Assessing Community-Based Water Management: the Case of Rural CAPS (Nicaragua)

Assessing community-based water management: the case of rural CAPS (Nicaragua)

Autores y e-mail de la persona de contacto:

Luis del Romero Renau [email protected]

Departamento: Geografia

Universidad: Valencia

Francesc Hernández Sancho

Departamento: Estructura Económica

Universidad: Valencia

Área Temática: Sesión sobre economía del agua

Resumen: Traditionally, issues concerning the management of common-pool resources (CPRs), such as water management have been critically debated and advocated either as a “state solution” or a “market solution”. Nevertheless, some authors have proposed the “third way” to be the institutional endogenous solution (self-governance) as the best alternative to a market or state solution for common-pool resources management including community water management. This institutional endogenous solution, in the form of of CAPS “Comités de Agua Potable y Saneamiento” (Drinking water and sanitation committees), has been one of the reactions to the water crises in Nicaragua and other countries in the region, especially Guatemala, Costa Rica and El Salvador. In Nicaragua, while the government and private firms play an important role in urban water management the majority of rural zones are managed by CAPS organizations which thereby play a vital role in the country’s hydrosocial cycle. CAPS may be a good example of an “enduring CPR institution” as proposed by Ostrom (Ostrom, 1990), who suggested eight design principles necessary to make them robust and long lasting. It is the purpose of this study to examine how these eight design principles have been applied to the case of Nicaraguan CAPS, to water management institutions organized by local communities in rural areas of the country and to other key actors in the Nicaraguan “hydrosocial cycle” as described by Swyngedouw.

Palabras Clave: common-pool resources; water management; Nicaragua; water crisis

Clasificación JEL:

1. Introduction

According to Swyngedouw (2006), water embodies bio-chemical and physical properties, cultural and symbolic meanings and socio-economic characteristics simultaneously and inseparably. These multiple metabolisms of water are structured and organized through socio-natural power relations: relations of domination and subordination, access and exclusion, emancipation and repression called the “hydrosocial cycle” (Swyngedouw, 2004). The 'hydro-social cycle' is a way of representing the deepening entanglement of flows of water and social power relations (Bakker, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2004). Unlike the scientific 'hydrologic(al) cycle', consideration of the hydrosocial cycle makes it impossible to abstract water from the social conditions that give it meaning. For instance, its management (through public administration, private firms or as a common-pool resource management), and from the people and the societies through which it flows. In the case of Nicaragua this approach is extremely compelling. The last data of the National Statistics Institute in Nicaragua (INIDE) estimated in 2012 the population of Nicaragua to be 6,071,045 inhabitants (INIDE 2014), with an average population density of 37000 m3 per inhabitant (Brenes, 2011). Water resources are vast, as we will discuss at length, but nevertheless, only 64% of population has access to clean and fresh water in their homes (Kreiman, 2010). Therefore a focus on the local sociopolitical organization (the “hydrosocial cycle”) of the water would be better suited to understanding the problems and challenges of water management in this country.

Traditionally, issues concerning the management of common-pool resources (CPRs), such as water management have been critically debated and advocated either as a “state solution” or a “market solution” (Hardin, 1968). Nevertheless, some authors (Smith, 1981; Ostrom, 1990; Mc Kean, 1992) have proposed the “third way” to be the institutional endogenous solution (self-governance) as the best alternative to a market or state solution for common-pool resources management including community water management. This approach is narrowly linked to the “ecology of the poor” ideas of modern political ecology (Martínez Alier, 2011), which promote the study of ancient, local and traditional CPR practices as they are considered more efficient and sustainable than other private, hierarchical or state-centered 1

management approaches (Ostrom, 1990; Hanna and Munasinghe, 1995; Barlow, 2007; Martínez Alier, 2011).

This institutional endogenous solution, in the form of of CAPS “Comités de Agua Potable y Saneamiento” (Drinking water and sanitation committees), has been one of the reactions to the water crises in Nicaragua and other countries in the region, especially Guatemala, Costa Rica and El Salvador (Kreiman, 2010). In Nicaragua, while the government and private firms play an important role in urban water management the majority of rural zones are managed by CAPS organizations which thereby play a vital role in the country’s hydrosocial cycle.

CAPS may be a good example of an “enduring CPR institution” as proposed by Ostrom (Ostrom, 1990), who suggested eight design principles necessary to make them robust and long lasting (Sarker et al, 2000). Design principles are defined as the requirements to conduct effective collective action (Sarker and Itoh, 2001), a set of characteristics or “an element or condition” (Ostrom, 1992) that underlies the success of CPR institutions. It is the purpose of this study to examine how these eight design principles have been applied to the case of Nicaraguan CAPS, to water management institutions organized by local communities in rural areas of the country and to other key actors in the Nicaraguan “hydrosocial cycle” as described by Swyngedouw. This analysis will also serve to identify strengths, weaknesses and challenges faced by CAPS as they strive to achieve efficient water management in Nicaragua.

2. Methodology

The methodology of the research was based on a qualitative and complementary approach. Firstly, a set of 14 semi-structured interviews of key actors in water management and water research in Nicaragua were conducted. The interviews took place in Managua, Río Blanco, San Dionisio and Masaya between July and November 2012. They aimed to better understand water management and CAPS management in Nicaragua and were composed of a set of open question divided into 5 different topics: a) statistical information about the number of CAPS in the country, number of members, presence of women and presence of CAPS along the territory; b) the history of CAPS and their processes of creation; c) the CAPS’ 2

internal organization (decision-making processes, services provided, prices of services, monitoring and evaluation processes, etc.); d) CAPS’ social capital, CAPS and its relation with public organizations, private companies, community members and work network and e)positive aspects, weaknesses and challenges concerning CAPS and water supply and management in the country. They were carried out in a semi-structured way, in order to get responses to planned questions but including the opportunity to get information concerning other topics that interviewed actors might consider significant.

Interviews lasted approximately one hour and were conducted face-to-face in the subjects’ places of work. Conversations were recorded and later transcribed. The interviewed actors were divided into two categories: a) direct representatives of CAPS and CAPS networks and b) key actors having vast information about CAPS’ water management (NGO staff working in CAPS creation projects, university researchers and municipality staff). All information was expressed according to the role played by each actor in relation to CAPS, and personal approval for the use of the information in this paper and the inclusion of the subject’s job position in the article was given.

In addition to this, a comprehensive bibliography revision was carried out concerning community – based water management, CAPS and Ostrom’s theory. Finally, all information was systematized following a triangulation technique in order to contrast collected information from the different actors and the bibliography to Ostrom’s principles and develop an accurate assessment of CAPS using Ostrom’s theory as an analytic framework.

Ostrom’s principles were originally designed as a tool to understand the functioning of an organization, rather than a precise technique to assess its level of success, since any organization is more complex than the sum of its parts. Nevertheless, we considered this theoretical framework very suitable to analyze the pros and cons of the most important water management body in Nicaragua, since it has been already applied to study other enduring, self-managed water institutions in developing countries such as Sri Lanka, The Philippines, Turkey or Tanzania with useful results (Ostrom, 1990; Queen et al., 2007). In the case of Nicaragua this is the 3

first time that CAPS are being studied while applying such an approach, which we hope will be useful for future research projects making international or regional comparisons between CPR water institutions.

3. The hydrosocial cycle in Nicaragua

Figure 1: General map of Nicaragua. Source: Own source.

Nicaragua is the country in Central America that contains the most water surfaces within its territory. It has 21 basins, 85 rivers (in total 6695 km long), 49 lakes (the largest two of which have a 10.033 km2 extension), which means that 7.7% of Nicaragua's territory is water. Nevertheless, it is also the country with the greatest water-access problems in the region, as only 64% of the population receive potable water in their homes (Kreiman, 2010) and a third of the population lacks daily access to clean water (CODA, 2011). In the rural areas the percentage is reduced to 48% and along the Atlantic coast the situation is even worse with only 25% of the population in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN in Spanish) and 29% in the South Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS in Spanish) having

access to drinking water and sanitation (SNU, 2010). Although natural conditions are positive, as the country possesses enormous resources, the social, geographical and political conditions in Nicaragua have thwarted the access to clean water for many citizens, thereby making the hydrosocial cycle an interesting lens through which to understand these issues in context. In fact, water management in Nicaragua faces not only technical, but also social, political and environmental challenges. We identify three critical factors in this cycle: water pollution, geographical conditions and the economic and political landscape.

Water pollution

More than 60% of people receiving water in the country do not have access to a good quality source. Therefore not only water access, but water quality are both critical problems. Due to the lack of sewage systems, many rivers, lakes and watersheds are heavily polluted. Xolotlán lake, the second largest lake in the country, is completely polluted and considered to be irrecoverable (Lacayo et al., 1991). In addition, many wells used by rural communities are being polluted by chemicals and organic substances dumped by livestock, farmers and the mining industry (interviews no 1,2,3,14 2012; pers. comm.). In the cities, dumping by the foreign texile industry (maquilas), livestock and agriculture has devastated local watersheds.

Geographical conditions

While the climate is generous in rainfall in most regions and therefore surface water resources in Nicaragua are vast, it is important to note some of the adverse geographical conditions and factors which impede access to water. Some regions, particularly in the center and north of the country, are quite dry. The country is regularly affected by hurricanes and earthquakes, the later of which completely destroyed the capital, Managua, in 1972. Hurricane Mitch in 1988 also destroyed many basic facilities including wells, sewage systems and dams. Furthermore, the country has experienced rapid demographic growth from 3.8 million in 1991 to almost 6 million today, with the highest rates of growth occurring in the poorest rural areas. The rapidly increasing demand for an already inaccessible resource has made potable water scarcer now than even a decade ago.

Economic and political situation

Nicaragua is one of the poorest countries in America. According to HDI (2013), Nicaragua is the third poorest country on the continent, after only Haití and Guatemala, and is in the poorest 129 out of a total of 187 countries in the world. Life expectancy at birth is 74.3 years old and gross national income (GNI) per capita is $2,551 per year. According to Word Bank (World Bank 2014), the poverty headcount ratio at the national poverty line was 42.5% of population in 2009, due in large part to much of the population still living in underdeveloped rural areas; over 40% in 2010 (CEPAL, 2005) without institutionalization. The weak Central State lacks the capacity to be present all around the country; thus, leaving important rural areas without any public representation. Furthermore, even local municipalities do not have enough economic resources to confront water access problems (interviews no 11, 12, 13 et 14 2012; pers. comm.). Furthermore, the role of private companies in rural areas has been so far strictly symbolic (Gómez, 2011).

Apart from these factors, the recent history of the country is an important factor in understanding many of the features of the hydrosocial cycle in Nicaragua. In recent Nicaraguan history, there have been many impactful events that have affected development and progress. A civil war occurred between 1979 and 1990; after the triumph of the Sandinista Revolution had left a strong mark on society and a created a deep political division that remains today (Carrión, 2011). With the ascent to power of the Sandinistas in 1979, Nicaragua became the only country in the region with a government conceived during the Cuban Revolution, which had succeeded 20 years before. The new government passed off a new constitution in which the State became guardian and administrator of natural resources. Furthermore, important institutions in water management were created as the Natural Resources and Environment Ministry (MARENA) and Nicaraguan Institute for Spatial Research (INETER) (Gómez et al, 2012).

Although the first CAPS were created at the end of the seventies, it was in the heat of sweeping revolutionary changes including country-wide agrarian reform, that more CAPS were born in Nicaragua. They had been supported since 1984 by the Administration of Rural Water Networks (GAR) and afterward by the National Water and Sewerage Institute (INAA), which made agreements with different cooperative organizations and put community leaders in charge of them.

Afterwards, with elections in 1990, the triumph of the Liberal Party permitted Violeta Chamorro to become President of Nicaragua. In this period political water management began a decentralization process aiming at self-sufficiency and promoting private sector participation. In 1998, under Arnoldo Alemán (term 1997 – 2002), deep reforms of the sector were passed, expressed in the law no. 297 about Drinking Water and Sanitation Systems Services. In this law the National Committee of Drinking Water and Sanitation (CONAPAS) was created as an actor in the political public water arena. The National Company of Water Networks and Sewage Systems (ENACAL) was created as well, as a water services supplier, available for privatization. In addition to this, a new regulatory body was born and took the name of the old INAA. It was in 2001 when the first comprehensive water law was passed (Law no. 620, General Law of National Waters) with the primary aim to establish a legal framework for the management, conservation, sustainable exploitation and preservation of water resources while adopting an integrated multi-level approach based on the science of river basins (Gómez et al., 2012).

As a result, the main public actors in water management today are the central government through the different Ministries and Institutes (ENACAL, INAA, Health Ministry – MINSA – Social Investment, emergencies Fond– FISE-) and the municipalities, under the rule of the Nicaraguan Institute for Municipalities Promotion (INIFOM). But in spite of all this, there remains no kind of administration or plan with an integrated approach to water management.

Figure 2: Key institutional actors in Nicaraguan water management. Source: own elaboration.

Apart from the state, in the case of Nicaragua, it is necessary to emphasize the presence of two relevant actors involved in water management, especially in rural areas: international cooperation agencies and CAPS. In fact, international cooperation has played an important role in the improvement of water and sanitation access, supporting the construction of many systems. As a consequence, many CAPS have been created. CAPS are community organizations that take charge of water management in villages, as we will explain in the next section. The administration has recognized the important role played by CAPS, and as a matter of fact, a “Special Law of Community Drinking Water and Sanitation Committees” (Law no. 722) promulgated on the 14th of June 2010, enables these common-pool water management organizations to become institutional actors for water management.

4. CAPS Community drinking water and sanitation committees

Common-pool water management is not exclusive to Nicaragua’s case, but it is probably one of the countries in the region where they have been more developed, making it possible to state that CAPS are the main community-based water management actor in Nicaragua. Today, there are about 5,100 CAPS supplying water to 1.2 million people across the country (Enlace, 2008). Although the first committees appeared in the seventies, they did not receive firm institutional support until 2010 with the passing of Law no. 722. The vast majority of these committees are located in the country’s Pacific region, although some exist on the borders of the agricultural regions in the center of the country. In the Atlantic region, these organizations are less developed and less used and consequently, there are other

systems of management based on indigenous organizations systems1 (interviews no 1 et 2 2012; pers. comm.). What we will attempt in this section is a brief characterization of CAPS as community based actors, focusing on some generic features that are shared by most of the CAPS organizations. Nevertheless, it must be noted, that within the 5000+ associations, one finds great diversity as well as both good and bad organizational examples.

CAPS categories

1 In indigenous communities, the community governments generally exist and their aim is to manage all community problems. Inside the governments, there are different committees and each one uses to take responsibilities in a life community area. Inside these governments it is usual to find a Water and Sanitation Committee. 8

Differences between CAPS can be discussed in terms of three factors: number of water connections monitored, type of water catchment systems used and management activities. Firstly, in reference to the number of connections, it is possible to find CAPS that supply water just for 30 or 40 houses; meanwhile others can supply water for more than 1,000 houses, as in the case of the Masaya CAPS (interviews no 1 et 2 2012; pers. comm.). Secondly, CAPS can be classified in categories depending on the catchment system used for water supply: direct catchment from the source; dug well; hand pump well; electric pump small pipe (MABE) or small pipe by a gravity system (MAG). The various types are distributed according to regional trends: MABE systems are more common in areas near the capital, as are Masaya, and MAG systems in the North (Estelí, Chinandega and Chontales) (interviews no 1 et 2 2012; pers. comm.). In the rest of the country, technical systems are less developed, and water is most often supplied by gravity from wells or springs located in higher places. Thirdly, although a CAPS main aim is to provide drinking water to one or some communities from an available spring, they sometimes also take charge of other activities, such as the construction of latrines and community-based repair or maintenance of sanitation systems. More developed and experienced CAPS do other kinds of activities as well: water management and environmental awareness-raising campaigns and seminars, free water supplies for schools or community social centers, comprehensive management of the water cycle, etc., (interviews no 1, 2, 11 et 13 2012; pers. comm.).

CAPS creation process

Generally, the creation process of each CAPS follows the same phases. When a community feels the need to stock up on water, its first step is to put in a request at the local Town Hall. There are two types of requests: a) specific requests, which consist of going directly to the Town Hall and submitting a formal letter or b) requests made during the participatory budgeting process that municipalities develop every year during the month of September (interviews no 1, 2, 13 et 14 2012; pers. comm.). When a decision concerning a project is made, either with funds from the municipality, from an international organization or from the Social Investment and Emergencies Fund (FISE), design and execution of the project commences and a

committee appointed to monitor the process is created within the community. (interviews no 1, 2, 13 et 14 2012; pers. comm.,).

The community usually contributes to the construction of the water system by supplying the workforce while the Monitoring Project Committee is responsible for recruitment and supervision of the process. Nowadays, the creation of the committee happens mainly in projects where international organizations or local development organizations participate, in order to ensure that the community stays involved in the long run (interviews no 11 et 13, 2012; pers. comm.,). Nevertheless, cases in which community does not participate are found and the process followed in the system’s formation and construction does undoubtedly affect the effectiveness of the organization and foreshadow the participation of the community in the long term (interviews no 11 et 13, 2012; pers. comm.).

Figure 3: Steps for the CAPS creation. Source: own source.

CAPS are typically first formed by the Monitoring Project Committees and since Law no. 722’s instatement, it is compulsory for them to register in order to acquire the status of legal entity. This process starts in the Town Hall, where the first approval of the process must be granted and confirmed. Afterwards, the request for the inclusion in the Water and Sanitation Services Suppliers Central Registry, attached to the INAA, is completed, which ends the legalization process.

Following this brief summary of CAPS typologies and creation processes, the subsequent section will analyze CAPS performance according to the Ostrom’s eight principles for CPR institutions.

5. Assessing CAPS with design principles for community-based Natural Resource Management

Ostrom, the foremost proponent of the institutional endogenous solution to CPR problems, suggested that eight design principles are necessary to make CPR institutions robust and long lasting. The eight principles are: 1) clearly defined boundaries; 2) proportional equivalence between benefits and costs; 3) collective choice arrangements; 4) monitoring; 5) graduated sanctions; 6) conflict resolution mechanism; 7) minimal recognition of rights to organize and 8) nested enterprises (Ostrom, 1990; 1992). These principles are a useful lens by which to understand the functioning of these organization and assess their actions to thereby better comprehend the unique challenges of water management in Nicaragua.

Due to the fact that Ostrom proposed these design principles while researching CPR institutions in poor countries and included many references to CPR water and irrigation management institutions (Ostrom, 2000), we consider this analytic framework very suitable to apply to the case of CAPS in Nicaragua. A “design principle” in water management is understood, according to Ostrom (1992: 68), to be “an element or condition” that exists to account for the success of a water management institution. This section will focus on the examination of how these eight principles that characterize enduring, self-organized water management institutions apply to water CPR management in Nicaragua in the form of CAPS.

Design principle one: clearly defined boundaries

The presence of clearly defined boundaries enables members of a CPR institution to know who is in and who is out of a defined set of relationships and thus with whom to cooperate (Ostrom, 2000). It stipulates the presence of well-defined boundaries around a community of users and boundaries around the resource system that this community uses. Each component helps to internalize the positive and negative externalities produced by participants so that they bear the costs of appropriation and receive their share of the benefits of resource provision (Agrawal, 2002).

In this sense, CAPS are in charge of managing the water system of a community. Generally, in rural areas, the geographic boundaries of communities and their lands are well defined and there is an absolute consensus between neighbors about the membership of each house to a water system. Concerning membership rights granting access to water, according to the interviews, all the members of the 11

community are eligible to be members of the CAPS’s executive board, and only community members are responsible for and beneficiaries of the water networks (interviews no 1, 2 et 13 2012; pers. comm.). Therefore the right of access and participation in CAPS is reserved for each member of a local community.

Nevertheless, focusing on the geographic boundaries of each CAPS, we consider here the criticism of Turner to this design principle: “Agro-pastoral reality strongly diverges from this model (CPR design principles). Rules of access are often politically malleable and spatial boundaries fluid” (Turner, 1999: 649). In the case of CAPS, it is not uncommon that conflicts arise between farmers or legally established land owners when a new CAPS is first organized and new infrastructure must be built. This happens frequently and especially in communities that do not exist on official maps and or in which land ownership is not clear. These cases are especially problematic when the property holder of a water source is unclear (interviews no 5, 7 et 9 2012; pers. comm.). However, the General Law of National Waters (2001) assures that the water supply for a community will be always a priority, including cases where the source of water is found on private land and even if the landowner desires to use it for an alternate activity. In addition to this, the Water and Sanitation Committee Act of 2010 empowered the CAPS to become legal entities in water management, which has therefore strengthened CAPS’ decisive power when disagreements concerning water management arise.

To summarize, although the boundaries between communities concerning belonging to one or another CAPS are clearly defined, other kinds of boundaries, especially geographic and legal boundaries between private lands and community lands are often unclear.

Design principle two: proportional equivalence between benefits and costs

It refers to the congruence between costs incurred by users and the benefits they receive via their participation in collective action (congruence between appropriation and provision). The “cost” of water access through a CAPS organization consists of a definite amount of work hours that the community supplies for the water network construction, funds for the initial investment (about 2.500 CS or $125), and a monthly fee that is agreed upon by the general assembly (Enlace, 2008). When a new water network is installed, all the members of the community are 12

responsible for clearing the area, digging and installing the pipes. Normally, each family must cover a length and if in a family there are senior or disabled people, their neighbors are responsible for completing their part (Kreiman, 2010). In some cases when a family can’t contribute with workforce, they pay an additional sum (interviews no 4, 5, 7, 9 et 13 2012; pers. comm.).

Once the system is installed, each family must pay a monthly amount for their supply which, due to lack of gauges in rural systems, is calculated based on three main factors: the kind of system existing in the community (MAG, MABE, hand – pump well, etc.), number of members in the family and the household income (Enlace, 2008). A gravity system fee costs between 10 and 20 CS per month ($0.50) and an electric – pump system fee can be up to 30 or 50 CS ($2.50). The benefits obtained for the payment of these fees are the access to water either from public fountains in the community or in each household, in a sufficient amount and quality to sustain the members. Water is prioritized for daily personal use and then re-used for agriculture.

From the quality–cost relationship point of view, it is possible to find benefits for consumers, since fees are quite low. Comparing these to rates in urban areas that are paid to water supply companies, a big difference can be found. In some urban areas, fees as high as 300 CS ($15) monthly are paid and gauges track differences between consumers. Fares established for CAPS are adjusted for the household income of each family, but as they are low in general, the lack of surplus money in the organization can threaten system effectiveness and durability. In light of these issues, people working in CAPS have emphasized the need for a precise calculation of CAPS costs, in order to establish a proper rate system respecting familial capacity to pay and the CAPS’s financial needs to maintain the water network to a good standard. Vis-à-vis the second Ostrom principle, success is generally achieved as a quality–cost relationship that benefits consumers.

Design principle three: collective-choice arrangements

Ostrom (1990:90) states, “most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules”. As stated before, all the members of the community can participate in the executive board of a CAPS committee. The

members of CAPS committees who approve operational rules are chosen during general assemblies (interviews no 5, 7, 9,4 et 13 2012, pers. comm.).

Collective–choice arrangements can make CAPS more efficient, since local users have first-hand and low-cost access to information about their situation and thus a comparative advantage in devising effective rules and strategies for that location, particularly when local conditions change (Berkes et al, 2000, cited by Cox et al, 2010). Nevertheless, the pre-existing community leaders are normally the ones who play a key role in configuring the committees. According to CODA, 61.2% of the Committees were elected in a community assembly, 17.2% were organized after an agreement between local leaders of different communities and the rest were proposed either by the municipality or an NGO (CODA, 2011).

On the other hand, approving the statutes, which include operational rules (rules for water use, sanction causes, steps in the decision making process, conflict resolution mechanisms, etc.) is the second most important step for communities. This process calls for large-scale participation, as statutes must be approved during a community assembly with more than 50% of votes (interviews no 1, 2, 4 et 13 2012; pers. comm.).

In these assemblies at least one member of each home in the community is required to be present in order to guarantee equal participation. Nevertheless, typically it is the men who attend. Furthermore, CAPS committees are typically composed of 6 or 7 members who in the majority of cases are all men. As a REDCAPS representative stated in one interview (interviews no 1 et 2 2012; pers. comm.), only about 30% of CAPS members are women. In fact, underrepresentation of women in CAPS and in the decision – making therein, represent a threat to one of CAPS’ principle accomplishments. Even so, women’s participation in CAPS has increased in recent years, as a consequence of efforts by some working in water management, mainly international cooperation and local development organizations, in order to promote women’s participation in the decision making processes. Women’s participation is essential because it is usually women who use and control water resources in homes (women prepare food, take care of family hygiene, wash clothes, transport water from the spring to the house, etc) and because equal

representation would be a positive step toward improving collective choice arrangements.

Another critical point in the internal evaluation of CAPS is to analyze their accountability toward the community with regard to financial administration. The more accountability takes place, the more transparent CAPS work will be. Financial accountability should be made available to the public at general assemblies and reviewed for quality control markers such as efficiency.

In general, the CAPS with solid structures are the ones where the decision making processes are more participative: especially when decisions that affect all the members, such as fee rate schedules or approval of an organization’s statues, are made communally, whereas daily and less impactful decisions may be made by the CAPS’s representatives. In fact, the more participative the process to approve rules and to resolve problems, the more efficient and durable the systems tend to become.

All the interviewed actors agree that collective–choice arrangements are one of the yet unresolved matters of CAPS in Nicaragua, as community decisions are still unduly influenced by some leaders and it has proved difficult to establish permanent community mechanisms which achieve appropriate decision-making processes. Additionally, the long-established leaders often can be found withholding information from the constituents, and as a consequence the community may be unable to respond to their system and its needs in real-time. In such cases, CAPS have become mere service providers, and lost their essences as common–pool resources organizations. Additionally, some CAPS never realize their tasks and instead become dysfunctional, as they fail to ever garner community support. Because of this, nowadays, there are many inactive CAPS across the country (Vagliente, P.; 2011), (interviews no 4, 11, 12 et 13 2012; pers. comm.).

Design principle four: monitoring

This principle stipulates either the presence of monitors or the condition that these monitors are members of the community or, otherwise accountable to those members. The president of a CAPS, who is normally a member of the community, is responsible for monitoring water management and detecting possible problems, whereas each family is responsible to take care of water network infrastructure on their own land. Three common problems that necessitate monitoring are: incorrect 15

use of water by families, damage to water networks and water quality issues (pollution produced by livestock or agriculture with pesticides etc.) (interviews no 1, 2, 3, 5, et 13 2012; pers. comm.).

The costs of monitoring human behavior in the water supply cycle are reportedly low, according to the interviewees, due to institutional arrangements such as credible commitments by participants to work collectively on the basis of mutual trust. As in other CPR management cases (Sarker et al., 2001) endogenous, self- enforcing institutions are far more effective than the exogenously imposed institutions that tend to be costly as well.

Concerning breaks in the water network, due to the communitarian structure and hence the leadership’s deep knowledge of the land where the community is settled, CAPS have great capacity to quickly identify water use problems in the system such as breaks or leaks. Where their capacity tends to lack, and therefore their greatest difficulties occur is in dealing with these problems and to solving them. The lack of funds for the purchase of tools and other materials and the lack of expertise in technical aspects of water management are some important hindrances. The majority of people interviewed have stressed the need in many CAPS for expertise and technical advice to address these challenges. Nevertheless monitoring of many water management systems is being steadily improved through the expertise and support of different NGOs that focus on the provision of and management of water in rural communities. To summarize, according to the interviewees, the principle of monitoring itself is accomplished in the vast majority of CAPS. The difficulty comes when the problems monitored must be fixed (interviews no 1, 2, 9 et 13 2012; pers. comm.).

Design principle five: graduated sanctions

This principle stipulates the efficacy of graduated sanctioning of systems to prevent violations of community rules (Cox et al, 2010). Graduated sanctions progress incrementally based on either the severity or the repetition of violations and it helps to maintain community cohesion while genuinely punishing severe cases. In the case of CAPS, sanctions are set forth in each organization’s statutes. These sanctions are associated with non-permitted water uses such as irrigation or using water for animals to drink. Sanctions have different levels: from a courtesy call or 16

first warning to the service being cut off if the infraction persists (interviews no 1 et 13 2012; pers. comm.). In the latter case, water service would be re–connected after the payment of a fine with a price that has been previously stipulated and included in the statutes.

Taking this evidence under consideration, it is possible to conclude that CAPS do utilize this Ostrom principle. Nevertheless, there are some problems: even if the statutes have established sanctions, they are not always adopted. In fact, only a few times have CAPS actually put into practice their sanctions mechanisms (interviews no 1, 2, 4, 9, et 13 2012; pers. comm.). In rural communities, where neighbors have lasting, trusty and even familiar relationships, adoption of these sanctions tends to generate some neighborly tensions. In fact, in any given community there are often both supporters and detractors for imposing sanctions. So, it may be necessary to conduct an awareness raising campaign about the importance of sanctions application, in order to teach and demonstrate methods of sanctions by consensus and ways to apply sanctions without creating divisions between members.

Design principle six: conflict resolution mechanisms

This principle states that systems with low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms are more likely to survive. Conflicts over exhaustible resources are inevitable in CPR management, therefore, in the interest of maintaining collective action during these times, the presence of an established mechanism for conflict resolution is highly recommended.

Water management tends to be one of the CPR domains where conflicts are more present. In the case of CAPS in rural Nicaragua, conflicts arise due to factors as deforestation around fountains that affect water flow, water pollution due to livestock pollution or pesticides in agriculture, droughts that decreases the amount of available water and population expansion due to immigration and especially natural growth (interviews no 3, 7 et 10 2012; pers. comm.). Furthermore, social conflicts arise due to the tariff policies held by CAPS, legal authority over water bodies or simply due to the dependent relationships held by each member of CAPS with regard to their responsibilities and duties. The approximately 5,100 CAPS present in Nicaragua take on a wide range of forms. Some with poor organization are almost inoperative and unable to cope with interpersonal problems within, whereas many others have solid 17

management systems that help to prevent and solve conflicts quickly(interviews no 1, 2, 4, 5 et 13; pers. comm.).

When starting a monitoring and tracking system, the literal sources of water seem to be common sources of conflict. As mentioned previously, said sources are often located on private land. The community represented by the CAPS normally initiates an agreement with the landowner for the use of the source and when agreement is not possible, the community tries to purchase the water source from them. Law no. 722 has facilitated this process by giving legal status to the CPR institutions. Now CAPS can function as legal owners of the source properties, in contrast to the past, when land needed to be registered on behalf of an individual person representing the CAPS, which in turn bred new conflicts.

In contrast, many CAPS have working conflict resolution mechanisms and many manage to avoid them with conflict prevention practices. Environmental awareness is a key tool and one of the main activities of the CAPS organizations. Through seminars, meetings or public community conferences many CAPS successfully educate and illustrate how to manage water properly, for example by minimizing spills into rivers and lakes and protecting source areas from any kinds of pollution. In this sense, it is essential to maintain an exchange of information and experience between different CAPS, especially those recently created (interviews no 1 et 2 2012; pers. comm.).

Design principle seven: minimal recognition of rights to organize

Principle seven stipulates that external government agencies do not challenge the right of local users to create their own institutions. An external government agency imposing its own rules on a community managing a CPR may suffer from a government failure when imposed rules are not in agreement with the rules and principles that govern the community (Cox et al., 2010).

Most of the CAPS in Nicaragua, especially in recent years, have been born by the hand of international organizations which have financed the construction of water supply networks and have invested in the maintenance and durability of their networks by promoting community participation in the form of CAPS (interviews no 1, 3, 4, 5 et 11 2012; pers. comm.). Even in cases where CAPS weren’t conceived by international organizations, they usually receive some external support especially 18

during the formation process and while growing and gathering community participation (interviews no 1, 3, 4, 5 et 11 2012; pers. comm.). One might therefore inquire about the potential interference of external organizations in CAPS management and/or relationships of extreme dependence between these NGOs and the CAPS which hinder their missions. In fact, as a direct consequence, even after external consulting finishes, some CAPS never go on to achieve self–sufficient management, especially when the consultation was unsuccessful and the NGO did not succeed to establish community empowerment. Nevertheless, in Nicaragua there are a huge number of CAPS that have reached self–sufficient capacity, even if they continue to receive external aid, especially financially.

Secondly, it is necessary to analyze the relationship between the government and CAPS. At a first glance, CAPS’ independence from the state and municipalities seems assured by the recognition of their status as autonomous actors. At least a few times, municipalities have tried to meddle in CAPS decisions, but mostly without success, since CAPS are aware of their independence and neutrality, not only from the current administration but also from political parties (interviews no 1, 2, 4, 7 et 9 2012; pers. comm.).

On the other hand, the State through INAA has succeeded in controlling CAPS indirectly with the passing of Law 722. As a consequence of the law, the CAPS creation processes, their internal statutes and their daily management have been influenced, as this law has imposed the creation of similar structures for every CAPS without taking into account that the main characteristic of a community organization should be, in fact, their flexibility to adapt to local and neighborhood needs (interviews no 4, 12 et 13 2012; pers. comm.). Even if CAPS are a type of community organization, independent of the State, Law no. 722 gives them the obligation to manage and monitor the systems: collect funds coming from the payment of the service; coordinate with INAA, mayoral services and other organizations which take part in water management; control appropriate system use and avoid pollution of springs, etc (Law 722; 2001). Law no. 722 was born as a consequence of CAPS collective influence, especially those which are older and more functional. Nonetheless, a great controversy exists in Nicaragua around this law. For many CAPS, its existence is an advantage, because now they are eligible for

legal coverage that will permit them to work properly, for example by using a bank account to manage rate service payment collection.

However, there are opinions claiming that through this Law the State is assigning its own responsibility to the CAPS (interviews no 4, 11 et 13 2012; pers. comm.). In fact, CAPS have as a main purpose “to obey the regulations established by INAA concerning the administration, operation and maintenance of rural aqueducts” (Law 722; 2001), which has effectively made CAPS duty–bearers of the population’s water and sanitation rights. Opponents of this law insist that CAPS are, in reality, rights–holders being put in charge of public administration, asserting that this Law has reduced CAPS’ autonomy (interviews no 1, 3, 4, 5, et 11 2012; pers. comm.).

Despite this legal criticism, most CAPS-members believe in their organization’s independence from others structures, both public and private, and express that they are typically respected as external administrative actors in water management. As a result, it is possible to state that this principle is in fact accomplished in the case of Nicaraguan CAPS.

Design principle eight: nested enterprises

Principle eight states that in successful systems, “governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises” (Ostrom 1990:90). If we follow Swyngedouw’s hydro-social cycle idea discussed in the introduction, we shall assess whether CAPS, as small common-property systems, function well nested within larger systems that play a role in the water cycle. In other words, a cross-scale integrated approach to water management is essential to understand the possible problems that may arise between actors. Therefore we will attempt to confirm here, whether there are cross-scale cooperation mechanisms coordinating different CAPS.

In the case of Nicaragua, the existence of coordination mechanisms between different CAPS does accomplish this principle. Communication between CAPS takes place at the community level, where CAPS belonging to adjacent communities who assist each other in problem resolution; sharing the burden. Secondly, CAPS coordination also exists at the level of the municipality, where CAPS belonging to the same municipality work together. It is possible as well to find CAPS actors networking at the departmental level (interviews no 1, 2, 9, 12 et 13 2012; pers. 20

comm.). Since CAPS are more present in the Pacific area, professional networks at these three administrative levels are more common throughout this zone. In contrast, on the Atlantic coast these connections are hardly found (interviews no 2 et 12 2012; pers. comm.).

In 2004, CAPS decided to organize themselves at a national level, in a new structure known as REDCAPS (CAPS network). When the discussion about water management privatization started in Nicaragua, existing CAPS decided to create a national CAPS network in order to defend public water policies and community management. In the interview addressed with REDCAPS members, they defined themselves as a “Movement for water and the environment”. Nowadays, REDCAPS is a platform whose main objective is to advocate for CAPS’ rights. They managed to succeed in passing Law no. 722 and currently are trying to gain state investments to finance electrical energy projects in rural communities (interviews no 1 and 2 2012; pers. comm.).

As mentioned, the CAPS that have formed REDCAPS and which act as leaders therein, tend to have more experience and management skills. Less organized and less competent CAPS have so far stayed on the sidelines of the process and of the network even if their membership in REDCAPS might make them stronger, like Ostrom states (interviews no. 4 and 13 2012; pers. comm.).

6. Conclusions

Although Nicaragua is a country rich in water resources, many of its communities especially in rural areas, still do not have access to clean water. The hydrosocial cycle in rural Nicaragua is characterized by the presence of a Central State and by municipalities that can barely afford large investment costs in physical capital, and by the presence of a multiplicity of public and private actors who take part in water management (ENACAL, FISE, MINSA, INAA, international organizations, CAPS etc.). In addition, water management has faced situations resulting in greater water-access difficulties for parts of the population: such as natural disasters like Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the civil war after the triumph of Sandinista Revolution that lasted more than ten years, environment pollution, etc. As a reaction to these conditions, more than 30 years ago the first CAPS were created in 21

order to provide and manage water in local communities. They are community-based and self-organized associations that aim to address the problem of water access and sanitation through the construction and management of new water supply networks. Therefore, they are considered common-pool resource management institutions.

In this report we attempted to assess whether the case of CAPS in Nicaragua can be considered a good example of a robust and long lasting CPR institution. To do so, we analyzed this institution by applying Ostrom’s eight design principles, as these principles were primarily based on developing countries like Nicaragua. In general terms, we have concluded that the CAPS accomplish the principles proposed by Ostrom. If the country, the third poorest in the continent, is not currently in a humanitarian emergency related to water access, it is probably because of the existence of this “third way”; the communitarian self-governance of water management. Furthermore, these actors have been acknowledged in the country’s new laws including no. 722, which enables them to become legally established associations, while keeping their communitarian and democratic bases.

Nevertheless there are some principles where CAPS need to improve. The first of Ostrom’s principles show one of the most important deficiencies of many CAPS: the definition of clear boundaries concerning land-ownership. It is quite relevant, especially when a CAPS organization must identify its water sources or build new infrastructure. Design principle three also brings to light other important problems quite common in local endogenous institutions: the lack of equal opportunity for participation on the executive boards. Often the current community leaders try to dominate or impose their opinions as actors on the boards of the CAPS. Furthermore, women remain underrepresented in the vast majority of CAPS despite being largely responsible for domestic water management. Design principle four defends monitoring practices as important criteria for good CPR institutions. Although monitoring systems work properly in almost all of the CAPS, the solutions to the technical water problems are often hard to find due to lack of funds or technical expertise in many communities. Nevertheless, in the past few years this problem has been addressed by the participation of NGOs in the organization and on the technical support teams of many CAPS.

Several of these problems were addressed with the development of Law no. 722 that enable CAPS to become legal or institutional actors. Nevertheless, some interviewed actors consider this law, more than an official recognition of CAPS’ form, as a strategy to delegate to the CAPS the responsibilities of the State concerning water supply and management, thereby institutionalizing them. Although this is only one of the challenges that must be faced in the near future, with the problems above mentioned, the case of CAPS can be considered not only a good example of a self-governed water managed institution, but also a possible exemplary resource for similar institutions in the region that are currently being developed.

7. Bibliography

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WEBSITES

INIDE, (2014). Instituto Nacional de Informción de Desarrollo. Available at http://www.inide.gob.ni/. (30-04-2014).

The work Bank (2014). World develop indicators: Nicaragua. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/nicaragua. (30-04-2014).

LAWS

Law no 620, 2010. General Law of National Waters. Nicaragua. (Ley General de Aguas Nacionales, 620).

Ley no 297, 1998. Law about Drink Water and Sanitation Systems Services. (Ley general de servicios de agua potable y alcantarillado sanitario). Law no 722. 2011. Special Law of Community Drinking Water and Sanitation Committees. Nicaragua. (Ley 722. Ley especial de Comités de Agua Potable y Saneamiento).

8. Annexes

a. Interviews:

Number Institution 1 REDCAPS general attorney (National CAPS Network). ANUSAR (Masaya) 2 REDCAPS president (National CAPS Network) 3 Hydraulic Technician in Agua para la Vida NGO (Río Blanco) 4 Health managament and public participation expert in different CAPS 5 National Coordinator of Agua para la Vida (Water for Life) NGO. (Managua) 6 Senior consultor in water management Nitlapan (Researh institute on rural development) at the Universidad Centroamericana (Managua) 7 General Manager of Hibimusún Enterprise (hydroelectric power and water distribution) and CAPS president of Bilampí-Wasawás. Río Blanco. 8 Director of Nitlapan (Researh institute on rural development) at the Universidad Centroamericana (Managua) 9 CAPS administrator (San Dionisio) 10 Environmental Technician, Municipality of Río Blanco 11 Manager of NGO ECODES working in CAPS strengthen in Nicaragua 12 PC Coordinator. MDG Fund (Spain – Nicaragua) PC Democratic economic governance in the water and sanitation sector in the RAAN and the RAAS 13 Expert in water Management, La Cuculmeca 14 Project Manager in San José de Bocay Municipality