HIS 314 Lecture 19: MANDIR and MANDAL

SLIDE ONE In Chapters 26 and 27 of his book, Guha examines Two Themes in Indian Democracy: Caste and Religion. In India, these were better known as Mandal and Mandir

MANDAL refers to the MANDAL COMMISSION, a commission appointed by the JANATA PARTY which recommended an affirmative action plan (specifically, the reservations of jobs and seats in educational institutions) for OTHER BACKWARD CASTES. Do revisit the slideset dealing with the JANATA PARTY earlier in the course.

MANDIR refers to the agitation to build a temple (the Hindi word for a temple is mandir) dedicated to the Hindu god, Ram, in the exact location of a 16th mosque built by the Mughal emperor Babur.

But these are chapters about the 1990s and 2000s in the history of contemporary India. How is a commission from the 1970s and a temple from the 1500s connected with the history of the 1990s and 2000s? That is what we will see in the rest of these slides.

SLIDE TWO Let’s start with MANDIR, the agitation for the temple. But to understand its significance, we have to locate in a longer history of Hindu nationalism in India.

The RSS goes back to 1925, though they gained some support after Partition riots, especially among refugees, their association with the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi lost them any significant popularity.

The RSS calls itself a non-political entity. It stands at the head of a number of organizations that include a political party. The earliest party was called the Jana Sangh, which was dissolved to join the Janata Party. After the Janata break-up in 1977, the former Jana Sangh renamed itself the or BJP). In addition to the BJP, the RSS also controls trade unions, women’s groups, student unions, and a religious forum called the VISHWA HINDU PARISHAD (World Hindu Forum), usually abbreviated to VHP.

Political fronts of the RSS – whether the Jana Sangh or the BJP, had not been very popular or electorally significant, averaging around 20 seats in a Parliament of 450 seats over the years. In Nehru’s era they tried to garner support via the agitation for Hindi language, and against the Hindu Code Bill, but failed. Over the decades they had tried to rouse popular support through issues such as Kashmir or cow protection, but these did not resonate with people either. In 1984, when Rajiv Gandhi won his huge victory, the BJP was down to just two seats in Parliament.

BUT, by 1991 they had over a 120 seats in the Indian Parliament and were the single largest opposition party. How did they accomplish this? Largely on account of spearheading a very successful political campaign on the issue of the temple.

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SLIDE THREE Hindu nationalists claimed that in the 16th Century, a general of the first Mughal emperor, Babur, constructed a mosque (known as the Babri Masjid – a masjid means mosque) over a temple marking the birth place of a mythical, legendary, Hindu god, Ram, in the town of AYODHYA in the state of (UP). They now wanted to replace the mosque by “rebuilding” a temple dedicated to Ram at that very spot.

In 1949, when Hindus had secretly installed idols of a “baby Ram” in the mosque, riots broke out in Ayodhya. The courts entered the picture and ordered the removal of the idols and sealing of the doors to the mosque to both sets of worshippers. Since 1949, both Hindus and Muslims had prayed OUTSIDE the building.

Any dispute that existed in Ayodhya though, was very LOCALIZED, until 1984. This is when the VHP (the religious front of the RSS) started a campaign around the issue. Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination ended that agitation.

SLIDES FOUR and FIVE But Rajiv Gandhi’s unfortunate decision to play equal-opportunity communal populism (see slide 11 in the previous slide set, and my commentary on that), and ordering the opening of the locks on the Babri masjid (mosque) in 1986, rekindled the agitation. The fact that a mythological serial on the story of Ram was wildly popular on Indian television at the time helped the VHP-RSS gain popularity for their cause as well.

The agitation for the temple was led by the VHP, but it was another member of the “RSS Family”, the BJP, under their then president, LAL KRISHNA ADVANI, who made the agitation for the temple into a national POLITICAL issue.

In 1990, Advani decided to ride a fake “chariot” (a Toyota truck made to look like “chariots” used in the television series on Ram) across the country. The journey was to begin at the temple in SOMNATH (remember the temple issue, if not, see slides 10 and 11 of “Nehru’s India” slide set) in September, and, meandering across the country, end up in AYODHYA.

This campaign also drew a great deal of support, particularly financial support, from Hindus OVERSEAS, the “Non Resident Indians” (NRIs) sent money and material to support this effort.

SLIDE SIX A chariot in Hindi is called a RATH, a journey, YATRA. Advani’s Rath Yatra, as the visual shows, generated violence and deaths wherever it went.

This was accomplished by deliberately driving the “chariot” through Muslim neighborhoods in the cities it visited. The chariot was accompanied by crowds who shouted provocative, anti-Muslim, slogans. That led to riots, violence and the deaths recorded on the graphic.

Why do this? Keep in mind that in 1990, the BJP only had TWO seats in Parliament. The 2 ideology of the RSS had always been one of HINDUTVA or the emphasis on “HINDUNESS.” The Indian electorate, however, had historically rejected this ideology, and voted on other issues.

If there were an escalation of riots based on religion, it was hoped that people would think more along lines of their religious identity and also vote accordingly. So, ultimately, this “yatra” was a cynical, vote gathering, strategy. The violence that accompanied the yatra actually helped CONSOLIDATE the potential voters for the BJP.

SLIDE SEVEN The strategy paid off in the elections held in 1991.

These elections were seriously disrupted when Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated while campaigning.

The BJP did not WIN the election; it was won by by a narrow margin by the INC, nowled by PV Narasimha Rao. BUT, the BJP did become the largest opposition party with 120 seats, up from just 2 seats before this.

Even more important, the BJP won the assembly elections in the state of Uttar Pradesh, where Ayodhya is located. The state administration, therefore, was the BJP’s starting in 1991.

That control allows them to enable the destruction of the mosque on December 6, 1992

SLIDE EIGHT A very large group of “devotees” had collected in Ayodhya on December 5th, claiming they wanted to offer prayers. On the afternoon of the 6th, they broke through the police barricades, climbed up to the dome of the mosque and brought down the entire structure.

The police (under state control) and paramilitary forces (under the central government’s command) stood by as the 450 year old building was razed to the ground by the mob.

This was a landmark event in the history of independent, completely unprecedented, of course, but also marked a watershed in the history of Hindu nationalism in India.

SLIDE NINE and TEN What were the political OUTCOMES of Demolition?

The demolition was followed by a series of riots, mainly initiated by Hindu nationalists that provoked and attacked Muslims across the country.

In Bombay (now Mumbai), there was state-organized violence against Muslims. For ten days mobs were allowed to attack, rape, loot, pillage Muslim homes. A regional Hindu nationalist party, the SHIV SENA, was in power, and the party chief PUBLICLY commended his followers for their action. 3

Bombay was the only place that also saw some defiance from Muslims. Though this retaliation came in shape of bombs, and directed by Muslim mafia dons hiding in Dubai and other offshore locations.

All the violence, and even the retaliation in Bombay, actually served the purposes of the Hindu nationalist groups. In the general elections of 1996, for the FIRST TIME EVER, the BJP emerged as the single largest party in Parliament. A HUNG Parliament, though, ensured that the BJP did not have enough seats to actually SUSTAIN their government.

A two-year period of political instability saw two more governments form and fall. In 1998, fresh elections were called and the result finally led to a BJP government. Because the BJP depended on their regional allies to make up their majority in Parliament, the more liberal and avuncular ATAL VIHARI VAJAPAYEE rather than the more militant ADVANI was chosen to be Prime Minister.

Another general election had to be called in 1999 and this time the BJP was able to stay in power until 2004.

SLIDE ELEVEN The MANDIR issue might have been pivotal in bringing the Hindu Nationalists to power in 1998, but could not SUSTAIN their power.

In the next round of general elections, in 2004, the BJP lost. From 181 seats in Parliament, they came down to 138 seats

For the next 10 years an INC government led by (though many believed that SONIA GANDHI, Rajiv Gandhi’s widowed wife, was the real power behind the throne) ruled India.

BUT, the stint in power from 1998 to 2004 had made some important changes. For one, it gave the party greater RESPECTABILITY, they were seen as capable of running a government and not simply as a loud and raucous opposition.

Their stint in power also allowed them to make some important appointments of their ideologues to important positions, and influence, among other things, the history that was taught to school students in India.

When back in opposition after 2004, they indulged in violence against minorities including Christians and of course Muslims.

SLIDE TWELVE In 2014, therefore, under the leadership of a once-obscure RSS preacher called NARENDRA MODI (who claims to have started life as a humble tea vendor), the BJP was back in power.

4 Modi first rose to prominence when he led the BJP to a political victory in assembly elections in the state of GUJARAT (Mahatma Gandhi’s home state!) in 2001, using vituperative and overtly anti-Muslim language that even BJP leaders had not used to date.

Modi gained global notoriety (and was banned from entry to the US) for his handling of the GODHRA riots.

In 2002, to revive their flagging popularity, the BJP had invited millions of Hindus to push for building the temple at Ayodhya. A train coach full of Hindu volunteers, called kar sevaks, caught fire (perhaps as a result of an attack) in Godhra in Gujarat. 58 kar sevaks, were burnt to death. As Chief Minister of Gujarat, Modi had the bodies of the victims, whom he labelled “martyrs,” paraded through the state, and this provoked the expected, violent, reaction.

For days, Chief Minister Modi gave Hindu mobs a free hand to go on a rampage against Muslims. Police stood by, and even helped the rioters. Over 2000 Muslims died in the violence that Modi himself, publicly, justified with Newtonian mechanics: Each action has opposite reaction, he said!

The same Narendra Modi not only led the BJP to an electoral victory in national elections in 2014, but had his mandate renewed and strengthened with an even more impressive electoral victory in 2019.

The second term of Modi’s government has seen some important developments that may well have a much more long term impact than his tenure in office.

 In August 2019, the government abrogated Articles 370 and 35A of the Constitution that granted Jammu and Kashmir special status and created two UNION TERRITORIES out of the state. To clamp down on protest, the entire (former) state was put under curfew for months and as of March 2020 has not yet returned to any semblance of normality.  On November 9, 2019, a pliant Supreme Court (Modi’s interference in the Judicial arm of government rivals that of Indira Gandhi) gave a “final” decision on a legal dispute over who “owned” the land on which the Babri Mosque had stood. While criticizing the mob’s demolition the mosque, the Supreme Court, strangely, concluded that the land “belonged” to Hindus, paving the way for the possible construction of a temple at the site.  On 12 December 2019, the government enacted the CITIZENSHIP AMENDMENT ACT that began a process aimed at undermining the citizenship rights of Muslims in India. It has led to huge nationwide protests led by women and students. These protests have only been subdued because of the outbreak of COVID 19.

SLIDE THIRTEEN Some ECONOMIC factors explain both the support for Modi as well as his return to a more overtly Hindu nationalist agenda in his SECOND term in office.

The Indian economy had been undergoing changes since the era of Rajiv Gandhi, slowly 5 abandoning the planned economy model of Jawaharlal Nehru and embracing neo-liberal, market-driven economic policies.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and an immense financial crisis that brought the government to near-bankruptcy in 1991 further consolidated these changes. These changes were also mandated by the IMF and World Bank before they released the loans needed to tide over the 1991 crisis.

The liberalization of the economy unleashed aspirations for even higher growth, especially among the Indian middle class. In this milieu, Nehru’s liberalism came to be regarded as suspect as his socialist economic policies.

Narendra Modi, as Chief Minister of Gujarat, had some well-publicized successes in attracting new industry to the state. When he campaigned in the national elections in 2014, he did so as someone who could bring economic growth. Hindutva, or Hindu-ness took a back seat in this campaign.

Operating as he does in the populist mode of Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister Modi has not really been able deliver on these promises. The growth rate of the Indian economy has been plummeting since a year after he took office.

That is one of the reasons why there has been such a sharp return to divisive politics, whether on the Mandir, Citizenship, or Kashmir, during Modi’s second term in office.

SLIDE FOURTEEN So what DROVE this rise in Hindu nationalism from the 1990s onwards? Economics, as discussed immediately before this, explains a small part, but to really understand why Hindu nationalists make the push they do, we have to put in the context of the assertiveness of lower caste groups that begins in the late 1970s.

Despite all their rhetoric, the REAL fear that Hindu nationalists have is not of MUSLIMS, who form a small and by and large, poor and powerless minority of India’s population.

The fear they could never openly express was the fear of organization around CASTE, particularly among the rising BACKWARD CASTE and DALITS of India.

The aim of Hindu nationalism is to create and consolidate a political constituency of ALL Hindus. Yet, the leadership of the RSS, for example, has invariably come from upper caste Brahmins, who want to speak for all Hindus.

Politics that emphasizes caste differences, and seeks to empower lower castes, not only undermines the agenda of creating a SINGLE HINDU constituency, but, critically, destroys myth of Hindu majority all together.

If the politics of lower caste assertion succeeds, then upper caste Hindus actually also become an electoral MINORITY, in numbers somewhat smaller than India’s Muslims!! 6 It is no coincidence that the agitation for the MANDIR comes at the same time as OBCs are supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the MANDAL commission.

Or, that it was a rising OBC leader, Lalu Prasad Yadav, who had the gumption to arrest ADVANI and stop his “yatra” in October, 1990.

SLIDE FIFTEEN I will not go into a long and the somewhat complex history of caste in India. For that, do look at the powerpoint slides in Caste: A Historical Approach

Suffice to say for now, that “caste” in politics operates in ways that has ALMOST nothing to do with RITUAL status. The best analogy is to think of how RACE in American politics.

As we have discussed earlier, Dalits and OBCs together make up about 74-76% of the Indian population (Muslims make up about 14%) and upper castes only around 10-12%.

The assertion of lower castes since the late 1970s has had some important political results. To take only a couple of examples, since 1989 only two Chief Ministers (CM) of Uttar Pradesh, (India’s most populous state), have been upper caste men. Twice in this time, a Dalit woman, , has been CM. NO upper caste man has been CM of Bihar since the late 1980s. A Dalit has been President of India.

BUT that big picture should not blind us to local issues, and power imbalances. Although there have been many organized lower caste political groups, UPPER CASTES have traditionally monopolized the political sphere, the bureaucracy, and most important, the INTELLIGENTSIA. And this has provoked a great deal of RESENTMENT among the majority.

It is in THIS context that we have to recall TWO important events or periods

 One the history that allowed OBC groups to play an important role in national politics, see http://jan.ucc.nau.edu/~sj6/Janata%20Party%20and%20Aftermath.pptx under the leadership of Charan Singh during Janata Party era.  Second, the return of OBC politics (after a hiatus during Mrs. Gandhi’s second innings and under Rajiv Gandhi), when Prime Minister V.P. Singh, in 1989, announced that his government would begin implementing the Mandal Commission Report Recommendations

SLIDE SIXTEEN The MANDAL COMMISSION, created during the Janata Party era in 1979, had issued its recommendation in 1983. These included classifying 52% of the population as being part of the OTHER BACKWARD CASTES (OBC). This was in ADDITION to the 22% of the population already classified as Scheduled Caste (Dalit) or Scheduled Tribes.

These groups, the Mandal Commission’s findings demonstrated, had been historically deprived entry into educational institutions and government positions. The Commission therefore 7 recommended AFFIRMATIVE ACTION programs for OBCs, and reserved seats for them in colleges and an OBC quota for GOVERNMENT jobs.

The report had been shelved by Indira Gandhi, who was Prime Minister when the report was delivered. It continued to be ignored by Rajiv Gandhi. But, V.P. Singh decided to act on it and announced that his government would IMPLEMENT the Mandal Commission recommendations.

The absolute FURORE this decision provoked among the upper caste Hindus (who had had a virtual monopoly in higher education and government positions except for token Dalit representation) was unprecedented.

SLIDE SEVENTEEN Some upper caste students set themselves on fire in public, to protest against the decision. Well to do, upper caste mothers, who had never protested anything before, came out on to the streets to support their children’s future.

The rhetoric used was of MERITOCRACY, that merit rather than caste should decide who gets into colleges or enter some occupations. The protestors completely ignored the long history of privilege that secured them their “merit.”

Even the symbols used in protests were redolent of privilege. Rich upper caste boys pretended to be shoeshine boys in protest, signifying that was the only option left to them if Mandal recommendations were implemented. Clearly, they considered such work beneath them. Given that there WERE people who earned their living shining shoes, the upper caste students’ own assumptions about the natural order of society stood revealed through such protests

What was at stake here were not simply a few thousand government jobs that would now be reserved for OBC groups, but rather THE THREAT TO THEIR PRIVILEGED POSITION IN SOCIETY that was recognized both by upper caste students and housewives.

SLIDE EIGHTEEN The reaction of the upper castes worked to galvanize India’s OBC communities, and led to emergence of strong leaders with national reputations who were as diff from the urbane Nehru, Indira or Rajiv, as chalk from cheese.

Among two of the most prominent leaders who acquired a national reputation and a solid political in their own states were MULAYAM SINGH YADAV (Uttar Pradesh) and LALU PRASAD YADAV (Bihar).

Although both had made their initial mark as student leaders protesting the Emergency, neither of them took to the trappings of urbane, westernized, Anglophone politics that prevailed in the national capital. If anything, they celebrated their rusticity, and were brash in speaking truth to power. In this, they did reflected both the mood and the situation of their constituents.

8 But, one cannot really talk about OBC groups without also thinking about DALITS. Once again, do go back to the Janata Party powerpoint for more details. Dalits, on account of economic distress, face more oppression that OBC groups did. In the aftermath of centuries of living as people with no rights, the emergence of a leader like AMBEDKAR was very important to Dalit pride. It was of great significance that one of them was framing the constitution, was talking on equal terms with those who had literally held power of life and death over them in earlier generations. After AMBEDKAR’s death, many Dalits went back to voting for the INC, and were represented by people like Jagjiwan Ram, the absolute antithesis of the firebrand Ambedkar.

The political space that was opened up with the end of INC hegemony in the 1970s, also worked for Dalits (as it had for OBCs). , who worked to set up what eventually came to be called the (BSP), worked with Dalit intellectuals and government staff. Affirmative action programs instituted with constitution for Dalits (See table, Guha pg 605), meant there were quite a few Dalits in the top and at the very bottom of government staff.

After Kanshi Ram, Dalits found a leader in his protégé, MAYAVATI, a former schoolteacher. A provincial and national leader, Ms. Mayawati gave a new voice and different public persona to Dalit politics, one that was combative, ambitious and totally unscrupulous in adopting all means to secure power for Dalits.

SLIDE NINETEEN Such has been the power of OBC mobilization that even the BJP, historically always controlled by upper castes (Vajapayee, Advani and Joshi, the three leaders who brought the party to center stage of politics in the 1990s were all upper caste), has taken to promoting OBC leaders.

UMA BHARATI who was present at the demolition of the Babri Masjid is from an OBC background, as is NARENDRA MODI, the present Prime Minister.

SLIDE TWENTY I cannot emphasize enough the extent to which the hegemony of the INC from Nehru to Indira Gandhi had kept OBC or Dalit groups from emerging in national politics. They were given their due in state politics but “managed” by what scholars have called the “Congress machine.” The upper caste leadership of the INC represented them, but did not allow national level OBC leaders to emerge outside of the party.

One reason we see the rise in OBC presence and Dalit assertiveness in national politics in the post-Rajiv (1989) era, is that from 1989 through 2008, most national governments did not have single party majorities and relied on COALITIONS to govern.

This sort of political scenario, where governments need to be much more responsive to public opinion than large-majority governments, made it easier for minority or suppressed groups who have the resources, to express their demands for rights.

9 SLIDE TWENTY ONE One common characteristic that marked the first generation of new Dalit and OBC leaders, was their cultural difference from the older political elite of India.

Unlike Nehru, Indira, or Rajiv, this generation of Dalit and OBC leaders were parochial rather than cosmopolitan, and often said things that were considered impolite if not anathema in Indian political discourse, and certainly never spoken of in the living rooms of polite westernized urban elites! They absorbed Indira Gandhi’s populist tactics, but were and are not averse to using either foul language or indeed adopting violent tactics when needed. Among the men, misogyny was not uncommon.

Whether representing castes or communities, this generation of lower caste leaders are examples of a fascinating ongoing political experiment, what one might call democracy without liberalism.

Leaders like Modi, Lalu Yadav or Mulayam achieved political power because electoral democracy was working. Without it, they would be nowhere.

In fact, one could go further and argue that in shedding the veneer of western liberalism, they are more representative of Indian society than earlier generations of political leaders. If, under their leadership, the democratic process is less liberal than it was before, it is because they better represent an illiberal society from which they have emerged. If they are not averse of violence it is because of the recognition that oppression is violent, and so must be the assertion of rights AGAINST that oppression.

This is, as I say, a fascinating experience, because till now we have accepted that liberalism and democracy must be part of a single package. India started a political experiment that we are now seeing replicated across the world, whether in the UK, in Brazil, in the Philippines or even closer home, as brash, illiberal, misogynistic, and rude political leaders come to power through the democratic process! Let’s see how this experiment turns out.

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