'A Vision for Building the Egyptian Nation'

Faculty of Arts and Philosophy

Seppe Malfait

‘A Vision for Building the Egyptian Nation’

A Discourse Theoretical Analysis of President Morsi’s Hegemonic Renaissance Project

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Oriental Languages and Cultures

2013

Supervisor Prof. dr. Giovanni Schallenbergh

Co-supervisor Dr. Brecht De Smet

Abstract

Dutch

Deze scriptie onderzoekt de discursieve strategie van de Egyptische president Muhammad Morsi gedurende de eerste zes maanden van zijn termijn. Daartoe worden speeches, interviews, beslissingen, decreten en andere acties van Morsi geanalyseerd aan de hand van het discourstheoretische begrippenapparaat van Laclau en Mouffe. Dit onderzoek betoogt dat Morsi, in het kader van de strijd van de Moslimbroeders om uit te groeien tot de belangrijkste politieke speler in postrevolutionair Egypte, aanvankelijk trachtte de maatschappij te pacificeren om hegemonie te verwerven. Hiertoe paste hij een verdeel en heers strategie toe om het sociaal antagonisme van de 25 Januari Revolutie af te breken en de ontwikkeling van een niet- islamistische—islamistische breuklijn tegen te houden. Hij nam een hele reeks ongerelateerde maatschappelijke groepen op in zijn identiteit van ‘het volk.’ Morsi gaf de eisen van deze groepen een plaats in zijn ‘al-Nahdah’ project van nationale wederopbouw. Om de verschillende groepen die samen ‘het volk’ vormden te verenigen, sloot hij de krachten die zijn project van geleidelijke hervormingen bedreigden uit van deze identiteit. In reactie op de toenemende protesten en stakingen en op het weglopen van niet-islamistische leden uit de Grondwetgevende Vergadering, greep Morsi eenzijdig de macht. Op deze manier behoedde hij het proces van het opstellen van de grondwet, dat de islamisten domineerden, voor opschorting. Deze zet geeft een strategische koerswijziging aan. Morsi vertegenwoordigde nu niet langer alle Egyptenaren, maar wel ‘de meerderheid.’ Hij dreef een wig tussen de heersende coalitie en de oppositie. Dit zette de versplinterde oppositiegroepen ertoe aan hun krachten te bundelen in een anti-Morsi verbond. De opkomst van dit contra-hegemonische, alternatieve discours vormde een eerste ernstige bedreiging voor Morsi’s hegemonie.

English

The present study investigates the discursive strategy employed by Egypt’s President Muhammad Morsi during his first six months in office. For this purpose, it applies Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theoretical conceptual framework to analyze speeches, interviews, decisions, decrees, and other actions of Morsi. This thesis proposes that Morsi, as part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s struggle to develop into the most important player on Egypt’s postrevolution political scene, initially tried to pacify society in order to attain hegemony. For this purpose, he applied a divide and rule strategy to break up the social antagonism of the 25 January Revolution and to impede the development of a non-Islamist—Islamist divide. He co- opted a vast range of unrelated social groups in his constructed identity of ‘the people.’ They inscribed their demands in his national rebuilding project of ‘al-Nahdah.’ To unite the different groups constituting ‘the people,’ he excluded the forces who posed a threat to his gradual reform programme from this identity. In reaction to an increase in protests and strikes and to a walkout from the Constituent Assembly by non-Islamists, Morsi unilaterally grabbed power to protect the Islamist dominated constitution drafting process. This move marks a strategic change. Morsi now represented ‘the majority,’ rather than all Egyptians. This drove a wedge between the ruling coalition and the opposition. What is more, this urged the splintered opposition to set their differences aside and join forces in an anti-Morsi bloc. The emergence of this counter-hegemonic alternative discourse posed the first serious challenge to Morsi’s hegemony.

Preface

This research project was an arduous and challenging process which I could not have successfully finalized all by myself. Therefore, I would like to express my gratitude to everyone who provided me with moral and intellectual support throughout this trajectory.

Mom, Dad, Hannelore, Brecht, and Mia take first place. That is where my family should be. Not only for your patience and comprehension during this writing process, but above all for your share in my personal development. Thank you for being there, and—equally important— for leaving me alone whenever I need you to. Special thanks to Mia for proofreading my text.

I would like to thank my supervisors prof. dr. Giovanni Schallenbergh and dr. Brecht De Smet for their intellectual guidance, for their faith in my capacities, and for the freedom of movement I enjoyed.

I would also like to extend a word of gratitude to the teaching staffs of both the Department of languages and cultures of the Near East and the Islamic World of the University of Ghent and the Netherlands-Flemish Institute in Cairo. In particular I would like to show my appreciation for the lessons taught by Ferida and Adel. Not only did they improve my Arabic skills considerably, but—more importantly—they put their trust in me, and challenged my point of view on multiple subjects.

And of course my friends. First and foremost, Jan, who I consider an unofficial supervisor. It is my hope that the outcome of this itinerary is as ‘awesome’ as you convinced me it would be. Dave and Xavier. My fellow students: Fleur, Anne-Katrien, and Gowaart. Sara, Rasha, Koen, and Peter.

Thank you!

List of Abbreviations

ACPSS Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies

CIHRS Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

DEDI Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute

EGP Egyptian Pound

ERSAP Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme

FJP Freedom and Justice Party

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GFTU General Federation of Trade Unions

IMF International Monetary Fund

NDC National Defence Council

NDP National Democratic Party

NFPR National Front for the Protection of the Revolution

NSF National Salvation Front

SCAF Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

SCC Supreme Constitutional Court

SIS State Information Service

List of Tables

Table 1 Antithetical chains of equivalence during the 25 January Revolution 34 Table 2 Extract Interview with national TV on 22 September 2012 63 Table 3 Varieties of Civil-Military Relations Found in the Middle East 70 Table 4 Extract #1 24 June speech (Logic of difference) 73 Table 5 Extract #2 24 June speech (Logic of difference) 73 Table 6 Extract #3 24 June speech (Logic of equivalence) 76 Table 7 Morsi’s initial chains of equivalence 80 Table 8 Extract Interview TIME Magazine 91 Table 9 Extract #1 6 December speech 92 Table 10 Extract #2 6 December speech (Logic of equivalence) 94 Table 11 Morsi’s chains of equivalence during constitutional turmoil 95 Table 12 Protesters’ chains of equivalence during constitutional turmoil 97 Table 13 Table of Transliteration 114

List of Figures

Figure 1 Issues on the voters’ agenda from August 2011 to June 2012 (% of population) 82 Figure 2 Protesters carry a banner with Morsi depicted as Pharaoh on 23 November 2012 115 Figure 3 Protesters carry a banner which reads ‘Muḥammad Mursī Mubārak’ on 23 November 2012 116 Figure 4 Banner with inscription ‘mamnūʽ dukhūl al-Ikhwān’ – ‘No entrance for Muslim Brothers’ above the entrance to Tahrir from Muhammad Mahmoud street on 23 November 2012 117

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Note on Transliteration

In order to strike a balance between the scholarly nature and the legibility of this dissertation, I have opted to use the common spelling for Arabic terms. The first time an Arabic term is used, I put a linguistically correct transliteration of it in brackets, following the system of transliteration of the Library of Congress1.

1 For the table of transliteration see Appendix 1. System of Transliteration

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Table of Contents

Abstract ...... iii Preface ...... v List of Abbreviations ...... vi List of Tables ...... vii List of Figures ...... vii Note on Transliteration ...... viii Introduction ...... 1

Part 1 Discourse Theory ...... 5

Chapter 1 Theoretical Framework ...... 7 1.1 Relation to discourse analysis ...... 7 1.2 Post-structuralist roots ...... 7 Chapter 2 Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory ...... 9 2.1 Discourse ...... 9 2.2 Hegemony ...... 11 2.3 Social antagonism ...... 14 2.4 A conceptual toolbox ...... 16

Part 2 Historical Framework ...... 19

Chapter 1 Mubarak’s Hegemony Unravels ...... 21 1.1 Sadat opens the door ...... 21 1.2 Mubarak’s neoliberal turn ...... 22 1.3 Hegemony in decline ...... 25 Chapter 2 The Discursive Battle for Tahrir ...... 28 2.1 Perceived coherence of disparate elements ...... 29 2.2 The Myth of Tahrir ...... 31 2.3 The battle unfolds ...... 33 Chapter 3 The SCAF: Dividing, Ruling, but not willing to Govern ...... 39

Part 3 The Muslim Brotherhood in the Driver’s Seat ...... 43

Chapter 1 Historical Development of the Ikhwan ...... 45 1.1 The rise of an Islamist grassroots movement 1928-1952 ...... 45 1.2 Nasser’s persecuted scapegoat ...... 47 1.3 Revived by Sadat as a counterbalance to the Left ...... 49 1.4 Hovering between ally and bogeyman ...... 50 1.5 Conclusion ...... 53 Chapter 2 From Clandestinity to Mainstream: the Ikhwan hedge their bets ...... 54 2.1 The Muslim Brothers’ double game during the revolution ...... 54 2.2 The Muslim Brotherhood under the SCAF ...... 55 2.2.1 A marriage of convenience ...... 55 2.2.2 Growing mistrust ...... 57 2.3 Conclusion ...... 60 Chapter 3 Muslim Brothers in Arms ...... 62 3.1 The political aftermath of the Rafaḥ border attacks ...... 62 3.2 Ikhwānī governance under military rule ...... 64 3.2.1 The SCAF’s core interests ...... 65 3.2.2 The military preserved intact ...... 68 Chapter 4 Morsi’s First 100 Days ...... 71 4.1 ‘Our strength lies in our unity!’ ...... 72 4.1.1 Victory speeches ...... 72 4.1.2 Actions speak louder ...... 74 4.2 The indispensable scarecrow...... 75 4.3 The Myth of al-Nahdah ...... 77 4.3.1 A signifier without signified ...... 78 4.3.2 The all-encompassing Egyptian Renaissance ...... 78 4.3.3 Beware of the ‘Other’ ...... 79 4.3.4 Filling the lack ...... 81 4.3.5 One Nation ...... 82 4.4 Shifting away from the differential pole ...... 83 4.4.1 ‘It’s still bread, freedom and social justice’ ...... 84 4.4.2 Conflicting evaluations ...... 86 4.5 Hegemonic for want of an alternative ...... 87 Chapter 5 Constitutional Turmoil ...... 89 5.1 Captain Morsi sails toward the logic of equivalence ...... 90 5.2 ‘yasquṭ, yasquṭ ḥukm al-Murshid!’ ...... 96 5.3 Symmetric antagonism ...... 98 5.4 The polarization backfires ...... 99 Conclusion ...... 101 Bibliography ...... 104

Appendix ...... 113 1. System of Transliteration ...... 114 2. Figures ...... 115 3. Interviews ...... 119 3.1. Interview with national television on 22 September 2012 ...... 119 3.2. Interview with TIME Magazine on 28 November 2012 ...... 165 4. Speeches ...... 175 4.1. Speech on the occasion of winning the presidential elections on 24 June 2012 ..... 175 4.2. Victory speech on 29 June 2012 on Tahrir Square ...... 181 4.3. Televised speech to the nation on 6 December 2012 in reaction to the street clashes ...... 188

Introduction

When I arrived in Cairo in early September 2012, I was eager to find out how Egyptians felt about their widely celebrated revolution and its aftermath. ‘They must be proud of their audacious toppling of a dictator. Now they finally have what they longed for: democracy. Of course Rome was not built in a day, and the way is long, but now to have a democratically elected president is a first major step forward. If he does not fulfil his promises, they can elect another candidate.’ After listening to an array of opinions on the country’s situation, I soon concluded that few shared the naive optimism of many Western commentators— including myself at this time. I was fascinated—and at times worn out—by the lively discussions between people with different points of view. I read about the country’s political history and followed the news closely in an attempt to make sense of the fact that one person longed for the days under Nasser, another pleaded that Mubarak was a better president than Morsi would ever be, or claimed that the Muslim Brothers had set out to dominate the entire country and establish an Islamic state, or yet another’s conviction that this Islamic state would lead to the achievement of the revolutionary goals. Living for five months in post-revolutionary Cairo opened my eyes in several ways. The glasses through which I view the world underwent—and are still undergoing—a transformation. What is most important and relevant for my dissertation, is that this experience taught me that the glasses through which one views the world around him are manufactured and liable to change. This dissertation combines my interests in both the political turmoil in Egypt and contrasting viewpoints on society and the ways in which these are discursively constructed.

Research questions

The present dissertation is the condensation of my attempts to come to an understanding of how ‘the people’ which ousted Mubarak had grown increasingly disgruntled with the outcome of their revolution. How could this ‘people,’ which had once taken a unified stance

against a common enemy and successfully ousted him, grow so polarized, to the extent that they took up arms against each other less than two years later? How is it possible that five months after a president’s electoral victory, tens of thousands took to the streets to demand his removal? This study sets out to answer the following research questions: What discursive strategy did Morsi employ in his struggle for hegemony during his first six months in office? Under what circumstances, in what ways and for what reasons was Morsi’s discourse constructed, contested and modified?

Rationale behind theory and case selection

To answer the research question at hand, the present study applies the conceptual framework developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their principal work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (2001, Second ed.). The motivation behind the choice for their discourse theory was prompted by the necessity to incorporate a range of contingent elements in my analysis. Their multifarious theory allows to create a coherent narrative of social and political struggles out of a range of disparate elements and sources such as texts, speech acts, objects and institutions. The application of a discourse theoretical approach to the case of post-revolutionary political conflict in Egypt intends to make a twofold contribution to the field of research on political struggles. Firstly, by producing an alternative account of the strategy of a key player in the Egyptian transitional period, this study aims to contribute to the growing body of research on revolutionary conflicts and their aftermaths. Secondly, it intends to illustrate the practical value of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory for conducting empirical research. Thereby, it aims to counter criticisms that their discourse theory is but an idealist fabrication lacking any material footing and concrete analytical value.

Pragmatic delineations

This research will focus on Morsi’s discursive strategy within the time frame of his first six months in office from the announcement of his electoral victory on 24 June 2012 until the approval of the constitution on 25 December. This time frame is divided into two periods. The first period under investigation comprises the first hundred days of Morsi’s presidency. Morsi had promised a range of changes during this period. However, when his first hundred days expired, the conflicting assessments of his success sparked a major social debate.

Therefore, this is a favourable moment to draw up a provisional balance sheet of Morsi’s discursive strategy. The second phase is characterized by the increasing discontent with the constitution drafting process and Morsi’s one-sided way of governing. The social polarization erupted in massive demonstrations and clashes as a result of Morsi’s constitutional declaration on 22 November 2012. Moreover, this study confines itself to Morsi’s discourse concerning domestic policy in spite of the fact that it cannot be partitioned off foreign policy, since decisions concerning one undeniably affect the other. It goes without saying that both lines of demarcation are artificial and they have been drawn on practical grounds.

Outline of structure

This thesis is subdivided into three parts. The first part explains the theoretical underpinnings. Firstly, it situates Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory in the extensive spectre of approaches to discourse analysis. It also briefly touches upon its philosophical foundations. This is reduced to a minimum of background information required to understand the theory. Secondly, the first part examines the discourse theory with a focus on explaining the key theoretical concepts that are applied to analyze Morsi’s discursive strategy. The conclusion covers some concise remarks concerning methodological implications. The second part discusses at length the conditions for the emergence of Morsi’s discourse from a historical perspective. In order to understand and explain Morsi’s discursive strategy, it is necessary to extensively describe the socio-economic and political context in which his discourse was constructed. Firstly, this section treats the development and erosion of Mubarak’s hegemonic neoliberal discourse of reform, tracing its origins back to Sadat’s economic liberalization. Thereafter, it tackles the construction of the counter- hegemonic revolutionary discourse, its functioning, and how it dislocated Mubarak’s discourse. Finally, this part investigates the SCAF’s (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) discursive response to the disintegration of the revolutionary coalition bending these historical events to its own will. The last part commences with an account of the historical development of the Muslim Brotherhood focusing on three aspects that are necessary to understand its strategy during and after the 25 January Revolution: (1) its oscillating relationship with the state between hostility and entente, (2) the composition of its following and the interests of its leadership,

and (3) its latent internal tensions. Thereupon, it addresses the Muslim Brothers’ strategy during the 25 January Revolution and under the SCAF’s rule. It goes thoroughly into the relationship the Muslim Brothers and Morsi had, during the latter’s presidency, with the SCAF, which has been playing a key role in Egyptian politics for decades. Lastly, this study analyzes three of Morsi’s speeches; two interviews with him, and a range of Morsi’s actions and decisions to explain the formation, contestation and transformation of Morsi’s discourse. It examines the discursive strategy of Morsi’s al-Nahḍah project and the reasons why Morsi employed this strategy to achieve a hegemonic status.

Part 1 Discourse Theory

‘Your theory is crazy, but it's not crazy enough to be true.’ Niels Bohr to a young physicist (Quoted in Walker, 2006, p. 54)

Chapter 1 Theoretical Framework

1.1 Relation to discourse analysis

Beke (2012, p. 9) distinguishes two poles on a continuum of approaches to discourse analysis. On the one end, micro-contextual analysis is mainly concerned with inter- and intratextual relations. On the other end—where he situates the theory of Laclau and Mouffe—, he positions the poststructuralist macro-contextual approach which views discourse as a totality of interactions which construct the social and political order. Torfing makes a similar distinction between ‘formal linguistic techniques and the theoretical propositions of Laclau and Mouffe.’ This ‘theory’ is ‘neither a theory in the strict sense of a more or less formal set of deductively derived and empirically testable hypotheses, nor a method in the strict sense of an instrument for representing a given field from a point outside it.’ He views it as ‘constituting a theoretical analytic in the Foucauldian sense of a context-dependent, historical and non-objective framework for analysing discursive formations.’ (Torfing, 1999, p. 12)

1.2 Post-structuralist roots

Laclau points out that post-structuralism has been the most important philosophical influence in shaping discourse theory. (2005, p. 1) Post-structuralism refutes both foundationalist and essentialist philosophical perspectives. Foundationalism permanently anchors certain undeniable grounds—for example God’s will, human nature, or social cycles—on the basis of which all socio-political phenomena can be explained. Sayyid and Zac (1998, p. 251) assert, ‘As there are no a priori foundations, and as identities are

constructed, these identities do not pre-exist in a (relatively) unified form before undergoing their construction. Rather, their unity is defined in that construction.’ Instead of discovering truth and understanding the world relying on a priori categories, discourse theorists research how truth is fabricated by analyzing how subjects, objects and politics are constructed within a discourse. Likewise, discourse theorists oppose essentialism. According to Fuss (1989, p. xi), ‘Essentialism is most commonly understood as a belief in the real, true essence of things, the invariable and fixed properties which define the “whatness” of a given entity.’ This belief in an irreducible, unchanging essence is abandoned. Discourse analysts argue that this essential ‘whatness’—e.g. race or gender—is socially constructed, and they set out to research how identities are constructed in a specific context. (Sayyid & Zac, 1998, pp. 250-251)

Chapter 2 Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory

2.1 Discourse

Discourse is a relational totality of signifying sequences that together constitute a more or less coherent framework for what can be said and done. The notion of discourse cuts across the distinction between thought and reality and includes both semantic and pragmatic aspects. It does not merely designate a linguistic region within the social, but is rather co-extensive with the social. (Torfing, 1999, p. 330)

Laclau and Mouffe view discourse as a ‘social practice which constructs our reality’1 (Carpentier, 2001, pp. II-3), since ‘all social phenomena and objects obtain their meaning(s) through discourse’ (Carpentier & De Cleen, 2007, p. 267). On the same line as a language system, elements of all social structures are differential and relational. ‘In an articulated discursive totality, where every element occupies a differential position [...] all identity is relational and all relations have a necessary character’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 106). These elements have the status of ‘floating signifiers.’ A floating signifier is ‘[a] signifier that is overflowed with meaning because it is articulated differently within different discourses’ (Torfing, 1999, p. 301). They do not have a foundational meaning which lies in themselves. They receive their meaning solely through their relation with other elements in the same discourse. (Sereni, 2006, p. 20) To explain the view of discourse as constructing the social reality, Laclau and Mouffe give the frequently quoted example of the falling of a brick and the occurrence of an earthquake. They acknowledge the existence of these objects and the occurrence of these events ‘externally to thought,’ but they deny that ‘they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence.’ Whether one perceives them as ‘the wrath of God’ or ‘natural phenomena’ depends on the fixation of their meaning through discourse. (2001, p. 108) Dryzek defines discourse as ‘a shared way of

1 My tanslation from Dutch, ‘een sociale praktijk, die onze werkelijkheid construeert’

apprehending the world’, which ‘enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts’ (in Glynos, Howarth, Norval, & Speed, 2009, p. 8). As one acts in accordance with his perception, discourse constructs the social reality. Rather than a closed totality, this discursively constructed ‘order of society is only the unstable order of a system of differences that is always threatened from the outside’ (Laclau, 1988, p. 249). Meaning can never be ultimately fixed because of the ‘openness’ of this system of differences, nor can it be absolutely unfixed. This double impossibility ‘implies that there have to be partial fixations—otherwise, the very flow of differences would be impossible’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 112). The partial fixation or temporary stabilization of meaning is the outcome of an ‘articulatory practice,’ which Laclau and Mouffe define as ‘any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified’ (2001, p. 105). These practices connect elements with each other, changing their meaning, and forge them temporarily in a perceived coherent system that is a discourse. For the time this discourse manages to fix these elements, their meaning will seem unambiguous. It is important to stress that both linguistic and non-linguistic (e.g. objects, institutions, organizations, policies, historical events, et cetera) practices are considered by Laclau and Mouffe as signifying acts. ‘The partial fixation of meaning produces an irreducible surplus of meaning. The field of irreducible surplus is termed the discursive (or the field of discursivity)’ (Torfing, 1999, p. 300). This field of discursivity poses an apparent paradox. On the one hand it makes partial fixations of meaning possible. On the other hand, it constitutes a permanent ‘field of undecidability,’ which undermines any attempt to ultimately fix meaning. (Torfing, 1999, p. 92) This results in a perpetual tension between the undecidable field of discursivity and concrete discourses which continuously make decisions in this undecidable field. (Sereni, 2006, p. 22)

2.2 Hegemony

The achievement of a moral, intellectual and political leadership through the expansion of a discourse that partially fixes meaning around nodal points. Hegemony involves more than a passive consensus and more than legitimate actions. It involves the expansion of a particular discourse of norms, values, views and perceptions through persuasive redescription of the world. (Torfing, 1999, p. 302)

The gramscian concept of hegemony is a practice exerted by the ruling classes to be in command and dominate the opposing classes. Hegemony does not solely include violent means of coercion and repression, but foremost ‘common consent.’ The ruling groups seek to win the active consent of those over whom they rule. They pursue the acceptance of their political and moral leadership by presenting its particular interests as the public interest. Political conflicts are regarded as struggles between several hegemonic projects for dominance. The fall of one hegemony and the rise of another coincide. The counter- hegemony of the formerly dominated groups replaces the hegemony of the ruling groups it subverted. The establishment of hegemony is a process of forging an alliance between several groups. Rather than building a coalition between pre-existing identities, these groups are articulated in a new discursive formation and receive a new shared identity. Gramsci distinguished two strategies applied by hegemonic projects. Firstly, ‘transformism’ involves expanding the ruling class by co-opting antagonizing forces. The second ‘successful’ hegemonic strategy is concerned with the construction of an active consent. This ‘expansive’ hegemony strives for specific demands for the general welfare. For the sake of this public interest, the constituents leave their differences aside. (Beke, 2012, pp. 23-26; Mouffe, 1979, pp. 178-185) De Vos (2003, p. 163) rightfully regards the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe as ‘a model of discursive conflict: Political conflicts are understood as struggles between conflicting discourses that strive to impose their own system of meaning.’ A hegemonic project ‘includes a vision of how state, economy and civil society should be organized’ (Torfing, 1999, p. 301). Since ‘[a]ny discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 112), the field of discursivity forms the arena in which a perpetual discursive struggle is being waged between different hegemonic projects to ‘be understood not just as one possible project among many alternatives, but as the only possible social

order’(Smith, 1994, p. 36). ‘Thus, to hegemonize is to construct the dominant meaning’ (De Vos, 2003, p. 168). Laclau and Mouffe define hegemony as ‘an articulatory practice instituting nodal points which partially fix the meaning of the social in an organized system of differences’ (Torfing, 1999, p. 109). Nodal points are ‘privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a signifying chain’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 112). These are empty signifiers which temporarily stop the constant flowing of the floating signifiers, and fixes them. It is important to note here that a nodal point does not give a floating signifier its meaning, but functions as a reference point, the ‘word to which “things” [i.e. floating signifiers] themselves refer to recognize themselves in their unity’ (Žižek, 1989, p. 105). Žižek gives the example of communism as a nodal point which fixes the meaning of floating signifiers in a signifying chain in their relation to communism:

If we 'quilt' the floating signifiers through 'Communism', for example, 'class struggle' confers a precise and fixed signification to all other elements: to democracy (so-called 'real democracy' as opposed to 'bourgeois formal democracy' as a legal form of exploitation); to feminism (the exploitation of women as resulting from the class- conditioned division of labour); to ecologism (the destruction of natural resources as a logical consequence of profit-orientated capitalist production); to the peace movement (the principal danger to peace is adventuristic imperialism), and so on. (Žižek, 1989, p. 96)

The empty signifier2 is the most extreme type of floating signifier whose meaning shifts so frequently that it becomes ‘[a] signifier without a signified. A signifier [that] is emptied of any precise content due to “the sliding of the signifieds under the signifier.” [...] [It] is so over-coded that it means everything and nothing’ (Torfing, 1999, p. 302). A nodal point provides a discourse with a certain unity and coherence which shape it into a temporarily stable totality and constitutes its identity. (Sereni, 2006, p. 27) The concept of ‘empty signifier’ plays a key role in presenting the particular interests of a hegemonic project as the universal interest in its pursuance of common consent. Laclau argues that ‘although the fullness and universality of society is unachievable, its need does not disappear: it will always show itself through the presence of its absence’ (1996, p. 53). To become hegemonic, a group must, therefore, be able to present its particular interests as ‘the incarnation of the empty signifier which refers to the absent communitarian fullness.’ In order to speak on behalf of the ‘impossible object of society,’ the particular interests of a

2 ‘God,’ ‘Nation,’ ‘Party’ and ‘Class’ are examples of empty signifiers or ‘master signifiers’ [Cf. Torfing (1999, p. 98)]

group must be turned into an ‘embodiment of the signifier of an empty universality.’ If the ‘universal’ call is for revolution and emancipation, the group must be able to present itself as capable of granting this demand. If, on the other hand, the demand is for order and unity, this group must be able to manifest itself as the guarantors of stability and unity. (Torfing, 1999, p. 177) ‘Hegemony is always possible, but never total’ (Sayyid & Zac, 1998, p. 262). Due to the irreducible surplus of meaning, it is impossible for groups to establish an everlasting hegemony. Counter-hegemonic projects continuously try to subvert and destabilize the dominant discourse. Torfing defines a dislocation as ‘[a] destabilization of a discourse that results from the emergence of events which cannot be domesticated, symbolized or integrated within the discourse in question’ (Torfing, 1999, p. 301). The hegemonic discourse no longer succeeds in upholding its universal claim and its contingency is revealed. Consequently it is perceived as only one of many possible worldviews. A dislocation not only has a destabilizing function, it also paves the way for other hegemonic articulations. A myth is a response to the dislocation of a discourse. Its function is to ‘suture’ the dislocated gap by means of rearticulating the dislocated elements into a new objectivity. It will attempt to present the social as a closed and coherent totality. (Sereni, 2006, pp. 32-33) A myth can evolve into a ‘social imaginary which establishes one single horizon of intelligibility’ (Smith, 1994, p. 36). ‘[I]t imposes itself as the universal framework for the interpretation of experience’ (Ibid.). To the extent that a project achieves a hegemonic status, it successfully upholds the view that practically any social demand can be granted within its framework. The meanings that are partially fixed in this discourse have become conventionalized to the extent that they are perceived as natural.

2.3 Social antagonism

The unity of a discourse is established by social antagonism. Social antagonism is a result of the exclusion of discursive elements, the differential character of which is collapsed through their articulation in a chain of equivalence. The chain of equivalence expresses a certain ‘sameness’, but the only thing the equivalential elements have in common is that they pose a threat to the discourse in question. (Torfing, 1999, p. 305)

The two necessary conditions for a hegemonic articulation are ‘the presence of antagonistic forces and the instability of frontiers which separate them’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 136). Hegemonic articulation involves the negation of identity in a twofold sense. It involves both the negation of alternative frameworks for interpretation and the negation of people who identify themselves with these frameworks and interpret their experiences through them. The outcome of this negation is the rise of social antagonism. (Torfing, 1999, p. 120) Laclau and Mouffe abandon the traditional conception of antagonism as an opposition between actors with fully constituted identities. Rather, the antagonistic relation arises from the impossibility of the full constitution of the identity of social actors. The failure of social actors to attain their identities (and their interests) is blamed on the ‘Other.’ The ‘Other’ is held responsible for this ‘blockage of identity.’ (Howarth, 2000, p. 105) Social antagonism is now defined as the presence of a ‘constitutive outside’ which simultaneously constitutes and destabilizes a discursive formation. Antagonistic identities are mutually constitutive. Without ‘them’ there can be no ‘us.’ By excluding ‘them,’ the identity of ‘us’ is constituted: the frontiers of a discursive formation are established by means of excluding all ‘radical otherness.’ (Torfing, 1999, p. 124) As Howarth (2000, p. 106) asserts, ‘[Antagonisms] show the points where identity can no longer be stabilized in a meaningful system of differences, but is contested by forces which stand at the limit of that order.’ On the other hand, they continuously threaten each other’s existence, since ‘any identity is always threatened by something that is external to it’ (Ibid.). A constitutive outside is discursively constructed by articulating different elements in ’a chain of equivalential identities [...] [which] are been brought into line with one another and placed vis-à-vis a purely negative identity that is seen to threaten them’ (De Vos, 2003, p. 165). Laclau (1988, p. 256) gives the following example of a chain of equivalence: ‘[I]f I say that, from the point of view of the interests of the working class, liberals, conservatives, and radicals are all the same, I have transformed three elements that were different into substitutes within a chain of equivalence.’

Two discursive ‘strategies’ to dominate the field of discursivity can be distinguished: the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. Bake (2012, p. 33) contends that the former corresponds to the gramscian notion of ‘expansive hegemony’, and the latter to ‘transformism.’ In a logic of equivalence, through their articulation in a chain of equivalence, the particularity of identities (a, b and c) in a discourse will be suppressed by the creation of a antithetical negative identity (d) which they perceive as threatening—the constitutive outside. The differences between the identities (a, b and c) weakens in favour of their shared identity (-d) of being the negation of the constitutive outside. Ultimately, when a chain of equivalence incorporates a vast amount of identities (a, b, c, e, and f), they will be made equivalent and their particularity will be dissolved [(a=b=c=d=e=f)=(-d)]. The situation in which both antagonistic forces successfully construct one another as constitutive outside is called a symmetric antagonism. In a logic of difference, on the contrary, chains of equivalence are broken down and the disarticulated elements are articulated separately in a new discursive formation. The emphasis in this logic is on the particularity of each identity. (Howarth, 2000, pp. 106-107; Sereni, 2006, pp. 40-42) Howarth and Stavrakakis clarify how both logics operate:

If the logic of equivalence functions by splitting a system of differences and instituting a political frontier between two opposed camps, the logic of difference does exactly the opposite. It consists in the expansion of a given system of differences by dissolving existing chains of equivalence and incorporating those disarticulated elements into an expanding order. Whereas a project employing the logic of equivalence seeks to divide social space by condensing meanings around two antagonistic poles, a project employing a logic of difference attempts to weaken and displace a sharp antagonistic polarity, endeavouring to relegate that division to the margins of society. (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 11)

These logics are not mutually exclusive. They always co-exist, since none will ever prevail completely. Because of their ‘reciprocal subversion’ none is able to constitute ‘a fully sutured space’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 129). Rather, they are to be regarded as two poles on a continuum. The extent to which a given logic is predominantly employed in a discursive formation constantly shifts on this continuum. Laclau and Mouffe give two polar examples in which one of the two logics prevails:

An extreme example of the logic of equivalence can be found in millenarian movements. Here the world divides, through a system of paratactical equivalences, into two camps: peasant culture representing the identity of the movement, and urban culture incarnating evil. The second is the negative reverse of the first. A maximum separation has been reached: no element in the system of equivalences enters into relations other than those

of opposition to the elements of the other system. There are not one but two societies. And when the millennarian rebellion takes place, the assault on the city is fierce, total and indiscriminate: there exist no discourses capable of establishing differences within an equivalential chain in which each and every one of its elements symbolizes evil. (The only alternative is massive emigration towards another region in order to set up the City of God, totally isolated from the corruption of the world.) Now let us consider an opposite example: the politics of Disraeli in the nineteenth century. Disraeli as a novelist had started from his conception of the two nations, that is, of a clear-cut division of society into the two extremes of poverty and wealth. To this we must add the equally clear-cut division of European political space between the 'anciens regimes' and the 'people'. (The first half of the nineteenth century, under the combined effects of the industrial revolution and the democratic revolution, was the era of the frontal chains of equivalence.) This was the situation Disraeli wanted to change, and his first objective was to overcome the paratactical division of social space – that is, the impossibility of constituting society. His formula was clear: 'one nation'. For this it was necessary to break the system of equivalences which made up the popular revolutionary subjectivity, stretching from republicanism to a varied ensemble of social and political demands. The method of this rupture: the differential absorption of demands, which segregated them from their chains of equivalence in the popular chain and transformed them into objective differences within the system – that is, transformed them into 'positivities' and thus displaced the frontier of antagonism to the periphery of the social. This constitution of a pure space of differences would be a tendential line, which was later expanded and affirmed with the development of the Welfare State. This is the moment of the positivist illusion that the ensemble of the social can be absorbed in the intelligible and ordered framework of a society. (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, pp. 129-130)

2.4 A conceptual toolbox

Rather than providing a ready-made methodology, Laclau and Mouffe hand the researcher a framework of conceptual tools to analyze how disparate elements are forged together into coherent discursive formations which are in perpetual conflict which each other. Howarth (2000, p. 131) elucidates:

[D]iscourse theorists are concerned with how, under what conditions, and for what reasons, discourses are constructed, contested and change. They seek, therefore, to describe, understand and explain particular historical events and processes, rather than establish empirical generalizations or test universal hypotheses, and their [Laclau and Mouffe’s] concepts and logics are designed for this purpose.

The methodological freedom and considerable intervening of the researcher raise questions about truth, validity and verification of claims and explanations by discourse

theorists. As pointed out above, I will not elaborate on the philosophical foundations of the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe required for a satisfactory answer. Let it suffice here to briefly outline the position of discourse theorists on verification. They refute both the belief that a final or absolute truth can be reached, and the conception of truth as a ‘subjective imposition,’ reducing truth and knowledge to power. Interpretations proposed by discourse theorists can only count as ‘candidates for truth or falsity.’ Howarth (2005, p. 328) explains this: ‘[interpretations] can be regarded as potentially true, if they first accord with the social ontologies and “regimes of truth” within which they are generated. In addition, they must also constitute warranted interpretations of the new phenomena they purport to understand and explain, or at least plausibly contest and refute accepted interpretations.’ Consequently, if this double requirement is met, the interpretations are held to be true until decisively refuted, placing the final judgement in the hands of the academic community.

Part 2 Historical Framework

Chapter 1 Mubarak’s Hegemony Unravels

1.1 Sadat opens the door

Sadat’s (Anwār Sadāt) Infitah (Infitāḥ) policy heralded the transition from a public sector dominated economy under Nasser (Gamāl ʽAbd al-Nāṣir) to a capitalist private sector led economy under Mubarak (Ḥusnī Mubārak). Sadat envisaged his Infitah as the foundation of a capitalist, Western-oriented, democratic Egypt. This project, set out in 1974, was aimed to open Egypt’s economy to free-trade, free-market economy, and to attract foreign investments, business, and commerce. The political aspect of the ‘Open Door’ policy constituted a break with the warmongering Nasserist discourse, towards a peace with Israel. The aim of this transformation was to become a key ally of the United States. The expected prosperity of this capitalist economy was supposed to gain the Egyptians’ support for the geo-political orientation towards the United States. (Osman, 2010, pp. 117-118) On the surface, Sadat’s economic policy seemed to bear fruit. Between 1975 and 1986, Egypt’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product) witnessed a yearly average growth of 9 percent. Despite the 2.8 percent annual population growth, the per capita income annually rose at an average of 6 percent. The investment rate and the gross domestic savings doubled between 1973 and 1985. Moreover, several indicators attest social progress. The amount of absolute poor households fell from 51 percent in the early 1970s to 30 percent in the early 1980s. The infant mortality rate declined from 117 to 91 per thousand. Life expectancy increased from 50 to 58 years. The average caloric intake per capita improved from 100 percent of the minimum requirements to 128 percent, and primary school enrolment rose from 72 to 78 percent. (Ikram, 2006, p. 24) However, fundamental structural changes remained deficient. This growth was largely fuelled by unsustainable external factors; high oil prices, workers’ remittances, Israel returning the Sinai oil fields, the reopening of the Suez Canal, tourism receipts, and

external assistance. (Alissa, 2007, p. 3) According to Bruton (1983, p. 682), these windfall rents did not result in an improved production of the ‘real’ economy. The government missed opportunities to raise the efficiency of resource use. He explains:

Where policies are unsuitable and misguided, sharp increases in the availability of resources, especially of foreign exchange, are likely to exacerbate, rather than solve, problems and to slow, rather than hasten, the establishment of the basis for an independent economic system that, as a consequence of its routine operation, produces increasing economic welfare for its people. (Bruton, 1983, p. 680)

Egypt became a ‘rentier state.’ Sadat’s economic transition consisted solely of the liberalization of trade. An immense increase of imports, accompanied by a decreased export, disturbed the balance-of-payment severely. His economic legacies to Mubarak were, firstly, a massive external debt of 14.3 billion dollars—an eightfold augment from Nasser’s reign—and, secondly, a rent economy surpassing the productive economy. (Abu-Odeh, 2009, pp. 361-362) Sadat’s policy paved the way for a capitalist state, but the transition was not completed under his rule. Rather, the public sector maintained its economic dominance. This ‘bureaucratic capitalism’ did not succeed in attracting the desired foreign business and investments. (Stewart, 1999, p. 142) Despite the release of political prisoners and the establishment of a multiparty system, the president remained firmly in control. Sadat laid the seeds for an alliance between power and possession. He morphed the republic into a sort of ‘presidential monarchy’ by surrounding himself a kind of influential ‘royal family.’ His intertwined executive and legislative power allowed him to build a client network of politicians who illicitly benefited from the economic opening. (H. A. Hassan, 2010, p. 322) El-Sayed El-Naggar (2009) contends that the emerging capitalist class amassed profits through its connections with government officials in trade for its allegiance to the ruling bureaucratic class.

1.2 Mubarak’s neoliberal turn

From Sadat’s assassination onwards, Mubarak maintained a discourse of reform: ‘Nasser liberated Egypt; Sadat gave it peace; I wish to rebuild it’ (in Davidson, 2000, p. 80). He had allegedly received the country in a ruinous state, ‘Economy zero. Debts high. Infrastructure nothing. No hope to invite anybody to invest his money. No telephone lines. No electricity.

No water or sewage. No, no, no, no, no’ (in Davidson, 2000, p. 80) In his 1981 inaugural address he vowed to steer the country towards a bright future, ‘We will embark on our great path: not stopping or hesitating, building and not destroying, protecting and not threatening, preserving and not squandering’ (in Slackman, 2011).

"Reform" is the name the government of Hosni Mubarak has given to changes it has been effecting in the economic field; although it is not a term that it is keen on using in reference to the political sphere. However, the Mubarak regime has, from its inception, shown a predilection to sponsoring the terms of democratization and liberalization in public discourse: Al-dimuqratiya wa al-huriyat al-'ama (democracy and public freedoms) have been the declared political objectives, course of action and character of the regime. The combination of necessary rhetoric, as well as internal and external expectations, have made political reform a term of public discourse. (Ismail, 1995, p. 37)

From the mid 1980s, Egypt’s rampant economic decline forced the country to enter into negotiations with the IMF (International Monetary Fund). The international economic climate had started deteriorating after 1982. The government was ill-prepared for the consequences of the decline in oil-related foreign exchange revenues which started in 1982. During the next three, years it maintained a high growth rate of six to seven percent. Nevertheless, this growth resulted in increasing balance-of-payments deficits because of the shrinking total imports. These could only be financed through foreign borrowing. (Ikram, 2006, pp. 54-56) The dwindling oil prices of the mid-1980s affected the Egyptian rentier economy dramatically. Its main sources of income—workers’ remittances, the Suez Canal, petroleum exports—shrank severely. (Alissa, 2007, p. 4) Richards (1991) asserts that, in exchange for foreign rents, the Egyptian government implemented necessary reforms, but at a slow pace—to maintain social peace—and it limited itself to the reforms required to ensure that the United States would continue its support, not solely directly, but also through its influence on international agencies. This strategy of ‘fiddling while the country burns’ was a ‘successful disaster.’ The temporary postponement of real reforms achieved its aim of maintaining social rest. Yet, this reprieve proved disastrous on a medium to long- term scale. After a decade in office, Mubarak and his regime were up their neck in economic problems. The labour force and the entire population grew at a yearly rate of 2.7 percent, the nominal debt rose spectacularly from less than $2 billion in 1970 to $21 billion in 1980 to $50 billion in 1990, the price system and institutional structures ‘grossly misallocated’ resources and stifled the private sector. The 1991 signing of the ERSAP (Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme) with the IMF and the World Bank heralded ‘a dramatic shift from an étatist

towards a neoliberal regime of capital accumulation’ (Roccu, 2012, p. 100). According to Farah (2009), this programme contained a wide-ranging package of monetary and fiscal reforms on the one hand, and liberalization, privatization, and investments on the other hand. The first package was implemented in the first ‘wave of reforms’ from 1991 to 1997. The latter were put into action during the second wave by Ahmed Nazif’s (Aḥmad Naẓīf) ‘reform cabinet’ from 2003 to 2008. (Roccu, 2013) From the IMF’s perspective, the first wave was a ‘remarkable success’ (Zaki, 2001, p. 1878). The keystone, fiscal stabilization, was reached through a reduction of the fiscal deficit from over 15 percent of GDP in 1991/1992 to 1.3 percent in 1995/1996. Over the same period, inflation fell from 21 percent to 7.1 percent. Liquidity growth declined as well from over 27 percent in 1990/1991 to 10.5 percent in 1996/1997. (Subramanian, 1997) The second wave of reforms was also appraised by the IMF dubbing Egypt ‘An Emerging Success Story’ (IMF, 2007, pp. 32-33). The macroeconomic indicators confirm the IMF’s assessment. The GDP annual growth rate rose from 3.2 percent in 2003 to 4.1 percent in 2004, 4.5 percent in 2005, 6.8 percent in 2006, 7.1 percent in 2007, and 7.2 percent in 2008. Indeed, ‘The relatively robust performance of the Egyptian economy in very recent years is an indisputable fact’ (Achcar, 2009, p. 455). However, the socio-economic flipside of Egypt’s exemplary neoliberal course give a less rosy picture. As Beinin (2009, p. 30) points out, ‘Egypt’s macro-economic scorecard looked very respectable if one did not examine too closely levels of debt, trade deficits, inflation, unemployment, inequality and poverty.’ Vast parts of Egypt’s population were denied any rewards from this economic success. The privatization of state enterprises redistributed resources from the public into the hands of a new economic elite. This emerging elite reaped nearly all fruits of the economic boom. It entered into a strategic alliance with the bureaucratic elite around Gamāl Mubarak within the ruling NDP (National Democratic Party). Joya (2011) argues that, in spite of the neoliberal discourse of a reduced role of the state in favour of the private sector, a nexus of political and economic power was established between rural and industrial elites and the bureaucratic elites. The former two gained policy-making power while the bureaucrats actively promoted their interests granting them access to public resources and services. She summarizes:

Rather than relying on economic competitiveness, investing in research and development and involving the population in the economy, the wealth and power of these ‘crony capitalists’ was the product of the state sponsored appropriation of public resources facilitated by the IMF-led privatisation programme. (Joya, 2011, p. 371)

1.3 Hegemony in decline

Roccu (2012) convincingly argues that Mubarak’s implementation of neoliberal reforms accelerated the ‘gradual unravelling of hegemony’ that had been taking place since the Six- Day War. Despite the limits on political participation and the excessive use of repression, Nasser succeeded in establishing hegemony between 1952 and 1967. Rather than coercion, his dominance was based on common consent. The 1967 fiasco brought this phase to an end. As discussed above, Egypt remained a public-sector led economy under Sadat, despite some transformations. The Camp David treaty and the reorientation towards the west were necessary for the envisaged opening of the market, but did not bear him support of the masses. The rise of neoliberalism on the international stage started pressuring the regime’s capital and urging it towards thoroughgoing reforms. These pressures could be deflected by the country’s geopolitical importance. Mubarak initially walked the same path. Welfare programmes and other material assistance for the masses started shrinking. Accordingly, his popular support base diminished; even though Mubarak held the ‘ruling bloc’ together, his relationship with the people slowly but surely deteriorated. (Roccu, 2012, pp. 225-227) Roccu (2013) applies Harvey’s historical-geographical framework to analyze how the social consequences of Mubarak’s neoliberal policies played a key role in the Egyptian uprising. Harvey (2005, pp. 159-166) distinguishes four main processes of neoliberal policies of ‘accumulation by dispossession’; the corporatization, commodification, and privatization of hitherto public assets; financialization; the management and manipulation of crises; and finally, the state redistribution which reverses the flow from upper to lower classes. Harvey contends that three decades of neoliberalization and the global crisis are a fertile breeding ground for an anti-capitalist movement ‘constituted out of a broad alliance of the discontented, the alienated, the deprived and the dispossessed’ (2010, p. 240). Roccu (2013) asserts that the Egyptian case presents ample proof for the four features characterizing neoliberal policies, and that the Egyptian uprising is a prime example of such an anti- capitalist alliance. The economic boom was accompanied by distressing social consequences. On the one hand, groups who were not directly affected by the reforms (e.g. judges, tax collectors, and intellectuals) grew increasingly discontented and alienated from the regime because of its excessive repression, and the increasing deprivation of political and civil rights. On the other hand, the ranks who suffered from the growing inequality; expropriated farmers, sacked labourers, and progressively more impoverished sections of

public and informal sector. The increasing dispossession and deprivation of these groups further fuelled their disenfranchisement. In the decade or so leading up to the uprising, Egypt saw an increase in social protests. Between 1998 and 2004, there were more than 1000 collective actions of workers. 191 of these came after Nazif had taken office in July 2004. In 2006, 222 strikes were reported and in 2007 that number rose to 580. In 2007, the protest movement expanded to include white- collar employees, civil servants, and professionals. In December 2007, 55000 tax-collectors— generally important adherents to the regime—held a strike. (Beinin, 2008) The regime remained successful in separating the socio-economic protest movements from the protests demanding political reform. For one thing, the activists distanced themselves from political parties. They suspected that they would use the collective actions to further their own interests. For another, whereas the Egyptian government often responded to socio- economic demands to defuse mounting frustrations, it usually cracked down on protests demanding radical political change. (Ottoway & Hamzawy, 2011) The shockwaves of the global financial crisis terminated the success of Mubarak’s strategy of divide and rule. The ensuing augmenting food prices and economic deterioration dragged new groups of dispossessed into ‘the orbit of discontent.’ What is more, the regime no longer disposed over two fundamental instruments. First, the model that was supposed to ensure economic growth and welfare for many faltered internationally. Second, it no longer had its traditional instruments of salary increases and food subsidies at its disposition to isolate political protests. Repression and electoral fraud were his last resort. This further cleared the way for an alliance of the dispossessed and the discontented. Moreover, drastic neoliberal reforms had pitted the essential institution of the army against the private sector oligarchy around Nazif’s cabinet. (Roccu, 2013, pp. 433- 436) ‘Neoliberalism had managed to erode the few remnants of what Gramsci would have called hegemony on the national scale, both within the ruling bloc and in society at large’ (Roccu, 2013, p. 436). Coercion—vote rigging and violent repression—alone is insufficient to maintain hegemony. The global crisis was the final factor in scooping out the common consent for his rule. His discourse could no longer endorse its universal claim. The ensuing protests and demands of an augmenting amount of dispossessed and discontented could no longer be integrated in his discourse. It was no longer able to ‘conceal[...] its own partiality, historicity and contingency and normalize[...] itself as the only possible way of thinking

about politics’ (Smith, 1994, p. 36). This dislocation destabilized his discourse and opened the gate for other projects to contest the domination of the discursive field.

Chapter 2 The Discursive Battle for Tahrir

[R]evolutionary conflicts are experienced as a life and death struggle between not just social groups but social representations, one representing the sacred, the other the profane. (Alexander, 2011, p. 14)

A vast body of research on the Egyptian uprising stress one or more crucial well-defined causes that brought about the overthrow of Mubarak. Many point out the socio-economic grievances caused by Mubarak’s neoliberal policy; inflation, the increasing wealth gap between poor and rich, unemployment, lack of health and social services, et cetera. Others attribute the revolution to political factors such as a lack of freedoms and rights, widespread corruption, violent repression of activists, a pseudo-democracy with rigged elections and exclusion of opposition parties, and the emergency law. More factors often mentioned include ‘cyberactivism’ (Khamis & Vaughn, 2001), the demographic ‘youth bulge’ (Lagraffe, 2012), the ‘domino effect’ (Rastegari, 2012) of al-Buʽazīzī’s self-immolation and the swift ouster of President Bin ʽAlī in Tunisia. Alexander rightfully asserts, ‘I will not argue that social factors are without significance, but that they in themselves don’t speak. It’s representations of social facts that do the talking’ (Alexander, 2011, p. 3). These factors certainly contributed to the widely felt discontent in the Egyptian society, fuelling the revolution. Yet, the assertion that one or more of these causes would inevitably have lead to a revolution reveals a teleological view of history. Claiming that the combining of forces by people from different backgrounds with conflicting interests into a revolutionary bloc, is a natural, spontaneous and unavoidable consequence of these factors, indicates a stern hineininterpretierung. This retrospective gaze overlooks the fact that all these contingent elements ‘only formed a

coherent unity through the articulation of a discourse. [...] they only received the meaning of “elements that have something to with the revolution,” when they were articulated together’1 (Beke, 2012, p. 48). The perception of this unity as self-evident is a logical outcome of the attempt of this discourse to represent all these demands and identities as a coherent unity. It is this representation—or discourse—that ‘does the talking.’

2.1 Perceived coherence of disparate elements

Whereas ’25 January’, ’11 February’, ‘Tahrir’, ‘liberation square’, ‘revolution’, ‘internet generation’, ‘the new media’, and ‘the Egyptian people’ had nothing in common before the uprising, they have since become inseparable symbols of the 25 January Revolution. These unrelated elements with a fragmented semantic history have been articulated into a coherent discourse. By linking these floating signifiers to one another in a new constellation, it temporarily succeeded in attaching a certain meaning to them. (Beke, 2012, pp. 46-47) A prevalent narrative of the revolution reads as follows: it occurred ‘suddenly and spontaneously’ (Khashan, 2012, p. 919), launched by the ‘tech-savvy youth’ (Michaels, 2011), and lacking ‘both political leadership and a clear ideological orientation’ (B. Hassan, 2011, p. 4). Ezbawy summarizes this narrative:

[T]he members of various protest movements overcame the absence of leadership via stability and unity within their own movements during the revolution and via ties and coordination with the other movements. Thus, the January 25th revolution, sparked by groups of Young people, was a leaderless revolution, joined immediately by large masses without a unified leadership. It was a revolution that was launched in a virtual space within a network – the internet – with all its new tools of communication: most importantly blogs, Facebook, and Twitter, and then moving into non-virtual society after the date and location had been set. (Ezbawy, 2012, p. 32)

Beke rightfully opposes the widespread view that after their initial spark, this alliance came into being ‘ex nihilo’ (2012, p. 44). These young people—among others the 6 April Movement, Kifāya! (‘Enough’) and Wael Ghonim (Wā’il Ghunīm)—did in fact take up the

1 My translation from the original in Dutch, ‘Ze vormden pas een coherent geheel doorheen de articulatie van een discours. […] Het wil enkel zeggen dat ze pas betekenis kregen als “elementen die met de revolutie te maken hebben”, toen ze samen werden gearticuleerd.’

political leadership. Alexander (2011, p. 32) contends that these groups ‘formed the revolution’s “carrier group.” It was they who projected the symbols and, after they made connection with the audiences, directed the revolutionary mise en scène.’ He goes on to argue that this ‘directorate’ tried to keep its existence and strategizing secret to uphold the democratic pretensions of the revolution. ‘25 January’ is one of the essential floating signifiers that received a new meaning through its articulation by the revolutionary discourse. Marking Egypt’s National Police Day, it was a ‘fitting choice’ (Ali, 2011) by activists to stage mass demonstrations. This national holiday commemorates the struggle of the police forces in Ismailia against the British in 1952. In the activists’ regard it became a ‘focal point’ for their indignation over the behaviour of the Police and the Interior Ministry. ‘The idea of subverting Police Day’ had started on 25 January 2010. The 6 April Movement had already staged a protest which was violently broken up. (Khalil, 2012, p. 122) 25 January was not a random date that ‘fell from the sky’ (Beke, 2012, p. 42). A long process of semantic shifting preceded the attachment of the new meaning of ‘first day of the Egyptian uprising’ to this overdetermined floating signifier. Likewise, the choice of Tahrir Square as the epicentre of the revolution was not arbitrary. In 1919, this public space had been the scene of the uprising against the British Occupation. After these events Ismailia Square2, after khedive Ismail (Ismā‘īl), was unofficially renamed ‘Liberation Square’3. Hereafter it became the ‘main arena of public protesting’ (Salama, 2013, p. 130). During an occupation by some 3000 anti-Iraq war protesters in 2003, the square witnessed the first chants4 urging Mubarak to step down. (Toensing, 2012) In 1955, Nasser officially named it Tahrir Square, referring to the ‘liberation’ from the British and King Farouk in 1952. (AlSayyad in Britt, 2011) AlSayyad (2011) contends that the Egyptians only considered Tahrir Square as the symbol of their liberation on 25 January 2011, despite their acceptance of 23 July 1952 as the date of their revolution.

2 In Arabic: Mīdān al-Ismā‘īlīyah 3 In Arabic: ‘Mīdān al-Taḥrīr 4 The imperative ‘Irḥal!’or ‘leave!’ became one of the memorable chants during the 25 January Revolution.

2.2 The Myth of Tahrir

‘If on the one hand they [dislocations] threaten identities, on the other, they are the foundation on which new identities are constituted’ (Laclau, 1990, p. 39). Beke (2012) argues that the ‘Myth of Tahrir’ is the discursive response to the dislocation of Mubarak’s discourse of reform, forging a spectre of dispossessed and discontented groups into the identity of ‘the people.’ ‘[T]he function of myth is to suture the dislocated space by means of constructing a new space of representation’ (Torfing, 1999, p. 303). This is attempted ‘by means of the rearticulation of the dislocated elements’ (Laclau, 1990, p. 61). ‘To the extent that a project achieves a hegemonic status, it appears that virtually any problem can be resolved within its framework’ (Smith, 1994, p. 36). The revolutionary counter-hegemonic project achieved hegemony, because the ‘Myth of Tahrir’ offered a ‘surface of inscription’ for a variety of social demands and grievances centred around the core demand; the removal of the regime. People from all backgrounds participated in the 18-day uprising early 2011 to demand the ouster of their common enemy. In order to achieve their common goals, the participants put their differences aside. An Egyptian artist witnessed on Al-Jazeera live from Tahrir Square that no religious or partisan chants were voiced. She repeatedly emphasized the strong sense of unity among the protestors: ‘We are all Egyptians!’5 (in Youtube, 2011)

Men, women, young, old, Muslim and Christian of all classes participated in this revolution. Variations of this phrase were repeated everywhere. While at one level most people were aware of and were celebrating this diversity, the main emphasis was on the common identity of people in the Square and the unity of their demands. Women and men organised and led the protests, guarded the entrances to the Square, gave speeches, and doctors attended to the injured in makeshift clinics. ‘No one sees you as a woman here; no one sees you as a man. We are all united in our desire for democracy and freedom. (Taher, 2012, p. 369)

Beke (2012) asserts that the ‘Myth of Tahrir’ provided the discursive bridge between all these identities. A broad and layered social alliance between all sections of society, who were discontented, alienated, dispossessed, or deprived, was a requisite to achieve their goals. The apparent self-evident unity of the revolutionary coalition between all these

5 In Arabic: ‘Kullinā Maṣriyīn’

groups is discursively constructed. These unrelated groups, with their divergent and conflicting interests, were fused together into the identity of ‘the people.’ As pointed out before, ‘mythical spaces’ provide this ‘surface of inscription’ by constructing all ‘forces of negativity’ into the identity of an ‘Other’, which at the same time constitutes and destabilizes the identity of the myth. (Torfing, 1999, p. 129) In pursuance of cohesion of the revolutionary identity, Mubarak and his nizam (niẓām)6 are created as the necessary constitutive outside. The differences and conflicts between the identities which together constitute ‘the people’ are temporarily suppressed by the construction of this mutual enemy, who is held responsible for all their grievances. These identities inscribed their different demands in the surface provided by the ‘Myth of Tahrir.’ These different demands merged into the shared demand: the fall of the nizam. The construction of this social antagonism between ‘the people’ and ‘the regime’ is evident from the slogan ‘The people wants the downfall of the regime’7 which was sprayed all over walls and frequently echoed through Tahrir. The antagonistic force ‘the regime/the system’ is blamed for the ‘blockage of identity’ of ‘the people’ wrongly presuming that the eradication of this force will evidently permit them to become the ‘fully constituted’ Egyptians they always wanted to be; dignified and free. This social antagonism, placing ‘the people’ diametrically against ‘al-nizam,’ is created by the construction of two opposite chains of equivalence8. In Alexander’s terms, these two chains form the revolutionary ‘binary moral classification.’ (Alexander, 2011, p. 14) The revolutionaries’ discourse represented the identity of ‘the people’ as sacred in contrast with the profane ‘regime’:

Mubarak was exercising ‘repression’ and ‘brute force,’ while the demonstrators called for ‘freedom’ and ‘communication.’ The revolutionaries denounced the ‘barbaric’ Egyptian state headed by a ‘modern day Pharaoh,’ interpreting his moves as ‘carefully calibrated.’ They characterized their own movement, by contrast, as ‘leaderless,’ choosing time and again to emphasize the ‘spontaneous’ character of their activities. While regime officials were ‘dogs’ and ‘thugs,’ the protesters were described as ‘the people.’ Mubarak had launched a ‘crackdown’ to ‘throttle’ the people’s voice with ‘violence,’ but protesters remained ‘courageous’ and ‘undaunted,’ and their ambition said to be ‘communication.’ The ‘arrogant’ autocrat addressed his subjects as ‘sons and daughters’; the revolutionaries

6 This can mean both regime (of Mubarak) and system (of institutions, or even international system) 7 In Arabic: al-sha‘b yurīd isqāṭ al-niẓām 8 See Table 1 Antithetical chains of equivalence during the 25 January Revolution

spoke of one another as ‘citizens.’ The demonstrators were ‘youthful’; the regime was ‘petrified.’ Mubarak’s was a ‘dictatorial’ regime; the revolution demanded ‘democracy.’ (Alexander, 2011, pp. 17-18)

2.3 The battle unfolds

As pointed out above, the revolutionary alliance constructed the nizam as constitutive outside to suppress the differences between the different identities composing ‘the people.’ It held the nizam responsible for obstructing the full development of its identity. Howarth and Stavrakakis point out that ‘[t]his “blockage” of identity is a mutual experience for both the antagonizing force and the force that is being antagonized’ (2000, p. 10). Mubarak’s discursive reaction to the destabilizing events was the mirror image of the revolutionaries’ discourse. He constructed the antagonizing force as a constitutive outside through the creation of diametrically opposed chains of equivalence. Through their fixation in this chain, the particularities of these identities were broken down in favour of their shared aspect of ‘instigators, a danger to the national security.’ Thus a symmetric antagonism came into effect. Mubarak’s discourse represented his regime as the sacred guarantor of the ‘universal demand’ for order and unity. In order to legitimate repression, he depicted the demonstrations in Tahrir as profane protests which endangered the rule of law and order.

Those opposing the regime were ‘instigators,’ ‘foreigners’ and ‘spies,’ not true ‘Egyptians,’ not the sincere ‘patriots’ who constituted the ‘vast majority.’ While outside agitators engaged in ‘sabotage’ and created ‘chaos,’ the state would maintain ‘stability’ and ‘security.’ The street activists were a small ‘minority’ of ‘outlaws,’ an ‘illegitimate and illegitimate’ [sic] group who employed ‘force.’ The state, by contrast, was lawful, had the ‘popular support of the vast majority,’ and displayed and ‘ability to listen.’ Critics engaged in ‘propaganda,’ but Mubarak’s regime was ‘careful’ and ‘deliberate,’ willing to initiate ‘dialogue.’ The revolutionaries, by contrast, were taking ‘uncalculated and hast steps that would produce more irrationality.’ They were ‘intellectual adolescents’ with ‘little standing,’ while the sate was ‘big’ and ‘strong.’ The protests were quickly becoming ‘exhausted,’ even as Mubarak and his regime remained ‘resilient.’ Those who challenged the regime were ‘dangerous,’ but the regime was ‘safe.’ (Alexander, 2011, p. 16)

Table 1 Antithetical chains of equivalence during the 25 January Revolution9

The Mubarak Regime’s Chains of The Revolutionaries’ Chains of Equivalence Equivalence

Profane Protest Sacred Regime Profane Regime Sacred Protest

Instigators Egyptians Repression Freedom

Foreigners, Spies Patriots Choking brute force Communication

Chaos Security, Stability Modern day pharaoh Leaderless

Force Willingness to listen Carefully calibrated Spontaneous

Hasty Careful Petrified Youth

Uncalculated Deliberate Dogs, thugs The people

Vast majority of Irrational Dialogue Mubarak and cronies Egypt

Minority Popular majority Sons and daughters Citizens

Exhausted Resilient Dictator Democracy

Little Standing Big, Strong Arrogant

Dangerous Safe Violence

Primitive Modern

Sectarian Rational

Illegitimate

Illegal

Outlaws

9 Adapted from Alexander ( 2011, p. 24)

Sabotage

Propaganda

Intellectual adolescents

As outlined before, in the theoretical framework of Laclau & Mouffe, political conflicts are conceived of as ‘struggles between conflicting discourses that strive to impose their own system of meaning’ (De Vos, 2003, p. 163). This discursive battle is a twofold process. Evidently, it is not solely waged on the ideational level of rhetoric, but also on the the ground. The first consists of linguistic articulatory practices temporarily fixing the meaning of the dislocated floating signifiers. Both discourses aim to dominate the discursive field with their representation of social facts and the events on the ground. The struggle is also waged the other way around. By changing the course of events on the ground. Through non-linguistic articulatory practices both camps can provide signifieds (the events) which support their universal claim. A prime example of this ‘material’ struggle, is the transformation of a regular square into the Republic of Tahrir.

Apart from being a mere site of mass protests, Tahrir also increasingly morphed into an activity-system in its own right: a ‘freed zone’ within the belly of the dictatorship. Through its self-governance and authentic life, Tahrir became the practical negation of al- nizam and a ‘microcosm’ of the whole revolutionary Project. Its salient activity not only defied the regime, but projected an alternative to the current social formation. (De Smet, 2012, p. 447)

The creation of this alternative republic and the distribution through, among others, Al- Jazeera broadcasts of this positive image to the world was of great importance to the demonstrators. This way the revolutionary bloc projected social facts—signifieds such as peacefulness, cooperation, horizontal democracy, unity—which matched its rhetoric— or signifiers. Moreover, the Republic of Tahrir is the materialization of the alternative vision promoted by the counter-hegemonic project. According to Torfing (1999, p. 302), such a vision is indispensable for a hegemonic project, which he defines as ‘a political project, including a vision of how state, economy and civil society should be organized, that aspires to be hegemonic.’

Mubarak’s discursive strategy of ‘turning broader public opinion in the country agains the protestors’ (Shadid, 2011) and promising economic and political reforms had lost its effectiveness. In an interview with ABC News, Mubarak asserted that he was tired of being president, but that he could not leave office because ‘the country would sink into chaos’ (in Amanpour, 2011). He could no longer uphold his universal claim of defending the sacred order and unity which legitimated violent repression of the profane protests. Rather, the universal demand was now for revolution and emancipation. The Myth of Tahrir gathered momentum. It revealed the contingency of his discourse and was able to articulate a contesting myth which convinced ‘the people’ it was able to fulfill the universal demand. As Alexander (2011, p. 48) puts it, ‘Egypt’s layered audiences seemed ever more distant from his [Mubarak’s] megaphone. There was another powerful speaker in the national echo chamber, and the means of symbolic production were no longer Mubarak’s to control.’ It became impossible for his discourse to domesticate the events. Consequently, he resorted to the reverse tactic of manipulating events on the ground to make them match his signifiers. On the fifth day of demonstations, the police was withdrawn from the streets. Four prisons were opened, releasing thousands of convicted criminals on the streets who embarked on a round of rampaging, looting, and plundering. Evidently, this move by Mubarak intended to instigate violence and chaos on the streets linking it to the ‘profane’ protest movement. The day after, Mubarak appeared on state television during an everyday meeting with the military chiefs. Despite some initial successes, he failed to legitimate his repression. The majority of the population connected the disorder with the regime, rather than with the protests. (Alexander, 2011, pp. 46-53) Desperately clinging to power, coercion was the regime’s last resort. From the first day on, the security forces had violently repressed the uprising. Rubber bullets, live ammunition, water cannons, and loads of teargas injured and killed many. Some activists were abducted, tortured and murdered. The two bloodiest episodes were the events of 28 January and 2 february. On the ‘Friday of Rage’–28 January—hundreds of thousands of protesters moved towards Tahrir Square. Security forces cracked down with excessive use of force to impede them from reaching Tahrir Square. In what was dubbed ‘the Battle of Qaṣr al-Nīl Bridge,’ bloody clashes erupted, leaving scores of protesters injured or dead. Finally, the protesters broke through the police ranks and reached the square. (Kirkpatrick, 2011) On 2 February, thousands of Mubarak supporters flooded into Tahrir Square, many of them riding into the anti-Mubarak crowd on camel or horseback wielding sticks and whips.

During the ensuing ‘Battle of the Camel,’ 3 people were reported killed and 600 injured. (Englund & Fadel, 2011) Finally, on 10 February the army dealt a decisive blow to Mubarak’s eroded hegemony by explicitly choosing the side of the protesters. Until then the army had defied intervening to break up the protests. The inclusion of the necessary military shackle to the revolutionary chain of equivalence was the kiss of death for Mubarak’s regime. Mubarak had no other choice, but to resign the following day. The SCAF formed an interim governing body that took over power, and vowed to guide Egypt toward democracy.

Chapter 3 The SCAF: Dividing, Ruling, but not willing to Govern

The accession of the military to the formation of ‘the people’ posed an apparent paradox. It was a crucial event that dealt the final blow to the Mubarak regime, leading to the eradication of the constitutive outside on 11 February. At the same time, this widely celebrated event ushered in the dislocation of the ‘Myth of Tahrir.’ Torfing (1999, p. 131) warns that ‘Emphasis on the stabilizing function of social antagonism should not allow us to forget that social antagonism is also a source of dislocation.’ As argued before, the construction of the regime as a common enemy was required to suppress the differences between the disparate identities constituting ‘the people.’ However, the removal of this common enemy did not lift the ‘blockage of identity.’ The toppling of the regime did not allow them to become ‘fully constituted’ Egyptians. It became apparent that the fulfilment of this common demand did not equal the fulfilment of the amalgam of socio-economic and political demands it represented. The ‘Myth of Tahrir’ could no longer uphold its universal claim of change and emancipation. The momentum of the cry for drastic change and immediate revolution faded. The disappearance of the constitutive outside revealed the contingency of the revolutionary discourse. It lost its perceived coherence. This destabilized the revolutionary discourse thoroughly. The different subjects composing the identity of ‘the people’ started articulating their own demands—for democracy, political rights, improved living conditions, etc.— separately. Beke has insightfully analyzed the SCAF’s discursive strategy to safeguards its own interests and keep on ‘ruling but not governing.’1 To maintain its power and influence, reinstalling the old system was a requisite. For this purpose the SCAF decided on a divide

1 I will elaborate on Cook’s notion of ‘Ruling but not governing’ and the intentions and interests of the SCAF during the transitional phase in Part 2 - ‎Chapter 3 Muslim Brothers in Arms

and rule tactic to take the wind out of the sails of the revolutionary bloc and consolidate its hegemonic position. In Gramsci’s terminology, the SCAF’s strategy was one of transformism. To weaken the social antagonism of the revolution, it articulated the dislocated elements from the chain of equivalence ‘the people’ of the Myth of Tahrir together in such a way as to make them seem complementary. (Beke, 2012, pp. 87-90) The logic of difference is the discursive strategy applied by a transformist hegemonic project. The SCAF articulated the detached identities and demands in a new discursive formation. It provided a surface of inscription for all the separate ‘legitimate demands.’ All these particular identities were articulated in the overarching nationalist identity of the ‘Fatherland,’ the ‘Community’ and the ‘Sons of the Egyptian People.’ Stavrakakis points out that Disraeli’s ‘One Nation’ project ‘is based on the absorption of all social divisions into an ever-expanding system supported by the illusion of a society encompassing all differences and demands. The fantasmatic prototype of his ideal is that of a happy family: “One Nation” was the celebration of shared experience within a happy family’ (Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 77). Likewise, the SCAF’s ‘One Hand’ ideal2 was aimed at unifying the fragmented social field. It embodied the universal interest of order and unity in order to achieve gradual change. A new meaning was attached to the floating signifiers. ’25 January’ was fixed as a national holiday again, and the ‘revolution’ became another glorious moment in the history of the Egyptian people. (Beke, 2012, pp. 91-98) This prevailing strategy of co-opting as many identities and demands as possible is necessarily complemented by the construction of a chain of equivalence. To achieve a unified ‘One Nation,’ a certain degree of similarity between the different elements has to be conceived by the identities constituting ‘the Egyptian people.’ Therefore, the SCAF constructed the symmetric antagonism that was at the core of the 25 January Revolution as constitutive outside. The remnants of the old regime as much as the ‘misbehaving youngsters hurling rocks and bottles’ were portrayed as destabilizing and instigating chaos. These mutually antagonizing forces threatened the cohesion of the ‘Community’ and the national project of gradual progress. The deep social antagonism was weakened, and the social field was pacified (Beke, 2012, pp. 99-100)

2 Reflected in the well-known slogan ‘The army and the people are one hand,’ in Arabic: ‘al-gaysh wa-al-sha‘b īd wāḥidah’

The SCAF’s strategy converted the 25 January Revolution into a ‘passive revolution.’ Simon clarifies this gramscian concept:

Gramsci suggests that a strategy of passive revolution is the characteristic response of the bourgeoisie whenever its hegemony is seriously threatened and a process of extensive reorganisation is needed in order to re-establish its hegemony. A passive revolution is involved whenever relatively far-reaching modifications are made to a country’s social and economic structure from above, through the agency of the state, and without relying on the active participation of the people. Social reforms which have been demanded by the opposing forces may be carried out, but in such a way as to disorganise these forces and damp down any popular struggles. (Simon, 1991, p. 28)

The two main characteristics of Gramsci’s passive revolution are Caesarism and transformism. According to Adamson (1980, p. 199), ‘Caesarism refers to a political intervention by some previously dormant or even previously unknown political force capable of asserting domination and thus of restoring a static equilibrium during a hegemonic crisis.’ On 10 February 2011, the SCAF—acting as a Caesar, a strongman—broke the stalemate between the old regime and the revolutionary bloc in favour of the latter. After its Caesarist performance, the SCAF applied transformism as its method of governance in order to restore the old status quo. As pointed out above, the SCAF co-opted certain revolutionary groups in its discourse by inscribing their distinct claims in its nationalist project for reform. Solely those demands that did not threaten the restoration of the system were regarded legitimate, e.g. free elections, increased wages, et cetera. However, the demands for thorough structural change which constituted a danger to the SCAF’s interests and power foundations were not incorporated in the SCAF’s nationalist discourse. The groups demanding such institutional reforms were discursively constructed as the constitutive outside. These external enemies were vilified as a danger for ‘the Nation’s interests; stability and unity. (Beke, 2012, pp. 100-102)

Part 3 The Muslim Brotherhood in the Driver’s Seat

Chapter 1 Historical Development of the Ikhwan

1.1 The rise of an Islamist grassroots movement 1928-1952

‘We are brothers in the service of Islam; hence, we are the “Muslim Brothers”’ (al-Banna in Mitchell, 1993). In 1928, Hassan al-Banna (Ḥassan al-Bannā) founded the Society of the Muslim Brothers (Jamʽīyat al-lkhwān al-Muslimīn) in the Egyptian city of Ismailiya (al- Ismāʽīlīyah). Initially, the Society primarily focused on charity work, Islamic education, and the building and establishing of mosques. During the 1930s, it expanded its scope. Al-Banna sheds light on his bottom-up reformist agenda, ‘The idea of the Muslim Brothers includes in it all categories of reform […] a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea’ (al-Banna in Mitchell, 1993, p. 14). The Muslim Brotherhood set up an ‘Islamic pillar’1 (De Smet, 2010, p. 26) with its own social provisions: health care, education, social welfare, sports, news production, and a political party. Rather than aspiring the establishment of an Islamic state, the Muslim Brothers prioritized the islamization of society and the application of Islamic law or sharia (sharīʽah). Since its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood’s pan-Arabist and pan-Islamist discourse was strongly anti-colonial. It blamed the foreign dominance in Egypt for the deterioration of the situation of the Islamic community. Its political programme of reform was aimed at fighting social inequality. It included a state-led economy, nationalizations, Islamic finance, and social welfare reforms. This vision found fertile breeding ground among the discontented educated lower-middle- class and middle-class. (Lia, 1998; Mitchell, 1993, pp. 1-19) As De Smet puts it:

1 My translation from the original in Dutch, ‘islamitische zuil’

In spite of the Islamic rhetoric, the call for rejuvenation and the rejection of the imitation of the West, the content of the Muslim Brothers’ programme responds perfectly to the actual social issues of that period of time; political and economical dependence, the immobility of the agricultural ruling class, and the social issue.2 (De Smet, 2010, p. 26)

Early on, the Muslim Brotherhood faced internal divisions, leading to rifts in 1932 and 1939. Between 1931 and 1932, some dissidents voiced their discontent with al-Banna’s leadership. They criticized his stubbornness, his control over the treasury, and his appointment of a deputy for Ismailiya upon his 1932 departure to Cairo. Al-Banna refused to give in, and craftily strengthened his position. When he threatened to dismiss the persisting opponents, they took the honourable way out. In reaction to these events, al- Banna sought to enhance his authority over the Society. (Lia, 1998, pp. 60-71; Mitchell, 1993, pp. 9-11) In the following years he moulded this top-down governance into a hierarchical structure. Ever since, the General Guide (al-Murshid al-ʽĀmm) has been assisted by an advisory General Guidance Bureau (Maktab al-Irshād al-ʽĀmm). The membership fees were calculated according to wealth. In Egyptian society at that time, social and economic factors generally determined ones position. In the Society of Muslim Brothers, by contrast, climbing the hierarchical ladder depended on devotion and contribution to the organization and Islamic duties. (Lia, 1998, pp. 98-104) As the years passed, dissatisfaction with al-Banna’s pragmatist, non-violent position on the foreign domination and the Palestinian issue grew larger. In 1939, a radical splinter group seceded to form 'the Society of Our Master Muhammad's Youth' (Jamʽīyat Shabāb Sayyidnā Muḥammad). However, three years later al-Banna yielded to the calls for the establishment of a paramilitary unit. Inside the Society’s ranks, it was known as ‘the Special Section’ (al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ), and outside it became known as ‘the Secret Apparatus’ (al-Jihāz al-Sirrī). (Mitchell, 1993, pp. 12-19 & 29-33) During the Second World War, the government was replaced by a more favourable one towards Great-Britain. Its relationship with the Muslim Brothers shifted back and forth between enmity and alliance. The economic, political, and social unrest following the war played into the Society’s hands. Mitchell (1993, p. 19) argues that ‘The war years and their political and economic consequences for Egypt added momentum to that advance [in numbers and influence].’ De Smet (2010, pp. 26-27) contends that although the Muslim

2 My translation from the original in Dutch, ‘Ondanks het islamitische taalgebruik, de oproep tot herbronning en de afwijzing van de imitatie van het Westen, sloot de inhoud van het programma van de Moslimbroeders naadloos aan op de werkelijke maatschappelijke problemen van die tijd: politieke en economische dependentie, het immobilisme van de agrarische heersende klasse en het sociale vraagstuk.’

Brothers are committed to fight social inequality, they cannot be categorized as ‘islamosocialists.’ They aim to improve the living conditions of the poor, but are ill-disposed toward class struggle, and especially the communist forces advocating this struggle. In reaction to a big defeat in the rigged elections of 1945, the Muslim Brothers gave up the attempt of gaining political power through parliament. Al-Banna struggled more and more to appease the growing faction of violent members who committed several attacks on the British occupier and Jews. Finally, the regime cracked down on the Muslim Brothers. It imprisoned 4000 of its members and assassinated al-Banna in 1949. Due to deep disagreements, it took the Muslim Brothers two years to elect Hassan al-Hudaybi (Ḥassan al-Huḍaybī) as General Guide. In 1951, mass popular demonstrations spread, intended to cast off the yoke of British influence. At the same time, military and paramilitary forces were preparing armed resistance against the British occupier. Al-Hudaybi’s continuous backing of the government further deepened the rift between moderate and radical factions of the Society. (De Smet, 2010, p. 27; Mitchell, 1993, pp. 35-99)

1.2 Nasser’s persecuted scapegoat

On 25 January 1952, British soldiers violently intervened in a popular protest. This sparked a massive popular uprising. Al-Hudaybi condemned it, and denied any involvement from the Muslim Brotherhood. Unofficially though, many Muslim Brothers took part in the resistance. After six months of instability, the Free Officers staged a coup on 23 July led by General Muhammad Naguib (Muḥammad Nagīb). The military’s agenda represented the demands of the anti-imperialist and nationalist protest movement. It included civil democracy, social justice, anti-corruption, establishing a strong military force, and complete independence from foreign influence. (De Smet, 2010, p. 28; Zollner, 2009, p. 24) The Free Officers did not intend to share power. Therefore, they weakened the three major threats to their authority: the Muslim Brothers, the nationalist Wafd movement, and the communist movement. The latter was suppressed violently. The Free Officers cracked down on communists’ protests, and arrested their leaders. They pulled the rug from under the feet of the nationalist movement by outlawing the political party system in 1953. The only threat left were the Muslim Brothers, who were exempted from the prohibition on

political parties. Following a divide and rule strategy, the Free Officers exploited the internal differences of the movement. During their first half year in power, the Free Officers maintained friendly relations with the Society. Hoping to be a serious partner in his governance, Al-Hudaybi pledged allegiance to Nasser—who was outmanoeuvring Naguib at this point. However, during 1953, the atmosphere of cooperation gradually made way for mutual mistrust and fear. The January 1954 order for dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood was a first step in Nasser’s—who by now dominated the Revolutionary Command Council—plan to get rid of the Muslim Brothers. At the same time, the rift between different factions in the Society widened. Some advocated rapprochement towards the regime, others propagated a stance of non-alignment, while others took a firm stance against the regime. (Gordon, 1992, pp. 79-108; Zollner, 2009, pp. 25-36) The disarray culminated in the assassination attempt on Nasser, allegedly by a radicalized splinter group, in October 1954. This event enabled Nasser to justify the ensuing persecution of the Muslim Brothers. Six leaders were executed, al-Hudaybi was given a lifelong sentence of hard labour, at least 800 militants received heavy prison sentences, and another 6000 were imprisoned. (Rubin, 1990, p. 12) According to De Smet (2010), the Society of Muslim Brothers split in three different factions during the following years of repression. One group emigrated to the Gulf. These businessmen ensured a flow of money to their homes and befriended companies in Egypt. They would return in the 1970s to become the backbone of the ‘Islamic bourgeoisie.’ Another faction adhered to al-Banna’s discourse of gradual reform. They preached the continuation of Islamizing society through education and social provisions. This bottom-up approach intended to achieve the dominance of the Ikhwan by convincing as much Egyptians as possible. One faction of these reformers completely drew back from the blasphemous society. This group came to be known as al- Takfīr wa al-Hijrah (excommunication and emigration). A last group radicalized in Nasser’s prisons. These militants were heavily influenced by the ideology of Sayyid Qutb. His body of thought preaching the overthrow of the state had a great appeal among the disillusioned Muslim Brothers. According to Qutb, the world was in a state of Jāhilīyah (ignorance) like the one before the existence of Islam. The regimes of the day were hostile towards the rule of Allah on earth. Qutb did not offer a clear alternative vision for governance. Rather, the elimination of apostate regimes would inevitably lead to the rule of the Kingdom of Heaven, and the establishment of a true Islamic state. (Sagiv, 1995, pp. 36-42)

When he no longer feared their opposition, Nasser relaxed his tight grip on the Muslim Brothers in 1957 and 1958. In 1964, Nasser felt confident enough to release the remaining prisoners of the Muslim Brothers. The hardliners, however, had already begun to reorganize. They were laying plans to avenge the wave of arrests of 1954 and the torture they had endured. When their assassination and power grab plot was discovered in 1965, the authorities carried out a second wave of repression. About 27000 people were arrested, 26 were tortured to death, and three leaders—among whom Qutb—were hung. This blow drove the Muslim Brotherhood underground until after Nasser’s death. (Rubin, 1990, p. 15; Zollner, 2007, pp. 416-421)

1.3 Revived by Sadat as a counterbalance to the Left

In the context of his economic transition away from Nasser’s socialism, President Sadat sought a rapprochement with the Society of Muslim Brothers as a counterweight to the leftist opposition. He released their leaders from prison, allowed exiles to return home, and–despite their continued illegal status—they were allowed to publish their own newspaper, al-Daʽwah in 1976. For one thing, Sadat’s rehabilitation of the Muslim Brothers fitted in with his attempt to legitimate his rule with a religious discourse. He promoted an islamization of society, supported Islamic financial institutions, justified his decisions with religious motives, and he supported Islamic student movements. For another, this policy of appeasement served to secure the upcoming Islamic bourgeoisie’s and the Islamic student movements’ support as a counterweight to the disaffected leftist and Nasserite opposition. (Rubin, 1990, pp. 16-18) Aly & Wenner (1982) attribute the revival of the Muslim Brothers under Sadat’s rule to three external and two internal factors. The former include the aftermath of the Yemen War (1962-1967), the 1967 humiliation during the Six Day War, and their ties with Saudi Arabia. The Muslim Brothers were able to profit from Nasser’s military miscalculations by offering an appealing narrative to the disillusioned. They depicted the defeats of the secular regime as God’s revenge for violating Islamic law and aligning itself with the atheist Soviet Union. More important for this research are the domestic factors: the ongoing economic

crisis and Sadat’s ‘open door’-policy, and the role of the Left in Egyptian politics under Sadat. Sadat’s Infitah caused a transformation in the social composition of the Muslim Brothers. On the one hand, certain victors of the economic liberalization—the emerging Islamic bourgeoisie—took over the organization’s leadership. The unofficial appointment of ʽUmar al-Tilmisānī—a large landowner—as General Guide demonstrated this liberal tendency. A substantial fraction of the capitalists who profited from the ‘Open Door’ and had close ties to the bureaucracy were rich Muslim Brothers, who had fled to the Gulf because of Nasser’s repression. Upon their return under Sadat, they gained vast financial and commercial power and influence. About 40 percent of the country’s private sector was in the hands of Muslim Brothers. Springborg (in Beinin, 2005, pp. 120-121) claims that ‘those currently in control of the Muslim Brothers are of the Islamic Infitah bourgeoisie who “bought” the organization with resources acquired through collaboration with the Sadat regime.’ This influenced the society’s political course in favour of Sadat’s liberalization policy. On the other hand, a large amount of victims of the harsh social conditions caused by this policy joined the society’s rank and file, because the wealthy Islamists took up the task of providing basic social provisions. Finally, late in the 1970s the main Islamist student movement and the liberalized Muslim Brothers merged and would form the basis of the resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s. (Beinin, 2005, pp. 118-124; De Smet, 2010, pp. 29-30; Wickham, 2002, pp. 93-97) After his crackdown on the ‘Food Riots’ and signing the Camp David treaty of 1977, Sadat’s relationship with the Ikhwan turned sour. In reaction to the Muslim Brotherhood’s rival stance, Sadat resorted more and more to violent repression. Members who were disgruntled with the Society’s non-violent approach joined radicalized paramilitary cells. In 1981, this process reached its climax when radical Islamists assassinated Sadat.

1.4 Hovering between ally and bogeyman

When Mubarak assumed power in 1981, he severely lacked legitimacy. In order to broaden his base of consent, he pursued a policy of political détente. He released prisoners and allowed a controlled political liberalization. His avoidance of confrontation with the Muslim

Brothers and his conciliatory tone toward them, fitted in these measures to ease social tensions. The Society of the Muslim Brothers flourished during the first decade of Mubarak’s rule. The Muslim Brothers expanded their networks, established institutions, and dominated the professional middle-class associations. At the same time, they expanded their low-class following by continuous welfare provisions for those who suffered from the economic liberalization. In spite of its perpetual non-recognition as a political formation, the Society laid seeds for its transformation into a modern political party through its electoral politicking during the 1980s. It participated in the 1984 and 1987 elections held by Mubarak to enhance his democratic facade. Since it could not participate in the elections as a political party, it had to form a coalition. Its electoral programme largely matched Mubarak’s liberal policy. With the recent persecutions still fresh in their mind, the Muslim Brothers did not exert their increasing influence and power in the syndicates and parliament to openly provoke the regime. It was clear from the outset that the regime did not tolerate open confrontations in the form of strikes or demonstrations. Rather, the Muslim Brothers sought to secure the state’s legal recognition, and to play a key role in the regime’s vision of politics. In the meanwhile, the society intended to maintain its traditional legitimacy based on the recognition by society. Its oppositional rhetoric was aimed at expanding and appeasing its social base. (Al-Awadi, 2004, pp. 49-139; Beinin, 2009, pp. 21-26; El-Ghobashy, 2005, pp. 377-381) Beinin clarifies this situation of peaceful coexistence during the 1980s:

Although the Muslim Brothers have been tolerated most of the time, the extent of toleration depends on the whims of the regime. It is useful to the regime that the Brothers appear to be the only alternative to its ‘secularism’. However, they cannot be allowed to become strong enough to alter the status quo. The Brothers, in turn, do not seek to threaten the regime because doing so would endanger the network of social services and other institutions which form the social base of their political power. (Beinin, 2009, p. 23)

Since the early 1990s, the good relationship deteriorated rapidly. As argued above, the dire social consequences of Mubarak’s neoliberal turn gradually eroded his social basis. The regime’s change in economic strategy went hand in hand with a switch in political policy. ‘It started to abandon its conciliatory efforts, alienate the political opposition, and affirm its alliances with the commercial elites’ (Al-Awadi, 2004, p. 164). The Muslim Brothers successfully channelled the social grievances. They now opposed the government policies openly. Fearing its expansion, Mubarak did not spare the largest opposition movement from legal and physical repression in an attempt to reduce its influence. The Muslim

Brothers were prohibited from participating in parliamentary elections in a coalition in 1990. From 1993 on, the state controlled professional syndicates aiming to curtail the Ikhwan’s power in these associations. In response to the growing political and social impact of the movement, the repression intensified from 1995 until 2000 under the pretext of the battle against Islamist extremists. Leaders and activists of the society were arrested, as well as Islamist student movement leaders. (Al-Awadi, 2004, pp. 140-190; El-Ghobashy, 2005, pp. 381-387) The internal discord of the movement rose to the surface. A power struggle was being waged between a conservative hard-line ‘prison generation’ of the 1940s and 1950s and the moderate reformist ‘student generation’ of the 1960s and 1970s. The former consisted of members of the old paramilitary group. They occupied the key positions of the Muslim Brotherhood. The latter were in charge of the policy-making and seated in the student movements and the parliament, but did not have a fair say in the internal matters of the Society. They favoured dialogue with other opposition groups, and strove after pluralism and democracy. The parliamentary victories of 2000 and 2005, however, enhanced their internal position. These victories ushered in new repressive measures from the regime. Until the end of his reign, Mubarak arrested, tried, and tortured Muslim Brothers out of fear for their growing influence. Which, in turn, strengthened the hard-liners’ position. (De Smet, 2010, pp. 32-33) The neoliberal course of the Mubarak regime urged the Muslim Brotherhood to create a contradictory socio-economic discourse. According to Beinin, ‘The discourse of Egyptian political Islam contains populist appeals to workers and the “lumpen intelligentsia” as well as the business interests of bankers, financiers, and entrepreneurs closer to the leadership of the Muslim Brothers’ (2005, p. 135). On the one hand, it preserved its support for liberalization policies which served the interests of its rich leadership well. On the other, the Ikhwan sought to secure and expand the support of their social following by reaching out to the disgruntled labourers. However, this socialist turn had little effect, due to the Muslim Brothers’ rejection of social protest. The Ikhwan have been more successful in channelling the anti-imperialist sentiment in society. Anti-imperialism—spearheaded by the Muslim Brothers—contributed to a large extent to the rise of a pro-democracy movement. As democracy is a requisite for political participation of the Ikhwan, they presented themselves as leading this anti-authoritarian movement demanding the end of the Mubarak regime. However, when protests demanded structural change in power

relations and the economic system, they withdrew. Evidently, the discourse of the Ikhwan is very diverse and consists of many disparate elements. ‘Islam’ is the empty signifier which gives this contradictory discourse its perceived unity. (Beinin, 2005; De Smet, 2010, pp. 33- 34; Naguib, 2009, pp. 164-172) Naguib concludes:

The contradictions in the political strategies, tactics, and discourse of the Brotherhood, the transformations in the social composition of the organization, and its expanding and changing mass base lead us back to the use of Islam as a unifying factor in the building and maintenance of such a diverse organization. [...] ‘Islam’ becomes the solution to all the different problems—to the injustice and exploitations suffered by workers and the poor, to the national humiliation and personal alienation suffered by the educated middle class, to the lawlessness and disorder feared by the rich, even to the degradation and harassment suffered by young women in work or on the street. (Naguib, 2009, pp. 171-172)

1.5 Conclusion

Three threads, which are important to understand the Ikhwan’s course during and after the revolution, run through their historical development. The first concerns their mass base and their leadership. Since its early days, the Muslim Brotherhood’s social welfare provisions in combination with its strong anti-imperialist discourse responded adequately to the needs in society throughout the decades and garnered them a mass support base. When the country’s social inequality took a turn for the worse because of the ongoing liberalization under Sadat and Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood profited in two ways. Firstly, the returning Muslim Brothers who took up leadership were able to gather vast wealth. Secondly, they profited from the governments failing to provide social welfare and took up this task. This further broadened their support base. A second thread is the organization’s continuous internal dissent. Several segments of the Muslim Brothers were discontent with the leadership’s authoritarian course, and there was a constant debate over political strategies. These divisions lead several groups to the splinter off. The last thread is the pendulous relationship between the Ikhwan and the different regimes. It swung back and forth between toleration and repression depending on the caprices of the regimes.

Chapter 2 From Clandestinity to Mainstream: the Ikhwan hedge their bets

2.1 The Muslim Brothers’ double game during the revolution

The Muslim Brothers were the most notable absentees from Tahrir during the first days of the 25 January uprising. Fearing a renewed wave of violent persecution and in line with its bottom-up gradual reformist strategy, the most powerful opposition force in the country opted for a cautious approach urging Mubarak to implement reforms. In spite of the rejection by their leadership to officially endorse the protests, many young members took to the streets as individuals. However, as the demonstrations gained momentum and it became evident that the protesters would stand their ground, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership realized it could not let the unique opportunity to play a key role in the country’s future slip. Therefore, it decided to back the 28 January protests, without putting itself at the forefront. Muhammad Morsi3 (Muḥammad Mursī) told Associated Press, ‘We are not pushing this movement, but we are moving with it. We don't wish to lead it but we want to be part of it.’ This low profile position not solely resulted from concerns over self- preservation, but also from the well-founded fear of being used as a scarecrow by the Mubarak regime to discredit the protest movement. Mubarak had often used a threatening ‘Islamist dictatorship’ as the only undesirable alternative—the constitutive outside in Laclau and Mouffe’s terminology—to his rule. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood sought to reassure the fellow demonstrators who suspected them of hijacking the revolution. Therefore, they did not brandish Islamist symbols or slogans. The participation of the Muslim Brotherhood was a catalyst for the development of the demonstrations. Although it allegedly did not want to lead the revolution, it silently set itself up as the major organizer of the movement. Drawing on its decades of experience as a welfare provision organization it supplied materials for tents, food, drinks, blankets, medicine, et cetera. It also played an

3 I have opted to use the romanization ‘Morsi’ instead of ‘Morsy,’ or ’Mursi,’ because President Morsi’s advisers stated that this is the preferred spelling. (in Stengel, Ghosh, & Vick, 2012)

important role as protector of the demonstrators, preventing intruders from entering Tahrir. (Pargeter, 2013, pp. 212-216) The Muslim Brothers tried to turn the events into their advantage while assuring the protesters that they did not intend to take over. By the beginning of February, the Muslim Brothers changed their reformist tune. They felt confident enough to adopt a strong anti- Mubarak language demanding his downfall staunchly proclaiming their refusal to engage in any dialogue with the regime. Moreover, they started speaking in the name of the people. They also tried to comfort the demonstrators by guaranteeing that they would not field a presidential candidate nor take up ministerial posts. Yet, in spite of the rhetoric of acting solely for the common good, the Ikhwan evidently looked after their own interests. Above all, they pursued the official recognition and the institutionalization of their presence they had been yearning for so long. They would not mind striking a deal with the regime for this purpose. That is why, when negotiations with regime representatives took place, they entered, in spite of their strong language to the contrary. The two faces of the Ikhwan infuriated both opposition forces who rejected the call for dialogue and many among their own younger members. Whereas the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership depicted the dialogue as an opportunity to voice the people’s demands, people on Tahrir saw the negotiations as a move by the regime to divide the opposition and those who entered in the dialogue as jeopardizing the revolution. When the negotiations reached a deadlock, and the revolutionary momentum showed few signs of decay, the Muslim Brothers blasted the regime for not fulfilling its promises. Nonetheless, their leadership still left the door open for dialogue until the regime was overturned on 11 February. (Pargeter, 2013, pp. 216-221)

2.2 The Muslim Brotherhood under the SCAF

2.2.1 A marriage of convenience

After Mubarak’s ouster, the Muslim Brotherhood treaded a difficult path between the SCAF and the revolutionaries. Its foremost concern was to avoid confrontation, most of all with the leading military, but also with the revolutionaries in order to enhance its revolutionary credentials and not to lose its popular support base. This way, the Muslim Brothers believed they would be able to manoeuvre themselves into a power position. Whereas some

demonstrators continued a sit-in to urge the SCAF to immediately hand over power, the Muslim Brothers were among the first to leave Tahrir after Mubarak stepped down. Its leadership promised not to nominate a presidential candidate and not to seek a parliamentarian majority to comfort both the opposition and the generals. Yet, the repeated pledges not to dominate the political arena seemed little more than hot air. By joining a select committee established by the SCAF tasked with outlining the transitional roadmap, the Ikhwan took the first opportunity it had to have a say in Egypt’s future. The most crucial issue was the constitution drafting process. In contrast with most political forces, the Muslim Brotherhood sought to organize parliamentary elections prior to the drafting of a constitution. Furthermore, it lobbied to ensure that a 100-member Constituent Assembly would be elected by the parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood felt confident that it would be victorious at the polls because of its large mobilization capacities and the political inexperience of the many different revolutionary fractions in Tahrir. Consequently, it would have a decisive say in appointing the Constitutional Assembly. The Ikhwan got their way and this roadmap was passed with 77.3 percent in a referendum. (Pargeter, 2013, pp. 221-224) The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood did not partake in the following mass demonstrations against the SCAF in April and the end of May 2011, leads to the conclusion that there was a mutually advantageous arrangement between the two main players on the political arena. The Ikhwan and the military can hardly be seen as natural allies, considering their predominantly confrontational history. Nonetheless, at this point a relationship of cooperation was highly beneficial for both parties. (Elgindy, 2012, pp. 94-95) The Muslim Brothers needed the military in order to consolidate their newfound legitimacy in parliamentary seats and to ensure an overall say in the Constituent Assembly, thus securing its major role in the political future of Egypt. For the SCAF on the other hand, the Muslim Brothers were a necessary ally in its transformist ‘divide and rule’ strategy to weaken the social antagonism. The Muslim Brotherhood was a vital shackle in the chain of equivalence of the Myth of Tahrir. Taking this shackle away was an important part of stealing the revolutionaries’ thunder. Stein (2012, pp. 55-57) also points out the alignment of the Muslim Brotherhood’s economic policies with the economic interests of the generals. Its programme stressed the necessity of a free market and private property, but at the same time it insisted on restoring the state’s role and that some ‘strategic’ sectors should not be

privatized. This was aimed at reassuring the military that it would maintain its economic autonomy and that the Ikhwan would not carry through thorough institutional reforms. In this political climate, the Muslim Brotherhood officially established its political party; the FJP (Freedom and Justice Party, in Arabic: Ḥizb al-Ḥurrīyah wa-al-ʽAdālah). This decision was reached after years of fierce internal debate. Conservative members had always argued that the Ikhwan should refrain from participating in party politics and leave the choice for a political party up to its members. However, the window of opportunity to move from clandestine opposition movement to mainstream political actor created by Mubarak’s ouster dissolved the ideological differences. The official explanation to overcome the divide was that the Ikhwan and the FJP were two completely independent bodies. Yet, this proved empty rhetoric: the Guidance Bureau appointed the party heads, Muslim Brothers were prohibited from joining another party, and the party’s charters were written by the Muslim Brotherhood. The policy of the leadership fostered aggravation among members who had hoped for a change of course after the revolution. Especially many youths were disgruntled; some of them established their own parties. The leadership tightened its grip and expelled the ‘errant youth,’ asserting that no dissent would be tolerated. With political power within its reach, all energy should be focused on grabbing it. The parliamentary elections of November 2011 were to be the litmus test for its political aspirations. (Pargeter, 2013, pp. 226-228)

2.2.2 Growing mistrust

As the elections drew near, the mutually beneficial relationship between the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood turned increasingly sour. Since the SCAF grew extensively fearful for an Islamist dominated parliament and Constituent Assembly threatening its interests, it took several steps to impose restraints on the Ikhwan’s political expansion. In July 2011, it issued a law stipulating that 50 percent of the lower house (People’s Assembly, in Arabic: Majlis al-Shaʽb) be reserved for individual candidates and that 65 seats of the upper house (Shura Council, in Arabic: Majlis al-Shūrá) be reserved for individual candidates and 28 for party candidates. Public pressure forced the SCAF to increase the share of the party candidates to two thirds in September. This was still sufficient to curtail the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary dominance. Furthermore, it upheld the Nasser-era provision that half of the seats be reserved for representatives of ‘labourers and farmers.’ In reality these

seats were taken by retired military and security personnel. In response to this perceived threat to its political momentum, the Ikhwan abandoned their cautious approach. Whereas they had vowed to nominate candidates to a maximum of 35 percent of the contested parliamentary seats in the early aftermath of the 25 January Revolution, this figure had increased to 50 percent by April 2011, and by October they announced to run for all seats with the Democratic Alliance for Egypt. Moreover they threatened to boycott the elections unless the SCAF amended the election law. However, they refrained from participating in the 30 September demonstrations avoiding a direct conflict with the SCAF. Finally, the SCAF yielded to pressure coming from all sides and allowed all seats to be contested by party candidates. (Pargeter, 2013, pp. 228-230) This triumph was short-lived, however. In early November, the SCAF laid out a set of supra-constitutional principles in the Selmi document which included that the military retained all its privileges, the SCAF could appoint 80 percent of the Constituent Assembly, and it had the right to object articles of the constitution draft. This bold move by the SCAF drove the Muslim Brothers back into the arms of the revolutionaries, and sparked mass demonstrations in Tahrir. Yet, the Muslim Brotherhood, unlike other opposition forces, did not demand the departure of the military rule. Rather, they intended to demonstrate that the generals were not able to rule without its support. Once more, the SCAF was forced to withdraw its declaration. The Muslim Brothers pulled its supporters from the streets and entered into negotiations with the SCAF. The elections were organized according to the Ikhwan’s plans between 28 November 2011 and 28 January 2012. The final results of the elections, with a turnout of 60 percent, showed a dominance of the Islamist current. The FJP gained 47 percent of the votes, and the ultraconservative Salafist parties gained 24 percent. The two main secular parties, the Wafd Party and the Egyptian Current, only gained about 8 percent each. These results caused great concerns among non-Islamists, women, and the religious minorities about the establishment of a civil state and human rights. Although the precise powers of the parliament were vague, and would remain a question for serious political struggle, its task of naming the 100 members of the Constituent Assembly was of great importance for the country’s future. (Elgindy, 2012, pp. 90-95; Pargeter, 2013, pp. 230- 231) With these unique opportunities knocking, the Muslim Brothers went full out to control the political arena. Once again they backtracked from one of their promises. In March 2012, they decided to field Khayrat al-Shater (al-Shāṭir) as a candidate for the upcoming

presidential elections. This decision was reached because they felt backed into a corner by the SCAF. The generals refused to dissolve the government of al-Ganzouri (al-Ganzūrī) and threatened to dissolve the parliament. Morsi declared, ‘We have chosen the path of the presidency not because we are greedy for power but because we have a majority in parliament which is unable to fulfil its duties.’ Moreover, the Ikhwan were eager to finalize the constitution before the presidential elections. This way, they could ensure the power of the parliament at the expense of the presidential powers. Therefore, they forged a strategic alliance with the Salafists, which assigned 75 percent of the seats in the Constituent Assembly to members of these Islamist currents. In making these hasty and audacious moves, the Muslim Brotherhood seemed to be overplaying its hand. Two weeks after its formation, the Constituent Assembly was suspended by an administrative court. Earlier, 25 of its members had walked out of the committee, protesting the overwhelming Islamist dominance which lead the non-Islamists to fear that rights of women, Copts, youth, and minorities would be absent from the constitution. This suspension reversed the timetable: the drafting of the constitution now would be completed after the presidential elections. This raised the stakes of the presidential elections notably, since the president would now assume the same powers Mubarak had, thus hold the key to Egypt’s future. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood had been compelled to field a new candidate—Muhammad Morsi— because al-Shater was one of the ten candidates who had been banned from running for office. (Pargeter, 2013, pp. 231-236) On 12 June, the list of members of a new Constituent Assembly was approved. This prompted a walkout by 57 Members of Parliament, arguing that the assembly lacked legitimacy and accusing Islamists of trying to dominate the constitutional process. (Ottoway, 2012) On 14 June, days before the final presidential election round, the SCAF announced the dissolution of the People’s Assembly, based on the SCC (Supreme Constitutional Court) ruling that declared the parliamentary election law unconstitutional. This decision transferred the legislative powers to the SCAF. At this point, the SCAF had the power to name the members of the Constituent Assembly in case the current committee should fail to draft a constitution. In the absence of a parliament, it was not clear when or where the future president would assume powers, he would probably have to do so in front of the generals. (I.A., 2012) On 18 June, amidst the presidential elections, the SCAF one- sidedly issued a constitutional amendment annex drastically restricting the future president’s power. The SCAF members were now responsible for all issues related to the

armed forces. It appropriated the power to appoint its leaders, the head of the SCAF acted as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and minister of defence until a new constitution was established. The president needed the approval of the SCAF to declare war. He also needed approval of the SCAF for the army’s intervention to maintain internal security and defend public properties. (Ottoway, 2012) The SCAF had taken legislative power, the power to veto the new constitution, and stripped the president of authority over the military. These moves were generally conceived as a last effort of the old regime to withhold the Muslim Brotherhood from achieving both legislative and executive power. After a long stretched juridical tug-of-war, the dissolution of the parliament was not annulled, and the appeals against the formation of the Constituent Assembly were repeatedly postponed enabling it to proceed with its task to draft the constitution.

2.3 Conclusion

During the 25 January Revolution and under the SCAF’s rule, the Muslim Brotherhood’s primary objective was to seize with both hands the unique opportunity to grow out from the largest underground opposition movement to the most important political player in the post-revolutionary stage. During the revolution the Ikhwan cautiously put their eggs in two baskets. They joined the protests demanding the ouster of Mubarak in order not to miss the boat in case the protests would prove successful. Yet, at the same time, they continued to leave the door open for dialogue with the regime until its downfall in case it would gain the upper hand. Likewise, in Egypt’s post-revolutionary stage, it manoeuvred skilfully between the SCAF and the revolutionary forces. In practice, this meant forming a mutually beneficial alignment with the SCAF while carrying the big stick of joining anti-SCAF protests on the one hand, and fobbing the revolutionaries off with promises of goodwill on the other. Out of fear for an increasing Islamist dominance in the Egyptian political sphere, the SCAF made last-minute radical decisions to restrict the Muslim Brothers’ power. With the People’s Assembly dissolved, the presidency and the Constituent Assembly were at this point the two key channels through which the Muslim Brothers had to anchor their political power. For the new president to govern without restrictions, however, he would have to reconcile with the SCAF. The next chapters examine Morsi’s rapprochement with the generals and his

discursive strategy in the light of these insights into the Ikhwan’s endeavours to attain legitimate political power.

Chapter 3 Muslim Brothers in Arms

3.1 The political aftermath of the Rafaḥ border attacks

On 5 August 2012, unknown gunmen killed 16 Egyptian border guards in North Sinai. During a forceful military offensive, sending in troops, carriers and helicopters to hunt them down, 20 militants were killed. In response to the killings, Morsi drastically purged the security apparatus firing several top security officials—among whom the Commander of the Republican Guard, the Intelligence Director, and the commander of the military police— on 8 august. On 12 August, Morsi made two sets of game-changing decisions. Firstly, a major reshuffle within the SCAF. Tantawi (Ṭanṭāwī) , head of the SCAF and the Minister of Defence for over twenty years, as well as the number two man in the military Chief of Staff, Sami Anan (Sāmī ʽAnān), were forced into retirement. They were named presidential advisors, they were lauded for their accomplishments during the transitional phase, and they received medals. Moreover, Morsi dismissed the heads of all the services of the armed forces and gave them similar honourable exits. All the new appointees came from within the SCAF. Rather than a thorough institutional transformation, this was a major personnel shuffle, with juniors taking the posts of their superiors. According to Abdel Kouddous (ʽAbd al-Qudūs), this was all ‘part of a safe exit scenario, whereby members of the Supreme Council will be able to leave their posts without fear of prosecution for the numerous crimes committed over the transitional period’ (in DemocracyNow!, 2012). The second set of decisions was the four-article constitutional declaration of Morsi. By issuing this decree, Morsi annulled the SCAF’s amendment of 18 June, which limited the presidential powers notably. Morsi now had full legislative power, in addition to executive power. He now also had the power to appoint a constituent assembly if the current were to fail in its task. Morsi thus had near dictatorial powers. The shifting of these powers from the unelected unpopular SCAF towards the elected president was welcomed by many as a positive development. (DemocracyNow!, 2012) During an interview with Egyptian Television on 22 September, President Morsi declared his decisions were taken in the public interest. He argued that he—as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces—acted in the best interest of the institution by replacing the old

generals by a younger generation. He praised the SCAF for its estimable role in managing the democratic transition. Just like the SCAF had done before, he presented the army and the people as one hand. He integrated the army in his discourse by stressing that it is a fundamental part of ‘the people.’ The backing of the military was essential for the realization of his project towards a stable civil state. He sent the army back to its barracks, stressing that the function of the troops is to protect the borders and the security of the homeland. Morsi portrays himself—in his role of President—as embodying the Egyptian unity, taking over the daily governance.

Table 2 Extract Interview with national TV on 22 September 20124

These decisions were never intended to marginalize the role of the institution or to aggress these persons in any possible way. Rather, this was the realization of the best interest, which everybody values. I realize the desire and interests of the Egyptian people. I preserve the institutions of the Egyptian state. This is my responsibility. I replaced some of the leaders for the sake of the participation of a new spirit and the youth, and also out of respect and appreciation for the leaders who have never committed corruption. Those who did commit corruption will be served law and justice. I look ahead and I imagine that the Egyptian people rallied for these decisions. I look at the reality, and I see that it loved these decisions. This means the approval of these decisions and the real legitimization of them. It’s a fact that Egypt—by the will of the Egyptian people—is now taking steps towards carrying the responsibility of a civil state, with the true meaning of civil state, which is explained in the al-Azhar document. As I said, that means that it is a nation state, a democratic state, a constitutional, modern, and stable state. The Egyptian Armed Forces have played a great role in the preservation of the revolution. The Egyptian Armed Forces have managed the transitional process, and endured a lot during their management, and protected this journey. Now the Egyptian people respects the Armed Forces. The Egyptian President, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, is devoted to the interests of this institution. He takes care of them just as he takes care of the rest of the nation’s institutions. The Armed Forces play a key role in defending the nation’s security and its borders. They are also an actual partner and essential supporter in defending the homeland security, whenever this is necessary. This affair and this atmosphere of love and unification between the Egyptian people, which considers the Armed Forces as an integral part of it, and between the Armed Forces and its self-perception as fulfilling a great role for this people, it is this unified

4 For full English text see Appendix 3.1. Interview with national television on 22 September 2012

system I take under my wings. These decisions were, and still are—as will other decisions in the future be—part of the realization of the following interests; welfare, and raising the value of the popular will, and of the real transition with the entire Egyptian people towards complete freedom and social justice, and democracy, and the implementation of a lasting constitution which will be approved by the Egyptian people. These are decisions taken in view of the will of this people, expressing this desire for achievement of the interests. They are never against individuals at all, as they were realized in the public interest, and so we see their results in society and even in the world too.

3.2 Ikhwānī governance under military rule

There has been an inconclusive debate about the intentions and the ramifications of these far-reaching decisions. It revolves mainly around the way these decisions were reached and who was consulted in the process and who was not. Lynch (2012) distinguishes three lines of reasoning in this debate: the first conceives these decisions as the establishment of a long- term military rule in alliance with the Ikhwan. Others see these decisions as a unilateral, sweeping power grab by Morsi and the Ikhwan, pushing the SCAF aside. They fear a full- scale ‘Ikhwanization’ of Egypt. In their view, Morsi grabs dictatorial powers capable of shaping the constitution and Egypt’s future. Lastly, those taking a middle-ground position on these decisions see it as a step forward in the democratic transition. They perceive these events as the ousting of a hated military junta by an elected president. This research supports the view that a deal was brokered between the SCAF and the presidency, rather than that the latter was ‘outsmarting the generals’ (Cook, 2012a) or ‘escalating the power struggle’ (AJE, 2012). Both actors viewed the other as the most suitable partner to realize his own interests. President Morsi intended to integrate the vital institution of the armed in his discourse, thus securing the support of the most powerful actor on the Egyptian scene. At the same time Morsi expanded the power of the presidential institution. What is more, he also seized revolutionary legitimacy by stripping the much- hated political leadership of the SCAF of its last formal political power. According to Hellyer (2012), the popularity of Egypt’s military had started fading during the last months of its rule and the first month of Morsi’s rule. The majority of the Egyptians wanted the military

to give up its political role and retreat to the barracks, and the public would not stop subjecting the military to scrutiny. Cook (2012b, p. 309) perceptively argues that, even though the events of the 25 January Revolution and its aftermath afflicted the regime badly, its adherents managed to keep it intact by reshuffling the actors. Mubarak had erroneously assumed that he was of key importance for the system’s survival, while actually the institution of the presidency was far more important than the actor occupying the chair. The generals looked for an alliance with a partner that would serve their interests, and take over the chair of Mubarak:

Throughout the transition, it was very clear that the commanders of the SCAF knew precisely what they wanted, which was essentially what they had under Mubarak: control over the military’s economic interests [...]; maintenance of social and political stability; and importantly, preserving the military’s role as the ultimate source of power and legitimacy in the political order. The problem was that the officers were ill equipped to develop a political strategy to achieve their objectives. As a result, they were willing to negotiate with any group or individual whom they thought [...] could deliver. (Cook, 2012b, p. 319)

Indeed, the military intended to restore the old regime, protecting its core interests, and find a conservative ally to occupy the presidential chair and handle day-to-day governance and maintain internal stability. It found the ideal partner in Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood and left it to them to ‘govern’ while it kept on ‘ruling.’

3.2.1 The SCAF’s core interests

In his book Ruling but not governing (2007), Cook asserts that Egypt is a military-dominated state. He distinguishes four core interests of the military enclave relating to the economy, foreign and security policy, the political and state apparatus, and nationalism. It will take aggressive measurements to protect these interests. According to Cook, the existence of the regime is an existential issue for the officers to secure these interests. Therefore, they will take action to make certain that the regime remains intact. Understanding their worldview and insight in these core interests, enables analysts to make sense of officers’ behaviour and their tendencies. However, it remains difficult to reveal clear red-lines that would enable researchers to predict how officers act, due to their incapability of perfectly assessing political situations and consistently acting upon these assessments. Military leaders emphasized their economic independence as the best way to achieve development. As the statist economic policies faded, the officers shifted their stress in

favour of neoliberal economic discourse, promoting privatization and structural adjustments. Under the state-led economic policy of Nasser and the Free Officers, the generals built up personal economic interests. Sadat’s economic Infitah policy ushered the creation of a nexus between the military and the economic elite. (Cook, 2007) Kamrava (2000, p. 80) argues that ‘since the 1970s there has been a “horizontal expansion” in the role of the military into the national economy. In addition to an expanding military industry and its role as a veteran arms producer, the Egyptian military is economically active in the agricultural sector, in civilian industries, and in the national infrastructure.’ Mubarak granted immense autonomy to the generals in trade for their allegiance. They were free to establish and rule over a lucrative, tax-free combination of defence as well as non-defence business: the “MIBCC” (Military-Industrial-Business-Commercial Complex) which it would be eager to protect from anyone trying to dismantle it. (Hashim, 2011, p. 109) It is a ‘vast military-run commercial enterprise that seeps into every corner of Egyptian society’ (Stier, 2011). It occupies key positions in a multitude of important industries, including the production and distribution of food cement, gasoline, and vehicles, construction, and in the possession of public lands. Security policy—domestic and foreign—is another core interest of the military elite. Military trials are the military’s method par excellence to repress opposition groups and ‘maintain domestic security.’ The SCAF continued these practices after the revolution, despite heavy protests. The officers have always depicted themselves as indispensable for securing the Egyptian borders from threats from outside, the Zionist danger in particular. Since the coup of the Free Officers in 1952, the military enclave has retained its autonomy in this field. Since the mid-1970s, Egypt has maintained relations with Israel. It even signed a formal peace treaty with it despite domestic opposition. The refusal by Mubarak to break ties with Israel over its invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was another sign of the power of the generals in the field of security and foreign policy. Not the relation with Israel, but the strategic and financial advantages—ties with the United States—it brought in for the military elite were essential. Another example of their autonomy was the sending of 35000 troops to Saudi Arabia in 1991 against the will of the majority of Egyptians. Moreover, the military establishment has always concealed its defence budget from the public’s eye ‘for the sake of domestic security.’ It depicts demands for transparency of the army’s decisions as a threat to national security. (Cook, 2007, pp. 22-23)

A third interest of central importance to the military establishment concerns the state and the political apparatus. Cook (2007, p. 26) asserts that in Egypt ‘officers and their civilian allies forged political systems with well-developed democratic facades, permitting the commanders to rule, but leaving it to others to govern.’ On the surface, Egypt’s political system seemed to be opening up by the 1980s. It had a parliament—with actual influence in certain policy areas—including a variety of political parties, a relatively free press, and permission for non-state-based groups to operate in cultural and social spheres. However, restrictive electoral laws, vote rigging, limits on the freedom of speech, substantial power for the presidential institution, the military appointment of the president, his staff and a majority of the governors, and Egypt’s Emergency Law all served to maintain the status quo. Lastly, of vital interest to the officers is the nationalist narrative portraying them as crucial defenders against external aggression, colonialism, and guarantors of the national interest. This discourse provides them with a considerable measure of legitimacy. It presents the 1952 Revolution as the ouster of a corrupt colonial regime. During the 1956 Israeli, British, French and English invasion, the armed forces heroically preserved Egypt’s independence. The 1967 calamity is blamed on the absence of one-third of the armed forces who were fulfilling their pan-Arab duty in Yemen. The 1973 6 October War is depicted as a restoration of the Egyptian territory and national glory. The armed forces are depicted as the guarantors of domestic and regional stability. The military elite has continuously sought to preserve and enhance this nationalist narrative. (Cook, 2007, pp. 28-29)

3.2.2 The military preserved intact

In return for the military's support, the Muslim Brotherhood incorporated many of its core demands -- no parliamentary oversight over the military budget, the establishment of a National Defense Council stacked with generals, and the ability to try civilians in military tribunals -- directly into the draft constitution. Egypt's founding document, then, is the realization of what the military has sought ever since Mubarak's departure. Even better for the military, it got exactly what it wanted while appearing to stay on the sidelines of Egyptian politics. (Stacher, 2012)

The new constitution5, drafted by the Islamist dominated Constituent Assembly, was highly favourable towards the military. It protected the officers’ first two core interests: The military maintained full autonomy over its MIBCC and the security and defence policy. Article 197 stated: ‘The [National Defence] Council is responsible for matters pertaining to the methods of ensuring the safety and security of the country and to the budget of the Armed Forces. It shall be consulted about draft laws related to the Armed Forces.’ This meant that the defence budget and the ‘Military Inc.’6 would not be subjected to any civilian oversight. The NDC (National Defence Council) was the sole organ responsible for its supervision. Although the NDC was chaired by the President, the constitution stipulated that eight out of its fifteen seats were permanently assigned to army officers. Moreover, the Minister of Defence was to be appointed from among the army’s officers. Another important stipulation with regard to the military’s autonomy was article 198. It allowed for civilians to be tried before military courts for ‘crimes that harm the Armed Forces.’ Thus the military retained its essential tool to repress voices who demand transparency and accountability of the armed forces. The fact that the possible removal of this clause provoked severe discontent among the generals during the drafting process proves the significance of these trials to maintain their autonomy in the name of ‘national security.’ Furthermore, President Morsi enhanced the nationalist narrative, indispensable for the popularity of the military. Even though the Muslim Brothers suffered heavy repression after their collaboration with the Free Officers during the 1952 revolution, Morsi paid

5 Retrieved 23 July 2013, from http://www.sis.gov.eg/newvr/theconistitution.pdf 6 A term coined by Springborg (e.g. in Simpson & Fam, 2011)

extensive tribute to the Free Officers Revolution. On the occasion of its 60th anniversary, he called the revolution ‘a model for other liberation movements throughout the Arab and Muslim world’ (in AO, 2012c). Ahead of the celebrations of the 6 October War, Morsi paid a visit to the tomb of Sadat and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and awarded ex-President Sadat and his Chief of Staff al-Shādhlī the highest honour for their accomplishments during the war. In addition, he enhanced the latest episode in the nationalist narrative of the armed forces. He lauded the SCAF for its great role during the 25 January Revolution and the ensuing transition process. These examples attest Morsi’s intention to burnish the nationalist narrative, serving yet another core interest of the officers. However, the 25 January Revolution successfully replaced the military as ultimate source of legitimacy by the people. It impeded the use of the officers’ tactics to hold up a mere democratic facade: restrictive electoral laws, ballot stuffing, the appointment of the president, his staff, governors, and Egypt’s Emergency Law. For the first time in history, the generals were not capable of appointing a president from among their own ranks, since ‘any attempt to rig the election, as in years gone by, could not win in post-Mubarak Egypt: civil society oversight, particularly from the well-organized MB machinery, made wide-scale rigging a non-option’ (Hellyer, 2012). The president, the other democratic institutions, and political freedoms can no longer be regarded merely as a democratic facade. ‘The people’ is a serious force to be reckoned with. Unlike before, their will cannot be ignored or repressed violently. Consequently, the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi were a logical choice as a partner considering their recent electoral successes, the overlap in economic interests, and the shared interest of maintaining stability. On these grounds, the present study concludes that the SCAF accomplished in a large measure its goal of returning to its comfortable position of ruling, leaving the governing to the Muslim Brothers and Morsi. As far as ruling over its core activities completely autonomously while maintaining its popularity concerns, the military proved very successful. Nevertheless, the military no longer ruled over the entire Egyptian nation: it had to take into account the will of the people.

3.2.2.1 Towards a ‘military democracy’?

These findings may indicate Egypt’s gradual evolution from a ‘Mukhābarāt’ (Intelligence) state towards a ‘Military democracy.’ Kamrava (2000) designed a typology7 of Middle Eastern states according to the ways in which states integrate the military so that they maintain political control and regime stability. This typology classifies Egypt as one of the ‘exclusionary states, in which once-ideological officers are still in power but have now civilianized themselves and much of the machinery of the state, having in the process become largely nonideological, civilian autocrats’ (Kamrava, 2000, p. 68). In military democracies however, such as Turkey and Israel, ‘the state predominates but allows the military to play an important role in domestic politics’ (Ibid.). They have a vibrant political party system in which the electorate has an actual role in the decision-making process. Although this subject would be interesting for further examination, it does not fall within the scope of this study. Accordingly, it does not propound the view that this evolution has occurred or will certainly occur.

Table 3 Varieties of Civil-Military Relations Found in the Middle East8

7See Table 3 Varieties of Civil-Military Relations Found in the Middle East 8 Copied from Kamrava ( 2000, p. 71)

Chapter 4 Morsi’s First 100 Days

It was clear from the very start of his presidency that Morsi’s undertaking to create common consent for his rule would prove very challenging. Morsi had won the first round of the presidential elections with 24.78 percent, just ahead of SCAF-candidate Ahmad Shafiq (Aḥmad Shafīq) (23.66 percent). While the FJP collected more than 10 million votes (37.5 percent) in the parliamentary elections, only 5.5 million people (25 percent) voted for Morsi in the first round of the presidential elections. Hamdeen Sabbahi (Ḥamdīn Ṣabbāḥī) (20.27 percent) and Abu al-Futouh (ʽAbd al-Moniʽm Abū al-Futūḥ) (17.47 percent) gained most of the votes of the revolutionary camp. Since only the first two contestants proceed to the final election round, no revolutionary candidate was running for office anymore. The stand- off between a ‘secular military’ and a ‘civil Islamist’ meant choosing between a rock and a hard place for many. They did not vote for Shafiq, former Prime Minister under Mubarak, or for Morsi, but rather against either the ‘threat of Islamism’ or ‘a new military dictator.’ (De Smet, 2013, pp. 73-74) Morsi won the final election round with 51.3 percent of the votes to Shafiq’s 48.27 percent. Above all, these elections indicated the deep division in Egyptian society. The elections proved that Morsi faced a tough challenge of convincing everybody of his legitimacy representing all Egyptians. In order to establish his hegemony, he would have to search for a balance in the intricate web of Egyptians social factions and their different wishes, which following De Smet (2013), we can divide in 7 groups: three remnant powers of the old regime, namely the SCAF, the neoliberal capitalists, and the old state apparatus. These want to restore order and stability. The election results surprisingly show they have a big support base. The four opposition movements, the liberal democrats, the social democrats, the Muslim Brotherhood and religious-sectarian movements, have in common that they want to safeguard the achievements of the revolution, but they all attribute different meanings to this revolution and have a different political agenda. On 24 June 2012, the Supreme Presidential Election Committee announced Morsi’s victory. This announcement triggered massive celebrations in Tahrir Square and all over the country. The same evening Morsi gave his first nationally televised speech. On 29 June, Morsi addressed Tahrir Square with a similar speech. Masses of demonstrators had been occupying the square protesting the SCAF’s constitutional declaration limiting the

president’s power. Hundreds of thousands flocked Tahrir Square, welcoming the president with waving flags, patriotic songs and chants.

4.1 ‘Our strength lies in our unity!’

Initially, the logic of difference prevailed in Morsi’s hegemonic project. He vowed to grant the wishes of all Egyptians in order to unify the deeply divided Egyptian society, evident from the presidential election results, and to weaken the social antagonism between Islamists and those who feared their domination. He incorporated almost every social actor and group in his discourse, connecting contingent social elements in an ostensibly coherent unity. He tried to articulate a wide range of demands separately, by convincing the Egyptians that all these demands would be met if they cooperated in his national Renaissance project. He aimed to establish ‘a social imaginary enabling a quasi-infinite integration of identities as legitimate differences’ (De Vos, 2003, p. 171) under the umbrella of a united nationalist identity of ‘Egypt’s sons’ (abnā’ Maṣr), ‘the community’ (al-ummah), ‘the people’ (al-shaʽb), and ‘the Nation’ (al-waṭan).

4.1.1 Victory speeches

In his 24 June speech, the first groups Morsi saluted were the martyrs and wounded, who fell for the revolution. He promised to fulfil the demands for justice and retribution. He went on to name the army, the honourable policemen, the judges, and the diplomatic corps. He claimed to represent all Egyptians, in- and outside Egypt, and he summed up every governorate of Egypt.

Table 4 Extract #1 24 June speech (Logic of difference)9

My entire people, all the Egyptians, Muslims and Christians, men and women, adults, elderly and youth, fathers and mothers, farmers and workers, government officials and teachers, academics, businessmen and employees in the public sector and working for the government, and those active in the business sector, and the employees in the private sector, and the employees in every state institution; merchants, drivers of busses, trains, taxis, and tūk tūks, all of them are my family, as are the craftsmen and the employed people, and those who own small stands or small shops, who make a living on the street, the grown-ups the pupils and the students, whether they attend private or public schools, and those who have jobs, everyone. It is my hope that I don’t ever forget any one, all are my family.

Strong concordance between all social groups is necessary, he claimed, to achieve the goals of the revolution, fulfil the demands of all groups, and to move towards a better future for all Egyptians. This is evident from the following extract of his 24 June speech.

Table 5 Extract #2 24 June speech (Logic of difference)10

On this historic moment I call on you, oh great people of Egypt, my family and kin, to strengthen our national unity, to reinforce the bonds between us, and to strengthen our inclusive national unity. Hold fast, all of you together, to the rope of Allah, and don’t be divided among each other, Allah Almighty speaks the truth. We are all Egyptians, regardless of our different points of view; we are all nationalists, even if our parties and currents differ. We are all loyal to the revolution and the blood of the martyrs.. There is neither place for language of discord nor for accusing each other of treason ever. This national unity is the road now for us to depart with Egypt out of this difficult phase and move towards an all-encompassing project, which we will carry together, for the true Egyptian Renaissance and development and for the right investment of all our resources.

In the 29 June speech11 on Tahrir, President Morsi apologised for not having mentioned the tourism sector and ‘the people of art, creation, culture, and the media people who are

9 For full text see Appendix 4.1. Speech on the occasion of winning the presidential elections on 24 June 2012 10 For full text see Appendix 4.1. Speech on the occasion of winning the presidential elections on 24 June 2012 11 For full text see Appendix 4.2. Victory speech on 29 June 2012 on Tahrir Square

sincere for Egypt; my beloved, children, brothers and sisters, the disabled’ in his first speech. He also promised to release the civilians who had been sentenced through military trials. Furthermore, he articulated the dislocated floating signifier ‘One Hand’ from the SCAF’s discourse fixing it into his own nationalist discourse: ‘All the sons of Egypt, in all its institutions and sectors, in all its villages, in all its hamlets, in all its cities, east, west, north and south of the country, all of them are one hand.’ Short powerful exclamations such as ‘Our strength lies in our unity!’, ‘Egypt's love is a duty!’, ‘Loving the homeland is an obligation for us!’ demonstrate his purpose of including as much social factions as possible, and forging and enhancing the nationalist unified identity.

4.1.2 Actions speak louder

Evidently, rhetoric and empty talk alone do not suffice to manufacture common consent. In order to construct a dominant meaning of the social, and to hegemonize the field of discursivity, Morsi ought also to put his money where his mouth is. As argued above, discourses cannot solely consist of linguistic utterances, but ‘must instead pierce the entire material density of the multifarious institutions, rituals and practices through which a discursive formation is structured’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 109). Consequently, it is necessary to also examine non-linguistic data—objects, festivities, decrees, actions, meetings, and institutions. Morsi immediately resigned from the MB and its political wing the FJP at the day of his electoral victory, aiming to portray himself as president of all Egyptians and diminish fears of him favouring the Ikhwan. In order to incorporate social actors in his discourse, Morsi granted several social demands in his first three months in office. One of his first decisions concerned the employees and pensioners of the public sector. He raised their wages by 15 percent and increased their monthly pension rates from 200 EGP (Egyptian Pounds) to 300 EGP. (AJ, 2012) Furthermore, he met with representatives of the GFTU (General Federation of Trade Unions) and different individual trade unions after weeks of workers’ protests to discuss their demands of social and healthcare improvements. Lastly, he vowed to write off the debts of Egyptian farmers who owed less than 10000 EGP, and announced that the government would pay the farmers 25 percent more for rice. (AO, 2012b) Morsi drew up a fact-finding committee to investigate the deaths and injuries of protesters during the revolution. It included six representatives of the martyrs’ families to

observe the investigation. Moreover, Morsi granted a pardon to all those arrested for committing crimes, with the exception of murder, supporting the 25 January Revolution. However, it was not clear how many people exactly would be released. He ordered the immediate release of 572 people detained under the SCAF-rule. Both decisions aimed to absorb revolutionaries and their demands into Morsi’s discourse. He also made several modest moves to incorporate minorities and women in his identity of ‘the Nation,’ by convincing them that their demands would be satisfied in his national rebuilding project. Shortly after his electoral victory, Morsi held talks with representatives of all Christian denominations to gain their trust. On 22 August, he met again with Christian heads and appointed a Christian, a woman, and a Salafist to his presidential team. After sectarian violence between Copts and Muslims erupted in Dahshūr, Morsi ushered the authorities to enhance the law forcefully and compensate those harmed. He stressed the importance of good relations between citizens—Copts and Muslims alike. He also intended to reassure the women. After meeting President Morsi, Mīrfat al-Tallāwī, secretary-general of the National Council for Women declared that she had confidence in Morsi’s sincere concern for women’s right and his endeavour to improve their situation. (ʽAbd al-Ḥalīm, 2012) Moreover, Prime Minister Hisham Qandil (Hishām Qandīl) announced the preparation of a law that punishes sexual harassment more harshly. Another social groups which Morsi tried to integrate, were the inhabitants of the Sinai Peninsula who have long felt neglected because of the unstable and insecure situation and the reluctance to improve this situation of Morsi’s predecessors. Morsi’s hard response to the killing of 16 soldiers in the Sinai garnered support from the local population. (El-Behairy, 2012) Moreover, in October he visited the Sinai to discuss the security situation, and reassure the population that they receive the same attention as all Egyptians. On the same trip, Morsi also visited Coptic families to address the religious tensions.

4.2 The indispensable scarecrow

The identity of ‘the Nation’ requires a binding agent for its unrelated elements to become a coherent unity. For this purpose, Morsi constructed a constitutive outside; ‘a threatening otherness that is incommensurable with the discursive system and therefore constructs its unity and limits’ (Howarth, 2005, p. 16). As argued above, he tried to forge a large amount of

unrelated identities—liberals, socialists, Salafists, Muslim Brotherhood members, Copts and other social groups and minorities—in the shared identity of ‘the people.’ The empty signifier ‘the people’ is articulated synonymously with ‘the revolutionaries’: ‘we are all Egyptians […] we are all loyal to the revolution and the blood of the martyrs.’12 Stressing the sole aspect every identity shares, i.e. that they are all revolutionaries and thus anti-fuloul (fulūl, remnants of the old nizam) is an attempt to unify a broad range of contingent factions into the cohesive identity of ‘the people.’ Morsi warned for this common enemy who threatens ‘the Nation’ in order to suppress differences between the different identities constituting it, ‘Together we will face discord and conspiracies aimed at disparaging our national unity and our social cohesion. As we have created the great January revolution together.’ This constitutive outside is established by constructing a chain of equivalence which is the complete opposite of ‘the people.’13

Table 6 Extract #3 24 June speech (Logic of equivalence)14

The people of Egypt have formerly endured a lot. They were inflicted with disease, hunger, injustice, oppression, marginalization, the forging of will and rigging of elections. We used to look to the world around us, and wonder when Egypt, the people of Egypt, would become the source of power. Today you are the source of power, as the whole world witnesses it in this story and in this great system, with which we will lift our Egypt to a better state and a brighter tomorrow and a shining future—in shāʼ Allāh. The people of Egypt have formerly endured a lot. They suffered from illness and hunger, injustice and oppression. The time has come in which this people regains its will and freedom, and attains a dignified life without hardships or obstinacy, and finds absolute justice that does not differentiate between big and small or between leader and subject, for everyone is equal before the law.

Morsi decided that no portraits of him should be hung up in government buildings. Refraining from this common practice of his predecessors serves to distance himself from the constitutive outside—Mubarak and the fuloul. In addition, the reopening of investigations into the officials who were accused of being responsible for the killings of

12 In Appendix 4.1. Speech on the occasion of winning the presidential elections on 24 June 2012 13 See Table 7 Morsi’s initial chains of equivalence, p. 79 14 For full text see Appendix 4.1. Speech on the occasion of winning the presidential elections on 24 June 2012

protesters during the revolution, the granting of amnesty to all revolutionary detainees, and his (failed) attempt to dismiss Mubarak-era prosecutor general Abd al-Meguid Mahmoud (ʽAbd al-Magīd Maḥmūd) should be seen in the light of excluding the fuloul. In addition to the old regime and its adherents, Morsi excluded all forces obstructing his project to rebuild the nation from the identity of ‘the people.’ The obscure forces asking for structural reforms of state institutions—especially of the military and the Interior Ministry—, are portrayed as a danger to this project. The backing of these institutions is indispensable to Morsi’s power position. If these demands would gain ground, they would pose a serious threat to his hegemony, with a possible dislocation of his discourse as a consequence. These are the political actors who claim the revolution still continues (al- thawrah mustamirrah) and call for emancipation and change. He slanders these ‘continuing revolutionaries’ for spreading dissension and conflict among the people, warning them that ‘There is no place for language of discord nor for accusing each other of treason ever,’15 and warns them, ‘I also warn anyone, whoever that may be, against trying to harm Egypt's dignity or pride, or even think of harming the dignity of its people, or the dignity of its president, irrespective of the person.’16

4.3 The Myth of al-Nahdah

This thesis maintains that the empty signifier al-Nahdah is the Master Signifier which determines the identity of Morsi’s discourse and hegemonizes the discursive field. This nodal point was the most successful in representing the universal lack of the Egyptians. It temporarily fixed the floating signifiers in signifying chains, rendering the discourse coherent. One chain of identities constitutes ‘the people,’ the opposite constitutes the obscure forces that obstruct the rebuilding of the Nation.

15 In Appendix 4.1. Speech on the occasion of winning the presidential elections on 24 June 2012 16 In Appendix 4.2. Victory speech on 29 June 2012 on Tahrir Square

4.3.1 A signifier without signified

‘Nahdah’ is an empty signifier, ‘a signifier without a signified,’ whose meaning shifts perpetually. Depending on the discourse which articulates it, it can refer to a 19th-20th century cultural movement in the Arab world, the European Renaissance, a Tunisian political party, an Egyptian Salafist party, an Omani football club, et cetera. Wehr (1994, p. 1177) translates Nahḍah—derived from the root n-h-ḍ—as ‘getting up, rising; awakening (esp., national), rise, growth, boom, upswing, advancement, progress; resurgence, revival, rebirth, renaissance; (spiritual) movement; ability, capability, power.’ Most commentators and analysts obdurately choose to translate Nahdah as ‘Renaissance.’ This translation gives away a problematic Orientalist, euro-centrist approach. It involves the projection of a European cultural movement between the 14th and 17th century that was nostalgic for the Classical ideals to a slightly similar movement in the 19th-20th century Arab world. Tomiche (2013) argues that the latter did not revive models of the past, but that the past was rather conceived as stifling the ‘awakening.’ Therefore ‘awakening’ seems to be a more appropriate translation which also encircles the different aspects of the term in Morsi’s project; an advancement or progress away from a dreadful period through a rebuilding process. Yet, since the Ikhwan and Morsi themselves consistently refer to his electoral program as the ‘Renaissance’ project, the present study also uses this translation.

4.3.2 The all-encompassing Egyptian Renaissance

Morsi’s al-Nahdah Myth contained his twofold discursive strategy. On the one hand, it embodied the logic of difference which we have discussed before. This nodal point fixed many identities in the nationalist identity of the ‘Egyptian people’ by means of inscribing their separate legitimate demands in the universal call for order and unity necessary for ‘the Nation’ to achieve progress. In his 24 June speech, Morsi presented his hegemonic Nahdah project as striving for the achievement of this general interest of the Egyptian people: ‘You, who are looking forward to the future, who want the best and revival, development and stability, safety and security for our homeland Egypt.’17 Almost every social actor was urged to inscribe its demands in this ‘all-encompassing Egyptian

17 In Appendix 4.1. Speech on the occasion of winning the presidential elections on 24 June 2012

Renaissance project […] that achieves dignity, stability, prosperity, and a dignified life for every free and proud Egyptian on Egyptian soil. I am determined to build together with you a new Egypt, a national, constitutional, democratic and modern state.’18 His vision of reconstructing a country that requires stability and unity was evident from his electoral Nahdah program:

The project finally aims to build a state that provides people access to education, healthcare, jobs, investment, and business building opportunities; and protects their rights and dignity within and outside the country. […] The project favors true democracy and national belonging, with Islam as a reference; and sets out with unpartable Egyptian pride. […] [R]ejuvenation of a nation cannot be achieved by any single party, sector, group or trend no matter how powerful it is, and that the way to the desired real renaissance is our unity of ranks and determination to achieve comprehensive revitalization and to be ready and willing to bear its heavy burdens and endure its toils and privations. If political gravitations have created big or small distances between us, the pioneering Nahda (Renaissance) Project can bring us back together and unite our efforts. (IkhwanWeb, 2012)

4.3.3 Beware of the ‘Other’

On the other hand, ‘Renaissance,’ or ‘Awakening’ implies that a dark time or sleep preceded. Morsi’s narrative reads as follows: This nation once had a thriving economy, a key role on the regional and international political scene, and a flourishing society; until ‘a corrupt clique,’ ‘a ruthless unscrupulous bureaucracy,’ ‘a brutal state’ tarnished its image, and its civil society through ‘despotism, repression and corruption,’ and caused the economy to fail through its ‘oppression and absence of justice.’ (IkhwanWeb, 2012) The signifier Nahdah fixes a chain of equivalence diametrically opposed to the chain of equivalence of ‘the people.’ It constructs the former regime, its adherents, and other forces—those claiming that the revolution continues—trying to destabilize the country as a constitutive outside. These two identities—the fuloul and the ‘continuing revolutionaries’— are constructed as one and the same group of people who are counter-revolutionary and instigate violence to obstruct the progress of Egypt and its ‘Renaissance.’ This counter-revolutionary constitutive outside serves as the discursive cement to forge unity and cohesion between the disparate elements in the shared nationalist identity.

18 In Ibid.

Table 7 Morsi’s initial chains of equivalence

The People Instigators

Freedom Oppression

Democracy Dictatorship

Justice Injustice

Equality Inequality

Misery, disease, hunger, Dignified life hardships

Building Destroying

Unity Division

Safety Violence

Revolutionaries Counter-revolutionaries

Stability Chaos

4.3.4 Filling the lack

In a situation of radical disorder ‘order’ is present as that which is absent; it becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier of this absence. In this sense, various political forces can compete in their efforts to present their particular objectives as those which carry out the [impossible] filling of that lack. To hegemonize something is exactly to carry out this filling function. (Laclau, 1996, p. 44)

During his initial period in office, Morsi was fairly successful in hegemonizing the discursive field. He convincingly presented his objectives and those of the Ikhwan as serving the public Egyptian interests. At this time, the Egyptians’ interests—the universal claim—were order, progress and unity. The socio-economic deterioration caused by the lack of these factors was strongly felt by the Egyptians. Morsi successfully presented his political project as ‘carrying out the filling of that lack.’ At this time, the empty signifier al-Nahdah succeeded in embodying this lack of progress, order and unity. It became ‘the signifier of this absence.’ Morsi’s program of stability, security, and gradual socio-economic reform had a large popular support base. The results of a survey held by the DEDI (Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute) and the ACPSS (Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies) during five periods from August 2011 to June 2012 support this claim. The results indicate that material, socio-economic needs—security, stability, unemployment and inflation—were the major concerns for Egyptians. (ACPSS & DEDI, 2012, p. 15) This demonstrates that the call for order, stability, unity and gradual reforms prevailed over the call for swift change, emancipation and revolution. Political issues such as corruption, the removal of former regime figures, establishing a sound democratic system, human rights and freedoms were not as high on the Egyptians’ agenda. After the second poll, DEDI-director Jakob Erle analyzed that ‘people still want law, order and stability, but they also want to see progress and change, albeit gradual and not rushed’ (in Lange, 2011).

Figure 1 Issues on the voters’ agenda from August 2011 to June 2012 (% of population)19

4.3.5 One Nation

An analogy can be drawn between the strategies of Morsi’s discourse and the post-war welfare state discourse in Europe. According to Torfing, ‘The modern welfare state is a social imaginary with the form of a one-nation project. It is held together only by its exclusion of both left and right extremism, which is seen as a threat to its universalist and rationalist pretensions’ (1999, p. 130). ‘It provided a space of representation for social and economic demands as legitimate differences and displaced all social antagonisms to its constitutive outside’ (Torfing, 1991, p. 86). Likewise, Morsi’s nationalist myth tried to incorporate as much legitimately different identities and demands as possible. This was necessarily accompanied by the establishing of a constitutive outside. Whereas the welfare state did so by ‘a chain of equivalence collapsing the differences between the political left

19 Copied from ACPSS & DEDI (2012, p. 15)

and the political right into a sameness of “extremity”,’ the al-Nahdah myth fixed the reactionary fuloul and the overly progressive revolutionaries in a chain of equivalence which dissolved the differences between them into a ‘sameness’ of ‘extremity,’ morphing them into an identity of ‘instigators.’ To a large extent, the al-Nahdah Myth was a continuation of the SCAF’s discursive response to the dislocative events of the 18-day uprising. It also tried to bring stability by weakening the social antagonism of the 25 January Revolution and between the Islamists and non-Islamists in the interests of Morsi and the Muslim Brothers. As pointed out before, the ouster of Mubarak dislocated the Myth of Tahrir. The discursive cement—the constitutive outside—which held the contingent elements together disappeared. The revolutionary coalition crumbled, and every identity started articulating its own demands separately. Morsi’s one nation Renaissance project, a ‘vision for building the Egyptian Nation’ (IkhwanWeb, 2012), tried to articulate a social imaginary that enables a ‘quasi- infinite integration of [these] identities as legitimate differences’ (De Vos, 2003, p. 171), in the same way the SCAF’s ‘One Hand’ did. To weaken the social antagonism that was at the core of the 25 January Revolution, Morsi adopted a transformist strategy following the logic of difference of articulating many demands and identities separately. Like the SCAF, Morsi also constructed the symmetric antagonism between the two forces—or ‘extremisms’— allegedly creating chaos and discord and impeding the Nation’s revival as a constitutive outside.

4.4 Shifting away from the differential pole

Right from the start of his presidency, the first rifts between Morsi’s all-inclusive rhetoric and his actions became apparent. In spite of his initial inclusive rhetoric and some makeshift decisions following the logic of difference, Morsi’s discourse shifted slowly towards the pole of logic of equivalence. It became increasingly apparent that Morsi did not succeed in mending the social ruptures and pacifying the social field. As time passed, more and more non-Islamist social factions grew disgruntled with Morsi’s handling of affairs. Morsi’s al-Nahdah myth did not provide an adequate space of representation for their demands for consensual representative democracy, freedoms and rights, a dignified life and social justice. More and more, they felt sidelined in favour of what they saw as an alliance

between Muslim Brothers, the SCAF, and the Salafists. They did not perceive him as the president serving everybody’s interests he had pledged to be. As Brownlee (2012) remarks, ‘Rather than being a civilian leader for all Egyptians, though, Mursi rapidly alienated the very constituencies he vowed to represent: Christians, women, revolutionary youth and millions of other non-Islamists.’

4.4.1 ‘It’s still bread, freedom and social justice’20

Several revolutionary groups feared a deal between the newly elected president and the SCAF securing the SCAF’s privileges in exchange for its support for Morsi’s rule. They feared this would result in the exclusion of revolutionary forces in the transition process. During his inauguration speech on 30 June at the Cairo University, Morsi praised the SCAF for its guidance during the transitional period after the revolution and honoured its members. The opposition groups voiced their discontent with this appraisal and with the fact that Morsi swore his presidential oath before the SCC, instead of the parliament. (AO, 2012a) On 29 July, the NFPR (National Front for the Protection of the Revolution) complained during a press conference that President Morsi did not fulfil his promise to involve its members in the decision-making. The NFPR was formed by several political actors on 22 June to support Morsi’s bid in the presidential race and to prevent Shafiq from becoming president. It consisted among others of ʽAlā’ al-Aswānī, Wael Ghonim, the 6 April Youth movement and the Egyptian Current Party. They voiced their frustration about Morsi’s lack of transparency, his rejection to cooperate, ignoring their initiatives, and his bias towards the Muslim Brothers in proposing names for the cabinet. The Islamist dominance of the constitution drafting process also continued to worry the revolutionaries as well as other parties, such as the liberal Wafd-party and the Egyptian Social Democratic Party. (Shukrallah, 2012) The final 35-member cabinet Morsi had formed dashed hopes of a drastic change in governance. The composition of the cabinet stirred up the disenchantment among the non-Islamist forces. They reproached Morsi for having appointed Hisham Qandil, an Islamist-leaning technocrat, as Prime Minister. Despite promises to include younger politicians and representing different segments of society in the government, 29 seats were reserved for technocrats, among whom seven had seated in the al-Ganzouri led

20 (Fouad, 2012)

SCAF-cabinet. Moreover, five FJP members, one member of the moderate Islamist al-Wasat (Wasaṭ) Party, and one member of the Salafist al-Nahdah party received a seat. The appointment of Muslim Brotherhood member Ṣalāḥ ʽAbd al-Maqṣūd as Minister of Information incited fears of censorship. Finally, the fact that the cabinet only contained two female ministers, one of whom was also the only Coptic minister, did not benefit the credibility of Morsi’s inclusive discourse either. Shahir George (Shahīr Jūrj) formulates the opposition’s frustration with this missed opportunity to form a revolutionary consensus government, ‘It appeases the old regime guard by keeping Tantawi, as well as other faces from the previous cabinet. It's obvious that the Brotherhood cannot afford to confront the old regime. […] There is no sense of deep-rooted change that will take place, merely that things will keep ticking over.’ (Hussein, 2012) Numerous activists were also discontented by Morsi’s alleged failing to take serious steps in the matter of freedom (ḥurrīyah)—one of the major revolutionary demands. Several rights groups have expressed their concern in regard to Morsi’s decisions on this subject. A report by the CIHRS (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies) denounced Morsi’s policy on the subject of human rights and liberties during his first 100 days in office. In spite of some positive ‘minimal, ad-hoc responses under pressure’ ,‘CIHRS fears that without a swift, radical reassessment of strategy, the current course will surely lead to an increased and grave assault on several fundamental rights of Egyptians.’ The report warned especially for a deteriorating situation of (1) the right to peaceful assembly and political protest, (2) the right to freely form and operate NGOs, (3) the right to form independent trade unions, (4) freedom of belief and minority rights, (5) Freedom of the media and information, and (6) women’s rights. (CIHRS, 2012b) As bread (ʽaysh) and social justice (ʽadālah igtimā’īyah) were two other key revolutionary demands, Morsi’s economic course would prove vital for the success in co-opting a vast range of social actors in his discourse. His biggest challenge was to move away from Mubarak’s aggressive neoliberal reforms toward an economic agenda of social justice. The Egyptian economy needed to abandon its reliance on windfall rents—workers’ remittances, the Suez Canal, oil and gas—and increase the clout of its real economy. Therefore, the workers’ and farmers’ purchasing power should be increased; assets should be distributed, the use of local savings enlarged, capital flight blocked, land reformed, the privatization process reversed, and regional economic links enhanced. However, severe pressure—from both external and domestic actors—restricted Morsi’s room for economic manoeuvring.

Despite their alleged intentions to help Egypt in its efforts to improve its economy, there was little hope that international organizations—the IMF and the World Bank—would contribute to the improvement of the socio-economic situation of the Egyptian people. As Bush and Mercer (2012, p. 404) perceptively put it, ‘The World Bank ignores the lessons to be learnt from the macroeconomic strategy of the high growth Mubarak years, when Egyptian wealth grew but the majority of Egyptians remained desperately poor – and which created the conditions for the 25 January revolution.’ Domestically, both the SCAF and the conservative higher echelons of the Muslim Brotherhood limited Morsi’s capacity to grant the social demands of the revolutionaries. The SCAF would not allow the demanded restructuring of the concentrated wealth of the ‘Military Inc.’ Meanwhile, the high-ranked Muslim Brothers compelled Morsi to pursue a line of privatization to safeguard their own economic interests. (Bush & Mercer, 2012, pp. 403-406)

4.4.2 Conflicting evaluations

In his speech on 6 October on the occasion of the 1973 October war, Morsi evaluated his first 100 days in office. During his election campaign, he had pledged to fulfil a total of 64 promises in the urgent matters of security, traffic, bread, cleanliness, and fuel within the first 100 days of his presidency. In front of some 70000 Muslim Brotherhood adherents, he defended his record claiming that 70 percent of the security goals, 40 percent of his cleanliness programme, and 80 percent of his bread promises were achieved. He maintained that his Nahdah project bore fruit, and the country was progressing steadily both socially and economically. (Spencer, 2012) However, the much-followed ‘MorsiMeter’—an initiative by ‘independent youth’ to monitor the performance of the president during this period— propounded the view that Morsi failed to convince large segments of the population of his progressions. The final report concluded that Morsi achieved 10 of his promises and partially fulfilled another 25, satisfying only 39% of the surveyed people with the implementation of his electoral programme. (MorsiMeter, 2012) The augmenting disgruntlement resulted in a rising amount of strikes for social demands and political demonstrations. Transport workers, teachers and administrative staff of Cairo University, and doctors lay down their tools demanding increased wages and better working conditions. Before his second month in office had passed, Egypt saw the first

political protest against Morsi’s rule and the ‘Brotherhoodization’ of the state. On 25 August, a few thousand demonstrators in front of the presidential palace in Cairo condemned what they saw as the monopolization of power in the hands of the Muslim Brothers and Morsi. A week later more than five thousand took to the streets reproaching Morsi that he failed to meet the revolutionary demands, chanting, ‘the revolution still continues.’ The acquittal of 24 defendants in the ‘Battle of the Camel’ trial on 12 October sparked anti-Morsi demonstrations in Tahrir Square. Protesters demanded Morsi’s ouster for having failed to meet his 100-days promises. In reaction, Muslim Brothers came out to support their democratically-elected president. This tense situation devolved in the first violent clashes between Morsi’s opponents and adherents. Both parties hurled rocks and bottles at each other, and the Morsi supporters demolished a podium erected by their opponents.

4.5 Hegemonic for want of an alternative

To describe a political project as hegemonic, then, is not to say that a majority of the electorate explicitly supports its policies, but to say that there appears to be no other alternative to this project's vision of society. […] The lack of an alternative is not, of course, an accident of history, but the product of strategic representations. A discourse can become hegemonic with or without 'the people's' belief in its specific claims; it achieves hegemonic status insofar as 'the people' believe that the cost of de-stabilizing its account of socio-political phenomena is too high. To the extent that their consent is hegemonically organized, 'the people' defend the stability of the hegemonic discourse's account. They protect the hegemonic account from disruption by participating in the erasure of alternative accounts, and they do so for the sake of stability itself. (Smith, 1994, p. 37)

During the first months of his presidency, Morsi’s discourse achieved a hegemonic status. Although the al-Nahdah myth never developed into a social imaginary, it was able to dominate the field of discursivity. It successfully embodied the universal call for progress, stability, and unity. The majority of the Egyptians were convinced that the time for revolution and drastic change had passed and that the time was ripe to abandon the revolutionary path and move toward a stable nation in order to improve their socio- economic situation. These factions were integrated in Morsi’s discourse and morphed into

the identity of ‘the people.’ There was no serious contending hegemonic project due to the division among non-Islamist political actors and because ‘the people’ deemed it not worth the high cost to destabilize Morsi’s discourse. At this point he successfully applied the divide and rule strategy following the logic of difference of co-opting most groups by granting their legitimate demands or convincingly promising to do so. In addition, he constructed those factions with ‘illegitimate’ demands as a constitutive outside threatening stability and progress on the other.

Chapter 5 Constitutional Turmoil

In reaction to the walkout from the Constituent Assembly by twelve liberal and Christian members in protest of the Islamist-dominated composition that did not appropriately represent the Egyptian society, and in response to a rising wave of demonstrations commemorating the ‘Battle for Muhammad Mahmoud’ and demanding retribution for the martyrs, Morsi unilaterally issued a constitutional declaration on 22 November 2012 announcing himself legally untouchable. This declaration gave him sweeping legislative, executive, and judicial powers putting himself above the judiciary, and shielded the Constitutional Assembly from dissolution, freeing it from any judicial oversight. This overconfident move served to secure the important role the Muslim Brothers would play in Egypt’s political future. In an attempt to appease the revolutionaries, the decree ordained the reopening of the trials of Mubarak and other fuloul, and the resignation of Mubarak loyal prosecutor, general Abd al-Meguid. (Revkin, 2012) Morsi’s power grab sparked the biggest wave of demonstrations since Mubarak stepped down. The following weeks, Egypt saw nationwide protests against Morsi. These protests ultimately turned into deadly clashes around the presidential palace. Moreover, several close advisers to the President—among whom Vice-President Mahmoud Mekki (Maḥmūd Makkī)—resigned in protest of Morsi’s decisions. On 30 November, the Constituent Assembly swiftly finalized a draft of the constitution. Several rights groups expressed their concern over the drafting process and the final draft which, according to Amnesty International, ‘falls well short of protecting human rights and, in particular, ignores the rights of women, restricts freedom of expression in the name of protecting religion, and allows for the military trial of civilians’ (AmnestyInternational, 2012). The next day, Morsi hastily called for a referendum on the new constitution within two weeks of its completion. Enraged by Morsi’s coup d’état, the SCC refused to supervise the referendum. On 10 December, the SCC judges changed their minds after Morsi had partly annulled his decree

and Muslim Brotherhood members ended their sit-in in front of the SCC building. Morsi was confident that his electoral base was strong enough to silence his critics through the ballot box. In spite of the widespread indignation with his unilateral moves, Morsi pushed through his ‘Mubarak-style referendum’ (CIHRS, 2012a). On 25 December, the High Electoral Commission announced the approval of the constitution with 64 percent of the vote and a turnout of 33 percent of the eligible electorate. (Arjomand, 2013, pp. 307-308)

5.1 Captain Morsi sails toward the logic of equivalence

The constitutional declaration betokened an ongoing shift in Morsi’s discursive strategy. The logic of difference lost its prevalence in favour of the logic of equivalence. As seen above, Morsi increasingly failed to match his actions to his inclusionary rhetoric during his first months in office. His majoritarian view of politics further deepened the social antagonism between the majority and the opposition forces. Hanna (2012) elucidates:

Morsi's majoritarian mindset is not anti-democratic per se, but depends upon a distinctive conception of winner-takes-all politics and the denigration of political opposition. Winning elections, by this perspective, entitles the victors to govern unchecked by the concerns of the losers. This chronic overreach has cemented the divide between Islamists and non-Islamists and heightened suspicions of the Brotherhood's ultimate intentions.

In an interview with TIME Magazine1 on 28 November, Morsi defended this view of politics contending that the constitutional process was representative for the society at large, since the Constituent Assembly was chosen by a democratically elected parliament, and that the people would be able to vote on the constitution in a referendum. He contested the view that his declaration had the effect of dividing society, ‘It’s not pulling apart. It’s a majority and opposition. I can see it very clear. But the opposition is not like it was before. They have the right, they do what they say. If you have 25% or 30% opposition, that’s a big number. We have [a population of] 90 million.’ Morsi clearly moved away from being the ‘president for all Egyptians’ he claimed to be in his victory speeches, toward a president of ‘the majority.’ He embedded his decision in the context of the gradual implementation of

1 For full text see Appendix 3.2. Interview with TIME Magazine on 28 November 2012

the revolutionary goals. The declaration was intended to protect the revolutionary transition. He laughed off insults of being a new pharaoh by claiming revolutionary legitimacy, ‘I’ve been part of the revolution. And from the Muslim Brotherhood I was in charge of the action in Tahrir square, representing the Muslim Brotherhood during the revolution.’ According to him, surveys indicated that about 90% of the population welcomed his decision, claiming that ‘they are with what I have done. It’s not against the people, it’s with the people.’ He framed his decree in the metaphorical context of an elected captain steering the national ship through transitional waters toward a destination of democracy, freedom, and social justice.

Table 8 Extract Interview TIME Magazine2

I’m very keen on having true freedom of expression. True freedom of faith. And free practice of religious faith. I am keen and I will always be keen on exchange [transfer] of power. I’m an elected president. My chief responsibility is to maintain the national ship to go through this transitional period. This is not easy. Egyptians are determined to [move] forward within the path of freedom and democracy, and this is what I see. Justice and social justice. Development with its comprehensive overall meaning. Human development. Industrial productive development. Scholarly research. Political development. International relations balanced with all different parties, East and West. We are keen in Egypt and I am personally keen right now on maintaining freedom, democracy, justice and social justice. The MB do not say anything different from that.

Morsi’s discourse articulated his adherents—‘the majority of the Egyptians’—in a chain of equivalence of ‘the people’ which is the complete negation of his opponents’ identity. He strongly defended his legitimacy, and presented his actions as serving the Nation’s interest. He presented his Nahdah-project as the only way to fulfil the universal revolutionary claim for progress, order and unity. Therefore, in his televised speech on 6 December, he took a firm line against the chaos-inciting protests in the name of providing security, protection and stability, ‘It is my duty to protect the homeland and to ensure the security of the citizens, which urged me to issue this [constitutional] declaration.’ At the same time he

2 For full text see Appendix 3.2. Interview with TIME Magazine on 28 November 2012

vowed to ‘communicate in all open-heartedness and open-mindedness’ with the peaceful opponents.

Table 9 Extract #1 6 December speech3

I say that we all must accept the will of the people, and this interest cannot be achieved by violence, and this will cannot be expressed by angry gatherings, but by wisdom, prudence and calm, which all give the opportunity to sound thinking and correct decision in which the minority accepts the opinion of the majority. Is not this democracy? They all have to cooperate to achieve the best national interest over personal interest, and opinion fanaticism, the party or the sect.

Morsi displaced all opposition forces to a constitutive outside diametrically opposed to ‘the people.’ He established a social antagonism between the protesters and ‘the people’, ‘whoever is trying and doesn’t observe the benefit of the majority of the people and trying to rock the boat, then it’s the responsibility of the president, of the government to see what’s going on. Rocking the boat is not to the benefit of anyone. To the contrary it’s against.’ Morsi repeatedly connected the violence around Tahrir Square with the remnants of the old regime, ‘violence is related to, as I said, the old regime, some way or another.’ He minimized the clashes. According to him, ‘It’s some sort of … misunderstanding from a few. But it’s okay. It will pass. It will go, and I think it will be registered as a good spot in our movement in history in the last two years.’4 Despite his distinction between permitted peaceful protests and unacceptable violence, the exclusion of the opposition from his definition of the people relegates the entire opposition to the position of external enemy. Morsi’s antagonizing rhetoric during his nationally televised speech on 6 December, further widened the social rift. Despite his claims of attempting to ‘come up with a consensus formula on matters of concern to all Egyptians,’ an (empty) call for national dialogue and a pledge that ‘there is no discrimination between them [opponents and supporters] based on religion, political affiliation or stance,’ he failed to make any actual concessions to the opposition. Instead, he drove a wedge between his opponents—

3 For full text see Appendix 4.3. Televised speech to the nation on 6 December 2012 in reaction to the street clashes 4 In Appendix 3.2. Interview with TIME Magazine on 28 November 2012

undermining his legitimacy—and his supporters ‘who came to defend legitimacy and paid a high price for it.’ Moreover, not unlike Mubarak, Morsi adopted a conspiratorial tone. He talked about vaguely identified armed infiltrators with ‘working links and contacts with a number of the affiliates or those who identify themselves as affiliates of political powers.’ Allegedly, gunmen were hired for money as had happened before during the transitional phase, ‘we have seen anonymous talk about a third party in the sorrowful incidents of Maspero, Mohamed Mahmoud and the Council of Ministers streets and Port Said. No one could reach that third party.’ Morsi lumped all the opposition forces together in one box which incarnated evil: a chaos-instigating minority—the constitutive outside. Through their articulation in a chain of equivalence, the differences between all the protesting factions—the liberal democrats, the socialists, the revolutionary youth, the fuloul et cetera—collapsed in favour of their shared identity of instigating chaos and being anti-revolutionary. This constitutive outside was held responsible for blocking the identity of ‘the people’ and the achievements of its ‘revolutionary’ demands. On 5 December, thousands of Islamist supporters attacked a sit-in staged by anti-Morsi demonstrators in front of the presidential palace sparking heavy clashes between both camps. Although it is not possible to ascertain that Morsi ordered these attacks, they are highly reminiscent to the ‘Battle of the Camel.’ Morsi’s supporters altered the social facts on the ground to make them match with Morsi’s signifiers. In his 6 December speech he claimed that these assailants were thugs who had confessed that they were hired by certain anti-Morsi political forces. However, a judge investigating this case, revealed that it were Muslim Brotherhood thugs who had captured 49 opponents of Morsi and beat them until they ‘confessed’ being hired. (Arjomand, 2013, pp. 307-308)

Table 10 Extract #2 6 December speech (Logic of equivalence)5

I will never allow anyone to resort to murdering, sabotage, plotting, terrorizing citizens, destructing public facilities or to call for a coup against legitimacy that is based on the free choice of the great people of Egypt. […] Some of the protesters on Tuesday 4 December attacked many presidential cars and a driver was severely injured and is still in hospital. Why did this happen? Does peaceful protest mean assaulting public and private buildings, blocking roads, disrupting production or tarnishing the image of Egypt? This can never be an acceptable peaceful protest. It is smacked with violence of some people who infiltrated into those who were expressing their opinions. This will never go unpunished. […] A number of protesters lost their lives yesterday, Wednesday 5 December, a day worse than the day before, when the peaceful protesters were flagrantly attacked by a number of lurking persons with weapons. […] The acts of inciting violence and the practice of terrorism against armless citizens continued till the morning.

5 For full text see Appendix 4.3. Televised speech to the nation on 6 December 2012 in reaction to the street clashes

Table 11 Morsi’s chains of equivalence during constitutional turmoil

Sacred Regime Profane Protest

Majority (70%-90%) Minority (10%-30%)

Safety/Security Violence

Stability Chaos

Revolutionaries Fuloul/Contra-revolutionaries

Unity Division

Consensus/Representative Fanaticism/Sectarian

National Interest Personal Interest

Wise/Prudence/Calm Angry Gatherings/Vandalism/Terrorism

All Egyptians/ The Great Egyptian Unknown Instigators/Infiltrators/Third People/The Nation Party

Progressive Reactionary

Democratic Legitimacy/Freely-Elected Illegitimate/Undemocratic

Rule of Law Illegal/Outlaws

Dialogue/Open-Minded/Communication Sabotage/Obstinate/Deadlock /Conflict /Cooperation

Sound Thinking Irrational

Constructive/Rebuilding Destructive

5.2 ‘yasquṭ, yasquṭ ḥukm al-Murshid!’

In reaction to the constitutional declaration, the splintered opposition landscape managed to set their differences aside and join forces in the face of a conceived threatening enemy. Their articulation through a logic of equivalence allowed every particular opposition group to ‘identify its own struggle with the struggle of other groups’ (Spinoy in Sereni, 2006, p. 40). The particularities of the different identities—social and liberal democrats, revolutionary youth groups, and even some fuloul– were set aside through their fixation in a chain of equivalence of ‘the people’ in favour of their shared aspect of being anti-Morsi. Morsi and the Ikhwan were constructed as constitutive outside. The different opposition groups held them responsible for obstructing the full realization of their identities and goals. Shokr contends that the polarization in Egypt is not between Islamism and Secularism. He asserts that the non-Islamists do not envision a total dissociation of religion and politics, ‘Their fight is not for an ill-defined secularism so much as it is for political

inclusion and democracy.’ (Shokr, 2012) According to them, the Ikhwan had betrayed the revolution. Tens of thousands took to the streets to protest against Morsi and the Ikhwan. They urged Morsi to step down chanting, ‘Irḥal’ (leave) and ‘yasquṭ, yasquṭ ḥukm al-Murshid’ (Down, down with the rule of the Guide)6. They reproached Morsi for being a new Pharaoh7 calling him Muhammad Morsi Mubarak8. The protesters hung a banner above the entrance to Tahrir Square from Muhammad Mahmoud Street that read ‘mamnūʽ dukhūl al-Ikhwān’9 (No entrance for Muslim Brothers) clearly designating their constitutive outside. The same occurred on the level of party politics, where 35 liberal, leftist and youth parties, as well as some former regime remnants, formed the NSF (National Salvation Front). Some opposition forces—among whom Abu al-Futouh—were reluctant to join this front, refusing to cooperate with fuloul. In response to these criticisms, Akram Ismāʽīl, member of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, said that talks about the fuloul – non-fuloul divide were meaningless, ‘The movement is being led by the democratic forces, and today

6 Reflecting the suspicion that Morsi was no more than a puppet of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, thus acting solely in the interest of the Muslim Brothers. 7 See Appendix 2. Figure 2 Protesters carry a banner with Morsi depicted as Pharaoh on 23 November 2012 8 See Appendix 2. Figure 3 Protesters carry a banner which reads ‘Muḥammad Mursī Mubārak’ on 23 November 2012 9 See Appendix 2. Figure 4 Banner with inscription ‘mamnūʽ dukhūl al-Ikhwān’ – ‘No entrance for Muslim Brothers’ above the entrance to Tahrir from Muhammad Mahmoud street on 23 November 2012

thousands have chanted only revolutionary slogans. The battle now is between the oppressive Islamist alliance and the ascending democratic force — an indispensible, historic and bitter battle’ (in Fahmy, 2012). Following the ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ principle, these former adversaries buried the hatchet and joined forces in the face of a perceived Islamist threat. Yāsir al-Hawārī of the Constitution Party stated, ‘This isn’t the time to be caught up in and separated by ideologies and principles. We unite to protect the nation from dictatorship’ (in Fahmy, 2012). All these actors where incorporated in a chain of equivalence, weakening their differences by emphasizing their shared identity of being pro- democracy and fighting against the authoritarianism of Morsi and the Muslim Brothers. Even the former antagonism between fuloul and anti-fuloul was broken down through their articulation in this chain of equivalence.

Table 12 Protesters’ chains of equivalence during constitutional turmoil

Profane Regime Sacred Protests

Traitors Revolutionaries

Dictator/New Pharaoh/Mubarak

Authoritarianism Democracy

Muslim Brotherhood The People

Attackers/Violent Peaceful

Brotherhoodization Consensus/Representative

Repression Freedom

Majoritarianism Plurality

5.3 Symmetric antagonism

As both antagonistic coalitions successfully constructed each other as constitutive outside, a symmetric antagonism operated. On the one hand, the counter-hegemonic anti-Morsi movement consisting of social democrats, liberal democrats, revolutionary youth groups, and some remnants of the old regime, on the other, the ruling bloc consisting of the Muslim Brotherhood, the religious-sectarian movements, the SCAF, the neoliberal capitalists, and parts of the old state apparatus. Both hegemonic projects strove to impose their systems of meaning and dominate the discursive field. This discursive conflict is exemplified by the struggle to fix the dominant meaning of the key empty signifiers ‘the people’ and ‘the revolution.’ Morsi rearticulated the empty signifier ‘the people,’ applying to it the signified of ‘the majority’ (i.e. his supporters). Declaring that ‘2012 is the best year for the Egyptians in their lives, in their history,’10 implies that those who think otherwise are actually not Egyptians, but a ‘third party.’ The non-Islamists, on the other hand, perceived themselves as ‘the people’ who were trying to dispose yet another dictator which blocked the achievement of ‘the people’s’ 25 January Revolution. Tadros (2013, p. 5) rightfully contends that ‘the battle over Egypt’s proposed constitution is a function of the larger battle unfolding over ownership of the 2011 revolution and the very identity of the country.’ The non-Islamists resolutely see themselves as the sole owners of the 25 January Revolution. In their discourse, a new Egypt was born in Tahrir on 25 January. In contrast to the Islamists—both Muslim Brothers and Salafists—who rejected the early calls for civil disobedience, it were the non-Islamists who sparked the revolution and secured its victory through street battles. They depict the Muslim Brothers as the last ones to join the protests and the first ones to leave under the SCAF. For them, the revolution still continues. Islamists on the other hand, view the revolution as the culmination of their struggle since Nasser’s crackdown. Other Islamists even trace the revolution’s origins back to the 19th century battle of Islamist against secularism. In response to the accusations of piggybacking on the non-Islamists efforts during the revolution, they claim to have played a crucial role in Mubarak’s ousting. After all, it was

10 In Appendix 3.2. Interview with TIME Magazine on 28 November 2012

they who successfully protected the revolution during the ‘Battle of the Camel’ and attacked police stations and prisons. (Tadros, 2013, pp. 5-6) In Morsi’s discourse, ‘the revolution’ is a glorious moment in the history of Egypt, referring to the 18-day period leading up to the toppling of Mubarak. The events at that time were something completely different from the current protests, for one thing because of their small size as pointed out above, for another because ‘There is now some violence that we haven’t seen before, which constitutes something bad going on’ (Morsi in Stengel, et al., 2012)—turning a blind eye to the street battles which were necessary to overthrow Mubarak.

5.4 The polarization backfires

By unilaterally appropriating more powers than Mubarak ever had, Morsi overplayed his hand. He felt confident that he was able to make such a bold power grab because he was backed by the military and the Interior Ministry, which were both spared from through reforms, the Salafists and the Ikhwan. In order to entrench the Ikhwan’s newfound political forefront role, Morsi protected the Islamist dominated Constituent Assembly from dissolution and accelerated the drafting process. Within a week a draft was finalized and two weeks later a referendum was held and the draft was approved. In spite of the mass demonstrations, it appeared on the surface as if his plan had worked out. Yet, this one-sided way of politicking backfired severely. Before his 22 November decree, Morsi had successfully prevented the opposition groups from joining forces and articulating an alternative vision of society. His discourse had achieved a hegemonic status because it was able to present itself as the only way to achieve progress. The only alternative to his project was chaos and instability. However, by antagonizing the non-Islamists through his constitutional decree, he pushed all the discontented into each other’s arms. The opposition forces were able to articulate themselves into an anti-Morsi counter-hegemonic bloc and set their internal differences aside. For the first time since his rise to power, a sound alternative for Morsi’s discourse was articulated. He could no longer uphold that his al- Nahdah myth would grant the universal claim for progress, order and unity, thus making ‘the people’ believe that the cost for destabilizing his discourse was too high. The momentum had started shifting towards the call for emancipation and change. The massive demonstrations and street battles marked the first signs of erosion of Morsi’s hegemony.

Conclusion

This thesis has applied Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theoretical framework to analyze President Morsi’s discursive strategy in his bid for hegemony during his first six months in office. In order to come to an understanding of the reasons for and the ways in which Morsi’s discourse was constructed, disputed and changed, the present research firstly described the conditions for its emergence and the historical development of the Muslim Brothers. The first part offers an explanation of the discourse theory, and thereafter, it contextualizes the construction of Morsi’s discourse. The present dissertation describes how, after Nasser’s death, the hegemony of the regime gradually declined and how Mubarak’s neoliberal discourse of reform had ultimately sapped his dominant power position. In these conditions, a broad array of alienated and dispossessed groups joined forces in a counter-hegemonic bloc that destabilized Mubarak’s discourse. The disparate groups set their differences aside and inscribed their demands in one common call— provided by the ‘Myth of Tahrir’—for the ouster of the regime. When this demand was fulfilled, however, the binding agent between the different segments of the popular alliance disappeared. Mubarak’s fall did not result in the achievement of the particular demands of all groups, and the different factions started voicing their demands separately. The SCAF skilfully capitalized on this dislocation of the revolutionary discourse. The SCAF has always played a quintessential role behind the scenes and intended to keep it that way. In order to protect its interests and keep on ruling it had to restore the status quo and seek a substitute for Mubarak to take up his daily governance role. Subsequently, it successfully weakened the antagonism of the 25 January Revolution by means of a transformist divide and rule strategy. On the one hand, following the logic of difference, it integrated an amalgam of social groups in the identity of ‘the people’ by incorporating their ‘legitimate demands.’ On the other hand, it constructed the two extremisms—the remnants of the old regime and the

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revolutionaries who demanded thorough reforms—as a threat to the national security and progress. In order to explain the rationale behind Morsi’s discursive strategy, a sketch was given of the historical development of the Muslim Brothers. The most important factors taken into account to explain Morsi’s strategy were (1) the largesse of the Ikhwan’s social support base thanks to its social welfare provisions, (2) the economic interests of their capitalist leadership, (3) their internal rifts over the political roadmap towards a dominant power position, and (4) their on-off relationship with the successive regimes of Egypt since their conception. During and after the revolution, the Muslim Brothers moved cautiously, yet determinedly, towards their long awaited power position. Out of fear for a new wave of repression, they officially only joined the protests three days after they had started and kept the option for dialogue with the regime open. They repeatedly reassured their fellow demonstrators that they would not seek to dominate post-revolutionary Egypt. After the revolution, they felt confident that they could translate their numerical power into political power. Therefore, the Muslim Brothers aligned themselves with the SCAF in a marriage of convenience. On this path, the leadership did not tolerate internal dissent. However, out of fear for the increasing Islamist dominance in both the parliament and the Constituent Assembly, the SCAF pulled back and curtailed the Muslim Brothers’ power. In these circumstances, Morsi was inaugurated on 30 June 2012. He managed to reconcile with the SCAF by giving them full control over their core interests and leaving the old system intact. This thesis propounded that the SCAF achieved its goal to go back to ruling, leaving it to the Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood to govern. In exchange, Morsi garnered revolutionary legitimacy for replacing the much hated heads of the SCAF, expanded his presidential powers, and secured the vital support of the military. The present analysis revealed that, initially, Morsi’s discursive strategy was more or less the continuation of the SCAF’s strategic response to the 25 January Revolution. In order to pacify the social field and attain hegemony, Morsi had to pull the revolutionary alliance out of its joint and prevent the groups that feared Islamist dominance from joining forces. Therefore, Morsi predominantly followed the logic of difference to integrate an array of social groups in his discourse. He successfully presented his ‘al-Nahdah myth’ as the only way towards the implementation of the revolutionary goals and progress for ‘the people.’ This Renaissance project absorbed all ‘legitimate demands’ of those groups who threw their lot with it. Yet, the identity of ‘the people,’ that was loosely forged out of an array of

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contingent groups, required a certain degree of unity and coherence. Therefore, a threatening identity was necessarily excluded from ‘the people.’ The symmetric antagonism between the reactionary remnants of the regime and the utterly progressive revolutionary forces were constructed as the constitutive outside that incarnated evil. The opposition between the two camps collapsed through their fixation in a chain of equivalence which stressed their shared aspect of obstructing the national progress and incarnating evil. As long as Morsi successfully conventionalized this vision of society and there appeared to be no sound alternative, he retained his hegemonic position. The growing dissatisfaction with Morsi’s alleged neglect of his promises for inclusiveness and his failure to fulfil the demands for freedom, social justice, democracy, and a dignified life resulted in a rising amount of strikes and protests and a walkout from the Constituent Assembly in protest of the perceived Islamist domination in the constitution drafting process. Morsi’s reaction, in the form of his constitutional declaration, marked a turning point in his discursive strategy. Morsi took his gloves off and unilaterally grabbed sweeping powers to protect the Constituent Assembly and ensure the Muslim Brotherhood’s power position in the country’s future. Morsi went from being a president of all Egyptians to a president of the majority which supported him—a coalition of the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists, the Ministry of Interior, the military institution, and the capitalists. Following the logic of equivalence, he established a social antagonism between ‘the people’—which by now consisted solely of his adherents—and ‘a third party’ of instigators who threatened ‘the people.’ At the first glance, this strategy seemed successful. A constitution draft, which served the Ikhwan’s interests, was swiftly finalized and approved by referendum. Yet, beneath the surface, evident from the ensuing mass demonstrations and clashes, Morsi’s overconfident move backfired heavily. This antagonizing move drove the divided opposition forces in each other’s arms. They overcame their dissent and aligned in a chain of equivalence of ‘the people’ which was put diametrically opposed to the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’s rule’ and called for Morsi’s ouster. Whereas Morsi’s discourse had been hegemonic faute de mieux during his first months in office, this audacious power grab had initiated the emergence of a serious counter-hegemonic alternative. Thus, the shift toward a strategy characterized chiefly by the logic of equivalence provoked the first serious contestation of Morsi’s hegemony.

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Appendix

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1. System of Transliteration

Table 13 Table of Transliteration1

1 For notes and rules of application see http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/romanization/arabic.pdf

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2. Figures

Figure 2 Protesters carry a banner with Morsi depicted as Pharaoh on 23 November 20122

2 Photo by Andre Pain/EPA/Landov, Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/07/26/205820813/a-tale-of-two- massive-protests-rallies-in-egypt?ft=1&f=

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Figure 3 Protesters carry a banner which reads ‘Muḥammad Mursī Mubārak’ on 23 November 20123

3 Photo by Seppe Malfait

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Figure 4 Banner with inscription ‘mamnūʽ dukhūl al-Ikhwān’ – ‘No entrance for Muslim Brothers’ above the entrance to Tahrir from Muhammad Mahmoud street on 23 November 20124

4 Photo by Seppe Malfait

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3. Interviews

3.1. Interview with national television on 22 September 2012

English Translation49

The President:

From my heart and with my entire spirit and all my feelings, I salute with all love the entire Egyptian people, whether they are in Egypt or abroad. I salute especially the families of the martyrs of the Egyptian revolution with a prayer for the martyrs for mercy and forgiveness. I owe special salutations as well for those who were wounded during this revolution and since then until now.

All of them together constitute this people and they support each other and love one another. They are all the children of Egypt under one sky, on one soil. My eternal salutations and love go out to all of them with peace. Peace be upon all of you in Egypt and abroad, and all of you on television and the people who work for Egyptian TV, radio, and the media, and all people of Egypt: Peace, blessings, and the mercy of Allah be upon you.

Interviewer:

How did you feel when the results of presidential elections were announced?

The President:

My feelings were filled with a sense of duty and severe awareness of this responsibility in this phase. I was very worried about myself and I prayed to Allāh, the Glorified and Exalted, and thereafter, I turned to the entire people of Egypt, without discrimination or differentiation for any reason, to support me, after Allah, the Glorified and Exalted. Hopefully, I am worthy of their great and valuable trust.

49 This is my translation from the Arabic transcript which can be found on p. 145. The video of the interview was retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mUuTLCyonmY

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Then, my thoughts varied between my heart, spirit, affection, and reason, responsibility, and the fatherland, the world, the journey, the revolution and what had preceded and what followed it.

I felt that the world wanted what was best for Egypt and the skies wished Egypt the best. Not because of me, but because the Egyptians rose up with stern awareness in this revolution, and because they have chosen by their will a president in an atmosphere of democracy. This imposes, with my sense, now and in view of the future, on my shoulder, on myself, on my mind, on my heart, on my spirit, and on my life, all of this, huge sense of vast responsibility, which does not make me sleep happily and deprives me of my sleep, keeping me awake all the time since that historical moment until now. And I wish this people all the best, God willing, and I have been thinking of this people with these feelings since that moment until now. And I have been thinking about the hope of the people, the wideness of their view towards the future, and their perception that this is their revolution and that this is their soil and this is the sky which casts its shadow over them and that this is the Nile and this the earth and this the will they acquired and the freedom for which we paid every high and valuable price. Whether this will pay off well for us? That is the feeling the people have. The people and I rest assure with great optimism, practical genuine realism, knowledge and cognizance, and resources, will and possibilities, with the people and its nature, and its history and its participation, and its children and its men, its youth, its women, its Muslims and Christians; realizing all of this makes me very optimistic that we will take steps forward together. The objectives are big, the hopes are vast, and the resources are extensive. The effort, required from me and from this entire people together, is a very big effort. We have the will and the resources, the freedom and the climate, we have the love and reassuring evidence. God willing, we will be able to complete our objectives. This will take some time. And we need some time. I’m not saying this to procrastinate or to keep away from the problems. Rather, I am in the middle of the problems, taking them upon me, assessing their gravity, and assessing the hopes of this people and its youth concerning job vacancies and reduction of unemployment, security, stability, safety, health, education, tourism, the Nile and its water, agriculture, industry, modernization, companies, factories, production, the public sector, the business sector, the government, and the private sector. Together, God willing, we will set all of this in motion towards a better tomorrow.

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Interviewer Mister President, what is your view on the cost of transformation before, during, and after the revolution?

The President

The Egyptian people, the entire people, took part in the revolution. According to the statistics and other evidence, close to 20 million Egyptians were in the streets and squares of Egypt on Friday 11 February 2011; in Tahrir Square, and every square of freedom in Egypt altogether on Friday the 11th of February 2011. This is an unprecedented amount in the entire history of Egypt, this is a magnificent number.

I said it before, I repeat, and I stress that there is not one single house in Egypt, absolutely no household of which not at least one, big or small, youngster, man or woman, of every kind and diversity, participated in this revolution. This people, who made this revolution, hurt nobody and didn’t assault any private or public possession during this revolution. Everybody was respected, but nobody was in charge of a single person, a group, a community, a party, or something else. Rather, it were the goals and principles of the hope which guided this revolution. They realized it since then until now, with this determination, this spirit, and this will. Among them were the martyrs, men and women fell. The blood of some of them was spilled. This blood is pure and valuable. This was the true fuel for the continuation of the revolution. This was the true fuel for every step that followed after this, for the sake of the peaceful transition away from the situation of dictatorship, political vacuum, tyranny, injustice, falsification, forgery of the consciousness and of the will, and away from the situation of distortion, heinous dictatorship, squandering of resources, and corruption; the transition away from all of this towards a new situation was accomplished in about 20 months. During these 20 months a lot of incidents occurred.

This is the price of the martyrs and the wounded. And every one of 20 million that came out could have been a martyr. Every one that came out on the streets raising the value of freedom and demanding rights and elevation of the value of popular will could have been a martyr. Nobody knew where the bullets came from or the murdering. Praise be to Allah that the number of its big value is limited.

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This is a peaceful revolution. This people paid a high price before the revolution, psychological suffering, political marginalization, injustice, feelings of coercion deteriorated the services: education, health, corruption, bribery. The number of families that was wasting, controlling, and exhausting all the resources didn’t exceed 32. 400, 500, or less spread corruption over the Egyptian earth. This is a feeling that the Egyptian citizen experienced: the daily suffering, the scorching prices, and the low income. The corruption that was prevailing. This is a high price all Egyptians, all of us, paid together for 30 or 40 years in a row.

And this was prevailing and widespread, and the situation became worse day after day. The straw that broke the camel’s back were the rigged elections for the People’s Assembly of 2010. The judges had a great role in revealing this vote-rigging. The judiciary had a great role in addressing this rigging. However, the oppression, the repression, and injustice ran very high, and the judiciary fell victim for it as well. The power of the people was stirred at that point. All of this were prologues to the revolution. These were the strategic reserves for the people’s fury, which led to the great 25 January Revolution. This people wholly participated in it, all and sundry took pains without distinction. No party by itself, or individual by itself, or faction by itself, but the totality suffered from the deprivations and the feeling that this people is marginalized. The world looks at us: What are you doing? Why are you not doing this? Nobody in the world does something for someone in his place, that’s impossible! The great step, it was the price during the revolution, was that everyone was prepared to sacrifice himself, everybody could be a martyr. Parents incited their children to participate in the revolution. This occurred in Egypt’s towns, in the country estates and the small villages, and in the provinces and the capital and in Alexandria and in the airports, the harbours, the universities and the schools. They were all attending with this magnificent spirit the 25 January Revolution which lasted 18 days; the first and biggest goal was achieved: the regime, or the head of the regime, departed. But his lackeys and devotees remained and he kept on imagining that he would be able to return afterwards, but that will not be the case.

The people of Egypt, which achieved its freedom and acquired its own will by its own hand, which took part in the elections for the People’s Assembly and the Shurá Council, which is about 40 million, and this people, which voted during the presidential elections and took part with more than 25 million, this people which remembered, grasped, and decided that it

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was no longer possible to say ‘it is better to return to the way it was before’ and to close the door. The distribution of this misconception is an attempt to forge the consciousness- raising of this journey, which is a vast awakening, but the people want real stability, and real security, and they need someone who reassures them and does not just palm them off. We will spare no effort for this and take serious steps towards the restoration of security and its components. Not a return to how it was, but a restoration in the sense of fulfilling the obligation completely. We have already taken a lot of steps in that direction. The security nowadays differs from the security months ago. Today, security does not pass for political safety in the old sense, but has come to a point where it is eager to stop the crime before it has been committed - The intervention in order to break up clashes.. The preservation of the people and its freedom of opinion, and the non-intervention in the suppression of its voices.

This is a stage which also requires from us an effort, cooperation, consciousness and awareness for the danger around us all which threatens us and in the first place our development. Development cannot be established without stability, and stability cannot be achieved if the people don’t feel this stability in the form of security and other forms of stability. Stability in the form of security and development, and stability in its general sense. This takes some time. I am not procrastinating, but I am saying some time in the sense of serious steps, for which, praise Allāh, the Interior Ministry and the police do their best, and the people see this now. I mean that they combined forces again to create actual safe environments for the citizen where he can feel safe when his son or daughter goes to school or private class, or when he walks in the street, or where he can feel safe about his possessions. This situation is gradually returning. I see this as an achievement, not only my achievement: rather, there is actual cooperation between civil social forces, the Interior apparatus, the police, and the loyal sons of Egypt on all levels.

People feel this now. I’m not saying that everything is achieved and that stability has become absolute. Yet, as long as there is progression, and as long as serious steps are being taken; principles are being established and the basic rules of the progress are agreed upon: freedom, complete freedom for the citizen, and all his rights, in the police station and on the road and his rights in traffic. But also his duties and his commitment, and the law, and his respect for the values of this system will inevitably bring back positivity as we notice from investments, stability, and production in the homeland, and security. All of this

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coincides and moves to fulfil the hopes of this revolution. Some of its goals have already been achieved: especially political and public freedoms, and mechanisms of democracy and stability, the big and wide concept of civil state, love between all.

However, the widespread hopes for economic stability, it is a pleasure for me that the people has this big hope, because it prompts it to action. This keeps the people producing, and necessitates consciousness and awareness for what we have produced and what we have eaten of the production of our hands and our sweat. We support the democratic process, and we support the Egyptian popular will consequently. We acquire more and more of our will in our decisions. This stems from us. We have undoubtedly spilled a lot of sweat and produced a lot to provide in the people’s needs.

Nobody will pay us what we should pay for ourselves. This production instrument is, praise Allah, present among the Egyptian people. Production requires stability, safety, security, time, knowledge of rights and duties, and, in shā’ Allāh, this will improve for the better.

Interviewer

Mister President, you have stressed more than once that Egypt will remain a democratic, constitutional, civil state. What is your point of view on these three terms and their meaning in particular?

The President

It is a fact that all political forces and parties together have already signed a document, known as the al-Azhar document. There were before two documents, published by a big coalition of parties, but all of these documents have been moulded into the al-Azhar document.

The al-Azhar document advocated many and varied values and principles, most importantly the values of freedom and social justice. There was a part that talked about the Egyptian state and the nature of the Egypt state. ‘What ought to be incumbent upon it in this stage?’ The text agreed that the Egyptian state in this stage should be what we, Egyptians, would like it to be for ourselves; namely a national, democratic, constitutional state in the modern, legal sense.

The concept of social justice means that the people is the source of power and that there is a rotation of power. These concepts, and these basic principles with their clear and deep-

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rooted meaning for all of us, which have been agreed upon, and will be continuously promoted. There is no difference of opinion about these, and I work hard to permanently and materially achieve them on the ground, and I strive for their achievement and protect them. We have covered a long way for many of these principles. Egypt today is truly democratic. The elections, those for the People’s Assembly, the Shurá Council, and the Presidency, were completely free, and reflected the people and their will. There were no violating irregularities, and the supervising judiciary was transparent and unified as we know.

The meaning of the modern state, and of the people and the community as the source of power— this is not our opinion about it, this is the people’s decision during the elections—is understood to be the rotation of power. This is my special responsibility. I protect it in order for it to materialize. The Constituent Assembly now establishes the constitution in order to safeguard that such affairs will be in place: respect for the law, a constitutional legal state, and respect for the law and constitution. This is what I do day and night until no kind of violation of the law occurs. And we respect the ruling of the judges as well, because this is part of respecting the law and respecting the rulings of the judiciary that we agree with this law. We are discussing the Egyptian state we all want and this is a firm state, a strong state which acts according to these principles that are imposed upon her.

Interviewer

Why then, mister president, do some people persist on intimidating the political Islamic current?

The President

In Egypt there is a big partisan and non-partisan popular political social movement. This is the nature of this phase. It is a matter of reassurance in regard of this stage that there is real interaction, and that there is a positive attitude, that there is pluralism of opinions, views, ideas, expression, thinking, and of partisanship. This is a very healthy affair and it is required. No faction or current or party should ever feel frightened, or fear for himself or for his country because of another current, because the nature of the progress and the nature of the integrative movement, which I see in Egyptian society, requires diversity. If some of you fear others, I want to reassure everybody that there is no doubt at all about the functioning of freedom of expression, freedom of movement, freedom of establishing

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parties, and the circulation of power and the dedication to the values of the law, democracy, and the governance –the cabinet- and everyone moving in the squares. There is no place for fear, or to lurk, or aggression from anyone against anyone as long as we walk in group in the light of these principles upon which we have agreed.

Interviewer

Mister President, will there be presidential elections after completion of the constitution?

The President

That depends on the constitution. I do not intervene in the drafting of the constitution. The Constituent Assembly, with its different components, plays this role in the writing of an essential draft on which a broad social dialogue will be held. Then an agreement will be reached on the final form of this draft by the Assembly in complete freedom. Then this will be the draft constitution which is presented to the people for a referendum. If it will be approved, it will become the constitution. From that moment on, it needs to be respected. And if this constitution comes down to this, I resign, and I respect it, and I obey it in order for the concept of constitutional state to be realised.

Interviewer

When can the Egyptian people complete the evaluation of the performance of the government? The Egyptian people expect results on the ground.

The President

In regard to expressing an opinion about the president or the government, this is guaranteed for everyone. Freedom of expressing opinion, freedom of expressing ideas, and peaceful political opposition is guaranteed. This is a right for all citizens. I stressed earlier that the protection of opinion, ideas, perspectives, criticism, constructive criticism, peaceful protest, sit-in is a duty of the state. And I am the head of this state. Everyone has the right to give his opinion about the president or the government, and express his aspirations, hopes, and wishes in the realization of the goals and solving of the problems. All of this is guaranteed for everyone.

I don’t want to say, ‘don’t forget that solving problems takes time.’ When we break up time into one hundred days, then into a year, or two years, or more, this division is peculiar,

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because the priorities require that there are issues that need priority in its solving more than others. If we discussed the traffic problem, and this is an urgent matter, we have put great effort in it and some things have improved, but it still needs more. We have addressed the garbage problem, and this is a matter of utmost importance according to us all, and we have put very big effort in it, but there is still need for bigger efforts and more actions to get rid of them for good. We also need social consciousness and an exhaustive campaign for a clean homeland. I announced this before and the government has taken a lot of steps. Therefore the problems we talked about which have priority are the ‘problems of the hundred days.’ This is a division on the timescale, but among the other problems are education, health, prices, investments, and stability. All these matters need to be solved with a plan that gives us an overall conception. The government has started and works on the prevention of crises and the solving of immediate emergency problems. This is important, but al-Nahḍah is also important, actual development, the transition to stability and real growth. This is one side and the ground is another side and the two complete each other.

Interviewer

Mister President, you have been in contact with and even lived the challenges that the Egyptian people endure. What is in the quiver of the executive power in both the short and long term as far as first aid for the people who seek it in reality is concerned?

The President

The word ‘first aid,’ a necessary word, this means what we call the solution for emergency crises. Because the legacy of the previous period is a burden on the back of all the Egyptians. If we are talking about investments, there are guidelines for it. As I said, in spite of the magnitude of these investments, there was corruption. If we are talking about resources of the homeland, and there are a lot of them, and they are varied, but they were misused and mismanaged, and great corruption occurred in them as well. If we are talking about real stability, it can be realized step by step.

A solution to the problems now, and to the crises of these affairs are necessary and they take time. If we are talking about investments, then a very big impulse was given in the field of investments in general: there are productive investments there are also commercial investments, agricultural investments, and industrial investments. If the movement is

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outwards, then we have to give priority to Egyptian investors in order for them to work in an advantageous environment.

I take direct care of this, and you know that we have in our government and the public sector and the business sector a bit more than 6 million people, but we have in the private sector of investment and production around 17 million, the rest of Egypt’s children is added to this: the pensioners, the craftsmen, the merchants, the small private entrepreneurs, they all live in this homeland. If we speak of the transition process for the homeland I don’t want it to be a long process. It intends a push towards more investments and an encouragement of these investments, and to remove the obstacles for these investments on the field of petrol industry and petrochemistry. This is very important for us, we need fuel because of our energy and production and electricity.

In the field of agro-industry, this is also very necessary. The consumer goods in the general sense receive huge investments, and we stimulate them and we take initiatives abroad –in the East, North, West and then South as far as Africa - to attract investments.

Concerning the water of the Nile, and the guidance of its consumption, we desire to communicate with Africa for the preservation of the springs of the Nile and its resources. We talk about an integrated system, the government developed an integral plan in all the fields. I believe that we are moving slowly in these areas for true investments and for actual development, and thereafter to a timely solution for the occurring problems in order to cut back the suffering of the Egyptian people.

Interviewer

Are we capable of accomplishing the Renaissance, mister president?

The President

Definitely yes. I am impelled to say yes forcefully. I know the Egyptian people and its will and its wishes to fully realize this Renaissance. We have the capability of revival, and we have enormous capabilities to develop. They have been mistreated and its management has been misused. Its operational efficiency has been very weak. We are making efforts now, and everybody has noticed during a short period that there has been a movement toward supervision of the governance and guidance of the resources, toward justified distribution of the resources and complete extermination of every source of corruption, and gradual

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transformations in the corrupted institutions; the censorial apparatus, the apparatuses which investigate corruption and the corrupters. This legacy, which we all know, and is not a legacy in the good sense of the word, is a heavy burden on the backs of all us. In shā’ Allāh, we will get rid of all these negative affairs bit by bit and we will progress step by step towards a positive situation.

The general structure of education, the schools on pre-university as well as university level, the structure itself, is a good structure. The available possibilities and the resources, the teachers and the lecturers, the professors and the assistants as well, these resources are good resources. Now the student or the pupil–he is a product–leaves the education in accordance with the curriculum and the educational system itself. This is what we hope to be in good circumstances so that there will be graduates capable of carrying responsibility and giving for this society, but also to solve its problems. There about 18 million pupils in pre-university education studying in this stage. There are more than 2 million in university education, both in governmental universities and private universities and other institutions. In the pre-university education there are also teachers, and this constitutes the biggest portion of governmental schools. There are also private schools on the pre- university level. The private sector operates in the field of education, language, empiricism and other schools. Education is a very large system; 20 million students and on top of them another 2 million work in it: teachers, staff members, professors, and assistants. We are talking about more than 22 million people working and dealing with education in Egypt. If we added to them their families and children, and if we count an average of 3 individuals for every family, that means that we are talking about more than 60 million Egyptians. Education is a shared matter between all of them throughout the year, all day long, 24 hours a day.

Actually, the subject of education takes first place for us in the matter of priorities next to the law, the control over the work and the real role of the teacher, and the professors and the assistants and the staff members and the direction. The role of each of these is legal discipline and to contribute to the school and the university with their real role. This is necessary for its expenditure.

Education will remain the responsibility of the state, in regard of its expenses and oversight. Nothing else is possible, except for expenses of some of the details because what

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the government spends on education is not enough. There are contributions of the private sector and family and social sector as well. However, what we need for this is at least double of what the government spends now on education, the curriculum and the development of the curriculum. All of these are existing plans. The most important element right now, in which I hope we can realise a lot, is the budget that we spend on both pre-university and post-university education in Egypt.

I, with my knowledge as a man of education before and my appreciation of education and family, claim that a bill of education in Egypt, spent in reality by the parents, the government and the private sector, is no less than 100 billion Egyptian Pounds. The government contributes about 60% of this amount, and the rest is paid by private schools and parents. We don’t want the expenses to fall under 100 billion Egyptian Pounds, and what the family sector and the social sector and the private sector pay, is added value to this in the development of the education system. The resources need to be increased so we can increase that which we need to spend on education. The portion of the expenses of Egypt, the costs for the students, compared to this portion in a lot of countries in the world, is smaller. But we strive to raise it, and this affair needs production and investment which turn into financial value in the budget of which a big portion is taken for education.

I am aware of them and I acknowledge them: the teacher, the tutor; the guardian, private classes, I am aware of all of them, and I see it and I’m conscious about it. However, I want some kind of general cultivation to take place, and a general appreciation for the parent, the teacher, the tutor, the female teacher, the professor, the assistant, the aide, the assisting teacher or the staff-member, who work in the educational system. We are in the process of building a nation. This nation cannot be built but on the basis of education in the first place. The reduction of the illiteracy rate is related to the operation of education. Research, the promotion of scientific research, industry, production, and agriculture, this system relies in the first place on education. Training and technical schools rely on education. All of this is an integral system. I know that the resources and salaries of people in education are not sufficient. My dream for the education is bigger than this, and I’m very interested in the issue of education. However, there is not enough time to talk about the details concerning the educational process. But we now have people in education. Responsible people and a minister responsible for the administration and realization of the education process. And

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we also have in higher education and scientific research an organization in the Ministry and the Supreme Council of Public and Private Universities and scientific research centres.

I am not in a position to order any one, but I appeal to the workers in the field of private education and the owners of private schools to take into consideration in this process that these expenses burden the people. I also address my children and brethren, the teachers in education and teaching, down to the university and all the professors, because private tutoring is not in the public interest, that this way -or even worse- it will become a necessity due to every home. If the teacher and the professor fulfil their duties in school and university, I believe that this phenomenon and this problem will be solved for the greater part. I hope, and I look around me at society and at all of Egypt, and I see that there is a new consciousness, which is being formed by those who are watching over the educational and didactic process in Egypt. However, I will keep on saying that it is my responsibility and that of the government to raise the budget for education ,and -In shā’ Allāh- next year ,in the budget of 2013-2014, this will be raised with a reasonable rate. But it is really necessary that we cooperate together whether in the costs of private school, or in the private tutoring, the phenomenon that burdens all houses, or in watching over the attendance and the teaching in school or the universities, the lecturers and the teachers.

I want them to cooperate with me and with the government in this stage of development of the educational process. I do not to discuss their rights at all, because they have plenty of rights, much more than they perceive. But the process is like this, and we tolerate it together for some time, but not all the time. We will proceed –in shā’ Allāh- to a better and brighter tomorrow, with the provision of Allāh.

Interviewer

When do you expect drastic solutions for the slums? When will the inhabitants of the slums experience less hardships of the inhumane life in Egypt? The President

As we know, there are a lot of slums in Egypt, but they are not all the same. The development of some of them requires more effort than others. To search for alternative housing is not in the culture of slum inhabitants with a high degree. But we are striving for this. There is a plan of action for the areas and the inhabitants with an integrated infrastructure of schools and water supply and electricity and other needs. We will not

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achieve the relocation of all of them to new places, but we will contribute to a solution of the problem. The development of the place itself is a key aspect of this subject.

There are for example some places where natural gas cannot be imported, because of the risk it encompasses. The streets are very narrow and built randomly, with all due respect and love for everyone living in them, too much of the electricity supply is consumed by some in their shops. Others use it to run their electrical appliances while we try to sypply them and other neighbourhoods. I believe that you perceive this very clearly nowadays, the infrastructural development, the development of schools where children go to, the health services, the Minister of Housing now, and the governors of the places in which slums exist and especially Cairo, there is special attention for this. These are our brethren and our children and our family living in these places. The solution for this problem requires time. I go to them, work together with their representatives, and we investigate how we can solve these problems, and especially those in the field of health and education and services, consisting of electricity and gas.

Interviewer

What is your opinion on the administrative corruption from the bottom to the top of the pyramid?

The President

Administrative corruption starts from the top and not from the basis of the pyramid. The basis is overall in a good state. However, when the big men are corrupt, parts of the body rot, but not the entire body. Administrative corruption poses a major challenge for the Egyptian state and government. Corruption cannot be eradicated at once. The widespread corruption does not only affect administration, but has a wide negative impact.

We are proceeding, and I am proceeding, towards the main axes. Corruption is one of those. You may have noticed some changes that have taken place regarding some leaders towards a more rightly guided administration and less corruption, and towards taking control over places of bleeding, and towards equitable distribution of power and wealth, towards an actual progress of social justice for the workers, the farmers, the women, the men and the craftsmen. Corruption is naturally antithetical to any kind of social justice, development, or Renaissance.

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We will never let the corrupt continue the corruption, for everyone knows that, by the will of the people who gave me this responsibility, I will never allow corruption in its place. Everybody will be held accountable. Yet, in regard to interrogations, I do not want exceptional measures which correlate to this stage in history. Nowadays, there is undoubtedly a promotion of the value of the legislation and respect for the court rulings; we have representation, we have legislation, we have supervisory devices, we have an action system through which it is possible to bring about adjustment and reduction of this corruption. This corruption was a philosophy and a culture of a system.

It’s no secret for anyone that it is still present and part of it did not seize to exist. These corrupted, some of whom I took control over now, others I am investigating, drained the wealth of the nation, and moved it outside of its borders. This vast wealth, this money belongs to the Egyptians. Interrogations are being considered, and I move in the entire world, and this is not easy, to recover the stolen funds. First they need to be traced, ‘Where are they? Who do they belong to?’ Then they are recovered.

I endeavour with all force, with the supervisory bodies, to some parts of these bodies themselves I made some alterations for the sake of this, to capture these corrupted remnants. They are not millions or thousands, by nature the Egyptian society (the Egyptian people) are good. During Ramaḍān we saw how people supported each other. However, there are people trying to get away with theft or investments in corrupt practices. Those I warn.

The Egyptians are by nature pointing out those responsible for practicing corruption. I never talk about corruption at the basis, but rather about corruption that was practiced at the top. It is fading step by step and it requires some time. It ought not be a long time. Because the corruption undermines the system of development, and affects investments, there is a situation of lack of perceived assurance for investors or investing companies.

We strive to limit, control, and eliminate this, which I observe very closely and scrupulously, and many children of this nation work together with me in different bodies to do so. Yet by the law, even if there is no confusion at all, this case is not easy, but not impossible either. There are paths in two directions; the first is that of development, investments, progress, production, and stability so that the people can invest consciously, and aware and conveniently. The second is the path of eliminating this corruption and the corrupted.

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The culture of the past is over. It will never come about again. In shā’ Allāh, the people will sleep untroubled by their spirits, money, or possessions in the future. I consider this a responsibility on my shoulders towards this people. The destiny of the corrupted is prosecution and the law. I don’t want to use drastic measures, this would do more harm than good. I say to the corrupted: ‘Beware of resting assure because there are no exceptions or extraordinary measures. You will also be held accountable quickly by the law, some of you underway, some left, some abroad, and some have already been arrested.’ Now this is also in progress in all domains. Nowadays in Egypt, nothing stands above the will of the Egyptians.

Interviewer

Mister President, currently the most important issues on the scene are factional protests and its demands, and strikes and the rights of those people who are striking in all governorates and institutions. How do you see these protests?

The President

The essence of factional protests is an expression of the opinion of people and their need for increased income and salaries. This is a guaranteed right for everyone.

I would like to provide some explanation. For example in the past year 2011-2012 the total of budget expenses was around 480 billion. Only 126 billion was spent on wages. The expenses in the new budget increased to around 533 billion from 480 billion, yet the wages increased up to 135-136 billion. The wages are a result of the raise in salaries of the people. Taxes are also a result of these circumstances.. Some of the essential resources, a portion of the public budget of the state, are taxes. It was estimated that they would be around 390 billion. 25 billion of these couldn’t be collected last year in view of the present circumstances. People were not able to pay due taxes with some postponement.

The factional protests and the expression of it is a permitted act and there is no objection to it. I know that the incomes are not high enough, I know that the prices and expenses are higher than the incomes.

But I want to say once again that protests, which interrupt production, and reduce the possibilities of responding to the demands, and the protests, which shut down factories – there are not so numerous, but they are often present- these protests project a negative

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image regarding the general image of Egypt. Investment possibilities and their rates might decrease and not increase, and this negatively affects the possibility of meeting the demands and so forth.

I appreciate these factional protests, and I evaluate the problems of their adherents, and I follow them up one by one in every factory and company, in the government, in the university, concerning the employees, the teachers, the doctors, and in every group. I follow this up and I know for a fact that the people are experiencing a transitional process, in which some of the difficulties and the incomes are less than demanded, but the numbers tell that the situation of differences requires compensation.

Our Egyptian debt services constitute about 25% of the budget. We want to reduce this, and not ask for more loans nor burden ourselves with more new loans. There is growth. The new stock indicators are good now; they show that there is a good impression about the Egyptian economy and its growth. There is an investment movement coming from abroad to Egypt and there is a faith in Egyptian investors because they work. There is a conservation of energy and energy consumption, and there is earnest control over the subject of support, so that the supports won’t fall in the hands of those who don’t deserve it.

Together, these things tell us that strikes and factional protests, which I appreciate and respect—and I respect protests and the wishes of the participants—should not shut down production. We can never allow factional protest to obstruct the roads, or to disrupt the production process, or to shut down the commercial process, or to affect the overall image of our nation all together. This cannot be allowed, this is a very difficult and dangerous affair

But the voices should reach the responsible—me—by means of the trade unions or labour groups. That is what we do through the constructive dialogue with one another. What we can do and what we have to refrain from. It is not op to anyone to take what we are entitled to. No, as I have said before, we stem the bloodletting with our hand, but we have to be patient with each other. This is a lot more preferable to extending our hands to beg.

I declare,—God willing—I say with knowledge and expertise that these demands will be met in the next budget with a very high portion in the general financial year of 2012-2013. God willing, within two years from now the people will perceive the progress, which we have created with investments, new projects, employment rate, the return of tourism and an

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increased number of tourists and their services, with all of this. The increased flood level of the Nile this year, and the augment in portion of the crops this year compared to the same cultivated area (wheat has increased one and a half million ton), and the fruits rose as well, and the mango production as well, while its price lowered in the market. Rice increased to 8 million tons. Because of this we have increased the price per ton for the farmer, this way what he deserves from the production flows back to him This is all we work towards.

Interviewer

And what about the minimum wage?

The President

The minimum wage is a right that needs to be applied. We are now striving to impose it. We have now reached 800 Egyptian Pounds, and the goal was 1200. God willing, we will reach this as well in the new budget. We reach this limit with the imposition of a maximum wage as well. There was an unfinished legal decree in the People’s Assembly, which set the maximum wage in every institution at 35 times the minimum wage in the whole country - not the salaries; I say the income- that this doesn’t exceed 50.000 pounds in a special situation. This ensures a balance, and that is what I strive for now. We limit and look at every income and its form. The energy consumption is also leading the right way. Support is reaching those who are entitled to it. All these affairs are now on the ground, not only are they currently being studied, and are there a number of plans on the ground, but some of them are being implemented –God willing- partly.

Interviewer

Mister President, what is your opinion about the fact that there are some leaders who are anticipating their resignation every now and then, and are afraid and perhaps don’t work. Mister President, you know that the youth needs to practice its role, which they have lost since years. The President

The youth has the right to exercise a distinctive role in different areas of work. However, in the leadership of labour, in the crucial points of labour, and a lot of production facilities – this doesn’t mean that we don’t need the experienced owners—there is a need for youthful spirit and blood, and its development, and its evolution, and there is also need for the

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methods of the age, and experience of the men as well, and of the present people who are responsible. Those who are awaiting their dismissal—this phenomenon occurs often in some of the negative sides- [must know that] we don’t just change for the sake of change. Rather, we replace those of whom we see that there is someone better than him, or those who play a role in corruption, or those who don’t participate in the system of development and do not contribute seriously to the cooperation with the new plan of the government (the general progress, present in the society). This continues, and perhaps the entire society sees that we are advancing gradually, not hastily nor hurriedly, to bring about real changes in the organization of employment in the public sense, and especially in the sore and controlling devices in society.

Interviewer

Mister President, I would like to shed light on the decisions of 12 and 18 August, which are among the most important political decisions taken in Egypt. What is your opinion about these decisions?

The President

The decisions taken on 12 and 18 August were in fact necessary and due. I, mandated by the Egyptian people through free, fair, and democratic elections, elected civil president who realizes the concept of stability and civil state, and bears total responsibility, I took these decisions. After these I took other decisions as well. These decisions were never intended to marginalize the role of the institution or to aggress these persons in any possible way. Rather, this was the realization of the best interest, which everybody values.

I realize the desire and interests of the Egyptian people. I preserve the institutions of the Egyptian state. This is my responsibility. I replaced some of the leaders for the sake of the participation of a new spirit and the youth, and also out of respect and appreciation for the leaders who have never committed corruption. Those who did commit corruption will be served law and justice.

I look ahead and I imagine that the Egyptian people rallied for these decisions. I look at the reality, and I see that it loved these decisions. This means the approval of these decisions and the real legitimization of them.

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It’s a fact that Egypt—by the will of the Egyptian people—is now taking steps towards carrying the responsibility of a civil state, with the true meaning of civil state, which is explained in the al-Azhar document. As I said, that means that it is a nation state, a democratic state, a constitutional, modern, and stable state. The Egyptian Armed Forces have played a great role in the preservation of the revolution. The Egyptian Armed Forces have managed the transitional process, and endured a lot during their management, and protected this journey. Now the Egyptian people respects the Armed Forces. The Egyptian President, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, is devoted to the interests of this institution. He takes care of them just as he takes care of the rest of the nation’s institutions. The Armed Forces play a key role in defending the nation’s security and its borders. They are also an actual partner and essential supporter in defending the homeland security, whenever this is necessary.

This affair and this atmosphere of love and unification between the Egyptian people, which considers the Armed Forces as an integral part of it, and between the Armed Forces and its self-perception as fulfilling a great role for this people, it is this unified system I take under my wings. These decisions were, and still are—as will other decisions in the future be—part of the realization of the following interests; welfare, and raising the value of the popular will, and of the real transition with the entire Egyptian people towards complete freedom and social justice, and democracy, and the implementation of a lasting constitution which will be approved by the Egyptian people. These are decisions taken in view of the will of this people, expressing this desire for achievement of the interests. They are never against individuals at all, as they were realized in the public interest, and so we see their results in society and even in the world too.

Interviewer

Mister President, you seized the legislative power, and you said that its use will be kept to a minimum?

The President

This stage is short and it will end with the election of a new People’s Assembly. This will be the case after the implementation of the constitution –God willing. I wanted to preserve the legislation, not use it. I will not use the legislative powers in this phase at all, unless in a very limited way and after having consulted those who are involved in drawing up

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legislation. Until today–since 12 August until today in September, 40 days- I have not drafted any law or issued any decree, except for two things. The first is in the matter of the second year of secondary school. The students who will return this year in the second year of secondary school, they will have the right to choose between the old and the new system of public secondary schools. The second decree concerns the health insurance of our children and our kids. Before primary education, about 7 million children are covered by health insurance upon entrance in school.

I issued a legislation, in accordance with the proposals of the government and the Health Ministry, that included them in health insurance. These are the two things I issued so far. I am keen on preserving legislation and I want to return it to the legislative power at the right time. However, it is necessary for the success of this phase to conduct a thorough examination of the legislation in order to achieve the interests.

Interviewer

Mister President, what is your policy on Egypt’s foreign relations in the light of Egyptian national security in the Second Republic?

The President

The Egyptian foreign relations are now based on an equilibrium in a relationship of equality and mutual respect in achieving the interests. In a movement towards the entire world, East, West, North, and South, we will open our doors, but we will not close other doors –or open doors- at the expense of other doors. Egypt is capable of managing its own affairs, and taking its own decisions and is equal to all other countries.

I started in Africa for the cultural and historical depth, and the profundity of real interests with Africa and the Nile Basin countries. After that I headed for the Arabism and the Arabs, with a visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the conference in Makkah during last Ramaḍān, because this is the innate place for Egypt both historically and in the future. Thereafter, I headed to the East, to China. Then, I attended a conference in Teheran. After that, I went to Europe, and I will visit the UN in the near future, and after that many more visits. I open doors and I connect with states of the world, with governments, presidents, investors, businessmen, and companies for the sake of my homeland, Egypt, my country. I want to develop the production system, and the investments, and the employment in Egypt

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to bring back its interests to everybody, because the building of this nation requires progress in the sphere of foreign affairs, which realizes necessarily the domestic interests.

If the progress in foreign affairs and the external relations do not function in the interest of the nation and the people, then what is its value? We cannot live away from this world. There is no doubt about the balance. We understand consciously, and we know what to do, and in which direction to move, where to place our feet, and how to realize our interests. Nobody will interfere in our matters, nor will we intervene in the matters of someone else. In this journey I strive with all my effort for complete mutual respect between all the countries of the world.

Interviewer

Mister President, you know about the negligence of the Nile Basin countries since a long time. That’s why we would like to know the results of your visit to Ethiopia.

The President

During this visit I met with about thirteen presidents of African states. After this I went with a high-level delegation of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, who used to be the Minister of Water Resources, to offer him condolences. This appreciation is required from us. Today and yesterday, the Prime Minister was in Sudan to sign agreements for pass roads, and commercial, agricultural, production, and other industrial agreements with Sudan. I will visit other countries as well. I will visit Uganda shortly to participate with them in the celebrations of their national holiday in order to connect with them. They all notice that the value of Egypt is very big, and they are aware of the great happiness in this cooperation. And Egypt embraces Africa, and communicates with them, and Africa loves Egypt and is keen on it. The Nile Basin countries are a part of Africa, and all of Africa is at the heart of our external relations.

Interviewer

Mister President, how would you assess the relationship of Egypt with Iran in light of the tensions between Iran and a big part of the rest of the world? The President

I travelled to Iran to participate in the conference of the Non-Aligned Countries. I am fully aware that in the Arabic and the Islamic region, and in the Middle East there are a lot of

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issues. On top of these issues is the Syrian problem. Iran, a key player in the regional scene and regarding the Syrian problem as well, can play a positive and active role in solving this problem. I am also aware that the peoples and nations of this region are in need of stability and feelings of security. Egypt is a great country, and grace to Allah for its value, its people, its history, and its promising future of developing its value.

Consequently, I wanted to visit Iran to understand how the states of this region can positively contribute to a solution of the regional problems. I called for the initiative, which is now known as the Quartet of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey.

Egypt is an active state, not a party in the problem, but there is a very special and distinct bond between the Egyptian and the Syrian people. We have not forgotten about the United Arab Republic. The sufferance of the Syrian people renders us sleepless, and haunts all the peoples of the region. I want the state and the people of Iran to be part of the solution for this problem, and Turkey as well because they have a role in and relationship with the problem, and they are bordering, and Saudi Arabia as leader of the region of the Arabic Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, a big state, very important for us, and with reasonable and rational leaders.

Therefore, I wanted these four countries to be the core. This doesn’t mean just by themselves. Rather, it can include a lot of other countries of the region, of the Gulf states, or other Arab countries, or surrounding countries, and even non-Arab countries, Islamic and non-Islamic. This core is there to solve the problem. I wanted Iran to be an active part in this because there can’t be a solution of this problem while turning a blind eye to the existence of Iran, because Iran is present, and it’s a big, stable state. There is a lot of work, and it has a problematic relation with its neighbour Syria in history and at the moment. Therefore I don’t see a problem at all in the presence of Iran in this quartet; it is rather a part of the solution of the problem.

The quartet met twice. Once at the level of aides of the Minsters of Foreign Affairs, the second meeting was at the level of the Minsters of Foreign Affairs. Maybe in the future there will be a meeting at the highest level of the United Nations. We will meet with the heads of state and the Prime Ministers of the four countries at the General Assembly of the United Nations at the end of this month to discuss the problems at the highest level as well. We will communicate with the other Arab nations in the region on this and with the major powers in the Security Council: the United States, France, Great-Britain, China, and Russia.

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When I was in Europe I also spoke with Italy and the European Union, and North-Africa with Sudan. We are a wide movement for the sake of the success of this quartet. Al-Akhḍar al- Ibrāhīmī also communicates with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in his capacity as an envoy to the United Nations. He is a man who truly knows the problem, and the nature of the area, its population, and its popular arrangement. Mister Nabīl al-ʽArabī, the Secretary- General of the Arab League, was also present and communicated with this Quartet and with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. They all communicate now out of a firm desire among the states and governments, representing its people, to solve the Syrian question.

Interviewer

Do you expect an end to the bloodshed in Syria any time soon?

The President

A solution is not expected, but we strive for it. We will continue striving and moving actively to stop this bloodshed. There is no other subject to discuss, there’s no doubt that this bloodshed has to stop. The Syrian regime needs to realize that, with the continuation of this bloodshed, it violates all the laws, customs, culture, history, and humanity, in regard of what it is doing in Syria. This bloodshed needs to end, that’s why we are moving now.

Interviewer

Mister President, what has Egypt done since your mandate to develop conclusive solutions for the Palestinian issue?

The President

The Palestinian question has always been, still is, and will always remain in the heart and mind of every Egyptian. The Egyptian people has always been, still is, and will always keep on supporting its Palestinian brothers. Peace cannot be realized in the region of the Middle East without giving the Palestinians their complete rights, as was originally stipulated in the peace treaty. Palestinians must receive all their rights, and must be able to establish their own state by their free will, according to their decision. We don’t make decisions in their place, we support them in making their decisions.

I say very clearly, and I got to know noble Palestinian brethren of different factions, that the agreement which they strive for, that we now embrace this movement for a final

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agreement between them. This agreement will help Egypt in fulfilling its duty to realize the interests of the entire Palestinian people more and more. In shā’ Allāh, they will reach an agreement. We, as Egyptians, will always keep on embracing the rights of the Palestinians. We provide them in their nutritional needs with medicines, and we communicate with them, and facilitate the educational process for students, and facilitate visiting and returning to their relatives. Egypt always opens its arms for its siblings; Muslims and Arabs, the Palestinians, neighbours, and family. We can never lose sight of this question. We can never neglect it. What I am saying now, is the opinion of the entire people of Egypt towards Palestine and the Palestinians.

Interviewer

Mister President, why did you refuse to hang your picture in the presidential palace or in the institutions?

The President

I want to establish the concept of a state of institutions, not a state of the individual, nor the promotion of a culture of the individual who is capable of doing anything, inspiring everything, a ruler who is above everybody.

The age of these concepts has passed, therefore this issue is a step, though not a very big one, but with it, and with every step I took, I wanted to habituate the Egyptian people that no person can ever achieve hegemony over or ownership of the will. It is the individual that chooses and decides whatever he wants. There will never be room again for dictatorship of the individual.

Interviewer

I asked myself and the colleagues who work in the presidential institution: you arrive at night, when do you rest?

The President

‘And serve thy Lord until there come unto thee the Hour that is Certain.’ I strive as much as I possibly can. I hope to be on the mind of my Lord, and on the mind of the Egyptian people who chose me. I fulfil my duties as good as possible. I hope that with the spirit, the love, the will, and the power of the Egyptian people we can achieve a system of development. In

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order for Egypt to join the ranks of the great states; stable, productive, agricultural, and industrial—I am talking about aircrafts, ships, railways, and heavy industry. I am talking about clever economy, not just rentier. I have a big dream for Egypt. Interviewer

A word from your Excellency directed at the Egyptians. What do you ask from them?

The President

I love all the Egyptians, and I want them to increase their love for one another. I want stability, safety, and a comfortable life for them. I want, with complete consciousness, that we are a bit patient at this stage, so that we will be able to control our own will, produce our own nutrition, our own medication and weapons. We will attack nobody with our weapons. However, Egypt needs these four; The will, the food, the medication and the arms. At that point Egypt—the state and the people, the government and the society—will be in the ranks of the biggest and great states, great by its history and its children. However, what we hope for ourselves will be achieved by the provision of Allah.

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Arabic Transcript50

الرئيس

من قلبي وبكل روحي ومشاعري أتوجه بكل الحب تحية إلى الشعب المصري سواء في داخل مصر أو خارج مصر، وتحية خاصة إلى أسر شهداء الثورة المصرية مع دعاء إلى الشهداء بالرحمة والمغفرة، وتحية واجبة وخاصة أيضا إلى المصابين في هذه الثورة ومنذ قيامها حتى اآلن.

هؤالء جميعا يكونوا هذا الشعب ويتعاونوا فيما بينهم ويتحابوا ، هم أبناء مصر تحت سماء واحدة على أرض واحدة فتحياتي ومحبتي لهم جميعا )والتحية الدائمة بالسالم.. فالسالم عليكم جميعا في مصر وخارج مصر وفي التليفزيون وأهل التليفزيون المصري واإلذاعة واإلعالم وأهل مصر جميعا السالم عليكم ورحمة اهلل وبركاته.

المذيع

ما شعور سيادتكم وقت إعالن نتيجة االنتخابات الرئاسية؟

الرئيس

أن شعورى ملئ باألحساس بالمسئولية والتحسب الشديد للمسئولية في هذه المرحلة فأنا كنت مشفقا اشفاقا كبيرا على نفسي وراجيا اهلل سبحان وتعالى التوفيق ومتوجها حينئذ إلى الشعب المصري كله بدون تمييز أو تفريقة ألي سبب من األسباب أن يكون بعد اهلل سبحانه وتعالى خير عون لي وأن أكون عند ظنه بهذه الثقة الكبيرة الغالية.

فالمشاعر حينئذ كانت مشاعر مختلطة بين القلب والروح والعاطفة والعقل والمسئولية والوطن والعالم والمرحلة والثورة وما بعد وما قبل ذلك.

كنت أشعر بأن الدنيا تريد لمصر خيراوأن السماء أرادت لها خيراليس بسببي ولكن ألن المصريين هبوا بوعي شديد بهذه الثورة واختاروا لهم رئيسا بإرادتهم في جو من الديمقراطية ، هذا يضع بإحساسي حينئذ وحتى اآلن بالنظر إلى المستقبل يضع على عاتقي يضع على نفسي على عقلي على قلبي على روحي على حياتي كلها أحساس كبير جدا بمسئولية ضخمة جدا ال تجعلني أنام قرير العين تؤرق مضاجعي طول الوقت منذ ذلك التاريخ هذه اللحظة وحتى اآلن وأنا ما أتمناه لهذا الشعب كل الخير وان شاء اهلل أكون عن ظن هذا الشعب بإحساسي بتلك اللحظة وحتى اآلن بهذه الكيفية .. وعن أمل الناس ورحابة نظرتهم إلى المستقبل واحساسهم بأنه هذه ثورتهم وهذه أرضهم هذه السماء التي تظلهم هذا هو النيل هذه هي األرض هذه هي اإلرادة التي امتلكتها والحرية التي

50 This transcript was provided by the SIS (State Information Service) of Egypt. It was retrieved 12 June 2013, from http://www.sis.gov.eg/ar/Default.aspx. All speeches delivered by Morsi have been deleted from this web page after his removal.

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بذلنا من أجلها كل غالي ونفيس ماذا نحن فاعلون هل سيعود ذلك بالخير علينا هذا إحساسي الناس وأنا على يقين بتفاؤل شديد وبواقع عملي حقيقي وبمعرفة ودراية بالموارد وباإلرادة وباإلمكانيات وبالشعب وطبيعته وتاريخه وحاضره وأبنائه ورجاله وشبابه ونسائه ومسلميه ومسيحييه ، معرفتي بكل هذا يجعلني متفائل جداً ونحن نخطوا خطوات معاً إلى األمام فاألهداف كبيرة واآلمال عريضة والموارد كثيرة والجهد المطلوب بذله مني ومن كل هذا الشعب مجتمع مع بعضه جهد كبير جداً لدينا اإل اردة والموارد ولدينا الحرية والمناخ ولدينا الحب ولدينا واقع مطمئن نستطيع إن شاء اهلل أن نحقق أهداف تأخذ بعض الوقت ونحتاج بعض الوقت وهذا الوقت ال أقوله تسويفاً وال أقوله بعداً عن المشاكل وانما أنا في داخل المشاكل وحامالً لها ومقدر لقيمتها وآلمال هذا الشعب وشبابه وفرص العمل وتقليل البطالة واألمن واالستقرار واألمان والصحة والتعليم والسياحة والنيل والمياه والزراعة والصناعة والتحديث والشركات والمصانع واإلنتاج والقطاع العام وقطاع األعمال والحكومة والقطاع الخاص، كل هذا أحنا بنتحرك معاً به إلى إن شاء اهلل غدا أفضل.

المذيع

ما هى وجهة نظر سيادتكم عن ثمن التغيير قبل وأثناء وبعد الثورة؟

الرئيس

إن الشعب المصري شارك في الثورة كله ويوم 11 فبراير 1111 يوم الجمعة كان في شوارع مصر وميادينها في ميدان التحرير وكل ميادين الحرية في مصر بالكامل اإلحصائيات قالت والواقع ما يقرب من 11 مليون مصري هذا أمر غير مسبوق في التاريخ كله هذا أمر عظيم.

أنا وقلت وأكرر وأؤكد أنه ال يوجد بيت في مصر واحد ال يوجد بيت على اإلطالق لم يكن منه على األقل أحد أبناءه كبير أو صغير شاب أو رجل أو ام أرة على االختالف أو التنوع مشاركاً في هذه الثورة هذا الشعب الذي قام بهذه الثورة ولم يجرح أحد ولم يعتدي فيه على ملكية خاصة وال عامة ورعي الجميع ولم يكن أحد قائد بمفرده أو مجموعة أو جماعة أو حزب أو غيره ولكن وانما كانت األهداف وعناوين األمل هي التي تقود هذه الثورة هؤالء بهذه العزيمة وبهذه الروح وبهذه اإلرادة وما حققوه بعد ذلك حتى اآلن كان منهم شهداء سقط منهم رجال ونساء وأريقت دماء بعضهم هذه دماء الزكية غالية هذه كانت وقود حقيقي الستمرار الثورة وكانت وقود حقيقي لكل خطوات تلت بعد ذلك من أجل االنتقال السلمي من حالة الديكتاتورية والفراغ السياسي والجبروت والظلم والتزييف تزييف الوعي واإل اردة والتزوير والديكتاتورية المقيتة واهدار الموا در والفساد، االنتقال بكل هذا إلى حالة جديدة مضي ما يقرب من 11 شهر تقريبا وخالل 11 شهر شهدت أحداث كثيرة جدا.

هذا الثمن من الشهداء والمصابين وكل من خرج من 11 مليون كان من الممكن أن يكون شهيدا وكل من خرج إلى الشوارع يعلي قيمة الحرية ويطالب بالحقوق واعالء قيمة اإلرادة الشعبية كان ممكن أن يكون شهيدا لم يكن أحد يعرف من أين يأتي الرصاص أو القتل الحمد هلل أن العدد على قيمته الكبيرة محدود.

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هذه ثورة سلمية دفع هؤالء هذا الشعب دفع ثمنا باهظا قبل الثورة دفع المعاناة النفسية ، التهميش السياسي، الظلم ، اإلحساس بالقهر تدني الخدمات، التعليم، الصحة، الفساد، الرشوة، المحسوبية- مجموع العائالت التي لم تتعدى 21 عائلة التي كانت تهدر كل الموارد وتسيطر عليها وتستنزفها وتفسد 011، 011 واحد وأقل الذين عاثوا في األرض المصرية فسادا هذا شعور كان يعيشه المواطن المصري المعاناة اليومية األسعار الحارقة الدخول المتدنية هذا الفساد الذي كان موجود هذا ثمن كبير دفعه المصريون جميعا كلنا دفعناه سنوات طويلة جدا 21:01 سنة.

هي ممتدة وتتراكم ويزداد الحال سوءا يوم بعد يوم كانت القشة التي قسمت ظهر البعير االنتخابات المزورة 1111 )انتخابات مجلس الشعب( وكان للقضاء دور عظيم في إظهار هذا التزوير الذي وقع وكان للقضاة دور عظيم في التصدي لهذا التزوير ولكن الطغيان كان عاليا جدا والقهر والظلم ووقع قضاة ضحيته لذلك أيضا وتحركت القوة الشعبية حين إذا كانت هذه كلها مقدمات للثورة كان هذا هو المخزون اإلستراتيجي للغضب الشعبي الذي أدى إلى الثورة العظيمة )ثورة 10 يناير( هذا شارك فيه الجميع وعانى منه الكل ليس فصيل بعينه وحده وليس حزب وحده وال فرد وحده ولكن الكل قد عان والمفسدين كانوا موجودين واإلحساس بأن هذا الشعب مهمش العالم ينظر إلينا ماذا تفعلون لماذا ال تفعلون ال يفعل أحد في العالم شيء ألحد بالنيابة عنه ) وال يمكن أبدا لما كانت الخطوة العظيمة كان الثمن أثناء الثورة وهو أن الكل مستعد للتضحية الكل يمكن ان يكون شهيدا، اآلباء يوقظون األبناء ليشاركوا في الثورة هذا حدث في قرى مصر وعزب ونجوع والمحافظات والعاصمة في واإلسكندرية والمطارات والموانئ والجامعات والمدارس الكل كان موجودا بهذه الروح العظيمة جدا في 10 يناير وهو 11 يوم وتحقق الهدف األكبر األول أن يزول النظام أو رأس النظام ولكن بقيت له إذناب وأتباع وبقى له من يتصور انه ممكن أن يعود إلى الوراء ولكن لن يكون.

إن الشعب المصرى الذي حقق حريته وامتلك إرادته بيده الذى شارك في انتخابات مجلسي الشعب والشورى ما يقرب من 01 مليون وهذا الشعب الذى تحرك في انتخابات الرئاسة وشارك بأكثر من 10 مليون منه في االنتخابات ، هذا الشعب الذى وعى وأدرك وقرر ال يمكن )أن يقول من األفضل أن أعود لما كان مقابل ان أغلق بابى عليا( هذا ترويج لمفهوم خاطئ في محاولة لتزوير وعي المرحلة، المرحلة بها وعى كبير لكن الناس يريدون استقرار حقيقي وأمن حقيقي والناس يحتاجون الى من يطمئنهم وما يطمئنهم وليس من يطمئنهم فقط ونحن نبذل في ذلك كل الجهد والخطوات الجادة نحو إعادة مكونات األمن وعناصره إلى حالها وليس اإلعادة إلى ما كانت عليه ولكن اإلعادة بمفهوم القيام بالواجب الكامل قطعنا في ذلك خطوات كثيرة األمن اليوم يختلف عن األمن منذ شهور األمن اآلن لم يعد أمناً سياسياً بالمفهوم القديم وانما صار أمنا حريصا على منع الجريمة قبل وقوعها- التدخل لفض االشتباكات .. المحافظة على الناس وحرية الرأي عدم التدخل في تكميم األفواه.

هذه مرحلة تحتاج منا أيضا منا إلى جهد إلى تعاون إلى إدراك ووعي أن الخطر المحيط بنا جميعا الذي يتهددنا هو التنمية في المقام األول والتنمية ال تقوم إال على االستقرار واالستقرارال يتحقق إال إذا استشعر الناس هذا االستقرار األمني وغيره االستقرار األمني والتنموي االستقرار بمفهومه العام هذا يحتاج إلى بعض الوقت وأنا ال أسوف ولكني أقول بعض الوقت بمفهوم خطوات جادة يبذل فيها جهد اآلن والحمد هلل الداخلية والشرطة والناس

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يرون هذا يعود إلى بمعنى يلملمون الشعث يكونون مكونات حقيقية لتأمين المواطن لكي يبيت وهو مطمئن على ولده في المدرسة أو الدرس الخصوصي أو على أبنته أو على حركته في الشارع أو على ممتلكاته هذا أمر يعود يعود تدريجيا وأرى فيه كنوع وأرى فيه كإنجاز ال أنسبه إلى نفسي وحدي ولكن هناك مشاركة حقيقية من قوى "المجتمع المدني ومن جهاز الداخلية والشرطة ومن أبناء مصر األوفياء في كل المجاالت.

الناس يستشعرون ذلك اآلن بنسبة وأنا ال أقول أن كل شيء تحقق وأصبح االستقرار كامال ولكن طالما أن هناك حركة وطالما اتخذت خطوات جادة وأرسيت مبادئ وأتفق على أصول حركة األمن كل األمن والحرية كل الحرية للمواطن حقه الكامل في قسم الشرطة والطريق وحقه في المرور ولكن أيضا واجباته أيضا والت ازمه والقانون واعالء قيمته هذه منظومة تعود باإليجابية بالضرورة كما نرى على االستثمار واالستقرار واإلنتاج وطن أمن كل هذا يتزامن ويتحرك يحقق اآلمال لهذه الثورة وتحقق أجزاء من أهدافها وخاصة السياسية والحريات العامة آليات الديمقراطية واالستقرار فيها مفهوم الدولة المدنية الكبير الواسع المحبة بين الجميع.

لكن اآلمال الواسعة في االستقراراالقتصادي هذا أمر يسعدني أن يكون لدى الشعب أمل كبير هذا األمل يحدوه فعل يالزمه إنتاج ويستلزم وعي واد ارك إلى ما أنتجنا وأكلنا من إنتاج أيدينا ومن عرقنا فنحن ندعم المسيرة الديمقراطية وندعم اإلرادة المصرية الشعبية حين أذن ونحن نمتلك أكثر وأكثر أرادتنا في قرارنا وأن ينبع من عندنا ال بد وأن نبذل عرقاً كثي اًر ونقوم بإنتاج لتوفير ما يحتاجه الناس.

لن يدفع لنا أحد ما يجب أن ندفعه ألنفسنا وهذا الحمد هلل في الشعب المصري آلة إنتاج واإلنتاج يحتاج المسألة مسألة أنتاج واإلنتاج يحتاج إلى استق ارر إلى أمن إلى ضمان إلى وقت إلى معرفة بالحقوق والواجبات وان شاء اهلل هذا سيسير إلى األفضل.

المذيع

سيادة الرئيس أنتم أكدتم فى أكثر من مرة أن مصر ستظل دولة ديمقراطية، دستورية، مدنية، ما هى وجهة نظرة سيادتكم تجاه المصطلحات الثالثة ومفهومها تحديداً؟

الرئيس

حقيقة كانت القوى السياسية واألحزاب جميعها قد وقعت وثيقة عرفت بوثيقة .. وكانت قبلها وثيقتين أخريين صدرا من تحالف أحزاب كبيرة ولكن كل هذه الوثائق صب في وثيقة األزهر.

وفي وثيقة األزهر كان إعالء لقيم ومبادئ كثيرة ومتعددة وعلى رأسها قيم الحرية والعدالة االجتماعية وكان هناك نص يتحدث عن الدولة المصرية وطبيعة الدولة المصرية ما يجب أن تكون علية في هذه المرحلة وكان النص باالتفاق أن الدولة المصرية في هذه المرحلة ما نحبه نحن المصريين ألنفسنا أن تكون دولة وطنية ديمقراطية دستورية بمفهوم قانونية حديثة.

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ومفهوم العدل االجتماعي أن الشعب مصدر السلطة وأن هناك تداوال للسلطة هذه العناوين هذه المبادئ األساسية بمعناها الواضح للجميع المستقر لدى الجميع هي التي تمت االتفاق عليها وهى التي مازالت مرفوعة من الجميع وال خالف عليها وهي التي أعمل جاهدا أن تحقق على أرض الواقع دائم وأن أحرصها وأرعاها كى تحقق، قطعنا شوطا كبيرا في كثير من هذه المبادئ مصر اآلن حقيقة ديمقراطية االنتخابات وما تم فيها سواء شعب أو شورى أو رئاسة كانت فيها حرية كاملة وكانت معبرة عن الناس وا رادتهم ولم يكن فيها مخالفات قادحة وكان القضاء مشرفا عليها كما نعلم بشكل واضح وحيد.

مفهوم الدولة الحديثة وأن الشعب واألمة مصدر السلطة هذا ما رأيناه وهذا هو قرار الشعب في االنتخابات مفهوم أن تداول السلطة هذه مسئولية خاصة عندي أنا أرعاها لكي تتحقق واآلن الجمعية التأسيسية تضع الدستور لضمان مثل هذه األمور أن تكون، احترام القانون : دولة دستورية القانونية واحترام القانون والدستور هذا ما أقوم عليه ليل نهار حتى ال يحدث أي نوع من أنواع المخالفة للقانون ونحترم أحكام القضاء أيضا ألنها جزء من احترام القانون واحترام أحكام القضاء أن نطبق لهذا القانون نحن نتحدث عن الدولة المصرية التي نريدها جميعا وهي الدولة المستقرة الدولة القوية الفاعلة لهذه المبادئ التي تقوم عليها.

المذيع

لماذا إذن سيادة الرئيس يصر البعض على التخويف من التيار اإلسالمى السياسي؟

الرئيس

مصر فيها حركة سياسية شعبية مجتمعية حزبية وغير حزبية كبيرة جدا، وهذه طبيعة المرحلة وهذه من دواعي االطمئنان بالنسبة للمرحلة أن يكون هناك تفاعل حقيقي أن يكون هناك ايجابية أن يكون في التعددية تعدد في اآلراء في الرؤى في الفكر في التعبير في التفكير في الحزبية هذا أمر صحى جدا ومطلوب وال ينبغى أبدا ألي فصيل أو تيار أو أى حزب أن يخشى أو يخاف على نفسه او على وطنه من تيار آخر ألن طبيعة الحركة وطبيعة الفعل التكاملى الذى أراه في المجتمع المصرى يحتم التنوع فإذا كان البعض يخشى من البعض اآلخر فانا أريد ان اطمئن الجميع انه ال بد من أعمال حرية التعبير وحرية الحركة وحرية تكوين األحزاب وتداول السلطة واعالء قيمة القانون والديمق ارطية والحكم هو الصندوق وكل يتحرك في الميدان فال مجال لتخوف وال مجال لتربص وال مجال لعدوان احد على احد طالما إننا نسير في ركب وفي إطار هذه المبادئ التى اتفقنا عليها.

المذيع

سيادة الرئيس هل ستتم انتخابات رئاسية بعد االنتهاء من الدستور؟

149

الرئيس

هذا يعتمد على الدستور " أنا ال أتدخل في وضع الدستور" الجمعية التأسيسية بمكوناتها المختلفة حتى اآلن تقوم بهذا الدور في وضع المسودة األساسية التى سيجرى عليها حوار مجتمعى واسع ثم يتفق على شكل نهائى من الجمعية بحرية تامة لهذه المسودة ثم هذا يكون مشروع الدستور الذى يعرض على الشعب لالستفتاء فإذا اقره أصبح دستوراوحين اذ واجب االحترام فما يأتى به هذا الدستور انزل عليه واحترمه وأطبقه حتى يتحقق مفهوم الدولة الدستورية.

المذيع

متى يتم للشعب المصرى تقييم أداء الحكومة، فالناس تنتظر نتائج على ارض الواقع؟

الرئيس

إن مسالة إبداء الرأي في الرئيس والحكومة فهذا مكفول للجميع حرية إبداء الرأي والتعبير عن الفكر واالعتراض السياسي السلمي الموجود هذا مكفول وهذا حق لكل المواطنين وان أكدت قبل ذلك أن حماية الرأي والفكر ووجهات النظر والنقد والنقد البناء والتظاهر السلمى واالعتصام هذا واجب الدولة وأنا على رأس هذه الدولة فإذا يحق للجميع أن يقولوا رأيهم في الرئيس أو في الحكومة ويعبروا عن طموحاتهم وأمالهم ورغباتهم في تحقيق "األهداف وحل المشكالت كل هذا مسالة مكفولة للجميع

أنا ال أريد أن أقول ال تنسوا أن حل المشكالت يحتاج إلى وقت وان هناك عندما نقسم الوقت إلى )مائة يوم ( ثم إلى عام أو عامين او غيره فهذا تقسيم نوعى ألنه األولويات تحتم أن هناك مشاكل تحتاج أولوية في حلها أكثر من األخرى فإذا تحدثنا عن مشكلة المرور فهذه مشكلة ملحة نبذل جهداً كبي اًر تحسنت بعض الشيء وما ازلت تحتاج إلى المزيد تحدثنا عن مشكلة القمامة فهذه مسألة في منتهى الخطورة بالنسبة لنا جميعا ونبذل جهدا كبيرا جدا ولكن مازال هناك حاجة إلى مجهود اكبر ولفعل أكثر للتخلص منها نهائيا نحتاج أيضا إلى وعي مجتمعى وحملة شاملة نحو وطن نظيف وأنا أعلنتها قبل ذلك والحكومة تأخذ فيها خطوات كثيرة جدا ولهذا " المشكالت ذات األولوية هى التى نقول عنها مشكالت المائة يوم.

هذا تقسيم نوعى للزمن ولكن ما بين المشكالت األخرى ، التعليم الصحة ، األسعار االستثمار- االستقرار كل ذلك أمور يجب آن تحل لها خطه لدينا تصور شامل والحكومة بدأت وتعمل لمنع األزمات حل المشكالت اآلنية الطارئة لكن هذا مهم ولكن المهم أيضا هو النهضة التنمية الحقيقية االنتقال إلى االستقرار والنمو الحقيقي هذا جانب واألرض جانب واالثنين يكملون بعضهم.

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المذيع

سيادة الرئيس المستم بل وعشتم التحديات التى واجهة الشعب المصرى ، ماذا فى جعبة السلطة التنفيذية تحديدا من خطط سواء كانت قصيرة المدى أو بعيدة المدى كإسعافات للشعب ليلمسها على ارض الواقع ؟

الرئيس

كلمة اإلسعافات هذه يعنى كلمة واجبه أن نقول هو حل األزمات الطارئة ألنه ميراث الفترة السابقة يثقل كاهل المصريين كلهم إذا كنا نتكلم عن استثمار كان له توجيه كما قلت لفساد على الرغم من ضخامة هذا االستثمار إذا كنا نتكلم عن موارد الوطن فهى كثيرة جدا ومتعددة ولكنها أسيئ إدارتها وأيضا حدث فيها فساد كبير جدا واذ نتكلم عن استقرار حقيقي فله خطوات

الحل اآلن للمشكالت وحل األزمات هذه مسألة واجبة وتأخذ وقت ولو أتكلمنا عن االستثمار فأنت تتحرك حركة كبيرة جدا في مجال االستثمار، االستثمار وبصفه عامه ولكن االستثمار اإلنتاجي ولكن يوجد استثمار تجارى أيضا هناك استثمار زراعى، وصناعى فاذا الحركة الخارجية لكى نجذب مستثمرين استثمار قبلها البد من المستثمرين المصريين أنفسهم يجدوا المناخ المناسب.

أنا ارعي ذلك رعاية مباشرة وأنت تعلم ان لدينا في الحكومة والقطاع العام وقطاع األعمال أكثر قليال من 6 ماليين لكن لدينا في القطاع الخاص االستثمارى واإلنتاج حوالى 11 مليون يضاف إلى ذلك باقي أبناء مصر أصحاب المعاشات الحرفيين أصحاب التجارة أصحاب المشاريع الصغيرة الخاصة كل هؤالء يعيشون على هذا الوطن فإذا نحن نتحدث عن مرحلة انتقالية ال أريدها أن تكون مرحلة طويلة فيها دفع نحو المزيد من االستثمارات وتشجيع هذا االستثمار وتزيل العقبات لهذا االستثمار في مجال الصناعة البترول البتروكيماويات هذا مهم جدا ألننا نحتاج إلى الوقود عشان الطاقة واإلنتاج والكهرباء.

وفي مجال الصناعة الز ارعية ده مطلوب جدا والسلع االستهالكية بصفة عامة فيها استثما ارت كبيرة جداً ونحن نشجعها وان تتحرك في العالم الخارجى من اجل جذب هذه االستثمارات سواء شرقا أو شماال أو غربا بعد ذلك وجنوبا حتى في أفريقيا. مياه النيل وترشيد االستهالك وحرص التواصل مع أفريقيا للحفاظ على منابع النيل وموارده نحن نتحدث عن منظومة متكاملة الحكومة وضعت خطة متكاملة في كل المجاالت أنا أرى أننا نتحرك رويدا في هذه المجاالت الستثمار حقيقي لتنمية حقيقية ، ثم حل المشكالت عندما يطرأ شيء في حينه بمعنى أن نقلل حجم المعاناة لدى الشعب المصرى.

المذيع

هل نستطيع تحقيق النهضة سيادة الرئيس؟

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الرئيس

بالتأكيد نعم ودافعى ألقول نعم بقوة ال هو ما اعرفه عن الشعب المصرى وا اردته ورغبته في أن يحقق فعال هذه النهضة لدينا إمكانية النهوض ولدينا إمكانيات ضخمة للتنمية أهدرت وأسيئت إدارتها كفاءة التشغيل ضعيفة جدا ونحن نسعى اآلن ولمس الجميع خالل وقت كثير مضى ان هناك تحرك نحو ترشيد اإلدارة ، وتوجيه الموارد ، وتوزيع عادل لهذه الموارد ، اقتالع تام لكل منابع الفساد.تغيرات تدريجية في المؤسسات التى فيها فساد ، األجهزة الرقابية واألجهزة التى تبحث عن الفساد والمفسدين ، تراث نعرفه جميعا هذا ميراث ، وليس تراث بمفهوم التراث الجيد هذا مي ارث أثقل كل كواهلنا جميعا إن شاء اهلل سوف نتخلص من السلبيات رويداً رويداً ونتدرج في اإليجابيات.

الهيكل العام للتعليم في مصر سواء على مستوى المدارس قبل الجامعى أو الجامعى هيكل جيدة الهيكل نفسه واإلمكانيات المتاحة والموارد والمدرسين والمعلمين او األساتذة والمعاونين ايضا هذه الموارد موارد جيدة اآلن الطالب والتلميذ الذى هو )المنتج( الذى يخرج من التعليم طبقا للمناهج طبقا لنظام التعليم نفسه. هذا ما نتمنى أن يكون على خير حال حتى يكون هناك خريج قادر على حمل المسئولية والعطاء لهذا المجتمع لكن أيضا تحل مشاكله إحنا التعليم قبل الجامعي فيه ما يقرب من 11 مليون طالب تلميذ في هذه المرحلة والتعليم الجامعي يعني أكثر من 1 مليون سواء في الجامعات الحكومية أو في الجامعات الخاصة والمعاهد األخرى والتعليم أيضا قبل الجامعي فيه مدارس وده األكثر نسبة المدارس الحكومية وفيه المدارس الخاصة والقطاع الخاص الذي يعمل في مجال التعليم ومدارس اللغات والتجريبية وغيره، وان المنظومة كبيرة جدا 11 مليون تلميذ بيعمل معهم من المعلمين والموظفين واألساتذة والمعاونين حوالي 1 مليون آخرين ونحن نتكلم عن أكثر من 11 مليون يعملون ويتعامل مع التعليم في مصر إذا أضفنا إليهم عائلتهم وأبنائهم لو مرتبط بكل واحد من دول 2 أفراد في المتوسط يعني نتكلم عن أكثر من 61 مليون مصري، التعليم مادة مشتركة بينهم جميعا على مدار اليوم والسنة وعلى مدار 10 ساعة في اليوم.

نحن الحقيقة موضوع التعليم بالنسبة لنا أول ما يحتاجوا إليه إلى جوار القانون وضبط العمل ودور المعلم الحقيقي وكذلك األستاذ والمعاون والموظف واإلداري دور كل هؤالء واالنضباط القانوني وقيام المدرسة والجامعة بدورها الحقيقي هذا يحتاج إلى إنفاق.

سيبقى التعليم مسئولية الدولة إنفاقا واش ارفا سيبقى هكذا وال يمكن أن يكون غير ذلك ولكن في اإلنفاق بعض التفاصيل ألن الحكومة ما تنفقه على التعليم ال يكفي هناك مساهمة للقطاع الخاص والقطاع األهلي أيضاً )المجتمعي( ولكن ما نحتاج إليه على األقل ضعف ما ينفق اآلن من الحكومة على التعليم المناهج وتطوير المناهج هذه كلها خطط موجودة ولكن العامل األساسي اآلن الذي أتمنى أن نستطيع أن نفعل فيه شيئا كثيرا هو حجم ما ينفق على التعليم في مصر سواء التعليم قبل الجامعي أو بعد الجامعي.

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أنا أزعم بمعرفتي كرجل تعليم قبل ذلك واحساسي بالتعليم واألسرة أن فاتورة التعليم في مصر ما ينفق حقيقة من أولياء األمور والحكومة والقطاع الخاص ال يقل عن 111 مليار جنية، الحكومة تساهم بحوالي 61% من هذا المبلغ والباقي يأتي في المدارس الخاصة وأولياء األمور ونحن نريد أن نصل إنفاق من الحكومة ال يقل عن 111 مليار ويكون ما ينفق من القطاع األهلي والمجتمعي والخاص قيمة مضافة على ذلك في تنمية منظومة التعليم ، الموارد تحتاج إلى زيادة لكي نستطيع أن نزيد مما يجب أن ينفق على التعليم نسبة اإلنفاق في مصر أموال بالنسبة للطالب إذا ما قورنت هذه النسبة في دول كثيرة في العالم فهي أقل منها، لكن نحن نسعى لرفعها واألمر يحتاج إلى إنتاج واستثمار تتحول إلى قيمة مالية في موازنة تأخذ منها نسبة كبيرة منها للتعليم.

أنا استشعر وأعيش هم المعلم والمدرس وولي األمر الدروس الخصوصية أنا أعيش كل هذا وأراه وأحسه ولكن أن أريد أن يحدث هناك نوع من أنواع التثقيف العام والوعي العام لولي األمر والمعلم والمدرس والمدرسة واألستاذ المعاون والمعيد أو المدرس المساعد للموظف الذي يعمل في المنظومة التعليمية أننا في مرحلة بناء وطناً وأن هذا الوطن ال يمكن أن يبني إال على التعليم في المقام األول خفض نسبة األمية له عالقة بالعملية التعليمية األبحاث وتطوير البحث العلمي والصناعة واإلنتاج والزراعة منظومة تعتمد في المقام األول على التعليم ، التدريب والمدارس الفنية يعتمد على التعليم هذه كلها منظومة متكاملة أنا أعرف أن موارد الناس في التعليم ومرتباتهم ال تكفي، حلمي أكبر من ذلك للتعليم ومهتم جداً بقضية التعليم والوقت ال يتسع لكي أتحدث في تفاصيل بالنسبة للعملية التعليمية ولكن لدينا اآلن في التربية والتعليم ناس مسئولين ووزير مسئول على دارية ومعرفة بالعملية التعليمية ولدينا أيضا في التعليم العالي والبحث العلمي أيضاً منظومة عمل في الو ازرة والمجلس األعلى للجامعات الحكومية والخاصة ومراكز البحث العلمي. أنا ال أملك أن أجبر بل أناشد العاملين في مجال التعليم الخاص وأصحاب المدارس الخاصة أن يراعي في هذه المرحلة أن هذه المصروفات تثقل كاهل الناس وأنا أيضا أتوجه إلى أبنائي وأخواني المدرسين في التربية والتعليم وحتى في الجامعة واألساتذة جميعا ألن الدروس الخصوصية هذه ليست في مصلحة المجتمع أن تكون بهذا الشكل أو تتفاقم وتصبح ضرورة واجبة على كل بيت فإذا أدى المدرس واجبه واألستاذ واجبه في المدرسة والجامعة أنا أتصور أن هذه الظاهرة وهذه المشكلة يحل منها جزء كبير جداً وأتمنى وأنظر حولي والى المجتمع وفي مصر كلها فأرى أن هناك وعيا جديدا يتكون لدى القائمين على العملية التعليمية التربوية في مصر ولكن أنا مازلت بقول بأن مسئوليتي ومسئولية الحكومة أن نرفع من قيمة ما ينفق على التعليم وان شاء اهلل في العام القادم في الموازنة عام 1112 - 1110 يرتفع هذا بنسبة معقولة. لكن نحن نحتاج فعال أن نتعاون جميعا سواء في مصروفات المدارس الخاصة أو الدروس الخصوصية الظاهرة التي تثقل كواهل كل البيوت أو في الحرص على التواجد في المدرسة والعطاء أو الجامعة في المحاضرة والمعمل والجامعة.

وأنا أريدهم أن يتعاونوا معي ومع الحكومة في هذه المرحلة لتطوير العملية التعليمية وال أريد أبدا أن أتحدث عن حقوقهم ألن حقوقهم كثيرة جداً أكثر بكثير مما يأخذونه ولكن المرحلة هكذا نتحمل مع بعضنا البعض بعض الوقت وليس كل الوقت ننتقل إن شاء اهلل إلى الخير واألفضل بإذن اهلل.

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المذيع

متى ترى للعشوائيات حالً جذرياً ومتى يلقى ساكنو العشوائيات أقل مالمح للحياة اآلدمية في مصر؟

الرئيس إن العشوائيات في مصر كما نعلم كثيرة وليست كلها زي بعض في بعضها تنميته عايزة جهد أكثر من اآلخر وايجاد مساكن بديلة ليست في ثقافة سكان العشوائيات بدرجة عالية ولكن نحن نسعى في ذلك وهناك خطة لعمل مناطق وسكن ببنية أساسية متكاملة من مدارس ومياه أو كهرباء أو غيره بشكل لن يحقق نقل الجميع إلى أماكن جديدة ولكن سيساهم في حل المشكلة لكن تطوير المكان نفسه هو جزء أساسي من الموضوع.

هناك بعض األماكن مثال ال يمكن إدخال الغاز الطبيعي إليها ألن الغاز الطبيعي فيه خطورة والشوارع ضيقة جدا وبنيت بطريقة عشوائية مع احترامي وحبنا لكل من يعيش فيها - خدمة الكهرباء والتحميل عليها زيادة عن اللزوم والبعض يحمل للورش والبعض يحمل في مثل هذه الظروف الصعبة إلى أجهزة كهربائية أو غيره ونحن نسعى لتوفير الكهرباء لهؤالء مثل توفيرها لباقي األحياء وأنا أتصور أنتم تلمسون ذلك بشكل واضح في هذه األيام وتطوير البنية األساسية ، تطوير المدارس التي يذهب إليها األبناء الخدمة الصحية والطبية وزير اإلسكان اآلن ومحافظي األماكن التي فيها عشوائيات وخاصة القاهرة، هناك اهتمام خاص بها هؤالء أخوانا وأبنائنا وأهلنا والمشاكل تحتاج في حلها إلى وقت.

وأنا أذهب إليهم وأتعاون مع ممثليهم ونبحث عن كيف نحل هذه المشكالت وخاصة في مجاالت الصحة والتعليم والخدمات والتي تتمثل في الكهرباء والغاز التي هي في عين االعتبار.

المذيع

ما رأيك فى الفساد اإلدارى من أسفل الهرم إلى أعلى الهرم؟

الرئيس

إن الفساد اإلداري بدأ من الرأس وليس من القاعدة )القاعدة بصفة عامة بخير(. ولكن عندما أفسد الكبار يعني سرى السوس في بعض العظام وليس كل العظام الفساد اإلداري تحدي كبير تواجه الدولة والحكومة المصرية ال يمكن التخلص من الفساد دفعة واحدة فساد كبير متسع ليس إدارياً فقط وانما تأثير كبير سلبي.

نحن نتحرك وأنا أتحرك نحو المحاور األساسية التي بها أو فيها فساد لعلكم الحظتم بعض التغييرات التي تمت في بعض القيادات نحو إدارة أكثر رشداً نحو فساد أقل ، نحو وضع اليد على أماكن النزيف نحو توزيع عادل للسلطة والثروة، نحو حركة حقيقية لعدالة اجتماعية للعامل وللفالح والمرأة والرجل والحرفي فساد مقاوم طبيعي ألي نوع من أنواع العدالة االجتماعية أو التنمية والنهضة.

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لن ندع أبدا مفسد أن يستمر في فساده ليعلم الجميع أن بإرادة هذا الشعب الذي حملني هذه المسئولية لن أدع فاسدا في مكانه أبدا سيحاسب الجميع لكن المساءلة أنا ال أريد إجراءات استثنائية تنسب إلى هذه المرحلة في التاريخ اآلن البد من إعالء قيمة القانون واحترام أحكام القضاء لدينا نيابة ولدينا قانون لدينا أجهزة رقابية ولدينا منظومة عمل يمكن أن تؤدي من خاللها إلى تحجيم وتقليل إنها هذا الفساد، الفساد هذا كان فلسفة وثقافة نظام,

ليس خافيا على أحد ما كان هو موجود ومازال بعضه وهؤالء المفسدين الذين أضع يدي على بعضهم اآلن وأبحث عن اآلخر نزفوا ثروة الوطن وأخرجوها إلى خارج حدوده هذه الثروة الكبيرة المال عرق المصريين المساءلة عين االعتبار وأنا أتحرك في العالم كله وهذا ليس سهالً السترداد األموال المنهوبة األول تحديدها، "أين هي؟ تخص من؟ ثم استردادها.

وأسعى بكل قوة مع أجهزة الرقابة وأجريت بعض التعديالت في بعض أجهزة الرقابة نفسها من أجل هذا لكي نضع أيدينا على هؤالء المفسدين ليسوا ماليين وليسوا آالف األصل في المجتمع المصري )الشعب المصري( ده الخير ونحن شاهدنا في رمضان كيف حمل الناس بعضهم بعضا فيه خير ولكن هناك ما يحاول أن يهرب بما أخذ أو يستثمر في اإلفساد وأنا أحذر هؤالء.

المصريين بطبيعتهم يدلون المسئولين عن المفسدين لكن أنا ال أتحدث أبدا عن فساد قاعدة وانما عن فساد كان في القمة ويزول تدريجيا ويحتاج إلى بعض الوقت ال يجب أن يكون الوقت ال طويال ألن الفساد يضعف منظومة التنمية ويؤثر على االستثمار ويوجد حالة من عدم اإلحساس االطمئنان للمستثمرين أو للشركات االستثمارية.

هذا ما انظر إليه بدقة شديدة كاملة ويتعاون معى الكثير من أبناء هذا الوطن في أجهزة مختلفة ، نسعى إلى تحجيم ، ضبط ، القضاء على ، ولكن بالقانون وحتى ال يكون هناك فوضى على اإلطالق هذا أمر ليس سهل ولكنه ليس مستحيل، ماشيين في اتجاهين )تنمية واستثمار وحركة وانتاج( واستقرار عشان الناس تستثمر بوعي واد ارك و ارحة ، والقضاء على هذا الفساد وعلى هؤالء المفسدين.

ثقافة الماضى انتهت لن تكون بعد ذلك أبدا ان شاء اهلل سوف ينام الناس مطمئنين على أرواحهم وأموالهم وممتلكاتهم في المستقبل هذه اعتبرها مسئولية في رقبتى لهذا الشعب المفسدين هؤالء مآلهم القضاء والقانون وال أريد أن استخدم إجراءات استثنائية هذه تضر أكثر مما تنفع ، وأقول للمفسدين إياكم أن تعتقدوا بأن ليس هناك استثناءات أو ليس هناك إج ارءات استثنائية لكن أيضا بالقانون وسريعاً ستحاسبون البعض في طريقه والبعض نزح والبعض خرج والبعض تم إلقاء القبض عليه واآلن جارى ذلك أيضا في كل المجاالت ليس هناك كبير في مصر على إرادة المصريين اآلن.

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المذيع

سيادة الرئيس أهم موضوع على الساحة حالياً االحتجاجات الفئوية ومطالبها واإلض اربات وحقوق هؤالء الناس الذين يقفون في كل المحافظات والمؤسسات، كيف ترى تلك االحتجاجات؟

الرئيس

حقيقة االحتجاجات الفئوية تعبير عن رأي الناس وحاجتهم في أن ترتفع دخولهم ومرتباتهم .. هذا حق مكفول للجميع.

وأنا أريد أن أقول بعض التوضيح يعني مثال في العام الماضي 1111-1111 كانت جملة المصروفات في الموازنة حوالي 011 مليار وكان األجور فيها فقط 116 مليار أجور .. زادت في الموازنة الجديدة المصروفات إلى 022 مليار من 011 مليار تقريبا لكن األجور زادت إلى 120-126 مليار أجور نتيجة الزيادة في مرتبات الناس بهذا الشكل .. الضرائب نتيجة الظروف أيضا .. مورد من الموارد األساسية بالنسبة للموازنة العامة .. من الموارد األساسية للدولة الضرائب .. كان مقدرا لها أن تكون حوالي 291 مليار فيه 10 مليار لم نتمكن من جمعها في العام الماضي نظرا للظروف الموجودة .. الناس غير قادرة على دفع ما عليها من ض ارئب بتؤَّجل بعض الشيء .

إن االحتجاجات الفئوية والتعبير عنها هذا أمر مباح ال بأس .. االحتياجات أنا أعلم أنها أكثر من الدخول واألسعار والمصروفات أكثر من الدخل.

لكن أنا عايز أقول مرة أخرى ان االحتجاجات التي تعطل اإلنتاج تقلل اإلمكانيات لالستجابة للمطالب ، االحتجاجات التي تغلق المصانع وهي غير كثير ولكن هي موجودة أحيانا .. هذه تعطي صورة سلبية بالنسبة للصورة العامة في مصر .. ممكن احتماالت االستثمار معدالتها تقل وال تزيد وهذا يؤثر سلبا على إمكانية تلبية المطالب وهكذا.

فهذه االحتجاجات الفئوية أنا أقدرها وأقدر مشاكل أصحابها وأتابعها واحدة - واحدة في كل المصانع والشركات في الحكومة في الجامعة في الموظفين .. في المدرسين .. في األطباء .. وفي كل الفئا.

أنا أتابع ذلك وأعرف أن الناس حقيقة يعيشون مرحلة انتقالية فيها بعض الصعوبات والدخول أقل من المطلوب لكن األرقام تتحدث عن حالة من الفروق تحتاج إلى تعوي.

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إحنا خدمة الدين المصري حوالي 10% ربع الميزانية ..عايزين نقلل هذا وال نذهب إلى االقتراض وأال نثقل كاهلنا باقتراض جديد .. هناك نمو .. البورصة مؤشراتها جيدة اآلن وتقول أن هناك انطباع جيد عن االقتصاد المصري في نموه .. وهناك حركة استثمار من الخارج نحو الداخل وهناك قناعة لدى المستثمرين المصريين عشان يشتغلوا .. هناك ترشيد للطاقة واستهالك الطاقة والنظر إلى موضوع الدعم بشكل جدي حتى ال يذهب الدعم إلى غير مستحقيه.

هذه األمور مجتمعة تقول أن اإلضرابات أو االحتجاجات الفئوية التي أقدرها وأحترمها وأحترم احتياجات ورغبات أصحابها يجب أن ال تعطل اإلنتاج .. ال يمكن أبدا أن نسمح بأن يكون االحتجاج الفئوي قاطع للطريق .. ال يمكن .. هذا أمر صعب جدا وخطير جدا .. أو معطال لحركة اإلنتاج أو مغلقا لحركة التجارة أو مؤثرا على الصورة الكلية لوطننا جميعا .. لكن أن تصل األصوات إلى المسئول إل َّى عبر النقابات أو مجموعات عمل هذا ما نفعله عبر الحوار البّناء فيما بيننا .. ما نستطيع أن نفعله وما الذي يجب أن نصبر عليه .. نصبر عليه ال ليأخذ أحد كائنا من كان حقنا .. ال .. نحن وضعنا يدنا كما قلت على النزيف ولكن نحتاج أن نصبر مع بعضنا البعض .. هذا أفضل بكثير من أن نمد أيدينا لغيرنا.

الموعد أنا أزعم إن شاء اهلل .. أقول بمعرفة ودراية أن هذه المطالب ستلبى في الموازنة القادمة بنسبة عالية جدا في السنة المالية عامي 1111-1112 وان شاء اهلل خالل سنتين من اآلن الناس سيشعرون بالحركة اللي إحنا عملنها باالستثمارات .. بالمشروعات الجديدة .. بمعدالت التشغيل .. وبعودة السياحة وزيادة عدد السائحين خدماتهم. بهذا كله .. وزيادة منسوب النيل في الفيضان العام الجاري وزيادة نسبة المحصوالت ) القمح زاد مليون ونصف مليون طن ( هذا العام من نفس المساحة المزروعة والفواكه زادت والمانجو إنتاجها زاد وسعرها أقل في السوق .. األرز زاد إلى 1 مليون طن .. عشان كده زودنا سعر الطن بالنسبة للفالح علشان يعود عليه من اإلنتاج ما يستحقه هو .. هذا كله نعمل إليه.

المذيع

وماذا بالنسبة للحد األدنى لألجور؟

الرئيس

الحد األدنى لألجور .. هذا حق ويجب تطبيقه ونحن اآلن نسعى لتطبيقه .. وصلنا اآلن إلى ما يقرب من 111 جنيه والمستهدف كان 1111 جنيه .. إن شاء اهلل نصل إليه أيضا في الموازنة الجديدة .. نصل إلى هذا الحد مع تطبيق أيضا الحد األقصى .. كان هناك مشروع قانون لم يكتمل في مجلس الشعب وهو 20 ضعف في كل مؤسسة بحد أقصى في الدولة كلها .. ومش المرتب .. أنا أقول الدخل .. أال يزيد عن 01 ألف جنيه في حالة خاصة هذا يعني يعمل توازن أنا ما أسعى إليه اآلن .. بنحصر ونشوف الدخول شكلها إيه .. لكن استهالك

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الطاقة يرشد أيضا .. يصل الدعم إلى مستحقيه .. كل هذه أمور اآلن على األرض ليس فقط جاري دراستها واعداد الخطط لها على األرض بل وتطبيق بعضها إن شاء اهلل نسبيا.

المذيع

سيادة ما رأيسيادتكم فى أن هناك بعض القيادات تنتظر اإلقالة بين حين وآخر يتخوفون وربما ال يعملون، وسيادتكم تعلمون أن الشباب يحتاجون إلى ممارسة دورهم الذى افتقدوه منذ سنوات؟

الرئيس

الشباب له كل الحق في أن يمارس دورا متميزافي مجاالت العمل المختلفة بل في قيادة العمل في محاور عمل ومؤسسات إنتاج كثيرة .. ولكن هذا ال يعني أن أصحاب الخبرة أيضا نحن ال نحتاج إليهم فنحن في احتياج إلى روح الشباب ودمائه وتطويره وتطوره واليات العصر والى خبرة الرجال أيضا والمسئولين الموجودين اللذين ينتظرون اإلقالة .. وهذا الكالم الذي يحدث أحيانا بعض السلبيات .. نحن ال نغير من اجل مجرد التغيير .. ولكن نحن نغير كل من نرى أن هناك من هو أفضل منه أو انه حوله دوائر فساد أو انه ال يشارك في منظومة التنمية ويساهم بجد في التعاون مع الخطة الجديدة للحكومة ) الحركة العامة الموجودة في المجتمع ( .. وهذا مستمر ولعل الجميع يرى .. أنا أتحرك حركة متدرجة وليست بطيئة وليست متعجلة إلحداث تغييرات حقيقية في هيكل العمل بصفة عامة وخصوصا في األجهزة الحساسة والرقابية في المجتم.

المذيع

أود إلقاء الضوء من سيادتكم على قرارات 11،11 أغسطس الماضي والتي تعد من أهم القرارات السياسية التي اتخذت في مصر، ما رأيكم فى تلك القرارات؟

الرئيس

القرارات في 11 و11 أغسطس في الحقيقة كانت الزمة وواجبة وأنا ما خوله إلي الشعب المصري في انتخابات حرة ونزيهة وديمقراطية بانتخاب رئيس مدني يحقق مفهوم االستقرار والدولة المدنية وتحمل المسئولية كاملة .. اتخذت هذه القرارات وبعدها قرارات اتخذت قرارات أخرى أيضا .. ولم تكن أبدا هذه القرارات المقصود منها تهميش دور مؤسسة أو العدوان بأي شكل من األشكال على أشخاص وانما هو تحقيق المصلحة التي يقدرها الجميع.

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أنا أحقق رغبة ومصلحة الشعب المصري .. انأ أحافظ على مؤسسات الدولة المصرية .. هذه مسئوليتي .. أنا أغِّير في بعض القيادات من أجل مشاركة الروح الجديدة والشباب وأيضا احت ارم وتقدير للقيادات التي لم تفسد قبل ذلك .. والذي فسد القانون موجود والقضاء.

أنا انظر إلى اإلمام وأتصور أن الشعب المصري التف حول هذه القرارات .. وانظر إلى الواقع .. فأرى أنه أحب هذه القرارات .. هذا معناه إجازة لهذه القرارات وشرعية حقيقية لها.

اآلن مصر حقيقة تخطو خطوات نحو تحمل المسئولية بإرادة الشعب المصري لدولة مدنية بمفهوم الدولة المدنية الحقيقية التي فُسرت في وثيقة األزهر كما قلت أنها الدولة الوطنية .. الدولة الديمقراطية .. الدستورية الحديثة المستقرة في هذا المفهوم ..القوات المسلحة المصرية قامت بدور عظيم في الحفاظ على الثورة .. القوات المسلحة المصرية أدارت المرحلة االنتقالية وتحملت الكثير في إدارتها وحمت هذه المسيرة .. القوات المسلحة المصرية اآلن مؤسسة يحترمها الشعب المصري .. رئيس مصر القائد األعلى للقوات المسلحة حريص على مصلحة هذه المؤسسة .. يرعاها كما يرعى باقي مؤسسات الوطن .. هي تقوم بدورها العظيم في حماية أمن الوطن وحدوده .. هي أيضا مشاركة حقيقية وداعمة أساسية في حماية آمنه الداخلي كلما لزم األمر.

هذا األمر وهذه األجواء من الحب والتكامل بين الشعب المصري الذي اعتبر أن القوات المسلحة جزء أصيل منه وبين القوات المسلحة واحساسها بأنها تقدم دور عظيم لهذا الشعب .. هذه المنظومة المتكاملة التي أرعاها .. هذه الق ار ارت كانت وما ازلت وغيرها من الق ار ارت في المستقبل من تحقيق المصلحة واالستق ارر واعالء قيمة اإل اردة الشعبية، االنتقال الحقيقي بالشعب المصري كله إلى تمام الحرية والعدالة االجتماعية والديمقراطية ووضع الدستور المستقر الذي سوف يستفتي عليه الشعب.

هذه قرارات اتخذتها بإحساس .. بإرادة هذا الشعب تعبيراعن هذه اإلرادة لتحقيق المصلحة ولم تكن أبدا - أبدا ضد أفرادعلى اإلطالق بقدر ما كانت محققة للمصلحة العامة وهكذا نرى آثارها في المجتمع وحتى في العالم أيضا.

المذيع

سيادة الرئيس قمت بضم السلطة التشريعية إليكم وقلتم أن استخدامها سيكون فى أضيق الحدود؟

الرئيس

إن هذه المرحلة قصيرة وستنتهى بانتخاب مجلس شعب جديد .. إذا كان هذا هو الحال بعد وضع الدستور إن شاء اهلل .. أردت بذلك أن أحافظ على التشريع ال أن أستخدم التشريع .. أنا لن أستخدم التشريع فى هذه المرحلة على اإلطالق إال فى إطار ضيق جدا وبعد أن يستشار فيه ذوو الشأن فى أى تشريع يصدر .. حتى اآلن منذ 11 أغسطس واليوم سبتمبر حوالى 01 يوما لم يصدر فيهم قانون أو قرار إال حاجتين فقط .. األولى هى أن سنة

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ثانية ثانوى والطالب الذين سوف يعيدون السنة فى ثانية ثانوى لهم الحق فهم مخيرون .. هل يختارون نظام الثانوية العامة الجديد أم القديم .. والثانية كانت فى التأمين الصحى على أبنائنا األطفال .. حوالى 1 ماليين طفل قبل التعليم االبتدائى يشملهم التأمين الصحى عندما يدخلون المدرسة.

فأصدرت طبقا لما عرضته الحكومة ووزارة الصحة تشريعا بأن يشمل التأمين الصحى هؤالء .. هاتان الحاجتان اللتان صدراحتى اآلن .. وأنا حريص وأحافظ على التشريع وأريد أن يكون التشريع من السلطة التشريعية فى حينه .. لكن ما يلزم لتسيير المرحلة هو الذى أفعله بعد تمحيص شديد جدا لتحقيق المصلحة.

المذيع

ما رؤية سيادتكم لعالقات مصر الخارجية فى ظل األمن القومى المصرى بطبيعة الحال فى الجمهورية الثانية؟

الرئيس

إن العالقات الخارجية المصرية اآلن تقوم على التوازن فى العالقة التوازن فى تحقيق المصلحة االحترام المتبادل الحركة نحو العالم كله شرقا وغربا شماال وجنوبا نفتح أبوابا ولكننا ال نقفل أبواب أخرى وال نفتح أبوابا على حساب أبواب .. مصر قادرة على إدارة شأنها واتخاذ قرارها والتوازن مع كل دول العالم.

بدأت بأفريقيا للعمق الحضارى والعمق التاريخى وعمق المصلحة الحقيقية مع أفريقيا ودول حوض النيل وتوجهت إلى العروبة والعرب بزيارة المملكة العربية السعودية والمؤتمر الذى عقد فى مكة فى رمضان الماضى ألن هذا هو المكان الطبيعى بالنسبة لمصر تاريخيا ومستقبال ثم اتجهت شرقا إلى الصين ثم ذهبت إلى المؤتمر الذى عقد فى طهران ثم ذهبت إلى أوروبا وسوف أزور األمم المتحدة فى القريب ثم زيارات أخرى كثيرة أفتح أبواب وأتواصل مع دول العالم ومع الحكومات والرؤساء والمستثمرين ورجال األعمال والشركات من أجل وطنى مصر أنا أريد تطوير منظومة اإلنتاج واالستثمار والعمل فى مصر ليعود بالمصلحة على الجميع ألن بناء هذا الوطن يحتاج إلى حركة خارجية تحقق بالضرورة المصلحة الداخلية.

إذا لم تصب الحركة الخارجية والعالقات الخارجية فى مصلحة الوطن والشعب فما قيمتها إذن وال نستطيع أن نعيش بعيدا عن هذا العالم .. البد من التوازن ونحن ندرك بوعى ونعرف ماذا نفعل وفى أى اتجاه نتحرك وأين نضع أقدامنا وكيف نحقق مصلحتنا وال يتدخل أحد فى شئونا الو نتدخل نحن فى شئون أحد فاالحترام المتبادل الكامل مع كل دول العالم هو ما أسعى إليه بكل قوة فى هذه المرحلة.

المذيع

سيادتكم تعلمون اإلهمال الذى عانه ملف دول حوض النيل منذ سنوات طويلة، لذلك نود التعرف على نتائج زيارتكم ألثيوبيا؟

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الرئيس

قابلت فى هذه الزيارة يوم المؤتمر حوالى 12 رئيس دولة من أفريقيا وبعدها ذهب وفد رفيع المستوى من رئيس الوزراء الذى كان وزيرا للموارد المائية قبل ذلك إلى أثيوبيا لتقديم العزاء فى رئيس وزراء أثيوبيا هذا تقدير وواجب علينا واليوم وأمس رئيس الوزراء فى السودان لتوقيع اتفاقيات لمعابر واتفاقيات تجارية إنتاجية زراعية وصناعية أخرى مع السودان وسوف أزور دوال افريقية أخرى وعندى زيارة ألوغندا قريبا لمشاركتهم فى احتفالهم بعيدهم القومى لكى أتواصل معهم، هؤالء جميعا يستشعرون أن قيمة مصر كبيرة جدا ولمست منهم سعادة كبيرة جدا فى هذا التعامل ومصر تحتضن أفريقيا وتتواصل معها وأفريقيا تحب مصر وتحرص عليها ودول حوض النيل جزء من أفريقيا وأفريقيا كلها فى القلب من عالقتنا الخارجية.

المذيع

سيادة الرئيس كيف تقيمون عالقة مصر بإيران فى ضوء التوترات بين إيران ومعظم دول العالم؟

الرئيس

لقد ذهبت إلى إيران لحضور مؤتمر ل دوعدم االنحياز وأنا أدرك تماما أن المنطقة العربية واإلسالمية والشرق األوسط بها مشاكل كثيرة وعلى أرس هذه المشاكل مشكلة سوريا، واي ارن العب أساسى على الساحة فى المنطقة وبالنسبة لمشكلة سوريا أيضا ويمكن أن يكون لها دور إيجابى فاعل فى حل هذه المشكلة، وأنا أدرك أيضا أن دول وشعوب هذه المنطقة فى حاجة إلى االستق ارر والى استشعار األمن، ومصر دولة كبيرة وبفضل اهلل قيمتها وشعبها وتاريخها ومستقبلها الواعد للتنمية له قيمته.

وبالتالى أنا أردت بهذه الزيارة أن تؤسس لمفهوم كيف يمكن لدول هذه المنطقة أن تساهم مساهمة إيجابية فى حل مشكالت المنطقة ، فدعوت بالمبادرة التى تعرف اآلن بالرباعية مصر والسعودية واي ارن وتركيا.

مصر دولة فاعلة، ليست طرفا فى المشكلة، ولكن هناك عالقة متميزة وخاصة جدا بين الشعب المصرى والشعب السوري.. نحن المصريون لم ننس الجمهورية العربية المتحدة والشعب السورى والشعب المصرى ومعاناة الشعب السورى اآلن تؤرقنا جميعا وتؤرق كل شعوب المنطقة وأنا أردت أن تكون إيران الدولة والشعب جزءا من حل هذه المشكلة ، وأيضا أن تقوم تركيا ألن لها دورا ولها عالقة بالمشكلة على األقل عالقة حدودية، والسعودية باعتبارها رائدة بمنطقة الجزيرة العربية والخليج العربى ودولة كبيرة وبالنسبة لنا مهمة جدا وفيها قيادات عاقلة ورشيدة.

وبالتالى أردت لهذه الدول األربع أن تكون نواة وليس معنى ذلك هى وحدها وانما يمكن أن تكون معها من دول المنطقة دول كثيرة من دول الخليج وغيرها من الدول العربية والدول المحيطة وحتى غير العربية أيضا، المسلمة وغير المسلمة ، وهذه نواة لحل المشكلة ، وأردت أن تكون إيران جزءا فاعال فيها ألنه ال يمكن حل المشكلة بغض الطرف عن وجود إيرانمن عدمه ألنها موجودة ودولة كبيرة ومستقرة وبها شغل كثير ولها عالقة بالمشكلة فهم

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جيران للسوريين فى التاريخ وفى الواقع وبالتالى أنا ال أرى على اإلطالق أن وجود إيران فى هذه الرباعية هو مشكلة ولكنه جزء من حل المشكلة.

لقد اجتمعت الرباعية اجتماعين.. واحد على مستوى مساعدى وزراء الخارجية، واجتماع آخر على مستوى وزراء الخارجية وربما مستقبال يحدث اجتماع على مستوى أعلى فى األمم المتحدة ،وسوف نلتقى رؤساء دول، ورؤساء وزراء لهذه الدول األربع فى الجمعية العامة لألمم المتحدة فى نهاية هذا الشهر لبحث المشكلة أيضا على مستوى أعلى ونحن نتواصل فى ذلك مع الدول العربية فى المنطقة، ومع الدول الكبرى الموجودة فى مجلس األمن واألعضاء سواء كانت الواليات المتحدة فرنسا بريطانيا الصين روسيا وأيضا عندما كنت فى أوروبا مع ايطاليا واالتحاد األوروبى.. وشمال أفريقيا مع السودان أننا نتحرك حركة واسعة من أجل نجاح هذه الرباعية واألخضر اإلبراهيمى تواصل أيضا مع وزراء الخارجية بصفته مبعوثا لألمم المتحدة وهو رجل يعرف حقيقة المشكلة وطبيعة المنطقة والسكان والترتيب الشعبى وأيضا األستاذ "نبيل العربي" أمين عام الجامعة العربية حضر أيضا وتواصل مع هذه الرباعية مع وزراء الخارجية ، هؤالء الجميع يتواصلون اآلن وسط حالة من الرغبة األكيدة بين الدول والحكومات المعبرة عن شعوبها لحل مشكلة سوريا.

المذيع

هل تتوقعون وقف قريب لنزيف الدم فى سوريا؟

الرئيس

المسألة ليست مسألة توقع، لكننا نسعى لذلك، وسوف نستمر فى سعينا وحركتنا الفعالة، لوقف هذا النزيف، ليس هناك مجال آخر للحديث عنه، البد من وقف النزيف هذا، وال بد من أن يدرك النظام السورى، أن استمرار إراقة الدماء هو بذلك يخالف كل القوانين واألعراف والثقافة والتاريخ واإلنسانية بالنسبة لما يقوم به فى سوريا، والبد من وقف هذا النزيف، ومن أجل ذلك حركتنا اآلن.

المذيع

بعد والية سيادتكم، ما الذى فعلته مصر لوضع حلول قاطعة للقضية الفلسطينية؟

الرئيس

القضية الفلسطينية كانت دائما ومازالت وستبقى فى قلب وعقل كل مصرى، فالمصريون الشعب دائما كان ومازال وسيبقى داعما إلخوانهم الفلسطينيين والقضية الفلسطينية ، وال يمكن أن يتحقق سالم فى منطقة الشرق األوسط بغير إعطاء الفلسطينيين حقوقهم الكاملة، وهذا ما نصت عليه اتفاقية السالم أصال، فالبد من أن يحصل

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الفلسطينيون على كل حقوقهم، وأن يقيموا دولتهم بإرادتهم الحرة، طبقا لقرارهم هم، ونحن ال نتخذ لهم قرارا نحن ندعمهم فيما يتخذون من قرارات.

أقول بكل وضوح، وأخبرت هؤالء اإلخوة الكرام الفلسطينيين على اختالف الفصائل، إن اتفاقهم وهم يسعون إليه، ونحن اآلن نحتضن هذه الحركة من أجل االتفاق النهائى بينهم، وهذا االتفاق يساعد مصر فى أن تقوم بواجبها أكثر وأكثر نحو تحقيق مصلحة الشعب الفلسطينى كله، وان شاء اهلل يتفقون.. لكننا نبقى دائما حاضنين كمصريين لحقوق الشعب الفلسطينى، وامدادهم الحتياجاتهم الغذائية بالدواء والتواصل معهم، وتسهيل الحركة العملية التعليمية للطالب، وتسهيل الذهاب والعودة لألقارب، فمصر دائما تفتح أحضانها ألشقائها العرب المسلمين، وللفلسطينيين الجيران واألهل. فهذه قضية ال يمكن أبدا أن تغيب عن أنظارنا، وال يمكن أبدا أن نقصر فيها، ما أقوله اآلن، إنما هو رأى الشعب المصرى كله نحو فلسطين والفلسطينيين.

المذيع

سيادة الرئيس لماذا رفضتم تعليق صوره فى قصر الرئاسة أو المؤسسة؟

الرئيس

أنا أريد أن أؤسس لمفهوم دولة المؤسسات ال دولة الفرد، وال إلشاعة ثقافة الفرد القادر على أن يفعل كل شىء الملهم بكل شىء صاحب اليد العليا على كل إنسان.

هذه مفاهيم ذهب عصرها وبالتالى هذه المسألة خطوة وليست خطوة كبيرة جدا، ولكن أردت بها وكل الخطوات التى اتخذتها أن يعتاد الشعب المصرى على أنه ال يوجد للفرد هيمنة أبدا عليه إنما هو صاحب اإلرادة وهو الذى يختار الفرد وهو الذى يقرر ماذا يريد؟، وال مجال أبدا مرة أخرى لديكتاتورية الفرد.

المذيع

لمست بنفسى والزمالء الذين يعملون فى مؤسسة الرئاسة أنك تصل النهار بالليل متى تستريح؟

الرئيس

وأعبد ربك حتى يأتيك اليقين"، أنا أحرص جدا قدر المستطاع، أرجو أن أكون عند ظن ربى بى، وعند ظن الشعب المصرى الذى اختارنى، فأقوم على أداء الواجب قدر المستطاع، وأتمنى بروح ومحبة وا اردة وقوة الشعب المصرى، أن نحقق منظومة التنمية، لتكون مصر فى مصاف الدول العظيمة المستقرة المنتجة الصانعة، أنا أتحدث عن صناعة الطائرات والسفن والسكك الحديدية والصناعات الثقيلة والزراعة، أنا أتحدث عن االقتصاد المعرفى وليس الريعى فقط، وأنا أحلم حلما كبيرا لمصر.

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المذيع

كلمة سيادتكم توجهها للشعب المصرى وتطلبها منهم؟

الرئيس

أحب كل المصريين وأريد منهم أن يزيدوا من حبهم بعضهم لبعض وأريد لهم االستقرار واألمن والرفاهية، وأريدهم بوعى كامل أن نصبر بعض الشئ فى هذه المرحلة حتى نكون قادرين على أن نمتلك إرادتنا وننتج غذائنا، ودوائنا وسالحنا، سالحنا لن نعتدى به على أحد ولكن يجب أن نتملك هذه األربعة، اإلرادة والغذاء والدواء والسالح، حين إذن تكون مصر الدولة والشعب، الحكومة والمجتمع فى مصاف الدول الكبرى العظيمة ، والعظيمة بتاريخها وأبنائها، لكن ما نتمناه ألنفسنا يتحقق بإذن اهلل.

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3.2. Interview with TIME Magazine on 28 November 201251

TIME: You’re on the world stage now.

President Mohamed Morsi: (In English) The world stage is very difficult. It’s not easy to be on the world stage. The world is now much more difficult than it was during your revolution. It’s even more difficult. The world. More complicated, complex, difficult. It’s a spaghetti-like structure. It’s mixed up. So we need to somehow take things, easily, so we can go together, the whole world — peacefully, peacefully, hopefully, all kinds of peace. I think you know that in general people like to say that we should keep peace by all means. I’m not talking about peace by its traditional meaning. Peace of mind, peace of heart, peace of living together, socially, culturally, not only militarily.

(Switching to Arabic) Thank you for your interest… a good bridge between Egypt and the U.S.

(In English) By the U.S., I mean the American people more than the authorities, politicians, etc. But the American people as I know are quite friendly, they are civilized, they have struggled, and they have given a lot of their country, to the world. It’s a different climate as we see from here but I think the media now have made things very close… [i.e., made the world a smaller place] and people are a small village, getting together.

Winds are blowing here and there and people are busy with their lifestyles but I think they are looking to see a better situation in the world during President Obama’s second [term], which is more relaxed. I want to make use of this myself, to have a very strong bridge between us, between the Middle East, Middle Eastern people, and east and west, and certain balance. So people can live feeling really that they are living peacefully, that they are settled and well established in their countries. That they are really doing the best at gaining what they expect, to live in peace, to feel democracy, freedom.

51 Retrieved 3 August 2013, from http://world.time.com/2012/11/28/transcript-times-interview-with-egyptian-president- mohamed-morsi/print/

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People here haven’t experienced any sort of that for more than 30 years — more. Decades living under very suppressive regime, very dictatorial… quite [distant] from the suffering. People felt they were not included in the equation of politics. You know, I’ve been suffering myself. I have seen East and West, here and there, studying history and seeing what’s going on, besides engineering of course. [Note: Morsi has a 1982 Ph.D. in engineering from the University of Southern California.] I have learned a lot from being here and there, especially in the United States, living with the people in the states, and the university, and industry, and the markets and the shops.

Of course the media then wasn’t as strong as it is now, but I [would wake up] to Good Morning

America every day, Barbara Walters and her great programs. And of course,Walter Cronkite… And I haven’t forgot … the captives in Iran [during the Carter presidency]…. [And the day he left office] they released the captives, who had been held for more than a year. That was a big struggle and debate going on.

Things have been going on in a certain way between East and West, and also the South. The people in the South have also been suffering a lot from being put out of the international equation. Now we want to bring the people into international affairs, so they feel that they are living in their countries, they are free, they say, they move, they produce, they work, they gain, they lose, whatever. This is very important. This is a new period, I think, not only for Egypt or the people of the Arab Spring, but I think for the whole world. To reconsider what has been done wrong in the past and see how can we make it correct, as much as we can. It takes time. So speed is low, acceleration is high. Somehow we’re pushing in all directions, trying to say to the people of the world, and convince the governments and the leaders that we should live at peace.

Conflict does not lead to stability in the world. Cooperation, how can we do that? It’s a struggle. It’s a very, very difficult struggle. To have a new culture, international culture, respecting individual countries and people’s cultures, their local ones, but can we have an international culture? Can we do that? A culture of cooperation, a culture of stopping war, bloodshed. Culture of real peaceful means of trade, militant actions to defend, not to attack, of using power in civilian applications, more than in militant applications. How can we do that? I think we can. It has been done earlier really, two or three centuries, back. But things have been done in certain way. Two world wars, more than 50 million killed…

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I don’t like people in my country to say, “The United States is against us,” because I know the American people are different from these positions that have been taken for a long time — double standards — and you know what’s going on in the world. But now I think I’m starting a new era, based on balanced, mutual benefits relationship which should be respected from all sides. Africa. The Arab world. The Islamic world. European Union, Russia and China. There is a very, very big strong difficult competition.

That’s why I say It’s not as easy as it was. I still remember, there was a saying in the United States, when the people say we are a nation of all nations. This is an expressive expression. It tells something [in a] very short, concentrated [way]. It says: we can live together. I think the States has been successful at this to a great extent. But internationally there are other things. The evaluation says different things.

So how can we do this? Economics now are not balanced in the world. Raw materials are one part, technology and products — very advanced scientific applications — are in the other side. Taking the raw materials, producing it, selling it back, there is a very big difference in price, keep the poor poorer, make the rich richer. We want to make some sort of balance in economics, not only in politics. They are related of course. And I think socially, we cannot be identical, never. Culturally, we cannot be identical.

We can cooperate, we can integrate. As much as we can. How can we do that? I think leaders in the world have a great responsibility in this. Human beings can live together.

I remember a movie. Which one? Planet of the Apes. The old version, not the new one. There is new one. Which is different. Not so good. It’s not expressing the reality as it was the first one. But at the end, I still remember, this is the conclusion: When the big monkey, he was head of the supreme court I think — in the movie! — and there was a big scientist working for him, cleaning things, has been chained there. And it was the planet of the apes after the destructive act of a big war, and atomic bombs and whatever in the movie. And the scientists was asking him to do something, this was 30 years ago: “Don’t forget you are a monkey.” He tells him, “Don’t ask me about this dirty work.” What did the big ape, the monkey say? He said, “You’re human, you did it [to] yourself.” That’s the conclusion. Can we do something better for ourselves?

I saw it 30 years ago. That is the role of the art. This is the very important role of art. Gone with the Wind has been treating social problems. Five in Hell. That was the Arabic title. Five

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Americans working behind German lines and they were using primitive military devices. I think it was Charles Bronson or something like that. My hard disk still carries a few things!

What was it like to deal with president Obama during the Gaza cease-fire?

President Obama has been very helpful, very helpful. And I can say really that his deeds coincide with his intentions. We’ve been talking together about the cease-fire, that’s very important, then we can talk about differences between Palestinians and Israelis. It’s not easy. It’s very difficult. Both sides are talking about differences. We want them to talk about similarities…. We are now doing this job as much as we can.

If we can succeed with 60-70% I consider this a big success. If we go forward, this area of the world will be better as far as peace is concerned. The stability of this area, Egypt and surroundings, is very important. That’s why we have a big challenge in Egypt. We have forces that try to drag back. This is no doubt. And also you can see that in Tunisia. You can see that in Libya. You can see that seriously in Syria, dragging situations back to whatever it was is a [goal]. We’re fighting [for this goal], not the people. And this area should have its opportunity to develop. The price of development is much, much cheaper than war. People are looking strongly to see better situations, better lives for their children, grandchildren, for their area.

It takes time. It’s a bottleneck. A bottleneck takes years. In the States it has taken years and blood, for a long time, not a short time. And Abraham Lincoln was considered a milestone, telling the people how to get together after the war, how can we see our country in a better situation. [He’d] been given a chance, and I think he succeeded to a great extent. But suffering has created after it stability. Or insisting on stability when the suffering is more than after the birth, people will realize that they should stick with what they have achieved.

So when the world is looking to itself to see what’s going on, I think they’re now realizing, people in the world are realizing that freedom is better than dictatorship. Democracy is better for the whole world. if there is a spot where you have dictatorship, where people are not free, people are not satisfied, they do not find food and shelter, they are under the poverty level, this is a dangerous spot for the whole world, because those people will move, and they will move to different places. They will be carrying bad feelings towards others. They may behave badly. They may behave wrongly. So how can we assure development for

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Africa, for the Middle East, for countries in this area? Egyptians are ready. We have resources. We have potential. We have very unique distinguished [population], so to speak. We are ready. We are in the road. We are trying to push and go. It’s not easy. The momentum that is needed for this pushing should be very high.

Our ship has been somehow put on the sand, not on the water, so we have to drag it forward, not backward, to real clean water. It’s not easy. To keep good relationship with the world, to help development, to make integration between development and international affairs and investment and economics, to spread over the good intentions and acts, also. To have mutual and balanced relationships with others. To take hatred from the hearts that has been built up. People have been seeing all the time: bloodshed in Palestine and different places, Iraq and Afghanistan, now in Yemen, Libya. They feel bad. [Trials that divide] North and South, East and West, Darfur, whatever. [Instability] in the Gulf. Threatening Iran and its role in international politics and the world. The fight around the fields of oils. These all are things that are mixed up together, that needs stronger leadership, with a vision… who should take the lead and act.

It’s time [for] action. Principles are agreed upon. But application of the principles? No one can debate about the principles. Everyone talks about peace, everyone talks about development, everyone talks about independence of different countries. The United Nations was built in 1947. Before that was the League of Nations. But actually, on the ground, the action is weak. I think we are more than 190 states. Now the Palestinians are trying to have a foot on the ground. And we help them. That doesn’t mean they will be capable to [stage] attacks on others. I don’t think they have this capability. The maximum they have is to resist, is to say what [do] we have to lose?

Is the Muslim Brotherhood in fact a democratic organization?

By definition, yes. It’s a big yes, sure. This stems from belief, Islamic belief, freedom for everyone, freedom of belief, freedom of expressing their opinions, equality, stability, human rights. ERA. It’s not only in America. Equal Rights Amendment. Everyone. This is a belief, this is coming from our belief: democracy, equal chance. But also responsibility. Law, constitution.

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Egypt is an ancient country; it’s an ancient state also. The constitution in Egypt is quite old. 1923. [The] first one. And we move toward more stable positions. We cannot get stable unless we have freedom, democracy, rights for everyone, equal rights, equal rights for men and women, for Muslim, Christians, for whoever is carrying any opinion The common thing, the base line, the reference is, the nationality, the citizenship–Egyptian, that’s all. And the law is for everyone.

We have had big violations. So what the Muslim Brotherhood has all the time trying to have settled is an institutional, constitutional state, so if we have the opportunity, I think It’s for the benefit of the Egyptians, the benefit of everyone in Egypt, Christians and Muslims and the benefit to the Muslim Brotherhood and others is to have an institutional, constitutional state.

(Switching to Arabic) I’m very keen on having true freedom of expression. True freedom of faith. And free practice of religious faith. I am keen and I will always be keen on exchange [transfer] of power. I’m an elected president. My chief responsibility is to maintain the national ship to go through this transitional period. This is not easy. Egyptians are determined to [move] forward within the path of freedom and democracy, and this is what I see. Justice and social justice. Development with its comprehensive overall meaning. Human development. Industrial productive development. Scholarly research. Political development. International relations balanced with all different parties, East and West. We are keen in Egypt and I am personally keen right now on maintaining freedom, democracy, justice and social justice. The MB do not say anything different from that.

Last week’s decree created a lot of controversy. If you had it to do over again, would you handle it differently? Revise it?

(In English) Oh no, I don’t see the situation this way. What I can see now is the Egyptians are free. They are raising their voices when they are opposing the president, and when they are opposing what’s going on. And this is very important. It’s their right to express, and to raise their voices and express their feelings and attitudes. But It’s my responsibility, I see things more than they do. I think you have seen the most recent opinion surveys. I think more than 80, around 90% of the people in Egypt are — according to these opinion measures — they are with what I have done. It’s not against the people, It’s with the people, coincides with the benefits. There is some difference between what’s happening now in expressing

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the opinions of the people and what happened in January 2011 [during the uprising against President Hosni Mubarak]. There is now some violence that we haven’t seen before, which constitutes something bad going on.

This is my responsibility, but in general the expression is okay. But there is some violence. Also there is some relation shared between these violent acts and some symbols of the previous regime. I think you and I — I have more information — but you can feel that there is something like this in this matter.

I’m not worried. I’m concerned. And I’m sure Egyptians will pass through this. We’re learning. We’re learning how to be free. We haven’t seen this before. We’re learning how to debate. How to differ. How to be majority and minority. It’s not minority but majority and opposition. We don’t have a parliament now. That’s too bad. We don’t have a constitution now. That [situation is] urging us, pushing people, to finish this but in some sort of stable climate and situation so people can go and vote on the constitution. We want to finish it.

…I’m president of all of [the people], to see what’s going on on our borders, to see what’s going on in the south, to see what’s going on in the Mediterranean Sea, to see what’s going on in Sinai, to see what’s going on in Tahrir, to see what’s going on in different places. This is a big responsibility now. It’s a challenge. And It’s not threatening but It’s important. I have to look into it and see how can we can manage to pass through this bottleneck. It’s a long bottleneck, it has been for two years or more. It may take some time more. But I am sure we will be moving toward having a constitution. This is very important. If we had a constitution, then all of what I have said or done last week, will stop [he wipes his hands].

We will have a constitution, which represents the people well. Now we don’t have a parliament, so I am responsible [he raises a finger in the air] for issuing laws, which is a big responsibility, serious one. I don’t like to use it unless I do have to. If I don’t, if I am not obligated, then I don’t like to use it. We are moving, slowly, [with] difficultly, but also successfully. So when we see people expressing themselves, [in] large numbers, good. This is a positive sign. But violence is not. So whoever is trying and doesn’t observe the benefit of the majority of the people and trying to rock the boat, then it’s the responsibility of the president, of the government to see what’s going on. Rocking the boat is not to the benefit of anyone. To the contrary It’s against.

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We have a situation, a delicate one. We’re moving, we’re learning. We have freedom, a new climate, a new environment. People are free. They’re expressing. They’re moving. No one is stopping them but violence is not allowed, shouldn’t be allowed. It’s against the law. It’s against the benefit of the people. If we keep telling things peacefully this is good. This is one of the advantages of the Egyptian revolution. Blood in a minimum level, and It’s still like this.

We guard [the people]. We’re looking. We measure. We see. We allow the people to move. They are free. But the responsibility is to have them safe, to guard them. To give them the opportunity to express but without violence on the borders of Meydane Tahrir. [Tahrir Square] It started before even I issued the constitutional [decree]; it has started for more than eight days or something. It’s some sort of … misunderstanding from a few. But it’s okay. It will pass. It will go, and I think it will be registered as a good spot in our movement in history in the last two years. I think we had big things like this several times. And during the presidential election you see what was happening. It was a great big unusual conflict between old powers and the new acts of the revolution.

It’s a first experiment, it’s a first experience for us in our history. So what do you expect? Things to go very smooth? No. It has to be a rough, at least. Not violent, but rough. So, we have enough patience. Hopefully, quickly we’ll pass quickly to the constitution. It will be as I understand from the constitution committee, a month or something. I say two months. I give them some time to have a social and society debate around the articles, about 230 articles, they are differing around about 15 of them. It takes some time. They’re doing their best. I’m trying to make conversations with all political parties, as much as we can. The church, other blocs.

So Egypt is moving. We have a new Egypt now. A civil state, not theocratic, not militant. A real civil constitutional state, that is going. There is some resistance. There are difficulties, obstacles, many things we can see, but it’s moving. Egyptians will succeed,Inshallah.

This year, 2012, was a big year, a lot happened. Many hail you as a statesman, others warn you’re a new pharaoh.

New pharaoh? [Laughs from the gut.] Can I be? I’ve been suffering, I’ve been suffering, personally!

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(Switching to Arabic) Political work for me started a very long time ago. 1986. I was nominated for parliamentary elections in 1995 and these elections were false. Then I was nominated in the year 2000 for parliamentary elections, and I became a member of parliament 2000-2005. And I was also nominated for 2005 and again the elections were forged. I have been responsible for political work at the Muslim Brotherhood for ten years. I come from within Egyptian society. I know the entire society, the people and what they suffer from. I originally come from [Sharkia] governate, east Cairo, but I’m a graduate from Cairo University. And I received my Ph.D. from the US.

I went to prison, [he touches his tie] and I was the chair of the materials department at university when I went to prison. The reason why I went to prison is that I was defending the judiciary and Egyptian judges. I know perfectly what it means to have separation between the three powers, executive power, legislative power and the judiciary. This is the main concept about a state based on institutions. The people are the original source of power. The president represents the executive power, and the president is elected by the people. And I’m keen that the people would have complete freedom of elections, and I’m keen on exchange [transfer] of power through free elections. I went all over the world, whether in the U.S., in Europe or the East, and I know how things are run. I know about technology, about research, scientific applications, culture, civilization, differences between nations of the world, the nature of history. And I’m a scholar of Islamic… (Switches back to English) I’m not a scholar, I’m talking about Islam. I know what Islam is, really. I know what Islam is, the meaning of comprehensive Islam, the meaning of peaceful acts and how Islam can be applied in the life of people. The misinterpretation of some of the Islamic figures also is not appropriate. I know what’s the real target and meaning and applications of Islam. I’ve been performing , practicing it for a long time, in my life, in society, in the parliament and now for how many months I’ve been in the presidential [palace]? It’s five months. Not 30 years [the length of Mubarak’s rule]. It’s five months.

It’s not two years, not 30 years, It’s five months. It’s five months after a big destruction, corruption, bad deeds. People have always been marginalized. I’ve been part of the revolution. And from the Muslim Brotherhood I was in charge of the action in Tahrir square, representing the Muslim Brotherhood during the revolution. Things are clear and I’m very happy to have you in this visit. Final question?

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I hope, when we have a constitution, what I have issued will stop immediately, and l have others sharing this with you, we’ll have a parliament, we’ll have elections. So It’s two months.

Is there enough of a buy-in from the society at large on the constitution?

They will vote on it. Now they are sharing their opinions in a committee, a legal committee, elected on. When they finish, then I will take it and put it in debate in society for two weeks or something, then people will vote. It’s their complete responsibility. I can say my opinion.

But what about the political environment around it? Don’t events of the last week indicate a society pulling part rather than coming together around it?

No, It’s not pulling apart. It’s not pulling apart. It’s a majority and opposition. I can see it very clear. But the opposition is not like it was before. They have the right, they do what they say. If you have 25% or 30% opposition, that’s a big number. We have [a population of] 90 million.

So expressing, as I said, peacefully expressing opposition is very healthy. It’s very important. But not violently. That’s what’s different. And violence is related to, as I said, the old regime, some way or another. They try to stop, to drag.

2012 is the best year for the Egyptians in their lives, in their history. We’ve had the first presidential real elections, in our history. It was not easy. It’s not easy now. We’re suffering, but always a new birth is not easy, especially if it’s the birth of a nation. And a big nation like this, an ancient one, a strong one, and it has very deep roots in history. We have scientist, we have politicians, we have opposition, we have farmers, we have scholars, we have children, It’s…it’s an infinite variety.

It’s not easy to lead it now, but It’s okay. We are capable of doing it. Inshallah we’ll do it successfully, peacefully. To us and to the whole region and to the whole world. We came with a mission of peace. We are not against individuals or countries or states, we wan to live in peace with others, but real peace, comprehensive peace.

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4. Speeches

4.1. Speech on the occasion of winning the presidential elections on 24 June 201252

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful and Compassionate. Grace be to Allah, prayers and peace be upon his messenger, Muhammad, Say: ‘In the bounty of Allah. And in His Mercy,- in that let them rejoice’: that is better than what they hoard.

Great people of Egypt..

You, who are rejoicing and celebrating the feast of democracy today..

You, who are standing on the squares, on Tahrir square, and on every square in Egypt.

My beloved ones, my family and kinfolks, my brethren and children..

You, who are looking forward to the future, who want the best and Renaissance, development and stability, safety and security for our homeland Egypt..

All my dearest,

I address you thanks to Allah, the Glorified and Exalted. We thank Allah together for our reaching of this historical moment which constitutes a new bright page, written by the hand of the Egyptians and their power of will, their blood, tears and sacrifices.

We all shape this moment with our sacrifices.

52 This translation is a revised version of the translations of both the SIS (Retrieved 15 June 2013, from http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Default.aspx) and Borzou Daragahi (Retrieved 30 July 2013, from https://www.facebook.com/notes/borzou-daragahi/egyptian-president-elect-mohamed-morsis-full-25-minute-speech- tonight/10150890249727286)

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I would not have stood among you today as the first president elected by the free will of the Egyptians during the first presidential elections since the 25 January Revolution, I would not have stood in this position with you in this moment with this tremendous joy which is pervading all groups of the beloved Egyptian homeland, I would not have been standing here today, but through the providence of Allah ,the Glorified and Exalted, and furthermore these sacrifices, this precious blood of our admirable martyrs and great wounded people.

Gratitude and salute to the martyrs and their souls, to their mothers and fathers and to my entire people, who have lost and sacrificed their loved ones for the sake of Egypt. Sincere salutations to these martyrs and the injured, who watered the tree of freedom with their blood, and paved the way for us to arrive at this moment, and I repeat with emphasis the appraisal and gratitude to the families of all those who taught their sons the meaning of true devotion to their country and of true martyrdom and endured the loss of their dear ones as the price for freedom. I renew the pledge to them that this precious blood will not go in vain.

Salutations to the great people of Egypt, and the army of Egypt, the best soldiers in the world, and to the Armed Forces, and all its sons, wherever they may be. Sincere salutations from my heart and love to them, which nobody but Allah, the Glorified and Exalted, knows. I love them and value their role and I am eager to reinforce them and to preserve them and this respectable organization which we all love and appreciate.

And for the noble policemen, my brothers and sons, of whom some wrongly conceive that I cherish some of them less than others, and this is incorrect. Those who commit a crime will be tried for it according to the law. As for the honourable policemen, the vast majority of my sons and brothers in the Egyptian police force, I have the right to give them obliged salutations, for they are to play an important role in preserving security and safety in the interior affairs of the homeland in the future.

Due salutations as well to all the Egyptian judges who supervised the Egyptian elections of the revolution and those who didn’t supervise them as well. Appreciation, respect and love are in order for the Egyptian judges. They constitute the third power which needs to remain high and independent and maintain its own force and separation from the executive power. It is my duty that in the future the judges truly operate independently from the executive and necessarily from the legislative powers.

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To all groups of the people of Egypt, to my family and kin, I say on this memorable day that today, thanks to your decision and your will, after Allah Almighty’s grace, I am president of all Egyptians, wherever they may be, whether they are in the homeland or not, in all governorates, cities and villages of Egypt, in its eastern, western, southern and northern outskirts or its centre. Our vast Egyptian soil and its honourable people, the dearly loved family and kin, the people of al-Nūbah, the people of Rafaḥ,ʽArīsh, Janūb Sīnāʼ, Marsá Maṭrūḥ, and of the West and the North and the Delta-provinces; Būr Saʽīd and the cities along the Canal: al-Ismāʽīlīyah and al-Suwīs, al-Sharqīyah and al-Daqahlīyah, Kafr al-Shaykh and al-Gharbīyah, al-Munūfīyah and al-Qalyubīyah, and al-Iskandarīyah, the oases, the Red Sea, Janūb Sīnāʼ, and Southern Upper Egypt, Binī Suwīf and al-Fayūm, al-Manyā, Asyūṭ, Sūhāj, Qinā, al-Aqṣur and Aswān and al-Nūbah a second time and the oases.

I address all of you on this remarkable day on which I became president of all Egyptians through Allah’s grace and your will. I will treat all Egyptians equally, no matter rank or status, I will not differentiate but on the basis of their added value to the country and their obedience to the constitution and law.

I cannot forget the men of the diplomatic corps and those who work there and in the General Intelligence Service, and the those who maintain the security of the homeland against its enemies wherever they may be. I don’t overlook any of them.

Oh great people of Egypt, this beloved Egypt which resides in all our hearts, the fatherland we all love, Egypt, which astounded the world with its revolution and the sacrifices of its youth, and dazzled the world with lines of its voters and the dedication of the children of the nation to stand in lines in front of the ballot boxes, be it on the occasion of the

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constitutional declaration of March 2011, or the People’s Assembly election late 2011, or later during the Shūrá Council election of early 2012, or the presidential elections which ended on the 17th of June 2012, the results of which we are currently celebrating and we respect.

Egypt, the fatherland and the people of Egypt, needs now to close its ranks and gather and join forces in order for this great, enduring people to reap the fruits of its sacrifices in a dignified life, social justice, freedom, and human dignity. These are the main slogans and, I say, the main goals which the throats of the revolutionaries chanted in all the squares of Egypt on 25 January 2011, and which these throats continue to express forcefully in all gathering places of the ongoing revolution. The revolution will continue until all its goals are accomplished. Together we will complete this march.

The people of Egypt have formerly endured a lot. They suffered from illness and hunger, injustice and oppression. The time has come in which this people regains its will and freedom, and attains a dignified life without hardships or obstinacy, and finds absolute justice that does not differentiate between big and small or between leader and subject, for everyone is equal before the law.

Oh beloved brothers, my family and kin, oh people of Egypt, who put trust in me, and have put responsibility on me, this heavy responsibility, I say to you all: by Allah’s grace and then by your will I have been put in charge over you, but I am no better than you. And I say to you that I will put all my effort in fulfilling the commitments and pledges I have taken upon me in front of all of you. Egypt is for all Egyptians, we all have equal rights ,and we all have equal duties towards this homeland. As for me, I don’t have any rights, on the contrary I only have duties. So stand by me, my people and kin, help me as long as I remain right and just in your eyes. Help me as long as I obey Allah in your eyes. If I do not and disobey him and do not adhere to what I have promised you, then you don’t owe me obedience.

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On this historic moment I call on you, oh great people of Egypt, my family and kin, to strengthen our national unity, to reinforce the bonds between us, and to strengthen our inclusive national unity. Hold fast, all of you together, to the rope of Allah, and don’t be divided among each other, Allah Almighty speaks the truth. We are all Egyptians, regardless of our different points of view, we are all nationalists, even if our parties and currents differ. We are all loyal to the revolution and the blood of the martyrs. There is no place for language of discord nor for accusing each other of treason ever. This national unity is the road now for us to depart with Egypt out of this difficult phase and move towards an all- encompassing project, which we will carry together, for the true Egyptian Renaissance and development and for the right investment of all our resources. Our resources are copious praise be to Allāh. But as you all know, they have been squandered, and their supervision has been exploited, we are today concerned with managing these resources in the best interest of all of us, God willing.

I call on you to get the all-encompassing Egyptian Renaissance project underway with the hands of all Egyptians. We, as Egyptians, Muslims and Christians alike, are promoters of civilization and construction. We have always been and will stay like this, God willing. Together we will face discord and conspiracies aimed at disparaging our national unity and our social cohesion. As we have created the great January revolution together.

I insist on astonishing the world together again with an Egyptian Renaissance –God willing- that achieves dignity, stability, prosperity, and a dignified life for every free and proud Egyptian on Egyptian soil. I am determined to build together with you a new Egypt, a national, constitutional, democratic and modern state. I will spend all my time working on this big project in accordance with our identity and our sovereignty.

I will work hard together with you to preserve Egypt’s national security on all its levels: Arab, African, regional, and international. We will respect international treaties, conventions – we come to the world with a message of peace – and we will execute the Egyptian commitments and agreements with the entire world. We will work towards a system of Egyptian values and its cultural identity with respect for human values, especially concerning freedoms and respect for the human rights and preservation of the rights of women, family and children, and the annulment of any form of discrimination.

We’ll establish - in shāʼ Allāh - balanced relations with all global powers, and between us and any country in the world, on the basis of shared interests and mutual respect, and equal

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benefits for the different partners, equal and equivalent benefits for all parties. We won’t allow ourselves to intervene in internal matters of any country, the same way we won’t allow any intervention in our matters. Because of this it is necessary to preserve national sovereignty and the national borders of the state of Egypt. Let everybody know that decisions of Egypt on its internal affairs, are taken by the will of its sons. Let everybody know that Egypt, with our call for peace with the entire world, is capable, by its family, its men, its people, by its armed forces and its glorious history, by all of this it is capable of defending itself and preventing any aggression or consideration of aggression against it or its children, wherever on earth they are.

Oh glorious Egyptian people.. my family and kin, I recognize the challenges of the current situation, but I am sure that ,with the support of Allah, then by our cooperation and your support, oh loved ones, we will be capable of quickly passing this phase together so that Egypt becomes strong and leading for its nation and ground-breaking in its world. This is the standing of Egypt and this is what awaits it in the future, God willing.

And I reconfirm – while we celebrate and rejoice together this great democracy with these elections, the victory of the nation’s will the way you are celebrating it now – what I declared before, namely that I won’t disobey Allāh in you, and I won’t betray him in my fatherland, and I put before my eyes the speech of Allāh, the Glorified and Exalted: “And fear the Day when ye shall be brought back to Allāh. Then shall every soul be paid what it earned, and none shall be dealt with unjustly”

Repeat with me, beloved ones, with our will, our unity, and our love for one another we are capable of building a dignified future for all of us. Some people might not see this from outside of this country, or consider it difficult for us, maybe out of compassion or something else, but, in shā’ Allāh, we are able to proceed on this march towards a brighter tomorrow.

My beloved ones, some see this faraway, and we see it nearby together, God willing, tomorrow is close at his glance. And Allah hath full power and control over His affairs; but most among mankind know it not.

Peace, and blessings and mercy of Allah be upon you.

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4.2. Victory speech on 29 June 2012 on Tahrir Square53

‘In the name of Allāh, the most Merciful, the most Compassionate. Praise be to Allāh; prayers and peace be upon the most honest messenger. Say, in the bounty of Allāh and in His mercy: therein let them rejoice. It is better than what they accumulate.’

O great Egyptian people, O beloved; O great people of Egypt, who stand in the square of revolution, the square of freedom, Tahrir Square. O you who are standing now in all squares of Egypt, in all villages, cities, and governorates of Egypt. O you who watch us now at home. O you who look at what is happening. O free world, O Arabs, O Muslims. O beloved Egyptian people, brothers and sisters, sons and daughters. O Muslims of Egypt; O Christians of Egypt. O decent citizens wherever you are, O Egyptians inside and outside Egypt. My people and beloved. Today, we are standing here to say to the whole world that this is Egypt and those are the Egyptians, those are the revolutionaries, who made this epic, this revolution. This is the square of martyrs. Here are their souls flying over us in Taḥrīr Square, the square of revolution, the square of martyrs, in all squares of martyrs in all governorates of Egypt. O all beloved, O great Egyptian people.

In the beginning, and before I say words from my heart to you; in the evening of last Sunday when the election results were announced, the Supreme Presidential Election Commission decided - thanks to God and to your will - to assign me the presidency of the Arab Republic of Egypt. This is a great honour; this is a great honour, and this is an assignment that I admire and will bear on my back.

On that day, I addressed the whole Egyptian people in the evening and mentioned the names of governorates in Egypt, and I mentioned many categories of all Egyptian people, but I unintentionally forgot to mention some governorates and some important categories which I appreciate and respect. I reiterate my greeting to all Egyptian people, and to those who I forgot in the governorates of Damietta, Al-Buhayrah, Cairo and Al-Jizah. Those are also my people and my beloved, like the rest of the governorates I mentioned.

53 Translation by Borzou Daragahi, retrieved 30 July, from https://www.facebook.com/notes/borzou-daragahi/full-english- language-text-of-egypt-presidents-mohamed-morsis-historic-june-29-2/10150901613042286

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I greet all categories of the Egyptian society, but I stress that - in addition to those I mentioned on Sunday - I respect, love and appreciate the people of art, creation, culture, and the media people who are sincere for Egypt; my beloved, children, brothers and sisters, the disabled. To all of them I reiterate my greetings.

I stand with you today, O my beloved, in the square of freedom. And tourism - I never forget workers in any sector; and now I greet the workers in the sector of tourism who are keen on the development of this nation in all fields.

Today, I stand in the square of freedom and revolution, with you in this square and other squares that you know in all Egyptian cities; this square specifically witnessed a new birth for Egypt. Egypt, the freedom and dignity. Egypt, the will and change. Egypt, the renaissance and the rights that will not be wasted.

I stand with you today to greet all of you, to greet all revolutionaries in all squares of Egypt. I love you all. I also greet our martyrs whose great sacrifices were witnessed by this place, which is proof that their blood watered the tree of freedom. When we mention the martyrs, we look back at history to learn that the tree of freedom was planted by decent men dozens of years ago at the beginning of the last century. Since the beginning of the last century, men have planted roots and seeds and watered them with their blood and honoured them with their sacrifices throughout the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and then decade after decade until we reached the time - after long oppression and a long night that lasted until 25 January 2011, when the martyrs of this revolution fell.

I also greet all the great wounded of the revolution and the families of the martyrs and the wounded, and all those who served the country, and made sacrifices for the sake of its development and progress.

O steadfast men of the revolution. When I say men of the revolution, I mean men and women, sons and daughters. I mean all of you. I am one of you, have always been, and I will remain that way.

As you know, during the revolution that took place here, we said that the revolution was led by its goals. This revolution is continuing, thanks to God, and has crystallized today in the form of a clear will, the will of all Egyptian people. It has crystallized in an elected president of the country, who leads the ship of the country. He truly leads this revolution, and stands

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before those revolutionaries and leads their march, bearing this responsibility before Allāh and before you so that this revolution will continue achieving all its goals.

O steadfast men of revolution; the great people, I came to you today and to all great Egyptian people, as I believe that you are the source of power and the ultimate legitimacy. You are the people and the source of power, and you are the legitimacy and the strongest part of it. Those who do not seek protection with you shall lose, and those who support your will shall succeed; and we want our nation to succeed.

I came to you today as I believe that you are the source of power and the legitimacy that is above all. No one, no institution, nobody can be above this will. The nation is the source of all powers, and it is the one that rules and decides; it is the one that can embrace or dismiss. That is why I came to the Egyptian people today. Everyone hears me now, all the people can hear me - the government, the army, the police, Egyptian men and women inside the country and abroad. No power is above this power. You are the people of power; you are the people of will; you are the source of this power; grant it to whoever you want and do not grant it to whoever you want; by Allāh's guidance of you; all Egyptian people.

This is why I came to the Egyptian people. I do not wear a bulletproof vest. I am reassured, thanks to Allah and thanks to you. I fear no one but Allah, and you come second in my thoughts.

This is why I came to the Egyptian people today after they granted me their confidence and assigned me this trust and responsibility. I came to renew my pledge to you, and remind you that you are the only ones that matter, to ask for your support after Allah's support. Are you ready to continue until the end of the road? Ready to obtain all our rights, all your rights?

Nobody will take away any of your rights as long as this is your will, after God's will. Here I am standing in front of you, here I am standing in front of you, here I am standing in front of you, O you great people of Egypt, who come before any other side, before any other measures. I say to you the great people of Egypt, you who are standing in all squares, you who are watching us in all houses, you who have elected me, you who have and are still opposing me, I belong to you all in one place and we are on the same voyage.

Not one of my rights will be taken away from me. No right will be taken away from those who said no, as no right will be taken away from those who said yes. This is democracy! The

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walk is over! We embark on development. Here I am standing in front of you the great people of Egypt, who come before anything else. O you the great people of Egypt, I says in a loud voice: You who are standing here and in all other Egyptian governorates, in all cities and villages, you are the source, you are the source and nobody can speak on your behalf.

And if the representative or the deputy are absent, I will be back to you, the source. I swear to God, I swear to God and I swear to you, I swear by Almighty God that I will honestly defend the republican system and I respect the constitution and the law and I will look after the people's interests fully and I will protect the country's independence and territorial integrity.

I swear before you, I swear to God and swear to you, the people of Egypt and the masses of Egypt, throughout the country, I swear to you that I will do that, and I swear in front you and before God, and the world is my witness that I will honour my pledge. I swear to you that I will work with you at any time to affirm our unity and glorify our forces. I reiterate my rejection of any attempt to hijack the people's authority or their MPs. I reiterate to you all that, as the president of the Egyptians, and after the legal measures that I respect because they would never be an obstacle, I will always overcome all obstacles, thanks to your willingness.

I reaffirm my rejection of any attempt, and here the word my rejection is not enough, because I am the decision-maker, through your endorsement, I am decision-maker through your will, I will go on and there is no room for hijacking the people's authority or their MPs.

I reaffirm to you that I will not neglect any of the president of the republic's prerogatives. I will not neglect and I will not give up and I have no right to do that. It is not my right to relinquish the prerogatives and tasks that you honoured me with, that you honoured me with and on the basis of which you chose me. This is a pact between you and me. This is the meaning of the modern state. And this will never mean that we will not respect the law or that we don't give much importance to the constitution, the judiciary and the institutions. There is contradiction between this and that.

I will work with you all the time to achieve all the goals of the revolution. I will not neglect any of its rights or the rights of its martyrs, as I already promised, I will not forget the blood of the martyrs and the injured and the demands of those who have been affected. Punishment is a debt on my neck. I will not neglect it.

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I will work with you all the time, as soon as I take the Presidency, to keep our national entity and be strongly attached to it. I will put the country's higher interests above all. I pledge to consolidate the principles of right and justice and freedom and social justice and the elimination of all forms of injustice, corruption and discrimination.

Injustice will be punished on the day of Resurrection. God does not dictate to the tyrant [what to do], so that when He judges him, he will not escape. We now see how God punishes the tyrants.

I will work with you for the recovery of the Egyptian economy and to put an end to the suffering of millions of Egyptians. I will work for a dignified life and genuine social justice in order to make the dignity of Egyptians the aim of all the state's networks and institutions.

I will be with you. I will be reachable for all. My doors are open. The doors are not locked. I will always welcome you and will be always in contact. Revolutionaries! Free men, we will complete the course!

We will complete the course. We will complete the course. We will complete the course in a civil, national, constitutional, modern state. I will not hinder development, we will not disturb traffic, we will not attack private or public property. We will protect each other. Each of us will embrace the other. Clashes or accusations of betrayal will never be tolerated. All the sons of Egypt, in all its institutions and sectors, in all its villages, in all its hamlets, in all its cities, east, west, north and south of the country, all of them are one hand.

I will be in contact with all of you. I will be in contact with all of you. I will not make any difference between supporters and opponents. I ask for advice from you and help from God and from all of the sons of Egypt.

God willing, I will work with you for the return of Egypt, a leader in its innovation, culture, media, education, research, science, industry, production, agriculture, in all forms of work, with perfection.

God loves it when one of you is doing some work with perfection. Together, we will work with perfection so that that we will be self-sufficient through development.

I will work with you all to be partners in this national work. We will expand the scope of confidence between us and honour concord and togetherness. I will work with you for a return of Egypt, a return of Egypt, free in its will, in its foreign relations. Together, we will

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get rid of any meaning of tutelage to any kind of power. Egypt is free on its land, free in its decisions and moves.

We have come with a message of peace. We are not aggressive against anyone, but we are capable, with you all, to respond to, rather to prevent any aggression against us from any quarter whatsoever.

We shall create together - O you loved ones, O you citizens, O you honourable people - a new concept for foreign relations with all the world powers. We extend our hands to everyone. I also warn anyone, whoever that may be, against trying to harm Egypt's dignity or pride, or even think of harming the dignity of its people, or the dignity of its president, irrespective of the person. However, I am talking about your will and with your will.

Together we stress the concept of our national security, our complete national security, in Africa, the Arab world, the Islamic world, and the rest of the world.

We shall not forfeit our rights and we shall not forfeit the right of any Egyptian abroad. God willing, our political system, which respects the people's will, is the main engine behind any stance we take in our foreign relations.

I shall always be the first supporter of the continuation of this revolution. I support it so that it goes on strong, effective and that it will be present everywhere, in every corner of the homeland and in every national action.

I want these voices, with this will, to continue so that they will always announce that we are free, that we are revolutionaries and will continue that course.

Let us all continue chanting the anthem of our homeland with love. Egypt's love is a duty, Egypt's love is a duty! Loving the homeland is an obligation for us. All of us will continue to chant the anthem of freedom and dignity and recall what the predecessors had said: The whole creation has started to watch how I build the foundations of power alone and the pyramid builders in bygone times had sufficed me at the time of challenge.

O you revolutionaries, O you great Egyptian people. I assure you and I would love to stay with you. I do not like to leave you. But, loved ones, it is the time and the responsibilities.

At the end of this short address, I assure you ... I see the family of Dr Umar Abd-al-Rahman and banners about the civilians imprisoned or detained by military courts from the start of

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the course of the revolution until now. I am responsible for the right of all these and my duty requires me to exert all effort, and I shall do that as from tomorrow so that these are freed, including Shaykh Umar Abd-al-Rahman.

I stress at the end of this speech that the slogans which all of us have repeated will be achieved in reality by us together. Our strength lies in our unity! Our strength lies in our unity! Our strength lies in our unity! Unite! Be brothers and love your homeland. The march of the nation advances under love and compassion.

May God be with you. May God be with us. May God be with you, and He will not leave your acts behind, for tomorrow is just a day away. God will have His say, but most people are not aware of this.

God willing, we shall move forward together. God willing, we shall move as revolutionaries and free, and continue to achieve the rest of the goals, respecting the will of the people, the law, the constitution and the rulings issued by the lofty Egyptian courts.

I thank you, I greet you, and may God's peace, mercy and blessing be upon you.

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4.3. Televised speech to the nation on 6 December 2012 in reaction to the street clashes54

In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

The great people of Egypt,

Ladies and gentlemen,

I am talking to you today with a heart full of pain and a soul full of grief for the lives that were lost and the blood that were shed without guilt in the incidents that took place in front of the presidential palace over the last two days.

I do feel the right of each and every citizen and my duty towards them, being a supporter or opposer, because, for me, the country and its citizens are one unity without any discrimination between them in terms of the right to security and safety. I also stress that there is no discrimination between them based on religion, political affiliation or stance.

Those tragic incidents have taken place under the guise of a political dispute that would originally be solved through dialogue and consensus. This would achieve the interests of our homeland by accepting the will of the people; the will of this people who have been suffering marginalization, oppression, injustice, corruption, election rigging and the use of all kinds of bullying against them by a regime that fell with all its symbols. That regime will never come back on the land of Egypt.

54 Translation retrieved on 15 June 2013, from http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Default.aspx

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The great Egyptian people know their value, civilization and beliefs, and know what's going on in the world, and live in this world and the age. Therefore, the challenges are as great as the capabilities, potentials, and abilities of the Egyptian people to rebound from their long setback.

I talk to those who opposed me, in an honorable way, and those who came to defend legitimacy and paid a high price for it; and there is nothing more expensive than life. I say honestly and explicitly that though I respect the right of peaceful expression of opinion, which is a genuine right for all, I will never allow anyone to resort to murdering, sabotage, plotting, terrorizing citizens, destructing public facilities or to call for a coup against legitimacy that is based on the free choice of the great people of Egypt.

Some of the protesters on Tuesday 4 December attacked many presidential cars and a driver was severely injured and is still in hospital. Why did this happen? Does peaceful protest mean assaulting public and private buildings, blocking roads, disrupting production or tarnishing the image of Egypt? This can never be an acceptable peaceful protest. It is smacked with violence of some people who infiltrated into those who were expressing their opinions. This will never go unpunished.

A number of protesters lost their lives yesterday, Wednesday 5 December, a day worse than the day before, when the peaceful protesters were flagrantly attacked by a number of lurking persons with weapons. This is the new thing that cartouche guns, firearms and teargas canisters have been used. In yesterday's incidents, 6 of Egypt's pure youth have been killed and more than 700 men and women were wounded, 19 of them by gunfire and 62 by cartouche guns. The acts of inciting violence and the practice of terrorism against armless citizens continued till the morning, and security forces arrested more than 80 of those involved in violence and holders and users of weapons. The public prosecution interrogated some of them and the rest are being held. It is regrettable that some of those arrested have working links and contacts with a number of the affiliates or those who identify themselves as affiliates of political powers.

Some users of weapons and those practicing violence are hired for money as revealed by the interrogations and their confessions. Who then gave them money and arms and supported them? This has also happened a long time ago during the transitional phase. Before that, we have seen anonymous talk about a third party in the sorrowful incidents of Maspero, Mohamed Mahmoud and the Council of Ministers streets and Port Said. No one

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could reach that third party. Those arrested have spoken about them and their links with them. The public prosecution will reveal the results of their confessions after the interrogations it is currently conducting with the perpetrators, inciters and financiers, whether in Egypt or abroad, are finished.

I clearly distinguish, by law, between political and national symbols, who are against some political stances and acts, as well as the opposers of the draft constitution, because this is normal, agreed upon, and acceptable, and those who spend the money they collected through their corruption, by working with the former regime, and committed crimes to burn the country and demolish its structure.

Therefore, I communicate, in all open-heartedness and open-mindedness, with the former, and apply the law firmly on the later in a way that achieves justice and maintains the security of the country. The issuance of the constitutional declaration has caused some political and legal objections, which is acceptable. However, it is high time to hold accountable and punish, by means of law, those who used violence and stirred it, those who hired thugs, brought weapons and paid money. It is high time to hold them accountable and punish them by law. I would like to stress that the facts that urged me to issue this constitutional declaration were, and are still, posing serious danger on the homeland and its security. camel, who was acquitted, provide a sufficient reason. These meetings, with others, constitute a sufficient reason for the declaration. I have announced, and today I reiterate it, that immunizing the constitutional declaration, laws and decrees was not intended originally to prevent the the judiciary from exercising its right, or prevent citizens from challenging any decisions or laws.

This declaration will not be used except, as I have said before, in relation to acts of sovereignty exercised by the State as a governing authority, and it determines, adapts and determines these acts, which is established by the independent Egyptian judiciary.

The judiciary, being far from politics and its fanaticism, has safeguarded the rights and freedoms. Today, the judiciary is called on, with all respect and appreciation, to continue this role and emphasize protection of the State and its institutions. I have full confidence that this is the exact role played by the judges. It is my duty to protect the homeland and to ensure the security of the citizens, which urged me to issue this declaration. My duty is that

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I have set by maintaining the acts of sovereignty that protect State institutions from being manipulated or stripped of their roles. I will carry out this duty under any circumstances, whatever the pressures are.

In addition, Article 5 of the declaration, though some people have seen it as a repeat of what has been already established, came only as a guarantee for the protection of the homeland and its security and sons and their property from any uncalculated acts of some irresponsible groups out of no conscience or a deterrent of law. But I want to emphasize that if this article is causing concern for anyone, I am not insisting on it because its meaning and content are already established. Anyway, the constitutional declaration will expire once the referendum is conducted, with yes or no.

By this declaration, I really wanted to get to the stage of completing the constitution, holding the referendum and giving the opportunity to the people to say their final word and then to obey their will.

I, as well as many loyal people, have spent a long time over the last two weeks, despite these incidents, to come up with a consensus formula on matters of concern to all Egyptians. Contacts were also made with a number of national and church symbols and some party leaders as well as others concerned with the interest of this country and the future of its sons. All these resulted in inviting all political symbols and powers as well as heads of political parties, revolutionary youth and jurists to come together next Saturday at 12:30 noon at the presidential palace to hammer out a collective agreement that unifies the nation. It is through such an agreement that we can get out of the narrowness of division and dispute to the spaciousness of difference, in case we have not reached a consensus. Several suggestions have been floated in this regard, including the continuation of the Shura Council, the coming elections law and how it will be, and also how the roadmap will be after the referendum, whether the people say yes or no.

The innocent blood that was shed in the incidents of the last two days will never go in vein. Those who paid money, provided weapons and incited violence will be referred to the public prosecution in preparation for interrogation. I cannot here but extend my sincerest condolences to the families of the martyrs, praying God Almighty to have mercy upon hem. As for the wounded, I spare no effort to provide all due care to them and secure them all means of treatment. I also wish them a speedy recovery and well-being.

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If the people accepted the constitution, they will embark on completing the construction of their institutions. If the people refused it, I would start the formation of a new constituent assembly, whether through consensus or direct election to draft a new constitution. I will not use a single authority in public affairs, and the final say will be that of the people; the maker of the revolution and its protector.

At the end of my speech, I call on everybody, all the people of Egypt, and those who love this country and wish it good and stability, to abandon violence and not to allow anyone to exercise it. What is the relation between peaceful protest and attacking buildings, facilities or party headquarters? This is not acceptable as it harms all of us.

I call on the Egyptian people to stand against all these violent acts. And to those staging protests I say the right to protest is guaranteed. However, as I have confirmed before, peaceful protest must be staged away from disrupting work or traffic, threatening innocents or assaulting companies, institutions, ministries or embassies. We are carrying on with dialogue, and I call everyone now to have a dialogue. It is by love and law, and by firmness and decisiveness with anyone who violates law that Egypt will recover and rebound after a long time under the yoke of a corrupt regime that lasted for several decades.

I wish you all the best, cooperation, communication and love. May God save Egypt from all evils and guide our way.

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