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attack occurredwhenTunisia seemedtohave stabi- In anycase,incontrasttootherattacks,theBardo Mount ChambiareaalongtheAlgerianborder. well asthepersistenceofterroristhotbedsin ing the jihadi threat and the chaos ravaging , as firm thefearofTunisian governmentofficials regard- lence occurringintheveryheartofcapitalcon- as vulnerablethehinterland.Theseactsofvio- Brahmi) in 2013 demonstrate that the capital is just leftist politicalfigures(ChokriBelaïdandMohamed 14 September 2012andtheassassinationsoftwo assault ontheAmericanembassybySalafists lence ispartlyduetoregionaldisorganisation.The gained a new impetus since the revolution. This vio- 1 rorism isnotnewtoTunisia, the successofpoliticaltransition.Althoughter- political change,securityistheprimarychallengeto In thiscountry, whichcontinuestosparkhopeforreal 2011 revolution. in theheartofcapitalTunisia sincetheJanuary constitutes the first major terrorist operation to strike Thisattack lamic StateofIraqandtheLevant(ISIL). 24 people andwounded45wasclaimedbytheIs- seum attackinTunis thatcausedthedeathof On 18March2015,authorshipfortheBardoMu- Security Threat Political Scientist, UniversityofParis I Khadija Mohsen-Finan Challenge a Security A Fragmented MaghrebFacing Changing RegionalOrder 2 legiance toal-Qaeda. violent Islamismmarkedarupturewith Tunisian politicalIslamism ledbyEnnahdha. southeast ofTunis. Atfirstthepresspresentedattackas acaseofbanditry, buttheinquiryrevealeditwasaSalafistgroup.The emergenceof 3 January2007,ashootouttookplace betweenthepoliceandanarmedgroupcallingitselfAsadibnal-FuratArmy intheareaofSoliman, claimed responsibilityfortheattack,which tookplaceinfrontoftheGhribasynagogueDjerbaandcaused21 casualtiesand30wounded.On Emerging in September 2006 as a splinter group from the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), AQIMhaspledgedal- EmerginginSeptember 2006asasplintergroupfrom theAlgerianSalafistGroupforPreaching andCombat(GSPC), On11April2002,a25-year-oldFrench Tunisian blewhimself upinatanktruckhewasdrivingthatpackedwithexplosives. Al-Qaeda 1 terrorist violence has terroristviolencehas ed asourceofinsecurityintheregion. More recently, thepresenceofAQIMhasconstitut- difficult relationswithstates. tions, inparticulartheTuaregs, whohavealwayshad with atraditionofirredentismamongcertainpopula- ings, whichescapestatecontrol,areassociated automobiles) orcriminalactivities.Theseundertak such ascontraband(fuel,cigarettes,sugar,stolen tect theircitizens.Hence,illegalactivitiesdeveloped, tible intheirinabilitytocontrolterritoryandpro- were already suffering from state weakness, percep- uprisings of 2011, and Sahel countries combines witholderfactors.Well beforetheArab The securitythreatemergingfromtheArabSpring two rivalorganisations. Islamic Maghreb(AQIM)andtheState(IS), that benefits the members of bothAl-Qaeda in the region arethesourceofsignificantarmscirculation its bordersandtheweaknessofcertainstatesin Libya has affected the entire region. The porosity of the fallofColonelGaddafi,chaoticsituationin gional orderandthedestabilisationofLibya.After nisian transitionisfeelingtheeffectsofnewre- This securityissuedemonstratesthatthefragileTu- was electedpresidentoftheRepublic. won thelegislativeelectionsofNovember2014, Caid Essebsi,theheadofcoalitionthathadjust lised on the political and institutional levels. Beji paying substantialransoms.Buttheorganisation hostage, andstateshavenegotiatedtheirreleaseby activities, AQIM has not hesitated to take Europeans 2 To fundits -

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2015 81 Changing Regional Order Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2015 82 Changing Regional Order Keys 3 to come theaidofPolisario Front,which countries followed,withAlgiersatfirstrefusing government. Aperiodofdetentebetweenthetwo possible cooperationwiththenewAlgerianmilitary geria wereutopianandconstitutedanobstacleto ritorial claimsonMauritaniaandcertainpartsofAl- admitted onavisittoAlgiersthathiscountry’ster- tween thetwocountriesuntil1988,whenHassanII ries claimedbyMorocco.Tensions continuedbe- by FarhatAbbasontherestitutionofcertainterrito- didinfactrenegeontheagreementmade tries initiallyinvolvedborderdisputes.Independent The conflictbetweenthetwomajorMaghrebcoun- ble obstacletoAMUoperation. between AlgiersandRabathaveconstitutedasiza- Arab MaghrebUnion(AMU)in1989.Thedisputes never really worked, despite the establishment of the alarming securitysituation.Maghrebintegrationhas Maghreb countriesarenotorganisedtohandlethis The WeightofAlgerian-MoroccanDisputes Spring. nisian, allegedlyrecruitedbyAQIMduringtheArab group of assailants.Of the 37 terrorists,11 were Tu- strategy, alsorevealedthetransnationalnatureof which showedthelimitationsofAlgeriansecurity terrorist attackagainsttheInAmenasgascomplex, their institutionsrecruitthroughouttheregion.The The terroristorganisationsstrivingtodefystatesand they thensoldorexchanged. countries oforigin(,)equippedwitharms Many of Gaddafi’s auxiliary troops returned to their weapon stockafterthedownfallofColonelGaddafi. arms cachecomesfromthedispersionofLibya’s organisation hasonhand.Today, alargepartofits sophistication oftheweaponsal-Qaeda-allied Amenas gasfacilitiesinJanuary2013revealedthe significant arsenal.TheattackontheAlgerianIn type offunding,AQIMhasmanagedtobuildupa also controlscontrabandnetworks.Thankstothis 5 4 include ,partofMali, theAlgerianSaharaandallofWestern Sahara. Based onamapdrawnbypartymember, Moroccannationalistsbelievetheircountry, whichshouldextendtoSaintLouisin , shouldalso developed bynationalists, should legitimatelyrecoverallterritoriesthatwere“amputated” beforeandduringthe French . quoi-l-algerie-defend-le-statu-quo-au-sahara-occidental,0884 Akram TheconceptofGreaterMoroccowas developedinthemid-1950sbyAllalal-Fassi,leaderofIstiqlal party. Accordingtothisconcept Aomar B B 3 elkaïd aghzouz ; “Pourquoi l’Algérie défendlestatuquoauSaharaoccidental,” inOrientXXI , 23April2015,http://orientxxi.info/magazine/pour- ; “LeMaghrebetl’Europefaceàlacrise duSahel :Coopérationourivalités?”, inAnnéeduMaghrebIX,2013,p.179. Morocco outofthemanagementaffairsregarding giers, whichalwayswishedtokeepbothFranceand perceptible intheirhandlingoftheMalicrisis.Al- This rivalry between and was likewise lowed theolddemonsof‘GreaterMorocco’ the 350,000-strongmarchonWestern Saharaal- changed radically. Indeed,theMoroccaninitiativeof from Morocco,’ theAlgeriangovernment’sattitude Rabat considered ‘its Saharan provinces amputated nouncement oftheGreenMarchto‘recover’ what Sahara since 1973. But in 1975, after the an- had been fightingfortheindependenceofWestern lising theregime. Islamists duringthe1990swithaimofdestabi- can counterpartsofcomingtotheaidAlgerian an politicalplayerscontinuetoaccusetheirMoroc- stinacy regarding the issue. Algeri- These reasonsdonotsufficetoexplainAlgeria’sob- ern Sahara. border isneverdissociatedfromtheissueofWest- liament. InRabat, on theotherhand,issueof having beendefinitivelyratifiedbytheMoroccanPar- tween thetwocountries,1972conventionnot officially recognisedtheinviolabilityofborderbe- the Algerian political class since Rabat has still not These tensionsareallthemoredifficulttodispelfor sion betweenthetwocountries. would becomethefocalpointofrecurrentten- flict, whichregularlyexperiencesconvulsionsand ent channels,inparticulartheWestern Saharacon- hegemony thatwastobeextendedthroughdiffer- bat were clearly engaged in a struggle for regional But beyondtheofficialarguments,AlgiersandRa- cover territoriesinthenameofits‘historicrights.’ revolution, whereasforMorocco,theaimwastore- defensive byAlgiers,indicatingtheprotectionofits neighbouring regime.Thisattitudewasputforthas accused oneanotherofwishingtodestabilisethe possession ofTindouf.As1975,thetwostates the IfraneAgreement,whichrecognisedAlgeria’s buried afterRabat’srecognitionofMauritaniaand surface, aconceptthatAlgiersthoughtdefinitively 5 4 tore- in L’Otan etleMaghreb , FRS/L’Harmattan p.18-43. taken actiononanotherfront toexpressitsconcern Excluded fromSaheliannegotiations, Moroccohas rameters. the majorregionalpowercontrollingallsecuritypa- likewise contrarytoAlgeria’sambitionofbecoming But thisreturnoftheFrencharmytoregionis military alliancebetweenFranceandtheSahelstates. the French-American strategy and the diplomatic and ence intheSahel.Ithasthenceforthparticipated consisted ofstemmingFrenchandWestern interfer- my’s returntoMalithwartedAlgeria’spolicy, which they hadregularlybeenputtingforth.TheFrenchar- an awkwardpositionwithregardtotheprinciples sition while putting the country’s political leaders in by FranceweakenedtheAlgeriangovernment’spo- The regionalcounterterroriststrategyimplemented quest ofnorthernMali. ists andTuareg separatistsembarkedonthecon- The Malianarmycollapsedandacoalitionofjihad- to relyonitsformerallies,particularlytheTuaregs. the militarycoupinMali,Algeriafounditverydifficult and securitypresenceintheregion.In2012,after ed toleadtheSahelstatesrejectforeignmilitary strategy intheSahel.Indeed,Algiersalwaysattempt- nalled, to a certain extent, the failure of the Algerian when OperationServalwaslaunchedinMali,itsig- erately excludedMorocco.ButinJanuary2013, the beginningofjointmilitarycooperationthatdelib- cords with Niger,Mali and Mauritania, which marked 2010, thegovernmentsignedTamanrasset Ac- conflicts, inparticularbetween1991and1995.In Sahel countries.Algiers played this role in numerous tion betweentheTuaregs andthegovernmentsof Algeria alsouseditspowerofnegotiationandmedia- could bebutaninvaluableally. on itsownsoilduringthecivilwar(1992-1998), country, whichhadfoughtagainstarmedIslamism lished byPresidentBush.Washington feltthatthis national struggleagainstIslamistterrorismestab- ria hasoffereditsservicestoparticipateintheinter- Since 2001,itisasanexperiencedvictimthatAlge- Tuaregs andthegovernmentsofMaliNiger. ism anditsabilitytoconductnegotiationsbetween essential: its expertise in combating Islamist terror- the Sahelarea,putforthtwofactorsitconsidered 7 6 Abdenour InApril2012,thepersonnelofAlgerian consulateinGaoweretakenhostagebyaTuareg groupthathadlongbeenfriendlywith Algiers. B enant ar ; “(Re)penserle(s) relation(s)Otan-Maghreb :perspectiveetlimites d’undispositifrégionaldesécurité limitéauMaghreb,” 6 follow its own logic, vying withtheother at atime tives. By the same token, each country continues to each countryisgovernedbyitsownsecurityimpera- The notionofcollectivesecuritydoesnotexistand it fromIslamicStateorAQIM-ledIslamistterrorism. building acollectivesecurityplanthatcouldprotect the EuropeanUnion.Thisdivisionpreventsitfrom disorganised beforeunitedpartners,as,forinstance, division. Thecountriesintheareacontinuetoappear Today, theMaghreb’sgreatweaknessresidesinits as, forinstance,theEuropeanUnion disorganised beforeunitedpartners, in theareacontinuetoappear resides initsdivision.Thecountries The Maghreb’sgreatweakness piecemeal andfragmented. region, whichappears,byforceofcircumstances, tion weakensthestrategicscopeofMaghreb whom itmustnegotiateseparately. Thisconfigura- Maghreb butratherhastodealwithstates, by NATO, whichdoesnotrecogniseastrategic the regionaldivisionconsiderablycomplicateaction the terroristthreat.Yet thesenationalpositionsand strategic subregionwhose states cooperatetoblock vents thecountriesinareafromorganisingintoa detrimental inmorewaysthanone.Firstofall,itpre- region. Having become structural, this contention is them toestablishallianceswithactorsoutsidethe tween thetwocountries.Theirdisputeshaveled Malian affairsrevealsthelackofcollaborationbe- The parallel involvement of Algeria and Morocco in two focalpoints:theeconomyandreligion. Moroccan presenceandinvestmentsrevolvearound 2014, namelyMali,IvoryCoast,GuineaandGabon. rocco visitedanumberofAfricancountriesinMarch ence ofAlgeriaintheAfricanarena,KingMo- Western .Taking advantageofalesserpres- is alsoexercisedthroughthecountries’ presencein Competition betweenthetwomajorMaghrebstates protect itselffromthethreatsouth. with terrorism, particularly displaying its desire to 7

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2015 83 Changing Regional Order Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2015 84 Changing Regional Order Keys since 1975asamongtheSahrawi refugees inTin- rawi populationsunderMoroccanadministration emulation effectwasfeltasmuchamongtheSah- have likewisebeenfuelledbytheArabSpring.The Such humanrightsdemandsoriginatingpre-2011 international legality. of humanrights,individualandpoliticalliberties doing so,theyhavedrawnonanewregister–that Since then, demands have gained a civic nature. In precede theArabSpring,datingbackto2005. changed. Sahrawidemandsregardinghumanrights roccans, thetypesofdemandshaveradically ble boneofcontentionbetweenAlgeriansandMo- With regardtotheWestern Saharaconflict,averita- tionalism thatseemsobsolete? Moroccan rulingclassesdesperatelyclingtoana- gional affairs in the Maghreb, while the Algerian and different changeshaveontheorganisationofre- tributed bypublicopinion.Whateffectscanthese international policy, butalsothesocialpressurecon- It isnolongeronlytheimperativesofpowerdictating regional andinternationalaffairshavebeenmodified. ing regionalgeopolitics.Thestandardsgoverning in thehistoryofArabcountrieswhileradicallychang- Indeed, thistimeofrupturehasmarkedamilestone there arenewfactorsintroducedbytheArabSpring. In additiontotheseadvantages,repeatedlyputforth, sive civicrights. writing uphistoryorarrivingatfullandcomprehen- these countries,suchasreligiousfundamentalism, bining effortstohandleissuescommonallof societies ofgettingtoknowoneanotherandcom- the partieslessforce,importanceforMaghreb ments withoutuncoordinatednegotiationsthatlend economic synergy, the opportunity to sign agree- expressed morethanonce,whethertheyconsistof The advantagesofanintegratedregionhavebeen Shedding NationalMindsets the regionrelinquishtheirnationalapproach. threat. Itisimperativethatthetwomajorcountriesof when jointactionisneededtoneutralisethejihadi 9 8 http://orientxxi.info/documents/dossiers/quarante-ans-de-conflit-au-sahara,0880 (ed); Perspectives onWestern Sahara,RowmanandLittlefield,2014. SeethespecialissueofOrientXXI:“QuaranteansdeconflitauSahara occidental,” Khadija M ohsen -F inan ; “Western Sahara: AconflictontheFringesofNewRegionalDynamics,” inAnouar 8 Spring. who had expressed their anger well before the Arab all, thereisalackofprospectsfortheSahrawis, economic synergy. Andfinallyand perhapsabove the regioncallsforMaghrebintegrationandgreater Secondly, theeconomicclimate of thecountriesin swelling theranksofjihadistsplaguingarea. to the conflict, thus precluding theSahrawis from of all,theregionalsecuritysituationcallsforanend come seems,infact,dictatedbythreefactors.First in ordertosettletheWestern Saharaissue.Itsout- These arenewfactorsweabsolutelymustaddress this neworder. Secretary-General’s 2012reportalreadyhintedat people ofWestern Sahara’ intoaccount,theUN tic evolutionthatwouldincitethepartiestotake‘the and internationalatmosphere,aswellthedomes- the citizen.Bymentioningeffectsofregional concept of politics that enshrines the emergence of Sahara aseverywhere,wearewitnessinganew now weighsupondecision-making.IntheWestern surely growingfreer.Whereverwemaybe,opinion zens, in a context where expression is slowly but an entirelynewmannerbypoliticalactivistsandciti- political action is now experienced and conceived in are choosingmorecentrelineoptions.AsinTunis, identifying lessandwiththePolisario Frontand established byMohamedVIin1992.Theyarealso Advisory CouncilforSaharanAffairs(CORCAS), pectations. ThelatterdonotidentifywiththeRoyal the ’spoliticaloffersmeetSahrawiex- are increasingly inadequate. Neither Morocco’s nor institutions establishedtorepresenttheSahrawis Western Saharademonstratethatthemeasuresand The civil disobedience movements burgeoning in Polisario Front basedinSpain. Shahid movement,comprised by dissidents of the cal life.ThisprotestwassupportedbytheKhatal- entitlement of youth to greater participation in politi- end ofcorruption,reformtheelectoralcodeand the and changeintheadministrationjudiciaryof the Young Revolutionariesgroupdemandedreform douf. InMarch2011,theappealmadeinTindoufby Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), 9 B oukhars andJacques R ousselier