SÜDOSTEUROPA, 54. Jg., 3/2006
Enver Hoxhaj *
The Politics of Partition in Kosovo
1. The Problem On the eve of a decision on Kosovo's final status, the Contact Group, meeting on 4 November 2005, ruled out the option of its ethnic and territorial partition be- tween Serbia and its Albanian majority.1 The Contact Group, comprising six powerful nations, (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US,) has a fundamental role in defining the final status of Kosovo, which has been adminis- tered by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) since June 1999. The exclusion of ethnic partition as a guiding principle is an important moment in the development of international policy in favour of a peaceful and long-term solu- tion. The reason for this is that partition would not end the Kosovo conflict, but instead could cause further violence, resulting in the creation of ethnically ho- mogenous territories through population transfers. Due to the mixed ethnic com- position of its population of around two million and its large size (10.887 km²), such a solution would not be in the political, economic, and social interests of the people of Kosovo. In addition, a conflict, which had been one between the Ser- bian state and Kosovo's Albanian majority for territory and power, could instead be turned into one within Kosovo and between its citizens. It would also beg questions about the morality of the international community's policy towards the Balkans, since the Yugoslav break-up of the 1990s, and of its humanitarian mili- tary intervention in the name of human rights and multi-ethnic societies. Further- more, it could call into question the feasibility and outcome of political processes in Bosnia and Macedonia and perhaps spark ethnic tensions within both Serbia and Montenegro. With the November 4 declaration, the Contact Group seems to be drawing a line in the sand, making clear that such scenarios cannot be allowed to arise. However, in the politics of ethnic conflict regulation, the argument for partition is not new. Its history in different parts of the world bears a bloody record of vio- lence, forced migration and frozen conflicts. But is the Contact Group really re- jecting partition? So far, its declarations have not been followed by actions.2
* Dr. Enver Hoxhaj, Associate Professor, University of Prishtina, Department of Political Science; Member of Parliament, Kosovo 1 Koha Ditore, 5 November 2005. 2 In fact the Contact Group, in April 2005, had already rejected the idea of partition, but it could, or did not, create mechanisms for implementing this policy. For a critical view, see International Crisis Group (ICG): Bridging Kosovo's Mitrovica Divide. Europe Report No. 165, 13 September 2005, available at
Furthermore, among its ten guiding principles, especially those concerning decen- tralisation, the position of the Kosovo Serbs and the protection of Serbian cultural and religious sites places, are provisions which could well lead to circumstances which result in nothing less than the formal, internal ethnic division of Kosovo. So far, the Contact Group has come to an important consensus on Kosovo's inde- pendence as a future option.3 However, if internal ethnic partition is the price of the settlement, and of independence, then this could destroy the possibility of Kosovo building a future civic state and a democratic political community based on citizenship, an aim that the Contact Group has also agreed by consensus. From the Serbian side, however the territorial and ethnic partition of Kosovo has been on its political agenda ever since NATO's military intervention and UNMIK's establishment in 1999. Indeed, it has already happened because the UN administration never gained control of, or united, the whole of Kosovo. Since its inception, UNMIK has allowed the operation of "parallel structures" of the Ser- bian state in the north and elsewhere throughout Kosovo. Thus, Serbia has achieved a de facto ethnic division along the Ibar River that divides the city of Mitrovica and the three other municipalities of Zubin Potok, Zvečan and Lepo- savić from the rest of Kosovo. Consequently, the Serbian governments, which have come to power since the fall of the Milošević regime in October 2000, have been promoting territorial solutions and options that are popular in public life. The politics of territoriality and partition are nothing new for Serbia though and indeed these are its traditional policies towards Kosovo. However, in the context of the status process, Belgrade seems either to be (1) trying to achieve the physi- cal detachment from Kosovo of the area around Mitrovica, if Kosovo becomes independent, or (2) the creation of an "entity" in the north and cantons with cul- tural and territorial autonomy for Serbian enclaves and religious sites within the rest. I believe that any form of formal partition would be extremely dangerous for Kosovo and the rest of the Balkans.4 Indeed the historic root of the conflict was the original ethnic partition of Albanian territories by Serbian occupation in 1912. Since this date, the history of that occupation has been marked by Serbian hege- monic rule, discrimination, apartheid and "ethnic cleansing". By contrast the fu- ture Kosovo needs to cast aside the politics of antagonism and territorially and replace them with the politics of accommodation. It needs to develop a stable de- mocratic political order, despite the deep ethnic cleavages of its society and create institutional space for its Serbs and other ethnic groups based on a civic contract and then to follow this with an effective state-building process. Kosovo's dilemma after the status settlement is that between becoming and remaining a functioning
3 See Koha Ditore, 25 December 2005; International Crisis Group (ICG): Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition. Europe Report No. 170, 17 February 2006, pp. 10–14, available at
2. Nation Building Kosovo presents today a typical exercise in nation or state building. For Francis Fukuyama this terminology "reflects the experience, in which culture and historical identity was heavily shaped by the political institutions like constitutionalism and democracy". 5 Such efforts first came to be known in the United States, where a nation arose out of state design. In Europe, there is clear distinction between nation and state; here "nation-building in the sense of the creation of a community bound together by shared history and culture" cannot be achieved by state construction. For that rea- son, Fukuyama believes that if a nation arises from the state, "it is more a matter of luck than design". For other authors this terminology includes other aspects. For Michael Ignatieff, nation building means today the experience of humanitar- ian military interventions after a state collapse.6 This is made possible in the world's dangers zones today rebuilding state order and reconstructing war-torn societies. For him such is the experience today not just in Kosovo and in Bosnia, but also Afghanistan and Iraq: These are the new "laboratories" of nation build- ing. Such humanitarian military interventions happened not only because of the human rights violations, but also for the sake of the regional stability and security. In the past, nation building was the result of decolonisation and the reconstruction of failed states. In the last few decades, UN peacekeeping and peace-building missions have been based on such experiences.7 Since nation building is a broad and vague term, many authors prefer to de- scribe such a phenomenon as state building. For Simon Chesterman the focus of UN missions like in Kosovo and elsewhere are actually the highest institutions of governance of the territory, in other words, the state authority. Thus we are not talking about a nation, i.e., a people who share a common history, customs and language, but about the rebuilding of the state's authority. Analysing UN transi- tional administrations and state-building exercises in such a context, he argues that,
5 Fukuyama, Francis: State-building. Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century. London: Profile Books, 2004, p. 134. 6 Ignatieff, Michael: Empire Lite. Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. London: Vintaga, 2003, pp. 1–24, 109–127. 7 Boyce, James K.: Investing in Peace. Aid and Conditionality after Civil Wars. Adelphi Paper, Vol. 351 (September 2002), International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; Caplan, Richard: A New Trusteeship? The In- ternational Administration of War-Torn Territories. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; Chesterman, Simon: Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and In- ternational Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Dobbins, James: America's Role in Nation-Building. From Germany to Iraq. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003. The Politics of Partition in Kosovo 383
"the term state-building refers to extended international involvement (pri- marily through not exclusively, through the United Nations) that goes be- yond traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates, and is directed in constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of pro- viding citizens with physical and economic security. This includes quasi- governmental activities such as electoral assistance, human rights and rule of law technical assistance, security sector reform, and certain forms of de- velopment assistance." 8 Whatever the case is for Kosovo's, I think that there are three distinct aspects of its nation and/or state building: The first concern of post conflict reconstruction presented an exercise in ex- tending administrative and civil functions throughout the territory.9 The mandate for this sprang from Security Council resolution 1244, which was to be carried out by UNMIK.10 Among priorities were humanitarian relief, technical assistance for supporting the return of refugees, reconstruction of houses and restoring the banking and payments system. Another concern was stability, which was dealt with by the deployment of KFOR peacekeeping troops responsible for internal and regional stability and a UN police mission responsible for the maintenance of security. The creation of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) was part of this exer- cise, including here the demobilizing of the KLA and the establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) that was to absorb many of its former fighters. Because of the need to create a state authority, UNMIK concentrated on the con- solidation of its power and creation of administrative structures. It created four so-called pillars for humanitarian issues, civil administration, democracy building and elections and reconstruction and economic development. A "Joint Interim Administration" was formed comprising 20 departments that functioned like min- istries, staffed and lead jointly by internationals and locals. Department heads par-
8 Chesterman, Simon: You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 5. 9 For this phase, see Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 10 of Secu- rity Council Resolution 1244 (1999), S/1999/672, 12 June 1999; Report[s] of the Secre- tary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999; S/1999/987, 16 Sept. 1999; S/1999/1250/Add.1, 23 Dec. 1999; S/1999/1250, 23 Dec. 1999; S/2000/177, 3 Mar. 2000; S/2000/177/Add.1, 3 Mar. 2000; S/2000/177/Add.2, 28 Mar. 2000; S/2000/177/Add.3, 25 May 2000; S/2000/538, 6 June 2000; S/2000/538/Add.1, 29 June 2000; S/2000/1196, 15 Decem- ber 2000; S/2001/218, 13 Mar. 2001; S/2001/218/Add.1, 26 Mar. 2001; S/2001/926, 2 Oct. 2001; all available at
11 See
These tensions became stronger during preparations for the determination of final status and represent the third aim.18 This overlaps with the second, as it has to do with the strengthening of the PISG and the rule of law. Because of UNMIK's unclear mandate, the lack of operational policies and an exit strategy the transformation of politics, economics and society came to a delay. In April 2002, after three years of the "interim" administration, SRSG Michael Steiner presented a roadmap for final status. This policy called "Standards before Status," stated that in order to start addressing status issues, standards had to be fulfilled in eight key areas. These standards were the functioning of democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, return and reintegration of refugees, economic development, property rights, dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade and KPC reforms.19 It then took more than a year to begin their implementation as there was neither a plan on how to implement these standards, nor a deadline for com- pletion. In December 2002 a Security Council delegation came to Kosovo and recommended to UNMIK the creation of an implementation plan, active coopera- tion with the PSIG and ensuring local "ownership" for standards.20 But, still, noth- ing happened.21 It was only thanks to US pressure that in December 2003, an im- plementation plan was developed.22 In October 2005, a comprehensive report written by Kai Eide, Norway's ambassador to NATO and a Special Representa- tive of the UN Secretary General finally confirmed that enough progress had been made to begin discussions on Kosovo's "future status". On the other hand Eide's report also argued that the PISG should do more regarding the return of refuges, the integration of minorities, making government more effective and in the fields of the rule of law, the judiciary, corruption, property rights, health, education and so on. It also recommended that more work should be done in building a democ- ratic society as a whole.23
No. 10–12, pp. 516–535. 18 About this phase, see Report[s] of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/2004/71, 26 Jan. 2004; S/2004/348, 30 Apr. 2004; S/2004/907, 17 Nov. 2004; S/2005/88, 14 Feb. 2005; S/2005/335, 23 May 2005; all available at
Kosovo's nation-building practice shows that democracy can function only if there is first a state authority recognised by the population and outside actors, and second, if its territory and borders are not contested, and third, if the political sys- tem is able to accommodate different cultural groups, which can affirm their iden- tities within it.24 This is the case not only for Kosovo and within the Balkans, but also elsewhere. "Standards before Status" aimed to achieve these goals: Its basic principle was that unless Kosovo was multi-ethnic, it could not aspire to inde- pendence. Thus, Standards represented a policy of "earned sovereignty" and was a roadmap for the political process to final status.25 However, there are – I think one could say: there were – three developments, which have had a deep impact on the general situation since 1999 influencing the nation-building exercise and standards implementation in particular. In my view, they threaten Kosovo's future if not properly addressed in the status settlement. The first issue relates to self-determination.26 The demand for self-determi- nation has long been a main characteristic of Kosovo's history and political de- velopment. Ninety percent of Kosovo Albanians want nothing short of independ- ence. They regard themselves as a separate political community: they see them- selves as a group of people who recognize one another as belonging to the same community, who accept a particular commitment to each other and who seek their political independence. In fact, more than this, they share a common history, lan- guage and culture with Albanians in Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and in South Serbia and built together Rilindja, their national movement in the fight against the Ottoman Empire. Today they believe that after Kosovo's incorporation into Serbia in 1912-13, they each engaged in their own struggles against Serbian and Yugoslav regimes. In Kosovo, they built their own public culture, and its
24 For a theoretical discussion, see Rustow, Dankwart A.: Transition to Democracy. To- ward a Dynamic Model. In: Comparative Politics, Vol. 2 (1970), pp. 337–363, pp. 350–353; Schmitter, Philippe C.: Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy. In: Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5 (1994), No. 2, pp. 65–67. 25 This idea was initiated by the so called "Goldstone Commission", which published two report on this issue (available at
27 In details, see Brunner, Georg: Völkerrecht und Selbstbestimmungsrecht in Kosovo. In: Clewing, Konrad and Reuter, Jens (Koordination): Der Kosovo-Konflikt. Ursachen – Akteure – Verlauf. München: Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, 2000, pp. 117–135. 28 Chesterman, You, the People, op. cit. (above n. 8), pp. 204–205. 29 Wood, Nicholas: UN effort to rebuild Kosovo loses steam. In: International Herald Tribune, September 30, 2005, p.2. 30 United Nations S/RES/1244, Preface. 31 In 2000, UN Security Council created in East Timor a transitional administration with effective sovereignty over this territory until its independence, which made its mission to be a successful one. About this view, see Chesterman, You, the People, op. cit. (above n. 8), pp. 135–145. 32 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 November 2005. 388 Enver Hoxhaj the operation of Serbian state parallel structures within Kosovo. The consequence of this was the de-facto ethnic division of the north, including the northern part of the city of Mitrovica, Zvečan, Zubin Potok and Leposavić. Thus, these areas had nothing in common with the rest of the territory and its public life. This situation was also in contradiction to the aims of the Constitutional Framework, which de- clared: "Kosovo is an entity with an interim international administration, which, with its people, has unique historical, legal, cultural and linguistic attributes [....]" and over which the PISG "shall exercise their responsibilities".33 Thus neither UNMIK nor the PISG were able to govern an undivided territory, something which SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen himself confirmed.34 This is a situation that Kosovo's Albanian political leadership has systematically condemned, warning that if UNMIK cannot create conditions to overcome ethnic division, then this could affect the final status settlement and partition could thus be a very likely scenario. The third development has much in common with the first and second. Self- determination does not mean shifting from a nationally heterogeneous community to one that is ethnically homogenous. Kosovo has always been a land of social diversity with its peoples divided along the lines of ethnicity and religion. Both these elements have played a crucial role in building the identities of Albanians, Serbs, Slavic Muslims, Turks and Roma. Thus, the division between Albanians and Serbs is linguistic as they speak different languages, they are different by vir- tue of their ethnic origins but it is also religious as the first are Muslims and sec- ond Eastern Orthodox. However, it must be noted that Islam has no importance in the building of Albanian identity. Hence, the division is primarily because of eth- nicity and culture rather than religion. Additionally, amongst Albanians there is also a significant Roman Catholic minority. Despite a long history of conflict however, Noel Malcolm is right when he argues, "over the many centuries in Kosovo the ethnic divisions between Serbs and Albanians were never entirely clear-cut. There was ethnic-linguistic assimi- lation in both directions; and enough of shared way of life […]". 35 For these historic, identity and demographic reasons, it is clear that Kosovo's population should remain ethnically and religiously diverse as in the past. There- fore, it is from this starting point that a consensus on building a civic state and a political community based on citizenship should begin.36 Both, the civic state and
33 Constitutional Framework (above n. 15), Chapter 1. 34 UNMIK Press Conference, Pristina, 17 August 2004, available at
where the rights, interests and identities of all communities living in Kosovo are guar- antied according European and international minority standards; available at
3. Another Balkan Frankenstein? "It is always the powerful who dictate what the borders will be, never the weak. Thus, we must be powerful".42 So said Slobodan Milošević, the President of Ser- bia at the height of his power and speaking to the Serbian parliament 1991. This quote reflects not only his political agenda in the context of the Yugoslav disinte- gration and the wars within this multi-ethnic state but wars waged with the pur- pose of the occupation and control of territories and the moving of ethnic borders through "ethnic cleansing".43 This quote expresses not only the concept of the Serbian elites on the relation between state and territory in pre communist Serbia but also reflects current post communist politics after Milošević with regard to Kosovo.44 My argument that follows here is that this quote represents Belgrade's policy towards Kosovo in the context of the final status process. The president of Serbia, Boris Tadić indeed confirmed this recently during his visit to the Krem- lin.45 Taking about the current and future position of the Kosovo Serbs he pointed out that decentralisation should create two separate entities, one Serbian and one Albanian. Further, he said that if the right to self-determination and the creation of a new state was granted to Kosovo Albanians, then the same rights should be granted to the Republika Srpska in Bosnia. Highlighting the position of Mr Tadić does not mean that he, as a western orientated politician can be compared with Milošević, but simply that both their
42 Cigar, Norman: Genocide in Bosnia. The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing". College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1995, p. 42. 43 Silber, Laura and Little, Allan: The Death of Yugoslavia. London: Penguin 1995; Glenny, Misha: The Fall of Yugoslavia. The Third Balkan War. London: Penguin Books, 1992; Pešić, Vesna: The War for Ethnic States. In: Popov, Nebojša (ed.): The Road to War in Serbia. Trauma and Catharsis. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000, pp. 9–50. 44 Cf. Kosovo. Unresolved und Left Behind. In: Economist, 28 July 2003, p. 33; Cohen, Roger: Crack in Serb Armor gives U.S. an Opening. In: International Herald Tribune, June 25, 2005, p. 2; Meier, Viktor: Jugoslawiens Erben. Die neuen Staaten und die Politik des Westens. München: C.H. Beck Verlag 2001, pp. 43–118; Kramer, Helmut and Džihić,Vedran: Die Kosovo Bilanz. Scheitert die Internationale Gemeinschaft? Wien: Lit Verlag, 2005, pp. 175–178. 45 Radio B 92, 25 November 2005, available at
46 Mala-Imami, Naile: Ideja për ndarjën e Kosovës nuk është e re në Serbi [The Idea of Partition of Kosovo Is Nothing New in Serbia]. In: Koha Ditore, 17 August 2005, p. 6; Koha Ditore, 18 August 2005. 47 International Crisis Group (ICG): Kosovo. Toward Final Status. Europe Report No. 161, 24 January 2005, pp. 13–18, available at
50 More about his view, see Večernje Novosti, 07 March 2003; Koha Ditore, 18 January 2003, 03 February 2003, 25 February 2003; Economist, 15 February 2003. 51 Interview with Zoran Živković. In: Musliu, Fahri and Banjac, Dragan (eds.): Untying the Kosovo Knot. A Two-Sided View. Helsinki Files 20, Belgrade, 2005, p. 44. See also his interview in: Der Spiegel, 17 May 2005. 52 Interview with Vuk Drašković. In: Musliu and Banjac (eds.), op. cit. (above n. 51), pp. 13–19. 53 Cigar, Norman: Vojislav Koštunica and Serbia's Future. London: Saqi Books, 2001, p. 44. The Politics of Partition in Kosovo 393 rity". In his first speech to parliament on 2 March 2004 as he assumed the job of premier, he presented a program for cantonisation of Kosovo.54 Two weeks later, the eruption of violence in Kosovo on March 17 confirmed his view that multi- ethnicity there was impossible and that the riots only served to prove his point: "No matter what we call it – decentralisation, cantonisation, it makes no dif- ference – some kind of the autonomy must be given to Serbs in Kosovo".55 Some six weeks later on April 29, the Serbian parliament approved the gov- ernment's "Plan for the Political Solution to the Situation in Kosovo and Meto- hija", which had been drawn up by Koštunica's advisers.56 It did not explain what should happen with Kosovo's PISG, nor whether they should somehow be tied to the Serbian authorities in Belgrade. The plan foresees a solution by means of separating Kosovo Serbs from the Albanian majority through a "proper territorial organisation of the province". In order to accomplish this, it suggests the estab- lishment of five autonomous districts within Kosovo, which should be coordi- nated by a joint regional assembly and an executive council. These districts should have broad governance responsibilities in the fields of the judiciary, secu- rity, education, health, social policy, forestry and agriculture and natural and min- eral resources, including the privatization of social property. However, these re- sponsibilities are not easy to exercise at a local level thus the proposal that these Serbian areas create a system of governance completely separate from UNMIK and the PISG. However, the suggested districts do not reflect the ethnic composi- tion on the ground. Out of thirty municipalities only in five, Štrpce, Novo Brdo, Leposavić, Zubin Potok and Zvečan are Serbs in a majority. Thus, the plan sug- gests the exchange of territories, private property and people. It also, in its most unrealistic suggestion, proposes that Albanian majority inhabited land surround- ing these five districts be incorporated into them. In terms of security, it recom- mends the creation of "civil defence forces" somewhat akin to paramilitary for- mations founded and supported by Serbia, which would protect local Serbs. The result would thus be armed citizens living in separate Albanian and Serbian terri- tories in constant fear of attack, which would lay the basis for a state of affairs of permanent conflict and violence within Kosovo.57 While this plan received the unanimous support of the Serbian parliament, it also received unexpected and indirect criticism from the writer Dobrica Čosić, who is widely viewed as the ideological father of Serbian nationalism and is one
54 Koštunica's speech is available at
58 Dragović-Soso, Jasna: 'Saviours of the Nation'. Serbia's Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism. London: Hurst, 2002, pp. 36–42, 50–61, 86–97, 122–126, 141– 145, 169–187. 59 Čosić, Dobrica: Kosovo. Beograd: Novosti, 2004, pp. 252, 254, 255. 60 For the position of Miroljub Labus, Vice Prime Minister of Serbia, see Politika, 6 No- vember 2004. The same position was assumed by Čedomir Antić, historian and mem- ber of liberal group G 17, see VIP, 24 March 2004. Regarding the position of the Ser- bian elite on this issue, see also The Guardian, 23 March 2004. 61 Contact Group Political Directors visit to Belgrade and Prishtina. In: Musliu and Ban- jac (eds.), Untying the Kosovo Knot, op. cit. (above n. 51), pp. 294–296. The Politics of Partition in Kosovo 395 the south while keeping the north would be an outcome in which, at the end, both sides would agrees. It would be a compromise, with Albanians getting the inde- pendence of most of the territory while Serbia's leadership would save face in front of its citizens for losing Kosovo. The second scenario foresees independ- ence of the whole of Kosovo within its existing borders. In this case, Belgrade would aim at an internal ethnic division on the Bosnian or Cyprus model. This would mean that northern Kosovo – that is to say the Serb-run north of the city of Mitrovica plus the regions of Zvečan, Leposavić and Zubin Potok – would form a legal entity. In rest of territory, south of the river Ibar, which divides Mitrovica, its goal would be territorial autonomy or cantons for Serbs, who today live in Serb majority areas around Štrpce, Novo Brdo, Kamenica, Gjilani, Rahovec, Peja, Obiliq, Gračanica, Prishtina and other cities. Territorial cum cultural autonomous status for Serbian Orthodox monasteries and churches would also be part of this scenario. Serbian autonomous areas would also have special political and legal links to Serbia under this plan. My concern is that both these territorial scenarios represent a risk for both Kosovo and the Western Balkans. These strategies of conflict resolution would not be in the interests of the Kosovo Serbs, as they could not be accomplished without an exchange of people, territories and ethnic violence. Only in the area north of the river Ibar, is there a compact Serb majority where such policy could be accomplished. But if this was to be the case it could produce an unforeseen ef- fect: There are some 130.000 Serbs in Kosovo today of whom two-thirds of them, up to 75.000 people, live south of the Ibar. If the international community were to accept such a policy, it would make it impossible to protect these Serbs from Al- banian extremists, who would argue for the same homogenous ethnic territory as the Serbs had in the north. Likewise, the internal ethnic division of Kosovo would make it a weak state, without political and social cohesion, and thus its state building would be condemned to fail in advance. Such a division would also lead to a disastrous recycling of the conflict as in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Palestine, India, and other places. The current debate on the Dayton Accord, the modifica- tion of the Bosnian constitution and the attempts to build a stronger central state in Bosnia, thus attempting to move powers from the "entities" with their own separate territories and governments to the centre, illustrates what went wrong there and what lessons were learned by the international community. The di- lemma here is whether post status Kosovo should be a new political community based on citizenship as in Macedonia or a second Balkan Frankenstein resembling Bosnia.62 At the Dayton talks in November 1995, Milošević's goal was to undermine Bosnia's future and create a weak or failed state in advance. His successors appear to have the same goal for Kosovo. They aim to do this via decentralisation and territorial reorganisation. In January 2006, the Serbian negotiating team appointed Tadić, Koštunica and Drašković, and suggested a new plan for decentralisation.63
62 Bosnia, 10 Years Later. In: International Herald Tribune, November 25, 2005, p. 8. 63 Platform of the Republic of Serbia and of Serbia and Montenegro for the Negotiation 396 Enver Hoxhaj
While this plan once again promoted the concept of a Serbian territorial entity, which would include not only the existing Serbian municipalities but also create new ones plus one of "multi-ethnic composition", it also suggests the creation of "protection zones" for religious cites as the Peč Patriarchate, the monastery of Vi- soki Dečani, the church of Bogorodica Ljeviška, the St. Archangels, Dević mon- asteries and other thirty churches. According to this updated plan, Kosovo Serbs would constitute a separate political entity, linked to Belgrade. They would have their own municipalities, legal and constitutional guarantees, territorial and cul- tural autonomy and of course, they would oversee the protection of Serbian reli- gious and cultural heritage sites. It foresees autonomy for policing, for the judici- ary, in health, social, financial and economic policies. The platform thus suggests autonomy for Serbs in a Kosovo, which would in turn be an autonomous but inte- gral part of Serbia &Montenegro and now presumably just Serbia since the de- mise of that state. Despite its new language, the plan represents the spirit of Day- ton, i.e., creating a state within a state.64 Compared to earlier plans which we have examined this one contains a certain irony. It stresses that the existence of a Ser- bian entity would not destroy Kosovo's territorial unity and would not be a "base for its partition". A final point here: Belgrade's discourse on decentralisation and the position of Kosovo's Serb minority illustrates a paradox. This is that Serbia is the most centralised state in the Balkans and despite being five times larger than Kosovo it has never developed a plan for its own decentralisation and territorial reorganisa- tion. Although a Hungarian minority inhabits Vojvodina (whose autonomy was also abolished in the 1990s by the Milošević regime), while large numbers of Slavic Muslims and Albanians populate Sanđžak and the Preševo regions respec- tively, devolution has never been a domestic concern for Serbia. Still, there is no doubt that the decentralisation of Kosovo would provoke a chain reaction in Ser- bia with each of these three minorities demanding similar internal and/or external territorial solutions.65 Indeed, in January 2006 Albanians in Preševo formulated a platform demanding union with Kosovo if the international community allowed
Talks on Decentralization in Kosovo. Belgrade, February 2006; for a condensed version of Parts II and III of the Platform adopted by the Serbian negotiating team on 5 January 2006, see Platform on the Future Status of Kosovo and Metohija,
4. Accommodation Since the birth of the nation-state in Eighteenth-century Europe, there has been an ongoing debate about whether to organise power based on identity or reason.68 Since then, ethnic dimension of politics and ethnic conflicts have profoundly in- fluenced the external shape of empires and states, their expansions and contrac- tions in Europe and elsewhere. In the Balkans, the fall of the Ottoman Empire at beginning of the 20c and communist Yugoslavia at its end, demonstrated that states are not just territories with borders. States also include people, who can be their citizens, albeit of different ethnic, religious and social backgrounds. Thus, ethnic politics also affects the internal shape of the state, its territorial organisa- tion and its policies. Nevertheless, states require cohesive ideas and identities to legitimate themselves. In the European tradition, it has mostly been one ethnic group or nation that frames the politics, society and economy of any one given state.69 But the main question has always been how a larger ethnic group sees its relations with smaller ones and the way that the smaller ones see their relations to the larger one. This issue is also the key problem for many Balkan countries and remains the central issue for Kosovo. Although for Kosovars independence means the creation of a culturally heterogonous state which will protect and promote mi- nority rights, and create rich patterns of social diversity regardless of ethnicity and religion, the way it has been governed since 1999 is far from being the best way in which to achieve this aim. The power-sharing governing model of the PISG strongly improved the positions of all minorities, not just Serbs. However, Serbs do not recognise the authority of the PISG and on the PISG has not been committed to improving their situation. Kosovo Serbs argue that they want to re- main part of Serbia because their rights will not be protected in an independent state.70 By contrast, the Albanian leadership in Prishtina believes that their future and security will be guaranteed only in independent country. Whether or not Serb
66 Koha Ditore, 26 December 2005, 15 January 2006; Zëri, 16 January 2005. 67 Martens, Michael: Permanente Identitätskrise. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 April 2006, p. 10. 68 For the debate and different views, see Schöpflin, George: Nation, Identity, Power. The New Politics of Europe. London: Hurst, 2002, pp. 9–66. 69 For the Yugoslav case, see Schöpflin, George: The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia. In: McGarry, John and O'Leary, Brendan (eds.): The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation. Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts. 3London, New York: Routledge, 1997, pp. 172–204. 70 See Mateeva, Anna and Paes, Wolf-Christian: The Kosovo Serbs. An Ethnic Minority Between Collaboration and Defiance. Bonn: International Centre for Conversion, June 2003, pp. 21–38. 398 Enver Hoxhaj rights will be better or worse served in a post status Kosovo, amply illustrates the complexity of the situation. It demonstrates that ethnic politics in Kosovo have both a symbolic and a material aspect, which is to say the public recognition of group identities and redistribution of resources to these groups.71 In order to address both these aspects with regard to the integration of Serbs into Kosovo's institutions and public life, their situation should be seen in re- sponse to both their practical needs today and their past in this area. During the twentieth century, Kosovo Serbs experienced different social and economic con- ditions and consequently two quite different communities evolved. The first is that of rural Serbs, who live and work the land their family has owned for genera- tions. Like rural Albanians, these people never or at least rarely received any help from the state. The second community is that of urban Serbs, who since 1912/13 and in communist Yugoslavia received state support and held the best jobs in both the administration and the socialist economy. Theirs was a privileged status, rep- resenting a Herrenvolk due to their association with the state. Many of these peo- ple were also originally from Serbia. Generally, Kosovo Serbs have represented a minority of around 10% of the population while the Albanian majority has made up around 90% of Kosovo's people. The last census was conducted in 1991 by the Milošević regime and was boycotted by Albanians. Since then there have been no reliable population figures. Yet, according to the 1991 census there were 194,190 Kosovo Serbs who represented 9.9% of a population of 1,956.196 inhabitants.72 In the past and today, however population figures have always been misrepresented. Thus, after 1999, Belgrade manipulated the numbers of Kosovo Serbs by pretend- ing that 200.000 of them had left Kosovo. The perception that this was true how- ever strongly affected their will to integrate into Kosovo's governing institutions and international minority policy too. However, a study carried out by the Berlin based think tank, the European Stability Initiative (ESI) has argued that the wide- spread belief that the majority of Serbs left Kosovo in 1999 is simply false and that the reality of the war and the post-war situation have affected differently rural and urban Serbs.73 While in the cities of Prishtina, Peja and Prizren many Serbs left with the withdrawal of the Serbian state, in the countryside a large proportion of the rural community remained despite the difficult post-war economic situa- tion. Based on Serbian government sources, ESI calculated out that there were some 130.000 Serbs in Kosovo today.74 Of this number, it found that 75.000 lived
71 For theoretical aspects, see Miller, David: Citizenship and National Identity. Cam- bridge: Polity Press, 2005, pp. 62–81. 72 See Clewing, Konrad: Mythen und Fakten zur Ethnostruktur in Kosovo: Ein geschicht- licher Überblick. In: Clewing and Reuter (eds.), Der Kosovo-Konflikt, op. cit. (above n. 27), pp. 17–63, p. 51. 73 European Stability Initiative (ESI): People or Territory. A Proposal for Mitrovica. Ber- lin, Brussels, Sarajevo, 16 February 2004, pp. 6–17. 74 Zvanična prezentacija Koordinacionog centra Srbije za Kosovo i Metohiju: Principi organizovanja samouprave nacionalnih zajednica na Kosovo i Metohiji. [Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohia: Principles of the Organization of the Self-adminis- tration of the National Communities of Kosovo and Metohia]. Belgrade, January 2003. The Politics of Partition in Kosovo 399 in Albanian majority areas to the south of the river Ibar, while the rest, i.e., less than half the total number lived in the north, around Mitrovica. Thus, ESI con- cluded that only 65.000 Serbs left their homes and while Kosovo does not repre- sent a multi-ethnic paradise, it is still multi-ethnic just as many other Balkan countries. The fact that the majority of Serbs live spread across Kosovo, in Gračanica near Prishtina, Novobrdo, Gjilan, Kamenica, Šterpce, Rahovec and other rural re- gions is central for dealing with their situation both today and once status has been settled. In order to avoid the typical politics of antagonism, which have characterised politics since 1999, a post status Kosovo needs the politics of ac- commodation. It needs to develop a stable and integrated political order despite its ethnic divisions.75 Over and above the already developed mechanisms for mi- nority protection and equal representation in the PISG and Constitutional Frame- work, an interesting idea on how to deal with this issue has come from Hashim Thaçi, the former political head of the KLA and now the leader of the Democratic Party of Kosovo, the second largest in parliament. Although for him, Macedonia and Kosovo are, in terms of inter-ethnic relations not analogous, he argues that the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which ended the conflict there in 2001, could serve as good model for the accommodation of Kosovo's Serbs. He understands it as good basis for government and as a civic contract that will be the foundation of a future civic state.76 Even earlier, the International Crisis Group (ICG) developed a concept for a civic contract between Kosovo's Albanian majority and its minorities. They advo- cate the formula: "the government recognises and supports special rights for the minorities, and minorities acknowledge the authority of the government". They argue that "Serbs and other minorities must be given credible guarantees that they will have institutional space in Kosovo – the ability to protect and promote their rights through Kosovo's institutions." 77 To accomplish this ICG proposes the establishment of mechanisms to treat mi- norities as full and equal citizens, with rewards for good actions and clear penal- ties for bad ones. It suggests creating a committee on public services for minori- ties that would work to improve the positions of minorities and the dissolution of the Serbian state parallel structures. It supports the formulation of Charter of Rights that would consist of individual and minority rights and the creation of strong judicial mechanism for its implementation that would include international judges and prosecutors. Although the ICG proposal does not represent a detailed
This report gives the figure of 129.474 Serbs living in Kosovo. 75 Cf. Lijphart, Arend: The Politics of Accommodation. Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968. 76 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 27 May 2004. 77 International Crisis Group (ICG): Kosovo's Ethnic Dilemma. The Need for a Civic Con- tract. Europe Report No. 143, 2003, p. i, available at
78 On these events and different reactions, see Abramowitz, Morton: Going Backward in the Balkans. In: Washington Post, 19 March 2004, p. A23; Hitchner, Bruce R. and Wil- liams, Paul: A Defining Moment. In: The Baltimore Sun, 23 March 2004, p. 5; United Institute of Peace: Kosovo. Status with Standards. Washington D.C., 26.04.2004; Inter- national Crisis Group (ICG): Collapse in Kosovo. Europe Report No. 155, 22 April 2004, available at < http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2627&l=1>. 79 About the debate and different views on decentralization, see International Crisis Group (ICG): Kosovo after Haradinaj. Europe Report No.163, 26 May 2005, pp. 24–28, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3474&l=1>; Helsinski Komitet za Ljudska Prava u Srbiji: Srpsko-albanski dijalog 2005. Budući status Kosova [Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia: Serb-Albanian Dia- logue 2005: The Future Status of Kosovo]. Heslinske Sveske 21, Beograd, 2005, pp. 114–136. Koha Ditore, 10 September 2004; Zëri, 11 September 2004, 25 January 2005. 80 Cf. International Crisis Group (ICG), Bridging Kosovo's Mitrovica Divide, op. cit. The Politics of Partition in Kosovo 401 centralisation, which should even include the transfer of competencies in the fields of police, justice, education, culture, media and economics.81 It also advo- cates "horizontal links" between Serbian majority municipalities where Serbian state parallel structures could be turned into legitimate entities. It also proposes "protective space" for Serbian churches and monasteries, which should be secured by international military forces as crucial element of Serbian identity and world cultural heritage. Finally, Eide's recommendations with regard to the position of Kosovo Serbs vis-à-vis Kosovo's central institutions has created the common per- ception, of a possible internal ethnic and territorial division of Kosovo on the Bosnian model, if the international community as part of the status settlement should chose to go down this path.82 By contrast the platform of the Kosovo leadership regarding the reform of lo- cal government in the context of the final status settlement is guided by the prin- ciples of internal and external stability for the benefit of all citizens.83 It is based not on ethnicity and territoriality, but on citizenship, aiming at bringing decision- making closer to the people, at providing better services at a local level, at ensur- ing sustainable government and living conditions for all and integrating all com- munities into democratic institutions. It is a good foundation for stable long-term inter-ethnic relations and promotes the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of all communities. It is based on criteria such as the number of inhabi- tants, geographic features, available infrastructure, economic and financial sus- tainability and cultural and linguistic tradition of an area with regard to current and new municipal territories and their borders. It proposes the creation of new multi-ethnic municipalities with a non-Albanian majority and in particular, aims to accommodate the interests of the Serbian community through new municipali- ties, while taking into account their economic and financial viability. New mu- nicipalities should thus be formed in some areas based on the needs of minorities and in close cooperation with their leadership. The proposal regulates the ques- tion of municipal and delegated competencies, the appointment of senior officials, equitable representation, local finance, minority safeguards, voting mechanisms, use of language, education, freedom of association, media, use of symbols, inter- municipal cooperation, freedom of association, cross-border and international co- operation and other aspects. It also offers solutions as to how to overcome the di- vision of the city of Mitrovica by decentralisation and the creation of new admin- istrative units. Finally, the platform is based on the principles of functionality and modern standards of minority protection. We should bear in mind however that
(above n. 2), pp. i–iv. 81 United Nations Security Council (UNSC): A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo, op. cit. (above n. 23), pp. 16–17. 82 On Bosnia, see Hoch, Marc: Köder für den Balkan. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 Sep- tember 2005, p. 9. 83 Delegacioni i Kosovës për Status Final: Parimet themelore të reformës së pushtetit lo- kal në Kosovë. Prishtinë, 14 Shkurt 2006 [The Kosovo Delegation for Final Status: The Basic Principles for the Reform of Local Government in Kosovo. Prishtina, 14 Febru- ary 2006]. 402 Enver Hoxhaj today more than 30% of Kosovo's territory, especially in the north, is controlled by Serbian state parallel structures. This fact could shape both the external and internal future status settlement in the form of partition, if international commu- nity does not end the politics of territoriality.84
5. Conclusion This paper attempts to explain that ethnic internal or external partition is a dan- gerous option for Kosovo and for the Balkans and presents a potential scenario until a decision on final status is made. Moreover, partition would not resolve and improve the position of its citizens, but it would undermine Kosovo's future, its governing functionality, economic development and the modernization of its so- ciety. Ethnic conflict between Serbia and Kosovo's Albanian majority for territory and hegemony was created by the Serbian expansion at the beginning of the twen- tieth century. At the beginning of the new century, the conflict has gained a new dimension. From 1912 Kosovo represented an unresolved question of Albanian rights based on the principles of self-determination and secession for achieving its political independence. After the withdrawal of the Serbian state and its replace- ment by a UN "interim" administration, Belgrade aims to turn it into a question of a Serbian minority to which should be applied the same principles. After the loss of Kosovo, Serbia has redefined its state interest. It aims to secure as much terri- tory in Kosovo as possible and incorporate this into its political system through external partition. If this cannot be achieved, Serbia's second option is internal territorial and ethnic partition, including fragmenting Kosovo's institutions through decentralisation and territorial reorganization. The international commu- nity has ruled out external partition, and opposes Serbian tendencies for the crea- tion of a territorial and political entity within Kosovo. However, it does not ex- clude the idea of a Serbian entity in the North and of a strong decentralisation across Kosovo, which means new municipalities based on ethnic principles and with the powers and competencies of cantons. This could result in the construc- tion of "mini-state" within Kosovo's new state; an asymmetric ethno-federalism, in order to control it and make it a failed state.
84 The discussion on decentralization was shaped by different views on how, when and why to do it; see Zëri, 20 May 2005, 21 June 2005, 20 July 2005, 16 August 2005; Lajm, 19 December 2005, 11 January 2006; Zëri, 11 January 2006; Koha ditore, 14 January 2006, 15 January 2006. Regarding the different views on decentralisation after the beginning of talks between Kosovo and Serbia on final status, where decentralisa- tion and the position of local Serbs presents a crucial topic, see Express, 16 February 2006, 18 February 2006; Lajm, 27 February 2006; Koha Ditore 17 March 2006; Ex- press, 29 March 2006, 30 March 2006; Lajm, 31 March 2006; Express, 2 April 2006; Kosova Sot, 2 April 2006; Express 2 April 2006, 3 April 2006; Die Presse, 4 April 2006; Lajm, 6 April 2006; Koha Ditore, 8 April 2006; Epoka e Re, 8 April 2006; Ex- press, 12 April 2006; Koha Ditore, 17 April 2006, 19 April 2006; Zëri, 19 April 2006; Express, 19 April 2006; Lajm, 29 April 2006; Zëri, 29 April 2006. The Politics of Partition in Kosovo 403
This paper shows that both partition scenarios are more morally and political problematic than some imagine. They could cause a chain reaction of similar de- mands across the Western Balkans, followed by ethnic violence and aspirations for national, homogeneous states or entities within states. Other partitions in his- tory (Ireland, Palestine, Cyprus, Bosnia) show that the politics of partition might turn into divide and be forced to stay. By contrast to self-determination, partition could not successfully end the conflict and outside powers would be forced into long-term involvements. Military intervention and "interim" administrations won't be able to walk away from the region, and partition would feed ambitions for ethnic states which would result in decades of instability in a chronically vola- tile region, demanding in turn yet more military and security forces to keep the peace. Not Kosovo's independence, but its partition would result in a domino ef- fect from other ethnic groups in the Balkans. Independence, however, would mean not shifting from a national and heterogeneous community to one that is ethnically homogenous. It would also not mean the exchanging or changing of populations, territory and borders. Such a solution would lead to a situation, which the international community has been trying to achieve since the beginning of the Yugoslav collapse, namely providing the Western Balkans with the pre- dictability and stability necessary for reform, for EU integration and multicultur- alism.