Report No. DODIG-2021-094
U.S. Department of Defense
InspectorJUNE 18, 2021 General
Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases
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Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases Results in Brief
June 18, 2021 Finding (cont’d) Objective the DoD had processes to maintain the MOA, and report and address joint base concerns, these processes were not The objective of this audit was to determine always followed or effective. Joint base personnel often whether Service Components met the terms identified Service-based decisions, operational differences, outlined in the joint base memorandums of and a DoD‑wide lack of joint base knowledge and operational agreement (MOAs) and whether processes guidance as reasons why MOA terms were not met and as are in place to report and address joint overall program challenges. Also, joint bases did not always base–related concerns. have the resources to meet the performance standards that Background they were evaluated against.
Lack of relevant operating guidance and processes; exclusion Military personnel, civilians, and contractors of joint base consideration in Service processes and decisions; use similar processes to provide common and non-adherence to MOA terms can break down the joint installation support to DoD installations. construct, reducing efficiencies that can be gained from The DoD used the Base Realignment and joint basing. These factors can also hamper relations on the Closure process to realign 26 Service installation and potentially marginalize the input, needs, and installations into 12 joint bases, in part mission of the supported Components. to increase operational readiness and Recommendations to more efficiently support its forces. Lead Components (Service Components responsible for providing installation In part, we recommend that the: support for the entire joint base) at each • Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff, in coordination joint base received resources from the with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), take supported Components at the bases. appropriate action to resolve the disagreements at The lead Components assumed responsibility JB Lewis–McChord. for installation management and for providing • OSD take steps to improve communication on actions support to the entire joint base. We visited to improve the oversight of and adherence to joint base three joint bases where the Army, Navy, processes and requirements. and Air Force are each designated as a lead Component: Joint Base (JB) • Service Vice Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Lewis ‑McChord, JB Anacostia–Bolling, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the OSD, andB J Elmendorf‑Richardson. ensure relationships between joint base and Service Finding policies are clearly defined, and address concerns on joint base operations and potential conflicts in the MOA.
Lead Components at JB Lewis–McChord, JB Anacostia–Bolling, and JB Elmendorf– Richardson did not always meet minimum performance standards or other terms specified in the MOA. In addition, while
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Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases Results in Brief
Management Comments and Our Response are unresolved. We are requesting additional comments and documentation from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment and the Vice Chiefs of Staff of The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense the Army, Air Force, and Navy to address the actions for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties they will take to fully implement the intent of these of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment; four recommendations. the Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding Finally, we added one recommendation to the Joint for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; the Deputy Base Commander, JB Lewis–McChord, as a result of Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force management comments, requesting that the Commander Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of work with the Joint Management Oversight Structure to the Air Force; and the Commander, Navy Installations determine whether a policy variance is needed to permit Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval the dual-hatting of the deputy commander position. Operations, either agreed with the recommendations Therefore, we are requesting comments on this new or agreed to take actions that addressed the intent recommendation. of 8 of the 12 recommendations. Therefore, these recommendations are resolved but will remain Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page open. They also agreed to take action on 4 of for the status of recommendations. the 12 recommendations, but the actions described in their comments do not fully address the intent of the recommendations; therefore, these recommendations
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Recommendations Table Recommendations Recommendations Recommendations Management Unresolved Resolved Closed Assistant Secretary of Defense for 4.c, 4.d 4.a, 4.b None Sustainment Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for None 2 None Real Property 1.a, 1.b, 3.a, 3.c, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army 3.b, 3.d None 3.e Vice Chief of Naval Operations 3.b, 3.d 3.a, 3.c, 3.e None 1.a, 1.b, 3.a, 3.c, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force 3.b, 3.d None 3.e Commander, Joint Base Lewis–McChord 5 None None
Please provide Management Comments by July 19, 2021. Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.
• Unresolved – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
• Resolved – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
• Closed – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.
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INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500
June 18, 2021
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
SUBJECT: Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases (Report No. DODIG-2021-094)
This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General’s audit. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management’s comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These commen its ar ncluded in the report.
The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force; and the Commander, Navy Installations Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, either agreed with the recommendations or agreed to take actions that addressed the intent of 8 of the 12 recommendations. Therefore, these recommendations are resolved but will remain open. The responding officials also agreed to take action on 4 of the 12 recommendations, but the actions described in their comments do not fully address the intent of the recommendations; therefore, these recommendations are unresolved. The remaining recommendation was added to the report in response to management comments received on the draft report, and is therefore unresolved.
Therefore, as described in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, all 13 recommendations (resolved and unresolved) remain open. Please provide us within 90 days your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the 8 resolved recommendations. We will track the 5 unresolved recommendations until an agreement is reached on the actions you will take to address the recommendations, and you have submitted adequate documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions are completed. DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the unresolved recommendations.
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Send your responses to the resolved recommendations to either [email protected] if unclassified or [email protected] if classified SECRET. Send your responses to the unresolved recommendations to either [email protected] if unclassified or if classified SECRET. If you have any questions, please contact me at , .
Richard B. Vasquez Assistant Inspector General for Audit Readiness and Global Operations
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Contents Introduction
...... Objective 1 ...... Background 1 ...... ReviewFindin ofg. Internal Joint Controls Base Program Processes Require 7 Clarification and Revision ...... 8 Service Components Did Not Always Comply With Terms Established in the ...... Joint Base MOA, or Maintain the Agreement 8 Service Decisions and Differences, and a Lack of Joint Base Awareness, Consideration, and Operational Guidance Across the DoD Limited the ...... Ability to Comply With Joint Base MOAs 20 ...... OSD and Service-Level Decisions and Actions Impact Joint Base Operations 27 Management Actions Taken to Address Disagreement on Support to ...... Marine Corps Detachment at JB Anacostia–Bolling 28 ...... Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response 28 ...... AppendixRecommendations,es Management Comments, and Our Response 28
...... Appendix A. Scope and Methodology 45 ...... Use of Computer-Processed Data 47 ...... Prior Coverage 48 ...... Appendix B. BRAC-Designated Joint Bases and Components 50 ...... Appendix C. Installation Support Functions 51 ...... ManagementAppendix D. JMOS Roles Comments and Responsibilities 53
...... Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment 55 ...... Department of the Army 59 ...... Department of the Navy 70 ...... Department of the Air Force 73 ...... AcronymsU.S. Marine Corps and Abbreviations 74 ...... 77 FORDRAFT OFFICIAL REPORTFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYFORCUI Law OFFICIALUSE Enforcement ONLY USE ONLYSensitive vii
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Introduction Objective
The objective of this audit was to determine whether Service Components met the terms outlined in the joint base memorandums of agreement (MOAs) and whether processes are in place to report and address joint base–related concerns. See Appendix A for a discussion of the scope, methodology, and prior audit coverage. Background Joint Basing Overview
DoD installations employ military personnel, civilians, and contractors to perform common installation support functions, such as financial management, custodial services, grounds maintenance, law enforcement services, and physical security patrols. All installations execute these functions using relatively similar processes. The DoD used the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process to reorganize its installation infrastructure to more efficiently support its forces, increase operational readiness, and facilitate new ways of doing business. The joint basing program, established as part of the 2005 BRAC, represents the DoD’s efforts to improve the delivery of installation support across the Services by realigning 1 26 Service installations into 12 joint bases, based in part on geographic proximity. The 2005 BRAC recommendation designated the lead Component (Service Component responsible for providing installation support for the entire joint base) and the supported Components (Service Components transferring resources and responsibility for installation2 management functions to the lead Component) at each of the 12 joint bases. See Table 1 for the 12 joint bases and Appendix B for the 12 joint bases and the Component designations established by BRAC Recommendation 146.
1 While identifying efficiencies was a consideration of the 2005 BRAC process, the mission capabilities and readiness impact of the BRAC recommendations was the top priority. Joint basing is covered under BRAC Recommendation 146. The 12 joint bases established by BRAC Recommendation 146 include Joint Region Marianas, which is a joint region and varies slightly from the construct of a joint base. We use the term “joint bases” to describe all 12 installations. 2 In addition to the lead and supported Components (MOA signatories identified in BRAC Recommendation 146), tenants and other supported Components also reside on a joint installation. Tenants (like non-DoD organizations, DoD agencies, and DoD activities) are exempt from joint basing and are serviced by the lead Component through a traditional host‑tenant support agreement. Other supported Components (Military Department organizations not specifically identified in the BRAC language) transferred resources to the lead Component in exchange for support, and are classified as part of the lead or supported Component under the MOA. Our review does not include host-tenant support agreements.
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Table 1. Joint Bases
Joint Base Names and Locations Joint Base (JB) Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, Washington Washington, D.C. JB Andrews–Naval Air Facility JB Myer–Henderson Hall, Virginia Washington, Maryland JB Charleston, South Carolina JB McGuire–Dix–Lakehurst, New Jersey JB Elmendorf–Richardson, Alaska JB Pearl Harbor–Hickam, Hawaii Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek– Joint Region Marianas, Guam Fort Story, Virginia JB Langley–Eustis, Virginia JB San Antonio, Texas Source: The DoD OIG.
Aligned under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Real Property (DASD[Real
Property]) is responsible,3 in part, for DoD infrastructure and basing, including joint base program oversight. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Joint Basing Office reports to DASD(Real Property), and is the action office that oversees the Jointjoint basing Base program. Implementation
The OSD issued the Joint Base Implementation Guidance (JBIG) on January 22, 2008, to establish a comprehensive framework of joint basing procedures (the JBIG was amended on July 1, 2010). The JBIG establishes roles, responsibilities, and a governance structure; defines installation support functions; and describes other unique joint base requirements, such as the transfer of total obligation authority (budget authority granted [or requested] from Congress for a given fiscal year) and real property, personal property, and plant equipment from the supported Component to the lead Component. Multiple OSD and Service organizations participated in working groups to help develop the joint base framework, or to issue supplements to the JBIG to further develop certain topics discussed in the implementation guidance. The JBIG supplemental guidance covers topics like the development and use of a standard MOA template to document joint base agreements; the transfer and performance of command authorities; the transfer, acceptance, management, and accountability of real property; and details surrounding a specific functional support area. OSD organizations issued the
3 The OSD office overseeing the joint basing program has undergone three realignments—formerly the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment (DUSD[I&E]), followed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment (ASD[EI&E]) and within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment.
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JBIG supplemental guidance for program areas under their authority (such as the military personnel services [MILPERS] supplement issued4 by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness). Joint basing policy and guidance provide unique operating instructions for the joint bases, and supersede Service policy. However, where there is no joint base guidance or policy, the lead Component’s Service policies and procedures are followed.
The JBIG and its supplemental guidance identified the types of support and resources transferred5 to the joint base and those that remained with the supported Component. For example, civilians who performed covered installation support functions under the supported Component transferred to the lead Component. In addition, supported Components maintain responsibility for their mission‑related functions and positions, as well as for the command and control over their Service members. Military personnel who perform installation support are not transferred to the lead Component, but instead can be embedded into the joint base to provide the supported Components’ fair share of resources. The joint base commander provides embedded military personnel with day-to-day direction, which is limited Memorandumsto the control necessary of Agreementto accomplish installation support.
The Joint Base Partnership Council must develop and maintain a MOA between the lead and supported6 Components identified in BRAC Recommendation 146 for each joint base. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the Vice Chief of Staff of the
Air Force, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the Assistant Commandant of the7 Marine Corps approve each MOA on behalf of the identified Service Components. In 2008, the OSD issued a supplement to the JBIG that provided Components with a standardized MOA template and additional details on how to develop the joint base agreement.
According to the MOA template, MOAs must, at a minimum, define financial arrangements, installation support responsibilities, financial and performance reporting requirements, dispute resolution procedures, disposition of assets other than real property, and other relevant issues. The lead and supported Components cannot modify the standardized MOA template or its language, unless 4 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness memorandum, “Department of Defense Supplemental Guidance for Implementing and Operating a Joint Base,” April 24, 2008 (MILPERS supplemental guidance). The OSD issued clarifying and supplemental guidance to this memorandum in May, June, and October of 2009. 5 Supported Components transferred all the resources, contracts and other support agreements, real property, civilian personnel, and authorities for the installation support functions to the lead Component. 6 The JBIG defines the Joint Base Partnership Council as the local leadership group at the joint base responsible for overall implementation of joint base guidance. The council is chaired by the joint base commander and includes representation from the lead and supported Components and the major tenants on the joint base. The council is the first of six tiers in the DoD’s overall governance structure for the joint base program. 7 Unless otherwise noted, we will refer to the MOA signatories as the Service Vice Chiefs of Staff.
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specifically prompted to by the template to incorporate things like attachments or other supplemental information (that is required by OSD guidance), or approved deviations, variances, or other agreements to clarify Components’ responsibilities
(approved through the Joint Management8 Oversight Structure [JMOS], the governing body over the joint base program).
Joint base MOAs are not designed to be all-inclusive documents; this provides joint base personnel with flexibility needed to perform duties in a changing environment. However, this flexibility sometimes requires Service coordination and action outside of the MOA to ensure joint base personnel can successfully and Installationefficiently provide Support installation Functions support and and meet Performance agreed-upon terms. Metrics
The MOA outlines the 44 installation support functions established in the JBIG that lead Components must provide to supported Components. These support functions include a wide variety of support, like grounds maintenance, legal support, emergency management, and utilities, and are arranged into 12 functional categories. See Appendix C for a full list of the 44 installation support functions, by functional category.
The DoD established minimum performance standards, known as joint base common output level standards (JB-COLS), using a common framework of definitions, outputs, output performance metrics, and cost drivers for 40 of the4 4 installation support functions. JB-COLS are used by the DoD to measure the level of installation support provided across the joint bases, assess compliance
with the MOA, and help equalize differences9 between the levels of installation support typically provided by the Services. Joint base MOAs commit the lead Component to deliver installation support to these approved output standards; any changes related to the level of responsibilities outlined in the MOA must be approved through the JMOS.
8 Deviations are formal joint base requests to provide and measure installation support at a different level than the established performance standard. Variances are formal requests to diverge from the requirements specified in the JBIG and other supplemental guidance, including the joint base organizational structure and alignment, real property transfers, and the non-transfer of installation support functions or other responsibilities that are typically required to be transferred. The JMOS decision chain consists of six formal tiers, with representation ranging from the lead and supported Components on the installation, to the Services’ regional and headquarters-level offices and the OSD. Further details on the JMOS can be found on the next page of the report and in Appendix D. 9 When defining the JB-COLS, the DoD selected the highest performance standard used by any of the Services as the single, joint base standard to provide and measure installation support. Ideally, this would help ensure that a supported Component received installation support that at least met its own Service standards. Within the JMOS, the Installations Capabilities Council established the JB-COLS, and oversees and approves any changes or departures to the standards. As of July 2020, joint base performance is measured against 246 JB-COLS for 40 of the 44 installation support functions. Performance is measured against the lead Component’s Service standards for the four remaining functions (environmental restoration, facilities demolition, facilities new construction, and readiness engineering services).
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The Cost Performance Visibility Framework (CPVF) is a web-based reporting tool managed by the OSD Joint Basing Office that joint base personnel use to report on the extent their JB-COLS are met. The CPVF links resources to performance, provides visibility and transparency throughout the JMOS, and supports decision makers in their assessment of efficiencies, successes, and challenges related to the joint base program. Joint bases report performance information two times a year to the OSD Joint Basing Office through the JMOS. Reporting covers the 40 installation support functions with assigned JB-COLS, for a fiscal year’s second and fourth quarter reporting periods. The CPVF also provides visibility into manpower and cost information, which each joint base reports on annually during Governancethe fourth quarter Structure, reporting period Dispute for all Resolution, 44 installation and support MOA functions. Update Processes
The JBIG established the JMOS to provide the governing framework over joint basing to justify and approve variances to policies, review and approve changes to the MOA and JB-COLS, ensure Component interests are represented, resolve disputes at the lowest echelon, and provide oversight over compliance with the MOA. The JMOS decision chain consists of six formal tiers, with representation ranging from the lead and supported Components to the OSD and Service‑level headquarters, which work together to help ensure fairness. Proposed changes to the MOA and unresolved joint base disputes enter the JMOS at the lowest, installation-level tier, known as Joint Base Partnership Council, and are subsequently forwarded through the higher tiers for additional review and approval, as necessary. See Appendix D for a summary of the roles and participants for each of the six JMOS tiers.
Although the lead or supported Component may propose additional reviews of the joint base agreement at any time, the MOA requires that, at a minimum, the Joint Base Partnership Council review the MOA in its entirety every 3 years, as well as annually to identify mission, manpower, and financial impacts and to ensure installation support functions are performed to the agreed-upon levels. The annual reviews include information collected and reported in the CPVF. In April 2010, the OSD issued a memorandum outlining the types of changes10 that can be made to a MOA and the processes used to formalize those changes. Proposed MOA changes are processed through the JMOS. Minor and administrative changes, like corrections to the MOA’s personal property and plant equipment inventory list, can be reviewed and approved at the installation level by the Joint Base Partnership 10 DUSD(I&E) memorandum, “Business Rules for Processing and Approving Joint Base Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) Changes,” April 12, 2010 (April 2010 Business Rules Memorandum). The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment issued additional guidance related to this memorandum on January 3, 2019.
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Council. All significant proposed changes to the MOA, such as altered text or changed conditions that result in a change of responsibilities, must be submitted for JMOS consideration and be approved by the structure’s third tier, the Senior
Installations Management Group, which11 will then determine and route the proposed Jointchange Basesto the final Visited signature authority.
Each of the 12 joint bases have unique considerations and concerns—like those related to an installation’s size or geographic area, the number and proximity of locations making up the joint installation, or the types and range of missions performed on an installation. To ensure our review identified common challenges that exist within the program, we visited three joint bases where the Army, Navy, and Air Force are each designated as the lead Service Component
responsible for providing installation support: Joint12 Base (JB) Lewis–McChord, JB Anacostia‑Bolling, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson. Our report highlights only some of the common challenge areas observed during the audit. Therefore, these installations may face additional challenges or circumstances that we did not cover in this report. The challenges discussed in this report could also impact the remaining nine installations that we did not visit. JB Anacostia–Bolling
JB Anacostia–Bolling was initially established as a Navy-led installation by combining Naval Support Facility Anacostia and Bolling Air Force Base, which shared a common boundary. However, in October 2020, the Navy transferred its lead Component responsibilities at JB Anacostia–Bolling to the Air Force. To prepare for the Service transfer, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and Air Force Vice Chief of Staff approved a revised MOA in June 2020 that details the Components’ new relationship and responsibilities, and provides the framework for the planned October 2020 through October 2022 transfer of personnel, property, resources, and authorities. The Navy plans to fully transfer 39 installation support functions to the Air Force, remain responsible for 3 functions, and be partially responsible for 2 functions.
11 According to the April 2010 Business Rules Memorandum, significant changes include, but are not limited to: additions, deletions, or modifications to the MOA text (including the implementation plan and annexes); changed conditions that result in a change of responsibilities; changes in resourcing or manpower transfer requirements; and new or changes to existing variances and deviations proposed by the joint base. 12 The Navy and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff approved a modified joint base MOA on June 24, 2020, after we completed the majority of the audit fieldwork, to account for the transfer in lead Service at JB Anacostia–Bolling. As a result, our report discusses JB Anacostia–Bolling as a Navy-led installation, but recommendations concerning the installation reflect the change in lead Component to the Air Force.
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JB Anacostia–Bolling, located in southwest Washington, D.C., spans approximately 1,018 acres and is a center for Air Force and Navy ceremonial support. The joint base command is responsible for providing installation support to a workforce of 17,000 military and civilian personnel that represent the military and Federal agencies operating on the installation. JB Lewis–McChord
JB Lewis–McChord, an Army-led installation, was established by combining Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base, which shared a common boundary. JB Lewis–McChord spans approximately 90,283 acres in western Washington State. The joint base also includes the Yakima Training Center, which is located 168 miles away from the installation and encompasses over 323,431 acres to train DoD forces. The joint base command is responsible for providing installation support to a workforce of 54,000 military and civilian personnel that represent the military and Federal agencies operating on the installation. JB Elmendorf–Richardson
JB Elmendorf–Richardson, an Air Force-led installation, was established by combining Elmendorf Air Force Base and Fort Richardson, which shared a common boundary. JB Elmendorf–Richardson spans approximately 80,000 acres in south‑central Alaska, over half of which is designated as training grounds. The joint base command is responsible for providing installation support to a workforce of 15,218 military and civilian personnel that represent the military and Federal agencies operating on the installation. Review of Internal Controls
DoD Instruction 5010.40 requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs13 are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. We identified internal control weaknesses related to the compliance and execution of joint base MOAs and the processes used to report and address joint base concerns. We will provide a copy of the final report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in the DASD(Real Property), Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and Department of the Air Force.
13 DoD Instruction 5010.40, “Managers’ Internal Control Program Procedures,” May 30, 2013.
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Finding Joint Base Program Processes Require Clarification and Revision
At the three joint bases we visited (JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson), installation personnel did not always meet the minimum performance standards or other terms specified in the MOA. In addition, while the DoD had processes to maintain the MOA, and report and address joint base-related concerns, these processes were not always followed or effective.
Joint base personnel often identified Service-based decisions and operational differences, and a DoD-wide lack of joint base knowledge and operational guidance as reasons why MOA terms were not met and as overall program challenges. Furthermore, joint bases did not always have the resources to meet the performance standards that they were evaluated against. Finally, existing DoD processes to maintain the MOA and resolve installation concerns were sometimes cumbersome, untimely, and unclear.
Service-based decisions can impact how a joint installation operates. Lack of relevant operating guidance and processes; exclusion of joint base consideration in Service processes and decisions; and non-adherence to MOA terms can inhibit joint base operations and break down the joint construct and reduce the efficiencies that can be gained from joint basing. These factors can also hamper relations on the installation, and potentially marginalize the input, needs, and mission of the supported Components. Service Components Did Not Always Comply With Terms Established in the Joint Base MOA, or Maintain the Agreement
Personnel at all three bases we visited did not always comply with the terms established in the joint base MOAs. Specifically, personnel at the three installations did not always meet the minimum performance standards outlined in the MOA for covered support functions. In addition, personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling and JB Lewis–McChord executed support inconsistent with the joint base organization and responsibilities specified in the MOA and joint base program guidance. Furthermore, personnel at these two joint bases did not follow established procedures to modify the agreement with significant changes approved by the JMOS before implementing them.
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Joint Base Personnel Did Not Always Meet Minimum Performance Standards Required by the MOA
Personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson did not always meet the minimum performancePersonnel standards atspecified the three in the installations JB‑COLS when executing installation support reported that the decisions made under the MOA. Personnel at the and actions taken by higher three installations reported that the Service-level offices were a major decisions made and actions taken by reason why they did not meet higher Service-level offices were a the standards. major reason why they did not meet the standards. On average, joint base personnel across the DoD aggregately reported meeting at least 82 percent or more of the JB-COLS for 10 functional categories, and cited the most difficulty with meeting the standards for the remaining 2 categories, facilities investment14 and MILPERS (met 49 percent and 64 percent of the JB-COLS, respectively). Joint base personnel met some but15 not all of the JB-COLS for the 12 functional categories across the 12 installations. Common Reasons Cited in the CPVF for Unmet Performance Standards
Personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson cited funding and manpower constraints and higher Service-level actions as some of the primary reasons for not16 meeting the JB-COLS for facilities investment and MILPERS-related functions. Other reasons commonly reported in the CPVF included personnel turnover and new hire inexperience, incorrect or untimely closeout of service work, and Service members’ late submission of paperwork needed to process their orders.
For example, personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson reported that their ability to meet the JB-COLS was limited by: • a lack of resources to sustain installation facilities (like the manpower levels needed to consistently perform lower-priority work, such as routine repairs and maintenance, and funding to purchase needed supplies and critical long-lead parts); 14 CPVF data, as reported and modified by the OSD Joint Basing Office. Values are based on rounded, aggregate totals for all 12 joint bases; actual amounts reported in the CPVF for a single installation may differ. 15 CPVF data, as reported and modified by the OSD Joint Basing Office for the fourth quarter reporting period for FY 2015 to FY 2017. 16 Rationale reported in the CPVF for the three installations, covering the FY 2015 to FY 2018 (through the second quarter) reporting periods.
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• factors unrelated to the joint base construct (like Service-wide personnel shortages, hiring freezes, or manning reductions stemming from the Federal budget sequestration or a lack of funding due to continuing resolutions); and • time frames of higher Service-level offices to complete actions that were needed by base personnel to execute support (like releasing short-notice assignments, processing paperwork needed to generate enlisted orders, or resolving technical difficulties with a new personnel system and its associated evaluation forms).
Joint base personnel explained that there are no repercussions for unmet JB-COLS, and that the reporting of performance standards and other metrics into the CPVF is a time-consuming process that rarely results in additional benefits or resources to the installation. For example, an official tasked with preparing the annual CPVF manpower reports at JB Elmendorf–Richardson stated that she must first assess the Service-unique classifications of over 3,000 positions on the installation, then reorganize them under position categories set by the OSD for CPVF reporting purposes. The official explained that the Services do not track data based on the OSD categories, yet existing guidance requires that she use the categories to describe the workforce, regardless of whether the positions actually exist on the installation. In addition, she stated that usefulness of the manpower data submitted to OSD is further limited because it is only a snapshot in time and does Jointnot always Base reflect Personnel the actual Did manpower Not Always levels or breakoutsExecute onOther the base. Terms Required by the MOA Personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling and JB Lewis–McChord executed Personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling support inconsistent with the joint and JB Lewis–McChord executed base organization and responsibilities support inconsistent with the specified in the MOA and outlined in joint base organization and joint base program guidance. responsibilities specified in the MOA and outlined in joint base program guidance. MOAs define the terms of relationships agreed to between the lead and supported Components. MOAs also include separate annexes for functional support categories and other joint base aspects (like command authority, real property, resource transfers, and the joint base organizational structure), to further define Component responsibilities, roles, and other supplemental information. Through the MOA, lead Components agree to plan, program, budget, and execute budgetary resources for the transferred support functions and real property (except modernization and new mission requirements) to support the missions of all DoD Components and FORDRAFT OFFICIAL REPORTFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYFORCUI Law OFFICIALUSE Enforcement ONLY USE ONLYSensitive 10
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17 agencies on the installation. Unless an approved variance or deviation applies, the lead Component is required to execute installation support tasks18 for all transferred functions, in accordance with the MOA and program guidance. JB Anacostia-Bolling Personnel Did Not Always Perform Responsibilities Outlined in the MOA to Plan and Provide for Common Installation Support
JB Anacostia–Bolling personnel did not always adhere to the responsibilities outlined in the MOA to plan and provide for common installation support when the functional support responsibilities under airfield operations (an installation support function outlined in Annex Q-1 of the MOA) overlapped with the 19 responsibilities to provide support under the MOA’s other covered functions. While the MOA did not cite any variances that specified installation support responsibilities retained by supported Military Department organizations on the installation, joint base personnel acknowledged that common support tasks for airfield operations (like hangar sustainment and repair, perimeter lighting, and aircraft ground services) had not always been budgeted,20 planned, or executed to support a Marine Corps detachment on the installation. Joint base personnel explained that this gap in support resulted from interpretive differences over Annex Q-1’s supplemental information on Component responsibilities between officials from the installation’s21 public works department and the Marine Corps Installations Command. Joint base personnel believed the MOA excluded them from providing any airfield operations support to the detachment (since this installation support function was also considered a mission function), whereas Marine Corps officials believed that certain support tasks still applied.
While the DoD did not intend for the common delivery of installation support at joint bases to impact the command and control of mission functions or the operating activities of either Component, the lead Component could still be 17 Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) memorandum, “Issuance of the Resources Management Supplemental Guidance for Implementing and Operating a Joint Base,” April 17, 2008 (personnel and financial resources management supplemental guidance). OSD modified this guidance on February 6, 2009, to clarify and modify the functional transfer budget exhibit that was used to identify personnel and financial resources for covered installation support functions. 18 Mission-funded support was not exempt from transfer, but could be retained by the supported Component through deviations and variances, which must be specifically approved by DoD leadership and documented in the MOA. 19 Annex Q covers operational mission services, and consists of airfield operations (Annex Q-1), port services (Annex Q-2), and small arms range management (Annex Q-3). The JBIG defines airfield operations and arranges support into three functional subgroups—airfield support, airfield systems and equipment maintenance, and aircraft services. Covered support includes air traffic control, weather services, airfield management services, maintenance of airfield and air traffic control systems and equipment, and aircraft ground services. 20 The Marine Corps detachment is classified as an “other supported” Component on the installation, receiving support through the Navy and Air Force signed MOA. 21 The Joint Base Partnership Council included other agreements within Annex Q-1 to provide additional information on the Components’ responsibilities regarding airfield operations. The supplemental information stated that installation support did not include operation of the heliport located within a Marine Corps detachment’s enclave because it was operated exclusively by the detachment to support its mission.
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responsible for providing support if the responsibilities of a mission function overlapped with those of another installation support function that the lead Personnel at JB Lewis–McChord did Component was still responsible for, such as the upkeep and management of not adhere to the MOA’s joint base facilities (facilities operation and facilities investment functions outlined in organizational structure, or to the command Annex B and D of the joint base MOA). During the joint base transition (and authorities and responsibilities outlined unless an exception applied), supported Components transferred ownership of in program guidance and agreed to by the all their facilities, like installation support facilities, common infrastructure, Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff. and mission-based facilities, to the lead Component as part of the real property transfer. Since a facility now appeared on the property books for the lead Component’s Service and increased that Service’s budget authorization, it became the lead Component’s responsibility to sustain it (regardless of the facility’s use designation). For example, airfield operations support under the MOA, Annex Q-1, includes things like perimeter lighting, airfield repair, aircraft ground services (such as sweeping and snow operations), and hanger sustainment and repair. These functions can overlap with: • pavement clearance services and utilities functions under the MOA, Annex B (facilities operation support), and • sustainment efforts for all facilities—including the buildings, pavements, and lighting located on an airfield, under the MOA, Annex D (facilities investment support).
The public works officer at JB Anacostia–Bolling stated that the interpretive differences between his department and the Marine Corps had resulted in inconsistent support to the detachment. He explained that the Commander, Navy Installations Command funded a base operating support contract to augment support to the detachment but noted that any needed repair item over $2,500 must be funded through the installation’s local sustainment funds, which are insufficient to cover both the Marine Corps enclave and the installation. He explained that the public works department still tries to provide some airfield operations functions to the detachment, but since the funds are coming out of local sustainment funds, it is at the expense of base installation support and other mission areas.
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JB Lewis–McChord Personnel Did Not Comply With the responsible for providing support if the responsibilities of a mission function Established Joint Base Structure overlapped with those of another installation support function that the lead Personnel at JB Lewis–McChord did Component was still responsible for, such as the upkeep and management of Personnel at JB Lewis–McChord not adhere to the MOA’s joint base facilities (facilities operation and facilities investment functions outlined in did not adhere to the MOA’s organizational structure, or to the command Annex B and D of the joint base MOA). During the joint base transition (and joint base organizational authorities and responsibilities outlined unless an exception applied), supported Components transferred ownership of structure, or to the in program guidance and agreed to by the all their facilities, like installation support facilities, common infrastructure, command authorities and Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff. and mission-based facilities, to the lead Component as part of the real property responsibilities outlined transfer. Since a facility now appeared on the property books for the lead in program guidance and Component’s Service and increased that Service’s budget authorization, it became agreed to by the Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff. When joint basing was the lead Component’s responsibility to sustain it (regardless of the facility’s use first established, the OSD outlined the roles and responsibilities of the joint base designation). For example, airfield operations support under the MOA, Annex Q-1, commander and the deputy joint base commander in the JBIG, JBIG supplemental includes things like perimeter lighting, airfield repair, aircraft ground services guidance, and the standardized MOA template. The OSD dedicated these positions (such as sweeping and snow operations), and hanger sustainment and repair. to the delivery of installation support at the joint base. Joint bases are required to These functions can overlap with: establish these leadership positions within the joint base organizational structure • pavement clearance services and utilities functions under the MOA, depicted in the MOA. A member of the lead Component fills the joint base Annex B (facilities operation support), and commander position. He or she is considered to be the installation commander, • sustainment efforts for all facilities—including the buildings, pavements, with the authority and control over the real property making up the joint base. and lighting located on an airfield, under the MOA, Annex D (facilities The joint base commander has responsibility for installation management and investment support). support functions on the joint base. The deputy joint base commander position is filled by a member of the supported Component. The deputy commander serves The public works officer at JB Anacostia–Bolling stated that the interpretive as second in command to the joint base commander, assisting in the planning, differences between his department and the Marine Corps had resulted in management, and delivery of installation support. The deputy commander is also inconsistent support to the detachment. He explained that the Commander, Navy the senior supported Component commander for the command authorities retained22 Installations Command funded a base operating support contract to augment by the supported Component, as outlined in Annex A of the joint base MOA. support to the detachment but noted that any needed repair item over $2,500 must be funded through the installation’s local sustainment funds, which are insufficient The JB Lewis–McChord MOA established the two leadership positions within the to cover both the Marine Corps enclave and the installation. He explained that the joint base command organization, giving command authority and responsibility public works department still tries to provide some airfield operations functions to for the transferred support functions to the joint base commander, as required. the detachment, but since the funds are coming out of local sustainment funds, it is However, while no variances were documented in the MOA to permit deviation at the expense of base installation support and other mission areas. from the joint base structure or to the program’s implementing guidance, the deputy joint base commander’s responsibilities also included functions to support the Air Force mission. In addition, the joint base commander and deputy joint base commander positions were renamed to joint base garrison commander and deputy joint base garrison commander (which are not outlined in the MOA or in joint base implementing guidance), and the joint base commander title, responsibilities and authorities were realigned to a more senior Army mission commander on the installation. 22 In June 2011, the Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff approved a revision to the MOA to clarify the joint base commander’s role in the installation’s command organization. Specifically, the MOA was modified to read “the Army will appoint an officer in the grade of Colonel (O-6) to serve as joint base commander and assume the role of installation commander. As the installation commander, the joint base commander is responsible for providing installation services based on the priorities of the Army and Air Force Senior Service Component Commanders.” FORDRAFT OFFICIAL REPORTFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYFORCUI Law OFFICIALUSE Enforcement ONLY USE ONLSensitiveY 13
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Installation officials explained that this occurred because Service officials opted to follow normal Service structures over those established for joint basing. For example, an official administering the JB Lewis–McChord MOA explained that when the Air Force reorganized its installation workforce in preparation of joint basing, it became apparent that some of the functions performed by Air Force organizations were inherently mission in nature. However, instead of breaking apart the traditional Air Force construct, he explained that the Air Force decided to retain all functional capability under its historical formation, transferring it to the joint base construct. As a result, the deputy joint base commander is responsible
for delivering both installation support, and support typically categorized23 as mission support (like fueling support provided by the logistics squadron).
Although the Army’s regulation on command policy states that the DoD’s program guidance will prevail over conflicts with the regulation, and even acknowledges that senior mission commanders are not always the installation commander at
Army installations, there is still uncertainty within the DoD24 as to who should fill the role of the JB Lewis–McChord installation commander. There are conflicting interpretations at the joint base and within the Army on the MOA requirements regarding the authority of two Army commanders residing on the base, and Federal, OSD, and Army criteria. Some officials believe the position should be filled by a colonel—the Army official who is specifically identified in the MOA—whereas
others believe it should be filled by the senior mission commander,25 the Army official who typically assumes command over Army installations. As a result of the interpretive differences, the senior mission commander assumed the role of installation commander and adopted the typical Army construct at JB Lewis–McChord, delegating some, but not all of the installation commander’s authorities listed in the MOA,Differing back to Servicea colonel. cultures, business processes, and Differing Service cultures, business command and control structures processes, and command and can create unique relationship control structures can create unique challenges at a joint base. relationship challenges at a joint base. The Joint Basing Handbook explains that 23 Usually, the wing that performs the primary mission on an Air Force installation also maintains and operates the base. Installation support is structured similarly to the operational wing organization, where tasks are completed concurrently, and a clear distinction between base and operational mission support tasks may not always exist. 24 DUSD(I&E) memorandum, “Department of Defense Supplemental Guidance for Implementing and Operating a Joint Base,” April 16, 2008 (command authority supplemental guidance), states Service policies govern the appointment and assumption of command within the respective joint base Components. Army Regulation 600-20, “Personnel-General, Army Command Policy” (November 6, 2014). The regulation implements various DoD instructions and directives, and prescribes the policy and responsibility of command. 25 As described in the command authority supplemental guidance, the senior mission commander is typically the installation commander at Army installations. The commander will often delegate authority for installation management and support functions to the garrison commander in order to focus more attention on the mission.
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while installation and mission command organizations, such as a mission support group or a sustainment brigade, may 26intermix at traditional Service installations, they are kept separate at joint bases. This helps ensure no actual or perceived favoritism exists from the installation command to mission commanders from the same Service. However, personnel across the joint base program identified the dual-hatting of commanders and the command authority concerns at JB Lewis–McChord as known and ongoing issues, citing a range of impacts that either have occurred or could occur at the installation, such as: • competing priorities with two separate chains of command over the deputy joint base commander; • an environment permitting the majority of effort to be placed on mission priorities over those of the installation; • outdated or improperly issued installation policies and plans due to postponing needed updates until after the command authority disagreement is resolved, or by having a commander that may not have the proper authority sign and approve them; • degraded relationships and working synergies between the Service Components; and • an actual or perceived lack of impartiality when managing and prioritizing resources and services to support the needs of different or competing missions at the installation.
Installation personnel believed that the OSD Joint Basing Office was slow and did not always take action to address known and ongoing issues or concerns at the installations. To avoid further confusion on command authority, the Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff should coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment to resolve the disagreement of command authority at JB Lewis-McChord. Further, the OSD should keep the joint base community informed of the status of items under JMOS review and any effort to improve the program. JB Lewis–McChord Personnel Disregarded Established Processes in the Transfer and Delivery of Logistics Support Functions
Following a series of Army-wide logistics realignments, personnel tasked as the logistics support provider for JB Lewis–McChord did not adhere to MOA terms covering the transfer and delivery of logistics support. In 2014, the Army and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff approved Change 4 to the joint base MOA to support the Army’s efforts to more effectively align logistics support across the Army. 26 The Joint Basing Handbook, approved by the Service Senior Installation Management Group principals on May 19, 2015, and modified on September 15, 2015.
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The MOA change permitted the realignment and transfer of the installation’s directorate of logistics from the Army Installation Management Command to the
Army Materiel27 Command, which would then transform into a logistics readiness center. The change incorporated the transfer agreement between the two Army Commands into the joint base MOA, and its overarching framework for the delivery and transfer of logistics functions. The logistics organization remained under the operational control of the joint base commander, but was assigned to the Army Materiel Command for the purposes of receiving support, and locally, to the Army Sustainment Command’s 404th Army Field Support Brigade.
In part, the Army Commands agreed that the DoD’s joint base program guidance generally has precedence over Service regulations and instructions, and that the Army Materiel Command would: • comply with the joint base MOA and program guidance (which requires significant changes to be approved by the JMOS and incorporated into the MOA, like those affecting support levels, responsibilities to provide support, resourcing, or manpower), • only use Air Force provided resources for logistics installation support services, • meet all unique support requirements at the installation, • support unique requirements identified by senior Component commanders, and • obtain JMOS approval for any personnel adjustments to the former directorate’s table of distribution and authorities, or changes to the level of support provided.
However, while Change 4 to the JB Lewis–McChord MOA remained in effect, the 404th Army Field Support Brigade stopped following the MOA and program guidance, and began to unilaterally implement an Army Sustainment Command operations order at the joint base to support an Army-wide initiative to centralize and standardize logistics support across its installations. The brigade indicated that functions not meeting the Army definition of installation support would no longer be supported, and either ceased or planned to stop providing certain types of support previously provided under the MOA. The brigade moved to divest operational control of the installation’s logistics readiness center from the joint base commander, and transformed the center into part of, and a subordinate to, the 404th Army Field Support Battalion. Changes to command relationships and the realignment of manpower and other resources were planned or made, without conferring with the Air Force, or properly vetting through and obtaining the JMOS’ approval to make such changes. 27 The Air Force’s 627th Logistics Readiness Squadron combined with the installation’s directorate of logistics when JB Lewis–McChord was established under the Army Installation Management Command. FORDRAFT OFFICIAL REPORTFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYFORCUI Law OFFICIALUSE Enforcement ONLY USE ONLYSensitive 16
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For example, shortly after the 404th Army Field Support Brigade assumed the role of logistics support provider in 2018, two memorandums were issued concerning the future of logistics support services at JB Lewis–McChord. The 404th Army Field Support Battalion issued one memorandum that stated the Army would no longer fund cellphone or cable accounts in support of Air Force logistics efforts, and directed that any such support contract or account be canceled and closed immediately. The brigade issued another memorandum to notify the Joint Base Partnership Council of upcoming and potential changes to logistics support services provided by the battalion. In part: • The Army would only fund computer requirements determined by the support battalion to be installation support, and requested computers used in excess of that to be turned in. The computers in question directly supported the execution of Air Force logistics, and had transferred from the squadron to the Army in 2010 during the transition to joint basing. Installation personnel voiced concern over how the battalion performed its assessment, as computers actively supporting the Air Force would no longer be available and replacements may not be provided. In addition, personnel stated that the battalion had not maintained system and security requirements to keep the majority of those transferred computers connected to the Air Force network and functional to support Air Force operations. • The brigade had conducted a personnel review and determined that several positions were not directly related to installation support. The memorandum stated that these positions, or other positions identified by the brigade in the future, may be reassigned to better support efforts on the base. Installation personnel stated that the support battalion either planned to or had subsequently realigned several key civilians who had extensive knowledge of Air Force logistics, systems, and processes to the battalion—like a senior logistics manager, a resources advisor, and a computer systems management specialist. • The Army Sustainment Command spent about $25,000 to provide Airmen with personnel protective equipment for FY 2018, and the brigade would no longer continue to do so, citing it as a unit-level responsibility. Installation personnel stated that the Army had always budgeted and paid for the equipment for the Air Force, and such an abrupt stop would leave Airmen without a consistent supply of safety related items to complete daily installation and mission support requirements.
Personnel from the Air Force, 404th Army Field Support Battalion, and other Army organizations that either administered the MOA or provided functional base support, stated that the disparity in support levels occurred because the Services interpreted the meaning of installation support differently. Personnel from the FORDRAFT OFFICIAL REPORTFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYFORCUI Law OFFICIALUSE Enforcement ONLY USE ONLYSensitive 17
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brigade and battalion viewed the logistics support services provided by their predecessor to be in excess of the MOA requirements. However, the Air Force and other Army personnel on the installation stated that the Air Force had “paid” for these Services when they transferred resources to the Army to establish the joint base. They explained that within the Air Force, installation support and mission support are consolidated under one squadron to provide a single mechanism of support for its units. Because of this integration, personnel indicated that all funding, equipment, and civilian positions had transferred from the Air Force’s 627th Logistics Readiness Squadron to the Army when the joint base was established. Since the Army now controlled all the resources, the directorate of logistics provided both functions to the Air Force. The Vice Chiefs of Staff for the Army and the Air Force should resolve the disagreement on the transfer and Jointdelivery Base of logistics Personnel support Didfunctions. Not Always Update the MOA With Significant Changes
Personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson used the OSD’s standardized template to formalize and document the joint basing agreement, and generally included all the required elements in the respective MOAs. However, JB Anacostia–Bolling and JB Lewis–McChord personnel did not always update the MOA with significant changes impacting the agreed-upon terms. According to the MOA template, any requests for changes, modifications, or amendments to the MOA must be in writing, and are subject to approval (by the designated JMOS tier based on type of change). Furthermore, in the April 2010
Business Rules Memorandum, the OSD outlined the types of changes that can28 be made to the MOA and the processes established to formalize those changes. According to the business rules, proposed MOA changes are to be documented on a standardized change template, then routed through select JMOS tiers for review. After the proposed change is approved by the tier designated as the final signature authority for the specific type of change, the change template is appended to the originalPersonnel MOA at as JB part Anacostia–Bolling of the official document and of record.
JB Lewis–McChord did not always obtain Personnel at JB Anacostia–Bolling the appropriate approval to make, and and JB Lewis–McChord did not update the MOA with, significant changes always obtain the appropriate to the joint base organization and approval to make, and update responsibilities at the installation before the MOA with, significant acting on them. changes to the joint base
28 During January 2019, the OSD issued supplemental guidance to the April 2010 Business Rules memorandum to expand upon the MOA change submission and arbitration processes.
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organization and responsibilities at the installation before acting on them. According to the April 2010 Business Rules Memorandum, the JBIG, MOA template, and Senior Installations Management Group charter require significant29 proposed changes to the MOA be reviewed and approved through the JMOS. Instead, changes to the base organization, command responsibilities, and covered support outlined in the MOA and joint base guidance were implemented at JB Lewis–McChord without the proper approval, or formal revisions to the MOA to reflect changes impacting the joint base commander, deputy commander, and delivery of logistics support. JB Lewis–McChord personnel explained that deputy joint base commanders had always performed additional duties outside the MOA to further the Air Force mission at the installation, and stated that they could not find any requirement in the supplemental guidance prohibiting30 the dual-hatting of commanders, so they believed an update was not required. The Joint Base Commander should work with the JMOS to assess the need for a formal variance to permit the dual-hatting of the deputy joint base commander position at JB Lewis–McChord.
Furthermore, Army organizations on JB Lewis–McChord involved the JMOS only after exhausting Service avenues regarding the designation of the joint base commander and the transfer and delivery of logistics support. As noted by joint base personnel, the Army officials did not provide joint base personnel administering the MOA, the Air Force, or the JMOS with adequate time to assess and comment on the proposed MOA Jointchanges base before personnel acting onexplained them. Joint that base actions personnel explained that are often taken by Service organizations actions are often taken by and officials that are not bound by the Service organizations and MOA, and therefore, do not view the MOA officials that are not bound by change process as a required step that must the MOA, and therefore, do not be completed before executing actions. view the MOA change process as a required step that must be completed before executing actions. Joint base personnel added that the Army Sustainment Command did not postpone implementation efforts to resolve the logistics support disagreement because the command believed a delay could threaten timely completion of the Army-wide transformation model. 29 As described in the JBIG and the April 2010 Business Rules Memorandum, significant proposed changes will first be coordinated through the Joint Base Partnership Council and the Intermediate Command Summit before being routed to the Senior Installations Management Group for review. The group will review proposed changes to ensure compliance with existing joint base guidance and with Service policies and objectives. After review, it will either approve the proposed change as written, forward it to the appropriate signature authority, return it for revision and resubmission through the JMOS, or disapprove it. Proposed changes that affect existing policy must be reviewed and approved by the Installations Capabilities Council. 30 The requirement for the joint base commander to be fully dedicated to installation support is plainly stated in the JBIG. However, the requirement for the deputy joint base commander to do the same is inferred through the text of multiple program guidance, like the JBIG; MILPERS supplemental guidance issuances; and the Joint Basing Handbook, approved by the Service Senior Installation Management Group principals on May 19, 2015, and modified on September 15, 2015. FORDRAFT OFFICIAL REPORTFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYFORCUI Law OFFICIALUSE Enforcement ONLY USE ONLYSensitive 19
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At JB Anacostia–Bolling, personnel did not submit a proposed MOA change to the JMOS to obtain approval and formally revise the MOA with updated agreements on airfield operations support for a Marine Corps detachment on the installation. Joint base personnel explained that the level of required support was often a recurring disagreement between installation and Marine Corps officials. In the past, agreements were reached, but were either short-lived or never finalized. For the most recent disagreement, joint base personnel explained that they worked with the Marine Corps (and informally with some JMOS representatives) to create an inter-Service support agreement that outlines support to the detachment. However, an installation support agreement that exists outside of a joint base MOA goes against the purpose of a MOA—to define the installation support relationship between Components and the requirements to maintain it. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the Navy and Marine Corps reached a formal agreement on the support to provide to the enclave. Discussions in the Senior Joint Base Working Group’s September 2019 meeting minutes indicated that the issue still needed clarification, and efforts to resolve the issue may have been postponed in anticipation of the Air Force’s transition to the lead Service Component on the installation. Service Decisions and Differences, and a Lack of Joint Base Awareness, Consideration, and Operational Guidance Across the DoD Limited the Ability to Comply With Joint Base MOAs
Although the DoD developed processes to update and execute the MOA and report and address joint base concerns, these processes were not always effective. Installation personnel’s ability to comply with joint base MOAs and effectively execute installation support at JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson was limited by Service-based decisions and operational differences. Throughout the joint base community, officials we interviewed also reported that DoD personnel generally did not know about or understand the joint base construct, or have operational guidance available to support joint bases. Furthermore, DoD officials measured joint base performance against standards that the installations were not always resourced by the Services to meet.
As described in the Joint Basing Handbook, the DoD envisioned that combining installations into joint bases would create opportunities to share policies and practices between the Services, resulting in the identification and adoption of best practices. In a December 2014 memorandum to the Services, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics underscored the importance of cross-Service collaboration, asking the Services to continue to consolidate FORDRAFT OFFICIAL REPORTFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYFORCUI Law OFFICIALUSE Enforcement ONLY USE ONLYSensitive 20
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transferred support functions (where feasible), support joint base staff in efforts to develop hybrid solutions to common challenges, reinforce the joint 31bases’ ability to operate as a single community, and to institutionalize joint basing.
The memorandum stated that joint bases should be an integral part of each Service’s programs; however, it noted that after 4 years of fully transitioning to joint basing, the 12 installations were still challenged by a general lack of knowledge on joint basing throughout the DoD. The memorandum stressed that Service staff need to fully understand the ways joint base activities are resourced, executed, and evaluated and incorporate them into their policies and procedures. It noted that improving efficiencies and effectiveness was difficult; at times it may require breaking from the standard way of doingNow, things. 10 years later, joint bases Now, 10 years later, joint bases are still not are still not fully integrated into fully integrated into the DoD. Officials at the DoD. joint bases face a lack of general awareness and familiarity throughout the Services related to joint basing, have difficulty obtaining approval from higher Service‑level offices for actions to support the base that do not align with Service policy or are outside of Service norms, or are not always considered in Service-wide decisions and processes. The Service Vice Chiefs of Staff should clarify the order of precedence between the MOA, joint base policy, and Service policies for joint bases. They should also develop procedures to consider joint bases in Service-specific actions, identify and implement best practices, conduct a review of all joint bases, and establish training or issue guidance to ensure joint base personnel comply with Lackestablished of Joint processes. Base Awareness and Consideration in the DoD
It was commonly believed throughout the joint base program that the Services have not always been fully committed to joint basing, treating joint bases like their non-joint counterparts (without consideration of unique joint base aspects), and that the DoD and Services have not taken the necessary actions to institutionalize the joint base program and help ensure its success. Lack of Familiarity With the DoD Joint Basing Program and Continuity of Personnel
Personnel performing command, administrative, or functional support tasks at the three joint bases indicated that Service personnel at the installation, major command, and action officer levels often lacked familiarity with the program 31 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics memorandum, “Joint Basing,” December 2, 2014 (OSD Joint Basing Memorandum).
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and a working knowledge of the program’s processes and governance structure. Furthermore, while the OSD Joint Basing Office offered an annual, one-day orientation course, personnel filling command or administrative support positions at the installations indicated that this course, or any experiences gained while at
the installation, were often the32 first and only times personnel were exposed to the joint base concept in the DoD. Some officials even acknowledged that they did not always feel prepared to take on the unique management challenges of a joint base, or were uncomfortable departing their position and passing it off to someone else.
Furthermore, personnel throughout the program identified a lack of continuity or knowledge transfer and the need for continuous education among the joint base workforce. For example, installation command and administrative support officials explained that the learning curve was steep; once Service members became knowledgeable on the joint base program and more comfortable in their duties, it was time for them to be reassigned and the learning curve would start over for someone else. Some officials indicated that this was especially frustrating when there was little overlap between the incoming and departing command, and when the joint base commander and deputy joint base commander shared the same or similar appointment timetables. Furthermore, while joint base program personnel acknowledged that joint base success is largely due to working relationships, there were no transition plans, processes or other mechanisms in place at the three installations to maintain any success, progress, or knowledge achieved once a person (military or civilian) leaves his or her position. Lack of Consideration of the Joint Base Program
Because joint basing represents only a small portion of the DoD’s installations, personnel at the three joint bases believed that the Services lacked subject matter experts knowledgeable of the program, or that the Services were less likely to modify Service policies and processes to provide consideration of joint bases. Furthermore, personnel across the program cited a lack of understanding and accounting of the Services’ cultural and fundamental differences in DoD and Service-wide processes or decisions, which impacted compliance with the MOA and the ability to effectively execute installation support at the joint bases. They identified a range of impacted areas, including opportunities to consolidate support and realize efficiencies, Service-wide resourcing decisions, and the ability to issue joint personnel awards.
32 The OSD Joint Basing Office hosted an annual, one-day orientation course on policies, procedures, and command authorities to newly assigned joint base commanders, joint base deputy commanders, and other personnel working joint base-unique issues at the installations.
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Limited Opportunities to Consolidate Efforts and Realize Efficiencies
Multiple factors can impact the extent to which support functions of two or more Services can be combined. The level of consolidation varies from function to function. At times, functions must remain separate, or only minimal efficiencies may be realized. For example, there is not always a single, DoD-wide process or system in place that installation personnel can use to perform installation support. Installation personnel must rely on the Services’ systems, which are not always compatible with one another, or on operating processes and requirements, which are often not standardized across the Services. Efforts to consolidate functions can also be limited by the shared or retained authorities of the supported Component. Unconsolidated support efforts can result in installation personnel duplicating work or devising workarounds to meet mission and policy requirements and can decrease the opportunity for efficiencies. Examples of support functions joint base program personnel identified with limited opportunities for consolidation include information technology services management, facilities investment, MILPERS, installation chaplain ministries, financial management, and military Jointand family Base support. Resources Tied to Service Standards
DoD officials measured joint base performance against standards that the installations did not always have the resources to meet. When joint basing was first established, the DoD intended that installations would be fully resourced to meet the JB-COLS, the official performance metric used to measure installation support at joint bases. JB-COLS represent the highest performance standard used by any of the Services to help ensure that adequate levels of installation support are provided. This would sometimes require additional funding and manpower from the lead Component’s Service to meet these higher standards, above what it typically provided to its own Service installations. However, joint bases are no longer funded to meet these higher performance standards and are only resourced to meet the Service standards of the lead Component.
For example, JB Anacostia–Bolling personnel explained that one reason why they could not meet all of the minimum performance standards for facilities investment–related functions was that the Navy used regional installation support contracts to supplement the efforts taken at the different installations within a region. Joint base personnel explained that these regional contracts did not consider unique joint base aspects or the JB-COLS, and sustained installations only to the Navy’s performance standards.
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Improvements Needed to Better Manage Joint Base Facilities
Personnel at the installation, OSD, and Service levels all agreed that executing the facilities investment support functions was one of the most challenging, and longest-standing issues of joint basing. When joint basing was first established, only the operations and maintenance portion of the supported Component’s sustainment, restoration, and modernization funds transferred to the lead Component. This meant that while a mission support–designated facility
transferred to the lead Component, the supported Component would33 still be responsible for funding and providing for any modernization work. In 2008, the
OSD issued supplemental guidance to the JBIG 34that provided additional guidance on the facilities investment support functions. After the joint base transition, the OSD intended to issue additional facilities investment guidance to address the
specifics of the non-transfer of funds and mission support modernization projects.35 InJB-COLS July 2020, Are the NotOSD rescinded Aligned and to reissuedAvailable the facilities Resources investment supplement.
Until recently, the DoD remained committed to the JB-COLS, despite having fewer resources than planned to meet them. According to the April 2010 Business Rules Memorandum, before any proposed change to the JB-COLS output standards can take effect, the changes must first be documented on a standardized MOA change template; routed, reviewed, and approved through the appropriate JMOS tiers; and appended to the joint base MOA.
In January 2013, the OSD acknowledged that joint bases were operating in a
reduced funding environment and, at a minimum, expected36 lead Components to service any unique commitments documented in the MOA. The Services stopped allocating additional resources to meet the JB-COLS, and joint and non-joint bases began to share in the same funding levels and reductions under the lead Component’s Service. Service personnel cited impacts from the Federal budget sequestration, continuing resolutions, and other fiscal realities as some of the funding challenges shaping this decision. 33 According to the DUSD(I&E) memorandum, “Department of Defense Supplemental Guidance for Implementing and Operating a Joint Base,” April 15, 2008 (facilities investment supplemental guidance), the lead Component is responsible for all sustainment and restoration work (regardless of a facility’s designation), as well as for the modernization of installation support facilities and common infrastructure. It is the responsibility of the Component generating the requirement for all new construction work and modernization work on mission support facilities. The JBIG defines modernization as improvements to facility inventories, including the alteration of facilities to implement a new, higher standard (including regulatory changes); to accommodate new functions; or to replace building components that typically last more than 50 years (such as foundations and structural components). Modernization does not include recurring sustainment tasks. 34 The facilities investment supplemental guidance was first issued on April 15, 2008, then modified by the OSD on March 25, 2009, to clarify the requirement for and use of facility condition ratings. 35 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment memorandum, “Facilities Investment Supplemental Guidance for Operating a Joint Base,” July 23, 2020. 36 DUSD(I&E) memorandum, “Operating Joint Bases in a Reduced Funding Environment,” January 4, 2013.
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The DoD’s Planned Transition to Service Standards Will Not Address All Joint Base Concerns and Challenges
In response to continued reductions in funding, the OSD formally announced the Senior Joint Base Working Group’s decision to transition from the JB-COLS37 and the CPVF to the lead Component’s Service standards and reporting tools. Lead Components are still required to provide the same 44 installation support functions in accordance with the JBIG and individual MOAs. However, since the transition will impact the output standards, each individual base transferred and revised performance standards38 must first be approved by the JMOS and incorporated into the MOA.
According to the OSD June 2017 Transition Memorandum, the Services unanimously agreed to the transition, and were to publish a MOA39 change by March 31, 2019, for each joint base where they are the lead Component. However, as of July 2020, 40 the Services had yet to transition to lead Service standards and reporting tools. Personnel from the Service offices designated as joint base leads explained that comparisons between41 JB-COLS and Service standards are a complicated and time- consuming process. Service officials noted that new Service standards have to be created and that each Service must agree to the new standards before transitioning to them. Officials noted that ongoing program reviews across the DoD and changes in Service organizations and metrics contributed to the delay in transitioning.
While the transition may result in more favorable performance ratings once it is complete, through use of more subjective assessments and the realignment of performance metrics to available resources, it will not resolve all the challenges and inefficiencies experienced with joint basing, such as the issues discussed in this report. Furthermore, while some personnel at the three installations we visited believed that the transition could provide more useful assessments and allow for more informative comparisons between joint and non-joint installations, other personnel we interviewed stated that little value would be gained at the installations. Joint base personnel explained that performance standards do not capture or measure all the challenges experienced at a joint base. Some stated that future improvements in ratings could potentially provide false impressions that an installation’s problems have been resolved. 37 ASD(EI&E) memorandum, “Transitioning Joint Base Reporting Tools,” June 5, 2017 (OSD Transition Memorandum). 38 April 2010 Business Rules Memorandum. 39 Service performance standards are resource-informed. They are based on funding levels, with multi-tiered standards. JB-COLS are fixed standards. If the joint base does not fully meet a standard in its entirety, then the rating for that standard is “not met.” For example, if a JB-COLS metric requires compliance 90 percent of the time, and joint base personnel meet that standard 89 percent of the time when executing installation support, then that metric is “not met.” 40 The Air Force plans to use Air Force common output level standards (AF-COLS) in its AF-COLS Reporting Tool, the Army plans to use common levels of support in its Installation Status Report information system, and the Navy does not have a comparable system and will continue to use the CPVF until an alternative is available. 41 The Service-level action offices for joint basing are the Department of Army Headquarters, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management; Commander, Navy Installations Command; and Headquarters Air Force, Office of the Director of Civil Engineers. FORDRAFT OFFICIAL REPORTFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYFORCUI Law OFFICIALUSE Enforcement ONLY USE ONLYSensitive 25
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Processes to Report and Address Joint Base Concerns Were Not Always Effective Although the DoD developed processes to address joint base concerns, these Although the DoD developed processes were not always effective. processes to address joint base Existing processes were sometimes concerns, these processes were cumbersome, untimely, unclear, and not always effective. Existing dependent upon Service involvement. processes were sometimes cumbersome, untimely, unclear, and dependent upon Service involvement. Furthermore, the JMOS did not always provide sufficient guidance to effectively perform these processes, and did not always have mechanisms in place to resolve disagreements between lead and supported Components and instances of inaction by joint base personnel. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment should further clarify overall joint base processes, roles and responsibilities, and Service-specific actions that require coordination and agreement with the JMOS. Improvements Needed in Joint Base Governance and Oversight The DoD did not always update its While the DoD established a governance and oversight processes to governing framework (JMOS) account for the operation and management and issued implementation of joint bases; identify and resolve instances guidance to initially of inaction, unresolved concerns, or transition to joint basing (the challenges caused by differing Service JBIG and its supplemental cultures and procedures; or help ensure that guidance), the DoD did not joint base MOAs were current and adhered to. always update its governance and oversight processes to account for the operation and management of joint bases; identify and resolve instances of inaction, unresolved concerns, or challenges caused by differing Service cultures and procedures; or help ensure that joint base MOAs were current and adhered to. Joint base personnel acknowledged that they underutilized the JMOS, citing a general lack of joint base operational awareness within the JMOS as well as a lack of urgency and accountability to resolve issues at the installations. For example, the OSD last updated the JBIG on July 1, 2010, and its supplemental guidance memorandums, designed to implement solutions for issues not fully covered in the JBIG, are also largely outdated. In addition, available joint base guidance focuses primarily on the consolidation of individual installations and the initial efforts to implement joint basing, not on efforts to operate and maintain established joint bases.
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Further, in the absence of specific joint base policy and guidance, installation personnel follow the Service policies of the lead Component. However, joint base program personnel explained that the Services have fundamentally different mission sets, which impact how the Services view real property and installation management. Program personnel explained that this often leads to ambiguity, frustration, and misunderstanding at the installation level because procedural differences (such as those between a centralized and decentralized funding approach) may not be understood by joint base personnel. Further, procedural differences may not be considered and documented by both Services. For example, personnel performing functional support tasks at JB Elmendorf–Richardson explained that the Army uses a decentralized approach to fund and provide installation support, giving its installation commanders more discretion on how funds are spent to support the (largely deploying) fighting force. Since the Air Force views its installations as part of an overall weapons system, installation commanders are not given as much discretion, and funding and installation support are centralized at higher Air Force levels to better support the overall system.
According to OSD Joint Basing Office officials, the OSD began drafting a DoD Directive and a DoD Instruction that would promote joint base sustainment operations and clarify problem areas and processes. However, efforts to issue updated guidance, like the DoD Directive, were postponed pending DoD-wide assessments on the program and completion of other reform initiatives. Although the update to the Directive was postponed, the OSD formally issued two policy updates to begin realigning the focus of program guidance from joint base implementation to sustained operations. In January 2019, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment revised the JMOS submission process to better streamline and resolve proposed MOA changes and other joint base issues;42 and in July 2020, reissued the facilities investment supplemental guidance. OSD and Service-Level Decisions and Actions Impact Joint Base Operations
Service-based decisions can impact how a joint base operates. Lack of relevant operating guidance and processes; exclusion of joint base consideration in Service processes and decisions; and non-adherence to MOA terms can inhibit operations and break down the joint base construct and efficiencies joint basing was intended to provide. These factors can also hamper relations between joint basing officials, and potentially marginalize the input, needs, and mission of the supported Component. 42 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment memorandum, “Supplemental Guidance for Processing Joint Base Issues and Joint Base Memorandum of Agreement Changes,” January 3, 2019.
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Management Actions Taken to Address Disagreement on Support to Marine Corps Detachment at JB Anacostia–Bolling
In June 2020, the Vice Chiefs of the Air Force and Naval Operations signed a new MOA for JB Anacostia–Bolling that addressed the relationship between the Air Force, as a supporting Component, and the Marine Corps. For example, the MOA defines facility investment for the Marine Corps, and the MOA clearly identifies the items within airfield operations and facilities, among others, that are considered installation support or mission support in Attachment 1, Annex D. It also clarifies whether the Air Force or the Marine Corps has the responsibility to sustain those items. Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response Navy Comments on the Finding
The Commander, Navy Installations Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, recommended that we make clerical changes to the discussion on actions taken at JB Anacostia–Bolling to resolve the Marine Corps installation support disagreement. Our Response
We considered management comments when preparing the final report and added clarifying information to “Management Actions Taken to Address Disagreement on Support to Marine Corps Detachment at JB Anacostia–Bolling.” Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response Added and Revised Recommendations
As a result of comments received from the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations) on draft report Recommendation 4.d, we added Recommendation 5 to the JB Lewis–McChord Joint Base Commander to—pending OSD action—work with the JMOS to determine whether the Joint Base Partnership Council should submit a policy variance request to the JMOS to permit the dual-hatting of the deputy commander position. In addition, we revised language in Recommendation 4.d to clarify that the OSD should revise joint base guidance to clearly describe the extent dual-hatting is permitted for deputy joint base commanders. FORDRAFT OFFICIAL REPORTFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYFORCUI Law OFFICIALUSE Enforcement ONLY USE ONLYSensitive 28
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Recommendation 1 We recommend that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, take appropriate action to resolve the disagreements at Joint Base Lewis–McChord surrounding the: a. Designation and authority of the joint base commander.
Army Comments
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the recommendation stating that the Army’s concerns over command relationships and Component roles and responsibilities would be addressed during the upcoming Senior Joint Base Working Group meeting, tentatively scheduled for April 20 through April 21, 2021. The Army explained that senior Army leadership was initially not in favor of changing command authority relationships at JB Lewis–McChord until recently, when the Army’s position changed. After adjudication, a new MOA change will be required to reverse the command authority decision, as well as updates made to Army policy and DoD guidance. Air Force Comments
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, agreed with the recommendation stating that Air Force Headquarters will coordinate the command authority issue with the Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, OSD, and Services, and will formally resolve the disagreement through the JMOS. Our Response
Comments from the Army and Air Force Deputy Chiefs of Staff addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we confirm the Senior Joint Base Working Group held the scheduled meeting and verify that the Army and Air Force reached an agreement on command authorities and Component roles and relationships through the JMOS, and that appropriate actions have been taken to fully address the recommendation. Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments
Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, agreed with the recommendation stating
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that as the chair of the Senior Joint Base Working Group, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment will work with the Army and Air Force to resolve the ongoing command authority disagreement at JB Lewis–McChord by April 2022. Our Response
We acknowledge the comments from the Principal Deputy, and appreciate the OSD’s effortsb. inTransfer resolving and the delivery ongoing ofcommand logistics authoritysupport functions. disagreement.
Army Comments
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the recommendation stating that a decision was reached to submit a MOA change request to the JMOS, supporting the continued merger of the Army Field Support Battalion and logistics readiness center. The change will also propose a partial return of total obligation authority to the Air Force—specifically, control over resources that support mission readiness. The Army anticipated that the JMOS will reach a decision on the proposed MOA change and its related variance by December 31, 2021. Air Force Comments
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, agreed with the recommendation stating that Air Force Headquarters will coordinate the logistics support issue with the Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, OSD, and Services, and will formally resolve the disagreement through the JMOS. Our Response
Comments from the Army and Air Force Deputy Chiefs of Staff addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the Army and Air Force reached an agreement on logistics support through the JMOS, and that appropriate actions have been taken to fully address the recommendation. Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments
Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, agreed with the recommendation stating that as the chair of the Senior Joint Base Working Group, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment will work with the Army and Air Force to resolve the ongoing disagreementFORDRAFT OFFICIAL over REPORT logisticsFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYsupportFORCUI Law OFFICIAL USEat JBEnforcement ONLYLewis–McChord USE ONLYSensitive by April 2022. 30
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Our Response
We acknowledge the comments from the Principal Deputy, and appreciate the OSD’s Recommendationefforts in resolving the ongoing 2 logistics support disagreement. We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Real Property develop procedures to communicate the status of items in review with the Joint Management Oversight Structure and to highlight ongoing initiatives to improve joint basing.
Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments
The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment and responding for the DASD(RP), partially agreed with the recommendation and referred to changes recently implemented through the OSD’s January 2019 issuance of supplemental guidance, such as the establishment of time limitations and notification requirements for JMOS actions—to improve the visibility of joint base issues and the processing of joint base MOA changes. The Principal Deputy also stated that in addition to posting Senior Joint Base Working Group meeting minutes and decisions to the Joint Basing milSuites website, the DASD(RP) will add a dashboard to the website, by December 2021, to highlight43 issues submitted for resolution as well as the working group’s action items. Our Response
Although the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary partially agreed, the comments provided addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once we verify the DASD(RP) updated the Joint Basing milSuites website with the dashboard.
43 The Joint Basing milSuites is an informational website maintained by the OSD Joint Basing Office. Anyone with a valid DoD common access card can access the website to view joint base guidance, briefings from past OSD-sponsored events, and other types of information.
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Recommendation 3 We recommend that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment: a. Establish clear order of precedence between the memorandum of agreement, joint base policy, and Service policies for joint bases.
Army Comments
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the recommendation. The Deputy stated that the Army supports a collaborative effort among the OSD and Services to address this recommendation, noting that OSD should include language to clarify the order of precedence for policy within its future issuance of the “Joint Base Operations Guidance.” The Army also responded that in addition to actively participating in multiple joint base document and process revision reviews, it has also revised Army Regulation 600-20, “Personnel-General, Army Command Policy,” on July 24, 2020, which refers to joint basing guidance and the JMOS review process, and clearly establishes an order of precedence between the MOA, joint base policy, and Service policies for joint bases. Navy Comments
The Commander, Navy Installations Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the order of precedence between the MOA, joint base policy, and Service policies was currently established in the JBIG and noted that its replacement guidance—currently under revision by the OSD and in coordination with the Services—may provide clarification. The Joint Base Operations Guidance is estimated to replace the JBIG by April 2022. Air Force Comments
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, agreed with the recommendation and welcomed the opportunity to clarify and develop joint basing policy and operations with the OSD and other Services. The Deputy stated that Air Force Headquarters will coordinate efforts with the Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, OSD, Army, and Navy, and will formally address the recommendation through the JMOS.
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Our Response
Comments from the Army and Air Force Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander, Navy Installations Command addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation after we verify that the Joint Base Operations Guidance has been issued with, and internal Service regulations for the Army, Navy, and Air Force support, a clear order of precedence for policy that can be followed when planning, managing and executing installation support for joint bases. Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments
Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed with the recommendation stating that the priority of governing documents is described in each joint base MOA. Further, the Senior Installations Management Group charter also requires the Services to ensure compliance by their respective Components with DoD policies outlined in the JBIG, JBIG supplemental guidance, and the MOA. Marine Corps Comments
Although not required to comment, the Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics, agreed with the recommendation without further comment. Our Response
We acknowledge the comments from the Principal Deputy and Deputy Commandant. While we agree with the Principal Deputy’s comments, joint base personnel explained that actions are often taken by Service organizations that are not bound by the MOA. We believe that adding clarifying guidance into Service regulations that support joint base policy will assist the Services in their efforts to execute and monitorb. jointDevelop base internal operations. procedures to ensure joint base needs are considered in Service-specific processes and decisions.
Army Comments
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the recommendation. The Army responded that two recently issued internal documents—Army Directive 2020-11, “Roles and Responsibilities for Military Installation Operations,” October 10, 2020 and the “Army Installations Strategy,” December 14, 2020—ensure joint base needs are considered during Army specific processes, such as in the regionally aligned readiness and FORmodernizationDRAFT OFFICIAL REPORTFOR model USE OFFICIAL ONLYandFORCUI in Lawthe OFFICIALUSE total Enforcement ONLY Army USE analysis. ONLYSensitive 33
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Our Response
Comments from the Deputy Chief of Staff did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. Although the Deputy Chief of Staff agreed with the recommendation, the Army Directive and Army Installations Strategy do not ensure unique joint base needs are fully considered in Army processes and decisions. We agree that joint bases are impacted by the overarching processes and responsibilities discussed in Army Directive 2020-11—which clarifies roles, responsibilities, and definitions for military installation operations, and in the Army Installations Strategy—which sets strategic direction for Army installations and guides decision making on polices, planning, and practices at all Army echelons. However as discussed in this report, joint base officials have difficulty obtaining approval from higher Service-level offices for actions to support the base that do not align with Service policy or are outside of Service norms, and are not always considered in Service-wide decisions and processes.
Army Directive 2020-11 and the Army Installations Strategy do not discuss joint basing, and do not specify how the Army ensures that consideration is given to an installation’s joint base status during decision making and other processes described within the two issuances. For example, the Army Installations Strategy explains that the Army relies on numerous command and supporting organizations to ensure installations are operated and equipped with capabilities consistent with Army priorities, and cites the importance of education and training to acknowledge the critical role installations have in accomplishing the Army mission. The strategy does not discuss the impact multiple Army commands and organizations may have on a joint base supported Service Component, nor does it mention the priorities or missions of another Service.
Therefore, we request the Vice Chief of Staff provide additional comments to the final report to highlight how the decisions and processes detailed in Army Directive 2020-11 and the Army Installations Strategy include steps, or other built-in assurances to ensure joint base supported Component needs are fully considered. Navy Comments
The Commander, Navy Installations Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the Navy is represented throughout the JMOS, and the representation ensures fairness and equitable allocation of funding requirements, oversees compliance with the MOA, and resolves disputes and other issues. As part of the JMOS, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Readiness and Logistics) coordinates with Service leads on all joint base issues that impact Navy-specific FORDRAFT OFFICIAL REPORTFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYFORCUI Law OFFICIALUSE Enforcement ONLY USE ONLYSensitive 34
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processes and decisions. The Commander added that issues generally occur when a Service lead at the installation-level elects to resolve joint base issues outside of the JMOS. Our Response
Comments from the Commander did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. While we agree the JMOS is the governing body used to formally resolve issues at joint bases and to modify the MOA, there is still a need for joint basing to be institutionalized within the Navy. As outlined in the OSD’s Joint Basing Memorandum, Service staff need to fully understand the ways joint base activities are resourced, executed, and evaluated and incorporate them into their policies and procedures. We request the Vice Chief of Naval Operations provide additional comments to the final report highlighting how the Navy ensures joint base specific needs are considered within its own processes and decisions. Air Force Comments
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, agreed with the recommendation and welcomed the opportunity to clarify and develop joint basing policy and operations with the OSD and other Services. The Deputy stated that Air Force Headquarters will coordinate efforts with the Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, OSD, Army, and Navy, and will formally address the recommendation through the JMOS. Our Response
Comments from the Deputy did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We agree that joint bases are impacted by the overarching processes and responsibilities developed and approved by the JMOS. However, as outlined in this report, joint bases are also impacted by the actions, policies, and decisions internal to the Air Force. We request additional comments to the final report highlighting how the Air Force ensures joint base specific needs are considered within its own processes and decisions. Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments
Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed with the recommendation stating that joint base policy requires the supporting Component to resource and FORDRAFT OFFICIAL REPORTFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYFORCUI Law OFFICIALUSE Enforcement ONLY USE ONLYSensitive 35
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deliver installation support to the agreed-upon levels in the MOA. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary welcomed efforts by the Senior Installations Management Group to improve upon or develop new procedures that ensure joint base needs are considered in Service-specific decisions and processes. Marine Corps Comments
Although not required to comment, the Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics, agreed with the recommendation without further comment. Our Response
We acknowledge the comments from the Principal Deputy and Deputy Commandant, and appreciate OSD’s support in improving or developing new procedures that ensure joint base needs are considered in Service-specific decisionsc. Develop and processes. collaborative processes between the Services to identify and implement best practices at joint bases.
Army Comments
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the recommendation stating that OSD and the Services should work together to include language on processes that promote collaboration and the sharing of best practices when developing the Joint Base Operations Guidance. In addition, the Army stated that it recently had several successful engagements with Service counterparts, including: completion of a tri-Service review to assess joint base issues and align Service positions, working with the Air Force to address reform recommendations for two joint bases, and co‑hosting a semiannual “Super ICS Summit” with participation from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Intermediate Command Summit leads. The Deputy also stated that the Army will continue to schedule these summits, which reduce redundancy and promote collaboration, consistency, standardization, information sharing, and problem-solving among the Services. The Army stated that it will also continue to hold its monthly Intermediate Command Summit meetings with joint base leads, to further promote best practices and other efforts across the joint base program. Navy Comments
The Commander, Navy Installations Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the OSD already collaborates with joint base commanders during its annual Joint Base Commander’s Day and provides the results of the seminar available to joint base personnel. The next Commander’s FORDRAFT OFFICIAL REPORTFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYFORCUI Law OFFICIALUSE Enforcement ONLY USE ONLYSensitive 36 Day is tentatively scheduled for spring 2021.
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Air Force Comments
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, agreed with the recommendation and welcomed the opportunity to clarify and develop joint basing policy and operations with the OSD and other Services. The Deputy stated that Air Force Headquarters will coordinate efforts with the Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, OSD, Army, and Navy, and will formally address the recommendation through the JMOS. Our Response
Comments from the Army and Air Force Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander, Navy Installations Command addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We believe the actions described are examples of different ways to promote collaboration and information sharing among the Services. Therefore, we will close the recommendation once we verify that the Joint Base Operations Guidance has been issued to include language on processes that promote collaboration and the sharing of best practices among the Services, and we receive documentation to support the creation and continuing nature of the “Super ICS Summit.” Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments
Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed with the recommendation stating that the JMOS is made up of representatives from all the Services and the OSD to resolve disputes, review MOAs, and develop joint base policy. The Principal Deputy also stated that as the chair of the Senior Joint Base Working Group, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment encourages new Service efforts to identify and implement best practices on joint bases. Marine Corps Comments
Although not required to comment, the Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics agreed with the recommendation without further comment.
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Our Response
We acknowledge the comments from the Principal Deputy and Deputy Commandant, and appreciate the continued support to identify and implement best practices on jointd. bases.Conduct a review of all joint bases, to include the memorandum of agreement to identify potential command authority and organizational conflicts, and assess the effectiveness of support systems to joint bases.
Army Comments
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the recommendation stating that the Army continues to support OSD’s established guidelines for processing MOA packages within the JMOS approved timeline. Further, the Army supports the triennial MOA review, and is currently reviewing the OSD’s recommended reductions to CPVF reporting—annual CPVF reporting on commonly unmet JB-COLS. The Army estimated completion of this review by April 1, 2023. Navy Comments
The Commander, Navy Installations Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated that joint base reviews and assessments are an ongoing initiative of the OSD-led Senior Joint Base Working Group; and that joint base leadership reviews the MOA triennially to identify conflicts, which may result in recommended changes to the MOA. In addition, the Commander stated that the Services already conducted a tri-Service review for five of the “challenged” joint bases, which resulted in modifications to two MOAs. Air Force Comments
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, agreed with the recommendation and welcomed the opportunity to clarify and develop joint basing policy and operations with the OSD and other Services. The Deputy stated that Air Force Headquarters will coordinate efforts with the Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, OSD, Army, and Navy, and will formally address the recommendation through the JMOS. Our Response
Comments from the Army and Air Force Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander, Navy Installations Command partially addressed the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. As discussed in the report, installation
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personnel’s ability to comply with joint base MOAs and effectively execute installation support at JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson was limited by Service-based decisions and operational differences. However, the MOA and performance standards reviews cited within the responses alone will not identify every joint base inefficiency.
Joint base personnel explained that annual MOA reviews centered on reviewing and preparing CPVF submissions (personnel acknowledged that performance standards do not capture or measure all the challenges experienced at a joint base) and, at some of the installations, the triennial reviews conducted were minimal and rarely resulted in Components submitting input to the review or in changes to the MOA. Further, joint base MOAs are not designed to be all-inclusive documents. MOAs sometimes require outside Service coordination and action to ensure successful and efficient delivery of installation support.
Therefore, we request the Vice Chiefs of Staff provide additional comments to the final report with the results of the completed tri-annual review, including information on how the results have or will be used in DoD, and the planned frequency of these joint reviews; and information on how the Services plan to identify and assess inefficiencies in internal processes. Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments
Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed with the recommendation stating that joint base policy requires an annual review of the MOA, (for mission, manpower, and financial impacts) and a review of the entire MOA, triennially. The Principal Deputy also stated that the Senior Installations Management Group charter highlights the responsibility of the Services to review the MOA and to ensure Components comply with the MOA and applicable requirements and guidance. Marine Corps Comments
Although not required to comment, the Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics agreed with the recommendation without further comment. Our Response
We acknowledge the comments from the Principal Deputy and Deputy Commandant. While we agree with the Principal Deputy’s comments, we previously highlighted how the processes used to update and execute the MOA, and report and address joint base concerns were not always effective, in both the FORDRAFT OFFICIAL REPORTFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYFORCUI Law OFFICIALUSE Enforcement ONLY USE ONLYSensitive 39
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body of the report and in our response to the Services for Recommendation 3.d. Outside Service coordination and action is sometimes required to ensure successful and efficient delivery of installation support. Therefore, we believe the Services should proactively identify and resolve challenges within their own procedures and operations.e. Establish training or direct joint base commanders to issue local guidance to ensure installation personnel comply with established processes to update the memorandum of agreement and implement its current provisions.
Army Comments
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed. The Army responded that it supported the OSD’s orientation course and Commander’s Day briefing, and recommended that these events be incorporated into the OSD’s pending issuance of new operations guidance. Further, the Army stated that all new installation leaders attend a pre-command course at JB San Antonio, and instruction emphasizing joint base MOAs and command authority relationships is provided during the Senior Commanders Course. The Army also stated that a briefing—expected to be completed by June 30, 2021—was under development for senior Army commanders who will be assigned to a joint base. Navy Comments
The Commander, Navy Installations Command, responding for the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the Navy region commanders already coordinate training with their Service counterparts. The Commander added that although past attempts have been made, training does not always work because Service policies and protocols for some of the installation support functions are unique to each Service, and are therefore incompatible. When this occurs, the joint base is required to obtain a variance to resolve the issue. Air Force Comments
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, responding for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, agreed and welcomed the opportunity to clarify and develop joint basing policy and operations with the OSD and other Services. The Deputy Chief of Staff stated that Air Force Headquarters will coordinate efforts with the Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, OSD, Army, and Navy, and will formally address the recommendation through the JMOS.
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Our Response
Comments from the Army and Air Force Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander, Navy Installations Command addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation after we verify that the Joint Base Operations Guidance has been issued with information on available training opportunities, as supported by Service-specific training established by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments
Although not required to comment, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed and stated that DASD(RP) holds an annual joint base orientation course for new commanders and deputies, as well as an annual “Joint Base Commander’s Day” to focus on issues at the installations and to collaborate on potential solutions. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary welcomed additional efforts by the Services to provide training and comply with joint base MOAs. Marine Corps Comments
Although not required to comment, the Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics, agreed with the recommendation without further comment. Our Response
We acknowledge the comments from the Principal Deputy and Deputy Commandant. While we agree with the Principal Deputy’s comments, we reported that joint base personnel identified a lack of familiarity and working knowledge of the joint base program within the Services; as well as a lack of continuity or knowledge transfer and the need for continuous education among the joint base workforce. Further, personnel filling command or administrative support positions at the installations indicated that the DASD(RP) one-day orientation course, or any experiences gained while at the installation, were often the first and only times personnel were exposed to the joint base concept in the DoD. We believe each Service should prepare its workforce and ensure personnel have the knowledge and capability to successfully perform in a joint basing environment.
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Recommendation 4 We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment issue updated guidance to clarify: a. Existing processes, roles, and responsibilities pertaining to joint base governance and operations.
Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments
The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed with the recommendation and referred to efforts initiated by the DASD(RP) in 2019 to develop the Joint Base Operations Guidance. Once complete, this guidance will focus on sustaining joint base operations and will clarify the roles and responsibilities within a revised JMOS structure. Our Response
Although the Principal Deputy partially agreed, the comments provided addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once we verify that the Joint Base Operations Guidance has been issued and includes updated and clarifiedb. information.Roles of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Service Vice Chiefs of Staff within the Joint Management Oversight Structure for handling unresolved issues.
Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments
The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed and referred to actions that have already been planned or taken to help address unresolved issues at joint bases. Specifically, in an effort to streamline the development and updating of joint base policy and the issue resolution process, the Deputy Secretary of Defense delegated policy-making and oversight responsibility to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment in September 2020. The Principal Deputy also referred to the pending Joint Base Operations Guidance, with a planned issuance no later than February 2022, that will include an updated JMOS structure with clarified roles and responsibilities.
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Our Response
Although the Principal Deputy partially agreed, the comments provided addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once we verify that the Joint Base Operations Guidance has been issued and includes updated and clarifiedc. information.When Service decisions directly impact a joint base and the support provided by the lead Component should be documented in the memorandum of agreement, and what actions require concurrence from the Joint Management Oversight Structure.
Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments
The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed with the recommendation and referred to language in existing joint base guidance. Specifically, lead Components must provide supported Components with installation support functions agreed to in the MOA, and lead and supported Components should work together to determine joint base priorities in response to Service funding reductions. In addition, Service actions to remove a covered support function or drastically change the level of support must be documented (in variances or deviations) and approved through the JMOS. Our Response
Comments from the Principal Deputy did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We agree that existing joint base guidance provides the framework needed to outline the overarching responsibilities of the Components and the overall functional support areas covered by the MOA. However, as written, joint base MOAs do not provide detailed information on the actual methods used to execute support. Service personnel are responsible for planning, managing, and carrying out installation support tasks, and therefore must often rely on Service-specific policies because existing program guidance lacks detail needed to carry out installation support, and does not account for Service differences.
As stated in this report, personnel across the joint base program cited a lack of understanding and accounting of the Services’ cultural and fundamental differences in Service-wide processes and decisions, which impacted their ability to effectively execute installation support. In addition, in the report we also discuss how despite current guidance, Service-specific changes impacting the joint base were implemented without the proper approval or MOA revisions, like the delivery of logistics supportFOR DRAFTat OFFICIALJB Lewis–McChord. REPORTFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYFOR CUI Law OFFICIALUSE Enforcement ONLY USE ONLYSensitive 43
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We request the Assistant Secretary of Defense provide additional comments to the final report with details on how the existing guidance clearly includes, or how the anticipated Joint Base Operations Guidance will incorporate, clarifying information on the type and extent of Service decisions, actions, and impacts that should be reflectedd. Tinhe the extent MOA that or approved dual-hatting by the is permittedJMOS. in the joint base command structure, to include the deputy joint base commander.
Office of the Secretary of Defense Comments
The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (Installations), performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, partially agreed with the recommendation stating that joint base policy has consistently segregated mission support from the installation support roles of the joint base commander and deputy commander. The Principal Deputy described one instance where a MOA was returned to one joint base to eliminate the dual-hatting of the joint base commander position, and another instance where variances were used at a different installation to permit the dual-hatting of the commander and deputy commander positions. Our Response
Comments from the Principal Deputy did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. Although we agree that the requirement for the joint base commander to be fully dedicated to installation support is plainly stated in available guidance, the requirement for the deputy joint base commander to do the same, as noted in this report, is only inferred.
We revised the recommendation to clarify that the extent dual-hatting is permitted for the deputy commander position should be clearly articulated in guidance. We request the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment provide additional comments in response to the final report addressing how the guidance clearly addresses whether the deputy joint base commander is fully dedicated to Recommendationinstallation support or if 5 dual-hatting is permitted. Based on the results of actions taken by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment to address Recommendation 4.d, we recommend that the Joint Base Commander, Joint Base Lewis–McChord, work with the Joint Base Management Oversight Structure to determine whether the Joint Base Partnership Council should submit a policy variance request to the Joint Base Management Oversight Structure to permit the dual-hatting of the deputy commander position.
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Appendix A Scope and Methodology
We conducted this performance audit from July 2018 through February 2021 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a Universereasonable basis and for Sample our findings Information and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Each of the 12 joint bases are different and have unique considerations and concerns. To ensure our review identified common challenges across the different installations and Services, we selected three joint bases where the Army, Navy, and Air Force are each designated as the lead Service responsible for providing installation support and, to the greatest extent practicable, are also represented as a supported Component. We selected joint bases that reported higher instances in the CPVF of not meeting at least 90 percent of the performance44 standards specified in the JB-COLS for the 12 functional categories. We considered OSD and Service‑level concerns (identified through preliminary interviews with officials from the OSD Joint Basing Office and offices designated as the Service leads for joint basing), and different joint base attributes (such as an installation’s size, structure, location, and range of the CPVF reported information) so our sample was varied. We selected JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf–Richardson.
Our report does not capture every challenge area or inefficiency associated with joint basing; it is intended to highlight only some of the common challenge areas observed during the audit. In addition, we initially limited discussions and reviews related to the performance and execution of installation support functions to facilities investment and MILPERS, the two functional categories for which the 12 joint bases reported the most difficulty in meeting the JB-COLS. However, we also considered other concerns, or functional areas, that joint base personnel identified during the course of the audit.
The facilities investment functional category includes four installation support functions—facilities sustainment, facilities new footprint (new construction), facilities restoration and modernization, and facilities demolition. The MILPERS functional category includes one installation support function—MILPERS, which 44 As reported in the CPVF for the fourth quarter reporting period for FY 2015 to FY 2017.
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processes workforce changes and provides customer support services (including information systems support) to the military community. These services are Reviewseparate from of Documentation human resources services and providedInterviews to the civilian workforce.
We evaluated documentation against program criteria, including: • Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment (DUSD[I&E]) memorandum, “Department of Defense Supplemental Guidance for Implementing and Operating a Joint Base,” April 15, 2008 (MOA template), and subsequent supplemental guidance memorandums detailing Change 1 through Change 5 (July 31, 2008– September 18, 2015) • DUSD(I&E) memorandum, “Department of Defense Supplemental Guidance for Implementing and Operating a Joint Base,” April 15, 2008 (facilities investment supplemental guidance), and the subsequent supplemental guidance memorandum detailing Change 1 (March 25, 2009) • Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness memorandum, “Supplemental Military Personnel Program Guidance for Joint Base Implementation,” October 15, 2009 • DUSD(I&E) memorandum, “Business Rules for Processing and Approving Joint Base Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) Changes,” April 12, 2010 • DUSD(I&E) memorandum, “Modification to the Joint Basing Implementation Guidance (JBIG),” July 1, 2010 • Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment memorandum, “Transitioning Joint Base Reporting Tools,” June 5, 2017 • OSD Joint Basing Office, “Cost and Performance Visibility Framework Handbook,” March 2017 • Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment memorandum, “Supplemental Guidance for Processing Joint Base Issues and Joint Base Memorandum of Agreement Changes,” January 3, 2019
We met with multiple DoD stakeholders, including: • Officials from the OSD Joint Basing Office and offices designated as the Service leads for joint basing—the Department of Army Headquarters, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management; Commander, Navy Installations Command; and Headquarters Air Force, Office of the Director of Civil Engineers, to identify DoD and Service-level concerns.
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• Officials from JB Anacostia–Bolling, JB Lewis–McChord, and JB Elmendorf– Richardson. We conducted site visits to identify installation-level challenges and concerns related to joint basing; the extent the MOA is adhered to; and the processes used to update and execute the MOA and report and address joint base concerns. We met with installation leadership; personnel responsible for maintaining the MOA; and representatives from the supported and lead Component that either received or provided installation support, primarily in the facilities investment and MILPERS functional areas.
We obtained and reviewed supporting documentation, such as: • joint base MOAs, approved changes, and change requests; • JMOS meeting minutes, to assess specific issues raised and discussed; • Service-level criteria, to show differences between the Service processes and policy; • memorandums for record, white papers, or other written communication, to establish a timeline or detail past attempts to resolve concerns; and
• staffing and funding-level information. Use of Computer-Processed Data
We used computer-processed data from the CPVF to develop an audit sample and determine the extent joint base personnel met the JB-COLS, the minimum performance standards specified in the MOA. The CPVF is the DoD’s reporting tool of record, maintained by the OSD Joint Basing Office. It is used across the DoD to assess the overall well-being of the joint base program, and to collect and report installation support performance data for each joint base against the terms in the MOA and the JB-COLS. The OSD established user roles and responsibilities at the installation level and within select JMOS tiers to input, review, and approve information before it is released into the system. There is no single CPVF data source. Joint base personnel use multiple sources to populate the system since the lead Component’s Service policies and procedures are typically used to provide and monitor installation support for the 44 functions.
Because of this data limitation, we relied on the multi-tiered CPVF approval process and obtained corroborating statements from joint base personnel on performance challenges associated with the facilities investment and MILPERS functional categories to assess the overall reliability of the performance data. We found the information to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. We used the CPVF data in the report’s finding to provide a general indication of compliance with the performance standards; not to report on numerical calculations regarding
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compliance. Furthermore, the reliability of the CPVF data does not affect the overall conclusions and recommendations resulting from this report. Prior Coverage
During the last 9 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA) issued four reports on joint basing. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at http://www.gao.gov. Unrestricted Air Force Audit Agency reports can be accessed from https://www.efoia.af.mil/palMain.aspx by clicking on Freedom of Information Act Reading Room and then selecting GAOaudit reports.
Report No. GAO 14-577, “Implementation Challenges Demonstrate Need to Reevaluate the Program,” September 2014
The GAO recommended that the DoD evaluate the 44 support functions identified for joint base implementation to determine which functions are still suitable for consolidation and identify and make appropriate changes to address the limitations in consolidating these installation support functions. Additionally, the GAO recommended the DoD to evaluate the purpose of the program and determine whether the DoD’s current goals of achieving greater efficiencies and generating cost savings for the joint basing program are still appropriate or whether goals should be revised, and communicate these goals to the Military Services and joint bases and then adjust program activities accordingly. However, the DoD did not concur with the GAO’s recommendation to conduct a joint basing goal evaluation and provide direction since it believed joint bases had achieved savings, partially concurred with recommendation to take policy actions to address challenges, and concurred with recommendation to evaluate whether installation support functions remained suitable for consolidation.
Report No. GAO 13-149, “Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment and Closure Rounds,” March 2013
The GAO reported in 2012 that BRAC implementation costs grew to about $35 billion, exceeding the initial 2005 estimate of $21 billion by 67 percent. The DoD developed and utilized a quantitative model known as the Cost of Base Realignment Actions, which the GAO has found to be a reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and savings among candidate alternatives, to estimate the costs and savings associated with BRAC 2005 recommendations. However, cost estimations were underestimated when
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inputted into this model. Military construction costs for BRAC 2005 increased from $13.2 billion estimated by the BRAC Commission in 2005 to $24.5 billion after implementation ended in 2011.
GAO 13-134, “Management Improvements Needed to Achieve Greater Efficiencies,” November 2012
The GAO found that the DoD originally estimated saving $2.3 billion from joint basing over 20 years. However, in the absence of a plan to drive savings, that estimate has fallen by almost 90 percent. The report stated that DoD leadership has not provided clear direction to joint basing officials on achieving the cost savings and efficiency goals of joint basing. It was not clear whether the purpose of joint basing was to meet the joint base common standards for installation support or to achieve cost savings and efficiencies. The GAO concluded that without a consistent interpretation and reported use of the standards, the joint bases will not have reliable and comparable data to assess their service support levels, and the OSD cannot be assured of receiving reliable and comparable data on the level of support services the joint Airbases Force are providing.
Report No. F2015-0004-O20000, “Joint Base Support,” April 2015
The Air Force Audit Agency determined that the Air Force was not effective in obtaining manpower and funding resources for growth of supported units at joint bases. Specifically, the Air Force did not identify a net increase of 2,210 supported Army manpower authorizations or determine the base operating support needed for 1,313 Army and Navy manpower authorizations added through basing actions at three locations reviewed. As a result, the Air Force did not request the transfer of $10.2 million of annual obligation authority for an additional 137 manpower authorizations to support the increased mission.
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Appendix B BRAC-Designated Joint Bases and Components Installation Management Functions: Joint Base Supported Component Lead Component (Moved from) (Realigned to) Joint Base (JB) Lewis– Air Force (McChord Air Force Army (Fort Lewis) McChord, Washington Base [AFB]) JB Myer–Henderson Marine Corps Army (Fort Myer) Hall, Virginia (Henderson Hall) Joint Expeditionary Base Little Navy (Naval Expeditionary Army (Fort Story) Creek–Fort Story, Virginia Base Little Creek) JB Anacostia–Bolling, Navy (Naval Air Force (Bolling AFB)1 Washington, D.C. Station Anacostia)1 Navy (Naval Station JB Pearl Harbor–Hickam, Hawaii Air Force (Hickam AFB) Pearl Harbor) Air Force (Andersen AFB) and Joint Region Marianas, Guam Marine Corps ([Future] Marine Navy (Naval Base Guam) Corps Base Guam)2 Army (Fort Dix) and Navy JB McGuire–Dix–Lakehurst, (Naval Air Engineering Station Air Force (McGuire AFB) New Jersey Lakehurst) JB Elmendorf– Army (Fort Richardson) Air Force (Elmendorf AFB) Richardson, Alaska Army (Fort Sam Houston) and JB San Antonio, Texas Air Force (Lackland AFB) Air Force (Randolph AFB) JB Langley–Eustis, Virginia Army (Fort Eustis) Air Force (Langley AFB) JB Andrews–Naval Air Facility Navy (Naval Air Air Force (Andrews AFB) Washington, Maryland Facility Washington) Navy (Naval Weapons JB Charleston, South Carolina Air Force (Charleston AFB) Station Charleston) 1 The Navy and Air Force Vice Chiefs of Staff approved a modified joint base MOA on June 24, 2020, permitting the Navy’s planned October 2020 transfer of its lead Component responsibilities to the Air Force. 2 The Marine Corps became a supported Component at Joint Region Marianas due to the future addition of Marine Corps Base Guam into the Joint Region, not because of language in BRAC Recommendation 146. Source: 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report, Recommendation 146.
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Appendix C Installation Support Functions
Lead Components may provide 44 installation support functions45 to supported Components, which are arranged into 12 functional categories. In limited instances, specific joint bases may be exempt from providing certain I.support Housing functions.
16. Command Management . 1 Family Housing Services 17. Financial Management . 2 Unaccompanied Personnel 18. Installation Safety II. CommunityHousing ServicesServices 19. Legal Support 20. Management Analysis . 3 Children and Youth Programs 21. Procurement Operations . 4 Lodging VII. 2 Military2. Public Personnel Affairs . 5 Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Services (MILPERS) III. . 6Operational Military and Mission Family Services Support VIII.2 3.Security MILPERS Services
. 7 Airfield Operations . 8 Port Services 24. Installation Law Enforcement Operations IV. . Information9 Small Arms Technology Range Management Services 25. Installation Physical Security Management (ITSM) IX. LogisticsProtection Support and Services
V. TSM 1Environmental0. I 26. Base Support Vehicles and Equipment 27. Food Services 11. Environmental Compliance 28. Installation Movement . 12 Environmental Conservation 29. Laundry and Dry Cleaning 13. Environmental Pollution Prevention 30. Supply, Storage, and Distribution X. Facilities(Non-Munitions) Operation VI. Command14. Environmental Support Restoration
31. Utilities 15. Chaplain Ministries 45 The OSD originally established 47 installation support functions and later reduced the total to 44, after 3 functions were no longer considered to be common installation support. The three functions removed were history and museums (under command support); supply, storage, and distribution (munitions) (under logistics support); and readiness engineering (under facilities operation). FORDRAFT OFFICIAL REPORTFOR USE OFFICIAL ONLYFORCUI Law OFFICIALUSE Enforcement ONLY USE ONLYSensitive 51
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32. Pavement Clearance Services 33. Refuse Collection and Disposal 34. Grounds Maintenance and Landscaping 35. Pest Control Services 36. Custodial Services 37. Real Property Management and Engineering Services 38. Real Property Leases XI. Emergency39. Fire and Management Emergency Services
XII. 4 Facilities0. Emergency Investment Management
41. Facilities Sustainment 42. Facilities New Footprint 43. Facilities Restoration and Modernization 44. Facilities Demolition
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Appendix D JMOS Roles and Responsibilities
The JMOS governs joint bases and includes representatives from each Component for each joint base. It is responsible for the development and approval of the joint base MOA and oversees compliance. Designed to ensure fairness, the JMOS is also used to resolve issues and disputes at the installation and to provide a basis for equitable resource allocations between the lead and supported Components. Submissions (like a disagreement or proposed MOA change) advance through the JMOS until the appropriate tier approves or resolves them, or when a consensus cannotTier be and reached Title at a lower tier. Participants and Roles Highest and final authority in the JMOS decision chain. Office of the Formerly the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary Under Secretary delegated all policymaking and oversight responsibility for joint basing 6 of Defense for (including the authority to revise, rescind, or replace the JBIG and its Acquisition and supplemental guidance) to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Sustainment for Acquisition and Sustainment, further delegable to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Vice Chief of Staff Service Vice of the Air Force approve and sign applicable joint base MOAs, and sign 5 Chiefs of Staff (or designate a signatory for) related MOA changes. When necessary, the Service Vice Chiefs of Staff will assess requests to appeal a decision made through the JMOS. The ICC includes representatives from the Services, and several different OSD and DoD Agency and organization offices. It is chaired by the OSD, and primarily oversees the development and implementation Installations of installation support policy, and resolves disputes between DoD Capabilities Components on installation support. The ICC also approves or Council (ICC) disapproves variances (to joint base guidance) and deviations (to 4 agreed-upon performance standards). Senior Joint Base Working The SJBWG is part of the ICC. It includes representatives from Group (SJBWG) different OSD and DoD organization offices, as well as from the Services’ installation management leadership office for each Component. The SJBWG is chaired by the OSD. It oversees joint base development and develops policy recommendations for the ICC.
First tier that participates in the JMOS decision chain for all joint bases.
The SIMG includes senior representatives of the Military Departments’ Senior installation management organizations, and is chaired by the senior Installations assigned member. It provides oversight over programmed resources 3 Management needed to deliver installation support to the agreed-upon levels Group (SIMG) outlined in the MOA; tracks implementation; reviews and resolves (or forwards) joint basing issues, disputes, and questions submitted by the ICS; and makes joint base policy recommendations to the ICC.
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Table: JMOS Roles and Responsibilites (cont'd) Tier and Title Participants and Roles The ICS includes representatives from the lead and supported Components’ installation management echelon immediately above the joint base (major or regional command). The intermediate command Intermediate for the supporting Component chairs the ICS, which ensures functional 2 Command expertise is available to support the installation support functions. The Summit (ICS) ICS provides regional oversight over the installation support functions and reviews and evaluates issues, MOA changes, and the CPVF reports submitted up the JMOS by the Joint Base Partnership Council (JBPC). Entry point into the JMOS decision chain.
The JBPC incudes senior representatives for the major Service Joint Base Components (lead, supported, and other supported) and tenant 1 Partnership organizations on the installation. It is the installation’s local leadership Council (JBPC) group, chaired by the joint base commander. It resolves issues, approves MOA changes for submittal up the JMOS, communicates budget information, and works other issues with mission commanders. Source: The JBIG, DoD Joint Bases Handbook, and Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, “Delegation of Authority for Joint Basing Program Management,” March 4, 2020.
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Management Comments Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 3500 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3500
04/01/2021
SUSTAINMENT
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL PROGRAM DIRECTOR FOR AUDIT READINESS AND GLOBAL OPERATIONS
SUBJECT: Department of Defense Response to DoD IG Draft Report, Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases (Project # D2018-D000RH-0167.000), dated February 4, 2021
Attached is the Department of Defense response to the DoD IG Draft Report, Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases (Project# D2018-D000RH-0167.000), dated February 4, 2021.
The Department appreciates the Inspector General’s efforts “to determine whether Service Components met the terms outlined in the joint base memorandums of agreement and whether processes are in place to report and address joint base related concerns.” The recommendations in the draft report call for the resolution of issues at Joint Base Lewis- McChord, increased visibility of Joint Management Oversight Issues, Service collaboration to ensure joint base needs are considered Service decision, and updated guidance to clarify joint base governance and Service roles.
We share DoD IG’s view on the importance of resolving these joint base issues and the need to provide clear Joint Base guidance. Since the start of this investigation in 2018, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has clarified joint base decision authority, issued policy to add visibility to joint base issues and will soon release the Joint Base Operations Guidance to clarify joint base governance and Service roles in the coming year.
Please contact , Assistant Director of Basing, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Real Property, at if additional information is required.
CRAMER.PAUL.D AVID.
Paul D. Cramer Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment
Attachment: As stated
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Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (cont'd)
DoD IG Joint Base Draft Audit Project# D2018-D000RH-0167.000
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1 We recommend that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, take appropriate action to resolve the disagreements at Joint Base Lewis–McChord surrounding the: a. Designation and authority of the joint base commander. b. Transfer and delivery of logistics support functions.
DoD Response: Concur: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment ASD(S), as the chair of the Senior Joint Base Working Group (SJBWG) will work with the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and the Chief of the Air Force Logistics Engineering and Force Protection to address the unresolved command authority and delivery of logistics support functions at JBLM by April 2022.
Recommendation 2 We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Real Property develop procedures to communicate the status of items in review with the Joint Management Oversight Structure and to highlight ongoing initiatives to improve joint basing.
DoD Response: Partially Concur: The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Real Property (DASD(RP)) identified several joint base issues that stalled at various levels of the Joint Management Oversight Structure (JMOS) without resolution in 2018 and initiated development of new or revised policy to improve the visibility of joint base issues and processing of Joint Base Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) changes.
In 2019 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment issued “Supplemental Guidance for Processing Joint Base Issues and Memorandum of Agreement Changes” requires a joint base to notify the Joint Base Working Group when a MOA change or issue is submitted for decision. This policy also includes timelines for the adjudication at each level in the JMOS with requirements to either approve/disapprove or request adjudication at the next level in the JMOS.
In addition to the Senior Joint Base Working Group decisions and meeting minutes posted to the Joint Basing milSuites website; the DASD(RP) will add a dashboard highlighting the issues submitted for resolution as well as the Joint Base Working Group action items by December 2021.
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Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (cont'd)
Recommendation 3 We recommend that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment: a. Establish clear order of precedence between the memorandum of agreement, joint base policy, and Service policies for joint bases. b. Develop internal procedures to ensure joint base needs are considered in Service‐specific processes and decisions. c. Develop collaborative processes between the Services to identify and implement best practices at joint bases. d. Conduct a review of all joint bases, to include the memorandum of agreement to identify potential command authority and organizational conflicts, and assess the effectiveness of support systems to joint bases. e. Establish training or direct joint base commanders to issue local guidance to ensure installation personnel comply with established processes to update the memorandum of agreement and implement its current provisions.
DoD Response: Partially Concur: a. Each Joint Base MOA includes a priority of governing documents section that shows the joint base policy order of precedence. The Senior Installations Management Group (SIMG) Charter also requires the Services to ensure compliance by their respective Components with DoD policies outlined in the Joint Base Implementation Guidance, supplemental guidance and MOAs. b. Joint Base policy requires the supporting Component to resource and deliver installation support functions at levels agreed to in each MOA. The ASD(S) welcomes efforts by the Senior Installations Management Group (SIMG) to improve or develop new procedures to ensure joint base needs are considered in Service specific processes and decisions. c. The SIMG and Senior Joint Base Working Group (SJBWG) levels of the Joint Management Oversight Structure’s (JMOS), include representatives from each Service and OSD to resolve disputes, review MOAs and develop Joint Base policy. The ASD(S) as the chair of the Senior Joint Base Working Group (SJBWG) encourages new efforts by the Services to identify and implement best practices on joint bases. d. Joint Base policy requires an annual review of each MOA for mission, manpower and financial impacts and a triennial review of the entire MOA. Additionally, the SIMG charter highlights Service responsibilities to review MOAs, ensure Component compliance with DoD policies, JB Supplemental Guidance and JB MOAs. e. Annually, the DASD(RP) conducts the New Joint Base Commander (JBC) Orientation to provide new Commanders and Deputies with information on joint base policies, procedures and command authorities; and Joint Base Commander’s Day which focus on joint base issues and collaboration on potential solutions. The ASD(S) welcomes efforts by the Services to provide additional joint base training and comply with their joint base MOAs.
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Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment (cont'd)
Recommendation 4 We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment issue updated guidance to clarify: a. Existing processes, roles, and responsibilities pertaining to joint base governance and operations. b. Roles of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Service Vice Chiefs of Staff within the Joint Management Oversight Structure for handling unresolved issues. c. When Service decisions directly impact a joint base and the support provided by the Lead component should be documented in the memorandum of agreement, and what actions require concurrence from the Joint Management Oversight Structure. d. The extent that dual‐hatting is permitted in the joint base command structure.
DoD Response: Partially Concur: The ASD(S) introduced or implemented the following initiatives to clarify joint base decision authority and update joint base policy and guidance after identifying unresolved joint base issues. a. The DASD(RP) initiated the development the Joint Base Operations Guidance (JBOG) in 2019 to focus on sustained operations on joint bases and clarify roles and responsibilities within a revised the Joint Management Oversight Structure. b. The Deputy Secretary of Defense delegated policy-making and oversight responsibility for DoD Joint Bases to the ASD(S) in September 2020 to streamline the development and updating of Joint Base policy and resolution of JMOS issues. The forthcoming JBOG will include an updated JMOS structure that clarifies roles and responsibilities by February 2022. c. Current Joint Base guidance requires the Supporting Component of a Joint Base provide joint base installation support functions, acknowledged in each JB MOA, to the Supported Component. The 2013 “Operating Joint Bases in a Reduced Funding Environment” Memo recognized that each Service was operating at reduced installation funding levels and should work with their Supported Components to collaboratively determine installation priorities. Service actions that remove an installation support function (variance) capability or drastically change the level of installation support (deviation) require SJBWG approval. d. Joint Base Policy on “dual hatting” of the joint base commander or deputy commander has consistently segregated installation support from mission commander roles. The “Joint Basing Implementation Review Conference (IRC) Action Items” Memo dated July 14, 2008, documented the JB Langley-Eustis MOA was returned to eliminate “dual hatting” of the joint base commander position. Joint Region Marianas’s Region construct includes several variances to Joint Base policy and is the only Joint installation with a dual hatted Joint Region Commander and Deputy Region Commander positions.
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Department of the Army
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Department of the Army (cont'd)
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Department of the Army (cont'd)
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Department of the Army (cont'd)
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Department of the Army (cont'd)
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Department of the Army (cont'd)
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Department of the Army (cont'd)
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Department of the Army (cont'd)
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Department of the Army (cont'd)
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Department of the Army (cont'd)
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Department of the Army (cont'd)
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Department of the Navy
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Department of the Navy (cont'd)
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Department of the Navy (cont'd)
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Department of the Air Force
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, DC
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL
FROM: HQ USAF/A4 1030 Air Force Pentagon Washington, DC 20330-1030
SUBJECT: Department of the Air Force Response to the DoD Office of Inspector General Draft Report, Project No. D2018ဨD000RHဨ0167.000
This is the Department of the Air Force (DAF) response to the DoDIG Draft Report, "Audit of Department of Defense Joint Bases" (Project No.D2018ဨD000RHဨ0167.000). DAF concurs with the report as written and welcomes the opportunity to clarify and develop Joint Basing policy and operations in coordination with OSD and the other services.
AF/A4, as the DAF senior representative to the OSD-run Senior Joint Base Working Group (SJBWG), in coordination with Air Mobility Command (AMC), Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Department of the Army, and the Department of the Navy, will address issues identified in this report. As stated, we concur with the recommendations attributed to the U.S. Air Force [1.a., 1.b., 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.d, and 3.e.]. Since these recommendations cannot be solved by the DAF alone, we will officially address the issues through the Joint Basing governance structure (JMOS), which is chaired by OSD.
The AF/A4 point of contact is , , , or via email at .
BERRY.WARRE N.D. WARREN D. BERRY Lieutenant General, USAF DCS/Logistics, Engineering & Force Protection
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U.S. Marine Corps
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U.S. Marine Corps (cont'd)
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U.S. Marine Corps (cont'd)
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
Acronym Definition BRAC Base Realignment and Closure CPVF Cost and Performance Visibility Framework DASD (Real Property) Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Real Property JB Joint Base JB-COLS Joint Base Common Output Level Standards JBIG Joint Base Implementation Guidance JMOS Joint Management Oversight Structure MILPERS Military Personnel Services MOA Memorandum of Agreement OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
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Whistleblower Protection
Whistleblower Protection safeguards DoD employees against retaliation forU.S. protected Department disclosures that of expose Defense possible fraud, waste, and abuse in Government programs. For more information, please visit the Whistleblower webpage at http://www.dodig.mil/Components/ Administrative-Investigations/Whistleblower-Reprisal-Investigations/ Whisteblower-Reprisal/ or contact the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator at [email protected]
For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:
Congressional Liaison 703.604.8324
Media Contact [email protected]; 703.604.8324
DoD OIG Mailing Lists www.dodig.mil/Mailing-Lists/
Twitter www.twitter.com/DoD_IG
DoD Hotline www.dodig.mil/hotline
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