The Presentation of a Potentially Unique Cognitive
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AUTOPRIMING: THE PRESENTATION OF A POTENTIALLY UNIQUE COGNITIVE TRANSFERENCE PHENOMENON A thesis presented to the Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for degree Master of Science Ian P. Berger June 2004 This thesis entitled AUTOPRIMING: THE PRESENTATION OF A POTENTIALLY UNIQUE COGNITIVE TRANSFERENCE PHENOMENON BY IAN P. BERGER has been approved for the Department of Psychology and the College of Arts and Sciences by Mark D. Alicke Professor of Psychology Leslie A. Flemming Dean, College of Arts and Sciences BERGER, IAN P. M.S. June 2004. Psychology Autopriming: The Presentation of a Potentially Unique Cognitive Transference Phenomenon (68pp.) Director of Thesis: Mark D. Alicke There is little doubt that people evaluate others based on limited information. The information used when evaluating others oftentimes has little to offer in terms of accuracy of evaluations, but is used nonetheless. The thrust of the current research is an examination of the roles of priming, the self, and attitudes in social judgment, specifically addressing a form of cognitive transference referred to herein as autopriming. It is hypothesized that without regard to personal beliefs, people will use information they have generated when making social judgments, information that will have no effect (or less of an effect) on individuals who are exposed to this information but do not generate it. Three studies were conducted. Two of the three supported the autopriming hypothesis. Although the results of the three studies do not offer unequivocal support for the hypothesized autopriming phenomenon, there are some interesting findings worth examining. Approved: Mark D. Alicke Professor of Psychology Acknowledgments Apart from the obvious contributions made by committee members, the author would like to sincerely thank Andrew Geers, Ph.D., and Justin Buckingham, Ph.D. for their thoughtful and insightful comments regarding an earlier version of this paper. Table of Contents Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………3 Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………………4 List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………... 6 List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………….. 6 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….. 7 Relevant Theory and Implications………………………………………………………... 9 Pilot Studies……………………………………………………………………………... 29 Pilot Study 1……………………………………………………………………... 29 Pilot Study 2……………………………………………………………………... 36 Method…………………………………………………………………………………... 41 Results and Discussion…………………………………………………………………...43 General Discussion……………………………………………………………………… 54 References………………………………………………………………………………. 60 Appendix A……………………………………………………………………………… 66 Endnotes…………………………………………………………………………………. 68 List of Tables Table Page 1. Categories and Characteristics of Cognitive Transference……………………………...22 List of Figures Figure Page 1. Writer Participant Ratings of Neutral Targets Regarding Guilt, Pilot Study 1 33 2. Yoked Participant Ratings of Neutral Targets Regarding Guilt, Pilot Study 1. 34 3. Percentage of “Guilty” Neutral Target Opinion Attributions by Source of Statements and Attitude Expressed Within Statements, Pilot Study 1………….. 35 4. Ratings of Neutral Targets by Attitude and Statement Valence. Pilot Study 2………. 38 5. Pre- and Post-Experimental Pro-Prayer in Schools Writer Participant Attitudes by Valence of Prime…………………………………………………………………46 6. Pre- and Post-Experimental Anti-Prayer in Schools Writer Participant Attitudes by Valence of Prime…………………………………………………………………46 7. Writer Participant Pre- and Post-Experimental Consensus Ratings………………….. 50 8. Yoked Participant Pre- and Post-Experimental Consensus Ratings………………….. 50 9. Writer Ratings of Neutral Targets by Participant Attitude and Statement Valence….. 53 10. Yoked Ratings of Neutral Targets by Participant Attitude and Statement Valence… 53 Autopriming 7 Autopriming: The Presentation of a Potentially Unique Cognitive Transference Phenomenon There is little doubt that people evaluate others based on limited information. The information used when evaluating others oftentimes has little to offer in terms of the accuracy of these evaluations, but is used nonetheless. Although there has been some contention regarding the automaticity of these evaluations (for a review and rebuttal see Langer, 1978), they seem to occur routinely and spontaneously (Winter & Uleman, 1984; Winter, Uleman & Cunniff, 1985; Gilbert & Krull, 1988; Gilbert, Pelham & Krull, 1988; Gilbert, Krull & Pelham, 1988; for reviews see Winter, Uleman & Cunniff, 1985 and Gilbert 1989). In spite of their apparent pervasiveness, social psychologists know relatively little about how people make these spontaneous interpersonal judgments. Social psychologists have put a great deal of effort into exposing the faulty processes people utilize in making social judgments, and the current research intends to add to this knowledge base by demonstrating a phenomenon involving generation of arguments and social judgment. Previous attempts to neatly describe the mechanisms involved in social judgment have often concerned themselves with the findings associated with either the priming/attitude accessibility1 or the egocentric comparison literature. Findings supporting the priming/attitude accessibility approach tend to indicate that expressed attitudes or opinions (i.e., those made salient or accessible) will influence judgments regarding third parties (for a review see Higgins, 1996). Proponents of the second approach (i.e., egocentric comparison) are more inclined to make the assertion that it is one’s own opinions or beliefs that influence these social judgments (Ross, Autopriming 8 Greene & House, 1977; Markus, Smith & Moreland, 1985; Alicke & Largo, 1995; Biernat, Manis, & Kobrynowicz, 1997). Although there are almost certainly situations in which each of the aforementioned explanations can explain some social judgments, neither seems able to explain the entire spectrum of social judgment phenomena. The thrust of the current research is a further examination of the respective roles of priming, the self, and attitudes in social judgment, all within the context of cognitive transference, defined as transferring a thought, motive, belief or attitude onto other targets (Alicke, LoSchiavo, & Buckingham, 2000). The current research concerns itself with the concept referred to as autopriming, which manifests itself in social judgment independent of simple priming effects or personal attitude. It is believed that without regard to personal beliefs, people will use information they have generated when making social judgments, information that will have no effect (or less of an effect) on individuals who are exposed to this information but do not generate it. For example, a pro-choice advocate constrained to generate anti-abortion rights statements (i.e., counter-attitudinal arguments) will be more likely to judge a neutral target as being anti-choice than will a pro-choice advocate who has simply been primed with anti-abortion rights statements. One important consideration in the present research is that as in other forms of cognitive projection, these auto-primed thoughts are not necessarily representative of a person's actual beliefs or opinions. Transferred items can be quite influential in social judgment, even when cognitive projection occurs independently of one's own views (Alicke et al., 2000). Another distinction is that the mental contents that are to be transferred are self-generated rather than presented by an outside source. Autopriming 9 Because no previous research specifically addressing auto-priming has been conducted, the structure and predictions of other areas of attitude and social judgment (i.e., egocentric comparison and priming/salience) will be discussed, with special emphasis placed on the concept of cognitive transference. Because the current research deals with self-generated attitudes, there will also be a discussion regarding the nature of the self in social psychology. The purpose of this summary is not to offer an exhaustive review of all the applicable areas, but to give an overview sufficient to explain how the hypothesis of the research reported later in this paper relates to or deviates from these previous findings. Relevant Theory and Implications The Self Attitudes can be loosely defined as summary evaluations of objects (Petty, Wegener, and Fabrigar, 1997). Because these evaluations are made by an individual, the self would seem to be involved in the formation and use of attitudes. The concept of “self” bears examination in the context of attitude transference, social judgment, and the focus of the present research: autopriming. One question that must be posed when considering attitudes and the self is whether or not personal attitudes bias judgment regarding the object of these attitudes. The extant literature strongly supports the contention that personal attitudes can moderate perception and ratings regarding attitude objects. Some of the classic research in this area has shown that perceptions of possible rule infractions during football plays were in large part mediated by participants’ team allegiance (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954), participant attitudes towards an experimental confederate mediated causal attributions of Autopriming 10 attitudinally inconsistent behavior by the confederate (Regan, Straus, & Fazio, 1974), and that attitudes regarding capital punishment affected assessments of empirical evidence regarding the deterrent effects of capital punishment (Lord, Ross,