Computational Complexity of the Hylland-Zeckhauser Scheme for One-Sided Matching Markets Vijay V. Vazirani Department of Computer Science, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA
[email protected] Mihalis Yannakakis Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
[email protected] Abstract In 1979, Hylland and Zeckhauser [23] gave a simple and general scheme for implementing a one-sided matching market using the power of a pricing mechanism. Their method has nice properties – it is incentive compatible in the large and produces an allocation that is Pareto optimal – and hence it provides an attractive, off-the-shelf method for running an application involving such a market. With matching markets becoming ever more prevalent and impactful, it is imperative to finally settle the computational complexity of this scheme. We present the following partial resolution: 1. A combinatorial, strongly polynomial time algorithm for the dichotomous case, i.e., 0/1 utilities, and more generally, when each agent’s utilities come from a bi-valued set. 2. An example that has only irrational equilibria, hence proving that this problem is not in PPAD. 3. A proof of membership of the problem in the class FIXP. 4. A proof of membership of the problem of computing an approximate HZ equilibrium in the class PPAD. We leave open the (difficult) questions of determining if computing an exact HZ equilibrium is FIXP-hard and an approximate HZ equilibrium is PPAD-hard. 2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory Keywords and phrases Hyland-Zeckhauser scheme, one-sided matching markets, mechanism design, dichotomous utilities, PPAD, FIXP Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.59 Related Version Full version: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.01348 Funding Vijay V.