Notes and References

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Notes and References Notes and References 1. BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS 1. Joseph Dorfman, "John Bates and John Maurice Clark on Mono­ poly and Competition," Introductory Essay to John Bates Clark and John Maurice Clark, The Control of Trusts, Rewritten and Enlarged Edition [1912] (New York: Kelley, 1971),5. 2. Both John Bates Clark's great-grandfathers served in the Revolution: his paternal great-grandfather, Daniel A. Clark, serving under his maternal great-grandfather, General Jedidiah Huntington. Daniel Clark was a founder of the village of Plymouth Kingdom in Ver­ mont. General Huntington was "one of the eight original brigadier­ generals appointed by Washington." See Frances A. Toyer, "The Economic Thought of John Bates Clark," unpublished Ph.D. disser­ tation (New York University, 1952),4; and "John Bates Clark" in The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, vol. 13 (1906), 48. 3. The reference is to Daniel Clark. See Economic Essays, Contributed in Honor of John Bates Clark, edited by Jacob H. Hollander ([Published on behalf of the American Economic Association] New York: Macmillan, 1927), 365. 4. The evidence for this is ample and will be presented in following chapters. Two examples may serve here. Towards the end of his life (probably in 1955) Clark made the following notes on an envelope: "About 75 years ago, J.B.C[lark] called for truer 'anthropology' as basis for ec[onomics). "40 years ago (1915) [sic] I was writing 'Changing basis of ec[onomic] respons[ibility),." And in a letter to John C. Schramm, Director of the Calvin K. Kazanjian Foundation in 1955, Clark wrote: "For the purpose in hand, I like to think that I am continuing the tradition of my eminent father, who some 75 years ago began to stress ethical elements in economics." The "purpose in hand" was the forthcoming Kazanjian Foundation Lectures delivered in 1955 and published as The Ethical Basis of Economic Freedom. Clark to Schramm, 10 March 1955. Copy and envelope in J.M. Clark Papers. None of this, however, is to be interpreted as suggesting that the efforts of the younger Clark were limited to those originally undertaken by his father. 5. Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 5 volumes (New York: Viking, 1946-1958) V: 440. 6. John Bates Clark: A Memorial (Prepared by his children and privately printed, 1938), 5. 128 Notes and References 129 7. Thomas Ie Duc, Piety and Intellect at Amherst College. 1865-1912 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), 27-28. 8. Alan Simpson, Puritanism in Old and New England (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961),39. 9. A converter is a device for transforming energy from one form to another. The steam engine transforms heat energy into mechanical energy. Carlo M. Cippola adopts the useful term "inorganic conver­ ter" in order to distinguish technological advances beyond the use of animal or "organic" converters. See his The Economic History of World Population, rev. ed. (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1964), esp. Chapter 2. 10. See, for example, Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, volumes I and II (especially chapters 25 and 34), and volume III. 11. Simpson, 33. 12. John Bates Clark, 5. 13. John R. Everett, Religion in Economics: A Study of John Bates Clark. Richard T. Ely. Simon N. Patten (New York: King's Crown Press, 1946), 26. This work, Everett's dissertation at Columbia University, benefited from the suggestions of John Maurice Clark and Joseph Dorfman. The elder Clark, however, "was the third American figure to attain outstanding international importance." See Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, II: 804; III: 102, 188. 14. Hollander, 5. Professor E.R.A. Seligman placed him "on a level with Ricardo, Senior, John Stuart Mill, Jevons, and Marshall." See Essays in Economics, 151. Allan G. Gruchy notes that "textbooks are still largely written in the pattern sanctioned by Alfred Marshall and John Bates Clark at the turn of the century." See Modern Economic Thought: The American Contribution (New York: Pren­ tice-Hall, 1947), 13. 15. l. M. Clark was to later recall that his father commented "that when he was young, Hell was a very real thing ... but he was reserved about discussing such matters." John Maurice Clark to l.R. Everett, 17 September, 1944. Cited in Everett, Religion in Economics, 1953. 16. Toyer, 5. 17. John Bates Clark, 6, 7. 18. The patents were No. 86210 (26 January, 1869) and No. 57151l (17 November, 1896). "One was a 'new apparatus for heating houses of all kinds' which was purported to save money in the initial installation of a heating apparatus and also in the use of fuel; the second was a machine for converting wave motion into [mechanical] power." Toyer, 6. Other "Patents in the attic" were "Bridge across the Atlantic," "similar idea for mid-ocean airports," "Rope fire­ escape," and "2-story streets for N.Y." See notes in John Maurice Clark's hand in J.M. Clark Papers. 19. Everett, 28. 20. Toyer, 7. 21. John Bates Clark, 8. 130 Notes and References 22. Of the ten clerical members of the first Board of Trustees, Claud M. Fuess writes: "with one or two exceptions, they were all aggressively Calvinistic." Amherst was appropriate in another way for Clark since his paternal great-grandfather, the Reverend Daniel A. Clark, was on the original Board of Trustees. The Reverend Clark was "a vigorous, original personality, who had made himself unpopular in the town [Amherst] because of his energetic espousal of the tem­ perance movement and who was evidently a consistent trouble. maker, moving rapidly from one pastorate to another .... " See Fuess' Amherst: The Story ofa New England College (Boston: Little, Brown, 1935),42,43. 23. Fuess, 170, 179. 24. Friedrich August Gottreu Tholuck (1799-1877) was the son of a goldsmith who rose to become a leading defender of evangelical religion and Calvinism. In 1819 he was appointed professor at Berlin; in 1826 he became a professor at Halle where he remained the rest of his life. 25. Fuess, 209, 211, 219. Seelye had studied at Amherst under Henry B. Smith, who persuaded him to spend a year in Germany following his graduation. Smith himself had studied Kantian philosophy at Halle and Berlin and theology under Tholuck. See Le Duc, 42. As one student of the class of '71 remarked, "the atmosphere of that senior lecture may at times have been highly rarefied, but we did think, and we thought about God, freedom, and immortality." Yet another student described the lecture "as mainly an exposition of the West­ minister Catechism .... " Fuess, 217, 219. Still, Amherst produced men like Francis A. Walker, Herbert B. Adams, and Richmond Mayo-Smith in economics. 26. Fuess, 213, 215. In his campaign for Congress, Seelye "refused to make speeches or to spend money. His only expenditure, in fact, during the campaign, was the postage stamp which he placed on his letter of acceptance." Ibid. 27. From the manuscript, cited in Le Duc, 98. 28. John Bates Clark, 8, 9. 29. See, for instance, Veblen's "Professor Clark's Economics," The Quar­ terly Journal of Economics, 22 (February 1908), reprinted in Thor­ stein Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation and other essays (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961). The opening paragraphs clearly indicate Veblen's high regard for his former teacher. 30. See "J.B. Clark, 1847-1938" in J.M. Clark Papers. 31. Much of this was as a Latin teacher. See Joseph Dorfman, Economic Mind, III: 189. 32. Maurice (1805-1872) was a professor of English literature and history at King's College, London and, later, Cambridge. This earlier, English "movement was composed of 'social conservative critics' of capitalism and classical political economy. It attempted at the same time to meet the challenge of the 'un-Christian socialism' of the French revolution of 1848." See Joseph Dorfman, Economic Mind, III: xxiii. Notes and References 131 33. Donald O. Wagner, The Church of England and Social Reform Since 1854 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930), 110. See also Peter D'Arcy Jones, The Christian Socialist Rel'il'al, 1877-1914: Religion, Class and Social Conscience in Late" Victorian England (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). 34. James Dombrowski, The Early Days of Christian Socialism in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936),3. 35. Ibid., 15. 36. The article later became Chapter 10, "The Principle of Cooper­ ation," of his The Philosophy of Wealth: Economic Principles Newly Formulated (I st ed., 1886; reprint of 2nd ed., 1887; New York: Kelley, 1967), 198. The original article appeared in the New Eng­ lander, n.s., 2 (July 1879): 565-600. 37. Joseph Dorfman points out that the three sons pursued as careers the three main interests of the elder Clark: Religion, Engineering, and Economics. Clark's sister married Henry Carrington Lancaster on II June 1913. At that time, he was professor of French Literature at Amherst College. 38. John Bates Clark, 13. 39. J.M. Clark Papers. Understandably, in light of this recollection, the younger Clark's copy of John Stuart Mill's Autobiography was heavily underlined. 40. He also joined his father's fraternity, Sigma chapter of Delta Kappa Epsilon. 41. London: James Clarke [1896], 350, 354. 42. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1898), 12. Looking Backward was published in January 1888. 43. Le Due, 144. 44. Fuess, 224. 45. Fuess, 239. Garman also took some illustrations from theology, but they were relatively few. 46. In the posthumous Leiters, Lectures, and Addresses of Charles Edward Garman: A Memorial Volume, prepared with the cooper­ ation of the class of 1884, Amherst College by Eliza Miner Garman (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), 343.
Recommended publications
  • 00 Pre Mod Read Inst Evo
    Introduction Geoffrey M. Hodgson* The book is the first of what is hoped to be a series of readers produced by the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy (EAEPE) through Edward Elgar Publishing. The aim of these volumes is to present an exciting and diverse body of work in economics and related disciplines, to undergraduate students, graduate students and lecturers. Much of this work is not discussed in standard textbooks. Yet it is of enormous importance in understanding the manifest turbulence and transformations in the modern world. With the exception of the present introduction, the essays reprinted here have all been published before. They all appeared in collections of papers presented at successive EAEPE conferences and workshops since 1990. In compiling this reader, key papers have been selected from conference vol- umes between 1990 and 1996 inclusive.1 The papers have been selected not simply on their merit and importance but also to provide a coherent structure for the reader as a whole. Furthermore, the specific focus of this reader is on ‘key concepts’ and that too is reflected in the choice of papers. The first aim of this introductory essay is to place these essays in the historical and theoretical background of recent developments in economics and other social sciences. In recent years there have been enormous changes, especially within and on the fringes of economics itself. Some of these developments are sketched in section 1. Section 2 outlines the conceptual and theoretical foundations of institutional and evolutionary economics. Section 3 briefly summarizes the contents of the essays reprinted here.
    [Show full text]
  • The Institutionalist Reaction to Keynesian Economics
    Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Volume 30, Number 1, March 2008 THE INSTITUTIONALIST REACTION TO KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS BY MALCOLM RUTHERFORD AND C. TYLER DESROCHES I. INTRODUCTION It is a common argument that one of the factors contributing to the decline of institutionalism as a movement within American economics was the arrival of Keynesian ideas and policies. In the past, this was frequently presented as a matter of Keynesian economics being ‘‘welcomed with open arms by a younger generation of American economists desperate to understand the Great Depression, an event which inherited wisdom was utterly unable to explain, and for which it was equally unable to prescribe a cure’’ (Laidler 1999, p. 211).1 As work by William Barber (1985) and David Laidler (1999) has made clear, there is something very wrong with this story. In the 1920s there was, as Laidler puts it, ‘‘a vigorous, diverse, and dis- tinctly American literature dealing with monetary economics and the business cycle,’’ a literature that had a central concern with the operation of the monetary system, gave great attention to the accelerator relationship, and contained ‘‘widespread faith in the stabilizing powers of counter-cyclical public-works expenditures’’ (Laidler 1999, pp. 211-12). Contributions by institutionalists such as Wesley C. Mitchell, J. M. Clark, and others were an important part of this literature. The experience of the Great Depression led some institutionalists to place a greater emphasis on expenditure policies. As early as 1933, Mordecai Ezekiel was estimating that about twelve million people out of the forty million previously employed in the University of Victoria and Erasmus University.
    [Show full text]
  • Proquest Dissertations
    A REFORMULATION OF THE ADMINISTERED PRICE INFLATION HYPOTHESIS AND ITS EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION IN A CANADIAN CONTEXT By Richard Lesage Thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the de<g£g^e. of Master of Arts in E-conomics, ^ &•- UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA Ottawa, Canada, 1972, Richard Lesage, Ottawa, 1972. UMI Number: EC55942 INFORMATION TO USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI® UMI Microform EC55942 Copyright 2011 by ProQuest LLC All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis was prepared under the supervision of Professor Willy Sellekaerts, Ph.D. His continuous interest in this thesis has substantially improved the final product, his contribution was especially significant in chapter II where he did most the model building. The writer is also indebted to the University of Ottawa, for unlimited use of its computer and other research facilities, to Mr. John Kuiper, Chairman of the Department of Economics for the use of his computer program, to Mr. Donald A. McFetridge, Economist at the Prices and Incomes Commission, for a draft of a paper on Administered Pricing in Canada and to Professor William Baldwin of Darmouth College for his useful comments on a draft presentation of the results.
    [Show full text]
  • Complexity and the Theory of the Firm
    Innovation, Creative Destruction and Price Theory By Harry Bloch (Curtin University, Perth Australia) and Stan Metcalfe (University of Manchester, Manchester UK) Revised April 2017 Corresponding author: Prof. Harry Bloch, Email: [email protected] Mail: School of Economics and Finance, Curtin University, GPO Box U1987, Perth WA 6845, Australia Prof. Stan Metcalfe Email: [email protected] Mail: Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK 1 Innovation, Creative Destruction and Price Theory Abstract Our purpose in this paper is to consider developments in price theory required to facilitate the evolutionary analysis of economic change. Evolution is always a matter of change and, although its driving force is innovation, the price mechanism is central to how innovations are resolved into economic development. That is Schumpeter’s great theme but he said relatively little about who sets prices or how and why prices are changed. We focus particularly on price determination in markets disrupted by innovations, where firms are necessarily heterogeneous. We contrast the evolutionary paths followed by prices and market structure when prices are determined by market clearing to the paths when prices are determined through the application by firms of administered rules and routines to achieve their strategic objectives. This links the analysis to theories of administered prices and post-Keynesian price theories more broadly. Interaction of innovators with their customers and with established competitors create the context for the evolution of pricing rules along with differential firm growth, which together generates structural change in the industry and the economy. We show that analysing how the introduction and diffusion of innovations impact on the rules and routines provides the foundation for a broadly applicable evolutionary price theory.
    [Show full text]
  • GEORGE J. STIGLER Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 East 58Th Street, Chicago, Ill
    THE PROCESS AND PROGRESS OF ECONOMICS Nobel Memorial Lecture, 8 December, 1982 by GEORGE J. STIGLER Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 East 58th Street, Chicago, Ill. 60637, USA In the work on the economics of information which I began twenty some years ago, I started with an example: how does one find the seller of automobiles who is offering a given model at the lowest price? Does it pay to search more, the more frequently one purchases an automobile, and does it ever pay to search out a large number of potential sellers? The study of the search for trading partners and prices and qualities has now been deepened and widened by the work of scores of skilled economic theorists. I propose on this occasion to address the same kinds of questions to an entirely different market: the market for new ideas in economic science. Most economists enter this market in new ideas, let me emphasize, in order to obtain ideas and methods for the applications they are making of economics to the thousand problems with which they are occupied: these economists are not the suppliers of new ideas but only demanders. Their problem is comparable to that of the automobile buyer: to find a reliable vehicle. Indeed, they usually end up by buying a used, and therefore tested, idea. Those economists who seek to engage in research on the new ideas of the science - to refute or confirm or develop or displace them - are in a sense both buyers and sellers of new ideas. They seek to develop new ideas and persuade the science to accept them, but they also are following clues and promises and explorations in the current or preceding ideas of the science.
    [Show full text]
  • From the Progressives to the Institutionalists: What the First World War Did and Did Not Do to American Economics
    From The Progressives to The Institutionalists: What the First World War Did and Did Not Do to American Economics Thomas C. Leonard Review essay on Rutherford, Malcolm (2011) The Institutionalist Movement in American Economics, 1918-1947: Science and Social Control, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 410 pp. ISBN: 9781107006997. $95. 1. Introduction Let me begin by recognizing Malcolm Rutherford’s achievement here. In 1998, Geoffrey Hodgson, writing in the Journal of Economic Literature, could say that we lacked an adequate history of Institutionalist Economics. No longer. Thanks to Rutherford’s long labors in the archives, begun before the 21st century was, we now have a splendid history of Institutionalist Economics, and more generally, of the Institutionalist movement, and of American economics between the wars. This is a meticulous, carefully crafted, brick by brick reconstruction of an important but misunderstood era in economic and social thought. At its very best moments, you feel like you are peering into a lost world. Rutherford has produced the new standard against which future contributions will be measured, and also to which historians of American economics will be obliged to respond. Our charge in this symposium is to respond. 2. What the book does The structure of the book is straightforward: we are introduced to the founding group and its students, and we are given compelling portraits of some neglected but important figures, Walton Hamilton and Morris Copeland, who stand in for the first and second generations, respectively. Next we proceed to the core of the book, the professional milieu of the Institutionalist economists, the “personal, institutional, and programmatic bases” of the movement in the Institutionalist academic strongholds – Chicago, Wisconsin, Columbia, Amherst, Brookings, and the National Bureau.
    [Show full text]
  • Nine Lives of Neoliberalism
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Plehwe, Dieter (Ed.); Slobodian, Quinn (Ed.); Mirowski, Philip (Ed.) Book — Published Version Nine Lives of Neoliberalism Provided in Cooperation with: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Suggested Citation: Plehwe, Dieter (Ed.); Slobodian, Quinn (Ed.); Mirowski, Philip (Ed.) (2020) : Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, ISBN 978-1-78873-255-0, Verso, London, New York, NY, https://www.versobooks.com/books/3075-nine-lives-of-neoliberalism This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/215796 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative
    [Show full text]
  • Imperialism, Racism, and Fear of Democracy in Richard Ely's Progressivism
    The Rot at the Heart of American Progressivism: Imperialism, Racism, and Fear of Democracy in Richard Ely's Progressivism Gerald Friedman Department of Economics University of Massachusetts at Amherst November 8, 2015 This is a sketch of my long overdue intellectual biography of Richard Ely. It has been way too long in the making and I have accumulated many more debts than I can acknowledge here. In particular, I am grateful to Katherine Auspitz, James Boyce, Bruce Laurie, Tami Ohler, and Jean-Christian Vinel, and seminar participants at Bard, Paris IV, Paris VII, and the Five College Social History Workshop. I am grateful for research assistance from Daniel McDonald. James Boyce suggested that if I really wanted to write this book then I would have done it already. And Debbie Jacobson encouraged me to prioritize so that I could get it done. 1 The Ely problem and the problem of American progressivism The problem of American Exceptionalism arose in the puzzle of the American progressive movement.1 In the wake of the Revolution, Civil War, Emancipation, and radical Reconstruction, no one would have characterized the United States as a conservative polity. The new Republican party took the United States through bloody war to establish a national government that distributed property to settlers, established a national fiat currency and banking system, a progressive income tax, extensive program of internal improvements and nationally- funded education, and enacted constitutional amendments establishing national citizenship and voting rights for all men, and the uncompensated emancipation of the slave with the abolition of a social system that had dominated a large part of the country.2 Nor were they done.
    [Show full text]
  • The Economics of Business Cycles Numerical Model Role of Fixed Costs
    Modern Economy, 2020, 11, 600-608 https://www.scirp.org/journal/me ISSN Online: 2152-7261 ISSN Print: 2152-7245 The Economics of Business Cycles Numerical Model Role of Fixed Costs Gerald Aranoff Ariel University, Ariel, Israel How to cite this paper: Aranoff, G. (2020). Abstract The Economics of Business Cycles Numer- ical Model Role of Fixed Costs. Modern This paper presents a simple numerical model of the economics of business Economy, 11, 600-608. https://doi.org/10.4236/me.2020.112044 cycles with illustrated demand and cost curves. This is a purely theoretical model inspired by the writings of John M. Clark (1884-1963). The model Received: January 16, 2020 shows industry long-run equilibrium ( E (π ) = 0 ) under perfect competition Accepted: February 24, 2020 Published: February 27, 2020 for manufacturers to supply hypothetical fluctuating demand schedules, off- peak and peak, for a single non-durable product such as cement. The model Copyright © 2020 by author(s) and has two plant types: old high fixed-cost PlantL and modern low fixed-cost Scientific Research Publishing Inc. This work is licensed under the Creative PlantK. The model assumes linear total cost curves with absolute capacity lim- Commons Attribution International its for the two plant types. Both plant types have the same SACmin. Under License (CC BY 4.0). perfect competition neither plant type will dominate. The plant assets are as- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ sumed durable, to last for 50 years, and specific to manufacturing only one Open Access product, Q. The model, with its rigid assumptions, shows that industry com- posed of only modern low fixed-cost PlantsK will increase the amplitude of the business cycle, the range of industry outputs between peak and off-peak, versus an industry composed of only old high fixed-cost PlantsL.
    [Show full text]
  • The Making of the Institutional Theory of Social Costs: Discovering the K
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by UWE Bristol Research Repository The Making of the Institutional Theory of Social Costs: Discovering the K. W. Kapp and J. M. Clark Correspondence* By SEBASTIAN BERGER† ABSTRACT. This article reconstructs the making of the often “over- looked” institutional theory of social costs based on the unexploited correspondence between John Maurice Clark and Karl William Kapp. The reconstruction demonstrates that the institutional argument on social costs was developed as a critique of neoclassical economics and of post-WWII neoliberalism. Introduction While most economists feel at ease to identify the boundaries of the discourse on social costs with the views of Pigou and Coase (see, for example, Aslanbeigui and Medema 1998), the distinct institutional argument developed by John Maurice Clark and Karl William Kapp has been largely eclipsed from the discourse (for efforts to revitalize this argument, see Berger 2012; Elsner, Frigato, and Ramazzotti 2012; Berger and Steppacher 2011; Gerber and Steppacher 2011). Therefore, this article has two main aims. Firstly, it reconstructs the making of the institutional argument based on unexplored archival materials, that is, the unpublished correspondence on social costs between Clark and Kapp. The aim is to analyze for the first time their important collabo- ration, and the development and relation of their arguments. This reveals and corrects imprecisions in the existing literature concerning their use of the term “social costs,” sheds new light on how Clark influenced Kapp, and highlights the uniqueness of their institutional argument as a full-fledged theory of social costs.
    [Show full text]
  • Front Matter In" Wesley Clair Mitchell: the Economic Scientist"
    This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Wesley Clair Mitchell: The Economic Scientist Volume Author/Editor: Arthur F. Burns, ed. Volume Publisher: NBER Volume ISBN: 0-87014-052-3 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/burn52-1 Publication Date: 1952 Chapter Title: Front matter in "Wesley Clair Mitchell: The Economic Scientist" Chapter Author: Arthur F. Burns Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c3093 Chapter pages in book: (p. -14 - 0) We Clair Mitchell The Economic'Scientist.' Edited by ARTHUR F. BURNS NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC. NEW YORK 1952 S Copyright,1952, by Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 1819 Broadway, New York 23 All Rights Reserved Typography by Oscar Leventhal, Inc. Presswork and binding by H. Wolff Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 52-6013 PUBLICATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC. NUMBER 53 WESLEY CLAIR MITCHELL THE ECONOMIC SCIENTIST '•1 OFFICERS 1952 Harry Scherman, Chairman C. C. Balderston, President Percival F. Brundage, Vice-President George B. Roberts, Treasurer W. J. Carson, Executive Director DIRECTORS AT LARGE Donald R. Beicher, American Telephone and Telegraph Company Oswald W. Knauth, Beau fort, South Carolina Simon Kuznets, University of Pennsylvania H. W. Laidler, Executive Director, League for Industrial Democracy Shepard Morgan, New York City C. Reinold Noyes, Princeton, New Jersey George B. Roberts, Vice-President, National City Bank Beardsley Rumi, New York City Harry Scherman, Chairman, Book-of-the-Month Club George Soule, Bennington College N. I. Stone, Consulting Economist J. Raymond Walsh, New York City Leo Wolman, Columbia University Theodore 0.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Neoclassical Tradition in Labor Economics
    On the Neoclassical Tradition in Labor Economics Bruce E. Kaufman Department of Economics Georgia State University Atlanta GA 30303 April 8, 2002 [email protected] The author acknowledges with appreciation the helpful comments received from John Addison, Barry Hirsch, and John Pencavel on an earlier draft of this paper. 1 Abstract In a recent article George Boyer and Robert Smith describe the development of the neoclassical tradition in labor economics. In this paper I re-examine this subject and provide an alternative account of the evolution of thought in the field. I argue Boyer and Smith incorrectly define both the institutional and neoclassical approaches to labor market analysis. The essence of institutional economics is not a fact-gathering, descriptive approach, but a paradigm built on property rights, a behavioral model of the human agent, and theories of imperfect competition. In the case of the neoclassical paradigm, they err by defining it too broadly, making it largely coterminous with constrained optimization. What they refer to as neoclassical labor economics is actually divided into two separate theoretical approaches, one a market-clearing approach associated with the modern Chicago School and the second a nonmarket-clearing approach associated with economists of what I refer to as the "Cambridge Group." Viewed in this manner, the early institutionalists, the postwar labor economists (e.g., Dunlop, Kerr, Lester, and Reynolds), and the labor economists affiliated with the Cambridge Group are all within a common stream of economic thought built around Keynesian economics at the macro level and various non-clearing market models at the micro level.
    [Show full text]