DOCSLIB.ORG

Evaluation of Lattice-Based Signature Schemes in Embedded Systems

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Evaluation of Lattice-Based Signature Schemes in Embedded Systems Evaluation of Lattice-Based Signature Schemes in Embedded Systems Tim Guneysu¨ Markus Krausz Tobias Oder Julian Speith Ruhr-Universitat¨ Bochum & DFKI Ruhr-Universitat¨ Bochum Ruhr-Universitat¨ Bochum Ruhr-Universitat¨ Bochum Bochum, Germany Bochum, Germany Bochum, Germany Bochum, Germany [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Abstract—Lattice-based cryptography is a promising candi- ate advanced constructions, like identity-based encryption. In date and remedy in public-key cryptography in case quantum general, there are two approaches to lattice-based signatures. computers become feasible or a major breakthrough in solving The first one is the hash-and-sign approach [11], [12] that the factorization problem or the discrete logarithm problem is achieved. Due to ongoing research in this field, many schemes still requires a trapdoor sampler, and the Fiat-Shamir approach [8], lack implementations that examine their practicability, especially [9], [13] that turns a zero-knowledge proof into a signature for embedded systems. In this work we discuss the potential scheme. In this work we discuss the typical implementation of lattice-based signature schemes for practical applications on challenges of lattice-based signature schemes and evaluate constrained devices in a post-quantum era. We focus on the selected schemes on a ARM Cortex-M4F microcontroller schemes GLP, BLISS, and Dilithium and discuss their unique properties as well as challenges regarding their implementation platform or review existing microcontroller implementations on embedded devices. In this regard we present and review of these schemes. As Fiat-Shamir signature schemes usually optimized implementations of these schemes for ARM Cortex- are more efficient than hash-and-sign signature schemes and M4 microcontrollers to evaluate the practical performance of therefore better suited for an implementation on a microcon- the schemes. troller device, we will focus on the Fiat-Shamir schemes GLP Index Terms—lattices, signatures, microcontroller, dilithium [13], BLISS [8], and Dilithium [9]. I. INTRODUCTION A. Contribution Digital signatures are a fundamental asymmetric crypto- In this work, we provide a comprehensive survey of the graphic primitive with numerous applications in our daily life. three signature schemes GLP, BLISS, and Dilithium. We Every digital transaction that requires authenticity and integrity analyze the evolution of lattice-based signature schemes and requires a digital signature over the message or document. highlight unique properties of each scheme. We present the Currently deployed signature schemes, like RSA, DSA, or up to our knowledge first ARM Cortex-M implementation of elliptic curve-based solutions, base their security on either the GLP signature scheme and present an optimized imple- the factorization problem or the discrete logarithm problem. mentation of Dilithium. To complete the picture we review Ever since Peter Shor developed a quantum algorithm that is implementations of BLISS and its variant BLISS-B to show able to solve both problems in polynomial time in 1997 [20], the different requirements that these schemes have regarding quantum-secure alternatives have gained a lot of attention. the target platform. Classical signature schemes are present on millions of B. Related Work devices in the Internet of Things. Regarding the fact that these devices are often deployed in the field for years, a The GLP scheme has been presented in [13] and an op- transition to post-quantum cryptography must take place in the timized AVX implementation of the scheme can be found in foreseeable future. For this transition it is essential to evaluate [14]. BLISS [8] and its improvement BLISS-B [7] have micro- and assess the suitability of post-quantum signature scheme controller implementations on AVR [15] and ARM Cortex-M4 for contemporary embedded applications. [19], [21]. Dilithium has been published at TCHES’18 [10] The National Institute of Standards and Technology even and has been submitted to the NIST standardization process started a standardization process for post-quantum cryptogra- [9]. phy that also takes into account how the submitted schemes II. EVOLUATION OF LATTICE-BASED SIGNATURE perform on a large number of target platforms. Among the SCHEMES NIST submissions, four major classes of quantum-secure In this section, we review the discussed schemes, GLP [13], mathematical problems emerged: based on hash functions, on BLISS [7], [8], and Dilithium [9]. For the sake of simplicity, linear codes, on lattices, and on multivariate quadratics. In this we present high-level descriptions of these schemes and refer work we will focus on signature schemes based on lattices. Lattice-based schemes offer comparatively high performance, 0This work was partially funded by the European Union H2020 SAFEcrypto reasonable parameter sizes, and the versatility to also instanti- project (grant no. 644729). to the respective original publications for full details and determines whether Sc is added to or subtracted from y. The security proofs. changes in BLISS lead to a signature size of only 5.6 kbit instead of 9.0 kbit for GLP. Another improvement is that in A. Notation GLP, there are on average seven repetitions for each signing n Polynomials in Rq = Zq[x]=hx + 1i are labeled by bold attempt while BLISS has a rejection rate of only 1.6. Signing lower case letters. Bold upper case letters denote matrices. The and verification of BLISS is sketched in Algorithms 3 and 4. Gaussian distribution with standard deviation σ is denoted by Dσ. Algorithm 3: BLISS SIGNING ALGORITHM B. Signature Scheme: GLP Input: Key pair (A; S) such that AS = q mod 2q, message m 2 f0; 1g∗ The GLP scheme is an extension of the work by Lyuba- Output:z ; c shevsky [16], [17]. The private key is made of two polynomials $ m 1 y − Dσ s1; s2 with random ternary coefficients, i.e. coefficients in 2 c H(Ay mod 2q, m) {−1; 0; 1g. The public key consists of a globally constant 3 Choose random bit b 2 f0; 1g polynomial a and another polynomial t as1 + s2. The b 4 z y + (−1) Sc signing and verification procedures are sketched in Algorithms 5 Continue with a probability 1 and 2. Two masking polynomials y ; y are sampled that 1 2 jjScjj2 hz,Sci are used to hide the secret key in the signature. The message 1 M exp − 2σ2 cosh σ2 otherwise together with the masking polynomials and the global constant restart a is given as input to a random oracle (typically instantiated by a hash function) as required by the Fiat-Shamir transform. If the coefficients of the signature polynomials z1; z2 exceed a Algorithm 4: BLISS VERIFICATION ALGORITHM certain threshold (defined by the parameter k), the signature is Input: Public key A, signature z, c 2 f0; 1g160, rejected. The verification checks the validity of the signature message m 2 f0; 1g∗ with the help of the public key. The proposed parameters Output: Accept (valid) or Reject (invalid) provide a security of 80 bits pre-quantum security [14]. 1 Accept if 2 z does not exceed bounds and Algorithm 1: GLP SIGNING ALGORITHM 3 c =H(Az + qc mod 2q, m) n ∗ Input:s 1; s2 2 [−1; 1] , message m 2 f0; 1g n 160 Output:z 1; z2 2 [−(k − 32); k − 32] , c 2 f0; 1g There is also an improvement to BLISS called BLISS-B [7] $ n 1 y1; y2 − [−k; k] that has an improved key generation and achieves a rejection 2 c H(ay1 + y2, m) rate of 1.4 for signing for the same security level of 128 bits 3 z1 s1c + y1, z2 s2c + y2 of pre-quantum security. n 4 if z1 or z262[−(k − 32); k − 32] then D. Signature Scheme: Dilithium 5 go to step 1 One major property of GLP and BLISS is that they are based on ideal lattices which means that the underlying lattice is structured. To this day, there is no attack known that exploits Algorithm 2: GLP VERIFICATION ALGORITHM this structure and is more efficient than other attacks but it 0 n is not clear if there might be such an attack in the future. Input: z1; z2 2 [−(k − 32); k − 32] , t 2 Rq, c 2 f0; 1g160, message m 2 f0; 1g∗ Therefore the designers of Dilithium made a more conservative Output: Accept (valid) or Reject (invalid) choice and select module lattices as security foundation of their scheme. In ideal lattices all arithmetic is carried out on 1 Accept if n polynomials. Module lattices rather consist of (small) matrices 2 z1, z2 2 [−(k − 32); k − 32] and in which the matrix elements are polynomials. Obviously, this 3 c =H(az1 + z2 − tc, m) results in larger parameter sizes and slower computations. Algorithms 5 and 6 show the signing and verification of Dilithium. Table I provides a comparison of signature and C. Signature Scheme: BLISS key size for the three discussed schemes. We compare the With the objective to reduce the signature size further, instantiations of the schemes that were implemented. The Ducas et al. developed the signature scheme BLISS [8]. One Roman numeral behind the name of the scheme in Table I major difference to GLP is that the masking polynomial y refers to the parameter set that was implemented. is distributed according to a Gaussian distribution instead of being uniformly distributed in a small interval. Furthermore III. IMPLEMENTATION the rejection step is performed according to a bimodal Gaus- Implementing a lattice-based signature scheme on embed- sian. This can be seen in the choice of the random bit b that ded devices poses a number of challenges to the developer. All Algorithm 5: DILITHIUM SIGNING ALGORITHM too big to be stored in a single register. All schemes require to draw samples from some kind of Input: Key pair ((A; t); (s1; s2)) , message m 2 f0; 1g∗ distribution.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • On Ideal Lattices and Learning with Errors Over Rings∗
    On Ideal Lattices and Learning with Errors Over Rings∗ Vadim Lyubashevskyy Chris Peikertz Oded Regevx June 25, 2013 Abstract The “learning with errors” (LWE) problem is to distinguish random linear equations, which have been perturbed by a small amount of noise, from truly uniform ones. The problem has been shown to be as hard as worst-case lattice problems, and in recent years it has served as the foundation for a plethora of cryptographic applications. Unfortunately, these applications are rather inefficient due to an inherent quadratic overhead in the use of LWE. A main open question was whether LWE and its applications could be made truly efficient by exploiting extra algebraic structure, as was done for lattice-based hash functions (and related primitives). We resolve this question in the affirmative by introducing an algebraic variant of LWE called ring- LWE, and proving that it too enjoys very strong hardness guarantees. Specifically, we show that the ring-LWE distribution is pseudorandom, assuming that worst-case problems on ideal lattices are hard for polynomial-time quantum algorithms. Applications include the first truly practical lattice-based public-key cryptosystem with an efficient security reduction; moreover, many of the other applications of LWE can be made much more efficient through the use of ring-LWE. 1 Introduction Over the last decade, lattices have emerged as a very attractive foundation for cryptography. The appeal of lattice-based primitives stems from the fact that their security can often be based on worst-case hardness assumptions, and that they appear to remain secure even against quantum computers.
    [Show full text]
  • Making NTRU As Secure As Worst-Case Problems Over Ideal Lattices
    Making NTRU as Secure as Worst-Case Problems over Ideal Lattices Damien Stehlé1 and Ron Steinfeld2 1 CNRS, Laboratoire LIP (U. Lyon, CNRS, ENS Lyon, INRIA, UCBL), 46 Allée d’Italie, 69364 Lyon Cedex 07, France. [email protected] – http://perso.ens-lyon.fr/damien.stehle 2 Centre for Advanced Computing - Algorithms and Cryptography, Department of Computing, Macquarie University, NSW 2109, Australia [email protected] – http://web.science.mq.edu.au/~rons Abstract. NTRUEncrypt, proposed in 1996 by Hoffstein, Pipher and Sil- verman, is the fastest known lattice-based encryption scheme. Its mod- erate key-sizes, excellent asymptotic performance and conjectured resis- tance to quantum computers could make it a desirable alternative to fac- torisation and discrete-log based encryption schemes. However, since its introduction, doubts have regularly arisen on its security. In the present work, we show how to modify NTRUEncrypt to make it provably secure in the standard model, under the assumed quantum hardness of standard worst-case lattice problems, restricted to a family of lattices related to some cyclotomic fields. Our main contribution is to show that if the se- cret key polynomials are selected by rejection from discrete Gaussians, then the public key, which is their ratio, is statistically indistinguishable from uniform over its domain. The security then follows from the already proven hardness of the R-LWE problem. Keywords. Lattice-based cryptography, NTRU, provable security. 1 Introduction NTRUEncrypt, devised by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman, was first presented at the Crypto’96 rump session [14]. Although its description relies on arithmetic n over the polynomial ring Zq[x]=(x − 1) for n prime and q a small integer, it was quickly observed that breaking it could be expressed as a problem over Euclidean lattices [6].
    [Show full text]
  • Lattices That Admit Logarithmic Worst-Case to Average-Case Connection Factors
    Lattices that Admit Logarithmic Worst-Case to Average-Case Connection Factors Chris Peikert∗ Alon Rosen† April 4, 2007 Abstract We demonstrate an average-case problem that is as hard as finding γ(n)-approximate√ short- est vectors in certain n-dimensional lattices in the worst case, where γ(n) = O( log n). The previously best known factor for any non-trivial class of lattices was γ(n) = O˜(n). Our results apply to families of lattices having special algebraic structure. Specifically, we consider lattices that correspond to ideals in the ring of integers of an algebraic number field. The worst-case problem we rely on is to find approximate shortest vectors in these lattices, under an appropriate form of preprocessing of the number field. For the connection factors γ(n) we achieve, the corresponding decision problems on ideal lattices are not known to be NP-hard; in fact, they are in P. However, the search approximation problems still appear to be very hard. Indeed, ideal lattices are well-studied objects in com- putational number theory, and the best known algorithms for them seem to perform no better than the best known algorithms for general lattices. To obtain the best possible connection factor, we instantiate our constructions with infinite families of number fields having constant root discriminant. Such families are known to exist and are computable, though no efficient construction is yet known. Our work motivates the search for such constructions. Even constructions of number fields having root discriminant up to O(n2/3−) would yield connection factors better than O˜(n).
    [Show full text]
  • Cryptography from Ideal Lattices
    Introduction Ideal lattices Ring-SIS Ring-LWE Other algebraic lattices Conclusion Ideal Lattices Damien Stehl´e ENS de Lyon Berkeley, 07/07/2015 Damien Stehl´e Ideal Lattices 07/07/2015 1/32 Introduction Ideal lattices Ring-SIS Ring-LWE Other algebraic lattices Conclusion Lattice-based cryptography: elegant but impractical Lattice-based cryptography is fascinating: simple, (presumably) post-quantum, expressive But it is very slow Recall the SIS hash function: 0, 1 m Zn { } → q x xT A 7→ · Need m = Ω(n log q) to compress O(1) m n q is n , A is uniform in Zq × O(n2) space and cost ⇒ Example parameters: n 26, m n 2e4, log q 23 ≈ ≈ · 2 ≈ Damien Stehl´e Ideal Lattices 07/07/2015 2/32 Introduction Ideal lattices Ring-SIS Ring-LWE Other algebraic lattices Conclusion Lattice-based cryptography: elegant but impractical Lattice-based cryptography is fascinating: simple, (presumably) post-quantum, expressive But it is very slow Recall the SIS hash function: 0, 1 m Zn { } → q x xT A 7→ · Need m = Ω(n log q) to compress O(1) m n q is n , A is uniform in Zq × O(n2) space and cost ⇒ Example parameters: n 26, m n 2e4, log q 23 ≈ ≈ · 2 ≈ Damien Stehl´e Ideal Lattices 07/07/2015 2/32 Introduction Ideal lattices Ring-SIS Ring-LWE Other algebraic lattices Conclusion Lattice-based cryptography: elegant but impractical Lattice-based cryptography is fascinating: simple, (presumably) post-quantum, expressive But it is very slow Recall the SIS hash function: 0, 1 m Zn { } → q x xT A 7→ · Need m = Ω(n log q) to compress O(1) m n q is n , A is uniform in Zq × O(n2)
    [Show full text]
  • A Decade of Lattice Cryptography
    A Decade of Lattice Cryptography Chris Peikert1 February 17, 2016 1Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Michigan. Much of this work was done while at the School of Computer Science, Georgia Institute of Technology. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under CAREER Award CCF-1054495, by DARPA under agreement number FA8750-11- C-0096, and by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation, DARPA or the U.S. Government, or the Sloan Foundation. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. Abstract n Lattice-based cryptography is the use of conjectured hard problems on point lattices in R as the foundation for secure cryptographic systems. Attractive features of lattice cryptography include apparent resistance to quantum attacks (in contrast with most number-theoretic cryptography), high asymptotic efficiency and parallelism, security under worst-case intractability assumptions, and solutions to long-standing open problems in cryptography. This work surveys most of the major developments in lattice cryptography over the past ten years. The main focus is on the foundational short integer solution (SIS) and learning with errors (LWE) problems (and their more efficient ring-based variants), their provable hardness assuming the worst-case intractability of standard lattice problems, and their many cryptographic applications. Contents 1 Introduction 3 1.1 Scope and Organization . .4 1.2 Other Resources . .5 2 Background 6 2.1 Notation .
    [Show full text]
  • CRYSTALS-Dilithium: a Lattice-Based Digital Signature Scheme
    CRYSTALS-Dilithium: A Lattice-Based Digital Signature Scheme Léo Ducas1, Eike Kiltz2, Tancrède Lepoint3, Vadim Lyubashevsky4, Peter Schwabe5, Gregor Seiler6 and Damien Stehlé7 1 CWI, Netherlands 2 Ruhr Universität Bochum, Germany 3 SRI International, USA 4 IBM Research – Zurich, Switzerland 5 Radboud University, Netherlands 6 IBM Research – Zurich and ETH Zurich, Switzerland 7 ENS de Lyon, France Abstract. In this paper, we present the lattice-based signature scheme Dilithium, which is a component of the CRYSTALS (Cryptographic Suite for Algebraic Lattices) suite that was submitted to NIST’s call for post-quantum cryptographic standards. The design of the scheme avoids all uses of discrete Gaussian sampling and is easily implementable in constant-time. For the same security levels, our scheme has a public key that is 2.5X smaller than the previously most efficient lattice-based schemes that did not use Gaussians, while having essentially the same signature size. In addition to the new design, we significantly improve the running time of the main component of many lattice-based constructions – the number theoretic transform. Our AVX2-based implementation results in a speed-up of roughly a factor of 2 over the previously best algorithms that appear in the literature. The techniques for obtaining this speed-up also have applications to other lattice-based schemes. Keywords: Lattice Cryptography · Digital Signatures · Constant-Time Implementa- tion · AVX2 1 Introduction Cryptography based on the hardness of lattice problems is seen as a very promising replacement of traditional cryptography after the eventual coming of quantum computers. In this paper, we present a new digital signature scheme Dilithium, whose security is based on the hardness of finding short vectors in lattices.
    [Show full text]
  • High-Speed Signatures from Standard Lattices
    High-speed signatures from standard lattices Özgür Dagdelen1, Rachid El Bansarkhani1, Florian Göpfert1, Tim Güneysu2, Tobias Oder2, Thomas Pöppelmann2, Ana Helena Sánchez3, and Peter Schwabe3 ? 1 Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] 2 Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany [email protected] 3 Digital Security Group, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands [email protected], [email protected] Abstract. At CT-RSA 2014 Bai and Galbraith proposed a lattice-based signature scheme optimized for short signatures and with a security re- duction to hard standard lattice problems. In this work we first refine the security analysis of the original work and propose a new 128-bit se- cure parameter set chosen for software efficiency. Moreover, we increase the acceptance probability of the signing algorithm through an improved rejection condition on the secret keys. Our software implementation tar- geting Intel CPUs with AVX/AVX2 and ARM CPUs with NEON vector instructions shows that even though we do not rely on ideal lattices, we are able to achieve high performance. For this we optimize the matrix- vector operations and several other aspects of the scheme and finally compare our work with the state of the art. Keywords: Signature scheme, standard lattices, vectorization, Ivy Bridge. 1 Introduction Most practical lattice-based signatures [7, 16, 21], proposed as post-quantum [9] alternatives to RSA and ECDSA, are currently instantiated and implemented using structured ideal lattices [30] corresponding to ideals in rings of the form Z[x]=hfi, where f is a degree-n irreducible polynomial (usually f = xn +1).
    [Show full text]
  • Ideal Lattices: Cryptographic Applications and Open Problems
    Ideal Lattices: cryptographic applications and open problems Daniele Micciancio (UCSD) based on joint work with Vadim Lyubashevsky (UCSD) Outline ● Basing cryptography on lattices ● Average-case vs. worst-case complexity ● Cyclic lattices and generalizations ● Connections to algebraic number theory ● (Implementation issues) ● Open problems Point Lattices ● Set of all integer linear combinations of basis ⊂ n vectors B = [b1,...,bn] R ● L(B)={Bx: x Zn} ⊂ span(B)={Bx: x Rn} b1+3b2 B b1 b2 Successive Minima ● For every n-dimensional lattice L, and i=1,...,n, the ith successive minimum l(L) is the smallest radius r i such that Ball(0,r) contains i linearly independent lattice vectors λ1 λ2 Lattice problems ● Shortest Vector Problems (SVP) – Given a lattice L, find the nonzero lattice vector v closest to the origin (||v|| g l1(L)) ● Shortest Independent Vect. Prob. (SIVP) – Given a lattice L, find n lin. independent vectors v1,...,vn of length maxi ||vi|| g ln(L) ● Approximation factor g(n) usually a function of the lattice dimension n. Complexity of SVP & SIVP ● No polytime algorithm is known for g(n)=nO(1) ● Best polytime algorithm achieve g(n)=2O(n log log n/log n) [LLL'82, Schnorr'87+Ajtai,Kumar,Sivakumar'01] ● NP-hard for any constant approximation factors [Ajtai98, Mic98/01, Khot04, Blomer&Seifert'99] ● Conjecture: SVP and SIVP are hard to approximate within polynomial factors. ● Hardness of approximating SVP and SIVP used in cryptography Hard in practice? ● [LLL] & variants perform much better on random lattices than exponential worst
    [Show full text]
  • Ideal Lattices Eva Bayer-Fluckiger
    11 Ideal Lattices Eva Bayer-Fluckiger Introduction An ideal lattice is a pair (I, b), where I is an ideal of a number field, and b is a lattice, satisfying an invariance relation (see §1 for the precise definition). Ideal lattices naturally occur in many parts of number theory, but also in other areas. They have been studied in special cases, but, as yet, not much in general. In the special case of integral ideal lattices, the survey paper Bayer-Fluckiger (1999) collects and slightly extends the known results. The first part of the paper (see §2) concerns integral ideal lattices, and states some classification problems. In §3, a more general notion of ideal lattices is introduced, as well as some examples in which this notion occurs. The aim of §4istodefine twisted embeddings, generalising the canonical embedding of a number field. This section, as well as the subsequent one, is de- voted to positive definite ideal lattices with respect to the canonical involution of the real etale´ algebra generated by the number field. These are also called Arakelov divisors of the number field. The aim of §5 is to study invariants of ideals and also of the number field derived from Hermite type invariants of the sphere packings associated to ideal lattices. This again gives rise to several open questions. 1Definitions, notation and basic facts A lattice is a pair (L, b), where L is a free Z-module of finite rank, and b : L × L → R is a non-degenerate symmetric bilinear form. We say that (L, b) is an integral lattice if b(x, y) ∈ Z for all x, y ∈ L.
    [Show full text]
  • Compact Lattice Signatures
    Compact Lattice Signatures Dipayan Das1 and Vishal Saraswat2 1Department of Mathematics, National Institute of Technology (NIT), Durgapur, India 2Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Jammu, India Keywords: Compact Lattice-based Signatures, Short Signatures, Short Keys, Provable Security. Abstract: Lattice-based signature schemes have seen many improvements in the past few years with recent at- tempts (Guneysu¨ et al., 2012; Ducas et al., 2013; Ducas et al., 2014; Lyubashevsky, 2016; Ducas et al., 2017) to bring lattice-based signature schemes at par with the traditional number-theoretic signature schemes. However, the trade-off between the signature size and the key size, time for a signature generation, and the practical and provable security is not necessarily the optimal. We propose a compact lattice-based signature scheme with key-size and signatures of order n, where n is the dimension of the lattice. The proposed signa- ture scheme has faster algorithms for key generation, signing, and verification than the existing schemes. The proposed scheme is simple and is competitive with the other post-quantum signature schemes. 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Related Work The lattice-based public key cryptographic prim- The recently proposed lattice-based signature itives like encryption schemes (Hoffstein et al., schemes can be broadly distinguished into two 1998; Lyubashevsky et al., 2013) and digital signa- categories. The schemes in the first category fol- tures (Ducas et al., 2013; Lyubashevsky, 2016; Ducas low the hash-and-sign paradigm and use the GPV et al., 2017; Ducas et al., 2014), is almost close to be- sampling (Gentry et al., 2008) procedure to produce ing used as an alternative to the traditional schemes basis that is used as a trapdoor for the key generation in respect to size and computation time.
    [Show full text]
  • Ideal Lattices
    Ideal Lattices Vadim Lyubashevsky Tel-Aviv University Ideal Lattice FAQs Q: What are ideal lattices? A: They are lattices with some additional algebraic structure. Lattices are groups Ideal Lattices are ideals Q: What can we do with ideal lattices? A: 1. Build efficient cryptographic primitives 2. Build a homomorphic encryption scheme Cyclic Lattices A set L in Zn is a cyclic lattice if: 1.) For all v,w in L, v+w is also in L -1 2 3 -4 + -7 -2 3 6 = -8 0 6 2 2.) For all v in L, -v is also in L -1 2 3 -4 1 -2 -3 4 3.) For all v in L, a cyclic shift of v is also in L -1 2 3 -4 -4 -1 2 3 -13 -24 -13 -24 -12 23 -43 -41 Cyclic Lattices = Ideals in Z[x]/(xn-1) A set L in Zn is a cyclic lattice if L is an ideal in Z[x]/(xn-1) 1.) For all v,w in L, v+w is also in L -1 2 3 -4 + -7 -2 3 6 = -8 0 6 2 (-1+2x+3x2-4x3)+(-7-2x+3x2+6x3)=(-8+0x+6x2+2x3) 2.) For all v in L, -v is also in L -1 2 3 -4 1 -2 -3 4 (-1+2x+3x2-4x3) (1-2x-3x2+4x3) 3.) For all v in L, a cyclic shift of v is also in L vx is also in L -1 2 3 -4 -1+2x+3x2-4x3 -4 -1 2 3 (-1+2x+3x2-4x3)x=-4-x+2x2+3x3 -13 -24 -13 -24 (-1+2x+3x2-4x3)x2 =3-4x-x2+2x3 -12 23 -43 -41 (-1+2x+3x2-4x 3)x3 =2+3x-4x2-x3 Why Cyclic Lattices? ● Succinct representations – Can represent an n-dimensional lattice with 1 vector ● Algebraic structure – Allows for fast arithmetic (using FFT) – Makes proofs possible ● NTRU cryptosystem (fast but no proofs) ● One-way functions based on the worst-case hardness of SVP in cyclic lattices [Mic02] Is SVPpoly(n) Hard for Cyclic Lattices? Short answer: we don't know but conjecture it is.
    [Show full text]
  • Ideal Lattices and the Structure of Rings(J)
    IDEAL LATTICES AND THE STRUCTURE OF RINGS(J) BY ROBERT L. BLAIR It is well known that the set of all ideals(2) of a ring forms a complete modular lattice with respect to set inclusion. The same is true of the set of all right ideals. Our purpose in this paper is to consider the consequences of imposing certain additional restrictions on these ideal lattices. In particular, we discuss the case in which one or both of these lattices is complemented, and the case in which one or both is distributive. In §1 two strictly lattice- theoretic results are noted for the sake of their application to the comple- mented case. In §2 rings which have a complemented ideal lattice are con- sidered. Such rings are characterized as discrete direct sums of simple rings. The structure space of primitive ideals of such rings is also discussed. In §3 corresponding results are obtained for rings whose lattice of right ideals is complemented. In particular, it is shown that a ring has a complemented right ideal lattice if and only if it is isomorphic with a discrete direct sum of quasi-simple rings. The socle [7](3) and the maximal regular ideal [5] are discussed in connection with such rings. The effect of an identity element is considered in §4. In §5 rings with distributive ideal lattices are considered and still another variant of regularity [20] is introduced. It is shown that a semi-simple ring with a distributive right ideal lattice is isomorphic with a subdirect sum of division rings.
    [Show full text]