The Rise of the Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement

The rise of the Fossil Fuel Divestment movement

A study of policy entrepreneurs in triangular constellations.

“Greater than the tread of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come.”

Victor Hugo

I would like to thank mw. dr. C.M. Roggeband, who supervised my research with great care and enthusiasm. I am especially grateful for her constructive feedback and motivational talks that, without a doubt, enhanced my writing process. Many thanks as well to my interviewees, who participated with great enthusiasm and provided me with essential insights. I would also like to thank my research group for the support and inspiration and wish them best of luck for the next adventure.

Master thesis Jessie van Erp, 10332952 MA Political Science, specialisation Public Policy and Governance University of Amsterdam 2017, June 23 Supervised by mw. dr. C.M. Roggeband Second reader dhr. R.J. Pistorius

TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Transnational Advocacy Networks and the Divestment movement Theoretical framework Resource exchange perspective and venue-shopping Gatekeepers and policy entrepreneurs Policy networks and velvet triangles Research design Comparative case study Process tracing Document analysis Semi-structured interviews Justification and contributions Results The case of Ireland General political opportunity structure Issue specific opportunity structure The divestment movement in Ireland Policy making process and relevant actors Policy entrepreneurship The case of The Netherlands General political opportunity structure Issue specific opportunity structure The divestment movement in Ireland Policy making process and relevant actors Policy entrepreneurship Country comparison and analysis Conclusion Bibliography Appendixes Interview 1: Policy officer Trocaire Interview 2: Fossil Free TDC (Trinity College Dublin) student representative Interview 3: Fossil Free UvA – HvA student representative Interview 4: Director Fossil Free NL Topic list interviews

ABP: Algemeen Burger Pensioenfonds DNB: De Nederlandsche Bank (Dutch Central Bank) GGEI: Global Green Economy Index GLAN: Global Legal Action Network TD: "Teachta Dála", which in English means "Deputy to the Dáil” UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Introduction 12 December 2015 will be remembered as a historical day in the battle against climate change. On that day, representatives of 195 countries achieved an agreement in Paris on ambitious goals to mitigate climate change. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) brought all nations together to work for a common cause, namely to combat- and adapt - to the devastating effects of climate change (UNFCCC, 2017). This historical agreement was not an achievement of politicians alone. Long before the actual day a myriad of civil society actors had been coming together, coalesced and formed enormous transnational advocacy networks. By way of protests, petitions, lobbying and network gatherings these actors have been building momentum towards the negotiations of October 2016. While the Paris Agreement was celebrated worldwide by environmental NGOs, activists, politicians, citizens and the like, in the aftermath of the victory it became clear that there was a need to think about what happens after ‘success’. In fact, many transnational networks, local NGOs and activists emphasised that the Paris Agreements are no solution to climate change in itself. Rather, it is a call to action. Half year later, only 147 out of 195 countries have actually ratified the Paris Agreement. To all civil society actors that were pressuring, lobbying and urging their national governments to set ambitious climate targets prior to the Paris Agreement, this slow pace is more than worrisome. Interestingly, in the run up to the Paris Agreement, a particular global environmental justice movement has been gaining momentum as well. According to a 2013 report from the University of Oxford, the Fossil Fuel Divestment movement has been the growing faster than any other previous divestment movement, such as the one on tobacco and apartheid. Divestment is, in the words of the Fossil Fuel Divestment movement ‘the breaking of ties with an immoral industry’, in this case the fossil fuel industry. It entails reducing any asset in the fossil fuel sector for political, moral or ethical reasons, be it subsidies, stocks, funds or sponsorships (Global Divestment Mobilisation, 2017). In the words of Emma Howard, journalist at The Guardian (which, as a matter of fact, has started its own campaign called ‘keep it in the ground’), divestment is the opposite of investment – the removal of your investment capital from stocks, bonds or funds. The arguments that are central to convince institutions to remove their money from oil, gas and coal have both a moral and financial dimension (Howard, 2015). To meet the targets of the Paris agreement, namely to halt global warming to a 2 degrees rise, means that between two-thirds and four-fifths of fossil fuel reserves cannot be extracted but need to stay in the ground (Carbon Tracker, The Grantham

Research Institute and LSE, 2013). The moral case for divestment is beautifully formulated by Divest Invest Europe, a large European network within the global movement:

‘The ethical case for divestment and investment is simple. We cannot, in good conscience, invest in companies that are accelerating climate change, which disproportionately affects the poor, profoundly impacts the environment and, if unabated, is predicted to wipe out a large proportion of global GDP.’ (Europeans for DivestInvest, n.d., para. 1).

The financial argument relies upon the premise that if the Paris Climate Agreement is met, a large part of the investments in fossil fuels will become worthless (Howard, 2015). The argument goes that these so-called ‘stranded assets’ are growing a financial ‘carbon bubble’, as the fossil fuel reserves are not burnable. So far, around 732 institutions, among which pension funds, philanthropic organisations, governments and educational institutions, have divested from fossil fuels, which equals a value of more or less 5.45 trillion dollar. While the rise of this movement in the context of the Paris Agreement is an interesting occurrence in itself, it may very well be representative of a broader phenomenon. In point of fact, there is a vast body of literature dedicated to investigating political consequences of social movement action and interest group politics aiming for certain policy change. Considering that an important part of politics occurs ‘at the gates of’ formal decision-making arena’s, this academic inquisitiveness is not entirely unexpected. Much of this research on social movements and interest groups looks into the circumstances and conditions under which these groups either flourish or flounder. In continuation thereof, many scholars researching interest groups have investigated access to policymaking processes. The study of access in this regard is interesting because it reveals which groups are noticed by or important to influential political actors (Binderkrantz and Perdersen, 2016). This hints at the fact that that policy change cannot only be explained by an advantageous political opportunity structure, but that agency of particular actors plays a role in the policy process as well. While these structural and agentive approaches to policy change both have been subject of a considerable body of literature, the interplay between the two approaches remains an attractive field of research. The former has been emphasized in the political opportunity structure approach to policy change, whereas the latter has been emphasised in research on the concept of the policy entrepreneur. In my research I assess precisely this interchange,

7 attempting to answer the question how do policy entrepreneurs influence policy change incited by the divestment movement in decision-making arenas? To delve slightly more into the cause the divestment movement is advocating for, I start this thesis with introducing the work of multiple scholars on the emergence of the movement. In doing so, I place it in the context of a transnational advocacy network. Then, I will present the theoretical framework for this thesis. In doing so, I will discuss the central concepts and propose definitions that are most appropriate for my research. Furthermore, on basis of the theories introduced in the first part, I will illustrate the ongoing debate between various scholars on the role of policy-entrepreneurs. This leads to the positioning of my research in this debate, which will serve as a guide for the subsequent steps that are to be take in this thesis project. Then, I will introduce my case study to assess the role of policy entrepreneurs, accompanied by a research design, namely a country comparison of Ireland and the Netherlands, and a justification for the methodology employed. The analysis of the results is organised around the two possible interpretations for policy change, highlighting the role of policy entrepreneurs. By way of conclusion the interaction between the two approaches will be discussed. Finally, I will explore fruitful directions for further research.

Transnational Advocacy Networks and the Divestment movement The fossil fuel divestment movement is a transnational advocacy network, which uses a variety of strategies to encourage investors from the public and private sector to divest in fossil fuels stocks, and invest in climate-friendly alternatives. The movement was initiated at university campuses in the USA, and quickly spread all over the world. As a matter of fact, Bratman, Brunette, Shelly and Nicholson (2016) studied the American student divestment movement. It shows that, while the main objective of persuading institutions (in this case the university) to divest in fossil fuels oftentimes remains without the desired outcomes, the movement is successful when it comes to starting a debate and altering the discourse around sustainability. This seems to align with the findings of Soule and King (2006) in that influence differs over different responsiveness stages. In this particular investigation the conclusion of the researches is that due to the fossil fuel student divestment movement, new and constructive alliances between the students and institutional gatekeepers, like the faculty members and administrators, have been established. Yet, this does not tell us anything about the role of policy entrepreneurs or the importance of access to decision-making arenas. Although scholars acknowledge the timeliness of the movement, most of them do not hesitate to call it an early success (Ansar, Caldecott & Tilbury, 2013; Ayling & Gunningham,

2015). It seems to me that the measure for success is in these judgements is the extent to which the movement was able to raise awareness on the topic and to get it on the agenda of a large variety of institutions. On the one hand, scholars like Ayling and Gunningham (2015) highlight the innovative features of the movement, like the strong moral dimension that is prioritised over legitimacy due to expertise. On the other hand, some investigations emphasise that the fossil fuel divestment movement finds its roots in previous divestment campaigns such as tobacco and South African apartheid. Soule (1997) gives us insights in the emergence of the movement and how it diffused in the United States. While raising awareness and agenda-setting on fossil fuel divestment and investment in renewables is not the main goal, it helps in creating alliances. In fact, Baumgarner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball and Leech (2009) emphasise the importance of collective shifts of gatekeepers that allow for possible dramatic policy reversals. This aligns with the understanding that lobbying and advocacy take place in multiple venues, involving a great variety of gatekeepers. Amenta, Caren and Chiarello (2010) affirm this line of thought, arguing that if like-minded institutional political actors support the fossil fuel divestment movement representatives, the movement is more likely to produce the desired results. In contrast to Baumgarner et al. (2009), Amenta et al. (2010) highlight the rational thinking of the gatekeepers, arguing that the divestment movement is more likely to convince gatekeepers to support them, if there is something to gain for them. One could interpret this as a cost- benefit analysis, in which the advantages offered by the movement, such as augmenting electoral coalitions or gaining in public opinion, outweigh the costs of supporting their proposals. Of course, my choice for the transnational divestment movement is not randomly made. Divestment is, according to the Oxford dictionary “the action or process of selling off subsidiary business interests or investments” (Divestment, n.d.). In light of the task of mitigating climate change, one of the wicked problems of our time, the term ‘divestment’ was given a whole new dimension by an enormous transnational network of climate activists, NGOs, institutions, businesses and the like. Main players like Fossil Free, 350.org, Divest- Invest Philanthropy have framed divestment as “the breaking of ties with an immoral industry”. Concerning climate change, the industries that are considered most immoral are without a doubt the fossil fuel industries. It is for this reason that the transnational divestment movement uses a variety of strategies to encourage investors from the public and private sector to divest from fossil fuels stocks, and replace them with climate-friendly, or at least climate-neutral, alternatives. The unprecedented growth of the movement (Carrington, 2013)

9 makes it an appealing case for my research, but more importantly, it aligns with the previously mentioned, and one of the most important investment advices of the century: the Paris Climate Agreement. One of the key features of this agreement is that the emissions of conventional resources should be reduced to zero between 2050 and 2100 (Mommers, 2016), and compliance with this agreement is precisely what the transnational divestment movement pressures its targets for (Fossil Free, 2017).

Theoretical framework

Resource exchange perspective and venue-shopping This section is organised around questions of how interest- and advocacy groups voice their interest, to which gaining access to decision-making arena’s is key. A group of prominent scholars specialised in interest group studies, Binderkatz, Christiansen and Pedersen (2015) investigate interest group influence from a resource exchange perspective. These scholars argue that the access of interest groups to various political arenas is a crucial condition for exerting influence in the process. Relying upon a resource exchange perspective, their claim is warranted by the premise that gatekeepers such as politicians, bureaucrats and reporters have an essential role in either granting or denying interest- and advocacy groups access to the relevant decision-making arena’s. This view on particular actors within the policy process adopt a merely agentive approach to interest group influence. While this is an interesting argument, it seems to rely upon the idea that access to decision-making arenas is a necessary condition for influence. This assumption is contested by literature on social movement mobilisation that demonstrates ways in which mass mobilisations, mediated by the media or not, are able to exert influence over decision-making processes. As such, the assumption that access to decision-making arenas is necessary to influence political decisions is not fully evincive. A similar approach that underlines the importance of gaining access on the side of interest- and advocacy-groups is central to an extensive debate on venue-shopping. The debate revolves around the extent to which interest- and advocacy groups are able to pursue rational strategies in seeking an advantageous decision setting. Many scholars oppose this claim by arguing that, oftentimes, the activity of venue-shopping by interest- and advocacy groups is more experimental, and less calculated than usually is assumed. The strategic exchange element between gatekeepers and interest- and advocacy seems valuable to my research, as it would allow me to obtain useful insight into the belief systems and inner world

10 of both gatekeepers and interest- and advocacy groups. The pitfall of this approach is, as mentioned before, the unwarranted emphasis on access as an indispensable condition for interest- or advocacy groups to exert influence over decision-making processes. The importance of access should, however, not be underestimated. This debate will be illustrated in the following section. A common thread running through the body of literature on interest group influence is the assumption that having access is key to gaining influence over the targeted processes, like agenda setting or decision making (Binderkrantz and Perdersen, 2016). This assumption appears already in the work of Truman in 1951, who argues that

‘power of any kind cannot be reached by a political interest group, or its leaders, without access to one or more key points of decision in the government. Access, therefore, becomes the facilitating intermediate objective of political interest groups. The development and improvement of such access is a common denominator of the tactics of all of them.’ (Truman in Bouwen, 2004, p. 338).

While this is certainly an important train of thought, access can certainly not be equated with influence, as interest group actors may be able to gain access to a decision-making arena without translating their demands into an effective policy outcome (Bouwen, 2004). Moreover, it is often hypothesised that interest- or advocacy groups with access are more influential than those without. This has resulted in an extensive debate about how to define and operationalise influence, as well as how to measure it (Dahl, 1961; Dür, 2007; Leech, 2010). Within this debate it seems that most scholars utilise a merely intuitive understanding of access, which hints at an interesting gap. This gap is, to a certain extent, addressed by Binderkrantz and Perdersen (2016), who argue that “for access to be present, interest groups need to seek it, and relevant gatekeepers need to allow it” (p.2). This view implies, in line with previously mentioned scholars like Braun (2012) and Binderkatz et al. (2015) a more bidirectional interaction between gatekeepers and interest- or advocacy groups, instead of putting undue emphasis on the strategic capacities of solely interest- and advocacy groups. However, like viewing access as a necessary precondition seems unwarranted, this argument on the significance of gatekeepers might flawed in the same way. It assumes that gaining access requires gatekeepers for gaining access, a claim that is not backed up by enough convincing evidence.

Social movement literature addresses the previously mention interaction as well. For instance, Soule and King (2006) examine how social movements matter to policy change in the United States. What makes their research interesting is special attention dedicated to stages of policy responsiveness, which echoes the work of Burstein et al. (1995) and Schumaker (1975). This moves away from characterising the policy process as a dichotomous phenomenon, putting unwarranted emphasis on the policy outcome as the final and most visible stage of policymaking. Instead, Soule and King (2006) state that while social movements and the like influence policy change, the effects will differ in critical ways over the different stages. They ascribe this variations to the increasingly stringent rules as the policy process advances, as well to the increasing consequentiality of policy action. This approach is helpful in pinpointing influence of social movements and presumably interest – and advocacy groups over time, spanning over the policy cycle. However, their claims merely rely upon rational choice theory, namely that responsiveness of gatekeepers is contingent upon the cost of introducing it to higher levels of decision-makers. Applied in reverse, it portrays interest- and advocacy groups as actors that pursue only rational strategies. This belief is particularly opposed in research focused on the previously mentioned concept of venue-shopping, defined by Pralle (2003) as “the activities of advocacy groups and policymakers who seek out a decision setting where they can air their grievances with current policy and present alternative policy proposals” (p. 233). Pralle (2003) argues that in many cases venue-shopping seems more experimental, and less calculated than usually is assumed. I consider this view particularly interesting because he views the agency of interest – and advocacy groups as an investigational journey to find an entrance point into the decision- making arena, instead of the conventional philosophy of rational choice. In this way, Pralle (2003) gives useful insights in how the inner world and belief systems of advocacy groups, together with their resources, determine the most appropriate venue choice. Braun (2012) comes to a similar conclusion, namely that striving for access by advocacy groups is merely driven by a general tendency to interact with a myriad of policymakers, instead of one strategically chosen policy venue to seek access to. Whereas Braun does not specify what this experimental approach entails, it seems to hint at seeking multiple venues that seem most accessible. It is refreshing that these scholars somewhat downplay the strategic agency of advocacy groups, highlighting the experimental and behavioural factors that nuance the perceived ‘rational strategies’ of advocacy groups. However, this insight does not suffice to understand how these groups select and perceive their venues. Holyoke, Brown and Henig

(2012), for instance, conclude that ideological congruence between interest group representatives and advocates explains to some extent the approaching of certain gatekeepers working in particular venues. More importantly, however, is the issue the interest- and advocacy groups focus on. Holyoke et al. (2012) claim that most of the group representatives approach venues that are actively working on their issue. Dür, Bernhagen, and Marshall (2015) add the interesting finding that influence of private actors often is conditioned by the nature of the policy issue. When it concerns a legislative policy in the EU, the presence of conflicting interests strongly affects the influence business groups have. Lastly, in response to Binderkrantz and Perdersen (2016), Beyers (2016) argues that the interactions between the gatekeepers and interest- and advocacy groups are oftentimes centred around specific policy issue.

Gatekeepers and policy entrepreneurs The importance of access is reflected as well in the academic debate upon the concept of gatekeepers, which demonstrates the significance of agency in the policy process. Firstly, the debate revolves around the very definition of the concept of gatekeeper. Binderkatz et al. (2015) name politicians, bureaucrats, and reporters as the most important examples of gatekeepers but do not provide a clear-cut definition. The same goes for scholars as Braun (2012) and Bouwen (2004), who both have examined the interaction between interest- or advocacy groups and gatekeepers. Rather than offering a precise definition of who these so- called gatekeepers are, these scholars explain what the role of gatekeepers is, or put differently, what it is these actors do. Gatekeepers exchange resources with interest- and advocacy groups, namely relevant resources for decision-makers provided by these groups are exchanged for influence granted by gatekeepers (Binderkatz et al., 2015). According to Braun (2012), gatekeepers in public agencies have the capacity to strategically pick out interest- or advocacy groups to interact with, in his research also referred to as ‘brokerage’. Bouwen (2004) portrays the exact same interaction, specifying it as a supply and demand scheme. Taking into consideration all these complementing views on the role of gatekeepers it seems fair to say that the definition of a gatekeeper in line with the Oxford dictionary as “a person that controls access to something” is a safe one (Gatekeeper, n.d.). Turning the vague word ‘something’ into ‘decision-making arena’s’ and adding the strategic exchange component of Braun (2012) and Bouwen (2004) results in a definition that seems more suitable to my research. That is, a gatekeeper is “a person that controls access to decision-making arenas based upon the resource exchange with interest- and advocacy groups”. Inherent to this

13 definition, however, is the assumption that gatekeepers have a certain ‘control’ over access to decision making arena’s. This is an assumption that is largely undertheorized, and poses a challenge to my research. For that reason it is wise to complement the concept of gatekeeper with the analytically equivalent phenomenon of policy entrepreneur. Much policy-making literature has been dedicated to explaining periods of dynamic policy change. To this end, the concept of policy entrepreneur arguably plays an important role. Similar to gatekeepers, the role and activities of policy entrepreneurs in the broader context of the policy-making process remain fairly underexposed in academic literature. That is to say, how the activities of policy entrepreneurs contribute to advance certain policy change, and how their role can be better integrated in the study of policy-analysis remains a puzzle to be solved (Mintrom & Norman, 2009). Keck and Sikkink (1998) coined the term ‘political entrepreneur’ to indicate the key networkers for a certain campaign within a transnational advocacy network. Such network members, they argue, seek to get particular issues on the political agenda with effective framing strategies, as well as seeking advantageous venues to do so (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, 14). In addition, Keck and Sikkink (1998) stress that political entrepreneurs are key in fuelling the emergence and expansion of a network, as they oftentimes ‘personify’ the cause they strive for. When delving more into the realm of policy change, the term policy entrepreneur appears more appropriate. This term already appeared in the work of Kingdon (1984), who argued that policy entrepreneurs “lie in wait in and around government with their solutions at hand, waiting for problems to float by to which they can attach their solutions, waiting for a development in the political stream they can use to their advantage” (p. 165-166). In this definition, much emphasis is placed upon the ability to exploit a ‘window of opportunity’ and ascribes most of policy entrepreneurs’ success to a beneficial context or political opportunity structure. Modern studies on policy entrepreneurship seem to have shifted from emphasising the political opportunity structure to emphasising the agency of policy entrepreneurs. For instance, Mintrom and Norman (2009) assert that “policy entrepreneurs distinguish themselves through their desire to significantly change current ways of doing things in their area of interest” (p. 650). To be more specific, they elaborated upon the work of, amongst others, Kingdon (1984;1995), Robert and King (1996) and Mintrom (2000). This has led them to believe that four elements form the core of policy entrepreneurship, namely: social aquity, which is the ability to see and seize upon windows of opportunity by making good use of policy networks, as well as by understanding the local policy context of others in the network and responding effectively; problem definition, in particular what components are made

14 salient and for what purpose; coalition building and working in teams, as to demonstrate the degree of support or avert opponents’ arguments. Finally, policy entrepreneurs are said to lead by example, both with the aim to increase their credibility and to reduce the perception of risk for decision-makers (Mintrom et al, 2009). First of all, this approach is appealing as it, in contrast to earlier studies of e.g. Kingdon (1984), highlights the policy entrepreneurs’ aptitude to propose solutions and generate attention to certain problems. This hints at the capacity of policy entrepreneurs to, to a certain extent, influence the context in which they operate. Also, approaching policy entrepreneurship in this way aligns with the concept of gatekeeper in that it contains a resource-exchange component as well. The main characteristics ‘problem definition’ and ‘coalition building’ in particular involve the exchange between resources and influence of interest-and advocacy groups and decision-makers, as policy entrepreneurs understand very well that forming effective partnerships with relevant actors that work for a common cause increases the amount of resources, skills and support in return. Furthermore, it needs to be emphasised that both the concept of gatekeeper as the profile of policy entrepreneur merely refer to the abilities of the actor instead of the position they hold. This is an important guiding principle for identifying possible policy entrepreneurs in the case study of this research, as it concretises what characteristics and skills are to be identified. Moreover, both concepts illustrate a collaboration component between stakeholders, which will be elaborated upon in the following section. While there is certainly overlap between the concepts of gatekeeper and policy entrepreneurs, as previously illustrated, the concepts have some distinctive features as well. The matrix below visualises both the complementarity and the differences between gatekeepers and policy entrepreneurs, by way of differentiating between dimensions. The horizontal axe reflects the activities of gatekeepers, so either granting or denying access to decision-making arenas. The vertical axe differentiates between the two main activities of policy entrepreneurs, more specifically where their activities take place. Looking at gatekeepers and policy entrepreneurs through these two dimensions makes the matrix tailor- made for the purpose of my research (Figure 1).

Agenda setting

Social movements Counter-movements

Advocacy groups Counter-lobby

Open Closed

Politicians Politicians/parties Civil servants Civil servants Experts Experts

Policy process

Figure 1: integrating gatekeepers and policy entrepreneurs

Policy networks and velvet triangles As of the 1970’s public policy academics have started to explore the more informal processes through which policy is introduced and developed (Heywood, 1997). This research draws attention to policy networks, which are communities of policy actors that interweave the public and private sectors. Usually, such network revolves around a common interest or general orientation in a particular field and is made up of a multitude of different actors. It could embrace bureaucrats, key legislators, lobbyists, journalists, academics and the like. Much research of the policy-process in the USA has referred to a so-called ‘Iron triangle’, a policy network made up of legislative committees, interest groups and executive bodies (Heywood, 1997). Following this body of literature, Holli (2008) presents a conceptual analysis of feminist triangles, also referred to as ‘co-operative constellations’, which take the shape of strategic partnerships, triangles of empowerment and velvet triangles. The difference between the three merely lies in the categorisation of the triangle that varies for each of them. For the purpose of my research the latter may provide a fruitful way to investigate the relationships between various actors, as velvet triangles differentiate between state officials, civil society actors and universities or consultancies (Figure 2).

State official

Civil society actors Universities/consultancies

Figure 2: velvet triangle as presented by Woodward (2004)

The model incorporates both features of gatekeepers and policy entrepreneurs. With regard to the former, Woodward (2004) states that ‘the listening ear providing access to the policy agenda also receives something besides trust and loyalty. These are the new ideas, which can increase their bureau’s internal prestige and resources’ (p.76). Woodward (2004) clearly mentions the exchange-component, as well as the access element, granted or denied by a gatekeeper. The policy entrepreneur concept is less explicit in the model, although it illustrates the significance of building coalitions in a policy network with a great variety of actors. Altogether, this model is appealing for its simplicity and focus on relationships. However, some caution is required since the model has been used in country-specific contexts. This entails that the quality and number of potential actors may vary, as well as their relationships. The specific context of the countries to be studied merits, therefore, careful attention. To conclude this section I reiterate the research question that will serve as a guide for the rest of my thesis, namely, ‘how do policy entrepreneurs influence policy change incited by the divestment movement in decision-making arenas? In the next section I will elaborate on the research design of my thesis, which will include a detailed description of the research methods employed. In doing so, I will justify my choice for the methods utilized in my research. Furthermore, this section illustrates my train of thought in selecting the cases of my research, as well as a detailed warrant for my choices.

Research design

Comparative case study To assess the role of policy entrepreneurs influencing policy change incited by the divestment movement it is imperative to adopt a sound research design that will serve as a guide for my research. A country comparison between two European Union member states, Ireland and the Netherlands, forms the key component of my research design. The climate policy of the EU does not lead to unitary policy at the member state level, and is a geographical area where the divestment movement has not often been subject to academic research. This makes it interesting to compare two European countries. Besides this spatial variation, my research includes a temporal variation, since it explores different policy-making processes. It is for these reasons that my research relies upon a longitudinal comparative case study, whereby longitudinal refers to the length of a policy-cycle. Given the fact that a case study is more of a research design than a research method, it is particularly useful for triangulation with other research techniques. To make an insightful comparison between countries I have selected the two countries on basis of a ‘most similar system’ in terms of political opportunity structure. This inspired by Mill’s ‘method of difference’ that assesses cases with a similar context, but a different cause and outcome. Ireland and The Netherlands have a similar political opportunity structure, but very different outcomes with regards to divestment. That is, Ireland will most likely divest from fossil fuels within the upcoming 5 years, enshrined in a parliamentary bill, but the Netherlands move in the opposite direction and has no national policy on fossil fuel divestment (DNB, 2017). To justify my choice for Ireland and the Netherlands, it is key to understand on basis of what criteria I find them to have a similar political opportunity structure. Political opportunity structure is a concept that is widespread in social movement literature. One of the most prominent scholars that has both advanced academic theory on the concept and demonstrated its relevance in the policy-making process is Kriesi (1996; 2004). In his work Kriesi (2004) presents a typology that incorporates notions of political opportunity structures, which forms the basis of the countries I selected. This entails, firstly, that I have been looking at the structural dimensions of a country, namely the openness of the political system. Kriesi (2004) considers this to be a function of the centralisation and the degree of the separation of power. That is, the more decentralised a country, the more entry points of formal access. Applied in reverse, the more centralised a country, there are less access points to decision-

18 making arenas. This distinction is carrying considerable weight as it hints at the potentially important role that policy entrepreneurs can play. To be more specific, in a centralised system, there are thought to be less access points compared to a decentralised system, and this makes policy entrepreneurs and gatekeepers are all the more important, if not essential, for advocacy groups to generate policy change. Secondly, Kriesi (2004) includes the criterion of electoral systems into his typology of political opportunity structures. For instance, proportional electoral systems allow for more parties to enter in parliament. Therefore I conclude that in a proportional electoral system there is a greater variety of access points in decision-making. Conversely, majoritarian electoral systems are known to have less different access points as parliament is composed of fewer parties. Both Ireland and the Netherlands have a centralised government and a proportional electoral system, in other words, a similar political opportunity structure based upon Kriesi’s (2004) typology. This accounts for the comparability of the countries. What makes this country comparison interesting is the fact that the outcomes of the divestment campaign in the two countries are quite different, despite a similar political opportunity structure. With my research I aim to develop the theory on the concept of policy entrepreneurship and to investigate its interchange with the political opportunity structure approach to policy change. A comparative case study is helpful in theory development, as it will give me understanding of the case specific development of the movement in both countries. Moreover, it will also help me answer the more general ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions on the role of policy entrepreneurs in the relevant institutional context. In other words, ‘A “case study,” […] is best defined as an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units.’ (Gerring, 2004, p. 341). Since policy entrepreneurship is really an agentive concept, I have evaluated the behaviour, interests, beliefs and relationships of individual actors and organisations. That is, it is necessary to delve deep into the two country cases, in order to obtain any valuable insight in the concept of policy entrepreneurship. However, it is important to mention that by reviewing the literature on policy-making processes, Transnational Advocacy Networks and policy change, I can conclude that policy entrepreneurs never operate in a vacuum. Research on political opportunity structures has contributed to understanding on a structural level why policy change occurs. Therefore, by incorporating the more structural dimension of the political opportunity structure, the generalisability is not at a high risk. Arguably, the political opportunity structure can be complemented very well by the political entrepreneurship

19 approach, underlining the interaction between the different levels and giving policy entrepreneurship the weight it merits. My comparative case study relies upon a triangulation of the following research methods: process tracing, interviews and document analysis. These methods are briefly discussed in the following section.

Process tracing One of the key features of the method of process tracing is the possibility to identify causal mechanisms at work in a specific case. This means that, rather than theory testing, the investigation focuses on theory-building. Although process tracing often paves the way for an in-depth analysis of the case that is not predominant for country-comparisons, I has been of great additional value in assessing the policy-making process of the two countries. Since process tracing can be considered ‘a research procedure intended to explore the pathways through which initial conditions are turned into outcomes’ (Veynesson, 2008 in Zeitlin, 2017), it helped in understanding why the divestment movement in Ireland and the Netherlands produced different policy outcomes. To be more specific, process tracing allowed for a detailed illustration of the policy-making process in the specific institutional contexts of Ireland and the Netherlands, which has been crucial for assessing the role, position and influence of policy entrepreneurs within this process. In fact, in his methodology lecture Zeitlin (2017) emphasised that process tracing is particularly useful when analysing decision- making processes, and in order to understand why and how outcomes occurred. Caution is required, though, because employing the method of process tracing runs the risk of going too much into detail. Awareness of this pitfall helped me to guarantee comparability and generalisability of results. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that my research was not exclusively focused on the policy outcome, but all the more on the process leading to the outcome. To strengthen the findings I did not only rely upon process tracing of the policy cycle in Ireland in the Netherlands. Instead, I employed methods that can be fruitfully integrated with process tracing, namely open-ended, semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Triangulation of the results generated via the different research methods have helped in validating and strengthening the overall argument in this thesis.

Document analysis Policy documents, briefings, hearings, parliamentary debates and news articles from reliable media outlets have been rich sources that contributed to the reconstruction of the policy-

20 processes that were central to the comparative case study of the divestment movement. Triangulated with the method of process tracing, it provided the chronological component that is particularly key to understanding the key quality of ‘social acuity’. That is to say, social acuity involves timing of certain action by policy entrepreneurs, and a chronological construction of the policy process is key to the analysis of this element. Also, by way of a small frame analysis on basis of public speeches and briefings the ‘problem definition’ quality of policy entrepreneurs has been warranted, as official institutional text appeared to have relied upon the input of civil society actors. Such finding would hints at the problem defining capacities of a policy entrepreneur in the civil society environment.

Semi-structured interviews As most of the research on policy making and advocacy strategies highlights, aside of the formal procedures there are plentiful informal opportunities for lobby- and advocacy groups to influence decision-making processes. While process-tracing based upon policy-documents, briefings, hearings and news items provide a great deal of information on which actors are involved and/or coalesced, interviews shed a light on the rather informal procedures and, in particular, the role of policy entrepreneurs. Understanding how members of the divestment movement perceived the alliance with such gatekeepers has been crucial to my research, as their role oftentimes remains unexplicit in formal documentation. Altogether, interviewing main stakeholders has been an excellent way to triangulate my research in order to strengthen my argument. I employed purposive sampling, given the fact that the process tracing of the policy cycle combined with the document analysis has provided me with the names or organisations of the relevant actors and coalitions in the policy process. This means that for this research I have interviewed various members of the transnational divestment movement active in the two countries. They are members of student groups, national campaigners and transnational actors. Hence, I made a purposive sample of divestment movement members, because these actors are most likely to have the relevant information, are willing to share this information and not unimportant, they are most accessible. I interviewed the national coordinators of the divestment movement in both countries, and student representatives of local student divestment campaigns. Unfortunately, no state actor was available for an interview on the particular issue of divestment. As attempts to influence policy outcomes have a fairly secretive character, I made sure to offer the interviewees anonymity when processing the results. The interviews merely served as a way to confirm or contradict the results gathered by

21 process tracing. This means that, rather than asking fairly general and exploratory questions, more specific aspects have been central to the interview. In addition, as the results have been used for triangulation with other findings, it was not imperative, although desirable, to interview a very large group of members in the policy network. The perception of the respondents has either challenge or affirm previous findings or premises, as well as given insight in the belief systems and inner world of policy entrepreneurs, gatekeepers and stakeholders.

Justification and contributions So far I have evaluated various theories on the interaction between interest- and advocacy groups and state actors. Discussions about these interactions incorporate notions of access and influence, but many scholars leave the connection between the two fairly inexplicit. With my research I intend to contribute to this underexposed connection, by comparing the nature of relationships that exist between different members of the ‘velvet triangle’ or policy network in two different countries. The general political opportunity structure of the countries, Ireland and The Netherlands is similar, but looking at the specific features may very well shed a light on how policy entrepreneurs ‘see’ opportunities and subsequently ‘seize’ them. In other words, the agency of policy entrepreneurs within the divestment policy network has been assessed and, in particular, the interaction with more structural elements is highlighted. The literature review on policy entrepreneurs on the one hand, and political opportunity structure on the other leads me to hypothesise that successful policy change is more likely when policy entrepreneurs are present in all three sides of the velvet triangle, because they excel in exploiting windows of opportunities, defining problems in an effective way, successfully build coalitions and lead by example. This entails that with my research I try to demonstrate the fruitful integration of the policy entrepreneurship approach into the political opportunity structure framework.

Analysis

The case of Ireland

General political opportunity structure In the selection of the cases for the country comparison of the divestment movement, much attention has been paid to the comparability of the countries. Like The Netherlands, Ireland is a centralised state with a proportional electoral system. It is, however, of great importance to understand the specifics of the policy cycle of both Ireland and The Netherlands, and this section is dedicated to the former. The Irish parliament, the so-called Oireachtas, is made up of the lower house (the Dáil) and the upper house (the Seanad or Senate), both appointed for five-year terms (Freedom House, 2016). The lower house has 166 members who carry the name of "Teachta Dála" (TD), which in English means "Deputy to the Dáil” (Houses of the Oireachtas, n.d.). TD’s are elected by proportional representation and can be member of a government party, opposition party or sit as an independent member in the Dáil (Houses of the Oireachtas, n.d.) Each TD is bound to a geographical constituency, which fuels a local dimension to Irish national politics. It is said that if citizens reach out to their politicians, it is almost always done via their local TD (Interview 3, 2017, May 3). The upper house has a total of 60 members of which 11 are appointed by the prime minister, 43 are elected by a variety of interest groups, and 6 are elected by graduates of two universities, namely the University of Dublin (Trinity College) and the National University of Ireland (Houses of the Oireachtas, n.d.a). Both houses can initiate and revise legislation, although the Senate cannot initiate Money Bills, in other words, financial legislation (Houses of the Oireachtas, n.d.a). Given the fact that divestment merely concerns financial policy, only one house provides possible venues to the movement. Two parties have been dominating Irish politics, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, which do not differ very much on political ideology, but represent the two different sides in the Irish civil war of 1922-1923 (Freedom House, 2016). After the election of 2016 in Ireland, Fine Gael finds itself in a minority government, supported by the party Fianna Fáil until at least September 2018 (McDonald, 2016). This construction creates a unusual situation, perhaps even a unique window of opportunity. This will be elaborated upon later in this thesis.

Issue specific political opportunity structure Since the fossil fuel divestment movement is indubitably part of the larger environmental justice movement, it is useful to work with a more issue specific political opportunity structure that incorporates the development of the environmental movement in Ireland. The most complete and comprehensible overview is available in Leonard’s (2007) book The Environmental Movement in Ireland. He argues that the environmental movement in Ireland finds its roots in mobilisations organised around the conservation of Woodquay, a site of original Viking settlements in Dublin in 1978 and 1979. Leonard (2007) argues that during these mobilisations, for the first time, concerns about preservation, environment and local issues were unified. This could have been a fertile base for the development of the environmental movement in Ireland, but the opposite seems true. The movements remained small and locally based at the time (Yearley, 1995 as cited in Leonard, 2007). Something appears to have changed in the era of globalisation, in which politics gained a clear global dimension (Leonard, 2007). On the one hand, the Irish government has been putting much effort into attracting multinationals to settle in Ireland, with the aim of establishing stable economic development. On the other hand, the environmental movement obtained a global character, which gave an impetus to the rather small local environmental groups. The fact is, however, that the government prioritised attracting foreign investment over environmental issues (Leonard, 2007, 38). This means that advancing climate policy in this context, like in most contexts, is challenging the status quo, instead of upholding. In other words, it fuels the desire for policy change and, as asserted previously, this creates an environment in which policy entrepreneurs thrive (Little, 2017). In sum, climate change has been of low salience for incumbent parties (mostly Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil and to a certain extent the Labour party). In addition, Little (2017) concludes in his research that, not surprisingly, the Green Party has steadily been owner of the issue ‘climate change’ and ‘environment’, but without much substantial effect on Irish climate policy as a whole. This has been the general tendency until the influential Stern Report of 2006, which examined the economic effects of climate change (The Guardian, 2011). The combined with the persuasive documentary of Al Gore, An Inconvenient Truth, and an IPCC report in 2007 heightened public awareness and political attention to the topic of climate change. As a result, some candidates in the Irish general elections of 2007 of saw climate- change as a ‘vote-winner’. This led, for example, Fianna Fáil to incorporate the issue in their electoral programme in order to tap into the climate zeitgeist of the moment (Little, 2017). According to Little (2017) this was, arguably, a move to persuade the Green Party into a

24 government coalition, as it was expected to be particularly successful in this election round. This was, obviously, beneficial to the development of the environmental movement in Ireland. That is, larger support networks were established and civic participation in environmental decision-making increased (Leonard, 2007). It goes without saying that this works also the other way around, to wit: the rise of environmental social movements has also affected the political arena, as attested by the emergence and development of the Green party (Leonard, 2007). However, during interviews with members of the environmental movement in Ireland, it was repeatedly mentioned that Irish climate policy can be characterised by inertia, lack of action and missed targets. Little (2017) hints at this problem as well. In addition to this, Leonard (2007) warns that the degree to which the environmental movement has been incorporated in decision-making procedures should not be exaggerated. This leads to believe that the environmental movement in Ireland should not be considered authoritative in decision-making processes, but some of their campaigns were channelled into election programmes or subdued climate policy. In fact, one of the major milestones for the environmental movement was the adoption of a the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act in 2015, a goal for which a myriad of civil society actors lobbied and campaigned. Finally, it is imported to note that this issue specific illustration of the political opportunity structure in Ireland displays a certain variable element. In other words, the relevant political opportunity structure is not a static condition, but is characterised by its volatility In addition to underlining how the environmental movement in Ireland evolved over time as to come to a better understanding of the relevant political opportunity structure, it is sensible to dedicate attention to some of the financial aspects as well. Since fossil fuel divestment first and foremost refers to a financial act, namely divesting from fossil fuel assets and replacing it with a climate-neutral alternative, it is of the utmost importance to delve into the financial ties between the Irish government and the fossil fuel industry. The Global Green Economy Index (GGEI) (Tamanini, & Valenciano, 2016) offers excellent insights in the investments of the Irish state. This index measures the state of the Green economy both in terms of overall performance and overall perceptions of that performance by expert practitioners. It shows that Ireland is placed on number 26 out of 80 countries with regards to perceived performance, and on number 33 out of 80 countries in terms of actual performance. That means that Ireland’s economy is perceived to be ‘greener’ by experts than performance results indicate. This discrepancy is interesting, as it indicates that experts are less connected with certain aspects of the Irish green economy. To go more into depth, Figure 3 shows a

25 relatively strong performance concerning the markets and investment side of the green economy, the aspect that is most relevant for the case of divestment. However, the report of 2016 points out that Ireland has been falling a daunting 19 places on the overall GGEI index since 2014. This strongly hints at a worrisome inactivity in terms of climate policy and leadership.

Figure 3: Ireland’s green economy performance and perceived performance as measured in the GGEI 2016

The research done by Curtin and Deane (2015) gives important insights in the fossil fuel investments by the Irish government. More precisely, they investigate the investments by the Ireland Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF), a sovereign wealth fund managed by the so-called National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA). To clarify, the Oxford Dictionary defines a sovereign wealth fund as ‘a state-owned investment fund’ (Sovereign Wealth Fund, n.d.). Curtin and Deane (2015) found out that the fossil fuel investments of the ISIF had a market value of 72 million euro, and this is money that belongs to the Irish taxpayer. As later in this country case study will become clear, this novel research laid the foundation for an effective divestment campaign, whereby the ISIF was the main target.

The divestment movement in Ireland The previously mentioned financial, moral and legal arguments and the enormous efforts of the members of the Irish divestment movement have appeared convincing to some prominent institutions all over Ireland. Given the fact that the movement was born in universities all over the United States, it is not surprising that the divestment campaign in Ireland took off in universities, too. Maynooth University was the first university to adopt a fossil free investment policy. As of that moment student-led divestment campaigns became active in Trinity College in Dublin, with a victory in November 2016 (Power and McGrath, 2016); the National University of Galway, with a victory in March 2017 (Lindsay, 2017) and with an ongoing campaign at the Queens University of Belfast (Trocaire, n.d.). Not only universities took the pledge to divest from fossil fuels. Also philanthropic organisations, such as the Mary Robinson Foundation (DivestInvest, n.d.) and Trocaire, took the pledge to break their ties with the fossil fuel industry. All ‘victories’ of the Fossil Free movement are collected at the global website of Fossil Free (Fossil Free, n.d.). The last and most important victory for the divestment movement in Ireland has been the first of its kind Fossil Fuel Divestment Bill of 2016, which has passed the first and second policy stages in the Dáil. Once enshrined in law, the Divestment Bill can be considered historical legislation, as it would make Ireland the first country to fully divest from fossil fuels (Iee, 2017). Studying the divestment movement in Ireland will merely focus on the policy process around this national bill, as this unprecedented success is likely to provide remarkable insights in the role of policy entrepreneurs. To do so, it is, firstly, necessary to understand the different phases in the Irish policy cycle. Secondly the main actors in this policy process need to be identified. Therefore, the policy making process and the network in which relevant actors have been operating will be clarified hereafter.

Policy making process Attaining successful policy change in Ireland means that a bill has to pass five policy stages in both Houses. In the first stage, a bill is introduced to either the Dáil or the Seanad. In the second stage, the principles of the bill are debated upon and there is an opportunity to discuss possible additions or aspects that should be removed. In the third stage of the policy process, the bill is examined in more detail by members of the house (Dáil or Seanad) and there is room for amendments. Another name for the third stage is ‘the Committee Stage’. The fourth stage, where new amendments can be proposed, is known as the ‘Report Stage’. Finally, there is a final debate in the fifth stage. During this last stage, the bill will be discussed as a whole

27 and there is no longer the opportunity to amend the bill. Once a bill has passed all stages in one House, it will have to pass the same process (from the second stage onwards) in the other House to become enshrined in law (Houses of the Oireachtas, n.d.b). As explained previously, the Paris Agreement calls for ambitious climate policy on a national level and civil society actors have been eager to propose effective ways of complying with the targets. One of the proposals involved divesting public money from fossil fuels, and concomitant policy change in Ireland was initiated via the introduction of a Private Members Bill to divest the ISIF from fossil fuel investments. A Private Members’ Bill can be initiated by any member of the Dáil or Seanad, except for members of the government, ministers of state, leader of the House in de Seanad or Attorney General (Citizens Information, n.d.). Hence, in theory it is possible for any member to introduce a bill and turn it into legislation if there is sufficient support for it. In practice, however, it is very unlikely that a bill will pass, because in general the government opposes Private Members’ Bills (Citizens Information, n.d.). The fact that any MP can introduce a Private Members’ Bill indicate many points of access and many venues for policy change. However, whether a bill will be discussed in the Dáil depends upon a kind of lottery system, whereby only a few bills get selected. This is the result of a recent Dáil reform. So on the one hand, there are plentiful access points in the Irish Dáil, but if it concerns a Private Members’ Bill, the proposal is fully dependent on sheer luck, not on the decision of a gatekeeper. The Fossil Fuel Divestment Bill was introduced to the Dáil by an independent TD, Thomas Pringle, on the 30th of November 2016 and discussed in a second stage debate on the 19th of January 2017 (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2016). That day, the bill passed to the Committee Stage as it gained 90 votes in favour and only 53 votes against the bill. Basically, all parties, except for the party governing in a minority construction, endorsed the Bill. The global divestment movement welcomed this historical landslide, despite the bill still being in progress, with widespread media coverage in more than two-hundred-fifty news outlets (C. Sharkey, personal communication, May 18, 2017). Currently the bill has entered the third stage of the policy process, which makes the Ireland the first country that is on its way to fully divest from fossil fuels. The divestment bill is the first of its kind, and is considered a noteworthy victory for both the global and the Irish divestment movement. The path leading to this victory is certainly intriguing as it may very well lead to insights in the role of gatekeepers and policy entrepreneurs operating in a velvet triangle construction. The next section is dedicated to identifying key actors in the agenda-setting process and subsequent policy-process.

Trocaire as the national coordinator of the Divestment campaign As for Ireland, in particular previously mentioned philanthropic organisation Trocaire has played an important role in taking the student divestment movements to the national level. It is an Irish charity and development agency for the Catholic church in Ireland. Operating in a large environmental network, advocating environmental justice is, in their own words, the top priority of the organisation (Interview 1, 2017, May 18). The organisation clearly sees that climate change and global poverty are inherently connected (Trocaire, n.d – a). This results in a dual mandate for the organisation. On the one hand, they do development work overseas, directly supporting people in the challenges they face, for example during humanitarian disasters as a result of drought in sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, Trocaire aims to tackle the roots of those issues in Ireland. As such, the work of Trocaire has been a prominent actor in reminding the Irish government of its duty to mitigate climate change (Intereview 1, 2017, May 18). Having looked at the characteristics of the environmental justice movement in Ireland and the general tendencies regarding environmental policymaking, it seems fair to say that striving for ambitious climate policy involves, by definition, policy change. While signing the Paris Agreement provided the perfect foundation for such policy change, the effectuation of its goals were lacking. Cliona Sharkey, Policy officer at Trocaire, puts the finger on the sore spot in an interview.

‘There is huge gap between what we said that we are going to do in the Paris Agreement, and what we are actually currently committed to yet at national and international levels. The way we've been talking about it here, is trying to communicate both to the public institutions and the public that the Paris Agreement was really important, but it has not resolved climate change for us, it's not a life-jacket, it's a life-line.’ (Interview 1, 2017, May 18)

She argues that the Paris Agreement should not be seen as a solution to climate change, but merely as a call to action for all participating nations. Ireland, backed up by research of inter alia GGEI, clearly has been lagging behind in its commitments to mitigate climate change after the Paris Agreements, and this was not left unnoticed by the Irish environmental movement.

Civil society actors In absence of an official headquarter of the Fossil Free network that has offices in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany and France (Interview 4, 2017, June 15), Trocaire could be seen as the national coordinator for the fossil free movement in Ireland (Interview 1, 2017, May 18). To be more precise, the success of the Irish student divestment movements in the run up before the Paris agreements attracted the attention of the organisation, and stimulated them to launch a national divestment campaign. In fact, the policy officer of Trocaire explained that:

‘We needed to try to create or recreate that sense of urgency and generate new momentum. We could see that there was a need for something new, something compelling, that people could get behind, and that should be something that we could really bring to politicians. So we could see the Global divestment movement really taking up speed, really spreading internationally. There were a couple of student groups in universities in Ireland who were campaigning within their universities. We could see that there was a basis of potential, and wider interest in the issue here as well.’ (Interview 1, 2017, May 18).

There are three interesting elements to this passage. Firstly, there are notions of agency by Trocaire, since they state to be aiming to (re)build momentum for advancing climate policy. This sense of urgency would accommodate the process of translating the Paris Agreement into tangible Irish climate policy. Secondly, Trocaire shows to have recognised a favourable opportunity structure, constructed by a transnational advocacy network (the global divestment movement) on the one hand, and local student movements throughout Ireland on the other. Put differently, they display their capacity to ‘see’ windows of opportunity. Thirdly, Trocaire clearly pronounced its intentions to ‘bring it to the politicians’, being ‘it’ the issue of divestment. This is fascinating, since divestment can be directed to a great variety of actors, be that pension funds, banks or local governments. This, then, raises questions as to understand why they made the choice to target the national political arena, which will be elaborated upon later in this thesis. What is certain, though, is that in light of the impressive growth of the divestment movement both internationally and in Ireland, Trocaire seemed to have set their sights on getting divestment on the national political agenda, and on inciting policy change. This makes Trocaire a trivial actor from the civil society perspective.

More than once during the interviews with Irish divestment campaigners, the Stop Climate Chaos coalition was mentioned. It is made up of 28 Civil society actors active in the field of development, environmental, youth and faith (Stop Climate Chaos, n.d), and they coalesced to work together on policy and campaigning work on climate change, particularly on domestic issues (Interview 1, 2017, May 18). Not surprisingly, Trocaire appears to be one of the founding members of the coalition, together with big NGOs like Friends of the Earth and Concern (Concern Worldwide, n.d.). The main focus of this coalition was, for many years, to get the Irish government to adopt a national climate law. As explained before, this Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act was enacted in 2015, and was considered an important national milestone for advancing climate policy in Ireland, plagued by inertia around this issue. The domestic climate law was the result of years of collaborative campaigning, aiming to have ‘Ireland’s obligation put on a legal basis, a statutory thing to oblige the government to make progress’ (Interview 1, 2017, May 18). It was for this shared history, joint victories and personal relationships that Trocaire expected from the very beginning the Stop Climate Coalition to be important for the Divestment campaign they launched. This expectation turned into reality as the Stop Climate Coalition worked together on the divestment campaign in various ways. They wrote briefings together (Stop Climate Chaos and Trocaire, 2017), organised multiple joint events, of which a mass lobby event in November 2016 probably was the most important (Stop Climate Chaos, 2017). Being a large coalition of numerous civil society groups actively campaigning for the divestment movement, the Stop Climate Coalition impeccably fits the category of civil society actor. In a same fashion, Trocaire identified the various student groups as key actors to collaborate with (Interview 1, 2017, May 18). In fact, Colm Tong, founder and representative of the student group Fossil Free TDC (Trinity Dublin College) recalls how a more general collaboration with the Stop Climate Coalition on e.g. a Climate March led them to get in contact with organisations like Trocaire (Interview 2, 2017, May 25). Reflecting upon the collaboration between Trocaire and the student groups across Ireland on the Divestment bill in particular, the representative of Fossil Free TDC states

‘I think we contributed because we had quite a large campaign group with active members, especially young people. We could mobilise them to campaign and lobby for the Irish Divestment bill. We went to lobby groups, we did a lot of tweeting, social media, different events. Also supporting many events, a lot of stuff Trocaire has been organising, we helped to kind of strengthen that.’ (Interview 2, 2017, May 25)

It is evident that the student groups have been important to Trocaire in at least two ways. First of all, their successes in their own universities demonstrated the potential for success, and contributed to raising public and political attention for the case of divestment. Secondly, their large, and young, supporters base has helped amplifying and reinforcing the campaign of Trocaire on a national level. For the latter reason it seems reasonable to place the student groups in the category of civil society actors.

State Actors On an institutional level there have been several actors pleading for the case of divestment. The most important person has undoubtedly been independent TD Thomas Pringle, the politician responsible for introducing the bill. The policy officer from Trocaire beliefs that his role has been essential.

‘That was another critical success factor in getting anything into the official process, someone who is willing to take the issue and bring it forwards. We were really lucky that a parliamentarian, deputy Thomas Pringle, he is an independent TD, is really committed to climate change and global justice issues generally. He could see the potential of the issue and the campaign as well, and he offered to sponsor a bill. So that was great. It was his interest and commitment that made that a reality’. (Interview 1, 2017, May 18).

From this quote in becomes clear that Thomas Pringle approached Trocaire as he offered to sponsor a bill. He is well-known for his positive stance towards ambitious climate policy (Interview 1, 2017, May 18). Therefore, when advocating for climate policy on divestment, this is an excellent venue to achieve results. It shows the ideological congruence between Thomas Pringle and the climate coalition as he apparently is really committed to climate change and global justice issues generally. A small critical frame analysis sheds a light on the nature and degree of collaboration between the actors, as well. The quality ascribed to policy entrepreneurs to excel in ‘defining problems’ seems to be a close equivalent of diagnostic framing. As such, it is interesting to examine whether the frame proposed by civil society actors, in this case mainly Trocaire, is adopted on a political level, too. The debate on the Fossil Fuel Divestment bill of 19 January 2017 provides the major storyline as adopted by TD Thomas Pringe.

Looking at the problem definition or, as Benford and Snow (2000) would call it, looking at ‘diagnostic framing’, Thomas Pringle states ‘Ireland continues to lag behind in its commitments to mitigating climate change effects. Ireland is currently the eighth highest producer of emissions per person in the OECD’ (House of the Oireachtas Debate, 2017, para.4) Putting that next to the briefing from Trocaire and the Stop Climate Coalition from 11 January 2017 and it is not hard to identify some key similarities. In that briefing is written, for example, ‘Ireland has among the highest levels of consumption emissions and resource use per capita in the world.’ (Stop Climate Chaos and Trocaire, 2017, p.5). This gives the impression that Thomas Pringle has been inspired by some of the key elements in the briefing, in this case concerning the non-compliance with climate targets and the worrisome state of Ireland with regards to emissions. There are more examples of diagnostic frame alignment. Thomas Pringle claimed in the same debate

‘In 2009, financial analysts demonstrated that up to 80% of the fossil fuel reserves held by fossil fuel companies cannot be burned if we are to remain below an average global temperature rise of 2°C, as committed to by all Governments in the Paris Climate Agreement’. (House of the Oireachtas Debate, 2017, para.5).

Below a passage stated in the previously mentioned briefing of Trocaire and Stop Climate Chaos:

‘The majority of existing fossil fuel reserves must remain unburned if the goals set out in the Paris Climate Agreement are to be viable. In 2009 financial analysts demonstrated that up to 80% of known reserves held by fossil fuel companies cannot be burned if we are to remain well below an average global temperature rise of 2°C’. (Stop Climate Chaos and Trocaire, 2017, p. 2).

Without exaggerating, these two passages illustrate the exact same problem, in an almost identical fashion. The diagnostic frame as adopted by TD Thomas Pringle shows a very close alignment with the briefing from Trocaire and Stop Climate Chaos. A similar analysis provides evidence for prognostic frame alignment. Where TD Thomas Pringle argues:

‘If Ireland wants to benefit from the significant growth and job opportunities presented by the global decarbonisation agenda and energy transition, divesting the Ireland

Strategic Investment Fund, ISIF, would send a strong signal that it is committed to the Paris Climate Agreement and will be a seriously player in the transition to a fossil free global economy.’ (House of the Oireachtas Debate, 2017, para.5).

The briefing by Trocaire and Stop Climate Chaos states the following:

‘Having recently ratified the Paris Agreement, divesting the ISIF from fossil fuels would send a much needed signal from the Oireachtas of Ireland’s intentions to live up to its moral and political responsibility, and to play its part in delivering on this landmark global accord – our lifeline to a safe future’. (Stop Climate Chaos and Trocaire, 2017, p.5).

The logical solution to the previously formulated problem in Ireland as proposed by both Trocaire and Stop Climate Chaos is to divest the ISIF from fossil fuels. In the excerpts above they both emphasise the ‘strong signal’ or ‘much needed signal’ such divestment bill would send. Finally, there are also examples of motivational frame analysis, whereby a rationale for the solution is presented. Thomas Pringle emphasises, for instance, in an earlier debate that divestment ‘is not just ethical financing; it is also responsible financing’ (House of the Oireachtas Debate, 2016, para.2). In the briefing from Trocaire and the Stop Climate Chaos coalition is stated that ‘the financial arguments for divestment from fossil fuels align with the compelling moral case’ (Stop Climate Chaos and Trocaire, 2017, p.6). This is an example of motivational frame alignment as the rationale for the solution is based upon the same train of thought: it makes moral/ethical sense, and financial sense to divest the ISIF from fossil fuels. Obviously, it is key to ask what this evident frame alignment indicates? First of all, it confirms the strong relationship between Trocaire and Thomas Pringle, as the policy officer from Trocaire declared in her interview. Second, it allows for some plausible line of reasoning concerning the nature of their relationship. It seems fair to say that TD Thomas Pringle provided an excellent venue for bringing the issue of divestment to the political agenda. In exchange, the necessary information and arguments for the case were delivered by Trocaire, in collaboration with other civil society actors. This seems to confirm the resource element in the illustrated theory on gatekeepers, whereby information is exchanged for access to a decision-making arena. Hence it is reasonable to identify TD Thomas Pringle as a gatekeeper in the Irish divestment campaign. However, there is something more to the role of TD Thomas Pringle, which will be elaborated upon in a later.

Researchers, consultancies and experts Given the fact that the rationale for divestment involves quite some ‘technical’ knowledge and financial literacy, it is not unexpected that the third part of the velvet triangle is made up of a conglomeration of researchers or experts in the field. As a matter of a fact, the global divestment movement was fuelled by an article in the magazine ‘Rolling Stone’ of Bill McKibben, one of the founders of 350.org. that was published in July 2012. The article with the title ‘Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math’ is based upon a report launched by the Carbon Tracker Initiative (McKibben, 2012). The founder of the Carbon Tracker Initiative, Mark Campanale commissioned the 2011 report named ‘Unburnable Carbon – Are the World’s Financial Markets Carrying a Carbon Bubble?’ (McKibben, 2012). Both Bill McKibben and Mark Campanale teamed up with Trocaire and supported its campaign by attending events as keynote speakers (Interview 1, 2017, May 18). As the policy officer from Trocaire explained, Bill McKibben has been crucial to get Trocaire to prioritise the issue of divestment, whereas Mark Campanale provided essential authoritative input based upon numbers to an alliance building event in February 2016 (Interview 1, 2017, May 18). These two actors and their organisations have been key in demonstrating the relevance and the underlying principles of divestment in general, but to make a strong case for divestment in Ireland, more specific information was required as well. The policy officer of Trocaire mentions this in the interview as well. She draws attention to the fact that two Irish academics researched the investments of the ISIF already before they launched any campaign. In August 2015, Joseph Curtin working for the School of Accounting and Business, University College Cork (UCC) and The Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA) and Paul Deane working for the Environmental Research Institute and the UCC published a piece on the fossil fuel investments of the ISIF (Curtin and Deane, 2015). In the words of Cliona Sharkey, the policy officer of Trocaire ‘they had done that research, so there was basis for a campaign’ (Interview 1, 2017, May 18). This shows that their technical analysis was of importance to start a campaign at all. As the campaign progressed, their research was complemented by a report from Corporate Knights, commissioned by Trocaire (Heaps, n.d). This research did not only show the ISIF’s investments in fossil fuel companies, but also concluded that the ISIF missed out on twenty-two million euro that could have been generated by investing in climate friendly alternatives only in 2015 (Heaps, n.d.). These dramatic numbers undoubtedly warranted and strengthened the argument for divestment of ISIF as presented by Trocaire and the other civil society actors.

In a later stage of the campaign Trocaire could rely upon another sort of expertise, namely that of the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN). The support of this non-profit provided essential legal expertise to Trocaire and TD Thomas Pringle in developing the Fossil Fuel Divestment Bill (GLAN, 2017). It is for this reason that this actor is added to the category of ‘research and consultancy’. The cooperative constellation between the actors discussed above has been visualised in Figure 4. It takes the typical shape of a velvet triangle, differentiating between state actors, civil society actors and research and consultancy actors. The three sets of actors create a dynamism that may very well be a major explanatory factor for the success of the divestment campaign in Ireland (Woodward, 2004; Roggeband, 2014). Central to this triangular dynamism is the role of policy entrepreneurs, which will be elaborated upon hereafter.

-Thomas Pringle + staff.

- Green party

State official

Civil society actors Research/consultancies

- Trocaire - Academics Paul Deane and

- Stop Climate Chaos Joseph Curtin

- Universities (Trinity College, - Global Legal Action Network

National University of Galway, (GLAN)

Queens University of Belfast) - 350.org (Bill McKibben)

- Carbon Tracker Initiative (Mark

Campanale)

Figure 4: Ireland - Divestment movement actors velvet triangle

Policy entrepreneurship The introduction of the relevant actors in the Irish divestment campaign and the illustration of the network in which they carried out their joint efforts, allows for a more detailed analysis of the actors, aiming to identify policy entrepreneurs. As set out before, such actors have strong social acuity capacities, are able to effectively define the problem, excel in coalition building and tend to lead by example (Mintrom and Norman, 2009). Looking at the civil society actors in figure three, the actor that stands out concerning this profile is without a doubt Trocaire. With a strong focus on national policy change, it is this organisation that took the lead in the Irish divestment campaign. Most likely it is Cliona Sharkey, policy officer at Trocaire, who embodied these qualities in her work. This claim is warranted by the interview with the policy officer self, testimonies of other actors in the triangular constellation and in policy documents and campaign briefings. In the interview (Interview 1, 2017, May 18), it becomes clear that the organisation was really aware of the success of the divestment movement and the momentum it had created globally. Also, the policy officer shows an excellent understanding of the institutional procedures and recent changes in the policy process (Interview 1, 2017, May 18). She explains how Trocaire saw some of these opportunities and seized upon them (Interview 1, 2017, May 18), which makes their social acuity evident. An example of their capacities to go from ‘seeing’ the opportunity to ‘seizing’ it, is reflected in the following quote.

‘We did some scoping into the issue to see what is the potential for divestment to do the things we think need to be done in the post-Paris period. We were convinced that it could do something, and that it could be a basis to build new momentum, to bring in new people, new stakeholders, to open up new conversations around climate change. So, yeah, we decided to go for it.’ (Interview 1, 2017, May 18)

Regarding problem definition, the short frame analysis above provides some clear hints to Trocaire’s role in that. In addition to that, problem definition has been explicitly incorporated in their campaign timeline, with the aim to explain and simplify fossil fuel divestment and the ISIF, as well as the link to global poverty, which is very relevant for Trocaire as an organisation (C. Sharkey, personal communication, May 18, 2017). Coalition building has been central to the activities of Trocaire, particularly because they saw the divestment campaign as an instrument to grow the Irish climate movement in general, and they were keen to take a leadership role in this. Inviting others to come on board

37 has thus been a key activity of the organisation. This took the form of an alliance-building event, for which a myriad of different actors and renowned climate experts were invited; a joint submission on the case for divestment from 25 different Irish advocacy groups and networks to the same Ministers and managers of the ISIF; the commissioning of a report to Corporate Knights on further investigation of the financial status of ISIF with regard to fossil fuel assets; and a mass lobby event organised in collaboration with the Stop Climate Chaos coalition, (C. Sharkey, personal communication, May 18, 2017). These remarkable efforts regarding coalition building provide another impetus for integrating the concept of policy entrepreneur in the velvet triangle construction makes sense. In fact, Trocaire points out that in their perception the divestment campaign has been an exceptional case of collaborative working within civil society and with the political establishment. This, and the consequent mobilisation of an enormous group of Irish citizens, has been vital, in their eyes, to the success of the Irish divestment campaign (Interview 1, 2017, May 18). Leading by example refers to Trocaire’s efforts to reduce the perception of risk among decision makers (Mintrom et al., 2009). Demonstrating the potential and workability of divestment through the exposure they offered to the student groups victories is an evident example of that capacity. This quality oftentimes entails the effective shift of focus on risks as a consequence of action to a risk as a consequence of inaction. This is mostly demonstrated by Trocaire pressing into service a report on the financial consequences of non-divestment carried out by Corporate Knights (Heaps, n.d.), as well as their general warning to politicians of continuous missing of the targets as agreed upon in the Paris Agreement (Stop Climate Chaos and Trocaire, 2017). Whereas the student groups displayed similar policy entrepreneur qualities in their local campaigns (Interview 2, 2017, May 25), they are considered less of an policy entrepreneur in the national campaign, since they merely supported the activities of Trocaire, launching the national campaign. A similar logic applies to the Stop Climate Chaos, that got involved in the divestment campaign because of Trocaire, that was taking the lead in it. However, it seems fair to say that given the fact that they are the most important climate coalition, they played a key role in instigating and nurturing essential alliances. In sum, the civil society actors mentioned above all demonstrate qualities inherent to policy entrepreneurship, but Trocaire excels in all of them. Moving to the state actors in Figure 4, there is not much doubt that TD Thomas Pringle fits the profile of policy entrepreneur best. It was him that sensed a victory by offering to sponsor the bill, and it was him to effectively engage other politicians in the discussion, due

38 to his open mind set and unequivocal wish to jointly work on the details of the bill (Interview 1, 2017, May 18). This signals an ability to form coalitions and to effectively see and seize opportunities, which hints at meaningful social acuity. With help of Trocaire and the GLAN he was able to turn the problem definition into a form that was appealing enough to his fellow politicians as to gain the support of the majority of the Dáil. This is warranted by statements from his political colleagues uttered during the debate of 19 January 2017, who thank him for introducing the bill in this phrasing, praise him for his efforts and successful collaboration with civil society actors, and express their full support. Whereas the support of other parties was, obviously, crucial, the agency of the other TDs cannot be considered as far-reaching policy entrepreneurship. It gives the impression of being short of strong social acuity, and problem definition. The last category of actors, namely researchers and consultancies are probably less detectable when it comes to identifying policy entrepreneurs. However, looking at the three actors, academics Deane and Curtin, the GLAN, 350.org and the Carbon Tracker Initiative, I would argue that the first played a significant role during the agenda-setting process. They conducted the research on the financial status of the ISIF, because the divestment movement and the global numbers attracted their attention. This indicates social acuity in terms of seeing opportunities, and with the research they contributed strongly to the problem-definition in the Irish case. The report, in fact, triggered Trocaire to launch a campaign around their problem definition, as a result of which the ISIF became the main target for divestment (Interview 1, 2017, May 18). Along the way, they communicated via social media to have collaborated with people at Trocaire, who utilised the research of the two academics as the foundation of a national campaign on divestment. This illustrates their partaking in coalition-building activities. Moreover, as detailed examination of institutional investments in the fossil fuel industry remains a fairly rare phenomenon, one could see their initiative as an attempt to lead by example. As for the other actors categorised under ‘researchers and consultancies’, I would argue that the GLAN was merely supporting the work initiated by the other policy entrepreneurs, but has been contributing to the appropriate phrasing of the Bill, which is important to convince other TDs. Bill McKibben with his organisation 350. org as well as the Mark Campanale with his organisation the Carbon Tracker Initiative seem to suit the profile of policy entrepreneurs, but have broader and/or different targets. Whereas the former aims to change the ‘zeitgeist’ instead of particular policy (Trocaire, 2015), the latter is focusing on bringing about change in the financial sector, as he believes that power resides there (Trocaire, 2016).

Altogether, I can conclude that in the Irish case of advocacy for fossil fuel divestment, there are policy entrepreneurs among all three sets of actors, of which some have acted as gatekeepers, too. This will be further discussed in the country comparison section. The presence of policy entrepreneurs at various levels is assumed to fuel the triangular constellation in terms of effectiveness. In other words, the divestment bill is the fruitlet of an effective triangular coalition coming together at the right time around a shared issue.

The case of The Netherlands

General political opportunity structure To account for the comparability of the country cases, I chose to examine two centralised states with a proportional electoral system. While this is the main feature of the political opportunity structure Ireland and the Netherlands share, further illustration of the specific policy cycle in the Netherlands is much needed. The Dutch parliament is called the States General and is made up, like Ireland, of two chambers. The House of Representatives consists of 150 directly elected MPs (House of Representatives, n.d.) and the Senate has 75 indirectly appointed members (House of Representatives, n.d.a). Both chambers have the right to question the decisions of the cabinet, and the right to propose motions. However, only the House of Representatives has the right to amend bills and has the right of initiative, which means that members of the House of Representatives can propose bills (House of Representatives, n.d.b). The access points for interest- and advocacy groups are, thus, mainly found in the House of Representatives only. From 2012 until March 2017 the centre-right party VVD and the Labour Party (PvdA) have been governing in a majority government. These parties are not particularly known for their progressive climate policy, in particular the former. Since the elections of March 2017 until today, the political parties find themselves in a cumbersome formation process, with the VVD again as the largest party and a spectacular loss of 29 seats for the PvdA, which results in a modest stance in the negotiations (House of Representatives, n.d.c). While there exists no such thing as an ‘independent MP’ in the Dutch system, there are multiple small parties with only two or three seats in parliament (House of Representatives, n.d.c). Therefore, multiple access points are available, but are always bound to political party dynamics. According to Timmermans (2015), the Dutch institutional structures and rules on decision-making and interest representation result in a semi-open system, where corporate interest are oftentimes prioritised as a result of the so-called ‘polder model’. This leads to

40 strongly institutionalised relationships between the government and organisations and interest groups. Based upon the work of Lijphart (1999), Timmermans points out that this model offers rather selective access to decision-making arenas and ensures a certain degree of secrecy to ease the process of finding agreements. In addition, he notices that the population of interest groups in the Netherlands is relatively dense compared to other countries.

Issue specific political opportunity structure Despite the growing attention for climate change, global environmental justice movements and climate policy in general, not much research has been dedicated to mapping the environmental movement in the Netherlands. Van der Heijden (van der Heijden, 2017), as one of the Dutch experts on climate change and international politics sheds some light on the general developments concerning the climate movement in the Netherlands. First and foremost, he points out that over the years the Netherlands has changed from being a forerunner to being a hindrance when it comes to structurally mitigating climate change and other environmental problems (van der Heijden, 2017). With the Royal Dutch Shell as the largest Dutch enterprise, and as well the Dutch business actor who, worldwide, contributes most to the changing climate, it seems valid to argue that there are strong vested interests in the Netherlands, and they have been there for a considerable amount of time (van der Heijden, 2017). The ‘Eerlijke Geldwijzer’, a civil society initiative that examines the Dutch banking sector on, among other things, fossil fuel investments concludes in its 2015 report that the majority of Dutch banks, making up one of the largest banking sectors in Europe, have not genuinely committed to climate-friendly, or climate-neutral, investments (Warmerdam et al., 2015). Furthermore, van der Heijden (2017) concludes that the centre-right party VVD and the Christian-democratic CDA contain by far the most politicians hostile to effective climate policy. This is especially relevant as they have been part of the governing coalition for at least the last six election rounds. The latest, surprising, milestone has been the joint initiative bill for a national Climate Law, introduced by opposition party Groenlinks (the green party) and the coalition party PvdA (the Labour Party). The bill was paused because of the elections of March 2017 and the subsequent formation process, but it can be considered a positive development for the environmental movement in the Netherlands. It demonstrates that there are opportunities for policy changes in the environmental field. In the absence of recent, substantial academic work on the Dutch climate movement, I turn to the interview with the national coordinator of the divestment campaign Fossil Free NL, Liset Meddens. She describes the movement as, first of all, ‘really young’. The director of

Fossil Free NL recalls that when she started setting up the national divestment campaign three, four years ago, ‘there wasn’t really a strong environmental movement’ (Interview 4, 2017, June 15). She felt that there were multiple different initiatives by activists or environmental organisations and NGOs, but that it was not really strongly connected to one another. The research by van der Heijden (2000) proves otherwise, namely that in the past there was a fairly strong environmental movement in the Netherlands, but it seems reasonable to think of the movement’s evolution in terms of ‘waves’. The research by van der Heijden (2000) addresses for example the emergence of an environmental ‘wave’ during the 1990s. The director of Fossil Free NL appears to utter the term ‘movement’ when she refers to bottom-up and grassroots initiatives. However, it is important to keep in mind that the environmental movement has in many cases an institutionalised layer as well, attested by the presence of a myriad of environmental, conservational and ecological organisations and NGOs throughout the years. The director of Fossil Free NL states that the current climate movement in the Netherlands emerged out of the training weekends organised by some major environmental organisations and NGOs, namely Milieudefensie, Greenpeace Nederland, Transitie Nederland and Fossil Free NL, and that they are strongly connected via online platforms (De Nederlandse Klimaatbeweging, n.d.). Those weekends serve to build coalitions, share skills, knowledge and strategies and result in different types of initiatives and joint events (Interview 3, 2017, May 25; Interview 4, 2017, June 15)). As for the financial characteristics of the Netherlands, Tamanini and Valenciano (2016) report in the Green Economy Index that the Netherlands score well on how its green economy performance is perceived (number 8 in the ranking), but that the actual performance scores significantly lower (number 17 in the ranking). This position is a slight improvement compared to the GGEI results of 2014. The same results seem apparent in the more specific section of ‘Leadership in Climate Change’, where the Netherlands is perceived to perform well, given their position on number 7, but in terms of actual performance it is not granted any place in the rankings. The report concludes that, not for the first time, the Netherlands fall behind its main competitors overall, and that it has a relatively high carbon intensity of the economy. These results are summarised in Figure 5. Altogether, there is more than enough reason to step up the speed of the transition to a green economy in the Netherlands.

Figure 5: the Netherlands’ green economy performance and perceived performance as measured in the GGEI 2016

The financial situation in the Netherlands concerning the fossil fuel investments specifically, appears more complex compared to its Irish counterpart. The reason for this opaqueness is the fact that there is no such thing as a sovereign wealth fund in the Netherlands. In other words, there is no Dutch equivalent for the ISIF. Consequently, there is no analysis available of direct fossil fuel investments with taxpayers’ money, which was central to the storyline of the Irish case. However, there are similar national targets such as the Dutch central bank (DNB) and the pension fund Algemeen Burger Pensioenfonds (ABP), which is the obligatory pension fund for all employees in the public sector, be it the government or an educational institution. Given the absence of clear direct investments of taxpayers’ money into fossil fuel, the fossil free divestment movement in the Netherlands has encountered difficulties in raising a national profile of divestment (Interview 3, 2017, May 25; Interview 4, 2017, June 15). Yet, the movement celebrated some meaningful victories, which brings me to the following section on the divestment movement in the Netherlands.

The divestment movement in The Netherlands In the global database of the Fossil Free movement a total of five (partial) commitments to divestment appear. These pioneers are the for profit corporation Aegon, two philanthropic

43 foundations, the municipality of Boxtel, and small pension fund (Fossil Free, n.d.). Intriguingly, there is no educational institution in the Netherlands committed to divestment. In addition to these official commitments, the policy plan as presented by Fossil Free NL gives some insights in ongoing campaign efforts, negotiations and public actions. This is also where the campaign targeted at the ABP pension fund comes into sight. The ABP Fossil Free group organised multiple discussion meetings on the fossil fuel investments of ABP, and launched a petition which was signed by 12.000 citizens (Fossielvrij NL, 2016). As from 2015, the ABP has changed part of its investment policy and decreased investments in fossil fuel companies by 5 billion euro (Fossielvrij NL, 2016a). The director of Fossil Free NL beliefs that this campaign has been the biggest success of the Dutch movement so far (Interview 4, 2017, June 15):

‘Maybe our biggest success is the ABP campaign, and that we managed, with just a small group of volunteers, within one year, to move a fund of 380 billion euro's. I mean climate wasn't on their agenda, or it got very little attention. But within one year it got high up on the agenda. I think in 2014 we sat around the table and they sort of laughed at us, and one year later after our petition of 10.000 people, and the media attention from Nieuwsuur, Tegenlicht and The Guardian wrote about it, and so many people called on the ABP to divest because of the petition, we sat again around the same table and they were like 'oh but who are you guys, and by the way our policy has changed, and now the climate is high on our agenda. We're going to reduce 25% of our CO2 footprint by 2020'. They didn't say that they were going to divest, but I think that it was part of our biggest successes, because just a group of four volunteers influencing such a major financial institution, that is big.’ (Interview 4, 2017, June 15).

This quote shows several important aspects. Firstly, it highlights the limited resources Fossil Free NL has available. This is also clearly shown in the general policy plan of the foundation. Currently, Fossil Free NL is only financed by 350.org, and as a result the foundation has only one paid employee: the director Liset Meddens. She is supported by hundreds of volunteers in the Netherlands (Fossielvrij, 2016a). Secondly, the director of Fossil Free NL highlights that most time and resources have been used up until now to get divestment on the agenda of the pension fund. Thirdly, the quote hints at a relationship between ABP and Fossil Free that is characterised by confrontation rather than collaboration. Finally, it shows that ABP in the end was susceptible for the public pressure of the divestment movement, but not enough to

44 profoundly change policy and commit to divestment. In fact, in the annual report of sustainable investments 2016 the ABP explicitly takes a different position from the Fossil Free movement when describing their efforts concerning stakeholder engagement:

‘Participants and ABP think differently about exclusion. While ABP is reticent regarding the exclusion of certain sectors and companies (both for performance motives and the experience that we can achieve more if we keep the conversation with companies going), it seems that participants want to proceed much quicker to exclusion’. (ABP, 2016, p. 16, personal translation).

In September 2014 ABP received a joint letter from the Fossil Free movement together with seventeen civil society organisations, among which Greenpeace, Oxfam Novib, Mileudefensie and Urgenda, in which they urged the board of ABP to commit to divestment as soon as possible. In their reply ABP took a clear position: ABP is concerned about the effects of climate change, but is not willing to commit to divestment. They do not intend to exclude fossil fuel companies, since they expect them to be needed in the upcoming years. Moreover, ABP does not believe that divestment will contribute to a reduction in CO2 emissions (ABP, 2014). Almost two and a half years later, ABP did not change opinion. In a response to a mobilisation of May 2017 organised by ABP Fossil Free, it writes the uncompromisingly words ‘ABP does not think it is useful to sell our assets from energy companies. The upcoming years fossil energy will be needed’ (ABP, 2017, para.4, personal translation). While ABP certainly improved upon their sustainable policy in general terms, the Fossil Free movement did not achieve its goals yet. Considering that it concerns a pension fund responsible for the pensions of all Dutch government officials and university employees, one could argue that this is a national issue too. As a matter of fact, the Dutch central bank DNB is in charge of supervising the Dutch pension funds, among which the ABP (Pensioenwet, 2017). While DNB officially is an autonomous institution, the DNB is accountable to the Dutch Ministry of Finance. More importantly, the Minister of Finance appoints a government commissioner (commissaris van overheidswege) for DNB, as the Dutch state is the only shareholder of the DNB. This government commissioner is the main connection between the ministry and DNB, and it is vital to mention that this position has been central to an serious discussion on conflict of interest. Several politicians argued that in some occasions it is impossible to unify the position of representative of the State with the position of representative of a company like DNB. This, and the fact that the government

45 commissioner is appointed by the Minister of Finance indicates that there are close connections between the DNB and Ministry (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2001). In sum, while the immersion of the Dutch state in the policies of DNB and ABP seems non- existent on paper, the connection in practice it noticeable. While there may be a certain degree of influence from the Dutch state in the policies of DNB and ABP, policy change in a privatised pension fund is not totally comparable to governmental policy change it is worthwhile looking into what this campaign brought about on a national policy level. Prior to this, the policymaking process in the Netherlands will be briefly portrayed.

Policy making process The policy process in the Netherlands is build up as follows: when problems in society are signalled by politicians, parliament members can consider to draft a bill. Usually, MPs ask the government to draft a bill, but if the political will to do so lacks, there is the possibility for MPs to draft an ‘initiative bill’. The Climate bill drafted by the Green party and the Labour party was an example of that. As soon as the ministers agree on the draft bill, it is presented to the Council of State, which is the second stage. Being the main advisory body to the government, it examines the bill in terms of feasibility, practicability and impact on citizens. It is not obligatory to follow the advice of the Council of State, but in practice MPs always amend the text. At this stage the bill is still confidential. The bill goes public in the third stage, namely when the royal message is appended to the text, which serves to present the bill to the House of Representatives and is no more than a formality. As a fourth step, the bill and the advice from the Council of State will be evaluated by a Standing Committee of the House of Representatives. All political parties can propose changes and ask questions and if wished, civil society actors, experts and stakeholders are invited to comment. This results in a report, to which the involved minister replies in a memorandum. In the fifth stage, a bill will be discussed in a plenary debate, where parties can support, oppose or propose amendments. If a bill gets the support of the majority of parliament, it will be submitted to the Senate for a vote. The bill either gets adopted or rejected, but there is no longer room for amendments. As a final formality the bill gets signed by the king and countersigned by the minister in charge (House of Representatives, n.dd). The initiative bill for a Climate Law from the green party Groenlinks and the labour party PvdA, successfully went through the first four stages of the policy process. That is, the bill was drafted by a coalition of governing and opposition parties, without the governing

46 party VVD, submitted to the Council of State, and after rigorous revision appended by the royal message and introduced to the Standing Committee. While this is positive for the Dutch environmental movement in general, no specific notion of divestment is mentioned in the proposal. The issue of the carbon bubble appears for the first time during a debate in May 2014 concerning the vision of the cabinet on the Dutch banking sector. MP Klaver of the green party asked the Minister of Finance to inquire the exposure of the Dutch financial sector to the risks of the ‘carbon bubble’, a concept that is at the base of the divestment campaign. In a reaction of DNB is stated that there is no excessive credit risk for the Dutch banking sector. The issue strands in this stage and was not included in the vision of the cabinet on the Dutch banking sector. The carbon bubble appeared once more in a parliamentary question of September 2015, issued by two members of the Labour party, MP Nijboer and MP Jan Vos. The latter was also present during an ABP Fossil Free discussion meeting. As a member of the audience he expressed his concerns on the lack of urgency at ABP and expressed his intentions of pressuring ‘The Hague’ (where the parliament resides) in order to increase the sense of urgency at ABP (Fossielvrij, 2015). In response to the parliamentary questions from the two MPs, it becomes clear that the existence of- and the risks caused by the carbon bubble are questioned by the Minister. From there it follows that the arguments in favour of divestment do not resonate with him at this point in time. In addition MP Vos filed a request to the State Secretary of Infrastructure and the Environment and the State Secretary of Social Affairs and Employment to investigate the risks of the carbon bubble for their sectors, but both of them responded in a similar fashion as the Minister of Finance (Mansveld, 2014). To all appearances, they fulfilled the function of gatekeepers, but in this case blocking a proposal instead of allowing it to proceed to a higher level of decision-making. The discussion on potential effects of climate-related risks for the financial stability, however, continues. In February 2016, the Minister of Finance published a report on one of the regular meetings with the FSC (the Financial Stability Committee), in which is stated that the carbon bubble and the risk of stranded assets will be examined by DNB on a short term. Again, the Minister of Finance emphasises that no acute risk is perceived, although he promises to keep track of the developments in this field (Dijsselbloem, 2016). The promised report of DNB is published on 4 March 2016 and discussed in a public hearing on 8 March 2016 (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2016). During this public hearing the permanent Committee of Finance discusses the ‘carbon bubble’ with the president of DNB, in which the

47 latter recommends to ensure a gradual and steady transition to CO2 reductions, as well as to promote more transparency with regards to financial climate risks. No reference of divestment is made, and no concrete policy recommendations are done (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2016). This is where the agenda setting process of divestment was halted. Before the severe loss for the PvdA in the last elections, MP Jan Vos already left the political arena. Also, the general Climate law is jeopardised by a probable climate-unfriendly cabinet. Nevertheless, the process described above demonstrates that several MP’s are willing to give consideration to the issue of the carbon bubble, an potentially divestment. Though, it seems that the issue of the carbon bubble has been jointly capitalised by the Ministry of Finance and the DNB, who carefully frame it as part of a larger transition towards a climate friendly financial environment. This alludes to a gatekeeper role of both actors. Though, the prominent absence of the Fossil Free movement in this policy process raises a lot of questions.

Civil society actors Actors in the velvet triangle are all in the business of trying to create progressive change for their constituencies. During the interview with the national coordinator of the Dutch Fossil Free movement she explains what their theory of change entails

‘In our theory of change it says 'well we build up a bottom-up, diverse, loud movement to have public institutions break their ties with the fossil fuel industry, to delegitimize, to decrease the public support for these industries in order to create political space. This is sort of what we think we're doing, and what it causes. What we're aiming for is actually creating that political space to be able to also have policies, and for the government to facilitate a quick energy transition. Because we're saying that these companies are too entangled in our societies, so our governments don't act in favour of the public, but they act in favour of those companies’ (Interview 4, 2017, June 15)

Creating political space to achieve policy change is clearly at the heart of the Dutch divestment movement. Yet, to all appearances their involvement in the national policy process remains narrow, if not absent. This is surprising, because this is the arena where the most impactful policy change can be achieved. Understandably, the development of a bottom-up movement is central to their mission, since it is designed after the model of divestment campaigns elsewhere in the world (Interview 4, 2017, June 15). Intriguingly, however, is that

48 when the director of Fossil Free NL mentions ‘public institutions’ and ‘government’ it gives the impression that she makes an intuitive distinction between the two. Seemingly, the Dutch campaign refers to public institutions as local institutions like pension funds and municipalities, but not to national politics or political parties. While this is line with the desire to advance a bottom-up movement, such constricted perception of target groups may very well shape how impactful the divestment movement is with regard to policy change. Another public institution that is targeted by many different local groups are the universities and other institutions for higher education. Fossil Free NL supports student groups in seven different cities, where they make a lot of progress, but did not manage yet to convince any of the universities to divest. This is a stark contrast with the student campaigns in Ireland, where the potential for divestment was demonstrated by their successful divestment campaigns. In an interview with the student representative of the University of Amsterdam, she shares some of the challenges she faces. She states: ‘I would say, the problem definition is one of the most important, but also one of the hardest things. Because this topic is not something institutions want to be transparent about.’ (Interview 3, 2017, May 25). Later in the interview she specifies :

‘The problem is that, well the problem...it's actually great, Dutch universities don't have direct investments in the industry, because they don't have a lot of money. So the ties are a lot more indirect. Right now, the ties between the UvA and the Fossil Free industry are first of all through their bank, to their ties with the Deutsche Bank, and partly still with ABN AMRO. And then, the second thing is through their pension funds, so via all their employees. The third thing, that's a bit more indirect, there are, or there might be, we don't really know yet, people who are in the board of UvA who have some sort of background in the Fossil Fuel industry.’ (Interview 3, 2017, May 25).

The excerpt of the interview reveals the difficulties student groups encounter with effectively defining the problem that serves as a foundation for the divestment campaign. Furthermore, she highlights that in the case of the University of Amsterdam, it is challenging to build coalitions within the institution, for instance with the Green Office and Students for Sustainability as their goals slightly differ and the degree of institutionalisation varies (Interview 3, 2017, May 25). When I shortly compare this to the Irish case, it becomes clear the Dutch divestment movement finds itself in a very different position. Whereas the Irish

49 student campaigns showcased the potential for divestment, the Dutch student campaigns have, up until now, less victories to share. That is not to say that there is no potential. In fact, inside lobbying activities and art performances to simplify and visualise the problem are all part of the student campaign at the University of Amsterdam. What about other environmental civil society actors? As the joint letter to ABP demonstrates, many large environmental NGOs support the case of divestment and are willing to lend their names to the campaign directed at the ABP (Meddens et al., 2014). Furthermore, the Climate weekends are jointly organised by four large NGOs among which Fossil Free NL, and both interviewees from the Fossil Free movement stress the importance of those weekends as it allows the various groups to connect, build trust, share resources and experiences, and to organise events and actions together (Interview 3, 2017, May 25; Interview 4, 2017, June 15). Reflecting a bit more on the collaboration with other civil society actors, the Director of Fossil Free NL argues that on the one hand she experiences a high degree of collaboration on the other hand she adds:

‘What you see is that there is more collaboration on the grassroots and on the personal level, than on the organisational level, like I would say the NGO level. We could could improve a lot in that collaboration. I initiated one directors meeting with the director of Urgenda, Greenpeace and Milieudefensie, which amazed me a little bit. I thought we would just put our cards on the table and say how we are going to fix this. But that wasn't the case.’ (Interview 4, 2017, May 15).

She ascribes the hesitance to truly coalesce on an organisational level to the fact that there is not much personal bounding and trust-building between the directors of these organisations yet. On the grassroots level, however, this has been established through the climate weekends, which enhanced trust and collaboration (Interview 3, 2017, May 25; Interview 4, 2017, June 15). This tendency is very interesting, particularly because the larger environmental NGOs already established venues of access to national policymakers. This is warranted, for example, by their registration in the lobby transparency register of the Dutch government (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2017). Hence, Fossil Free NL seems to lack the resources, the focus on, but also the access to national policy makers to effectively incite policy change on a national level. Also, to all appearances, the more institutionalised civil society actors have neither been proactive in promoting the case of divestment on national policy level during, for

50 example, the formulation of the Climate bill, nor they explicitly offered access to Fossil Free NL.

State actors When assessing the main policy events on topics closely related to divestment, the involved state actors have been already introduced. Among them are, not surprisingly, MP Klaver as part of the Green party, but also two MPs from the Labour party MP Nijboer and MP Vos. These actors made efforts to get the carbon bubble on the agenda in a decision-making arena. On the other side of the coin, it is plausible to assume that the Minister of Finance, in collaboration with the DNB, has been trivialising the issue, as a result of which the carbon bubble was never prioritised on the political agenda. Neither the Climate bill did incorporate notions of the financial risk caused by climate change, which indicates that in these discussions the issue was never effectively brought to attention. Aside from the MP’s presence during the ABP Fossil Free discussion meetings, it seems that there has not been much interaction between MPs and Fossil free NL. I have not found evidence for any direct lobby on divestment directed at national politicians. In fact, the Director of Fossil Free NL admits that lobbying politicians is not really integrated in their strategies (Interview 4, 2017, June 15).

Researchers, consultancies and experts The joint letter to ABP was also signed by various research institutes, university professors and climate change and sustainable finance experts. In the letter they rely upon the findings of, inter alia, the Carbon Tracker Initiative. This demonstrates that, while some information may be hard to access as explained by the student representative of Fossil Free UvA, there are multiple research and consultancy actors that are closely connected to the Dutch divestment movement. The DNB discusses the financial risk of the carbon bubble on a national level, but is not really contested by any other research. As such, the research partners have not provided yet much input for national policy proposals on divestment. The abovementioned shows some real limitations and gaps concerning the cooperative constellation between the actors. The ideal model collaboration is displayed in Figure 6, which takes the shape of a velvet triangle, differentiating between state actors, civil society actors and research and consultancy actors. The lack of effective collaboration on national policy that concerns divestment, may very well be a major explanatory factor for the absence of successful policy change on the issue of divestment in the Netherlands (Woodward, 2004;

Roggeband, 2014). This is also visualised in Figure 6 by two red crosses. The distance between the state actors and the civil society actors reflects a major assumption in social movement literature, namely that social movements and state should be treated separately. The concept of velvet triangles, which excellently applies to the case of Ireland, reflects exactly the opposite, namely that social movements and actors can and do cooperate. The profile of policy entrepreneur in the Dutch context will be assessed hereafter, since it might reveal more specific causes for the lack of ambitious financial climate policy.

-Groenlinks (MP Klaver and party members) -PvdA (MP Vos)

State official

Civil society actors Universities/consultancies

- Fossil Free NL - Eerlijke Geldwijzer (part of Fair - De Nederlandse Finance Guide International) Klimaatbeweging - 350.org (Bill McKibben) - University-, municipality- and - Carbon Tracker Initiative cultural-divestment groups - multiple experts

Figure 6: the Netherlands - Divestment movement actors potential velvet triangle

Policy entrepreneurship To identify policy entrepreneurs in the Dutch divestment movement, it is necessary to look for actors who exhibit strong social acuity capacities, are able to effectively define the problem, excel in coalition building and tend to lead by example (Mintrom and Norman, 2009). The civil society actors in the Dutch divestment movement certainly exhibit qualities that are associated with policy entrepreneurship. Both the national level and the local groups of Fossil Free NL have put a lot of effort into building coalitions, both within the divestment movement as between broader environmental civil society actors on climate issues in general. As explained before, the national coordinator of Fossil Free NL does not only support collaboration between local groups, for example via national Fossil Free meetings, but she proactively undertakes action to collaborate and coalesce with environmental NGOs on an organisational level as well. Despite the fact that the latter has not yet been particularly efficacious, the Director of Fossil Free clearly demonstrates her quality and efforts for coalition building. Fossil Free NL coalesces also with research institutions and experts, as is warranted by the joint letter sent to ABP and the collaboration during events (Meddens et al., 2014; Fossielvrij, 2015). Still, coalition building with state actors remains does not receive much consideration from the Dutch divestment movement. This tendency is, however, subject to change, explains the national coordinator of the Dutch divestment movement.

‘It is actually the discussion we had back in February, we had like a global divestment gathering. And the US team has been around for like, 1 -2 years longer. They have much more experience than us, with the whole divestment campaign. They have built up a huge movement, and it has been really successful. But then, Trump got elected. So they have been sort of reflecting, especially on their political influence of the divestment campaign. This was actually one of our conclusions’ (Interview 4, 2017, June 15)

This quote reveals some of the reflections of the global movement on its own effectiveness, and how the transnational network of divestment actors profits from the trial-and-error-like process of the movement. Reflecting upon this, the Director of Fossil Free NL adds that as a movement they decided to explicitly target public institutions, and not politics. This confirms that the Dutch movement sees public institutions separately from state institutions, whereas in the Irish case actors focus on the similarities and potential alliances between them, considering institutions with a close link to the state, like ISIF, public institutions as well.

This global meeting stimulated Fossil Free NL to reflect upon the idea of creating political change (Interview 4, 2017, June 15). These considerations are evident in the following quote by the director of Fossil Free NL.

‘How do we create political change, not only through the public institutions, but maybe we also need the movement to directly focus on when there's political moments, or when there are political opportunities. That's one thing, I learned last February a lot from them. Like how can we more deliberately think of our political influence.’ (Interview 4, 2017, June 15).

The global meeting that provoked the idea of focusing on political influence and change, took place in the run up to the Dutch elections of March 2017. Quite spontaneously, the Director of Fossil Free NL decided to turn this idea into action as a first experiment. By way of a petition that went viral in no time, collecting over 10.000 signatures, she managed to make the issue of ‘climate change’ part of the final debate on national television. In her own words, ‘suddenly we targeted both the elections and the media, but that was more of a spontaneous thing on a personal level.’ (Interview 4, 2017, June 15). Even though this was a fairly spontaneous action, it shows Fossil Free NL’s ability to see and seize a political opportunity. Developing this quality might very well lead to fruitful ways of coalition building with state actors. In terms of problem definition the Dutch movement encountered some challenges. The arguments for divestment uttered during the ongoing campaign directed at the ABP never appeared to fully resonate with the board of the pension fund. While the movement emphasised the risks of the carbon bubble, accompanied by numbers and reports, and framed divestment as the only credible solution, the ABP downplayed the problem and risks caused by the carbon bubble and consistently chose for another way to deal with it, namely by continuing to collaborate with the relevant companies, in order to get adequate climate policies in place. This does not indicate that the framing efforts of the divestment movement are or have been of no use, but it does seem to be the case that the problem definition of the carbon bubble and the subsequent call to action do not resonate with the pension fund. This may be a sign of dissociation between the people at APB and the members of the movement, but can also be caused by conflicting interests and the absence of a shared ideology. The national coordinator of the Divestment movement acknowledged that the two-step approach for the student divestment campaigns, namely to target the ABP as part of their student campaign since all university employees have their

54 pensions with ABP, did not turn out to be successful (Interview 4, 2017, June 15). This can be considered ineffective problem definition. The student representative of Fossil Free UvA/HvA confirmed this (Interview 3, 2017, May 25). This leads me to believe that Fossil Free NL struggles with effectively deploying the problem definition for divestment. Leading by example refers to the efforts by Fossil Free NL to reduce the perception of risk among decision makers (Mintrom et al., 2009). Corresponding with the deviating problem definition, ABP really emphasised the financial risks of breaking ties with companies in their portfolio (ABP, 2016). So far, the Fossil Free movement has not been able to alter this line of thought. It must be emphasised, though, that in their communication with ABP, the movement emphasises divestment commitments of other pension funds, and thus shows some of the ‘leading by example’ quality. The other civil society actors and local divestment groups have been merely supportive of the campaigns, for which they do not particularly match with the profile of policy entrepreneur concerning Divestment. I previously demonstrated the deficient connection between state actors and civil society actors on the issue of divestment specifically. Nonetheless, some MPs have portrayed features of policy entrepreneurship. The awareness and concerns about the carbon bubble have been demonstrated in parliamentary questions by MP Klaver, but also by former MP Vos. The latter was even present during public meetings on divestment for ABP, where he offered to raise awareness on the issue in the House of Representatives. This could be interpreted as the intention to create coalitions. While the motives for the attention of the state actors remain unsure, it hints at their abilities for recognising a political opportunity. Furthermore, as their efforts took the shape of a question, rather than a definition of the problem, the problem- definition quality remains modest in this case. Altogether, in the Dutch case no velvet triangle regarding national policy change has been identified. Within the civil society sector, a strong, environmental grassroots movement is burgeoning. The development of the movement is at an accelerating pace, especially because climate gatherings allow for personal relationships to grow and for strong trust- building. However, the Dutch divestment movement can only count a few victories, as the actual commitments to divestment remain limited. Given the infancy of the movement in the Netherlands, and the relative resource scarcity of the movement, this is comprehensible. Other civil society actors in the environmental movement and the Fossil Free movement mutually benefit from each other’s’ experiences, strengths and expertise, but on an organisational level the collaboration could be intensified. More importantly, I would recommend the Dutch

55 divestment movement to strive for a combination of their strong grassroots features with political pressure from above. More specifically, this would entail identifying potential state actors as ally policy entrepreneurs and cooperate with them to get ambitious climate policy in place, to which divestment can be a powerful vehicle.

Country-comparison and analysis I have been looking at the divestment movement in both Ireland and the Netherlands, whereby I firstly assessed the political opportunity structure in which the movements operate. Knowledge about the constant interplay between the actions of a movement and the ever changing political landscape leads to understanding of, firstly, the strategies a movement selects and secondly, the windows of opportunity the policy process offers. In this section I compare the different outcomes of the campaigns in Ireland and the Netherlands. In doing so, I specifically assess the role of policy entrepreneurs in the process, and intend to elucidate how the concept of policy entrepreneur fruitfully can be integrated with the political opportunity structure approach to policy change. The general political opportunity structure of Ireland and the Netherlands is similar, and offers a reasonable degree of comparability. In effect, the comparable political opportunity structures provided one of the main criteria for the country selection. That is, both countries are centralised states, have a multi-party system with a proportional electoral system, and accordingly they are known to have a greater variety of access points as well as a greater amount of access points, compared to their federal or majoritarian counterparts. Not unexpectedly, the political opportunity structures exposed many specific characteristics after having a closer look at the general- and issue specific political opportunity structure. As the old cliché goes: the devil is in the details. The first details subject to analysis are the composition of government and the dynamics produced by party politics. Ireland finds itself in a minority government, which is a very unusual situation and described as ‘the first of its kind’ (Doyle, 2016). As a consequence the government’s ability to block policy change is not assured. Instead, it needs the precarious support of other parties or independent TDs for it to reject or adopt a bill. Looking at the Dutch case, a whole different picture arises. While the Netherlands has found itself minority constructions in the past, for the last election round a stable coalition was formed comprised of two parties, the centre-right VVD and the Labour party. Particularly the former, but generally also the latter, are not known for implementing or supporting ambitious climate policy. Quite the opposite, in the last election round climate policy was not even properly

56 mentioned in the VVD’s electoral programme, and the Climate Bill that was proposed earlier that year by the Green party and the Labour party was sharply opposed by the governing party. Even though the policy process around the Climate Bill has been paused due to the formation process of a new government after the elections of March 2017, in which the VVD conquered once more the most seats in parliament, it exemplifies the possibility for bills to pass even if not all the governing parties endorse it. In sum, this comparison of political opportunity structures shows that the fragile government of Ireland provides an advantageous window of opportunity for effective policy entrepreneurship, more than the political situation in the Netherlands, where it is easier to block proposals because of a fairly stable coalition between the parties. In case of the Divestment Bill introduced by TD Thomas Pringle in the Dáil, the minority position of the government offered an opportunity for the independent TD and the campaigners for the bill, and resulted in 90 votes in favour, against 53 against the vote. Basically, all parties and independent TDs, except for the governing party Fine Gael, endorsed the Bill. In fact, the policy officer of Trocaire acknowledges this exceptionally advantageous opportunity structure, as shown in the excerpt below.

‘One thing I would say, one thing that we have very clear is that part of the critical success factors to getting the bill to where it is, is the fact that Ireland has a minority government. The government voted against the bill, but because the government is a minority, and the majority, all the rest of the parties supported it, we had the numbers secure and it passed. That's also the reality.’ (Interview 1, 2017, May 18).

Interesting to this statement is that the organisation was apparently very much aware of this unique state. Put differently, she expresses a high degree of political literacy. The positive result of the Bill passing through the second stage of the policy process alludes to the organisations’ adeptness to successfully exploit it. Evidence that indicates a similar level of political literacy in the Dutch national divestment campaign remains missing for now. The second element of the political opportunity structure that highlights an essential difference between Ireland and the Netherlands revolves around the issue of independent members of parliament. TDs in Ireland are bound to a constituency, of which there are forty in Ireland. The Netherlands has several small parties, but such thing as an independent MP does not exist. Given the fact that the Divestment Bill was introduced by an independent TD in Ireland, it gives the impression of having some benefit associated with that. While the

57 collaboration on divestment with TD Thomas Pringle was not established for his status as independent TD, it was helpful to the policy process. This premise is backed up by the interview with the policy officer of Trocaire, who said:

‘Well, I suppose in some respects it was important, because as you know, there are certain dynamics between political parties. And if a particular party had been the sponsor of a bill, that very fact in itself can have an impact on whether certain parties will support it. So the fact that it's coming from an independent, it didn't have some of those dynamics attached to it. So, it was maybe a bit easier for it to progress. The deputy himself was also very open in his engagement with politicians from other parties, he was happy to work with others on the bill. He wasn't precious about it, he wanted it to be a positive collective exercise to take it forth. I think that was well received and allowed other parties to support it.’ (Interview 1, 2017, May 18).

Having an independent TD introducing the bill avoided certain political party dynamics that usually exists. In the Netherlands, there is no opportunity to introduce a bill without being affiliated to a political party. However, as mentioned above, much depends also on a politicians willingness to work together with other parties. This is something what would perfectly work in the Dutch system, and, in fact, has been demonstrated by the collaboration between Green Left and PvdA on the Climate Law. The current advantageous opportunity structure of Ireland, and the less advantageous opportunity structure of the Netherlands give strong indications of factors that contributed to the success of the Divestment Bill in Ireland, and the absence of an equivalent in the Netherlands. However, an advantageous opportunity structure does not lead inevitably to desired policy change. Quite the opposite, policy change seems to stand or fall by the agentive capacities of the actors involved. This is where the concept of policy entrepreneur comes in, and the campaigns as illustrated above provide some interesting clues to how policy entrepreneurs influence policy change with regards to divestment. Firstly, the assessment of the Irish campaign has resulted in the identification of multiple policy entrepreneurs. These policy entrepreneurs do not only come from different sets of actors (civil society actors, research and consultancy actors or state actors), but these actors are also related to each other in a particular way, namely one that resembles a perfect velvet triangle constellation. In line with my theoretical expectations, this constellation seems to have strongly contributed to the successful outcome of the Divestment Bill. To be more precise, policy entrepreneurs were

58 present in all three sets of actors between which the velvet triangle differentiates. The qualities inherent to policy entrepreneurship have been key to the success, and combined in a triangular constellation it seems that they have reinforced one another. One quality is important to highlight, namely the ability to forge fruitful coalitions. Most likely it is this quality that gave rise to this strong triangle of actors. Though, like an advantageous opportunity structure alone does not lead to successful policy change, neither do triangular constellations. The other qualities ascribed to policy entrepreneurs, namely social acuity, effective problem definition and learning by example, are key to the influence any velvet triangle can exert. From the Irish case I can conclude that policy entrepreneurship in a triangular constellation has been proven very successful for successful policy change, provided that there is an advantageous political opportunity structure and that crucial gatekeepers are on your side. How different is the Dutch case. On a national policy level, no velvet triangle is present. While some actors certainly show qualities of policy entrepreneurs, and collaboration is widespread and effective between civil society actors and research institutes and experts, the state actors are not really part of the joint efforts on divestment campaigning in the Netherlands. While this is understandable, given the fact that the resources of the national coordinating organisation are limited and the movement is still relatively young, it would not be injudicious to start finding some allies on a state level. Complying with the Paris Agreements in order to mitigate climate change and divestment are unquestionably the (partial) responsibility of national governments, which is the reason why engaging with state actors is almost unavoidable. That is not to say that the grassroots characteristics should be underestimated. In fact, the Dutch divestment movement has been reflecting upon this, and subsequently taking the first steps towards getting into the political arena. If it wishes to continue on the road of divesting with the help of state actors, it would be wise to have a close look at the example of Ireland. Yet, as set out in the theoretical framework and in particular in Figure 1, it is helpful to complement the role of policy entrepreneurs with the role of gatekeepers. To a certain extent these roles can overlap, though the ability to grant or deny access to decision-making arenas in the divestment campaign deserves more attention. As for Ireland, the grassroots division of the movement came across an excellent venue for bringing the issue to national politics: the internationally operating charity Trocaire. After intensive campaigning for environmental justice on a national policy level for the past ten years, the organisation is likely to have developed more personal relationships with some institutional actors that share their ideals.

Not only the amount of time spend on inside lobby activities, but also the funding from governmental bodies Trocaire receives, suggest the existence of durable ties between the state and the organisation. The fact that such a major NGO with access to some significant state actors took up on the issue of divestment really made a difference, and has been key to getting the Divestment bill to where it is (Interview 1, 2017, May 18). Having a fairly institutionalised actor taking the lead in the divestment campaign had the advantage of having venues of access already in place. The gatekeeper role suits TD Thomas Pringle, too. It was him who offered Trocaire and the divestment movement to sponsor a Bill, or put differently, granted access to a decision-making arena. Interestingly, getting the issue on the official agenda was in the case of Ireland a matter of luck, and no gatekeeper has been involved. That is, whether a private members bill will be put on the agenda depends on a recently introduced lottery system. It is, thus, a matter of luck if your issue gets selected, but it also circumvents the dependence on gatekeepers at a higher level of decision making. Gatekeepers are and have been essential to the Dutch case as well. The organisation taking up the divestment campaign in the Netherlands is almost purely grassroots, with one paid director, funded by the global divestment organisation 350.org. The ties with state actors are, therefore, non-existent or in still the making. This indicates that the organisation relies upon outside lobby activities for getting the issue of divestment to the political agenda. Nonetheless, as the velvet triangle and the case of Ireland suggest, having institutional allies increases the likelihood of bringing about policy change. Given the fact that other civil society actors in the Dutch environmental network do have institutional ties, these actors can take up the gatekeepers role by granting the issue of divestment access to the decision-making arenas that are accessible to them. This seems a feasible strategy, as there is significant ideological congruence between the environmental civil society actors. Despite the nonappearance of direct alliances between Fossil Free NL and national policy makers or state actors, policy entrepreneurs on the state level, like MP Vos from the Labour party, appear to have encountered gatekeepers in their efforts to getting divestment on the political agenda. A propos, the very fact that the issue was picked up by a MP without actively Fossil Free NL lobbying him demonstrates that neither gatekeepers, nor access to institutional venues are a necessary condition for getting an issue into the political arena. Aside of this, to all appearances MP Vos approached multiple venues to raise awareness for the carbon bubble risk, such as the Minister of Finance, the State Secretary of Infrastructure and the Environment and the State Secretary of Social Affairs and Employment. Despite them being all members of the Labour party, the issue was not considered a priority. In other words,

60 access to a higher level of decision making was denied. The crucial difference here is that the Irish system has a lottery system in place to which gatekeepers can exert no influence, whereas in the Netherlands they are essential for getting it to a higher level of decision- making. The lottery system in Ireland provided the Irish divestment campaigners with another advantage. The divestment bill got surprisingly quickly selected for a debate via the lottery system, which prevented counter lobbies to organise in time. The divestment campaigners reacted the opposite way, warranting the claim made by Keck and Sikkink (1998) that the ability to quickly and accurately generate information and to deploy it effectively is their most valuable currency (p.8). That, and the lack of organisation by opposition groups helped to convince the majority of the TDs in the Dáil, as opposition groups were too late to convince them otherwise. Altogether, the country comparison of the divestment movement in Ireland and the Netherlands offer compelling clues about the role of policy entrepreneurship in generating policy change. Particularly policy entrepreneurs functioning in a triangular constellation, a velvet triangle construction, have proven impactful in the Irish case. This can be explained by the exceptional qualities policy entrepreneurs possess, ranging from a sophisticated awareness of political opportunity structures and a capacity to act upon it, to an impressive capacity to build coalitions and design efficacious frames for a campaign. The Dutch case shows that allies on the state-level are not a necessary pre-condition for getting the issue of divestment on the agenda, but without institutional alliances it seems to get halted easier in the subsequent policy process. This suggests that the success of triangles of policy entrepreneurs in generating policy change is largely contingent upon access, which refers to seeking allied gatekeepers and, simultaneously, circumventing opposing gatekeepers. Personal relationships, shared values and ideological congruency between actors may be of help in this. Furthermore, the success of a triangle of policy entrepreneurs is largely contingent upon the political opportunity structure in place. As a matter of fact, the interchange between the political opportunity structure approach and the concept of policy entrepreneur become apparent. The qualities that policy entrepreneurs possess and effectively deploy, particularly in a triangular constellation, account for an ideal recipe to see and seize an advantageous political opportunity structure.

Conclusion When studying political phenomena is enlightening, and sometimes humbling, that many ideas on these phenomena have deep historical roots. A wonderful example of obtaining such insight, is when I read this pearl of wisdom written by the French poet and novelist Victor Hugo. He believed that ‘greater than the tread of mighty armies is an idea whose time has come’. It fuels the hope that wicked problems could be countered by great ideas. The Paris Agreement of 2015 relies upon the idea that burning fossil fuels is soon to be history. Inherent to that is an unquestionable investment recommendation: get you money out of the fossil fuel industry, or it will be soon worthless. This idea is at the heart of the fossil fuel divestment movement, which is said to be the fastest growing divestment movement in history. The victories and the extraordinary growth of this movement confirm that moving away from the fossil fuel industry is an idea whose time has come. The Paris Agreement embodies the obligation of countries to take appropriate action in order to successfully mitigate climate change. Agreeing upon it was a joint effort of government, civil society actors, researchers and the like. Translating it into action will therefore require the same degree of collaboration between the different sets of actors. When Keck and Sikkink (1998) write that public interest groups ‘thrive on controversy’, I see a clear link with the divestment movement. Stigmatisation of the fossil fuel industry and anybody linked to it, is a fundamental strength of the fossil fuel divestment movement. The arguments for divestment are not exclusively moral. The idea of divestment includes a strong symbolic dimension, and a compelling financial element, too. It gives a concrete opportunity to governments, institutions, foundations and the like, to turn the Paris Agreement into action, in other words, to practice what it preached. The divestment movement emerged as a real grassroots movement, and evolved over time into a dense transnational advocacy network. However, on the national level the global campaign has been translated in tailor-made national strategies and campaigns. Ireland is on its way to become the first country to divest from fossil fuels, and the Netherlands focus on the Dutch pension fund ABP, one of the largest pension funds in the world. The question that arises for these national campaigns is whether to engage with state actors or not. Ireland effectively got a Divestment Bill through the first crucial stages of the policy process with the help of policy entrepreneurs on the state level and thanks to a unique window of opportunity with regards to the political opportunity structure. ABP’s ties with the Fossil Fuel industry have been challenged in the Netherlands, as a result of which some assets have been moderately moved to climate-neutral alternatives. However, given the tight timeframe in

62 which measures to mitigate climate change need to take place, this might not be quick enough. Demonstrated by the success of Ireland on a national policy level, I believe that advocates for divestment could be splendiferous actors in reminding governments of their obligation to mitigate climate change, in line with the Paris Agreement. This encourages collaborative constellations between state actors, civil society actors and academics, already widespread in, for example, feminist movements. Policy entrepreneurs flourish in such cooperative triangles, and see added value in building alliances with state actors, perhaps at the risk of losing some profound grassroots features. The insights I obtained in this thesis by the assessment and comparison of Ireland and the Netherlands are of practical relevance, as it allows for mutual learning, and inspiration to other fossil fuel divestment campaigns. The theoretical relevance of this thesis resides in the successful integration of the concept of policy entrepreneur into the political opportunity structure approach to policy change. Also, it helps in understanding the similarities and differences between gatekeepers and policy entrepreneurs, which provides an extra explanatory component for the assessment of collaboration between policy entrepreneurs on different levels. Of course, these are merely exploratory steps towards a better understanding of policy entrepreneurs and fruitful ways of collaboration. This, and the interchange between the political opportunity structure approach to policy change and policy entrepreneurship offers an appealing field of further research. It would be interesting to incorporate notions of path dependency and questions on how transnational advocacy networks evolve over time. But for the time being, we can witness the fruitions of a powerful idea whose time has come.

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