Meta-‐Ethics the Fact-‐Value Problem 1

PHI 105: Introduction to Ethics Learning Unit 11: Handout Meta-Ethics The Greek word meta can be translated into English as “beyond,” though it can also convey a number of other meanings, depending on the context in which it’s used. It often refers to self-examination or analyzing something at a deeper level. Going beyond the surface. Meta-ethics, therefore, seeks to look more closely at ethics itself. It goes beyond prescribing specific moral actions to asking about the nature of moral philosophy, examining ethical terminology and the foundations of ethical thought. Two central issues for meta-ethics are the meaning of the term good (or right) and how we justify our moral beliefs. We’re going to examine several views related to these issues in what follows. However, let’s begin with a very basic description of some of the traditional normative ethical theories. This will give us something to work with as we apply our meta-ethical concepts. The Fact-Value Problem 1 Consider what the moral statement, “Honesty is good” would mean to each these ethical theories. Ethical Egoism: Honesty is in my best self-interest. Utilitarianism: Honesty produces the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people. Kantianism: Honesty is one’s duty, based on rational thinking. Virtue Ethics: Honesty promotes human flourishing. Notice that each of these bases the concept of “good” on some specific “fact” (or what they believe to be a fact) about the world. For example, the ethical egoist believes that acting only in one’s own self-interest is the best way to live one’s life. This view is often connected with psychological egoism, which holds that human beings can only act in what they believe to be their own self-interest, never against it. So, an ethical egoist might think that since it’s a fact that human beings can only act in their own self-interest, it makes sense that this should be the basis for all moral action or how we ought to act. Likewise, the utilitarian believes that experiencing pleasure is the best condition for human beings. If this is a fact, they argue, then we ought to perform only those actions that result in the greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest number of people possible. In both cases (and in the other two, as well), each ethicist is basing what we ought to do on something that is (or that they believe is) a natural fact of the world around us. They’re attempting to connect value with natural facts. 1 The discussion here has benefited from Pojman, Louis P. Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 7th Edition: Wadsworth, 2011. Please see his text for more on this topic. Page 1 of 5 PHI 105: Introduction to Ethics Learning Unit 11: Handout The Is/Ought Problem This did not sit well with philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) who argued that “no is implies an ought.” In other words, moral value or moral conclusions cannot be derived from morally neutral natural facts. For example, contrast the following two arguments. Empirical Argument Moral Argument Premise: All humans are mortal. Premise: Snow is white. Premise: Socrates is a human. Conclusion: It is good that snow is white. Conclusion: Socrates is mortal. Note how in the first argument each step clearly builds on the previous one. It’s consistent – there are no contradictions. If each premise is true, then the conclusion (Socrates is mortal) must logically follow. However, in the second argument, we cannot, on the basis of the fact that snow is white, conclude that snow ought to be white or that this is good. For all we know, it would be better if snow were blue or green. We’re trying to derive moral value from a natural fact. Here’s another example: Premise: Humans can only perform acts they believe will benefit themselves. Conclusion: It is morally right for humans to only perform acts they believe will benefit themselves. According to Hume’s argument, we cannot make this kind of leap from an is to an ought. Yet that is exactly what each of the normative ethical theories we examined is attempting to do. Emotivism Hume’s solution to this problem was to propose an ethical theory that later came to be known as emotivism. Emotivism holds that moral judgments are not logical statements or arguments at all, but simply feelings or emotions. So, for Hume, someone who says “Honesty is morally good,” is really just saying something like “I like honesty.” If this were so, then moral language would be purely subjective, relating only to the individual making the statement, rather than objectively applicable to everyone. About 200 years later, Alfred Ayer (1910-1989) expanded on Hume’s idea by arguing that moral statements don’t even report our feelings, but only express them. So, instead of “Honesty is morally good” meaning “I like honesty,” which is reporting a feeling, it actually means, “Honesty…Yay!” Ayer went so far as to say that moral expressions have no factual content at all – they are noncognitive. A cognitive statement, on the other hand, consists of factual content. In other words, we can know whether it’s true or false. The statement “I like honesty” is a cognitive statement, because it makes a factual assertion that we can verify. However, the emotional expression “Honesty.. Yay!!!” isn’t making any cognitive statement that can be verified. It’s just an exclamation. In addition to asserting that ethical statements were noncognitive, Ayer and, later, Richard Hare (1919- 2002) also held that ethical statements were prescriptive, telling others to adopt the same feelings and attitudes as we have. Prescriptivism sees moral expressions as imperatives, or commands, designed to provide moral guidance to others. Page 2 of 5 PHI 105: Introduction to Ethics Learning Unit 11: Handout Criticism of Ayer’s Emotivism and Noncognitivism While there certainly is often an element of emotion in our moral statements, emotivism seems insufficient to fully describe what we mean when we make moral statements. The fact that moral reasoning or logical discussion and thought about morality can result in the changing of one’s moral views seems to indicate that there is much more to moral statements than simple emotional expression or prescriptions, that there is something cognitive there. Also, emotional expressions apply only to the person expressing them, but the fact that the concept of universality is such a major part of most ethical theories seems to undermine this. For example, if it’s wrong for a particular person to steal, then it seems logical that it would be wrong for anyone else in similar circumstances to steal. This goes beyond emotional expression. The Naturalistic Fallacy and Intuitionism About 100 years after Hume, G. E. Moore (1873-1958) identified what he saw as a logical error that was similar to the one identified by Hume but still distinct. Moore called it the “naturalistic fallacy.” His argument is that any effort to define the concept of “good,” using only natural facts, must fail. Moore used the “open-question argument” to make his point. Basically, Moore is saying that if we ask the question “Is it true that X is good?” and asking the question logically makes sense – or, in other words, it’s a valid question that people could debate, then X is not good. That’s because, to Moore, if two things are truly equivalent, then it makes no logical sense to ask that question. For example, consider the following question, “She’s a girl, but is she female?” This question makes no sense, because, by definition, a girl is a female. To be a girl, one must be female. Therefore, if X means the same thing as “good,” then the question “Is X good?” should make no sense, because the two would be obviously equivalent (In other words, it’s asking, “Is good actually good?” which makes no sense). However, Moore argues that every such question does make sense, therefore it cannot be true. So, for example, hedonism holds that pleasure or happiness is the ultimate goal of life. For the hedonist, pleasure means “good.” So, Moore puts it to the test by asking, “It is true that pleasure (X) is good?” Moore would argue that since this question makes sense, and people could reasonably disagree on the answer to the question, it must not be true that these two terms are equal. A a result, Moore determined that the source for moral truth must be non-natural, and his proposed answer to the problem was intuitionism - that moral truth is understood instinctively, without the need for conscious reasoning. Criticism of the Naturalistic Fallacy Moore seems to make a critical error in his argument for the naturalistic fallacy. He treats “good,” which is an idea, as if it were a proper noun – a thing or object – but this doesn’t fit with the way the word or concept is used. When we say “The weather is good,” we’re not equating the weather with a thing. Similarly, when we say “Honesty is good,” we aren’t equating honesty with an object. “Good” is more of a descriptive term. The ethicist Louis Pojman proposes two possibilities for defining the word “good.” 1. The term “good” is “the most general term of commendation.” 2. The term “good” means “satisfying some requirement.” Page 3 of 5 PHI 105: Introduction to Ethics Learning Unit 11: Handout This makes more sense than Moore’s use of the word. For example, when we say that “Honesty is good” we aren’t equating honesty with some object or item called “good.” Instead, we’re saying that honesty meets our standards for appropriate behavior.

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