India – Mumbai – Muslims – Police Corruption – Extortion – Passport Security – Entry and Exit Procedures

Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: IND31476 Country: India Date: 27 March 2007

Keywords: India – Mumbai – Muslims – Police corruption – Extortion – Passport security – Entry and exit procedures

This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Questions

1. What is the general security situation for Muslims living in Mumbai? 2. Are the Mumbai police known to extort money from Muslims? 3. Are the Mumbai police known to be otherwise corrupt? 4. Please provide information on security in regard to entry and exit procedures for India and Mumbai in particular.

RESPONSE

1. What is the general security situation for Muslims living in Mumbai?

Research Response IND30381 of 10 August 2006 & Research Response IND30743 of 25 October 2006 Research on the relationship between Muslims and Police in Mumbai was recently completed in response to Question 1 and 2 of Research Response IND30381 of 10 August 2006. This response notes a number of sources which suggest that Mumbai’s Muslim communities have, historically, been targeted by police as suspected perpetrators, or abettors, of terrorism. There is, however, some disagreement about the extent of such targeting. For instance, the Christian Science Monitor reported that, while previous attacks had resulted in “arbitrary arrests, harsh interrogations, and detention without charge”, “police tactics” had not “been as sweeping” following the Mumbai bombings of 11 July 2006 (it may be of interest that the report notes the manner in which the Muslim suburb of Mumbra is referred to as “derisively as ‘mini Pakistan’”). The relevant extracts follow:

After bomb attacks in Mumbai three years ago, India’s stringent antiterrorism law – the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) – had been used with particular force against Muslims, resulting in arbitrary arrests, harsh interrogations, and detention without charge. POTA was repealed in 2004, and so far police tactics over the past week haven’t been as sweeping. Many of the hundreds interrogated were let go in a few hours; only a few remain in detention. …In 2003, Mr. Qazi was arrested following a set of bombings. He had been mistaken for a SIMI activist because of his work with the Students Islamic Organization (SIO), part of the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, a moderate religious social organization working for Muslim uplift and at one time associated with SIMI. “The word ‘Islamic’ in my organization’s name makes all the difference.”

“They [Mumbai’s police] came in large numbers at 1:30 a.m., in pitch darkness, and arrested me,” he recalls. “My neighbors thought I was a terrorist.”

…Outbreaks of communal violence in recent years have caused some Muslims to relocate to Muslim-majority areas.

Mumbra, a suburb 25 miles from Mumbai, saw an influx of Muslims after Hindu-Muslim riots in Mumbai in 1992 and blasts in 1993. Mumbra’s squalid quarters, dubbed derisively as “mini Pakistan,” are notorious havens for criminals – and, police allege, terrorists (Chopra, A. 2006, ‘Mumbai probe eyes local Muslim group’, Christian Science Monitor, 19 July http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0719/p06s01-wosc.html – Accessed 21 July 2006 – Attachment 2; see also: ‘POTA not the answer to terrorism, says Cong’ 2006, WebIndia123.com website, 17 July http://news.webindia123.com/news/Articles/World/20060717/394148.html – Accessed 21 July 2006 – Attachment 3; for further information on the POTA arrests and detentions which took place in Mumbai in September 2003, see Attachment 5 and Attachment 6 (Iyer, S. 2003, ‘Five arrested for Mumbai blasts’, The Tribune, 1 September http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030901/main2.htm – Accessed 9 August 2006 – Attachment 5; ‘Four arrested in Mumbai blasts case’ 2003, Rediff.com website, 1 September http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/sep/01blast.htm – Accessed 9 August 2006 – Attachment 6).

Alternatively, a report published in The Hindu in August 2006 is less upbeat about the relative improvement in police attitudes towards Muslims following the recent July 2006 bombings. According to this report, the police did undertake broad sweeps in Muslim areas during subsequent weeks in July 2006 and “in some Muslim-dominated pockets, there is fear, anger, and even resignation following the ‘combing’ operations being conducted by the police”. On 31 July 2006 The Times of India reported that “a group of Muslim MPs” had called for the task of investigating the July 2006 Mumbai bombings to be transferred from the Maharashtra Police to the national Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI); claiming that “the probe into the Mumbai blasts has been communalised and led to a witch-hunt”. “The MPs were critical of combing operations in Muslim-dominated areas, which they felt targetted [sic] ‘poor and innocent’ people. The delegation said the city police encouraged the Shiv Sena to hold the city to ransom during a day-long bandh a couple of weeks ago”. Subsequent research, Research Response IND30743 of 25 October 2006, noted an October report in the The Milli Gazette which claimed that “In Mumbai and elsewhere, Muslim men were picked up for questioning and often detained for days. Some were reportedly tortured”. It was also claimed that “[t]he harassment and discriminatory treatment even led some to conceal their religious identities, with some Muslim men shaving off their beards and women casting aside their burqas” (Sharma, K. 2006, ‘Why Mumbai escaped a flare-up’, The Hindu, 5 August http://www.hindu.com/2006/08/05/stories/2006080504921100.htm – Accessed 9 August 2006 – Attachment 4; ‘Muslim MPs say it’s a witchhunt, seek CBI probe’ 2006, Times of India, 31 July – Attachment 8; ‘Muslims in Mumbai at the Receiving End’ 2006, The Milli Gazette, 14 October http://www.milligazette.com/dailyupdate/2006/20061014_Muslims_Mumbai_communalism_ terrorism.htm – Accessed 20 October 2006 – Attachment 14; see also: Bagchi, S. 2006, ‘Tension among Mumbai’s Muslims’, BBC News, 17 July http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5187100.stm – Accessed 20 October 2006 – Attachment 15).

Research Response IND30381 of 10 August 2006 also notes a report published by Dawn on 12 July 2006 which suggested that the bombings had added to sectarian tensions between Maharashtra’s local political groupings. Such fears were reportedly expressed by local police in the context of clashes which had been occurring at the time “between members of the Hindu right-wing party [Shiv Sena] and workers of the [Muslim supported] Samajwadi Party” (as well as local Muslim residents) in relation to a number of issues.

Riots broke out last week in the powerloom city of Bhiwandi, about 75 km north-east of here, and home to thousands of Muslims. Local Muslim organisations had objected to the authorities constructing a police station adjacent to a mosque and a graveyard. When demonstrators tried to pull down the station, the police fired, killing three Muslims. Two policemen were later lynched by a mob.

The Hindu communal party, Shiv Sena, accused the Samajwadi Party of fomenting trouble in Bhiwandi. On Sunday, Shiv Sena leaders claimed that a statue of Meena Thackeray, wife of Bal Thackeray, the founder of the right-wing party, had been defiled.

Sena hooligans took to the streets, setting buses aflame, attacking shops, and forcing the closure of the city. In the suburb of Andheri, there were clashes between members of the Hindu right-wing party and workers of the Samajwadi Party.

Muslim traders in Andheri were targeted by the Shiv Sena. A senior minister in the state government accused the Shiv Sena of stage-managing the entire episode, and also charged the police of being partial towards the Sena hooligans.

Police sources here on Tuesday feared there could be backlash in Mumbai following the blasts. Thousands of paramilitary troops have been inducted into the city, even as Mumbai police have launched a hunt for militants with links to suspect organisations (Kumar, A. 2006, ‘Terror bombs cause mayhem on Mumbai’s lifeline: Over 160 killed, 600 injured’, Dawn website, 12 July http://www.dawn.com/2006/07/12/top1.htm – Accessed 9 August 2006 – Attachment 7).

Research Response IND30381 also provides information on the January 1993 anti-Muslim riots which took place in Mumbai (then known as Bombay) and the extent to which police complicity, and the involvement of the Bal Thackeray-led Shiv Sena political movement, played a role in orchestrating this violence. In September 1993 the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) observed that “the Police Commissioner at the time, Srikant Bapat (who has since been replaced), was a known Sena sympathiser and failed to come to the aid of Muslims as violence spread and Thackeray’s edicts, exhorting his followers to arson and worse, continued. Around 500 people died before the violence eventually subsided”. Despite the removal of Srikant Bapat from the post of Police Commissioner at this time it was still, according to DFAT, “generally acknowledged that Shiv Sena sympathisers constitute a majority of the Bombay police, including senior inspectors”. (For DFAT’s advice of September 1993, see: DIMIA Country Information Service 1993, Refugee Application Information Request. Cable ND 931, (sourced from DFAT advice of 21 September 1993), 21 September – Attachment 9; for historical information on the tacit police support once enjoyed by the Shiv Sena cadres, see: Human Rights Watch 1996, ‘India: Communal Violence and the Denial of Justice’, April, vol.8: no.2 http://hrw.org/reports/1996/India1.htm – Accessed 20 June 2006 – Attachment 10; and: Seabrook, J. 1998, ‘Very political crimes in Bombay’, Le Monde diplomatique (English edition) website, June http://mondediplo.com/1998/06/10india2 – Accessed 20 June 2006 – Attachment 11.)

Research Response IND30743 of 25 October 2006 provides information which indicates that, although no major incident of communal violence has occurred in Mumbai since 1993, the problem of sectarian violence remains ongoing with the occurrence of regular incidents such as localised clashes along communal lines and terrorist attacks of a suspected sectarian nature. For instance, on 21 December 2004, the Xinhuanet news service reported that a “government official” in New Delhi had indicated that, in the first nine months of that year, “a total of 95 people [had] been killed in sectarian violence between Hindus and Muslims in India”. It was further reported that Maharashtra had registered 10 of the deaths in this total and that Maharashtra had registered 74 incidents of Hindu–Muslim violence for this period. In March 2004 a Frontline article observed of the 1993 troubles that “[a]ccording to Asghar Ali Engineer, noted scholar and writer associated with the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, since the 1992-93 riots there has not been a single year in which a riot has not taken place in the State [of Maharashtra]” (‘95 killed in Hindu-Muslim violence till September’ 2004, Xinhuanet website, 21 December http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-12/22/content_2364938.htm – Accessed 24 December 2004 – Attachment 16; Katakam, A. 2004, ‘Polarised State’, Frontline, Volume 21, Issue 06, 13-26 March – Attachment 17).

A 2003 Frontline provides information on the heterogenous make up Mumbai’s Muslim population and the manner in which this complicates politics in Maharashtra.

In December 1992 – January 1993, Mumbai set a record of sorts for itself in the matter of communal madness. In the riots that followed the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, more than a thousand people were killed. Unlike previous riots, violence was dispersed and it spread to relatively newly urbanised areas. Arson, killings and the destruction of property occurred in distinctively different kinds of areas. Violence affected not only slums but also apartment blocks and chawls. What was common to all the areas was the systematic targeting of Muslims, who comprised 17 per cent of the city’s population.

The relief work that followed the riots helped members of the Muslim community resume their everyday lives. However, although successive governments promised to do away with communal forces and civic organisations worked towards communal amity, stray communal incidents still occur in Mumbai. “Mumbai changed after 1993” is a common refrain of long- time residents of the city. A decade later, subtle changes are evident in the spatial concentrations in Mumbai, in the attitude of Muslims towards the government and the political parties, and in the way Mumbaiites perceive their city

…Politically, Muslims in Mumbai are isolated from the rest of the city. Post-1993, they temporarily moved away from the Congress. Abdul Ansari, a resident of Mominpura, says: “Earlier it seemed the Congress was an alternative for us but after the Babri Masjid demolition it was obvious that it was doing lip service when calling itself a party for Muslims.” After 1994, the Samajwadi Party has emerged as a realistic alternative to the Janata Dal or the Congress. It has been projecting itself as a party that seeks to represent ordinary Muslims of the mohalla, who have been marginalised, impoverished and neglected by the Congress, the state and the community’s leadership. The emphasis is less on portraying the plebeian on the basis of religion. However, the Samajwadi Party has not been successful in Mumbai owing to the segmented nature of the Muslim community. Although the government increasingly deals with Muslims as a cohesive unit, the community does not have a homogeneous social character. As a result, it does not have a strong political base. The demonisation of Muslims as the ‘other’ has taken place despite the fact that there are multiple linguistic groups and sects among them. Historically, Muslims of Mumbai have been one of the most heterogeneous groups in India. The oldest Muslim communities in Mumbai are the Bohras and the Khojas, who are relatively small, wealthy trading communities of the Shia persuasion, and the Sunni Memons. The city also has a large number of Konkani Muslims, who hail from the coastal region south of Mumbai and constitute a Marathi group that is well-integrated into Mumbai’s industrial economy. The majority of the Muslims of Mumbai have come from U.P. and Bihar, since the 1920s, in search of jobs. The Ansaris, who are Muslim weavers from U.P., came in large numbers to work in the textile mills. Since the 1970s, there has been a steady inflow of impoverished Muslims from Bihar; they do many of the lowest-paid jobs, as coolies, sweepers and so on. Finally, there are smaller groups of Muslims from South India. The divisions between the older Muslim population of Mumbai and the newer migrants from North India are manifested not only through sectarian differences (Shia and Sunni) but also through class differences. The more recent migrants dominate the mill districts such as Nagpada and Madanpura, which have numerous small and informal businesses and workshops.

While these distinctions continue to divide Muslims, the state and several political parties project them as the ‘other’ and continue to handle them as a ‘unified problem.’ In fact, certain political parties, particularly the Shiv Sena, thrive on this propaganda. For a long time after the riots, there was a feeling that the Muslims would be safe only if the Shiv Sena was in power. Many believed that the Shiv Sena would harden its stance against Muslims in order to consolidate the Hindu vote, if it was out of power. Ram Punyani, a member of the EKTA Committee for Communal Amity, says: “People used to say it humorously. The people who are the cause of the riots should remain in power so that they remain occupied and do not resort to riots. The element of seriousness in this argument is that it is the political parties, whether they are in power or not that cause riots. This holds true for Mumbai as anywhere else”(Kaur, N. 2003, ‘Mumbai: A decade after riots’. Frontline, vol.20: iss.14, 5-18 July http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2014/stories/20030718002704100.htm – Accessed 9 August 2006 – Attachment 18).

Further information on the current relationship between the police and the Shiv Sena political movement is provided in Research Response IND30381 under Question 2 in Attachment 1. Further general information on communal tensions in Mumbai is provided in response to Question 2 of Research Response IND30743 of 25 October 2006 in Attachment 12. Research Response IND30743 is supplied as Attachment 12 (RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response IND30381, 10 August – Attachment 1; RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response IND30743, 25 October – Attachment 12).

Recent reports and supplementary information Maharashtra’s northeastern city of Malegaon, “one of India’s few Muslim-majority cities”, was recent the scene of “three bombs that killed at least 30 people”. The Christian Science Monitor provides information on these attacks, which were thought to have been intended to provoke sectarian violence and which may be linked to previous bombings in Mumbai. The report notes that, for the moment, “the forces of calm are eclipsing those that would sow chaos”. Pertinent extracts follow:

The smell of explosives was still lingering in the air when the discussion began. Malegaon’s streets had just been seared by three bombs that killed at least 30 people, and as the crowds began to seethe with anger, the city’s most revered Muslim leaders gathered to decide what to do. There was little question about the purpose of last week’s attack: Malegaon is one of India’s few Muslim-majority cities, and the bombs were planted near a mosque on a holy day when thousands of worshipers would come to pray.

Yet even before police arrived, the imams had made a choice. They used the loudspeakers of their mosques to spread a blanket of audible calm over the frayed city, imploring patience and forbearance. And for the second time in two months, a bombing apparently designed to ignite Hindu-Muslim riots failed.

For a nation whose past has lurched from one riot to another, the response to this summer’s bombings in Malegaon and Mumbai (Bombay) is no small shift, suggesting that – at least for the moment – the forces of calm are eclipsing those that would sow chaos.

The balance is a tenuous one at best, and experts do not suggest that India has put its violent past behind it. Even Wednesday, police found an unexploded bomb in Malegaon, though it was not yet clear whether the device was new or had simply failed to go off in the initial attack. But some say that an array of factors – from imams voicing reason in Malegaon to a less divisive political discourse nationwide – has helped India break its cycle of revenge violence in recent years.

…Mumbai descended into riots in 1992 after the destruction of a Muslim mosque. In 1993, bombs rocked the city, killing 257 people, in an attack that some say was tied to the rioting. An Indian court is expected to deliver sentences Thursday on the first four people to be convicted in the bombing.

…Now, these two cities in the state of Maharashtra are again linked, with law-enforcement officials hinting that the same terrorists responsible for the Mumbai bombing in July have simply changed their tactics: Now they are targeting Muslims to see if they can provoke a response (Sappenfield, M. 2006, ‘Bombs fail to incite as Indian imams urge calm’, Christian Science Monitor website, 14 September http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0914/p01s04- wosc.htm – Accessed 26 March 2007 – Attachment 37).

It has since been reported that arrests have been made in relation to the Malegaon bombings: “Eight suspects arrested for allegedly planting bombs in the textile city of Malegaon in Maharashtra state were all members of the Students’ Islamic Movement of India, or SIMI, said P.S. Pasricha, the state director-general of police”. It was also reported that: “Pasricha said two Pakistani nationals were also involved in the Malegaon blasts, but they were still at large” (‘Students Blamed for India Mosque Attack’ 2006, The Guardian website, source: Associated Press, 27 November http://www.guardian.co.uk/breakingnews/International/0,,6242258,00.html – Accessed 20 March 2007 – Attachment 38).

On 12 February 2007 The Hindu reported that Kerala’s Chief Minister V.S. Achuthanandan had said that “persons bearing Muslim names were being harassed in Mumbai and other places”. Achuthanandan reportedly made the comment in the context of arguing that “blaming and harassing a particular community in the name of ‘terrorism’ was a set back to national integrity” (‘Call to isolate communalists’ 2007, The Hindu website, 12 March http://www.hindu.com/2007/02/12/stories/2007021204270300.htm – Accessed 26 March 2007 – Attachment 36).

2. Are the Mumbai police known to extort money from Muslims? 3. Are the Mumbai police known to be otherwise corrupt?

Research Response IND30743 of 25 October 2006 Research on police corruption in India was recently completed in response to Question 2 of Research Response IND30743 of 25 October 2006. This response notes a number of sources which suggest that corruption is a serious and widespread problem within India’s various police forces. Significant among these sources is Transparency International’s October 2005 India Corruption Study, “the largest corruption survey ever undertaken in the country with a sample of 14,405 respondents, spread over 151 cities and 306 villages of 20 States”. Of those respondents who had “interacted with Police…87% perceived Police to be corrupt” and “[m]ore than 80% claimed to have paid [a] bribe to Police to get service in [the] last one year”. The report provides the following information on the services for which police bribes are payed. Most prominent among these services is the initiation of a First Information Report (FIR), but “avoiding being challaned [sic] for traffic”, “avoiding arrest/serving of notices”, and “[a]voiding arrest” are also noted and collectively such extortion constitutes 33% of all responses. The information follows:

2.5.3 Services for which Bribes are Paid First Information Report (FIR) is a very important document as it sets the process of criminal justice in motion. It is only after our FIR is registered in the police station, the Police takes up investigation of the case. Unfortunately, this leaves the Police in a dominant position of determining when and which criminal incident to register and which one to ignore. As a result, citizen is forced to bribe or exert influence to register an FIR. Also people very frequently pay for avoiding challans for various offences like traffic law violations. However, a lot of this corruption may also be due to laxity in traffic preventive measures resulting in citizen’s disregard for traffic rules. As a result, people very frequently break traffic rules and, when caught, tend to pay bribe to the police officials.

Table 2.9: Services for which Bribes are Paid for (Figures in per cent) Staffing of Police Services High Medium Low Total 1. Registering FIR 64 33 51 47 2. For avoiding being 07 24 13 16 challaned for traffic offences 3. For avoiding arrest/ 09 10 14 11 serving of notices 4. Other activities 07 12 06 08 (bail, other challan, etc.) 5. Avoiding arrest 05 08 06 06 6. Verification of Passport 05 05 06 05 7. Ensuring the case is followed up actively 03 08 04 05 8. Verification for Job 02 03 00 04 9. Filing of charge sheet 04 03 03 03 in the Court

Note: Multiple answers. (Transparency International India 2005, India Corruption Study 2005, October, pp.5, 29 & 34 http://www.tiindia.in/data/files/India%20Corruption%20Study- 2005.pdf – 18 October 2006 – Attachment 13). For further general information on the manner in which corruption permeates the various police forces of India, see the information detailed in response to Question 2 of Research Response IND30743 of 25 October 2006 which is supplied as Attachment 12 (RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response IND30743, 25 October – Attachment 12).

Recent reports and supplementary information The extent to which India is affected by a dysfunctional police force was recently the subject of a lengthy article which appeared in The Hindu on 26 January 2007. The article notes that “[t]he demoralisation and ill-discipline of the police forces is matched by the public’s distrust and fear of them. They are widely believed to be anti-poor, anti-women, anti-Muslim, and anti-outcastes. Torture is as routine as corruption is endemic.” The report continues:

Most people believe that the police perpetrate some crimes themselves, shield criminals, refuse to register complaints against criminals, fabricate false cases against innocent victims instead, use beatings as their favourite technique of investigation, and frequently resort to illegal detentions at police stations. For ordinary citizens, contact with the police can lead to extortion and bribery (Thakur, R. 2007, ‘India’s dysfunctional police’ 2007, the Hindu, 26 January – Attachment 20).

The extent to which Mumbai is affected by such problems is perhaps reflected by the regular reports which appear in the Indian press referring to police involvement in extortion practices in the Mumbai area. Some involve very senior officers. The reports also appear to indicate that action is being taken against at least some of the perpetrators by India’s Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB). Some recent examples follow:

From The Times of India on 13 February 2007: The anti-corruption bureau arrested three police constables in Mumbai on Sunday for attempting to extort money from a tour operator. The arrests have taken the number of policemen from Mumbai held this month on bribery charges to 10. The growing incidence of such cases is being viewed with alarm by senior police officers.

The three police constables held in the latest incident were attached to the Nirmal Nagar police station. They have been identified as Kundan Gadge, Praveen Rane and Ansar Patel. According to the ACB, the complainant in the case was a person who runs a tours and travel business near Bandra Terminus. He had filed a complaint that the three constables were harassing him and demanding money to hush up a case.

Last year, the travel agent had come under scrutiny on the basis of a report from the Nirmal Nagar police station, which was investigating the purchase and sale of railway tickets (‘3 more cops held for taking bribe’ 2007, Times of India, 13 February – Attachment 21).

From The Times of India on 27 January 2007: Deputy commissioner of police (Zone 8) Shashikant Shinde has come under the scanner of the anti-corruption bureau (ACB) following the arrest on Thursday of his reader (assistant) by the agency.

On Wednesday, the reader, Santosh Kotwal (31), was caught red-handed while accepting an extortion amount of Rs 10,000 from hotelier Ravi Pandey at the DCP’s office in Bandra- Kurla Complex. Kotwal has been raiding Pandey’s hotel, Liberty, at Vakola regularly and has been allegedly demanding a monthly hafta (bribe) to stop further raids. Pandey got a trap laid to arrest Kotwal. The ACB, which is likely to send summons to DCP Shinde soon, wants to question him on Kotwal’s appointment to his office (‘DCP under ACB scanner in extortion racket’ 2007, Times of India, 27 January – Attachment 22).

From Daily News & Analysis on 16 January 2007: The CBI on Monday, filed chargesheet before the 19th Metropolitan Magistrate at Esplanade court against five police officers, for falsely implicating twelve innocent people in a multi- crore fake stamp-paper scam case no. 73 of 2002.

CBI alleges that these 12 persons were implicated in order to extort money from them. “Accused police officers Dilip Kamat, Dattaraya Dhal, Juvekar, Agarkar and Bhosale claimed to have recovered Rs. 830 crore worth of fake stamp papers from the exonerated accused in Mumbai and another Rs. 300 crore worth from Hyderabad during their investigation in the case” said prosecutor Pradeep Gharat. The CBI have not made public as to where these officers obtained the fake stamp papers with which they implicated these accused (Cooper, D. 2007, ‘Cops guilty of filing false cases’, Daily News & Analysis, 16 January – Attachment 24).

From The Times of India on 5 January 2007: MUMBAI: Kisan V Agarkar, a senior inspector with the social service branch of the Mumbai police, has been suspended for extorting money from a hotelier by threatening to book him in a flesh trade case. Agarkar had taken Rs 30,000 from the hotel manager and was demanding more.

TOI was the first to report the case in its November 23 edition. Agarkar’s suspension came after joint commissioner of police (crime) Meeran Borwankar conducted a departmental inquiry which confirmed hotel manager Ravi Pandey’s allegations.

This is not the first time that a senior policeman from the social service branch has been netted in a case of extortion. Senior inspector Shankarrao Mahadik and inspector Narender Singh were similarly caught in 2003 for demanding a bribe from the management of the J-49 pub (Ali, S.S. 2007, ‘Sr inspector suspended for extortion’, Times of India, 5 January – Attachment 23).

As is noted above, reports of police extortion practices have regularly come to light as a consequence of the work of the India’s Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB). However, the capacity of the ACB to fight India’s corruption problems is of a limited nature, and the agency handles only select cases. This is acknowledged on the ACB website for the state of Maharashtra.

With the limited staff available to them, it is not possible for the officers of the Bureau to act as internal vigilance organization of all the departments. The responsibility of rooting out or curbing corruption is that of the Heads of the respective Departments and the Vigilance Officers appointed for this work in different Departments. The Bureau is expected to supplement these efforts. The Bureau will take up only those cases which cannot be investigated or enquired into by the officers of the Departments, especially when, the enquiry involves recording of statements of a large number of witnesses outside not belonging to the concerned department and collection of documents from Banks and other offices (‘Functions, Powers & Jurisdiction’ (undated), Anti Corruption Bureau, Maharashtra website http://acbmaharashtra.org/aboutus_function.asp – Accessed 26 March 2007 – Attachment 25).

In November 2004 the ACB released corruption figures which revealed that “[t]he most corrupt government department in Mumbai is the police force”. The report also noted that in spite of the ACB’s attempts to prosecute corrupt officials “the ACB stands helpless with cases pending in court and the delay in getting a sanction to prosecute corrupt employees” (‘And the loser is... Mumbai’ 2004, Times of India, 11 November http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/919618.cms – Accessed 26 March 2007 – Attachment 26.

It may be of interest that, in 2006, the US Department of State chose an episode involving a Mumbai police officer to illustrate the manner in which India’s “[p]olice used violence or the threat of violence to extort money and favors”. The episode follows:

In January Mumbai police constable Sunil Kamble beat a local shopkeeper, Roop Narayan Yadav, until he was unconscious, after Yadav asked Kamble to pay for his purchases. After an internal probe, the Mumbai police suspended Kamble, and charges were pending at year’s end (US Department of State 2006, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2005 – India, Section 1c, 8 March – Attachment 19).

4. Please provide information on security in regard to entry and exit procedures for India and Mumbai in particular.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) DFAT has most recently provided advice on airport and passport security in India to the Tribunal on 25 August 2000 (CX44230) and the 30 April 2003 (CX78610). At the time of the August 2000 (CX44230) advice DFAT advised of India’s airports that: “[a] computer linkage between passport and departure systems is still yet to be established and effective liaison systems are not in place between agencies to check on the departure of persons charged with involvement in serious crimes”. In April 2003(CX78610) DFAT advised that: “Immigration officials have access to computer systems at the airport allowing them to check if any charges or criminal records exist against departing Indian nationals”. DFAT’s April 2003 (CX78610) advice also provides advice on passport issuance and security checks (in the context of addressing a question concerning the significance of the Emigration Checks Not Required (ECNR) category of passport stamp). No comment is made in the April 2003 (CX78610) advice on the effectiveness of India’s passport checks and issuance procedures. DFAT’s August 2000 (CX44230) advice reported that “obtain[ing] a passport in another name…was easily done”. DFAT’s advice follows in detail:

DFAT advice of 25 August 2000 (CX44230): A1. In 1992 it would be very difficult for anyone for whom an arrest warrant was in force to leave the country undetected, either through inadequate checking or through bribery of airport/police/immigration authorities – although such persons could depart undetected if they obtained a passport in another name, which was easily done.

The current view is that the reliability of airport/immigration checking systems cannot be assured, and nor should it be assumed that the relevant authorities (or more particularly certain individuals) are not open to bribery.

A2. Of the seven photographs to be provided, four must be attested beforehand by the passport applicant and attached to the application, and three must be attested by an authorised officer or by the applicant in the presence of a passports officer. There is no need specifically to provide an attested copy of a ration card – any recognised document proving identity will suffice. A police officer will visit the applicant’s given address to confirm identity and residence. If the applicant is absent at the time of this call, he must present himself for scrutiny at the nearest police station. A computer linkage between passport and departure systems is still yet to be established and effective liaison systems are not in place between agencies to check on the departure of persons charged with involvement in serious crimes (DIMA Country Information Service 2000, DFAT Report No.471/00 – Departing Indian with Criminal Charges Outstanding and Issuing of Passports, (sourced from DFAT advice of 25 August), 29 August – Attachment 28).

DFAT advice of 30 April 2003 (CX78610): A.1 The emigration check not required (ECNR) stamp issued by the ministry of labour and contained in the applicant’s passport was the standard stamp used at that time. However, since that time the Ministry of External Affairs, which also issues passports, controls the issue of the ECNR and the format of the passport endorsement has changed.

A.2 No police checks are conducted specifically for issuance of the ECNR. The need for an ECNR arises for any passport applicant who is employed, is an income tax payee for the last 3 years, is an employee/dependent of Govt of India or dependent of same, is above 60 years of age or is travelling abroad for work purposes.

However, the regional passport office (RPO) conducts checks through the police (special branch) or intelligence bureau for the purposes of issuing the passport. Until recently, passports may have been issued prior to the results of these police checks becoming available. This practice, designed to ensure passports were issued within an acceptable timeframe, has now officially ceased.

A 3. The information in CX44230 of August 2000 is substantially correct. Immigration officials have access to computer systems at the airport allowing them to check if any charges or criminal records exist against departing Indian nationals.

CIR report says “of the seven photographs to be provided, four must be attested beforehand by the passport applicant and attached to the application, three must be attested by the authorised officer or by the applicant in the presence of a passport officer”.

More recently of the seven photographs, four must be signed by the applicant once they are attached to the application (the signature must then be placed half on the application form and the half on the photograph). The remaining 3 photographs also have to be pasted on the passport application but not oversigned by the applicant.

As per CX44230, if the applicant is absent at the time of the police (special branch) visit to their home, then he/she must present to their nearest police station (DIMIA Country Information Service 2003, DFAT Report No.74/03 – Emigration Check Procedure, (sourced from DFAT advice of 30 April), 12 May – Attachment 29).

It may also be of interest that DFAT has provided advice on the manner in which the Indian authorities may request an Indian citizen to surrender his/her passport. In such instances a passport surrender letter may be issued by a Regional Passport Officer of the Ministry of External Affairs. A specimen letter was provided to the Tribunal in February 2007 (sourced from the Regional Passport Office in Panaji, Goa) and this is supplied as Attachment 30 (the specimen is to be found at the bottom of the document) (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2007, DFAT Report 601 – RRT Information Request: IND31231, 5 February – Attachment 30).

Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) On 6 March 2002 the Research Directorate of Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) published a report which noted that: “[u]nder the Passports Act 1967, the Government may deny a passport to any applicant who ‘may or is likely to engage outside India in activities prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of India’” (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2002, IND38457.E – India: Current information on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir; the ethnic groups that are experiencing difficulties and recourse available to them; whether members of these groups can relocate to another area of India, 6 March – Attachment 32).

Of further interest may be a report on the significance of Indian passport numbers which was published by the Documentation, Information and Research Branch of the IRB in on 27 September 1996. The relevant information follows:

A representative of the Indian High Commission in Ottawa provided the following information during a telephone interview on 27 September 1996.

There are two numbers on the first page of an Indian passport. The hand-written number in the column next to the photograph is the passport number and has no significance other than being a serial number. This number also appears in a perforated format at the top of pages 19 to 36. The other number, which is above or below the photograph depending on the issuing passport office, is the registration number whose last two digits indicate the year of passport issuance. This number is used for any future cross- referencing by the issuing passport office (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1996, IND25108.E – India: Information on the significance of the number that appears over the photograph in an Indian passport, and whether the last two digits indicate the year in which the application for a passport was made, 27 September – Attachment 31).

Research Response IND30217 of 5 June 2006 Research on India’s security practices in regard to entry and exit procedures was recently completed as Research Response IND30217 of 5 June 2006. In addition to the DFAT advice noted above (CX44230 of 25 August 2000 and CX78610 of 30 April 2003) Research Response IND30217 discusses a number of sources which appear to indicate that India’s new computerised passport security system can be overcome by fraudulent means. Prominent among the sources addressed is a January 2004 report on an investigation which had brought to light the manner in which persons discovered to be in possession of “fake or altered Indian passports” had “tampered versions of the ‘machine-readable’ passports”. According to this report: “[t]he ‘identity theft’ was found to be carried out by replacing the digitally imposed photograph of the original passport holder with that of the ‘imposter’. The only give-away was the tampered sticker covering of the photograph. The sticker has several hidden security features visible only under ultraviolet light.” One of the cases of identity theft discussed involved a person from Mumbai:

On January 3 alone, the Emigration Department detained three persons with tampered passports in which the digitally-imposed photograph had been replaced. In one case, Prakasan of Kasaragod district was found to be travelling in the ‘guise’ of Suresh Pattena Lilliwala (passport number A 0696385) of Mumbai “by replacing the photograph of the original passport holder”. In his statement to the Emigration authorities, Prakasan said he had paid Rs. 20,000 to a person named Joseph in Sharjah to procure the altered passport of Lilliwala.

An official said Prakasan’s original passport was in the possession of his sponsor with whom he had fallen out. “Prakasan had to come to Kerala and he found that the easiest way to procure a fake passport was to approach the racketeers”, an official said. An Emigration inquiry also found that Lilliwala, who had travelled on a visit visa to Sharjah with Rs. 3 lakhs in US dollars, was yet to return to Mumbai (Anand, G. 2004, ‘Racket in duplicating passports unearthed’, The Hindu, 5 January – Attachment 33).

Further to this, Research Response IND30217 notes comments on problems with Indian passport security made in a June 2005 communication sent by the the New Delhi Overseas Compliance Officer of the then Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMIA). The communication notes “the difficulties all visa offices have in distinguishing genuine from non-genuine Indian passports given the commonly seen poor print and production quality and varying issuance standards in genuine passports” (Overseas Compliance Officer Information Report, New Delhi, 2005, ‘Delhi Anti Fraud Working Group’, 8 June – Attachment 22).

Research Response IND30217 of 5 June 2006 is supplied as Attachment 27 (RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response IND30217, 5 June – Attachment 27).

Further information on passport security In January 2000 a report published by the news service of Rediff.com discussed the ease of “obtaining ‘genuine passports’ on fake documents” in Mumbai (referred to in the report by its erstwhile title of Bombay). The process is described in detail:

In Bombay obtaining ‘genuine passports’ on fake documents for whoever is willing to pay the right price is no problem.

…A predetermined arrangement with the government officials, including cops, to co-operate in illegal acts in return for monetary benefits is commonly known as khancha in Bombay.

…In Bombay it is very easy to get a passport. The basic documents needed for a passport is a birth certificate and a ration card. In the absence of a birth certificate, a school leaving certificate is regarded as sufficient and even a voter’s identity card is considered enough in many cases. “Any Indian having these documents is entitled for a passport,” Yakernell [chief passport officer, H H Yakarnell] said. After the application is made, the passport office passes on the matter to the Special Branch-II (the intelligence wing of the city police) of the for verifying the antecedents of the applicant and in case there are no problems the passports are forwarded to the applicants by post.

The modus operandi of the travel agents is quite simple. What they do is to enclose fake birth certificates or school leaving certificates along with the applications. This completes step one. The passport office then forwards the application to the Special Branch-II, who in turn refer the application to the local police station for checking out if the applicant has a police record and whether he lives at the address given in the application.

The travel agents who have khanchas in SB-II are aware when a particular application will land up there. So when the request is forwarded to the local police station, they grease some palms and the cops are more than ready to bend the rules. They give a clear signal to SB-II who give a go-ahead to the passport office. The postal delivery is the last stage. That too is overcome by a khancha with the concerned postman by paying him Rs 50 or 100 (Khan, J. 2000, ‘Do a khancha and get a passport’, Rediff.com website, 11 January http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/jan/11jake.htm – Accessed 26 March 2007 – Attachment 34).

In June of 2006 The Times of India reported that “[i]n the backdrop of increased security threat post-9/11, sleuths have their concerns rooted in the absence of any other foolproof system to verify the local identity of a passport-seeker than the one done by the police”. The report suggests that it remains the case that the documents required to obtain a genuine passport remain relatively easy to acquire by fraudulent means:

Sources said issuing a passport only on the basis of a driving licence or a voter identity card or the ration card is not enough to authenticate the bona fide of a person.

“These days, all these can be managed for a paltry sum of Rs 200-500,” said a senior intelligence official.

The passport, unlike any other identification card, bears the stamp of the President of India, endorsing the bona fide of a citizen, and the same cannot be issued without thorough inquiries, the official added.

While suggesting the scrapping of police verification, MEA had claimed that this could lead to passports being issued in as short a duration as 15 days of an application.

But security agencies feel it is not worth the risk in the changed security scenario. They point out that after 9/11, even countries which did not have the system of police verification for passports have introduced it to check the misuse of the document that is also an internationally accepted proof of citizenship.

The first risk stems from terrorists and their sympathisers from countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh (‘Change in passport rules opposed’, 2006, Times of India, 19 June http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1657348.cms – Accessed 14 September 2006 – Attachment 35).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources: Search Engines Google search engine http://www.google.com.au/

Databases: FACTIVA (news database) BACIS (DIMA Country Information database) REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database) ISYS (RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports) RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response IND30381, 10 August.

2. Chopra, A. 2006, ‘Mumbai probe eyes local Muslim group’, Christian Science Monitor, 19 July http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0719/p06s01-wosc.html – Accessed 21 July 2006.

3. ‘POTA not the answer to terrorism, says Cong’ 2006, WebIndia123.com website, 17 July http://news.webindia123.com/news/Articles/World/20060717/394148.html – Accessed 21 July 2006. 4. Sharma, K. 2006, ‘Why Mumbai escaped a flare-up’, The Hindu, 5 August http://www.hindu.com/2006/08/05/stories/2006080504921100.htm – Accessed 9 August 2006.

5. Iyer, S. 2003, ‘Five arrested for Mumbai blasts’, The Tribune, 1 September http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030901/main2.htm – Accessed 9 August 2006.

6. ‘Four arrested in Mumbai blasts case’ 2003, Rediff.com website, 1 September http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/sep/01blast.htm – Accessed 9 August 2006.

7. Kumar, A. 2006, ‘Terror bombs cause mayhem on Mumbai’s lifeline: Over 160 killed, 600 injured’, Dawn website, 12 July http://www.dawn.com/2006/07/12/top1.htm – Accessed 9 August 2006.

8. ‘Muslim MPs say it’s a witchhunt, seek CBI probe’ 2006, Times of India, 31 July. (FACTIVA)

9. DIMIA Country Information Service 1993, Refugee Application Information Request. Cable ND 931, (sourced from DFAT advice of 21 September 1993), 21 September. (CISNET India CX2566)

10. Human Rights Watch 1996, ‘India: Communal Violence and the Denial of Justice’, April, vol.8: no.2. (http://hrw.org/reports/1996/India1.htm – Accessed 20 June 2006)

11. Seabrook, J. 1998, ‘Very political crimes in Bombay’, Le Monde diplomatique (English edition) website, June. (http://mondediplo.com/1998/06/10india2 – Accessed 20 June 2006)

12. RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response IND30743, 25 October.

13. Transparency International India 2005, India Corruption Study 2005, October, pp.5, 29 & 34 http://www.tiindia.in/data/files/India%20Corruption%20Study-2005.pdf – 18 October 2006.

14. ‘Muslims in Mumbai at the Receiving End’ 2006, The Milli Gazette, 14 October http://www.milligazette.com/dailyupdate/2006/20061014_Muslims_Mumbai_commu nalism_terrorism.htm – Accessed 20 October 2006.

15. Bagchi, S. 2006, ‘Tension among Mumbai’s Muslims’, BBC News, 17 July http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5187100.stm – Accessed 20 October 2006.

16. ‘95 killed in Hindu-Muslim violence till September’ 2004, Xinhuanet website, 21 December http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-12/22/content_2364938.htm – Accessed 24 December 2004.

17. Katakam, A. 2004, ‘Polarised State’, Frontline, Volume 21, Issue 06, 13-26 March.

18. Kaur, N. 2003, ‘Mumbai: A decade after riots’. Frontline, vol.20: iss.14, 5-18 July http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2014/stories/20030718002704100.htm – Accessed 9 August 2006. 19. US Department of State 2006, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2005 – India, Section 1c, 8 March.

20. Thakur, R. 2007, ‘India’s dysfunctional police’ 2007, the Hindu, 26 January. (FACTIVA)

21. ‘3 more cops held for taking bribe’ 2007, Times of India, 13 February. (FACTIVA)

22. ‘DCP under ACB scanner in extortion racket’ 2007, Times of India, 27 January. (FACTIVA)

23. Ali, S.S. 2007, ‘Sr inspector suspended for extortion’, Times of India, 5 January. (FACTIVA)

24. Cooper, D. 2007, ‘Cops guilty of filing false cases’, Daily News & Analysis, 16 January. (FACTIVA)

25. ‘Functions, Powers & Jurisdiction’ (undated), Anti Corruption Bureau, Maharashtra website http://acbmaharashtra.org/aboutus_function.asp – Accessed 26 March 2007.

26. ‘And the loser is... Mumbai’ 2004, Times of India, 11 November http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/919618.cms – Accessed 26 March 2007.

27. RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response IND30217, 5 June.

28. DIMA Country Information Service 2000, DFAT Report No.471/00 – Departing Indian with Criminal Charges Outstanding and Issuing of Passports, (sourced from DFAT advice of 25 August), 29 August. (CISNET India CX44230)

29. DIMIA Country Information Service 2003, DFAT Report No.74/03 – Emigration Check Procedure, (sourced from DFAT advice of 30 April), 12 May. (CISNET India CX78610)

30. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2007, DFAT Report 601 – RRT Information Request: IND31231, 5 February.

31. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1996, IND25108.E – India: Information on the significance of the number that appears over the photograph in an Indian passport, and whether the last two digits indicate the year in which the application for a passport was made, 27 September. (REFINFO)

32. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2002, IND38457.E – India: Current information on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir; the ethnic groups that are experiencing difficulties and recourse available to them; whether members of these groups can relocate to another area of India, 6 March. (REFINO)

33. Anand, G. 2004, ‘Racket in duplicating passports unearthed’, The Hindu, 5 January. (CISNET India CX88833)

34. Khan, J. 2000, ‘Do a khancha and get a passport’, Rediff.com website, 11 January http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/jan/11jake.htm – Accessed 26 March 2007. 35. ‘Change in passport rules opposed’, 2006, Times of India, 19 June http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1657348.cms – Accessed 14 September 2006.

36. ‘Call to isolate communalists’ 2007, The Hindu website, 12 March http://www.hindu.com/2007/02/12/stories/2007021204270300.htm – Accessed 26 March 2007.

37. Sappenfield, M. 2006, ‘Bombs fail to incite as Indian imams urge calm’, Christian Science Monitor website, 14 September http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0914/p01s04-wosc.htm – Accessed 26 March 2007.

38. ‘Students Blamed for India Mosque Attack’ 2006, The Guardian website, source: Associated Press, 27 November http://www.guardian.co.uk/breakingnews/International/0,,6242258,00.html – Accessed 20 March 2007.