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This is the published version of a paper published in Ethnologia Scandinavica.
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Garberding, P. (2020) We could smell that he's Stasi: Power and Justification Strategies of the Stasi in Music Life in the GDR and in the Swedish-German Music Contacts Ethnologia Scandinavica, 50: 43-66
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Permanent link to this version: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-42173 We Could Smell That He s Stasi ower and Justification Strategies of the Stasi in Music Life in the GDR and in Swedish-German Music Contacts By Petra Garberding
Justification of the political-operational necessity accepted and challenged and what conse- of recruiting quences it could have for those affected. The political-operational necessity of the [candi- Central concepts of this article are date’s] advertising lies in the concrete political- operational situation within the group of people power and “orders of justification” (Recht- responsible for the musical life of the GDR. […] fertigungsordnungen). This discourse It is of particular importance that the candidate has model was elaborated by the Frankfurt extensive connections in the area of operations, School of Critical Theory and has been which can be used for the acquisition of informa- developed further by the research associa- tion about the aims and intentions of the leading tion “Normative Orders” (Forst & G n- personalities of musical life in Sweden, the Fed- ther 2010).2 eral Republic of Germany and Austria; this is im- portant for the MfS, because it opens opportuni- By linking the concepts of power and ties for compiling information from other ranges orders of justification, one seeks to make of the economic and social life of these states clear how power functions as a system of through the circle of acquaintances of the candi- legitimization of social rules, norms and date’s extensive contacts with leading representa- institutions (Forst & Günther 2010:2). tives of the monopoly capital. […]1 This concept of power has in common This quotation is an example of the moti- with Michel Foucault’s concept of power vation for the choice of the musicologist that it is understood as a social phenom- Gerd Schönfelder (1936–2000) as an un- enon that can be both oppressive and pro- official employee (inoffizieller Mitarbei- ductive, as well as the idea of power as ter, IM) of the Stasi (Ministry for State something discursively constructed that Security of the GDR, MfS or Stasi). operates in cognitive space (Forst 2015: Schönfelder, who had an extensive net- 74). Forst and Günther, however, are of work in musicians’ circles in Sweden, the opinion that Foucault’s concept of West Germany and Austria, and who was power is nevertheless too much about pre- also a respected musicologist during the senting power as negatively connoted ‒ as GDR era, seemed to the Stasi staff to be a a power that tends to limit and constrain suitable person to “enlighten” the GDR subjects ‒ rather than illustrating the free- authorities about the conditions in musi- dom of subjects to reject or accept the jus- cal, social and economic life in these tifications for the exercise of power by states, to use Stasi terminology. I will re- others (Forst 2015:74; Forst & Günther turn to Schönfelder later in this article. 2010:3). Therefore their theoretical model The aim of this article is to give an in- strongly emphasizes power as “the ability sight into the influence of the Stasi on mu- to bind others by reasons (justifications)” sical life in the GDR and on musical rela- (Forst 2015:98). It is also about analysing tions between the GDR and Sweden. How the discursive space “in which claims of did the Stasi exercise power, how was this justification can be raised, contested, and power justified and what can the exercise defended, that is, a discursive space in of power tell us about ideas regarding mu- which the participants can carry out their sic and politics? On the basis of some con- struggles for normative orders as a dispute crete examples I want to show how the over justifying reasons” (Forst & G nther Stasi’s exercise of power was vindicated, 2010:3). Forst and G nther’s model is
Ethnologia Scandinavica, Vol. 50, 2020 etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
well suited for this study to reveal strate- changeable order or “the space of justifi- gies for the justification of power and to cations is ideologically sealed” (Forst show how the Stasi succeeded ‒ or failed 2015:97). Here there is often illegitimate ‒ in combining music and politics in its coercion. own sense. 3. When specific forms of exercising It is also about analysing the discursive power are part of social or political rela- space “in which claims of justification can tions, which conforms to a special order in be raised, contested, and defended, that is, a society, Forst speaks of domination a discursive space in which the partici- (Herrschaft). Here, too, there is often il- pants can carry out their struggles for nor- legitimate coercion. mative orders as a dispute over justifying 4. Violence is another asymmetrical reasons” (Forst & G nther 2010:3). form of power where physical coercion Forst distinguishes four forms of exists. Here the person exercising power power: 1. “Noumenal power”: Power as is in principle powerless, strictly speak- “the capacity of person A to influence per- ing, since the ruled have not accepted the son B so that he or she thinks or acts in a justifications of power and the person way that goes back to A’s influence, exercising power is now resorting to phys- which must be intentional in nature, other- ical methods of coercion. According to wise one would speak only of effect and Forst, “Power is the ability to bound not of power” (Forst 2015:97). The point others by reasons it is a core phenomenon here is to use justification narratives to of normativity” (Forst 2015:98). As we convince person B to accept the power of will see, all these forms of power existed A as legitimate. When person B accepts in the GDR. the justification strategies of A as mean- The material for this article comes from ingful, Forst speaks of “noumenal power”. Swedish and German archives, including It is important that noumenal power de- the archives of the Federal Commissioner scribes the power relations between equal for the Records of the State Security Ser- persons and is based on free will. Person B vice of the former German Democratic can reject the justification strategies of Republic (der Bundesbeauftragte f r die person A without suffering disadvantages Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes this form of power is exercised between der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokra- “free actors” (Forst 2015:60). The aim tischen Republik, MfS or Stasi), and the here, however, is also to make “invisible archives of the Royal Academy of Music exercise of power” visible (Forst 2015: in Stockholm (Kungliga Musikaliska 59). Akademien, KMA). The author also con- 2. By coercion or subjugation (Beherr- ducted 13 interviews with contemporary schung) Forst means asymmetrical condi- witnesses. In this article, two of these in- tions that generate a justification space formants, who were themselves affected that is based on certain “not well-founded by the Stasi or who got to know IM of the legitimizations”: Person B does not accept Stasi, have their say. The contemporary the reasons of person A. Person A maybe witnesses quoted by name in this article speaks here of a “God-intentioned” or un- were able to read and comment on the etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
quotations from the interviews before tasi as hiel an wor o the publication. The article is part of the re- Part search project “Between East and West: During the GDR era (1949–1989), the Ideology, Aesthetics and Politics in the Stasi described itself as the “shield and Music Relations between Sweden and the sword of the party” (Heidemeyer 2015: GDR 1949–1989”, which runs until 2020 10).3 and is carried out by the author together The task of the Stasi was to secure the with the historian Henrik Rosengren and SED’s monopoly of power in the state and the musicologist Ursula Geisler it is fi- to expose and ward off attempts to influ- nanced by the Baltic Sea Foundation at the ence and penetrate presumed enemies in Södertörn University in Sweden. good time. In addition, the Stasi operated The article is a contribution to research so-called “counterintelligence”, placing on music as a cultural, social and political its own spies in strategically important phenomenon. It is about studying music places, who in turn reported to the Stasi. In and musical creation in the field of tension addition, telephones and apartments were between societal norms and values, as bugged and postal traffic within the GDR well as social and economic conditions. and between the GDR and abroad were The focus is usually not on music per se, controlled (M nkel 2015 Polzin 2015). but rather on the social conditions for mu- For Sweden, the GDR was an important trading sicians, music critics, composers, musi- partner and political and cultural contact. As Birgitta Almgren, professor cologists and others (see, among others, emerita of German Studies, points out, Danki 2019 Fredriksson 2018 Arvids- GDR authorities regarded Sweden as an son 2014 Arvidsson 2008). alliance-free state, which was described as This article is also a contribution to a “focus country” (Schwerpunktsland) research on music and music politics in and interpreted as an important gateway to the GDR. There are already a number of Western Europe (Almgren 2011:41 2009: studies on various musical actors and 15). The GDR regime’s plan was to create areas in the GDR, but so far little research a positive opinion of the GDR in Western on international contacts in music and on Europe through friendly links and trade the methods of power of the Stasi on agreements between the GDR and Swe- music life in the GDR (Garberding 2020 den. Almgren has shown how there were Garberding, Geisler & Rosengren 2019 different views of the GDR in Sweden: Bernhard 2018 Kelly 2019 2014 Bret- there were those who judged the GDR schneider 2018 Rosengren 2018 Noeske positively and interpreted it as a model for & Tischer (eds.), 2010 Klingberg 2000). modern socialist politics, for instance in The existing studies are mainly written culture and education, but there were also from musicological perspectives this art- those who were critical of the GDR and icle would like to examine the topic of the decried it for lacking freedom of speech Stasi’s power methods in music life and in and travel (Almgren 2009). Swedish-German contacts from an ethno- My research in the Stasi archives in logical perspective. Berlin also shows that the Stasi was con- etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
stantly trying to expand its influence in The Stasi recruited its IMs by first hav- Sweden and how it was trying to gain in- ing them monitored by other IMs in order sight into Swedish cultural life. This also to determine whether they were suitable applies to Swedish musical life. for IM activities. Here the political atti- tude of the candidate was examined, his Choosing the Right People her relationship to the GDR, to socialism The introductory quotation to this article and to the SED. But the candidate’s life- illustrates how important it was for the style was also important, his her work, Stasi to select the “right” people for its family situation, the networks, contacts work. A crucial source of information for with the West and engagement in trade the Stasi were the so-called “unofficial unions, associations and in their neigh- employees” (GI, geheimer Informator bourhood (Florath 2015:40–47). If a can- [the term until 1968] and IM (inoffizieller didate was not positive about working for Mitarbeiter [the designation as of 1968, the Stasi, the Stasi could put the candidate BStU 2015:36, 43]). Their task was to under pressure (Jahn 2014 Almgren 2011). gather information about people, opin- If a candidate had contacts in the West, ions, events and so on in order to help the the employees of the Stasi investigated to Stasi protect the GDR against alleged what extent these could be used to the ad- enemies (Gieseke 2011:112–116). vantage of the Stasi. My studies in Stasi’s By attempting to gain knowledge about archives have shown that in the field of the political views of individuals as early music, the Stasi tried to recruit IMs who as possible, the Stasi wanted to prevent were considered particularly professional new rebellions, demonstrations and any and respectable by their colleagues, who opposition activity that could call the had a successful career and played an im- power of the SED into question (Florath portant role in their field. Experts in their 2015:40‒41). As the German historian field were particularly popular, but they Bernd Florath aptly describes it, the IM should not be too specialized (Garberding organization of the Stasi illustrates the 2020 Garberding, Geisler & Rosengren state’s fear of its own fellow citizens (Flo- 2019). rath 2015:41). German research shows Once the Stasi had found a suitable can- how extensive and comprehensive the didate, Stasi’s employees tried to recruit monitoring apparatus of the Stasi was, this person as an IM. For the IM, working considerably more so than in the other with the Stasi could mean many advan- Eastern European countries (Gieseke tages, such as facilitating their further ca- 2011 M nkel ed. 2015). For example, reer and greater freedom to travel. IMs shortly before the collapse of the GDR, also received financial compensation for 91,000 people were employed by the Sta- their work, but usually not large sums. If si, and they received information from someone had committed him- or herself as twice as many IMs. The IMs came from an IM, it was usually impossible to end the all groups in society and from all age cooperation without getting into difficul- groups. About half of the IMs were also ties (Florath 2015:50). This is corroborat- members of the SED (Florath 2015:40). ed not only by numerous eyewitness ac- etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
counts and previous research, but also by According to files in the Stasi archive, numerous television films about life in the Brockhaus had already been prepared to GDR, such as Weissensee, Germany 1983, provide the Stasi with information in No- and Das Leben der Anderen. vember 1957. It was the Stasi’s practice to first let possible candidates for coopera- Berg an an ohn nlight tion pass a kind of test in order to convince ener in sicolog the Stasi of their suitability. Brockhaus If the selected candidate had agreed to co- had to visit and report about a music ar- operate, he she normally had to sign a rangement in West Berlin for his “re- “declaration of commitment” in which he hearsal”. In the summer of 1957 he gave promised to keep his cooperation with the his report to a Stasi employee in a caf in Stasi secret under all circumstances. In her East Berlin. His report convinced the Stasi dissertation on the Stasi at the University of his suitability, as he not only fulfilled of Jena, the historian Katharina Lenski has the assignment, but even more thoroughly clearly shown how important the silence than expected wrote about a group of stu- about any cooperation with the Stasi was dents whom he suspected of working with she also speaks here of “circles of silence” an opposition group, the Young Commu- or a “silent community” (Lenski 2015:521). nity (Junge Gemeinde, Klingberg 2000: One example of a declaration of com- 197). In connection with his recruitment, mitment is the letter of commitment he was commissioned to contribute to the signed by the musicologist Alfred Brock- “Enlightenment of the Institute of Music haus, who worked for many years at the History” (Klingberg 2000:200). This for- Institute for Musicology at the Humboldt mulation shows how Stasi’s employees University (HUB) Berlin, in the 1970s and defined their work. They did not interpret 1980s as head of the musicology depart- their mission, as we do today, as a kind of ment.4 Brockhaus received his doctorate spying and denunciation. Rather, they saw in 1962 with the thesis The Symphony of themselves as employees who were sup- Dmitri Shostakovich and in 1969 he was posed to protect the East German state by appointed professor of musicology at the helping to achieve “clarity” about the po- HUB.5 Brockhaus was formally recruited litical views and activities of individuals, as a “secret informer” (GI) in East Berlin groups and institutions. From a discourse- back in 1957, but he did not make his writ- analytical perspective, one can speak here ten commitment until three months later: of a threat topos, a “locus terriblis” I, Heinz Alfred Brockhaus, born on 12.8.1930 in (Wodak 1998:85), which laid the founda- Krefeld […] voluntarily commit myself to cooper- tion for cooperation with the Stasi. One ate with the Ministry of State Security. I will keep speaks of a “locus terriblis” when an idea this cooperation secret from anyone. of an existential threat exists and one has I will sign my written reports with the name K. to defend oneself in time against an ene- Bergmann. I am aware that if I break this obliga- my. In the case of the Stasi employees, tion I may be held responsible under the laws of the GDR. So far I have not been contacted or re- they learned that one had to protect one’s cruited by any other department. own state against “foreign powers”, such Berlin, 27.2.1958, Alfred Brockhaus.6 as the capitalist countries. etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
In order to clarify whether a threat was enemy. In a seminar presentation with Prof. [Ernst present or not, the Stasi needed informa- Hermann] Meyer, the student [name] said: “She tion from persons who had insight into quoted an essay: Science must abstain from any political comment.’” certain groups, organizations or institu- The student [name] said to this student [name] tions and had certain networks at their dis- that she should only pay attention that she instead posal. In the Stasi files, the term “enlight- of Adolf [Hitler] does not say Walter [Ulbricht]. enment” is often used to refer to the gath- (Underlining in the original.)7 ering of information about suspected op- While the students quoted here thought ponents of the regime. “Enlightenment” is that music and politics should have noth- usually seen as a positive word, and in ing to do with each other, the interpreta- Stasi’s usage it can also be interpreted as a tion and reporting of the GHI shows that word that illustrates how the Stasi and its these views challenged the official dis- IM perceived their work as something im- course in the GDR, in which music was portant and constructive (see Almgren supposed to express a certain political 2009:448f.). ideology. The students were opposed to a One year after his recruitment in 1958, discourse order in which the political Brockhaus was promoted to Secret Main worldview is prescribed by the state and in Informator (GHI, geheimer Hauptinfor- which the interpretation of musical ex- mator, BStU 2015:36). Now he also as- pressions is also to be determined. This re- sumed responsibility for supervising other port to the Stasi shows how the discursive IMs, many of whom were students at the space in musicology at the HUB should be Faculty of Philosophy (Klingberg 2000: designed according to the official authori- 202). The meetings with the other IMs ties of the GDR: Any questioning of the were often held in Brockhaus’s office, but official discourse on music as an expres- according to Brockhaus this became sion of a certain (socialist) ideology “more and more difficult” for him because should be documented and then so-called he was “rarely alone” (ibid.). An example “measures” (Ma nahmen) taken. As of one of “Bergmann’s” collaborations Klingberg has shown, for several of the with Stasi is his report to his Stasi contact above-mentioned students the measures in 1962: meant that an academic career in the GDR He [Bergmann] reported the following about the was made more difficult or even denied. Institute of Musicology: There is now a real con- They had problems getting suitable hous- ception that some students want prove that music ing, received lower salaries than their col- has to be apolitical, that music has nothing to do with society. They continue to demand that mod- leagues, and some left the GDR for good ern western music be taught and performed at our (Klingberg 2000:201–202). Concepts institution. The following students belong to it: such as the “enlightenment of conditions Spokesman [name] 3. Study year. [Name], [name] in musicology at the HUB” legitimized and [name]. [Name] said the following: What can the exercise of power by the Stasi through be reflected in our music? Only fear and terror. its GHI Brockhaus. So he saw it as his task […] [Name] says, ideological things are decisive, that’s the trouble with us. If you don’t join in, to expose critics and hand them over to the you’re drilled until it fits. Stasi. By naming the quibbling students, The GHI estimates that [name] is a distinct power could be exercised at the individual etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
level, and individuals could be controlled 1983, “John” reported that there was an and persecuted. The power factor was fur- influential group of people in the VKM ther strengthened by secretly controlling who were not in accord with the party line the students – from today’s point of view and who advocated an “ideological co- a human rights violation. In this case one existence” between West and East Ger- can first speak of power in the form of man musicology. Another problem were subjugation – when the students were un- “church-pacifist” tendencies in the VKM, knowingly intercepted, and their opinions which were expressed, among other were presented to the Stasi – and then of a things, by the fact that composers used form of violence, when the denounced texts by Italian and French writers that students were subjected to so-called could be interpreted as “church-pacifist” “countermeasures”, such as not getting an statements. The Stasi had this problem apartment or employment. confirmed by another employee, Gerd From 1962 onwards, there are no fur- Schönfelder (see below).9 “John” sent ther reports in Brockhaus’s Stasi files. In along a list of names which included the 1969 it was announced that his profession- musicologist Ingeborg Allihn, who also al career and his work at the HUB took so had contacts in Sweden. Allihn was the much time that he could no longer be editor of the VKM journal Bulletin and “used” as GHI (Klingberg 2000:207). But “John” regarded her contacts with the in 1979 Brockhaus was recruited again, West and to the church as a problem.10 and this time as IMS “John”. As an IMS, he had the task of “politically-operatively is Politicall ehin the ence penetrating and securing an area of re- During a conversation with me, the Ger- sponsibility” (politisch-operative Durch- man musicologist Ingeborg Allihn said dringung und Sicherung eines Verantwor- that she was not surprised when she read tungsbereiches, BStU 2015:44), and as in her Stasi file that the supervisor of her one of these areas the Stasi had designated doctoral thesis, Alfred Brockhaus, had re- the Association of Composers and Music- ported on her as IM “John” of the Stasi. ologists of the GDR (Verband der Kom- She and her friends had long had a suspi- ponisten und Musikwissenschaftler der cion. “We could smell, he’s Stasi,” she DDR, VKM).8 The VKM was the main or- said. During the GDR period, she and her ganization for musical life in the GDR and friends were often fairly certain who was founded in 1962 by the composer worked for the Stasi. When she read her Hanns Eisler. The Council was superior to Stasi files after the fall of communism, her all other music organizations and was ac- suspicions were confirmed in all cases. cepted as a member of the International When I met Mrs Allihn for a conversation Music Council of UNESCO in 1966. Nu- in Berlin, I had been allowed to read some merous international connections were parts of her Stasi files with her consent. I maintained through the VKM, including wanted to talk to her about her contacts to Sweden. with Swedish music life and her trouble The GDR authorities were not satisfied with the Stasi. Ingeborg Allihn came into with the development in the VKM. In contact with Swedish colleagues, among etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
others Sven-Erik Bäck and Eskil Hem- munism these were exactly the contacts berg, through her work for the VKM and that helped Allihn to survive, since several her Chamber Music Guide (Kammer- valuable employment opportunities were musikführer, Allihn, ed., 1997). In the ear- offered her from West Germany. Thanks ly 1980s, by invitation of the VKM, she to them, the transition after the fall of travelled to Sweden to collect material and communism was relatively unproblematic find authors for the chapters on Nordic for her. composers in the Chamber Music Guide. Allihn’s report can be interpreted as an She also travelled from Sweden to Oslo at example of a narrative in which Allihn – the invitation of the Nordic Music Council looking back on the events – positions to take part in a music conference. From herself not merely as a victim of the Stasi. then on she remained in contact with Instead, she describes her own position in Swedish colleagues, especially with Eskil its complexity: On the one hand, through Hemberg, who visited her several times in her work for the VKM she was a target for the GDR.12 Brockhaus’s negative reporting to the She reported to me that her supervisor Stasi on the other hand, it was precisely Alfred Brockhaus had actually not been this work for the VKM that gave her em- particularly interested in her doctoral ployment and relative freedom in the thesis. She now believes that it may have GDR. Her report also makes it clear how, been advantageous for her that Brockhaus on the one hand, international cooperation told the Stasi about her, that she was “po- could allow a certain amount of freedom, litically behind the fence” and had church but, on the other hand, could lead to even connections. This would have had the more intensive scrutiny by the Stasi. It is advantage that the GDR authorities re- also interesting to see how certain persons garded her as “lost” – she could not be who presided over international bodies used for political purposes. One problem, and did not accept Stasi methods weak- of course, was that she couldn’t pursue an ened the Stasi’s power potential and how academic career at university for this rea- this clearly called its legitimacy into ques- son, but she thinks she was lucky because tion. she could work for the VKM, both with But Brockhaus wasn’t the only one who the Bulletin and with the Chamber Music reported on Allihn. In the GDR era, Allihn Guide. In our conversation she particular- was aware that, as a single mother, she ly praised the then head of the VKM, Vera could easily be pressured by the authori- Reiner, as an important pillar in her ca- ties, because they could always have reer: Reiner had repeatedly held her “pro- threatened to take her children away. tective hand” over her. Thanks to Reiner, “Thank God this never happened”, she Allihn probably had relatively large free- said in our conversation. But she also told dom in her work with the Bulletin. But the me about an experience when she was par- Bulletin also meant many contacts with ticularly afraid. An important contact for colleagues in West Germany and Western her in Sweden was, as I mentioned, Eskil Europe, which of course was a thorn in the Hemberg, who was chairman of the Swe- side of the Stasi. But after the fall of com- dish Composers’ Association (För- etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
eningen Svenska Tonsättare, FST) at the went to the Stasi in Dresden to find out time. Hemberg often travelled to the GDR who had reported on Allihn and the VKM. and was very interested in the musical life There she could read the notification and of the GDR. Allihn often acted as his saw the signature of the person who had “companion” on behalf of the VKM, done the denouncing she recognized which meant that she helped him to get Gerd Schönfelder’s writing. Allihn: access to concerts, museums, restaurants, “Then the VKM never sent Schönfelder etc.13 anywhere again.” She also learned at that Once, when Hemberg was in the GDR time that Schönfelder and his wife had re- to visit the Dresden Music Festival, Gott- cently been in Vienna for 14 days on be- fried Scholz, then director of the Vienna half of the VKM. “From that hour on, Musikhochschule, was also there. Allihn Schönfelder was dead to me,” said Allihn. was to look after the guests. When she and Today she is certain that she was simply the guests had accepted Vera Reiner’s in- lucky that the Stasi in Dresden had treated vitation to dinner, the musicologist and di- her so “benevolently”. It could have ended rector of the Dresden Academy of Music, very badly for her.14 Gerd Schönfelder, was also present (see Schönfelder illustrates here how an IM below about Schönfelder). During their on the one hand establishes good relations talk, Scholz invited Allihn to visit him and with a national and international organiza- his wife in Vienna. Allihn: “And then I tion (VKM) in order to then use them for saw his [Schönfelder’s] face, and it was monitoring on behalf of the Stasi. Schön- clear to me that he would do anything to felder here represents two different orders prevent that.” When she came to her hotel of power, which he combines as an IM: in the evening, she had a message that she On the one hand the noumenal power, in should be at the Stasi the next morning at which his colleagues in the VKM trusted 7.00 o’clock. A colleague offered to take him as a musicologist and respected col- her there and wait outside for her. She also league, regarding this exercise of power as received a call from Vera Reiner, who was justified (they let him travel to Vienna on aware that Allihn was going to the Stasi, behalf of the VKM). On the other, there is and Reiner advised her to say as little as power as a form of subjugation (with a possible. threat of violence in the background) in “Really, it was like a crime thriller,” Al- which he controls the same organization lihn said. She had rarely been so afraid. as an IM and reports to the Stasi on behav- When she came to the Stasi the next morn- iour as he regards as harmful to the state. ing, she was told that she had been These combinations of different power charged with allegedly passing on internal exercises were characteristic of the condi- information to Western colleagues. That tions in the GDR. was a serious accusation. Allihn denied everything and got away with a warning. er ch n el er an the Ro al When she was back in Berlin, Vera Reiner ca e o sic in toc hol said that the charges were not only against Gerd Schönfelder was a German music- her, but also against the VKM. Reiner ologist who had grown up and worked in etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
the GDR. During the 1970s he was em- one’s “political utility” (Hedin 2005:289). ployed at the University of Leipzig and Only those GDR citizens who were classi- the Music Academy (Musikhochschule) fied as politically reliable could become in Dresden, from 1972 as Vice-Rector and travel cadres. The political loyalty was de- 1980–1984 as Rector. In 1984 he became termined through a process in which the head of the Semper Opera in Dresden.16 In Stasi had surveys carried out on the person 1961 he became a member of the SED, in in question at his her workplace and in 1973 of the Central Music Commission his her residential area. They also exam- ( entrale Kommission Musik) of the Cul- ined the family and kinship relationships tural Association of the GDR (Kulturbund of the person, their political attitude and der Deutschen Demokratischen Repub- contacts in the West (Hedin 2005:294–299). lik). As of 1969 he was a member of the Within the travel cadre system, there VKM and was also active on the board.17 were also various gradations, depending In 1976 Schönfelder was invited to on the assessment of the travel cadre’s po- Sweden by the Swedish Composers’ As- litical loyalty and political influence. For sociation to represent the VKM. The invi- example, there were travel cadres who tation came from Eskil Hemberg, who were allowed to enter and leave the coun- was the chairman at the time. After this try without applications for their trips, trip there were regular connections be- while others still had to submit applica- tween Schönfelder and Swedish musical tions. There were travel cadres who were life, among others with Hemberg, the allowed to take their spouses with them, composer Jan Carlstedt, Hans strand while other couples were not allowed to (the Permanent Secretary of the KMA) travel together, because despite their status and Per Skans from Radio Sweden.18 as travel cadres they were observed with Schönfelder’s collaboration with strand certain mistrust by the GDR authorities.21 resulted, among other things, in the jointly As a travel cadre, Schönfelder under- published book Principle truth principle took to accept and obey directives from beauty: Contributions to the aesthetics of the Ministry of Culture. Within 14 days of modern Swedish music (Prinzip Wahrheit returning home, he had to send in a report Prinzip Schönheit: Beiträge zur Ästhetik in which he gave an account of how he had der neueren schwedischen Musik, 1984). followed the directives on his trip. Ac- In February 1979, Schönfelder was cording to sources in the Stasi archives, a granted permanent status as a so-called “permanent contact” with Schönfelder travel cadre (Reisekader) to what were was established at the beginning of the termed non-socialist foreign countries.19 1980s.22 At that time he had become His wife was also active as a travel cadre known to the Stasi as a very reliable travel and could often travel abroad with her cadre and his extensive and well-formu- husband.20 This meant that it became lated reports were highly appreciated. In a much easier for him to travel and that he 1981 report, for example, he categorized was considered politically reliable by the his Swedish music colleagues according GDR authorities. In order to become a to their sympathies for the GDR and di- travel cadre, one had to show the regime vided them into GDR sympathizers, crit- etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
ics and enemies. This report was highly the Academy’s gift and that the Volvo appreciated by the Stasi.23 In Sweden, meant a lot to him. It is also well-known Schönfelder collaborated with colleagues today that in the GDR the party elite drove in musicology among other things, he Volvos: the Volvo was a symbol of status produced analyses of Swedish musical and power. works, provided assistance with preparing In the GDR, most citizens received a musicological conferences and helped Ra- car only on application and after a long dio Sweden with the production of pro- waiting period, and then mostly a Wart- grammes on East Asian culture, especially burg or Trabant. “Western cars” were music theatre.24 mainly driven by politicians or people In 1981 the KMA wanted to thank with high social status. Car brands clearly Schönfelder for his work in Swedish mu- marked class affiliation in a state that sicology by giving him a Volvo. Hans liked to present itself as classless. For ex- strand, KMA’s permanent secretary at ample, the Stasi always examined what the time, wrote to the “responsible author- kind of car a citizen drove (M nkel 2015). ities” in Sweden and the GDR asking Schönfelder therefore had to justify his them to respect KMA’s decision to donate gift from the KMA to the GDR authorities a car to Schönfelder.25 The car was to be a so that they would not become suspicious thank you for Schönfelder’s important and so that he would not jeopardize his work for the Academy, which he did in the freedom to travel or even be deprived of form of lectures, discussions, scientific his car and see it collected as state proper- support and participation in conferences ty. Although Schönfelder had apparently all this commitment was difficult to meas- been very happy about the gift, he was not ure in money, according to strand. But a allowed to show the GDR authorities his letter from the regional administration in pleasure with the car. Instead, he present- Dresden to the Stasi shows that Schön- ed the car as an imposed gift that he had to felder stated that he received the car be- accept for “political reasons”. But a gift cause his own car had been destroyed in always obliges one to give something in an accident. When he told his Swedish return, as the French sociologist Marcel hosts, they decided to give him a Volvo in Mauss (2002) has stated. Because a gift al- gratitude for his work.26 In a letter to the ways establishes a relationship between customs in the GDR in 1982, Schönfelder the donor and the recipient, the recipient is thanked them for having been allowed to expected to give a counter-gift in the fu- import the car. Among other things, he ture. From this point of view, the gift of wrote that he had not been able to refuse the KMA can also be interpreted as an ob- the car “for political reasons”. He had ac- ligation of Schönfelder: the KMA hoped cepted the car on the advice of the GDR that he would continue to make his ser- ambassador Kiesewetter, because a rejec- vices available to them in the future – tion would have been seen as an insult to which he did. the Swedish king.27 One of my interviews In February 1983 Schönfelder was re- with contemporary witnesses shows that cruited as an IMS by the Stasi. As men- Schönfelder was extremely pleased with tioned above, the designation IMS means etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
an unofficial employee at the Ministry of something of particular interest to the Sta- State Security with a specific area of re- si.32 As a travel cadre, Schönfelder had de- sponsibility.28 In 1984 he was upgraded to scribed this work in Sweden in a report IMB status. This designated an unofficial about his trip to Sweden in 1981.33 co-worker, who was to work more specif- The recruitment of new IMs by the ically with control and defence against Stasi can be described as a combination of enemies or potential enemies (inoffizieller noumenal power in connection with a Mitarbeiter der Abwehr mit Feind- threat of subjugation. Noumenal power verbindung bzw. zur unmittelbaren Bear- was important in Stasi’s recruitment beitung im Verdacht der Feindtätigkeit methods. As previous research has shown, stehenden Personen, BStU 2015:43).29 the Stasi can be described as making use Schönfelder was advertised as IMS and of a “professionalization of denunciation” later as IMB in order to “utilize” his exten- (Florath 2015:42). In the early years of the sive contacts with musical figures in West GDR, the SED had established that volun- Germany, Austria and Sweden to “gain in- tary reports by fellow citizens on political formation about the aims and intentions of opposition were not always reliable and the leading personalities of musical life in could also be based on resentment and Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany conflicts between individuals. For this and Austria for the MfS”.30 reason, the IM system of state security Although Schönfelder was regarded as was continually expanded and profession- politically reliable according to his Stasi alized in the 1960s (ibid.). This profes- files, he was not easy to recruit for co- sionalization can also be described as a operation with the Stasi. He himself cited strategy of justification, since it was al- his high workload as a reason. His Stasi ways a question of justifying the secret files show that the Stasi visited him sev- surveillance of political views as indis- eral times to recruit him, which finally pensable to the state – so that the state succeeded in February 1983. In this re- could survive and people could gradually cruitment, Lieutenant Greif of the Stasi be drawn into the new political system. In had used the “recruiting legend” as a its 1979 guidelines, for example, the Stasi method, which was quite common among emphasized the importance of recruiting Stasi recruiters. The recruiting legend was IMs, who would join of their own free will a narrative in which the person to be re- and appealing to the personal willingness cruited was portrayed as extremely im- of individuals. A dilemma for the Stasi portant for the development or safe-keep- was that it was difficult for party members ing of the state. In doing so, the recruiter, to monitor their fellow human beings, as if possible, referred to an earlier success- their party membership was often known ful activity of the person to be recruited in and it was often difficult for these people order to convince them of their great im- to inspire confidence in others. As a result, portance for the state.31 In Schönfelder’s the Stasi tried to recruit more and more case, Greif mentioned Schönfelder’s re- people who were not known to be close to ports on Sweden’s work for a nuclear- the party or who were not party members weapon-free zone in Europe this was (Florath 2015:42). etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
According to Florath, the Stasi often internal and external enemies through the use of managed to use partial agreements with conspiratorial tools and methods in connection the IM candidates to persuade them to co- with the other prerequisites. The IM represents consistent political-ideological positions. He is a operate. Frequent narratives were for ex- convinced communist and internationalist, which ample that the Stasi asked for help in in- he does not reveal in every case.34 vestigating crimes, that the Stasi offered support in the candidate’s professional ca- In Greif’s description of Schönfelder, Schönfelder accepted the then common reers, promised them trips to the West or narrative of the threatened state, which even exploited a previous piece of mis- also had to be protected through “con- conduct in order to recruit a candidate for spiratorial tools and methods”. Schön- the purpose of making amends. But fear of felder is also clearly presented as a the power of the Stasi also led many can- “convinced communist and international- didates to commit themselves (Florath ist” and therefore as a suitable IM. He was 2015:47). given the alias “Hans Mai”.35 It was precisely this combination of According to Rainer Forst, any political voluntarism and coercion that character- normativity claims legitimacy, that is, that ized the Stasi. In the case of Stasi’s re- the political order can be justified and that cruitment strategies, it becomes clear that these justification narratives are accepted an important narrative in recruiting new by those living in that order (Forst 2015: IMs was that of political and social en- 187). But the mere fact that the Stasi want- gagement, which can be interpreted as an ed to keep its surveillance methods secret expression of noumenal power. This was a shows that it was aware of the problem, reason that many IM candidates could cer- that such methods basically violate demo- tainly consider acceptable. Another justi- cratic rules. In a genuine democracy, these fication narrative was that of the threat- monitoring principles should have been ened state, which had to be protected. openly discussed and decided by a parlia- Noumenal power, however, could very ment. In the GDR, as in the Soviet Union, quickly turn into coercion, even when the however, an important discourse was that IM candidate was just “offered” help with people must first learn socialism and not his her professional career or travel always know what is good for them – but abroad when he volunteered as an IM. A what the state knew (Jarausch 1999). rejection of these “offers” could already Starting from Forst’s ideas about democ- be interpreted by Stasi’s employees as racy and justification narratives, it can be criticism of the state, but did not necessar- said that in the GDR the discourse of edu- ily have to be. cation to socialist people divided fellow According to his Stasi contact Uwe citizens into different groups – those who Greif, Gerd Schönfelder became an IM felt these methods were justified and those out of “political conviction”. Greif: who rejected them as an encroachment on personal freedom. There were also prob- It can be said that the IM itself has an interest in a close and trusting cooperation with the MfS. He lems when the secret surveillance strate- has recognized that socialism in the GDR and in- gies could suddenly be exposed. I will ternationally can only be reliably protected from come back to that in a moment. etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
One of Schönfelder’s most important cized, among other things, that 98 per cent tasks as IMS “Hans Mai” was to observe of the students at the conservatory would musical life in Sweden, West Germany be unable to find work after their studies and Austria. He was supposed to gather because there were not enough permanent information about “the aims and inten- positions. He was also of the opinion that tions of leading personalities of musical musical life in Norway would develop life in these countries”, better if the Norwegians realized that suc- because this opens up opportunities to obtain in- cessful cultural work was not just about formation from other areas of the economic and professionalism and the right people, but social life of these countries, as through the candi- about socialist cultural policy. Cultural date’s circle of acquaintances there are extensive life in Norway, as in other capitalist states, contacts to leading representatives of monopoly was too much determined by problems of 36 capital. profitability.38 According to Schönfelder, Here it becomes clear how Schönfelder’s the “only efficient authority” in Norway in contacts to “leading personalities in musi- the musical field was the Oslo Philhar- cal life” were to be used for political pur- monic, whose “artistic level”, however, poses: Music was to be used here as a way did not or only rarely come close to that of to spy on social, political and economic the Dresden Philharmonic.39 activities in the above-mentioned coun- And how did Schönfelder report on tries. Sweden? For reasons of space, only one But one of the first orders for the Stasi example can be given here. The Stasi was was to be executed by Schönfelder in Nor- particularly interested in the KMA in way. Here he was commissioned to ob- Stockholm. In 1984, the same year that serve the celebrations on the occasion of Schönfelder was promoted to IMB, he the 100th anniversary of the Norwegian was elected as the first East German rep- Music Academy (Musikkhøgskole) in resentative to the academy in December. Oslo. Among other things, the Stasi want- The Stasi took his election as an opportu- ed to learn more about the political and so- nity to give them questions about KMA as cial development, about the participation a directive, before he went to Sweden: of West German citizens in the celebra- What is the current attitude of academy members tions and, further, to gain information towards the GDR? about former GDR citizens.37 Schönfelder What expectations are placed on further coopera- stayed in Norway from 26 September to 3 tion with the GDR in the cultural field? What role is Prof. Schönfelder to play in this? October 1983 and wrote a detailed report What is the attitude of the academy members to- after his return home. Due to lack of wards Prof. Schönfelder as a communist? space, the report cannot be described and What material remuneration will result from the analysed in more detail here. But in sum- election to the Royal Swedish Academy? mary it can be said that Schönfelder em- What rights and duties does an academician have? phasized the great interest of his Norwe- What are the Academy’s national and internation- al objectives? gian colleagues in music exchange with What funds are allocated to the Academy? the GDR and their great respect for the How are the interests of right-wing bourgeois cultural work in the GDR. But he criti- forces perceived? etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
How and through which persons are the interests pher.42 However, he received only 24 out of the USA and other reactionary systems en- of 44 votes in the election.43 This distribu- forced? tion of votes allows us to assume that Where are the starting points for the penetration into the conspiracy of Western secret services Schönfelder’s election was not entirely recognizable? self-evident and that not all of the mem- In particular, all findings in connection with the bers of the KMA supported him. From to- awarding of Nobel Prizes are significant.40 day’s perspective it is surprising that sev- eral people who supported Schönfelder’s In addition, the Stasi wanted information election to the KMA have been central about the political and economic situation figures in Swedish musical life. This in Sweden, wanted to know to what extent raises the question ‒ which cannot be one could recognize a right-wing orienta- tion in Swedish politics and how long the answered here: Why did these people sup- “opportunistic tendencies” in Swedish port Schönfelder’s election to the KMA? politics should be maintained. It also Erik Lundkvist, a Swedish organist wanted more information about Hans who gave concerts in the GDR for the In- strand, Per Skans and Eskil Hemberg in stitute for National Concerts (Institutet för order to “further clarify the personality Rikskonserter it existed from 1968 to profile”.41 The questions show that the 2010) and who has been a member of the employees of the Stasi did not have par- KMA since 1983, said in an interview ticularly good knowledge of KMA and with me that he and several of his col- that they apparently assessed its influence leagues in the KMA were surprised at the on Swedish cultural life as being greater choice of Schönfelder: “Why was he than it actually was. They also seem to elected? A cultural personality of the have confused KMA with the Swedish GDR? […] We were never properly told Academy. who he was, we knew too little about 44 Before I go into Schönfelder’s answers him.” to these questions, I would like to briefly But even when Schönfelder was elected report on his election to the KMA. The to the KMA in 1984, there was apparently choice of Schönfelder for the KMA was a suspicion that Schönfelder came to Swe- not entirely self-evident, as sources in the den not only for scientific reasons. Schön- KMA archives and contemporary witness felder’s Stasi contact Uwe Greif reported reports show. In 1984 he was proposed by to the Stasi that Schönfelder had told him the composers Jan Carlstedt, Eskil Hem- that before his election to the KMA he had berg and Ingvar Lidholm, and the music- “been questioned by the deputy president ologists Bo Wallner and Gunnar Larsson, [Claude G netay]”. Greif: whose proposal was based on Schön- He [Schönfelder] was confronted with the fact that felder’s commitment to Swedish music in the Swedish Academy had information that he the GDR and his important contribution to was on a “secret service mission of the Ministry of musicology through the publication Prin- State Security”. This allegation was vigorously re- jected by the IM. The Swede’s question whether zip Schönheit Prinzip Wahrheit. They also he [Schönfelder] could also take his oath on this described him as an important musicolo- was of course answered in the affirmative by the gist, humanist and Swedish bibliogra- IM.45 etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
According to Greif, Schönfelder had held tive of the “locus terriblis”: the image of a back in Sweden because of this mistrust threat is constructed, against which joint and had not fulfilled “his tasks”. His action must be taken (Wodak et al. 1998: Swedish colleague Hans strand was of 85). It was important to create “alliances” the opinion that this suspicion could be with like-minded partners, which also is a connected with the fact that someone in kind of unification strategy in the critical Dresden, where Schönfelder had just be- discourse analysis: Two individuals or come head of the Semper Opera, was re- groups must work together to fight a com- sentful about the appointment and now mon enemy (Wodak et al. 1998:84). The tried to defame him.46 KMA seems to have “alliance” with important partners such as believed Schönfelder’s statement and ap- the GDR is legitimized as an effective parently did not pursue the issue any fur- strategy against the aforementioned threat ther at that time Schönfelder was elected to Sweden by Americanization. Accord- as a new foreign member. ing to Schönfelder’s and his informant’s But what answers did the Stasi receive description it is necessary to raise the cul- to its questions about the KMA? Because tural level of the population in order to Schönfelder had not answered the ques- counteract Americanization. What is tions in his conversation with Greif, he meant by Americanization here remains wrote a report for the Stasi in January vague and is not explained in detail. One 1985. Among other things, he reported interpretation might be that the informant that the academy pursued a strict policy of of the KMA assumed that he she and neutrality at national and international Schönfelder had a similar idea of the prob- level. He also mentioned that “material re- lems with Americanization, for example, muneration” by the KMA was “only” set- the threat that other, new musical styles tled to the extent that the KMA paid him posed to the position of classical music in twice a year for the trip to Stockholm, pro- society. vided him with a free guest apartment dur- According to Schönfelder’s informant ing his stays in Sweden and paid daily ex- at the KMA, it is important to start cultural 47 penses. According to Schönfelder the work with the citizens as early as possible. aim of the KMA was: The term “child class work” (Kinderklas- … to uphold cultural values and, above all, to de- senarbeit) can have two different mean- velop the tremendous work of increasing the cul- ings here: (1) musical education at school, tural demands and the cultural level of the popula- and (2) creating class consciousness in tion and, by raising this level, to paralyse the children. The description remains vague Americanization of Europe. He [no name men- tioned here] told me very clearly that these are here, and it is possible that both are meant. clear alliances that point them to us. Various Here the GDR becomes an important role things that we have done here, for example, are model for this child class work. This nar- adopted by them, such as music for children, child rative also points to Sweden’s great inter- class work, in order to direct people from the out- 48 est in the East German education system set towards a culturally high level of education. and state cultural work in the GDR. As the In this report, the cooperation between the previous research on the contacts between KMA and the GDR is justified by a narra- Sweden and the GDR shows, many Swe- etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
dish politicians regarded GDR’s school classify individuals according to sympa- system with “one school for all” and the thies and antipathies towards the GDR. He state-financed cultural policy as a model describes here how the members of the (Almgren 2016:110ff. Almgren 2009 KMA take on different roles in private and Abraham 2007). in the more public milieu of the KMA. However, it was difficult for Schön- However, these differences can also be in- felder to identify the “right-wing bour- terpreted as showing that Schönfelder had geois forces”: the confidence of the members whom he It is always very difficult to safeguard the interests was allowed to visit at home and who of the right-wing forces, because they never ex- complained to him about colleagues in the pose themselves in such a way. When you are in KMA. their apartment, they make each other bad and The Swedish composer and organist when they sit opposite each other at the banquet, Karl-Erik Welin is positioned as an enemy they say the most beautiful and kind things to each other. So the party principle is not the same there in several places in Schönfelder’s Stasi as in West Germany. It is very difficult to recog- files. Since Welin publicly opposed the nize right-wing forces, but there are some. They GDR, Schönfelder had the GDR Artist expose themselves like this W e l l i n, Karl-Erik Agency arrange for him not to be allowed [sic!] did, who has publicly opposed the GDR to travel to the GDR. One can also speak with all these insinuations such as freedom, hu- here in Forst’s words of subjugation and manity, etc., which are idiotic. He is also a mem- ber of the academy and stayed away on the day of oppression. Welin did not accept the offi- my election. He was also one of those who spoke cial justification strategies of the GDR au- against it for two years. But he was also one of thorities and could therefore not be influ- those to whom the GDR gave an international ca- enced by GDR propaganda. In principle, reer. the removal of Welin from the GDR He was one of the organists who came to the points to a kind of powerlessness on the GDR and played at big music festivals here like part of the GDR authorities: Noumenal Händelfestspiele, Musiktage, Biennale, etc. Now he is no longer coming, I have already clarified power could not be exercised here – i.e. that with the GDR Artist Agency [Künstleragen- Welin could not be persuaded to respect tur der DDR]. It was this person of all people who the GDR of his own free will. Therefore used this opportunity to carry out a subliminal one had to limit his mobility and not let 49 propaganda over the years. him enter any more. Here Schönfelder tried to fulfil his task, to Interviews with contemporary wit- identify his opponents and the potential nesses showed that Schönfelder’s col- enemies of the GDR and to make them leagues in Sweden wondered why he “harmless”. One can also speak here of the could come to Sweden so often, but they “art of distribution”, as Michel Foucault did not suspect that he might have worked calls it (Foucault 2003:143). The aim is to for the Stasi. Erik Lundkvist, for example, place different individuals in closed mi- reported to me that he wondered why lieus, to monitor and control them and to Schönfelder was allowed to leave the classify them according to a certain sys- GDR so often. Later he understood that tem and to grant them some freedom of Schönfelder had to have a kind of “mis- action – or not. Schönfelder’s aim was to sion”. At that time he thought that it had to etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
be observations of the Swedish military or lieves that it must have been very difficult something similar.50 The then permanent for foreign colleagues to understand this, secretary of the KMA, Hans strand, had because it had already been difficult for introduced Lundkvist to Schönfelder. the East Germans themselves. “You must They became friends, and Schönfelder have grown up here [in the former GDR] visited him several times at home. Lund- and developed a sensibility for that,… that kvist describes Schönfelder as a “super- you can say I smell it, he can’t help it, he intelligent person” and says that it was is Stasi…”. As mentioned above, she very interesting to talk to him. In retro- meant that East Germans could “smell” spect, he also finds it interesting that who the Stasi was. But in Schönfelder’s Schönfelder often criticized the GDR and case it was difficult because he was very was very open with his criticism.51 skilful.52 At that time, Lundkvist had no way of Today one might ask why the suspicion knowing that this was a common strategy that Schönfelder could work for the Stasi for the Stasi staff they had learned to was not pursued further in Sweden after make personal contacts with those whom 1984. The question is still difficult to they observed. They were often very so- answer. But the suspicion arose again in cial and friendly and could speak on many the end of 1989, when Schönfelder was in different subjects – they learned this dur- Sweden and suddenly had to go back to ing their training with the Stasi. Birgitta the GDR. In December 1989, the music- Almgren, in her studies on the contacts be- ologist and journalist Carl-Gunnar hl n tween the GDR and Sweden, has shown wrote articles in which he pointed out that how Stasi’s employees were expected to Schönfelder had worked for the secret po- create trust by “covertly” expressing “po- lice of the GDR.53 Even at that time there litical views”. The GDR authorities knew did not seem to have been any discussion that not many Swedes liked to discuss in Sweden and not even in 1994, when politics and therefore recommended not hl n and the journalist Stefan Koskinen expressing political views directly (Alm- took up the subject again.54 Up until today gren 2009:206). Stasi employees learned there has been little discussion of this topic. systematic strategies to make personal But that is the subject of another article.55 contacts with “key people” and they prac- tised certain argumentation techniques to sic an Politics trategies o give a positive picture of the GDR and to sti ication an Power avoid difficult situations. Sometimes it According to the historian Jens Gieseke, could even be an advantage if a Stasi agent many former unofficial employees of the criticized the GDR in order to try to get his Stasi today justify themselves by saying counterpart on his side (ibid.). that this is certainly difficult to understand Ingeborg Allihn also told me that her today, but that the main reason for their West German colleagues were amazed at Stasi cooperation was their political con- how “courageous” Schönfelder was when viction. Basically, they believed in the he dared to criticize the cultural policies of “good core of the socialist idea”, “in the the GDR and Eastern Europe. She be- legitimacy of protection from operations etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
of enemy powers”, in the “desire to impart As in other professions, the careers of better knowledge of the opponent” and “to musicologists, music administrators, com- do something for the interstate or intra- posers and musicians have been influ- societal peace’” (Gieseke 2011:126). This enced by the presence of the Stasi. Stasi shows that the Stasi’s justification narra- staff members received many benefits, tives from the GDR era are still being up- were given desirable positions in the acad- dated. On the other hand, as Gieseke also emies, and were able to exert strong pres- emphasizes, other studies have shown that sure on others. Those who refused to there were also many Stasi employees mo- participate in the Stasi were not party tivated by personal advantages and career members or expressed opposition were opportunities (Gieseke 2011:127–128). marginalized and discriminated against The historian Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk (Halbrock 2015:77). As I have shown, emphasizes that in the GDR all citizens however, international contacts or even had some kind of relationship with the mere interest in them could also be prob- Stasi. Thus there were those who had lematic. Of particular interest here are in- committed themselves to the service of the ternational organizations such as the Stasi – voluntarily or not – and who were VKM, which had a high status in the GDR closely interwoven with it both profes- and internationally and was vital for inter- sionally and politically. Then there were national cooperation. If such organiza- also those who were disappointed in the tions had leaders who did not accept the political development of the GDR and noumenal power of the Stasi, they could hoped for reforms to come through the conquer certain power areas themselves Stasi apparatus. A third group were critics and protect their employees against forms and opposition members who suffered of coercion or violence by the Stasi. under the Stasi’s ruling mechanisms Stasi’s power methods and justification (Kowalczuk 2015:73–75). strategies moved constantly between nou- In this article I have given examples of menal power, subjugation and physical various justification narratives and power and mental violence. It was precisely this strategies of the Stasi. Frequent justifica- mixture of different power methods and tions of Stasi employees in promoting new justification strategies that made the Stasi IMs were the narratives of the “enlighten- so unpredictable and difficult to assess. As ment” of political positions of individuals, Kowalczuk notes, this was precisely the groups and institutions or the construction intention of the Stasi. An important prin- of so-called legends in which personal or ciple of rule was to intimidate people and professional merits of the candidate were repress individuality (Kowalczuk 2015: presented as indispensable for the protec- 69). In my opinion, on the other hand, an tion of the state from enemies. Other justi- important principle of the Stasi was also to fications that could motivate people to emphasize and use individuality, for ex- volunteer were support for professional ample when new candidates were to be re- careers, the possibility of getting a place cruited. The story of the consequential in- for their children at university or finding dividual, who has already done important an apartment. things for the state in the past and who is etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
therefore needed in the future to protect Dnd, AIM 3242 90, I, Vol. 1, p. 370. German the state, was an important narrative of the original: “Begr ndung der politisch-operativen Not- exercise of noumenal power. These differ- wendigkeit der Werbung ent perspectives fit in a state that is de- Die politisch-operative Notwendigkeit der scribed in different studies as a “welfare Werbung liegt in der konkreten politisch- dictatorship” (Jarausch 1999:60) and a operativen Situation innerhalb des f r das Musikleben der DDR verantwortlichen Perso- “participatory dictatorship” (Fulbrook nenkreises begr ndet. […] Dabei ist es von 2005:12): Emancipatory and egalitarian besonderer Bedeutung, da der Kandidat ber goals were combined with a repressive, umfangreiche Verbindungen ins Operations- dictatorial practice. On the one hand, the gebiet verf gt, deren Nutzbarmachung zur In- formationsgewinnung ber die iele und Ab- individual was expected to be committed sichten der f hrenden Persönlichkeiten des to society, on the other hand he she was Musiklebens in Schweden, in der BRD und in clearly expected to subordinate him- or Österreich f r das MfS von Bedeutung ist, herself to the collective. weil dadurch Möglichkeiten eröffnet werden auch Informationen aus anderen Bereichen When the state of the GDR finally dis- des wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen appeared after 1990, the ways in which Lebens dieser Staaten zu erarbeiten, da durch power was exercised and the justification den Bekanntenkreis des Kandidaten umfang- narratives changed radically. Now it was reiche Kontakte zu f hrenden Vertretern des Monopolkapitals bestehen. […]” up to the Stasi employees of the time to 2 “Normative Orders” is an association of re- reposition and legitimize themselves, and searchers from various social sciences and hu- as for the victims, it was up to them to manities disciplines, including European Eth- come to terms with their own past, to de- nology. The association was founded at the University of Frankfurt am Main in 2010, and mand justice. And they too had to reorient it sees it as its mission to investigate how po- themselves. There has not as yet been litical, economic, legal, religious and social much research done on this subject, and orders change, how different power structures even less on the influence the Stasi has develop from this, and how these in turn influ- ence power structures and life chances, on had in other states, such as Sweden. Also both a national and a transnational level. See still missing is a discussion of how the also: https: www.normativeorders.net de Stasi’s power and justification strategies (visited May 2, 2020). can have influenced cultural life in other 3 For more information about the Stasi and its history, see among others M nkel (ed.) 2015, states and how this issue could be ad- Gieseke 2011, Almgren 2011. See also: dressed in our time. https: www.bstu.de informationen-zur-stasi themen was-war-die-stasi (visited May 2, Petra Garberding 2020). Associate Professor of European Ethnology 4 In 1969 the academies in the GDR were re- Dept. of History and Contemporary Studies organized and from that year on the Institute Södertörn University for Musicology was transformed into a schol- SE-141 89 Huddinge arly department (WB) Musicology in the new email: petra.garberding sh.se Institute “Aesthetics Art Science” (I K) (Klingberg 2000:196). 5 BStU, MfS, AIM 4952 89 C, pp. 81–82, 88. Notes 6 BStU, MfS, AIM Nr. 2452 63, Part I, pp. 21– 1 Bezirksverwaltung f r Staatssicherheit Dres- 22. German original: “Ich, Heinz Alfred den, Leutnant Greif: “Vorschlag zur Werbung Brockhaus, geb. am 12.8.1930 in Krefeld […] eines IMS”, February 2, 1983. BStU, MfS BV verpflichte mich freiwillig, mit dem Ministe- etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
rium f r Staatssicherheit zusammenzuarbei- the wrong side politically, i.e. not in line with ten. ber diese usammenarbeit werde ich the party. gegen ber jederman [sic!] Stillschweigen be- 12 Interview with Ingeborg Allihn, June 18, wahren. Meine schriftlichen Berichte werde 2018. ich mit dem Namen K. Bergmann unterschrei- 13 Allihn emphasized in our conversation that ben. Mir ist bekannt, da ich bei Bruch dieser she did not have to report about him to the Verpflichtung nach den in der DDR geltenden GDR authorities. Gesetzen zur Verantwortung gezogen werden 14 Interview with Ingeborg Allihn, June 18, 2018. kann. Ich wurde bisher von keiner anderen 15 Some parts of this section about Gerd Schön- Dienststelle angesprochen oder verpflichtet. felder, the Stasi and the KMA have already Berlin, den 27.2.1958, Alfred Brockhaus.” been published in a Swedish article, but with a 7 BStU, MfS, AIM 2452 63, part A, Vol. 2, p. focus on the person of Schönfelder and his 88. German original: “ ber das Musik.Wis- role in the KMA (Garberding Geisler Rosen- senschaftl.-Institut berichtete er folgendes: Es gren 2019). gibt jetzt eine richtige Konzeption von eini- 16 ”Antrag auf Ernennung des Prorektors f r gen Studenten, die Beweisen [sic!] wollen, Lehre und Forschung der Hochschule f r da Musik unpolitisch sein mu , da sie Musik Carl Maria von Weber’ in Dresden, nichts mit der Gesellschaft zu tun hat. Sie for- Genossen Dozent Dr. Sc. phil. Gerd Schön- dern auch weiterhin, da man die moderne felder, zum ordentlichen Professor f r Musik- westl. Musik bei uns lehrt und auff hrt. Fol- wissenschaft (Musikästhetik und Musik- gende Studenten gehören dazu: Wortf hrer geschichte)”, October 29, 1975. BStU, MfS [Name] 3. Stj. [Name], [Name] und [Name]. BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, I, Vol. 1, p. 93. [Name] sagte folgendes: Was kann sich schon 17 “Kurzbiografie Dr. Sc. Gerd Schönfelder”, October 10, 1973.” BStU, MfS BV Dnd, AIM in unserer Musik widerspiegeln? Nur Angst 3242 90, I, Vol. 1, p. 56. und Schrecken. […] [Name] sagt dazu, Welt- 18 BStU, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, II, Vol. anschauliche Dinge sind eben ausschlagge- 1, pp. 170–171. bend, da ist bei uns eben das Schlimme. 19 BStU, MfS BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, I, Vol. 1, Macht man nicht mit, wird solange gedrillt, pp. 190–191. bis es pa t. 20 BStU, MfS BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, I, Vol. 1, Der GHI schätzt ein, da [Name] ein ausge- pp. 187–189. sprochener Feind ist. 21 An example is Erich Stockmann, professor of In einem Seminarreferat bei Prof. [Ernst musicology, and his wife Doris Stockmann, Hermann] Meyer sagte die Studentin [Name]: asscociate professor of musicology. They Sie zitierte einen Aufsatz: Die Wissenschaft were considered politically unreliable and mu sich jeglicher pol. Stellungnahme enthal- were not allowed to travel together. BStU, ten.’ MfS, HA VIII, Nr. 2656, pp. 166, 168 BStU, Der Student [Name] sagte zu dieser Stu- MfS HA VIII AP 51144 92. See also Gar- dentin [Name], sie solle nur aufpassen, da berding (forthcoming), 2020. sie statt Adolf [Hitler] nicht Walter [Ulbricht] 22 BStU, MfS BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, I, Vol. 1, sagt.” p. 374. Note: [Name]: due to the protection of per- 23 BStU, MfS BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, I. Vol. 1, sonal rights, I was not allowed to know the pp. 327 –336. See also Garberding Geisler names of these persons in the file. Rosengren 2019. 8 BStU, MfS, AIM 4952 89 C, pp. 2–3. See 24 Ibid. also Klingberg 2000:210 and BStU 2015:44. 25 Hans strand October 13, 1981. KMA ar- 9 BStU, MfS, AIM 4952 89, Part II, pp. 48–49. chives, The Swedish Musik- and Theatre Li- 10 BStU, MfS, AIM 4952 89, Part II, pp. 49–50 brary (Statens Musik- och teaterbibliotek and p. 57. (SMB). Secreterary’s correspondence, E 5 a, 11 BStU, MfS, AIM 4952 89, Part II, p. 2. “A. is vol. 9. politically behind the fence” can be inter- 26 Inspector Köhler to Region Department Dres- preted as a metaphor, with which “John” den, October 23, 1981. BStU, MfS, BV Dnd, wants to say that “A.” [Ingeborg Allihn] is on AIM 3242 90, I, Vol. 1, pp. 198–201. etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
27 Gerd Schönfelder to GDR’s Customs, March 40 BStU, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, II, Vol. 9, 1982. BStU, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, 1, p. 242. German original: I, Vol. 1, pp. 198–199 and p. 356. “Wie ist die aktuelle Haltung der Akade- 28 BStU, MfS BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, I, Vol. 1, miemitglieder zur DDR? Welche Erwar- p. 374. tungen werden an die weitere usammenar- 29 BStU, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, I, Vol. 1, beit mit der DDR auf kulturellem Gebiet ge- pp. 383–395. stellt? Welche Rolle ist Prof. Schönfelder da- 30 BStU, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, I, Vol. 1, bei zugedacht? Wie ist die Haltung der p. 370. Akademiemitglieder zu Prof. Schönfelder als 31 BStU, MfS, AIG, Nr. 26648, pp. 47–49. Kommunisten? Welche materielle Verg - 32 BStU, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, I, Vol. I, tungen ergeben sich aus der Einwahl in die p. 374. Königliche Schwedische Akademie? Welche 33 BStU, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, I, Vol. I, Rechte und Pflichten hat ein Akademiemit- pp. 327–336. glied? Welche ielstellungen verfolgt die 34 BStU, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, I, Vol. 1, Akademie im nationalen und internationalen p. 393. German original: “Es ist einzuschät- Rahmen? Welche Gelder flie en der Akade- zen, da der IM selbst Interesse an einer mie zu? Wie werden die Interessen rechts- engen und vertrauensvollen usammenarbeit orientierter b rgerlicher Kräfte wahrgenom- mit dem MfS hat. Er hat erkannt, da der So- men? Wie und durch welche Personen wird zialismus in der DDR und auch international versucht die Interessen der USA und anderer nur durch die Anwendung konspirativer Mit- reaktionärer Systeme durchzusetzen? Wo sind tel und Methoden im usammenhang mit den die Ansatzpunkte f r das Eindringen in die anderen Voraussetzungen zuverlässig vor in- Konspiration westlicher Geheimdienste er- neren und äu eren Feinden zu sch tzen ist. kennbar? Insbesondere sind alle Erkenntnisse Der IM vertritt konsequente politisch-ideolo- im usammenhang mit der Vergabe von No- gische Positionen. Er ist berzeugter Kommu- belpreisen bedeutsam.” nist und Internationalist, was er nicht in jedem 41 BStU, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, II, Vol. Fall offenbart.” 1, p. 242. 35 BStU, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, I, Vol. I, 42 KMA archives, SMB, KMA minutes, “Pro- p. 374. tokolldossier”, A 3 a, Vol. 21, 1984–1985. 36 BStU, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, I, Vol. 1, 43 KMA archives, SMB, A 1 a, KMA minutes, p. 370. German original: 1984–1985. “[…] Dabei ist es von besonderer Bedeu- 44 Interview with Erik Lundkvist, March 2, tung, da der Kandidat ber umfangreiche 2018. Verbindungen ins Operationsgebiet verf gt, 45 BStU, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, II, Vol. deren Nutzbarmachung zur Informationsge- 1, p. 249. winnung ber die iele und Absichten der 46 Ibid. f hrenden Persönlichkeiten des Musiklebens 47 BStU, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, II, Vol. in Schweden, in der BRD und in Österreich 1, p. 290. f r das MfS von Bedeutung ist weil dadurch 48 BStU, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, II, Vol. Möglichkeiten eröffnet werden auch Informa- 1, pp. 290–291. German original: “ iel der tionen aus anderen Bereichen des wirtschaftli- Akademie ist, die kulturellen Werte hoch zu chen und gesellschaftlichen Lebens dieser halten und vor allen Dingen eine ungeheure Staaten zu erarbeiten da durch den Bekann- Breitenarbeit zu entwickeln, um die kulturel- tenkreis des Kandidaten umfangreiche Kon- len Bed rfnisse und das kulturelle Niveau der takte zu f hrenden Vertretern des Monopol- Bevölkerung zu heben und mit der Hebung kapitals bestehen.” dieses Niveaus im Grunde genommen die 37 BstU, MfS, BV Dnd, AIM 3242 90, II, Vol. 1, Amerikanisierung Europas zu paralysieren. p. 55. Es sind klare B ndnisbeziehungen, die sie zu 38 BStU, MfS, BV DnD, AIM, 3242 90, II, Vol. uns hinweisen, das hat er mir ganz klar ge- 1, pp. 67–72 and pp. 73–79. sagt. Verschiedene Dinge, die wir hier ge- 39 BStU, MfS, BV DnD, AIM, 3242 90, II, Vol. macht haben, werden z.B. von ihnen ber- 1, p. 69. nommen wie Musik f r Kinder, Kinderklas- etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
senarbeit, um den Menschen gleich von vorn- tiskt mullvadsarbete.” Svenska Dagbladet, herein in der Erziehung auf ein kulturell June 6, 1994 Koskinen, Stefan: “Stasiman hohes Niveau hinzulenken.” var ofta i Sverige.” Svenska Dagbladet, Janu- 49 BStU, MfS, BV DnD, AIM 3242 90, II, Vol. ary 9, 1995 Koskinen, Stefan: “Spionen som 1, pp. 290–291. German original: “Die In- gick vilse i salongerna.” Svenska Dagbladet, teressen der rechtsorientierten Kräfte wahrzu- January 9, 1995 Koskinen, Stefan: “Svar.” nehmen, ist immer sehr schwierig, weil die Svenska Dagbladet 1995. sich nie so exponieren. Wenn man in deren 55 See Garberding Geisler Rosengren 2019. Wohnung ist, dann machen sie sich gegensei- tig schlecht und wenn man sich dann am Ban- References kett gegen bersitzt, dann sagen sie sich die schönsten und liebensw rdigsten Sachen. Abraham, Nils 2007: Die politische Auslandsar- beit der DDR in Schweden. Zur Public Diplo- Dort ist also das Parteienprinzip nicht so wie macy der DDR gegenüber Schweden nach der in der BRD. Rechtskräfte zu erkennen, ist diplomatischen Anerkennung (1972 –1989). sehr schwierig, aber es gibt welche. Sie expo- Nordische Geschichte, Vol. 6. Berlin: Lit Ver- nieren sich wie dieser Wellin, Karl-Erik lag. [sic!], der sich öffentlich gegen die DDR ge- Allihn, Ingeborg (ed.) 1997: Kammermusikführer. stellt hat mit diesen ganzen schwachsinnigen Stuttgart: Metzler. Unterstellungen wie Freiheit, Menschlichkeit Almgren, Birgitta 2009: Inte bara Stasi… Relatio- usw. Er ist auch Mitglied der Akademie und ner Sverige – DDR 1949–1990. Stockholm: am Tag meiner Einwahl ferngeblieben. Er war Carlsson Bokförlag. auch einer derjenigen, die zwei Jahre lang da- Almgren, Birgitta 2011: Inte bara spioner. Stasi- gegen gesprochen hat [sic!]. Er war aber auch infiltration i Sverige under kalla kriget. Stock- einer derjenigen, denen die DDR die interna- holm: Carlsson Bokförlag. tionale Karriere verschafft hat. Almgren, Birgitta 2016: Dröm och verklighet. Er war einer der Orgelspieler, die in die Stellan Arvidson: kärleken, dikten, politiken. DDR kamen und zu gro en Musikfestspielen Stockholm: Carlsson Bokförlag. hier spielten wie Händelfestspiele, Musiktage, Arvidsson, Alf 2008: Musik och politik hör ihop. Biennale usw. Jetzt kommt er nicht mehr, das Diskussioner, ställningstaganden och musik- habe ich schon bei der K nstleragentur ge- skapande 1965–1980. Umeå universitet: Etno- klärt. Ausgerechnet dieser Mensch hat diese logiska skrifter 46. Möklinta: Gidlunds förlag. Möglichkeit dort genutzt, um eine unter- Arvidsson, Alf 2014: Bilder från musikskapandets schwellige Propaganda zu betreiben, ber vardag. Mellan kulturpolitik, ekonomi och este- Jahre hinweg.” tik. Umeå universitet: Etnologiska skrifter 59. 50 Interview with Erik Lundkvist, March 2, Bernhard, Theresa 2018: Musik. Bildung. Distink- 2018. tion. Symbolische Kämpfe im kulturellen Feld 51 Interview with Erik Lundkvist, March 2, der DDR. Berlin: Logos-Verlag. 2018. Bretschneider, Simon 2018: Tanzmusik in der 52 Interview with Ingeborg Allihn, June 18, DDR. Dresdner Musik zwischen Kulturpolitik 2018. German original: “Da musste man und internationalem Musikmarkt 1945–1961. schon hier aufgewachsen sein und eine Sensi- Bielefeld: Transcript-Verlag. Serie: Musik und bilität daf r entwickelt haben…, dass man sa- Klangkultur, DB-ID: 2865896-6 31. gen kann, ich rieche das, der kann nicht an- BStU 2015: Abkürzungsverzeichnis. Häufig ver- ders, der ist Stasi…” wendete Abkürzungen und Begriffe des Ministe- 53 hl n, Carl-Gunnar: “DDR-hefen [sic!] som riums für Staatssicherheit. BStU: Berlin. vände åter hem.” Svenska Dagbladet, Decem- Danki , Andrea 2019: Att göra hiphop. En studie ber 2, 1989 av musikpraktiker och sociala positioner. Mal- hl n, Carl-Gunnar: “Mitt påstående blir mö: Universus Academic Press. obesvarat.” Svenska Dagbladet, December Florath, Bernd 2015: “Die inoffiziellen Mitarbei- 23, 1989. ter.” In M nkel (ed.), pp. 40–51. 54 hl n, Carl-Gunnar: “Stasi-man favorit hos Forst, Rainer 2015: Normativität und Macht. operachefen.” Svenska Dagbladet, June 6, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 2132, 1994 Bäumel, Mathias: “Kulturellt och poli- Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag. etra ar erding, e o ld S ell hat e s Stasi
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