at the allies’ interests anywhere in the world beginning of 2013, if possible. Such a set of interests and positions would of course preclude they are focused cooperation between Ankara and not so much on the Moscow. survival of the Assad In a deeper analysis, Russia’s stance regime as on the “Day on Syria is based, above all, on its After,” which appears leaders’ largely traditional view of the global order. From the Russian per- to them as a huge spective, a regime change from the bloodbath and utter outside is destabilizing; involvement chaos in other people’s civil wars should be avoided as counter-productive; and international military intervention is a measure of last resort, requiring an approval by the United Nations Secu- there are clear differences in ap- rity Council (i.e., Russia itself) which proaches, creating obstacles to co- should sanction the use of force, set operation. On Syria and the Arab parameters for such use, and monitor Awakening more broadly, Moscow’s and control the military operation. and Ankara’s views and policies ap- The experience with the NATO-led pear to differ fundamentally. Since the intervention in Libya in 2011, which beginning of the anti-Assad uprising Russia had initially decided not to in 2011, Russia has been portrayed in oppose but then saw it going well be- the Western, Arab, and Turkish me- yond its humanitarian mandate into dia as an ally of Damascus. By con- a regime change, weighs heavily in trast, Ankara, which had opened up Russian considerations of how to pro- to Syria in the mid-2000s and in 2011 ceed on Syria. While Turkey would unsuccessfully sought to persuade take a view of humanitarian interven- President Bashar al-Assad to accede tion much closer to that of the United to the opposition’s demands. How- States and Europe than to Russia’s, a ever, Turkey soon gave up hope and better understanding of Russia’s mo- then turned into a leading interna- tivations would help in looking for tional opponent of the Syrian regime. opportunities for cooperation. In Turkey, as in much of the rest of the world, Russia’s behavior has been Moscow’s other concern is with the often explained by an interest to keep nature of the Arab Awakening itself, its “last remaining ally in the Middle which Russian officials and most -ex East;” protect the arms deals with Da- perts view as essentially a series of mascus and the naval facility at Tar- popular uprisings leading to further

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Islamization of the Arab world’s pol- both could be looking towards the fu- itics. They also see the process as ex- ture, to the time when the realities on tremely chaotic and favoring extrem- the ground would make internation- ist groups, including those tied to Al al peacemaking efforts in Syria both Qaeda, over the moderates. While necessary and productive. Moscow has withdrawn from geopo- litical competition in the Middle East Elsewhere in the Arab world, Rus- since the time of the first Gulf War in sians, who have limited influence, 1990, it is keenly aware of the impact would in principle welcome if other of turbulence in Muslim countries, countries followed Turkey’s political from the Arab world to Afghanistan, model, which has successfully mar- on its near neighbors in Central Asia ried Islam and democracy to produce and the South Caucasus, or its own economic prosperity and social sta- Muslim-populated regions, from the bility. However, Russia appears to be North Caucasus to the Volga. When skeptical as to the likelihood of this the Russians look at Syria at the be- taking place in the near term, in par- ginning of 2013, they are focused not ticularly in the region’s most import- so much on the survival of the Assad ant countries, including Egypt. In regime, which they consider essen- fact, Russians remains doubtful, es- tially doomed, as on the “Day Af- pecially with regard to the countries ter,” which appears to them as a huge where they have been at odds with bloodbath and utter chaos. It is in this the West, such as Libya and Syria. context that Russian and Turkish in- However, they are pragmatic enough terests may meet. to appreciate the opportunities on the ground when those emerge. No mat- For Turkey, as well as for the Gulf ter how much Moscow opposed the monarchies, Europe and the United U.S. invasion of Iraq and how much States, unseating Assad is a first pri- it later sneered at U.S.-led attempts to ority. Once he is deposed, however, bring democracy to Baghdad, it now there may be more of an interest to seeks to expand its energy and arms work toward a negotiated peace be- links with Iraq. tween the Syrian antagonists, who will have replaced the Allawite re- While supporting state sovereignty, gime and formed a new government Russia does not look kindly on sep- by that time. In turn, the Allawites aratism. Abkhazia and South Ossetia will have become the opposition. are two exceptions, due to the very The goal would be to prevent the special circumstances of the sum- worst in Syria and to safely contain mer of 2008. In Moscow’s view, the the conflict within the borders of partitioning of the existing countries this already conflict-ravaged coun- in the region along ethnic or confes- try. When President Putin and Prime sional lines is likely to complicate and Minister Erdogan talked about “new destabilize the situation rather than approaches” toward Syria following lead to lasting solutions. The support their meeting in December 2012,3 of minorities, such as Christians,

44 Insight Turkey FROM DAMASCUS TO KABUL: ANY COMMON GROUND BETWEEN TURKEY AND RUSSIA?

which Moscow has elevated to an ele- is concerned about its missile pro- ment of its foreign policy in the Mid- gram. On both counts, the Russians dle East, does not include supporting have been considerably less alarmist secession. This fully applies to Iraq, than the Americans, and particularly Iran, and Syria – whether the issue is the Israelis, but they share the same Shia vs. Sunni; Azeris vs. Persians; or end goal with them, generally for Arabs/Turks vs. Kurds. While accept- similar reasons. The Russians, howev- ing the autonomous status of Iraqi er, differ from the Americans in their Kurdistan, Moscow has no interest in strategies in dealing with Iran. They supporting Kurdish independence, are cautious with sanctions, which be it in Iraq or elsewhere, and espe- they see as empowering Iran’s ideo- cially by means of armed struggle. In logical hard-liners and undermining the 1990s, it refused to give political its pragmatists, and are completely asylum to the PKK leader Abdullah opposed to military strikes against Ocalan. Iran. They believe that a solution would need to involve respect for Iran, of course, is another historical Iran’s sovereignty, recognition of its empire like Turkey and Russia, only interests, and peaceful nuclear activ- much older. Moscow’s policy toward Iran over the past two decades has been fairly consistent. Russia sees Turkey can materially assist Iran as a regional power and, al- though it does not really enjoy deal- efforts to stabilize “post- ing with Tehran’s theocracy, its basic American” Afghanistan in approach is regime-neutral. Russia cooperation with other regional appreciates the fact that Iran’s revolu- tionary fervor is not directed north- actors ward, it is grateful to the Iranians for their understanding of Moscow’s problems in the North Caucasus ity under international supervision. during the Chechen war, and for their Many elements of that approach were support of the Russian bid to join the present in Ankara’s policies toward Islamic Conference Organization as Iran as recently as 2009. an observer. A decade and a half ago, Russia and Iran successfully managed Turkey’s approach toward Iran has to mediate an end to Tajikistan’s civ- ranged from helping reach an accom- il war – the only post-Soviet conflict modation between Tehran and the in- that has been fully resolved, so far. ternational community on the nucle- In addition, Russia has been selling ar issue to hosting U.S. interceptors to arms to Iran and built a nuclear pow- defend against Iranian missiles. This er station at Bushehr. produced hopes and, later, fears. Of course, Russians realize that the Turk- That said, Moscow is opposed to Iran ish-Iranian relationship goes back becoming a nuclear weapons state and several centuries and is highly com-

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uation in its geopolitical “soft under- Russia and Turkey agree on belly” of Central Asia. The growing flow of drugs from Afghanistan across the importance of the Minsk Central Asia to Russia is already a ma- process, which also involves jor security concern. Russia does not the United States and the have the power or the will to become involved politically or militarily in Europeans, to resolve the Afghanistan and its contribution to conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh economic projects there is likely to be very modest. Moscow, however, is al- through negotiations ready active in a number of regional for a, discussing Afghanistan, from the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza- plex. In the broader regional context, tion to the Collective Security Treaty Turkey and Iran offer the Arab world Organization to the so-called “Quad” two very different political models. consisting of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Their practical policies compete in Tajikistan and Russia. The idea is to a number of places such as Iraq and prevent Afghanistan from either ex- Gaza and openly clash in Syria. Rus- ploding or imploding in the wake of sia, by contrast, has neither resources the Western withdrawal. nor interest to involve itself fully in the complex web of Middle Eastern Turkey as a successful Muslim coun- politics. Moscow will largely watch try, which never sought to dominate Turkish-Iranian rivalry/rapproche- Afghanistan, has unique clout among ment from the sidelines. At the same Afghans. Besides its soft power, it time, it will support moves to reach a has economic interests in Afghan- negotiated solution to the Iranian nu- istan. Turkey can materially assist clear issue and efforts to include Iran efforts to stabilize “post-American” in regional security arrangements. Afghanistan in cooperation with oth- This could be an area of cooperation er regional actors: China, Pakistan, between Russia and Turkey if Ankara India, Iran, and the Central Asian elects to go down that path. states. The Moscow connection will not be the principal one for Ankara On Afghanistan, Russia, like others in Afghanistan, but forming a broad in the neighborhood, is bracing itself regional coalition in support of post- for the consequences of the imminent war rehabilitation of that country is withdrawal of U.S./NATO combat an interest that Turkey and Russia forces from that country. Moscow’s obviously share. main concern is that the end of West- ern military involvement in Afghani- In Central Asia, Russia’s Tur- stan could lead to the resumption of kic-speaking former imperial back- a full-scale domestic conflict and the yard, Moscow and Ankara appear emergence of a radical Islamist re- more as competitors. President Pu- gime, which would destabilize the sit- tin proclaimed the goal of forming a

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Eurasian Economic Union by 2015, Islamists positioning themselves to to which Kazakhstan and possibly exploit any instability to their advan- Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may ac- tage. Rather than jockeying for influ- cede. However, Washington is open- ence in the region, the main outside ly opposing this policy of Eurasian players, including Russia and Turkey, economic integration.4 The countries would be wise to cooperate to bar of Central Asia themselves, which the radicals from implementing their also include Uzbekistan and Turk- project of a “caliphate” in Central menistan, pursue “multi-vector” in- Asia. ternational strategies, in which the relations with the former hegemon The South Caucasus used to be one are balanced by ties with the United of the main battlefields in the long States, China, Europe, India, and of struggle between the Ottoman and course the Muslim world, where they the Romanov empires. In the pro- culturally belong. To local reformists, tracted conflicts in the region, re- Turkey offers an attractive economic, sulting from the break-up of the societal, and political model. To local Soviet Union, Moscow and Ankara nationalists, it is a kindred country. have taken rather opposite positions. To local military forces, it provides an Russia is formally allied to Armenia, alternative to Soviet/Russian patterns guarantees its borders, and keeps of military training and equipment. a military base there, while Tur- key has a quasi-alliance relationship In Central Asia, Turkey has already with Azerbaijan. Following the 2008 joined international competition for war, Russia still has no diplomatic regional influence. Unless Russia relations with Georgia, with which manages to modernize economically Turkey maintains close economic and massively increase its soft power, ties. Meanwhile, Russia has recog- it will see its residual influence de- nized the independence of Georgia’s crease even further. Whatever Rus- breakaway regions of Abkhazia and sia does, however, it is China that is South Ossetia and turned them into likely to be the principal economic de facto protectorates. Ankara has magnet for the region – especially if not followed Moscow’s suit on those developments there run more or less recognitions, but has a clear interest along the same pattern as in the first in Abkhazia, where it has emerged two decades after independence. The as Russia’s one credible competitor third decade, which has just started, for influence. For the Abkhaz, who however, promises important tests. have won independence from Geor- The founding presidents of Central gia and would now want to lessen Asia’s two most important countries, their dependence on Russia, the Tur- Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, 74, and key connection is absolutely key for Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarba- achieving state sovereignty. yev, 72, are nearing the end of their long tenure. Succession in either case Despite this competition, both Rus- may prove to be tricky, with radical sia and Turkey agree on the impor-

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tance of the Minsk process, which also involves the United States and Over the last 20 years, the Europeans, to resolve the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh through Russia and Turkey negotiations. Moscow maintains have advanced from reasonably good relations with Baku confrontation to and Ankara has recently made moves – even if they were eventually scut- something that may tled - toward historical reconcilia- be close to a real tion with Armenia. Turkey’s plan for building stability in the Caucasus, security community presented in the wake of the Rus- so-Georgian war, was appreciated in Moscow as a useful initiative. In the eventuality when the three countries eral security cooperation is assur- of the region – Armenia, Azerbai- ing the security of the 2014 Winter jan and Georgia – have consolidated Olympic Games in Sochi, which their independence, yet have found is directly adjacent to the restless it impossible, so far, to resolve con- North Caucasus. flicts which involve them all, Russia and Turkey have both an interest Finally, Russia has a certain interest and a role in providing security for and a role in Cyprus. The interest is the South Caucasus. Nagorno-Kara- linked to Cyprus’s position as a safe bakh and Abkhazia stand out as two haven for many Russian private busi- main areas of possible Russo-Turkish nesses, seeking to escape domestic interaction. jurisdiction so that they can function more freely. In view of the impor- The North Caucasus is, of course, tance of these interests, the Russian part of the Russian Federation. In the government in 2011-2012 extended 1990s and the early 2000s, Moscow sizeable financial assistance to the was incensed over the indications Republic of Cyprus. In return, the of Turkish support for the Chechen government in Nicosia has become separatist rebels. The Chechen war Moscow’s best advocate in the coun- is long over, but the string of small cils of the European Union. Russia’s ethnic republics between the Black role vis-à-vis Cyprus is further de- Sea and the Caspian remains Rus- fined by its membership in the Unit- sia’s zone of instability. Much of the ed Nations Security Council (UNSC), problem is clearly of domestic ori- which is dealing with the protracted gin, but Moscow is keenly interested conflict that has divided the island. in cooperating with Ankara, to the In any new attempt at resolving the extent possible, in stemming outside Cyprus conflict, Russia will be able to support for and participation in Isla- weigh in through the UNSC and its mist radicals’ activities in the North special relations with the Greek Cy- Caucasus. One obvious area of bilat- priot authorities.

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Conclusion To be up to the task of security-build- ing, the two country’s top leaderships The brief overview suggests that de- need to expand the purview of their spite the very different starting po- bilateral council to address possible sitions and diverging interests on a joint steps to help bring peace and number of issues, Moscow and Anka- strengthen stability in countries of ra have built a generally solid base of the region and resolve decades-old mutual respect that has allowed the conflicts. To operationalize such co- bilateral relationship to leave histor- operation, the bilateral council could ical enmity behind. This is no mean create a working group on regional achievement and is one of the pillars security issues. To give required depth of security and stability in Europe. and breadth to the working group’s ef- Over the last 20 years, Russia and forts, it needs to be assisted by an in- Turkey have advanced from confron- dependent advisory body composed tation to something that may be close of the two countries’ leading experts, to a real security community. The use businesspeople, academics, and prac- of force by either party is no longer titioners. More policy coordination considered as an instrument of policy between the two regional players in bilateral relations. would benefit the two countries and help the people of the region. Now is the time to take another step. Turkey and Russia have a sufficient amount of common ground that war- Endnotes rants closer cooperation on regional 1. Sinan Ulgen. “A Place in the Sun or Fifteen issues. The field for such cooperation Minutes of Fame? Understanding Turkey’s New Foreign Policy.” Carnegie Papers Number 1. Brus- is broad – from the Middle East to sels: Carnegie Europe, December 2010. Afghanistan and from the Caucasus to Cyprus. Both Turkey and Russia 2. For an in-depth discussion of Russia’s post-im- perial foreign policy, see: Dmitri Trenin. Post-Im- will benefit from more security in perium. “A Eurasian Story.” Washington: Carnegie those regions and will suffer from Endowment for International Peace, 2011. instability generated by the regions’ 3. Joint press conference of President Putin and numerous conflicts. In a number of Prime Minister Erdogan, Istanbul, December 3, cases, Moscow’s and Ankara’s ap- 2012. proaches are compatible; in others, 4. Cf. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s re- both would benefit from narrowing marks at the OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Dublin, their differences. December 5, 2012.

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