Maritime Expansion and Delimitation After the Timor Gap Treaty
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Judging the East Timor Dispute: Self-Determination at the International Court of Justice, 17 Hastings Int'l & Comp
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review Volume 17 Article 3 Number 2 Winter 1994 1-1-1994 Judging the East Timor Dispute: Self- Determination at the International Court of Justice Gerry J. Simpson Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/ hastings_international_comparative_law_review Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Gerry J. Simpson, Judging the East Timor Dispute: Self-Determination at the International Court of Justice, 17 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 323 (1994). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol17/iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Judging the East Timor Dispute: Self-Determination at the International Court of Justice By Gerry J. Simpson* Table of Contents I. Introduction ............................................ 324 1E. Some Preliminary Remarks about the Case ............. 327 III. International Politics and the International Court: A Functional Dilemma .................................... 329 IV. Substantive Questions of Law .......................... 332 A. The Existence of a Right to Self-Determination...... 333 B. Beneficiaries of the Right to Self-Determination ..... 334 1. Indonesia's TerritorialIntegrity and the Principle of Uti Posseditis................................. 339 2. Enclaves in InternationalLaw .................. 342 3. Historical Ties .................................. 342 C. The Duties of Third Parties Toward Peoples Claiming a Right to Self-Determination ............. 343 V. Conclusion .............................................. 347 * Lecturer in International Law and Human Rights Law, Law Faculty, Univcrity of Melbourne, Australia. -
Eurasia Asia & Oceania
Segment Overview Asia & Eurasia Oceania u p. 28 u p. 20 Number of countries 7 4 1,551 ,296 1 1,245 1,218 1 16 14 Number of projects 1 3 In production 2 43 1 1 6 Under development 10 Preparation for development Under exploration (oil and gas reservoirs confirmed) Under exploration Other 466 Production/Reserves 367 Proved reserves (million boe) 214 201 195 210 207 191 Net production (thousand boed) 179 197 190 188 167 166 28 27 27 26 25 25 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 485,275 485,069 483,187 406,828 409,776 / 352,383 Net sales 299,599 281,623 Operating income 264,849 235,814 Net sales (¥ million) 191,070 178,225 Operating income (¥ million) 96,341 94,050 85,541 84,325 73,574 68,319 47,076 41,752 42,601 39,769 36,461 32,228 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 018 INPEX CORPORATION Annual Report 2015 Middle East Americas Japan & Africa u p. 32 u p. 36 u p. 30 6 7 1 Minami-Nagaoka 1 2 Gas Field 1 Naoetsu LNG 3 Terminal 9 7 1 16 10 Natural gas pipeline network (Approx. 1,400 km) etc. 783 857 636 4 Project Overview Project 583 518 505 174 168 169 158 163 155 138 135 132 130 126 117 74 68 65 40 36 30 29 30 27 28 20 25 25 21 21 21 17 18 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 524,528 520,835 500,033 621,513 421,184 357,343 354,136 350,735 333,213 303,819 243,113 205,572 129,522 120,268 118,937 ) 113,662 104,525 93,959 32,555 28,568 25,959 22,771 24,607 16,692 16,693 12,673 11,435 13,351 15,303 5,945 5,525 (7,646) (3,035) 1,028 (6,089) (5,518) ( 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 INPEX CORPORATION Annual Report 2015 019 Project Overview by Region Asia & Oceania In the Asia and Oceania region, INPEX holds participating interests in the Offshore Mahakam Block in Indonesia, which is contributing significantly to earnings, and the large-scale Ichthys and Abadi LNG projects, where development and preparatory development activities are under way. -
LEGAL and COMMERCIAL RISKS of INVESTMENT in the TIMOR GAP Legal and Commercial Risks of Investment in the Timor Gap GILLIAN TRIGGS*
LEGAL AND COMMERCIAL RISKS OF INVESTMENT IN THE TIMOR GAP Legal and Commercial Risks of Investment in the Timor Gap GILLIAN TRIGGS* [This paper examines the legal and commercial risks for investors and contractors in the Zone of Cooperation of the Timor Gap, both during the transitional period under the administration of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (‘UNTAET’) and after East Timor gains independence. It is argued that while the Exchange of Notes between Australia and the UNTAET provides stability during the transitional period, there are significant risks to production sharing contractors once East Timor gains independence. The paper also considers the consequences of a possible application by East Timor to the International Court of Justice for the determination of a permanent seabed boundary. While international law indicates that the natural prolongation theory will apply to protect Australia’s claim to the continental shelf, there is a risk that the International Court of Justice will apply the equidistance principle, which would place Area A of the Zone of Cooperation on the East Timorese side of a notional median line. It is suggested that, if a final boundary is neither agreed by Australia and East Timor nor imposed by the International Court of Justice, respective sovereign and commercial interests are best served by some form of joint development regime. A new agreement could provide the foundation for fruitful, long-term relations between East Timor and Australia, by protecting the juridical positions -
Separate Opinion of Judge Vereshchetin
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE VERESHCHETIN While 1 am in agreement with the Judgment delivered by the Court, 1 feel obliged to deal in this opinion with one important issue which, in my view, although not addressed in the reasoning of the Judgment, also bars the Court from adjudicating upon the submissions in the Applica- tion of the Portuguese Republic. Besides Indonesia, in the absence of whose consent the Court is pre- vented from exercising its jurisdiction over the Application, there is another "third party" in this case, whose consent was sought neither by Portugal before filing the Application with the Court, nor by Australia before concluding the Timor Gap Treaty. Nevertheless, the Applicant State has acted in this Court in the name of this "third party" and the Treaty has allegedly jeopardized its natural resources. The "third party" at issue is the people of East Timor. Since the Judgment is silent on this matter, one might wrongly con- clude that the people, whose right to self-determination lies at the core of the whole case, have no role to play in the proceedings. This is not to suggest that the Court could have placed the States Parties to the case and the people of East Timor on the same level procedurally. Clearly, only States may be parties in cases before the Court (Article 34 of the Statute of the Court). This is merely to Say that the right of a people to self-determination, by definition, requires that the wishes of the people concerned at least be ascertained and taken into account by the Court. -
Northern Large Marine Domain
Collation and Analysis of Oceanographic Datasets for National Marine Bioregionalisation: The Northern Large Marine Domain. A report to the Australian Government, National Oceans Office. May 2005 CSIRO Marine Research Peter Rothlisberg Scott Condie Donna Hayes Brian Griffiths Steve Edgar Jeff Dunn Cover Image designed by Vincent Lyne CSIRO Marine Researchi Cover Design Lea Crosswell and Louise Bell CSIRO Marine Research Collation and Analysis of Oceanographic Datasets – The Northern Large Marine Domain Contents Contents...........................................................................................................................................i List of Figures.................................................................................................................................ii 1. Summary................................................................................................................................1 2. Project Objectives..................................................................................................................2 3. Background............................................................................................................................2 4. Data Storage and Metadata....................................................................................................2 5 Setting for the Northern Large Marine Domain ....................................................................3 5.1 Geomorphology..............................................................................................................4 -
The Tectonic History of the Banda Arcs, Eastern Indonesia: a Review
J. geol. Soc. London, Vol. 136, 1979, pp. 519-527,2 figs. Printed inNorthern Ireland. The tectonic history of the Banda Arcs, eastern Indonesia: a review M. S. Norvick SUMMARY: The Banda Sea is underlain by a small marginal oceanic plate, which is believed to have formed during the early Tertiary. Unlike other marginal seas to the N, the spreading of the Banda platelet was restricted by surrounding continental blocks. Its present complexity is a result of late Miocene-earlyPliocene collision and obduction of theBanda Sea island arc system over the leading edge of the Australian-lrian continental plate. Transcurrent faultingon the northern limb of the collision zone may have accentuated curvature of the arc. Subduction and volcanicitv ceased after collision in the Timor and Seram sectors, but are still active at the eastern extremity of the arc. Adouble spiral line of geologicallyvery complex, based on bathymetry (Mammerickx et al. 1976), reg- small, mountainous islands make up the Banda Arcs ional gravity (Vening Meinesz 1954; Chamalaun et al. of eastern Indonesia (Fig. 1). Although onshore out- 1976; Milsom 1977)and earthquake distribution crop information is scattered, and geophysical data on (Hamilton 1974a; Cardwell & Isacks1978). Seismic the deep seas that cover 90% of the area sparse, the lineshave been published across the Timor region tectonic history of the region has stimulated discussion (Branson1974; Beck & Lehner1974; Crostella & formany years, and produced different (sometimes Powell 1975) and the Seram Trough (Audley-Charles conflicting) interpretations. The present review attempts& Carter 1978). Two 1976 oceanographic surveys run to reinterpretto critically thedata and some of by Scripps(‘Indopac’ programme) and CCOP (‘Val- theplate tectonic theories on theevolution of the divia’ cruise) collected valuable seismic refraction and Banda Arcs in the light of recent geological mapping reflection data over the deep water areas (Purdy et al. -
Submission From: the Timor Sea Justice Campaign To: the Senate
Submission from: The Timor Sea Justice Campaign To: The Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Regarding: Australia’s declarations made under certain international laws 11 October 2019 Timor Sea Justice Campaign Submission regarding Australia’s declarations made under certain international laws About the Timor Sea Justice Campaign The Timor Sea Justice Campaign was a 15 year long, people-powered campaign that successfully helped to pressure the Australian Government to set permanent maritime boundaries with Timor-Leste. The campaign’s social media channels are now used to share information about the prosecution of Witness K and Bernard Collaery. This submission was prepared by Tom Clarke, the campaign’s spokesperson, and Monique Hurley, a human rights lawyer. Summary The Australian Government has utilised a range of reprehensible tactics to take revenue from natural resources belonging to its neighbour Timor-Leste. Underpinning these efforts to rip-off our neighbour was a series of decisions made by the Howard Government in 2002 to withdraw Australia’s recognition of the maritime boundary jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The Australian Government’s withdrawal of recognition happened just two months before Timor-Leste became an independent nation, knowing that the Timorese would want to negotiate – as is their right – permanent maritime boundaries with their neighbours in accordance with international law. The withdrawal meant the Government of Timor-Leste had limited avenues to challenge the Australian Government’s attempts to stonewall its requests to establish permanent maritime boundaries or challenge Australia’s unilateral depletion of contested resources. -
The Timor Gap, 1972-2002
The Timor Gap, 1972-2002 Robert J. King July 2002 The Timor Sea Treaty between Australia and East Timor was signed in Dili on 20 May 2002, the first day of East Timor’s existence as an internationally recognized independent state. The treaty was signed for Australia by Prime Minister John Howard, and for East Timor by Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. The treaty created a Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) of 75,000 sq km in the Timor Sea, with 90 per cent of revenue from production within the area going to East Timor and 10 per cent to Australia. The JPDA covered 100 per cent of a $US1.6 billion project being developed at the Bayu-Undan oil and gas fields by Phillips Petroleum and about 20 per cent of the ten trillion cubic feet Sunrise and Troubadour reservoirs.1An annex to the treaty awarded 18 per cent of revenues from the Greater Sunrise field, a deposit that straddles the eastern corner of the joint area, to East Timor. The Timor Sea Treaty will remain in force until there is a permanent seabed delimitation between Australia and East Timor, or for thirty years from the date of its entry into force, whichever is the sooner (article 22). The Timor Sea Treaty replaced the Timor Gap (Zone of Cooperation) Treaty between Australia and Indonesia, which lapsed when East Timor ceased to be a province of Indonesia following a United Nations supervised act of self-determination on 30 August 1999. The Joint Petroleum Development Area created by the Timor Sea Treaty covers Zone of Cooperation Area A established by the Timor Gap Treaty. -
The East Timor Case Before the International Court of Justice * East
Symposium: The East Timor Case before the International Court of Justice * East Timor Moves into the World Court Christine M. Chinkin ** L Introduction The events leading to Indonesia's military invasion and subsequent annexation of East Timor, accompanied by repeated allegations of gross violations of human rights,1 are well known. The legality of Indonesia's claim to East Timor as constituting the 27th province of Indonesia has been the subject of much debate.2 Sixteen years after the occupation, proceedings were commenced in the International Court of Justice to bring Indonesia's claim and the contrary claim of the people of East Timor to their right to self-determination under judicial scrutiny. However these claims will be raised only in * Note from the Editors: The European Journal cf International Law has decided to occasionally publish track* reviewing the main ifp»ff of cases pfndiny before the International Court of Justice The views expressed in such •rides are strictly personal, and do not necessarily reflect those of the editorial board. •• LLB; LLM; PhD (Sydney); Professor of Law, University of Southampton. This article was first presented as a paper at a conference on the Legal Issues Arising from the East Timor Conflict, sponsored by the Human Rights Centre, University of New South Wales and the International Jurists for East Timor, March 1992. An earlier version appeared as The Merits of Portugal's Case Against Australia'. 15 New South Walts Law Journal (1992) 423. 1 iTtcfc- u£vc been nmncroos rcpocXi by noo^jpT^ffPiinrnf^i OfBwni7wTioftt snicn ss Amnesty intf I'n^^otffl* since 1973 of human rights violations in East Timor. -
Timor-Leste's Evolving Security Ties with Southeast Asia
Finding Partners: Timor-Leste’s Evolving Security Ties with Southeast Asia Natalie Sambhi May 2019 he Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste of vulnerability which, coupled with domestic gained its independence in 2002. Since imperatives, shape its strategic outlook. then, the small country has been busy T As Southeast Asian states grow in economic diversifying its foreign relations, building on nascent bonds forged through United Nations and military terms, it makes sense for Timor- missions on its soil since 1999. Amid the Leste to build closer ties with them. China, international flurry, Timor-Leste must contend Japan, the United States and Australia, with a range of pressing domestic issues. The among others, will remain important partners country has only 1.3 million citizens, 74% of for Timor-Leste. However, Southeast Asian whom are under the age of 35.1 Timor-Leste partnerships draw dividends, in both material aspires to become an upper middle income and non-material terms. This essay assesses country by 2030 with healthy and educated the burgeoning relations between Timor- citizens, a diversified economy, high quality Leste and its Southeast Asian partners. The infrastructure and food self-sufficiency.2 first section outlines Timor-Leste’s strategic Timor-Leste’s oil dependence, as well as its outlook and security vulnerabilities as well erratic economic growth, do not bode well for as describing the current state of its defense the secure future the young nation’s leaders capabilities. The second section discusses have described. Its location in-between the reasons for closer Southeast Asian much larger states adds to a further sense engagement and assesses three major bilateral partnerships (Indonesia, Malaysia Natalie Sambhi is a Research Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre and PhD scholar at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. -
Frontiers in International Environmental Law: Oceans
chapter 2 Water and Soil, Blood and Oil Demarcating the Frontiers of Australia, Indonesia and Timor- Leste David Dixon 1 Frontiers, Borders and Boundaries This chapter explores frontiers as political and economic constructs, focusing on the contested borders and boundaries of Timor-Leste.* At its centre is a dispute about the maritime boundary between Timor-Leste and Australia in which access to hydrocarbon resources in the Timor Sea has been at stake. In 2018, Timor- Leste and Australia signed a Treaty ‘to settle finally their mari- time boundaries in the Timor Sea’ (2018 Treaty).1 Despite considerable mutual self- congratulation,2 this treaty does not finalise the boundary (instead cre- ating an anomalous and temporary enclave to accommodate Australia’s eco- nomic interests). Nor does it deal conclusively with the crucial question of who should extract oil and gas or where processing should be carried out: it could not do so, for these decisions are ultimately not for nation states but for international corporations. To them, frontiers are less about pride and security than about opportunities and obstacles. This indicates a broader theme: bor- ders and boundaries may be products not of the rational application of legal principles, but rather of political (often symbolic) concerns about sovereignty and of pragmatic, economic interests in resources allocated to states by fron- tier delineations. * Acknowledgements: This paper is written in tribute to David Freestone, a friend and for- mer colleague who has taught me much, not least the importance of academic integrity and commitment. As well as thanking David, I acknowledge Richard Barnes, Clinton Fernandes, Patrick Earle, José Ramos-Horta and the extraordinary people at Laˊo Hamutuk and Timor- Leste’s Marine Boundary Office. -
Timor-Leste: Background and U.S. Relations
Updated June 27, 2019 Timor-Leste: Background and U.S. Relations Overview projects, while opponents alleged that the government was Timor-Leste (also known as East Timor), is one of the spending unsustainably. world’s youngest nation-states, having gained its independence from Indonesia on May 20, 2002. This U.S. congressional concerns have focused on internal marked the end of more than three centuries of foreign rule, security, human rights, and the development of democratic including over 300 years of Portuguese rule followed by 24 institutions. The House Democracy Partnership initiated a years of Indonesian control. The nation’s transition to Timor-Leste program in 2006 that has managed training independence was traumatic: Following a 1999 nationwide programs for Timorese legislators, and assisted with the referendum that supported independence, violence led by building of a parliamentary library and the improvement of paramilitary militias supported by elements of the information technology in the Timorese parliament. Indonesian military killed around 1,300 Timorese and displaced nearly 500,000. Today, with a population of 1.3 Historical Background million, Timor-Leste is one of the world’s poorest nations, During the 1640s, Portugal began to assert control over with one of Asia’s highest illiteracy rates. Timor-Leste, a small outpost surrounded by Dutch-ruled Indonesia. This colonial presence would last until 1975, Timor-Leste has made considerable strides in building long after Indonesia gained independence from the stability and democratic institutions, although it continues Netherlands, when the Revolutionary Front for an to face many challenges in consolidating its democracy and Independent Timor-Leste (Fretilin) gained ascendancy and developing its economy.