A Competitive Idea-Based Growth Model

View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Institutional Research Information System University of Turin A Competitive Idea-Based Growth Model Carla Marchesea and Fabio Privileggib aInstitute POLIS - DiGSPES, Universitàdel Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”, Via Cavour 84, 15121 Alessandria (Italy). Email: [email protected], ORCID 0000-0001-9935-2038; bDept. of Economics and Statistics “Cognetti de Martiis”, Università di Torino, Lungo Dora Siena 100 A, 10153 Torino (Italy), ORCID 0000-0002-8837-2006 ARTICLE HISTORY Compiled April 29, 2019 ABSTRACT In this paper we present a model in which endogenous growth arises in competitive markets. Knowledge is described as a factor used directly in the final goods’ production. Firms demand both basic nonrival knowledge contents, which are supplied jointly and inelastically with raw labor, and further contents supplied by patent holders. This fact, together with Lindahl prices for knowledge, allows competition to work, while it also implies that workers’ income share declines overtime. In a first version of the model with constant cost of knowledge production the first best is attained. In a further version of the model, in which the cost of knowledge production is allowed to change over time and thus intertemporal externalities arise, in a decentralized economy a second best equilibrium occurs in the transitional period, while in the long run there is convergence to efficiency. JEL CLASSIFICATION C61; E10; O31; O41 KEYWORDS Endogenous growth; Competitive markets; Intangible inputs; Lindahl prices ‘Socrates: There are beds and tables in the world—plenty of them, are there not? Glaucon: Yes. Socrates: But there are only two ideas or forms of them—one the idea of a bed, the other of a table. —Plato, The Republic, Book X, dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon, 380 BC’ 1. Introduction The motivation for this paper is to further pursue the challenging notion of ‘competitive innovation’, in a framework in which, however, the classical view about the nonrival nature of knowledge is maintained. In fact, we aim at providing a parsimo- nious set of assumptions sufficient at supporting the viability of competition in the whole economy, that is, price taking behavior and zero profits at all levels, as well as market incentives for R&D activities and thus sustained economic growth. While the CONTACT Fabio Privileggi. Email: [email protected] assumptions we arrive at are demanding, they capture some features that might pre- vail in the economy thanks to the characteristics that technological change assumed in the last decades. The first feature we consider is that technical progress leads more and more to the provision of information goods or knowledge products (Scotchmer 2005) such as computer programs, internet applications, business models, etc., which are patentable1 and directly usable in the final goods production. It thus seems appro- priate to assume that knowledge can also enter directly into the final goods production function, without having to be incorporated into intermediate goods or into labor (as, e.g., in human capital models).2 This direct penetration of immaterial contents into final goods production also implies that much more information than in the past is available to asses the value of the marginal product of knowledge (Gray and Grimaud 2016). The second feature that we consider is the “routinization” process (Acemoglu and Autor 2011), which implies the possibility of codifying and automating many tasks— including cognitive ones—previously performed by workers. Bringing this trend to its limit, this substitution process in the medium-upper tier of the labor market would spare only creative tasks, which imply the elaboration of new models and ideas. But then the suppliers of such ideas need no more to be employees.3 Entrepreneurs who operate under the protection of laws on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) are well suited to supply knowledge contents. One can thus expect that patented knowledge has the potential for widely displacing both medium and high-skilled workers. While on the other hand robotization has in principle the potential for substituting also the remaining tasks, i.e., those of low-skilled workers, the perspective diffusion and economic impact of robots is still questioned (Gordon 2014). The problem is mainly represented by the difficulty of routinization of tasks which require a level of adapt- ability and responsiveness which is nowadays difficult to achieve. Hence, at least for a while the process of substitution should spare low-skilled workers, endowed with the basic levels of knowledge, which are still needed to exploit patented intellectual contents.4 In this paper, to describe the final goods’ production, we use a general neoclassical production function Y = F (X,AL)—where Y is a composite consumption good, A stands for knowledge, L for labor and X for an intermediate good—exhibiting constant returns to scale in two variables, X and the product (AL). We assume that workers inelastically supply basic knowledge, representing their inherited common cultural endowment, jointly with raw labor, while knowledge advances are supplied only by patent holders. Since intellectual contents coming from these two sources are perfect substitutes when used in the production of final goods, they are treated as just one factor, i.e., knowledge, a nonrival but excludable good. Since workers supply of raw labor and basic knowledge are physically joint and inelastic, they are willing to supply both factors provided that at least one of them has a positive price. Firms producing final goods demand just knowledge from both types of providers, while raw labor 1This trend for the U.S. can be dated back to 1998, when in the so called State Street Bank case a business method was declared patentable. Many other similar rulings followed with respect to software. For patentability in general see Eckert and Langinier (2013). 2For the case in which labor and individual licences for accessing disembodied knowledge are jointly demanded, see Marchese and Privileggi (2018). 3We envisage a potential turning point and thus depart from Acemoglu and Restrepo (2016) who maintain that new and more complex tasks for labor can always be created. 4Arrieta Ibarra et al. (2017) stress also the role of data produced by human interactions in the generation of information useful for Machine Learning. They envisage a world of “Data as Labor”, where workers are identified with the suppliers of such information, i.e., of basic intangible intellectual contents, and paid accordingly. 2 represents an externality of basic knowledge. A technical ingredient that renders competition viable and efficiently allocates workers to the single firms, internalizing the externality, is represented by the Lindahl prices paid by the final goods’ sector to compensate the suppliers of knowledge. As will be- come more clear in Section 3.4, the larger the firm’s dimension in terms of output (and thus the larger the number of workers it hires), the larger its revealed demand price for knowledge (since raw labor acts as a multiplier of the marginal product of knowledge); but a larger Lindahl price implies also a larger firm’s payment for the workers’ basic knowledge, or, so to say, a larger “payroll”. Hence, Lindahl prices support the exact equivalent of a competitive labor market equilibrium. The key idea about the viability of competition in the R&D market may be sum- marized as follows. Final good producers (in large number), besides the intermediate good X demand only knowledge A and are eager to pay the Lindahl price; patent holders (in large number) are willing to rent the positive stock of knowledge they already own whenever its price is positive. The price arises from the intersection between the (strictly decreasing) demand for knowledge with knowledge supply, where the latter is fixed at each instant because it originates from the available stock of already patented inventions, whose services, unlike in a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, are assumed to be perfect substitutes when used in production. Future Lindahl prices, when discounted at any previous instant according to the market interest rate, turn out to cover the cost of producing new inventions by R&D firms, which are thus incentivized to undertake research activities and eventually allow sustained endogenous growth of the economy. As R&D activities occur under a free entry condition, R&D firms earn zero profits and are thus competitive like any other actor in the economy, specifically, the firms in the final good sector. While in the basic version of the model knowledge used in production is fully excludable, so that the first best is reached, in a further version externalities arise and a second best result is attained in the transitional period. Even in the latter case, however, in the long run the decentralized solution converges to the optimal Asymptotic Balanced Growth Path (ABGP). Our results contribute to the debate about the motivations of the decline of the income share of labor at the advantage of the share going to intangibles and particularly to holders of patents, a stylized fact that has attracted much attention (Corrado, Hul- ten, and Sichel 2009; Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014; Koh, Santaeulàlia-Llopis, and Zheng 2016). A novel contribution of the paper is actually that of providing a rationale for a declining workers’ income share in a growing competitive economy. This result arises because, as economic growth proceeds, the share of knowledge owned by patent holders increases, as knowledge grows only thanks to research protected by IPRs. The paper is organized as follows: after a discussion of the related literature in Paragraph 2, in Section 3 the basic model is presented and its static equilibrium is thoroughly described, while Section 4 is devoted to the ensuing dynamic equilibrium.

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