Profile of Christos Papadimitriou
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Curriculum Vitae
Curriculum Vitae Prof. Michal Feldman School of Computer Science, Tel-Aviv University Personal Details • Born: Israel, 1976 • Gender: Female • email: [email protected] Education • Ph.D.: Information Management and Systems, University of California at Berkeley, May 2005. Thesis title: Incentives for cooperation in peer-to-peer systems. • B.Sc.: Bar-Ilan University, Computer Science, Summa Cum Laude, June 1999. Academic Positions 2013 - present: Associate Professor, School of Computer Science, Tel-Aviv University, Israel. Associate Professor, School of Business Administration and Center for 2011 - 2013: the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. 2007 - 2011: Senior Lecturer, School of Business Administration and Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Additional Positions 2011 - 2013: Visiting Researcher (weekly visitor), Microsoft Research New England, Cambridge, MA, USA. 2011 - 2013: Visiting Professor, Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Center for Research on Computation and Society, School of Computer Science, Cambridge, MA, USA (Marie Curie IOF program). 2008 - 2011: Senior Researcher (part-time), Microsoft Research in Herzliya, Israel. 2007 - 2013: Member, Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University. 2005 - 2007: Post-Doctoral Fellow (Lady Davis fellowship), Hebrew University, School of Computer Science and Engineering. 2004: Ph.D. Intern, HP Labs, Palo Alto, California, USA. 1 Grants (Funding ID) • European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant: \Algorithmic Mechanism Design - Beyond Truthfulness": 1.4 million Euro, 2013-2017. • FP7 Marie Curie International Outgoing Fellowship (IOF): \Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory" (IAGT): 313,473 Euro, 2011-2014. • Israel Science Foundation (ISF) grant. \Equilibria Under Coalitional Covenants in Non-Cooperative Games - Existence, Quality and Computation:" 688,000 NIS (172,000 NIS /year), 2009-2013. -
How Easy Is Local Search?
JOURNAL OF COMPUTER AND SYSTEM SCIENCES 37, 79-100 (1988) How Easy Is Local Search? DAVID S. JOHNSON AT & T Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey 07974 CHRISTOS H. PAPADIMITRIOU Stanford University, Stanford, California and National Technical University of Athens, Athens, Greece AND MIHALIS YANNAKAKIS AT & T Bell Maboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey 07974 Received December 5, 1986; revised June 5, 1987 We investigate the complexity of finding locally optimal solutions to NP-hard com- binatorial optimization problems. Local optimality arises in the context of local search algorithms, which try to find improved solutions by considering perturbations of the current solution (“neighbors” of that solution). If no neighboring solution is better than the current solution, it is locally optimal. Finding locally optimal solutions is presumably easier than finding optimal solutions. Nevertheless, many popular local search algorithms are based on neighborhood structures for which locally optimal solutions are not known to be computable in polynomial time, either by using the local search algorithms themselves or by taking some indirect route. We define a natural class PLS consisting essentially of those local search problems for which local optimality can be verified in polynomial time, and show that there are complete problems for this class. In particular, finding a partition of a graph that is locally optimal with respect to the well-known Kernighan-Lin algorithm for graph partitioning is PLS-complete, and hence can be accomplished in polynomial time only if local optima can be found in polynomial time for all local search problems in PLS. 0 1988 Academic Press, Inc. 1. -
Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design By
Incentives, Computation, and Networks: Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design by Yaron Singer A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Christos Papadimitriou, Chair Professor Shachar Kariv Professor Scott Shenker Spring 2012 Incentives, Computation, and Networks: Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design Copyright 2012 by Yaron Singer 1 Abstract Incentives, Computation, and Networks: Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design by Yaron Singer Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Christos Papadimitriou, Chair In the past decade, a theory of manipulation-robust algorithms has been emerging to address the challenges that frequently occur in strategic environments such as the internet. The theory, known as algorithmic mechanism design, builds on the foundations of classical mechanism design from microeconomics and is based on the idea of incentive compatible pro- tocols. Such protocols achieve system-wide objectives through careful design that ensures it is in every agent's best interest to comply with the protocol. As it turns out, however, implementing incentive compatible protocols as advocated in classical mechanism design the- ory often necessitates solving intractable problems. To address this, algorithmic mechanism design focuses on designing -
Conformance Testing David Lee and Mihalis Yannakakis Bell
Conformance Testing David Lee and Mihalis Yannakakis Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies 600 Mountain Avenue, RM 2C-423 Murray Hill, NJ 07974 - 2 - System reliability can not be overemphasized in software engineering as large and complex systems are being built to fulfill complicated tasks. Consequently, testing is an indispensable part of system design and implementation; yet it has proved to be a formidable task for complex systems. Testing software contains very wide fields with an extensive literature. See the articles in this volume. We discuss testing of software systems that can be modeled by finite state machines or their extensions to ensure that the implementation conforms to the design. A finite state machine contains a finite number of states and produces outputs on state transitions after receiving inputs. Finite state machines are widely used to model software systems such as communication protocols. In a testing problem we have a specification machine, which is a design of a system, and an implementation machine, which is a ‘‘black box’’ for which we can only observe its I/O behavior. The task is to test whether the implementation conforms to the specification. This is called the conformance testing or fault detection problem. A test sequence that solves this problem is called a checking sequence. Testing finite state machines has been studied for a very long time starting with Moore’s seminal 1956 paper on ‘‘gedanken-experiments’’ (31), which introduced the basic framework for testing problems. Among other fundamental problems, Moore posed the conformance testing problem, proposed an approach, and asked for a better solution. -
Xi Chen: Curriculum Vitae
Xi Chen Associate Professor Phone: 1-212-939-7136 Department of Computer Science Email: [email protected] Columbia University Homepage: http://www.cs.columbia.edu/∼xichen New York, NY 10027 Date of Preparation: March 12, 2016 Research Interests Theoretical Computer Science, including Algorithmic Game Theory and Economics, Complexity Theory, Graph Isomorphism Testing, and Property Testing. Academic Training B.S. Physics / Mathematics, Tsinghua University, Sep 1999 { Jul 2003 Ph.D. Computer Science, Tsinghua University, Sep 2003 { Jul 2007 Advisor: Professor Bo Zhang, Tsinghua University Thesis Title: The Complexity of Two-Player Nash Equilibria Academic Positions Associate Professor (with tenure), Columbia University, Mar 2016 { Now Associate Professor (without tenure), Columbia University, Jul 2015 { Mar 2016 Assistant Professor, Columbia University, Jan 2011 { Jun 2015 Postdoctoral Researcher, Columbia University, Aug 2010 { Dec 2010 Postdoctoral Researcher, University of Southern California, Aug 2009 { Aug 2010 Postdoctoral Researcher, Princeton University, Aug 2008 { Aug 2009 Postdoctoral Researcher, Institute for Advanced Study, Sep 2007 { Aug 2008 Honors and Awards SIAM Outstanding Paper Award, 2016 EATCS Presburger Award, 2015 Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship, 2012 NSF CAREER Award, 2012 Best Paper Award The 4th International Frontiers of Algorithmics Workshop, 2010 Best Paper Award The 20th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation, 2009 Xi Chen 2 Silver Prize, New World Mathematics Award (Ph.D. Thesis) The 4th International Congress of Chinese Mathematicians, 2007 Best Paper Award The 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2006 Grants Current, Natural Science Foundation, Title: On the Complexity of Optimal Pricing and Mechanism Design, Period: Aug 2014 { Jul 2017, Amount: $449,985. -
Satisfiability and Evolution
2014 IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science Satisfiability and Evolution Adi Livnat Christos Papadimitriou Aviad Rubinstein Department of Biological Sciences Computer Science Division Computer Science Division Virginia Tech. University of California at Berkeley University of California at Berkeley [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Gregory Valiant Andrew Wan Computer Science Department Simons Institute Stanford University University of California at Berkeley [email protected] [email protected] Abstract—We show that, if truth assignments on n variables genes are able to efficiently arise in polynomial populations reproduce through recombination so that satisfaction of a par- with recombination. In the standard view of evolution, a ticular Boolean function confers a small evolutionary advan- variant of a particular gene is more likely to spread across tage, then a polynomially large population over polynomially many generations (polynomial in n and the inverse of the initial a population if it makes its own contribution to the overall satisfaction probability) will end up almost surely consisting fitness, independent of the contributions of variants of other exclusively of satisfying truth assignments. We argue that this genes. How can complex, multi-gene traits spread in a theorem sheds light on the problem of the evolution of complex population? This may seem to be especially problematic adaptations. for multi-gene traits whose contribution to fitness does not Keywords-evolution; algorithms; Boolean functions decompose into small additive components associated with each gene variant —traits with the property that even if I. INTRODUCTION one gene variant is different from the one that is needed The TCS community has a long history of applying its for the right combination, there is no benefit, or even a net perspectives and tools to better understand the processes negative benefit. -
A Decade of Lattice Cryptography
Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0400000074 A Decade of Lattice Cryptography Chris Peikert Computer Science and Engineering University of Michigan, United States Boston — Delft Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0400000074 Foundations and Trends R in Theoretical Computer Science Published, sold and distributed by: now Publishers Inc. PO Box 1024 Hanover, MA 02339 United States Tel. +1-781-985-4510 www.nowpublishers.com [email protected] Outside North America: now Publishers Inc. PO Box 179 2600 AD Delft The Netherlands Tel. +31-6-51115274 The preferred citation for this publication is C. Peikert. A Decade of Lattice Cryptography. Foundations and Trends R in Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 283–424, 2014. R This Foundations and Trends issue was typeset in LATEX using a class file designed by Neal Parikh. Printed on acid-free paper. ISBN: 978-1-68083-113-9 c 2016 C. Peikert All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publishers. Photocopying. In the USA: This journal is registered at the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923. Authorization to photocopy items for in- ternal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by now Publishers Inc for users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC). The ‘services’ for users can be found on the internet at: www.copyright.com For those organizations that have been granted a photocopy license, a separate system of payment has been arranged. -
6.5 X 11.5 Doublelines.P65
Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87282-9 - Algorithmic Game Theory Edited by Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani Copyright Information More information Algorithmic Game Theory Edited by Noam Nisan Hebrew University of Jerusalem Tim Roughgarden Stanford University Eva´ Tardos Cornell University Vijay V. Vazirani Georgia Institute of Technology © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87282-9 - Algorithmic Game Theory Edited by Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani Copyright Information More information cambridge university press Cambridge, New York,Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao˜ Paulo, Delhi Cambridge University Press 32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10013-2473, USA www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521872829 C Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva´ Tardos, Vijay V. Vazirani 2007 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2007 Printed in the United States of America A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Algorithmic game theory / edited by Noam Nisan ...[et al.]; foreword by Christos Papadimitriou. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN-13: 978-0-521-87282-9 (hardback) ISBN-10: 0-521-87282-0 (hardback) 1. Game theory. 2. Algorithms. I. Nisan, Noam. II. Title. QA269.A43 2007 519.3–dc22 2007014231 ISBN 978-0-521-87282-9 hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLS for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. -
Linked Decompositions of Networks and the Power of Choice in Polya Urns
Linked Decompositions of Networks and the Power of Choice in Polya Urns Henry Lin¤ Christos Amanatidisy Martha Sideriz Richard M. Karpx Christos H. Papadimitriou{ October 12, 2007 Abstract balls total, and each arriving ball is placed in the least loaded A linked decomposition of a graph with n nodes is a set of m bins, drawn independently at random with probability of subgraphs covering the n nodes such that all pairs of proportional to load. Our analysis shows that in our new subgraphs intersect; we seek linked decompositions such process, with high probability the bin loads become roughly p 2+² that all subgraphs have about n vertices, logarithmic balanced some time before O(n ) further balls have arrived diameter, and each vertex of the graph belongs to either and stay roughly balanced, regardless of how the initial O(n) one or two subgraphs. A linked decomposition enables balls were distributed, where ² > 0 can be arbitrarily small, many control and management functions to be implemented provided m is large enough. locally, such as resource sharing, maintenance of distributed directory structures, deadlock-free routing, failure recovery 1 Introduction and load balancing, without requiring any node to maintain Throwing balls into bins uniformly at random is well- information about the state of the network outside the known to produce relatively well-balanced occupancies subgraphs to which it belongs. Linked decompositions also with high probability. In contrast, when each new ball is enable e±cient routing schemes with small routing tables, added to a bin selected with probability proportional to which we describe in Section 5. -
Lipics-ICALP-2019-0.Pdf (0.4
46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming ICALP 2019, July 9–12, 2019, Patras, Greece Edited by Christel Baier Ioannis Chatzigiannakis Paola Flocchini Stefano Leonardi E A T C S L I P I c s – Vo l . 132 – ICALP 2019 w w w . d a g s t u h l . d e / l i p i c s Editors Christel Baier TU Dresden, Germany [email protected] Ioannis Chatzigiannakis Sapienza University of Rome, Italy [email protected] Paola Flocchini University of Ottawa, Canada paola.fl[email protected] Stefano Leonardi Sapienza University of Rome, Italy [email protected] ACM Classification 2012 Theory of computation ISBN 978-3-95977-109-2 Published online and open access by Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing, Saarbrücken/Wadern, Germany. Online available at https://www.dagstuhl.de/dagpub/978-3-95977-109-2. Publication date July, 2019 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at https://portal.dnb.de. License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC-BY 3.0): https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode. In brief, this license authorizes each and everybody to share (to copy, distribute and transmit) the work under the following conditions, without impairing or restricting the authors’ moral rights: Attribution: The work must be attributed to its authors. The copyright is retained by the corresponding authors. Digital Object Identifier: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2019.0 ISBN 978-3-95977-109-2 ISSN 1868-8969 https://www.dagstuhl.de/lipics 0:iii LIPIcs – Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics LIPIcs is a series of high-quality conference proceedings across all fields in informatics. -
Sharing Non-Anonymous Costs of Multiple Resources Optimally
Sharing Non-Anonymous Costs of Multiple Resources Optimally Max Klimm∗ Daniel Schmand† July 18, 2018 Abstract In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equi- libria fundamentally depends on the method that is used to share the resources’ costs. We consider a general class of resource allocation prob- lems in which a set of resources is used by a heterogeneous set of selfish users. The cost of a resource is a (non-decreasing) function of the set of its users. Under the assumption that the costs of the resources are shared by uniform cost sharing protocols, i.e., protocols that use only lo- cal information of the resource’s cost structure and its users to determine the cost shares, we exactly quantify the inefficiency of the resulting pure Nash equilibria. Specifically, we show tight bounds on prices of stabil- ity and anarchy for games with only submodular and only supermodular cost functions, respectively, and an asymptotically tight bound for games with arbitrary set-functions. While all our upper bounds are attained for the well-known Shapley cost sharing protocol, our lower bounds hold for arbitrary uniform cost sharing protocols and are even valid for games with anonymous costs, i.e., games in which the cost of each resource only depends on the cardinality of the set of its users. 1 Introduction Resource allocation problems are omnipresent in many areas of economics, com- puter science, and operations research with many applications, e.g., in routing, network design, and scheduling. Roughly speaking, when solving these prob- arXiv:1412.4456v2 [cs.GT] 4 Feb 2015 lems the central question is how to allocate a given set of resources to a set of potential users so as to optimize a given social welfare function. -
Pairwise Independence and Derandomization
Pairwise Independence and Derandomization Pairwise Independence and Derandomization Michael Luby Digital Fountain Fremont, CA, USA Avi Wigderson Institute for Advanced Study Princeton, NJ, USA [email protected] Boston – Delft Foundations and TrendsR in Theoretical Computer Science Published, sold and distributed by: now Publishers Inc. PO Box 1024 Hanover, MA 02339 USA Tel. +1-781-985-4510 www.nowpublishers.com [email protected] Outside North America: now Publishers Inc. PO Box 179 2600 AD Delft The Netherlands Tel. +31-6-51115274 A Cataloging-in-Publication record is available from the Library of Congress The preferred citation for this publication is M. Luby and A. Wigderson, Pairwise R Independence and Derandomization, Foundation and Trends in Theoretical Com- puter Science, vol 1, no 4, pp 237–301, 2005 Printed on acid-free paper ISBN: 1-933019-22-0 c 2006 M. Luby and A. Wigderson All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publishers. Photocopying. In the USA: This journal is registered at the Copyright Clearance Cen- ter, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by now Publishers Inc for users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC). The ‘services’ for users can be found on the internet at: www.copyright.com For those organizations that have been granted a photocopy license, a separate system of payment has been arranged.