War of Movement/War of Position

chapter 6 War of Movement/War of Position

The understanding of the exact relationship between force and consensus is what strengthens the theory of the state in Gramsci. It allows us to think about the unity existing between civil and political society, the resistance of the state to the crises of capitalism, the forms of the crisis and the overcoming of these crucial moments. For Gramsci, the analysis of politics serves to justify a prac- tical activity, indicating those points where the force of will must concentrate its energies, maximising its results. His theory of the state was, therefore, not only a theory to explain its longevity, but also a theory to explain its crisis and the conditions for overcoming the present state form. It was from this per- spective that Gramsci engaged with a set of far-reaching conceptual pairs of great strategic reach: war of manoeuvre/war of position; East/West; perman- ent revolution/hegemony. The analogy between political struggle and military strategy began to be developed in Notebook 1 as part of a discussion on political and military leadership in the Italian Risorgimento. In §§117 and 118 the author discussed the importance of political leadership, and even its predominance, in the organisation of armies. Gramsci pointed out that the larger the army, the greater the importance of subordinating the military-technical leadership to political leadership.1 The deficiency in the leadership function implied a technical-military deficiency.2 It is clear that already in this first moment, Gramsci conceived the technical- military and political functions in a unitary way, a concept that is fundamental for his elaboration with respect to the relations of political-military forces. These relationships were dealt with in a more extensive manner in two other B texts present in the same Notebook, written probably between February and March 1930, a period of intense intellectual production on the part of the author.3 In these texts, Gramsci discussed, among other subjects, the use of detachments similar to the arditi, assault troops deployed by the Italian army during the First World War.4

1 PN1, Q1, §117, pp. 206–7. 2 PN1, Q1, §118, p. 208. 3 See Francioni 1984, p. 140. 4 After the end of World War I, veteran movements adopted the title of arditi and a part of them maintained relations with fascism. Obviously inspired by previous movements, in the

In the first of these notes, §133, the Sardinian Marxist disputed the tendency to generalise the tactic of ‘arditism’.He argued that this tactic corresponded not to an ideal form, but rather to a situation in which a) there was an inefficient regular army and b) the masses were in a state of passivity or demoralisation, and for this reason were replaced by special detachments.The general criterion for treating this phenomenon was ‘that comparisons between military art and politics should always be made with a grain of salt, that is, only as stimuli for thought and as terms simplified ad absurdum …’.5 In political struggle the element of discipline and hierarchy is not sus- tained by penal sanctions, but rather by conviction. Military detachments and political groups are, therefore, very different forms of organisation and cor- respond to distinct modes of action. Gramsci’s view was clear with respect to this: political struggle is more complex than war. In ‘political struggle, there exist other forms of warfare besides the war of movement and the war by siege or war of position’.6 Different tactics might be appropriate for some classes but not for others; this was the fundamental question for the author of the Notebooks.7 The critique was implacable: ‘in political struggle one should not ape the methods of struggle of the ruling classes, and avoid falling into easy ambushes’.8 But the criticism was directed at arditism and its generalisa- tion rather than the ‘war of movement’, which was not identified with these forms:

The tactics of the arditi, therefore, cannot be as important for certain classes as they are for others; for certain classes the war of movement and maneuver is necessary because it is appropriate for them, and in the case of political struggle the war of movement can be combined with a useful and perhaps indispensable employment of arditi tactics. But to fix one’s mind on the military model is foolish: here too, politics must rank

spring of 1921 the Arditi del popolo emerged, an armed movement constituted with the aim of organising the defence against the fascist bands. Although many communists had read- ily adhered to the Arditi, the leadership of the PCI, then directed by the Bordigist fraction, denounced the movement for being monopolised by forces that were not ‘strictly revolution- ary’ and announced in July of the same year the creation of detachments exclusively formed by communists. Gramsci’s position in this respect, more pondered, can be seen in the articles ‘Contro il terrore’ and ‘Gli Arditi del Popolo’ published in L’Ordine Nuovo. SF, pp. 287–9 and 541–2. See also Hajek 1984, pp. 43–4. 5 PN1, Q1, §133, p. 217. 6 Ibid. Emphasis added. 7 PN1, Q1, §133, p. 218. 8 PN1, Q1, §133, p. 217.