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HANDBOOK of DEVELOPMENTAL

Edited by Jaan Valsiner and Kevin J. Connolly

SAGE Publications London’ Thousand Oaks’s New Delhi 21 :

Dynamics in the Developmental Web

KURT FISCHER, ZHENG YAN and JEFFREY STEWART

Adulthood normally spans more than 60 years, LADDERS AND WEBS: META-METAPHORS starting from aboutage 20, andthecognitive changes OF ADULT COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT during those years are vast. Accumulated evidence indicates that cognitive development in adulthood is rich, , and dynamic, perhaps even more so The of shows that differeirt mets- than in infancy and childhood, with many factors metaphors functioning as central mental models have acting together in various contexts to produce had tremendous impact on scientific thinking (for systematic, dynamic variation. For instance, it can bc example, viewing the earth as the center of the observed that frequently show regression universe, seeing the spiral as the structure of DNA, performances and move down to lower levels of consideringthe personas adigital computer). Like- cognitive skill and then construct higher levels, wise, different meta-metaphors drive fundamental instead of always following a simple forward viewsof adult cognitive development. We categorize progression. This kind of backward transition two major types of meta-metaphors for adult phenomenon in adult cognitive processes shows an development — ladders and webs which engender interesting and important cognitive advancement, different portraits of adult cognitive development. one that may seem frustrating and counter-intuitive Developmental ladders characterize development to manyintelligent adults. as a simple fixed progression, following monotonie Backward transition is just the tip ofthe large ice- change, with one step following another in a single bergofcomplex cognitive development in adulthood. direction. As shown in Figure 21.1, the develop- In this chapter, we reframe adult cognitive develop- mental ladder-like trajectory has at least three ment dynamically. resynthesizing research findings features: (1) development simply follows a single to revealthe complex dynamics behind the variability straight line; (2) each step is fixed, following the in adult cognitive development, and reexamine the previous step alongthe line; and(3) forward progres- limitations oftraditional cognitive analyses (Fischer, sion along the line is the sole fonn of development. 1980b; Fischer & Bidell, 199$; Valsiner, 1991; van Piagefs (1983) cognitive developmental model, Geert, 1994). A constructed web (like that built in as it is us~sallyunderstood, is one of the most nature by a spider) serves as the meta-metaphor for common ladder-like models of cognitive development, and from the weh we elaborate three development (although Piaget himself had a more Important typesofdynamic pattemsin adult cognitive dynamic view, as in Piaget, 1975). According to this development: dynamic ranges, dynamic strands and model, thinking progresses througha series ofstages networks, and dynamic constructions. With these and then stops at the level of formal operations Concepts, we begin to capture the richness and coin- during . Many scholars have built upon Plexity of adult cognitive development and to offer a this Piagetian framework by extending the model new story abotit what, how, and why adult cognitive vertically or horizontally in adulthood, adding development takes place over time. more stages or more unevenness across domains 492 DEVELOPMENT IN ADULTHOOL)

development, like cognitive development, ash FINISH static progressive process unfolding along aseries ~ fixed ladder steps, either through stages or through~ linear ability scales. In short, this meta-metaphordoh~ simplify complex developmental phenomena and sketch general developmental trends, but at th~ expense of neglecting, downplaying, and even mis- representing the variability and richness of adult cognitive development. In contrast, developmental webs portray adult cognitive development as a complex process of dynamic construction within multiple ranges in Single multiple directions. As illustrated in Figure 21.2, the Trendline of developmental web has at least three important Development features: (I) development occurs in acomplex multi- in One Fixed Steps level range; (2) developmental pathways undergo Direction dynamictransformation throughmultiple strands or network links; and (3) multidireetional construction is the form of development. Dynamic skill theory (Fischer & Bidell, 1998) analyzes development as involving a constructed web that captures much of the rich variability in human behavior. Central to the variability, it tums out, is the fact that activities take place in specific START contexts. People do not act in a void. Growing adaptively in a dynamic world with various social, emotional, technological, and physical challenges Figure 21.1 A developmental ladder means that behavior must fit the immediacy of the situation. For adescription ofdevelopment that aims at both rigor and honesty, these contexts cannot be (Alexander et a!., 1990; Baltes, 1987; Basseches, ignored. A web captures the interconnected com- 1984; Berg, 2000; Commons et al., 1998; Dawson, plexity of skills in diverse contexts, as shown in 1999; Erikson, 1968; Gardner, 1983; Gruber, 1981; Figure 21.2. Each web contains distinct strands for Kegan. 1982; King & Kitehener, 1994; Kohlberg, differentcontexts andactivities, sometimes converg- 1969; 1984; Loevinger, 1976; Sinnott, 1998). These ing through coordination, sometimes diverging models either have substantially expanded Piaget’s through separation or differentiation, always built model along the vertical dimension by adding higher through specific sensorimotor and mental activities. cognitive stages such as post-formal operations and Emotional states also shape strands, such as the advanced reflective thinking, or have extended separation of positive and negative activities (good Piagets model along the horizontal dimension by and bad, nice and mean, approach and avoidance). including more eognitivç domains such as moral The web metaphor stresses that many components reasoning and self-understanding. contribute to ally activity, producing diverse shapes Other models that are grounded primarily in of development. A person acts interactively, engaged psychometric research, such as standardized ability with his or her many environments, and the action testing, often haveacknowledgedphenomena similar process is dynamic and nonlinear because the to Piagetian stages, but have emphasized certain outcome of an action involves more than adding upward anddownward general developmental trends together the behavior of the individual and the associatedwith age on standardized tests of abilities environmental components that contribute to it. (Baltes, 1987; Birren, 1964; 1970; Craik, 1977; Craik Specifically, each person constructs a unique web, & Salthouse, 199!; Horn, 1982; Horn & Cartell, while at the same time ordering principles help 1967; Salthouse, 1984; 1992; Sternherg, 1985). generalization across individual webs. Some abilities, such as crystallized , The web also incorporates skill variation within increase well into , while others, such as fluid each strand. Eachstrand is structured by a composite intelligence, begin to decrease by early or middle of available levels — the developmental range — with adulthood. reference to the experiences and contextual supports These various developmental models have sub- that contribute to its construction, For any single stantially added to knowledge of cognitive develop- domain of action(single strand), a person’s compe- mental changes and variations in adults, but all tence is not fixed at a particular point on the strand of them, to differing degrees, share an underlying but can vary along a portion of the strand. Practice ladder-like meta-metaphor. They treatadult cognitive and familiarity with a domain, contextual support for ADULT COGNITJyE DEVETClEMENT:DYNAMICS IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL WEB 493

multiple strands

0 a, > ‘I, a, -na a E

0) a -c0

a,C E a 0 a, a,> ~0

Figure 21.2 A developmental web

complex activity, andjoint participation with others Rethinking adult cognitive development requires all affect the level of a person’s activities along a establishing newmeta-metaphors to replace old meta- strand. Each single strand shows the developmental metaphors. Developmental webs can capture more range in skill and knowledge of the individual for of the richness and complexity of adult cognitive that particular task and domain given varying development than ladders. As a powerful meta- amounts ofexperience and contextual support. Later metaphor, the web can facilitate better understanding in the chapter we will elaborate how this variability of what, how, and why adults’ changes in can be integrated into the web metaphor. complex situations overtheextremelylong period of Conceptually, the developmentalweb differs from life after childhood. a developmental ladder in at least six important ways:

I The web places variation in activity at center DYNAMICRANGES IN TFIE WEB stage, whereas the ladder downplays variation, relegating itto marginality as error or individual differences, Research shows that the complexity levels of adult 2 The web is based on individual cognitive cognition continueto change in two important ways. performance, whereas the ladder is primarily First, for the same cognitive task, an adult often based on average group performance. shows multiple levels of cognition under different 3 The web includes multiple cognitive levels in circumstances. Because of the wide range of levels each person, whereas the ladder assumes a of which adults are capable, cognitive performance single level at a time. in adults varies much more widely than in children, 4 The web distinguishes multiple tasks and Adults can think more flexibly, dynamically, and domains, whereas theladder treats diversetasks contextually than children, while like children and domains in terms of a single line, they also continue to make errors, even ridiculous S The web has inherently complex interconnec- mistakes, and to act in simple, primitive ways. tions within it, whereas the ladder does not Second, the upper limit of cognitive functioning include networking among elements, continues to increase beyond what Piaget called 6 The web shows multiple directions of con- formal operations (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Piaget, struction, such as forward consolidation and 1975; 1983). Thus, adults can solve much more backwardtransition, whereas theladder assumes abstract and complicated cognitive tasks than a single direction offorward progression. children, even while they also can use low-level 494 DEVELOPMENT IN ADULTIJOOD

skills similar to those of children. The lengths of contextual support. Developmental researchdifferen- sotne strands in the web continue to expand into tiates two major typesof upper limit on skill perfor- development, representing a continuing increase in mance, varying with contextual support: optimal level adults’ optimal cognitive skills and a wide range of and functional level, Thereis no single level of com- variation in the level of skills that adults can usein a petence in anydomain. instead, in the absence oftask domain, intervention or scaffolding by others, individuals show great variation in skill levels in their everyday functioning (Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Fischer, Hand, Multiple Levels of Adult Cognitive & Russell, 1984; vanGeert, 2002). Optimal levels are attained primarily in those infrequent circumstances Development when environmental conditions provide strong support for complex performance- Such conditions, Along with the increase in overall complexity of including clearly defined tasks, familiar materials, adults’ cognitive development, both developmental practice, and memory priming of the gist of the research and everyday indicate that activity, are not present in most situations- For this adults show multiple levelsof cognitive development, reason, every personshows a persistent gap between not performance at one fixed level, Even very wise the functional level under typical (low-support) adults use simple skills when the situation requires conditions and the optimal level afforded by high simple action, and from time to time they may make support. unwise decisions when dealing with complex tasks Functional levels tend to be characterized by without sufficient contextual support to them. The slow, gradual, and continuous growth over time, dynamics ofadults’ multilevel performance varywith whereas optimal levels exhibit stage-like spurts contextual support, prior experience, andjoint action and plateaus within an upward trend, like those in with other people. Figure 21,3. These two trend lines diverge, becoming more disparate with age, because they depend on Optimal and Functional Levels different sets of growth processes. The functional level results from the steadyconstruction ofa skill in A central concept in traditional developmental a particular domain over time, whereas the optimal researchis that of ‘upper limit’: peoplehave an upper level S-the upper limit on functioning — is achieved limit on a given skill beyond which they cannot through strong contextual support for a skill com- go. This concept requires major revision, because bined with organic grow-lb processes that reorganize even an adult’s upper limit vanes dynamically with behavior and brain activity in recurring growth

Principles: AM - level Ab4

Abstract systems: Aba - level AbS

~j5Ab2 - Abstract mappings: > 0) level Ab2

Sm Abi single abstractions: -- -- - level Abi - -

Epa

Rp2 - F F 8 12 16 20 24 28 Age in years

Figure 21.3 Depeloj,ment otoptanal and frenctional levels in o domain ADULT COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT DYN1MIGS [N TIlE DEVELOPMENTAL WEB 495

cycles. Furthermore, the gap between functional and produced only aslight increase overthe six years and optimal levels gro\vs with age. Research has found a did not achieve even the level of single abstractions. far larger increase with age in the optimal level for The same students in the high-support condition a given skill than in its functional level, and conse- started at a higher level, single abstractions, and quently the gap increases from moved up to the level ofabstract systems. In addition, through adulthood (Bullock & Ziegler, 1994; Fischer, their trajectory showed spurts for the emergence of Kenny, & Pipp, 1990; Kitehener et al., 1993: Watson abstractmappings and abstract systems, similar to & Fischer, 1980). those shown in Figure 213. Muchmore sophisticated An example of optimal and functional levels in cognitive skills \vere called forth with support, while abstractions is the development ofconcepts ofselfin an absence of support ledto low-level skills, relationships. In a study of how Korean adolescents Note that optimal level produces aseries of spurts (grades 8 through 13. or adolescent through young in growth followed by plateaus or small drops — a adult) saw themselves in relationship with others, dynamic pattern of change that is common in devel- students participated in the Self-in-Relationships opment (Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Fischer, Kenny, , which included both an open-ended inter- & Pipp, 1990); Thatcher, 1994; van der Maas & view about their relationships (low support) and a Molenaar, 1992). The fact that the functional level high-support assessment(Fischer & Kennedy, 1997; shows no such systematic variability underscores Kennedy, 1994). Support was provided through the potential for missing the telling dynamics of their creation of a detailed diagram of the charac- development by examining performance in only one teristicsof specificrelationships. In thehigh-support condition and assuming that it represents the basic assessment, students (a) created descriptions oftheir nature of cognitive development. Growth patterns characteristics with particular people; (b) placed the differ under different conditions, even for the ‘same’ descriptions in one of three concentric circles from skill in the same person, and the dynamics of most to least important; and (c) grouped similar this variability are fundamental in adult cognitive descriptions, drewconnecting lines to indicate rela- development. tions, andadded aplus or minus to indicate emotional How do the spurts in optimal level relate to the valence (good, bad, or ambivalent). Then the inter- web of development? Various strands/domains in a viewer asked them a series of questions to elicit web show a cluster of spurts within a concurrent explanations of their diagram at different develop- zone, as illustrated in Figure 21.4, Put another mental levels. In the low-support assessment students way, in the developmental web, the optimal level

Domains Mathematics Self in Reflective judgment relationships

Clusters of diseontinuities in emergence Zones

Figure 2 1 .4 Clusters ol discontinuitiesfor two optimal levels across strands and domains 496 DEVELOPMENTIN ADULTIIOOD emerges when clusters of diseontinuities appear across many strands in the same time period. This skill phenomenon has a neurophysiologieal correlate, — Automaiized in that cortical substrates for the increase in ability — runctiona] Optima] show developmental changes that mirror the ‘F’ - scaffo]decj behavioral ones (Fischer & Rose, 1994; Thatcher, 1994). That is, patterns of cortical activity show F’ — F F spurts that are approximately concurrent with the F F F F F F spurts in optimal skill level. F F F F

Automatization and Co-Participation Optimal and functional levels are only two of the many skill levels that adults routinely use. For Figure 21.5 Developmental range in a web example, when people act automatically (without thinking or consciously choosing), they typically act at a low level, as when someone steps on the brake longer, he or she has a wider range of skills to use automatically when a child runs in front of the car. across portions ofthe strand. Figure 21.5 shows how Researchers have not directly assessed the the four levels that we have described are evident in developmental level of such automatic actions, hut the web. Automatized skills, marked by thick solid they exist in every domain, and usually they are lines, mostly occur early in each strand. Functional relatively simple and primitive. skills, perfonned thoughtfully but without support, On the other hand, people frequentlyact together are markedby thin solid lines. Optimal skills, which with other people, cooperating to accomplish a tusk usually depend on contextual support, occupy later portions of the strand and are marked by dashed together -. telling a story, putting together a jigsaw puzzle, playing poker, or building a house. lines. Seaffolded skills, in which people jointly One person scaffolds the actions of another, some- perfonn a complex activity, are most complex and times in expert and novice roles as with teacher are marked by dotted lines. and student (Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976) and sometimes as more equal collaborators (Granott, I 993b; Valsiner, 1996). In actuality, many situations Levels of Optimal Cognitive Development that often treat as individual are naturally social. Many children prefer to video must be understood in termsof games with their friends, either directly sharing them the whole scope of development from infancy, both or talking about them on the phone. Many scholars because later skills are built on earlier ones and write papers with the help of other people, even because adults routinely use skill levels that first when only one author is listed. In co-participation in emerge in infancy and childhood (especially when general, peopleen-construct complex skills that often they move down in a strand of the web to use go beyond their individual capacity, as Vygotsky automatized skills, or make backward transitions to (1978) emphasized with his concept of the zone of build new skills). Dynamicskill theory describes the proximal development, and Wood, Bmn’er, and Ross context-based constructiveprocess ofbuilding from (1976) elaborated with the concept of scaffolding. reflexes to actions, from actions to representations, Indeed, the importance of such social construction and from representations to abstractions (Fischer, has beenrecognized for the entire history ofmodern 1980b; Fischer & Bidell, 1998). Cognitive activity psychology and , but it continues undergoes massive restructuringduring the years of to be neglected in most research andtheory (Valsiner infancy and childhood, gradually building toward & van der Veer, 1988), which is especially puzzling concrete skills and conceptual categories. In adoles- in elaborations of explicit theories of social con- cence and early adulthood, people restructure their struction such as Erikson’s (1963). Co-constructive activities again, moving from representations to processes are at least as important in adults as they abstractions, Much ofthe rest ofadulthood involves are in children, consolidation, elaboration, integration, synthesis, and in addition, peoplemove up anddown in the level extension of these abstract skills, of their performance, adapting to the situation, goal, The skill hierarchy not only describes cognitive task, emotional state, andtheir co-participants. Real- development, hut provides a mler for assessing and time analysis of ongoing activity shows how level studying dynamic variations in adult activities, This varies dynamically with these factors, even more in ruler allows comparison of levels across conditions adults than in children (Bullock & Ziegler, 1994; and tasks, such as optimal, functional, and scaffolded Fischer & Granolt, 1995; Granott, l993a: 2002; levels (Figures 21.2 and21.3), and it makes possible Kuhn et al., 1995; Roberts, 198l; Siegler, 2002; analysis of the dynamics of real-time and Vaillant. 1977). Asa strand in aperson’s web grows problem-solving, as in backwards transitions and ADULI’ COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: DTNAMICE IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL WEB 497

for\vard consolidation, Dynamic analysis of skill (the final level). Each level arises from the gradual requires such a scale to assess variability and to combination of two or more skills from the prior model it, Cognitive development research has been level in aprocess ofcoordination and differentiation, hampered by the absence of such scales for coding Taken together, the four tiers producea scale of 13 activity across tasks, domains, and trials, except in levels that increase in complexity and integration — the arena of motor activity; where Cartesian coor- a 13-point interval scale for assessing the dynamics dinates provide ready-made scales for dynamic of development and variation. Reorganizations of analysis (Rose & Fischer, 1998; Thelen & Smith, neural networks seem to help catalyze development 1994; van Geert, 1994). of a wide range of skills at each new level (Fischer & Rose, 1994; 1996). Hierarchy ofAdult Skill Levels ‘I’he levels that characterize the final tier move through single abstractions, abstract mappings, From birth to 30 years ofage, an individual develops abstract systems, and abstract systems of systems, skills through four sequential tiers in a nested or principles. We will describe this development of hierarchy. Early reflexes become coordinated into increased complexity of abstract thinking from actions, actions are coordinated into representations, middle childhood throughadulthood, as shown in the andrepresentations into abstractions. Each of these left-hand part of Table 21.1, and we will explicate qualitatively different behavioral repertoires cycles the levels throughdiscussions ofrefteetivejudgment, througha similar pattern ofeoordinations — the four moraljudgment, identity development, and Darwin’s levels of each tier. Movement is from an initial single construction of the theory of . expression of an ability (the first level ofa giventier), The optimal level of representational systems to a mapping of two elements (the second level of (Rp3) usually emerges around the age of 6 years in a tier), to a sjsFstem that relates multiple elements middle-class children with high contextual support, (the third level), and finally to a system of systems and is elaborated andconsolidated over the next 3

Table 21.1 Levels of’development ofrepresentational and abstract skills Tier Level Representations Abstractions AgeF Rpl [Q] IS —24 months single representations Rp2 [Q— R] 3,5 —4.5 years representational mappings Rp3: [Q~e—~R~] 6—7 years representational systems Rp4/AbI: systems [Q~/’c—sR~’1 of representational 10—12 years I I = [Yl systems, which are L~2”~T~j single abstractions Ab2: abstract mappings [Y—Z] 14—16 years Ab3: abstract systems [Yg<—*Z 19—20 years Ab4: systems of abstract [Yg~—~Z%~ systems, which are I I 24—25 years principles [A~—*D~j - Note: Italic letters designate representational sets, and outline leuers abstract sets, Subscripts and superscripts designate differentiated subsets, Long straight lines and arrows designate arelation between sets or systems. Brackets mark a single skill, Note also that structures from lower tiers continue at higher levels (representations in abstract skills, etc.), but the fonnulas are omitted because they become so complex. Ages are modal for the emergence of optimal levels based on research with middle-class American and European children, They may differ across cultures or social groups. 498 DEVELOPMENT IN ADUL THOOD

or 4 years. (The earlier representational levels are When asked how the two differ, she nsuddies them shown for completeness and because they appear in together, not clearly articulating a difference: ‘They’re adult problem-solving, discussed below.) This level the same thing. Both of thesn involve being free,’ is the core of much adult functioning, because for Imagine how complex and confusing it is when a third many activities people need only concrete actions concept such as liberty is added to the pot! The same and representations, not sophisticated abstract kinds of confusion create difficulties in coordinating thinking. With a skill at this level, a person can one’s own identity with another person’s, often coordinate two or three different aspects of several leading to a kind of merging or globbing ofidentities representations. For instance, a child Kara and her with a close ftiend or partner (Erikson. 1968). Adults mother Jane can play teacher and student, where the as well as adolescents show this globbing together of child/teacher interacts simultaneously and recip- distinct abstractions, and it takes many different forms rocally with the mother/student: (Fischer, Iland, & Russell, 1984). At least adults are capable of building higher-level skills to compare and Play differentiate related abstractions. [STUDENT TEACHER The optimal level of abstract mappings (Ab2) IJANE )KARA (I) appears when adolescents are first able to coordinate LMOTHER CHILD I two or more abstractions, beginning at about age 15. Much sophisticated adult activity involves this level Children especially enjoy reversing conventional of simple relations of abstractions (Colby et al. roles to assume more powerful and independent adult 1983; Commons et al,, 1998; Cook-Greuter, 1999; roles in play; and adults frequently cooperate in this Dawson, 1999; King & Kitchener, 1994). Being able pretense. The mother and the child both act with a to use one abstraction in comparison with another is similar representational system, as shown in formula a great help in making thinking more precise. Inde- 1, but the snother’s skill may include an additional pendence and individualism are related but distinct, component for scaffolding her child’s skill, The with independence involving the freedom to do category relations usually remain fully concrete, things on one’s own, and individualism involving a even when the story becomes complex. commitment to freely choosing who one wants to be: The optimal level ofsingle abstractions (Rp4/Ab I) emerges at about age 10, when youngsters begin 1 to understand abstract concepts commonly used [INDEPENDENT flHFFIV1DtJALIgTj by adults, At this first level of abstract thinking, the ability to relate different explicit instances of In tandem with the increase in cognitive clarity at this representations to an intangible concept becomes level is a jump in social facility because of the comthonplace. For a I 2-year-old , traveling with capacity to coordinate and differentiate one’s own friends to a parade, buying her own lunch, and abstractions with someoneelse’s. In identity, a person choosing her own new clothes can all he related in can coordinate an abstraction about themselves with the concept of independence. The representational one about a close friend or partner, allowing for a systems for the parade, the lunch, and the clothes, new kind of intimate relationship, such as how which each have a structure similar to that in formula my independence is similar to and different from my 1, are richly coordinated in a new skill, which is friend’s, especially in our close relationship: an achievement of representational complexity (Rp4). A diagram for the coordination of two [SELF .~~FT:JENID systems to form an abstraction is shown in Table [INDEPENDENT INDFEPENDFENT 21.1. The coordination ofparade, lunch, and clothes systems gives them the power to broadly unify (Erikson, 1968; Fischer & .&youb, 1996; Kegan, the three contents into a ssngle abstract concept, 1982; Loevinger~1976; Noam et al,, 1990). independent: At around the age of 19 or 20, the optimal level of abstract systems (Ab3) emerges, as individuals 2) coordinate multiple abstractions and begin to under- [INDEPENDENT stand the subtleties and nuances in abstract relations in many domains, including understanding of self At this initial level, abstractions are somewhat fuzzy and others. For instance, the can because they are single: without comparison, compare and relate the subtleties ofabstractions like abstractions camsot be easily differentiated from each conformity and independence. At the prior level, other, The 12-year-old may use the same three relating different forms of conformity and indepen- examples for both independence (formula 2) and dence in different situations is difficult, but with individualist: ahslraet systems it is easier to see: for example, that both at school and with friends I show mixtures of SELF both conformity and independence. Similarly with identity coordination, a mother and father can ADULT COGNITIVEDEVELOPMENT: D)N4MICS TV THE DEVELOPMENTAL WEB 499

uslderstandhow their two identities differ with their of principles for newly emerging optimal levels, son and daughter, and a person can more readily Perhaps adults have enough to do simply general- coordinate his or her own conformity and indepen- izing and consolidating the abstractions required of dencewith a ft’iends or partner’s: them. Hosvever, some interesting work by Francine Benes (1984)on mnyelination ofneurons in thebrain [:T~~~:rFFNir PLMING rDNFFnFLJ.AFfiF4n suggests a possible major reorganization at mid-life, IEELF ( >F]F/ifEND (6) Myelin is the insulation around neural axons that [tND’EPENDINT INDEPENDENT greatly improves the speed and efficiency ofneural transmission, After years of only slow change in The optimal level of abstract systems of systems myelin, adults in their 40s and SOs show myelin (Ab4), or principles, is the final developmental level growth spurts for neurons connecting the prefrontal predicted by skill theory. Emerging under high- cortex to the limbic system. One speculation is that support conditions around the mid-20s, this highest this change createsmore refined control ofemotional cognitive level allows a personto coordinate several impulses, perhaps in relation with the mastery of the abstract systems together, as diagrammed in Table highest levels of abstraction that many adults achieve 21. I. 1-low does my own personal identity relate to by these ages. With the capacity to sustain complex moral dilemmas that I have faced, or career choices abstract andprincipled thinking without contextual I have made, or differentintimate relationships! have support (at least in areas ofexpertise) comesa greater had (Erikson, 1963; 1968)? By coordinating two or opportunity to bring wisdom to bear on emotional snore abstract systems, a person can construct and equilibrium and self-control. Perhaps this change is use a general principle that goes across systems, such relevant to Erikson’s (1963) suggestion that wisdom as the Golden Rule in and Reflective is the central issue in his final stage of identity Judgment in knowledge dilesumas. We will describe development. in some detail how Darwin built his level Ab4 principle of evolution by : Development of Reflective Judgment and Moral Judgment [EvaLUTJFDI~, - (7) SELECTION The foundations of knowledge are a fundamental issue in and philosophy, and John Once constructed, such a principle can be extended Dewey (1910) described a model for the develop- to many different abstract systems, as we will ment of understanding the bases of knowledge. illustrate later. People do not remain at this level for The goal of is what he called reflective long periods, but only use it as needed, svith environ- /udgment, the ‘active, persistent, andcareful consid- mental and social supports required to sustain it in eration ofanybeliefor supposed form ofknowledge the day-to-day activities of living. in the light of the grounds that support it, and the These skill levels provide a complexity scale with further conclusions to which it tends’ (1910, p. 6). which to assess the variabilityin people’s activities Key elements include the useofevidenceand reason- andto look for patterns of stability and order. People ing, the frameworks for knowledge and belief, and do not act stably at one skill level, as in the ladder justifications for conclusions. Developing reflective metaphorfor development. Instead they range widely thinking is oneof the important tasks and intellectual overmanylevels, sometimes changing almost instan- challenges in adult cognitive growth. taneously in adapting to different challenges. The The foundations ofmoral reasoning areeven more rangeextends from low levels ofaction andrepresen- important than reflectivejudgment in human society, tation (far belowthose shown in Table 21.1) to the especially for socially responsible adults. Moral highest level of abstraction (Brown & Reeve, 1987; evaluation and judgment are one of the intellectual Bullock & Ziegler, 1994; Fischer & Bidell, 1998; challenges that adults facein a world with multiple, Fiseher&Granott. 1995; Granott, 1993a; 1998; Kuhn often conflicting moralstandards anddecisions. Good et al., 1995; van Geert, 2002). Much of what we moral reasoning not only requires abstract thinking, describe in this chapter is the rules for order in this but also complexvaluejudgments and . The pervasive variationin adult cognitive development. influential work ofLawrence Kohlberg (1969; 1984) on moralreasoning reveals how people movein their Development beyond Abstractions? thinking from an authoritarian notion of morality througha gradual relativizing oftheir judgments, and Is there any evidence from these studies that might then to an established value system (a process point to the development of levels and tiers beyond generally analogous to that for reflective judgment). the level of principles (Ab4) — perhaps relating Indeed, theresearch on reflectivejudgment wasbased principles to each other or changing skill capacities directly on the research and methods that Kohlberg In some other way? Sound and sufficient empirical devised for morul judgment. evidence is required to answer this question, and we A rich research program led by Kitchener and knowof lirtle that has beendecisive beyond the level King has investigated the development of reflective 500 DEVELOPMENT INADULTHOOD

judgment in adults, as well as adolescents, including evidence. Stage 7 arguments (principles, Ab4) move tests of optimal and functional levels (King & to fully reflectivejudgment, including formulation Kitehener, 1994; Kitchener et al., 1993), whereas the of a principle that strong, justified conclusions research on moral judgment has not assessed these rest on their evidence, and that different kinds of two distinct levels. Kitchener and King start by evidence dependon thesituation andviewpoint from asking peopleabout difficultdilemmas andhow they whichthey were collected. know something is either tme or false for such a In moral judgment, Kohlberg’s stages 5 and 6 dilemma. One of their standard dilemmas coneems constitute what he calledprincipledmoral reasoning, chemical additives: are they good things because analogous to the principle of reflective judgment. when added to food, they prevent some illnesses; General principles are held to apply across cultures, or are they bad because they may cause cancer? along with local variations, and are used to guide Depending on the response to this dilemma, people judgments of lawfuland moral activities. Empirical can varyover seven stages of understanding, with the evidence supports the existence of a social-contract optimal stages emerging from, roughly, 2 years of principle, which Kohlberg characterized as stage 5, age up to 25 years and beyond (Fischer & Pruyne, in which people argue that values established by 2002). The stages map exactly onto the skill levels norms in order to promote social harmony for the outlined in Table 21.1 (Kitchener et al., 1993). good ofeveryone are subject to modificationaccord- At the first stage, responses reflect only an ing to the will of the people. The universal ethical absolute kind of thinking: a fact or conclusion is principles that Kohlberg hypothesized for stage 6, either right or wrong. In moral judgment, the first such as the Golden Rule (do unto others as you several stages reflect a similar concrete approach to would have them do unto you), remaincontroversial morality: an action is simply good or bad. By stage because researchto date has found few people who 4 of reflectivejudgment (the middle stage) people consistently function with such principles (Colby have moved to a relative type of thinking: the truth et al,, 1983). We propose that research on dypamic of a statement varies with the perspective. Whether variation in moraljudgment, such as optimal and something is tme depends on your bias’. This stage fi,mctional levels, will resolve this dispute. involves the construction of single abstractions One study of reflectivejudgment suggests a kind (Abl) for relative knowledge, and, as is typical for of order in the variation behind the emergence of this level in general, people have difficulty moving optimal levels, When a level or stage first emerges, beyond the confusion of single, uncoordinated people do not quickly generalize the new skill across abstractions. A person knows simply that knowledge all tasks but work slowly and painstakingly to create is a variable thing, and even though an attempt is the general skill. For instance, when the level of made tojustil5z a decisionabout chemical additives, abstract systems first emerged in the students in this thejustification is neither coordinated conceptually study at aboutage 20, they produced only about50% with the decision nor differentiated from it. oftheir arguments at stage 6 (Figure 21.6).Not until Thenature ofrelativism in moraljudgment remains the next level emerged at about age 25 did they a question in the research. It is unclear whether there produce nearly 100% of their arguments at stage 6. is a distinct stage ofrelativism. Two candidates are In general, each optimal level produces a spurt in stage 3, where moral judgment is based on one’s perfom~ance,as shown in the line for the general social group norms, or an additional stage between 4 reflective judgment score in Figure 21.6. But that and 5, where the relativity of moral judgment to level does not become powerfully generalized until society and culture is recognized (Dawson, 2002; some yearslater, with the emergence ofthenext level Fischer, 1-land, & Russell, 1984). (or even a further level beyond the next). For the functional level, the process is much longer yet, In stage 5 of reflective judgment (the level of 2 abstract mappings, Ab2) people begin to compare reaching 50% -only in the late Os. In general, arguments, evidence, and viewpoints, recognizing functional consolidation of optimal skills requires that somearguments and conclusions are better than many years of adult development. others, Arguments and justifications are linked to a An important finding about both reflective certain context or viewpoint, and there is certain judgment andmoraljudgment is that highereducatson logic relating to the conclusions, but still people plays a central role in their development and take a mostly relativistic stance, At stages 6 and 7, consolidation, All the people in the study in Figure Dewey’s goal of reflective judgment comes into 21.6 were students, either graduate students, college play: the tmth of the proposition depends on the students, or college-bound high school students. specific arguments made andthe supporting evidence Research shows strongly that education plays a more for the arguments. With sufficient evidence and important rolethan age alone inproducing movement argument, a conclusion can be firmly reached that to sophisticatedjudgments about moral issues andthe goes beyond a relativistic dependence of viesvpoint. nature of knowledge (Colby et al., 1983; Dawson, Stage 6 arguments (abstract systems, Ab3) recognize 2002; King & Kitchener, 1994; Rest et al, 1999). The that knowledge is not always certain but that strong. emergence of a new optimal level is not enough to justified conclusions can be made with sufficient produce the stable development of a sophisticated ADULT COGNITIVEDEVELOPMENT: DIWAMIC5’ IN TI-fE DEVELOPMENTAL WEB 501

7 - x General optimal RJ (Vi) Stage 7 ——±—— Optimal stage 6 tasks 0’2) Functional stage6taskscY2)~ H 100 6 90 ‘V a 0) -80 (U 0O ‘70 a 0 0 5 -60 ~ GO 0, CO S ‘-50 0 -a cc 4.... -40 fflr 4 / -30 -20 a 0. A~ / -10 I I 3- 0 14 16 18 20 - 22 24 26 28 Age in years

Figure 21.6 Development ofrefieetivefudgnient (datafrom Kitchener et al,, 1993,)

skill, A stimulating environment must catalyze the The complex interconnections among skill com- development of the highest stages of moral and ponents and domains in a web remind us of a neural reflectivejudgment, and it may be essential for other network, especially of the many dendrites that can domains ofadult development as well. proliferate from a single neuron within a network. With complex networking among multiple skills in multiple domains, adults manifest phenomena that occur not at all or in much reduced form in DYNAMIC STRANDS AND NETWORKS IN children, such as complex multiple identities, inter- THE WEB disciplinary expertise, creativity, and wisdom.More- over, dynamicnetworks ofstrands constantlychange over time and context, and produce emergent and Adults develop not only deeply but also broadly. To complicated cognitive processes and products. deal with complex natural, social, and spiritual Examples ofhow adults develop in multiple domains worlds, adults apply, extend, and expand their include strands of identity in adulthood, Darwin’s sophisticated cognitive skills in a wide variety of construction of the theory of evolution, and the distinctive tasks and domains that they encounter in pluses and minuses of cognitive aging. both academic settings and their everyday lives, including job, profession, health, family relation- ships, child rearing, homepurchase and maintenance, self-understanding, regulation, moral rea- Strands of Adult Identity Understanding soning, religion, and politics (Baltes & Staudinger, 1993; Erikson, 1978; Fischer, Hand, & Russell, Observing, analyzing, and understanding oneself 1984; Gardner, 1983; Kegan, 1994; Neugarten, is one of the most difficult lifelong intellectual 1968; Stemberg, 1990). In all phases of adulthood, challenges that each adult has to face. people need to update their skill repertoire in (1963; 1968), in his classicwork on identity develop- multiple domains constantlyin order to adapt them- ment overthe life course, had the insight that identity selves to change. Adults must develop multiple always develops in relationship with other people, specialized cognitive skills, such as critical reading, especially in family, friendship, and work, Erikson academicwriting, moraljudgment, householdman- described a developmentally ordered sequence of agement, business practices, emotional intelligence, crises that reaches its pivotal point at the end of child- andreligious practices, to meet challengesthey face. hood with the emergence of identity in adolescence. The dynamics and complexity of strands in the web Identity is a person’s sense of who she or he is and provide a model of the richness and complexity of wants to be, a self-constructed organization of emo- this breadth in adult cognitive development. tions, beliefs, values, goals, and individual history. It 502 DEVELOPMENTINADULTHOOD

is not fully achieved and finished in adolescence or We propose an important differentiation of the early adulthood but continues to be woven across identity framework through cognitive analysis of multiple life strands gradually as we grow older. the skills involved in and coordi- From the first formation of identity as the climax nation with others. Articulating identity development of childhood, adults extendand coordinatetheir o~vn through this skill analysis illuminates the ways that identities with other people’s identitiei across con- multiple strands of identity develop systematically texts and time periods, progressing through three in aperson’s web andhow people construct identity further stages, according to Erikson, This concept skills hierarchically in a way that correlates with of identity haspermeated modem society, so that it Erileson’s stage crises, The stages are shaped by is almost a truism today, although everyday use of basic human tasks and issues that people share the conceptis often superficial. Most of theempirical across cultures, such as learning skills for home work on identity development has unfortunately and work, choosing a romantic partner, making a not focused on the full scope of identity develop- living, raising children, andgrowing old. Individual ment during adulthood but has instead considered circumstances differ widely across cultures and primarily microdevelopment (substages) within the , yet the general pattem of crises (tasks emergence ofidentity in adolescence and earlyadult- and issues) remains similar. In addition, latercrises hood (for example, Marcia, 1980; 1994; Matteson, build up more complex demands in life situations 1977; Phinney, 1989; Turkle, 1995). This research and the need for integration of strands ofone’s life also neglects the importance of social coordination web — an important cognitive challenge (Kegan, ofone’s owIa identity with other people’s. As aresult, 1994). considerable confusion has reigned aboutthe degree Eachof the identity stagesbeyond the first requires to which the crises in fact form stages, although co-construction of one’s own abstract identity this research has not actually tested the stages with those of other people, and in each case this themselves. Fortunately a few studies have gone challenging task requires a minimum skill level, beyond the stage of emergence of identity (versus Table 21.2 lists Erikson’s stages. beginning with role diffusion) to examine the full of stages identity, and shows how each one depends on a Erikson described, especially throughcase analyses skill structure at a particular level to afford the andclinical material (Erikson, 1969; 1978; Gilligan, coordination that the stage requires. The earlier levels 1982; Loevinger, 1976; Neugarten, 1968; Noam before the emergence of identity are also shown, et al., 1990; Vaillant, 1977). because they lay the groundwork for identity through

Table 21.2 Development ofiden4tication and identity: relation to Erikson ‘s stages and generalizedskill diagt-am.r Erikson’s stages of Skill level Representational tier: Abstract tier: identity: first emergence identification identification Rpl [MEA> YOU ] ‘1’ 8 [MEA — YOU ] Concrete identifications Rp2 8 Rp3 [ME~E—* YOU~]

Stage 5: Rp4 [ME~e.~~5YOUPtflm[SELFw] identity versus Abl I role diffusion LME~÷—110U27J or (OThER~J

Stage 6: intimacy versus Ah2 [~fl2w—flit HER~] isolation

Stage 7: generativltv versus Ab3 [SELiF. &—* stagnation

Stage 8: Ah4 1~’~*--s rJfl’flJ)fifl versus despair ~> t’k,te: People develop specific skills, not global ones- These formulas must be filled in with specific content to capture a real skill. ,-1 toll are concrete personal characteristics, g to Z are abstract identity characteristics. ADULTCOGWITIVE OFVELOI’MENT: DYNAMICS IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL WEB 503

the formation of concrete identifications that charac- Much of the confusion of early identity formation terize oneself (ME’) in relation to important others comes from the multiplicity of strands of identity (YOU). These identifications are coordinated with formation and the difficulty in relatuig different a minimum of single abstractions to create the abstract identity characteristics to each other at this beginnings ofidentity in early adolescence,‘l’he skill optimal leveL To do comparisons of txvo personal formulas in Table 21.2 are listed with general characteristics of her own identity with that of components (letters for variables to be filled in) to lsabelle, Kara must drop down to concrete charac- make the point that a similar skill structure develops teristics, using a representational system. The across strands/domains in the web. For application coordination of her own abstract identity with that of to real people, note that thegeneral variables need to her friend’sthus remains out of reach, be specified with concrete content, There are no Erikson’s next stage of intimacy versus isolation instantly general and generalizable skills, involves thecoordination ofone’s own identity with The creation of multiple concrete identifications that of a friend or partner, and the cognitive mini- during childhood sets the stage for theemergence of mum is abstract mappings, as shown in Table 21.2. identity at the end of childhood arid the beginning When Kara focuses on her own independenttenden- of adolescence. For example, Kara played a teacher cies, then she can easily coordinate her own identity game with her mother Jane, as described in formula with that of Isabelle as she sees it. in a repeat of I. With just a change in that representational formulaS: skill (level Rp3), she identifies with Jane as both a teacher and a mother: [SaF --- —~ FIUENID [JNDEFENI-i-NT .tNDEPENDENTJ (5) Iden41/cation TEA CHER TEA c/lEN A challenge of intimacy is to have her own abstrac- JANE ~—* K,4RA tS) tions about Isabelle matching well enough with IMOTI/ER MOTTlER I Isabelle’s actions and abstractionsto sustain a close relationship. Contradictions also come easily at this She tries to act like ateacher and mother herself, not optimal level, because people have difficulties only in play but in real-life choices that she makes, dealing with multiple abstractions about self and such as helping anotherchild with homework similar other, When Kara focuses on her own caregiving, for to the way that she sees Jane teach students and care example, there niay be a conflict with Isabelle’s for a younger sibling and similar to the way Jane independence. Within herself too, her own care- takes care of Kara’s brother. With many such giving can seem to contradict her independence an concrete identifications, a child builds material for example of the sense of contradiction and conflict the creation ofan abstract identity. that many adolescents and adults experience (Fischer Thestage ofidentity versusrole diffi,ssion involves & Kennedy, 1997; Harter & Monsour, 1992). abstractanswers (notjust one)to the question, ‘Who Issues of intimacy, like the issues of every one of am I?’ A young person brings together at least two Erikson’s stages, exist throughout life, long before concrete representational systems like formula 8. the years of early adulthood and long after them, Coordinating that identification with her identifica- The reasons that they belong especially to early tion with her father as physician and , adulthood are primarily two: (I) people commonly seek intimacy at this age, especially sexual intimacy Ident(Jication and long-term partnership; and (2) at this age, cog- PHYSICIAN PHYSiCIAN nitive capacities make it possible to truly coordinate WALTER KARA (9) abstract identities in intimate relationships. In many FATHER PARENT cultures and life situations, young adults face the [ challenge of deepenedrelationships, involving either as shown for level Ab I in Table 21.2, she creates an sex or work, where the coordination of identities is identity of herselfas caregiver: paramount. Intimate relationships require holding a sense of self, but also an openness toward theunique- ness and depth of another; they require learning the [SELF -- - CAREGIVER (10) major components of anotheridentity, with the two people becoming a dynamic unit, especially for the At the same time she builds up many other specific ideal intimate partnership that Erikson describes, in identities, such as self as independent (formula 2), which both partners grow together to~vardfulfillment and she constructs her own conceptions of other in a stable relationship. people’s identities in a similar way, such as that her Intimacy of identities can be much easier with best friend Isabelle is independent: - higher levels, because then one skill can readily incorporate more than one or two abstract charac- FRIEENE: teristics of self and other, partners with ff4r.!EnENr!~iENT (II) children, for example, can share the identities of 504 DEVELOPMENT INADUL THOOD

caregiving and independence, working together to Erikson’s final stage involves ego integrity versus support each other as and as independent despair, with the challenge of putting the great persons with their own separate needs in an abstract expanse ofone ‘s life into amean/ngful synthes/s, and system (Ab3): with thepotential achievement ofwhat may properly be called wisdom, Understanding that one is many CO-PARENT CD-PARENT 1 identities, in interdependence with many other S]ELF< SPOUSE (12) people, as well as with the social and cultural IINDEPENDENT INDEFENDENTJ roles required for the meaningful participation in a historical time and place — all these strands coalesce Just as identity only begins to develop with the level into what Erikson calls integrity as one approaches of single abstractions (AbI), intimacy only begins the end of life. Failure to accomplish this synthesis with the level of abstractmappings (Ab2). That is may bring depression anddespair at midline or in old why Table 21.2 refers to the first emergence of age. Achievementofsuch agrand synthesis requires Erikson’s stagesat a spec/ficdevelopmental level, not only the highest level of abstract thinking, For the last two stages Eriksondepicts even more systems of abstract systems (Ab4) and the broad complex life tasks, The stage of generativity versus integrative principles about one’s life that they can stagnation requires meetingthe challengesofproduc- create, but also years of experience relating one’s tivity and creativity, in contrast to feelings of lackof own identity to those of intimate partners, friends, purpose, direction, or self-worth, The most obvious co-workers, children, as well as cultural groups and generativity is having children, but generativity historical epochs. This is truly a grand cognitive involves much more than procreation. This process achievementt emerges with abstractsystems,because with them one can coordinate multiple abstractidentities in selfand others, as in the example of and indepen- dence. However, the challenges of generativity are Networks in Darwin’s Development of enormous: peoplemust coordinate their identities with the Theory ofEvolution thoseofnot only their partners, co-workers, or friends. but also children, agingparents, andother people. The We have described identity development globally, abstract thinking at this stage has to accommodate a rich web of interdependence, relating a strong sense outlining aprocess that most people develop through, taking many different pathways with common ofpersonal identity and its changes over time with the themes (issues, crises). Now we switch to a different identities of others, both younger and older, whom one seeks to guide in ways commensurate with their perspective: analysis of a case of one person’s own needs for identity andchange. constmction of a multistrand, networked web. The Bern/ce Neugarten emphas/zed how cogn/t/ve case of ’s construction ofthe theory development contributed to the process of genera- of evolution portrays the dynamics of strands and tivity in a group of successful middle-aged people: networks in the web. Dynamic analysis is at its ‘We have been impressed with the central impor- richest in analyzing individual growth in detail (van tanceof what might be called the executive processes Geert, 1994), and Darwin unintentionally provided of in [including] the stock- a great source of data for analyzing how he created taking, the heightened , and above all, the theory ofevolution by natural selection. Darwin the structuringand restructuringofexperience — that kept a series of notes between 1832 and 1839 in is, the conscious processing of new information which he recorded his observations and ideas as they in the light of what one has already learned’ (1968, developed into his theory of evolution by natural p. 98). As onewoman from the study stated, ‘It is as selection. if there were two mirrors before me, each held at a The way Darwin constructed his revolutionary partial angle. I see part ofmyself in my mother who understanding is tantamount to a of is growing older, and part of her in me. In the other building complex knowledge networks in adult mirror, Isee part of myself in my daughter.’ Kara’s cognitive development. At theage of22, in December mother Jane in such a situation considers her focus of 1831, Danvin set out on a five-year voyage around on parenting in relationship to her mother and the world on the ship HMS Beagle, during which he daughter, as well as the independence that she sees recorded observations and about the natural in different forms in all three of them, That kind of phenomena he encountered. Toward the end of this comparison, going beyond the concrete particulars time, between 1837 and 1839, he kept a series of one set of actions to general identity analysis, of specific notebooks on his thinking about ‘the involves a highly complex abstract system: tmnsrnutation ofspecies’.In 1839 at the age o130, he had constructed what became his general theory, [CAREGWEp. FA,RENT PARENT - although he would not dare release it to the world at I fi &J.~Ti5?1ik SELF M/STIIEi7, large for another 20 years, when he finally published [fNDiEFREDERT iNDEPENDENTINDEPENDENT The ot-igin of species in 1859, Because of his notes (13) and notebooks we can peer over his shoulder to ADULT COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: DYNAMICS [N TIlE DEVELOPMEN7AL WEB 505

see the steps he took in building the theory and In attempting to build his understanding into a creating the principle ofevolution by natural selection comprehensive explanatory network, Darw’in tried (level Ab4). Table 21.3 outlines some of the major out a number of concepts before discarding them as steps in Darwin’s web, showing several separate inadequate. Darwin’s reading of an essay by Thomas strands (distinct skills for different domains) at each Malthus, conceming how populations can reproduce level, Detailed exposition can be found in several at much higher rates than their environments can other sources, especially Gruber (1973) and Fischer support, played a central role in his formulation of and Yan (2002). thefinal theory. Based on his notebooks, it seems that Before his voyage on the Beagle, Darwin held a Darwin hit upon his eventual theory several times, view’ ofthe worldinformedby conventional religious but he wasnot ableto generalize it fully until he had belief, like other at that time, God had reconstructed it repeatedly. This is a common created two separate worlds, the Physical World of occurrence in the construction of new knowledge, substances and theOrganic Worldofplants, animals, perhaps even more so for complex knowledge net- and people. The fact that these worlds hardly works. Darwin not only had to coordinate a number interacted was accepted as God’s , In terms of ofcomplex relationships (coral reefs, finches’ beaks, skill level, the concept for each of these two worlds species change over eons), but also hadto generalize required only a single abstraction for each world, these coordinations into a principle — evolution by with little need for a higherlevel because ofthe lack natural selection, Repeated construction is often of interaction betweenthe two. It was Charles Lyell’s essential to new understanding: indeed it constitutes Principles oJ’geology, which Darwinavidly read on generalization, with components being worked into his voyage, that opened up for him the question of the new fabric of a general skill, such as Darwin’s interaction, Inspired by Lyell’s description of gradual evolutionary principle. In sum, Darwin’s construc- change in the physical world, Darwin was at great tion ofthe final form ofhis famous theory illustrates to record the supporting evidence he found. an extremely complex process of organization and Darwin began to realize that thephysical changes reorganization of connections across multiple he saw might relate to thecommon that domains in order to build the coherent, innovative, creatures ill-suited to their environment by some and powerful knowledge network of evolutionary defect tended to die, such as birds with defective theory. wings or fish with defective gills. This phenomenon suggested how the physical world can influence the Older Adults’ Cognitive organic world by getting rid ofill-adapted organisms. Darwin’s knowledge of the practices of selective Most adults do not create a new principle that breeding of animals also contributed to the develop- ment ofhis insight abouttheaction ofphysical forces revolutionizeshuman thinking, but most do dealwith the challenges of cognitive and physical ageing, on the viability and adaptation of organisms. His including the growth of wisdom, at least for some thinking moved beyond single abstractions to domains, and the loss of some speed and facility, construct abstract mappings — lawful interactions especially latein life, When conceptualized in tenns between the worlds ofthe physical and the organic, of dynamic developmental webs, ageing involves as illustrated for level Ab2 in Table 21.3. growth combined with decline, wisdom along with Darwin’s notes portrayhis years offollowing this slowing down. insight in organizing the countless observations he The cultural stereotype, at least in many Western had gathered on his voyage. One especially impor- countries, is that cognitive ageing meanscognitive tant example is his work on the various species of decline and intellectual deterioration: ‘The older, Galapagos finches: he discovered that the different the dumber.’ Other common false beliefs are that species’ feeding habits were closely related to the peoplebecome less happy and more lonely with age. shapes of their beaks (a level Ab3 system insight). Happily, research data paint a more optimistic He realized that the form of the beak matched the portrait. Most adults experience more positive way the particular finch obtained its most common emotions and more numerous social connections as kind of food, This adaptive match pointed to the they grow older, with early adulthood being one of finely honed adaptation of the organism to its envi- the loneliest and least happy life periods, on average ronment, In anotherstrand/domain, Darwin used his (Carstensen, 1993; 2000). Likewise for cognition: knowledge of fossils to analyze how species had researchdoes not support theproposition ofan overall changed (evolved) over long time periods — how decline in intelligence during adulthood in concert characteristics of current species could be related with the general physical ageing process (Wechsler, to characteristics ofearlier speciesthroughconcepts 1972). Horn and Cattell’s (1967) classic research ofchange overtime, In this way, he built systems of shows the interweaving of gain and loss with abstractionsin several independent strands, which he cognitive aging. Many kinds of intellectual skills soon wove together to create the theory of evolution increase slowly but consistently with age, even in by natural selection. research limited to standardized psychometric tests. 506 DEVELOPMENTIN ADUL TNOOD

Table 21.3 Development ofDa,-w/n ‘s theo,’v ofevolution (1831-1839): a general overview Level Skill Major events Dates AbI: single Lio~i:o or [WORLD 1 From adolescence: musings Before 1831 abstmctions [ORGA.NIC [PHYSICAL] about creation and species; separation of organicand physical worlds

r ~.devMnt~ . — - - Ab2: abstract I ‘gj-UIRLU —---- -wOiktO Physical world eliminates mappings [PHYStCAL D-RGAN1C deviant organisms

[wo-~uun-~~~WOR~-.O People selectively breed [HUMAN rORGA.NIC animals and plants for desired characteristics Voyage of Beagle: mastering 1831—1836 Lyell’s Principles ofgeologv and collecting observations

[‘woRoo ~~~‘WORLO 1 Beginning ofcoral reeftheory: [D:R-GANIC PHYSICAL] corals vary with changes in physical world Ab3: abstract [OROAC H reef PHYSICAL xl Final coral-reef theory: coral 183 5—1837 systems Wa-RIO- ~c—> WORLO reefs grow as corals adapt [ORGANIC Y PHYSiCAL Yj to changing ocean depths by growing upward to reach light

[G~R0ANICH match PHi- S]1CAL xl Variations in Galapagos species 1 WORLD- i—> WORLD- match species characteristics [-ORGANIC Y PEYgICAL Yj with physical niche

10-EG~~NICRI time ORGANIC P.2 1 Many species show systematic WORLD ‘.) WORLD I change overlong time periods LO-ROAN1C Ti CRGAMC T2 J Struggling with idea of multiple creations monad creation Ab4: systems of ORGANIC XI PHYSiCAL Xl Inadequate process of evolution: 1837 abstract systems, WORLD WORLD monad theory, branching tree which are principles ORGANIC Yi pHYSICAL ‘ti tree ofUchange ORGANIC X2 PHYSICAL X2 ‘-:VJOEli) (—3 ‘-WORLD fYp:GANCC Y2 PhYSICAL Y2 Hybridization (instead of natural selection) evolution Xi PHYSiCAL XI Emergence oftheory of 1838—1839 W•ORLD ‘. ~:i~JOT/jLD evolution by natural ORGANiC Yl PHYSICAL Yl selection (heredity, variation, natural selection natural selection) - ORGANICX2 PIH’YSICALX2 WORLD <—‘—3 WOI9JLD ORGANIC Y2 PHYSI1.AL Y2 Vote: Skill structures in this table emphasize rclaiions between physical and organic worlds in the various phases of Darwin’s work. Fischer and Van (2002) describe the actual skills, specifying the componcnis from physical and organic worlds that Darwinactually coordinated. So,o’ce.r: Table adapted from Fischer & Yan (2002). Sourecs for historical infonuation: Barrett t 1974). t)arwin (1859). Keegan (1989), and especially Grubcr(l 981). T ADULTCOGWITIVE DEVELOPMENT: D1WAMTCS IN THE DEl ELOP~-tF.NTALWEB 507

These reflect xvhat is called crv,susllized iuielhgeitce, dynamic process of self-organization occurs in which composed of sk-ills that benefit from accumulated adults actively organize their limited mental resources experience, such as vocabulamy and general know-l- into dynamic skill networks to adapt to their complex edge. On the other hand. matty skills also decline with life tteeds. While some components, such as speed of age, especially from middle adulthood, and these activity and speed of processing information, reduce reflect what is calledfiuid intelligence, composed of the richness of the network past middle age, other skills that depend on novel activities aridinfonnation. components, such its synthetic thinking and inter- Most of the activities that adults need to do involve personal wisdom, can increase the richness. Through accumulated knowledge and crystallized intelligence, this process, both ageing and aged adults build and they get better with age. For example, Schaje’s dynamic cognitive networks to meet various complex (1996) longitudinal data indicate that inductive life challenges. Two examples t’rom research mnvolve reasoning rises slightly through middle adulthood, the specific of typing and the broad with a gradual decline begittning only in late adult- cognitive-emotional skill ofwisdom. hood. On the other hand, there are clear, small For the motor skill oftyping, oldcr adults organize declines in speed and physical strength beginning in their skills differently, anticipating a wider span of middle age (I-Ions, 1982: Salthouse, I-Iarnbrick, & letters and compensating for lower perceptual-motor McGuthiy, 1998). Illncss is also an important factor, speed in simple tasks such as reaction time and producing powerful declines in skill at any age and tapping (Salthouse, 1984). In a sample of 19- to 72- becoming more likely in old age. year-olds. older adults maintained typing speed by Cognitive ageing is clearly multidimensional and more precisely controlling the sequencing of key- multidirectional (Baltes, l987; Baltes & Baltes, strokes across larger spans of characters than did I 990; Berg, 2000; Bitten, 1970; Craik & Sahhouse, younger typists. For many skills besides typing, 1991; Schaie, 1983; Sternbcrg, 1985). Research that dynamic interconnection and compensation play a seems to show one simple factor underlying ageing similar critical role in changes during adulthood, (or development) is based on assumptions and statis- Dynamic compensation and adjustment within com- tical techniques that force complex webs into single, plex cognitive networks are widely observed in monolithic dimensions and preclude consideration domains of memory (Barrett & Watkins, 1986, of the textured richness ofdevelopmental webs (e.g. p. 129), chess playing (Charness, 1981), social inter- Gottlieb, Wahlsten, & Lickliter, 1998). action (Carstensen, l993), emotional understanding The standardized tests used in most ageing research (Labouvie-Vief, De-Voe, & Bulka, 1998), and job do not assess the complex skills that develop at the change (Stemberg, 1990). highest levels of abstraction. or the integration of Wisdom is very different from typing, yet it too emotional and cognitive strands that ground wisdom, involves building complex cognitive networks to Even the reduction in speed with age sometimes adapt to needs in life, Wisdom requires integration of comes from the increased sophistication of adult multiple types ofknowledge and skill about ptactical cognitive skills and their thinking processes: more and ethical issues in human life (Baltes & Staudinger, complex webs and networks take longer to process 1993; Dawson, 1999; Erikson, 1963; Stemberg, information (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Fischer & 1990). It requires an implicit, complex, effective Rose, 1994; Gruber, 1973; Schacter, 4999). What knowledge network combining multiple domains might be called cognitive pragmatics, or the culture- overlong time periods and extensive experience, and based software of mind and body, actually improve it seems to require special coordination ofemotional with age, as evidenced by numerous studies of adult and cognitive processes. Wisdom seems to compen- development (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Colby et al,, sate for physical slowing in middle and old age, 1983; Dawson, 2002; Erikson, 1969; 1978; Levinson, enabling many adults to perform synthetic thinking 1978; Loevinger, 1976; Neugarten, 1968; Noam about self and others in the complex world, often et al,, 1990; Vaillant, 1977; 1986). One of the most making people especially effective as, for example, telling findings is the age at which productivity political leaders, judges, moral leaders, and scholars, reaches its maximum in creative people working in In summary, adults can develop deeply and highly complex fields, such as historians andnovelists broadly in their skills — building complex identities (Denois, 1958; Simonton, 1991; 2000). People in with their family, friends, and colleagues, creating these fields become most productive and creative in new ideas, practices, or products that shape their their 40s, SOs, and even 60s. In contrast, people in less society, and building wise ways that go beyond complexly textured fields, such as mathematicians self-interest and immediate response. All these and poets, often peak in their 20s and 30s. outcomes depend on developnsent of networks How can the complex interconnections among connecting multiple strands in the web of skill and these features in cognitive ageing he analyzed and emotion, understood? Obviously, they are not totally separate features moving in different directions, With multiple elements interacting with each other over time, a 508 DEVELOPMENT INADULTHOOD

DYNAMIC BACKWARD AND FORWARD Nira Granott (l993a; 2002) devised a method- CONSTRUCTIONS IN THE WEB ology that allows a focus on both realtime skill construction andthe generalization andconsolidation that accompany it, She had teams of adults interact Besides multiple levels, strands, and connections, with a small Lego robot called a wuggle. The development in adults also mOves in multiple wriggle,which was about the sizeof a toy truck, was directions for cognitive construction, The complete programmedto respond to changesin light/shadow, picture includes not only complexvariations in the sound, and touch by altering its movements, The strands and networks but also dynamic construction dyads were given the task of figuring out what the processes within the web. Dynamically, adult cog- wuggle did, while video cameras recorded inter- nitive development moves forward, backward, and in actions and discussions, Granott (l993b) reasoned various other directions. It formsadynamic web, and that because most human cognition takes placein the even each separate strand is dynamic (and fractal), social arena, observing dyads will provide useful not a linear ladder (Fischer & Granott, 1995). insight into spontaneous learning and problem- Traditionally development is defined as forward solving and the social interaction will make overt progression, but cognitive development moves many leaming processes. Participants began in a backward as well as forward, ‘Progress’ results from small group in a room containing several wriggles acombination of backward and forward mnovement, that moved or sat among common objects such as with much backwardmovementpreparing theway to tables and boxes, and they formed dyads spon- move forward through the construction of new taneously during the observationsession, adaptive skills, Through thus constructing skills in In analyzing videotapes of this session, Granott multiple directions, adults can handle complex tasks and her coders easily reached agreement on what effectively and flexibly and advance their compe- constituted an interchange, a single dyadic inter- tence, Adults’ backward directions of cognitive action with the wuggle, and each interchange was construction are sometimes treated as an indicatorof scored for complexity using the skill scale, For failure and malfunction, especially in old age, but instance, when a dyad understoodthat making a loud instead, flexible use of simpler and more complex noise led the wuggle to change direction, the level skills reflects and wisdom, Two develop- was coded as an action mapping— that is, the second mental phenomnena show some of the order in the level of the action tier (Smn2), connecting making or multidirectionality of adult development: backward a sound with seeing a change in movement, transition and forward consolidation, In a typical initial encounter, the subjects were at first confused, then more engaged as their experimen- tation brought responses from the wuggle. Granott (1993; 2002) used the dyad of Ann and Donald to Backward Transition illustrate this process. Encountering a wuggle for the first time, they had to learn how it changed its One important principle of dynamic construction is movementin response to asound, In 148 interchanges backward transition, a movement of activity from over 27 minutes, they startedwith mere observation higher-level skills downto lower-level ones followed of the wuggle’smovement (thelowest level ofsingle by gradual movement in fits and starts back up to actions, SmI) and graduallybuilt up through higher higher-level, new skills (Duncker, 1945; Fischer, levels as they tried to understand the wuggle. The 198Gb; Fischer & Granott, 1995; Granott, l993a; sequence from actionto representation unfolded as l998; 2002). Backward transition or regression follows, Seeing the wuggle move is a single action, seemsto be a universal strategy that peopleuse when and hearing a sound is another single action (level they aretrying to construct newskills, as reflected in SmI). A mapping of actions (level Sm2) is noticing explicit problem-solving strategies such as ‘breaking that hearing a loud sound goes with seeing the a problem down into its simplest units’ and ‘starting wuggle change movement, A system ofactions (level again from the beginning’. When people encounter Sm 3) is combining several movements and sound a task that they do not havethe skills to perform, they situations. A single representation—-thewuggle reacts fall down to low-level activity — even sensorimotor to sound — emerges from coordinating several action actions similar to thoseofan — so that they can systems (level Sm4/RpI). And so forth:mnicrodevel- figure out the task and gradually build toward high- opment continues with relating and differentiating level skills, Recent microdevelopmental research representations ofthe wuggle and sound, indicates that backward transitions are pervasive in Among the dyads, however, such construction of adulthood and play such an important role that arepresentation did not proceed directly through the supposedly inadequate, lower levels of performance levels in a ladder-like manner- As shown in Figure need to be reexamined and reevaluated, Backward 21.7, progress toward a skill for understanding the transition leads adults to perform flexibly and to wuggle went in fits and starts — a series of backwards devise ways of solving complex tasks that are transitions and reconstructioos, not one consistent initially beyond them, up’vard construction, Initially Ann and Donald fell ADULT COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: DYNAMIGS IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL WEB 509

Redo Describe Redo gadget gadget gadget 4’ Abi

Rp3

Rp2

I, > 0 Rpl to Sm3

8m2

Smi 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Interchange

Figure 21.7 Backward transition and microdevelopment in understanding a wuggle: Ann and Donald (Gronott, I993a; 2002) downto a level far below their capacity, producing The repeated fall and rise of skill levels in the several level I actions and then building up a more construction andgeneralizationofnew knowledge is complex skill over several minutes. They interacted a common feature of microdevelopment. Adult with the wuggle and made sounds and other actions leamers also showed this scallop-shaped growth in to explore it, in a faltering way gradually building Yan’s (1998; 2000)recent study of learning to rise a their first representation that the wuggle reacts to computerprogram to do simple statistical operations. sound (level 4). But then at interchange 65 something Participants were graduate students who varied interesting happened: a wire had fallen out of the widely in their expertise, both with computers and wriggle,and when they placed it back (ina different with statistical operations. Each student worked at a hole, by mistake), the wriggle acted differently. In computer, with a teacher at her or his side to answer the face of this task change their fragile skill questions and to intervene when help was needed, collapsed, dropping back immediately to a level I Students with intermediate background experience action. Overthe next several minutes they once more showed clear scalloping in their leaminggraphs — a rebuilt more complex skills, graduallyretuming to a low level of skill followed by a gradual increase and representationthat the wriggle reactsto sound (level then an abrupt drop when a new task element was 4) and then going further to higher levels still, introduced, as illustrated in Figure 21.8. For students relating several representations to each other. with little background, skill level showed wide fluc- This process ofbackwardtransition andreconstruc- tuation initially, and scalloping gradually appeared tion happened two more times in the 27 minutes of as they became more familiar with the tasks, problem-solving. At interchange 118 Ann andDonald concepts, and computer operations. Students with a encounteredanothervariationin the task: they setout high degree of knowledge (experts), on the other to summarize what they knew, and again the change hand, showed,little scalloping, staying generally at in task led to a drop in their skill — this time level 2 the upper limit of skill required by the task, with mappings of actions followed by again rebuilding occasional transientdrops. skills to reach representations (levels 4 and 5). Then Another important finding of these studies is that at interchange 134 Ann and Donald changed the adults function at a level appropriate for the task at wiring of the wriggle again, and they showed back- hand, which may be far below their upper limit ~vardtransition to low--level actions followed by (either optimal or functional level). In Figure 21.8, reconstruction ofcomplex actions and representations. for example, a highly intelligent adult graduate 510 DEVELOPMENI’IN ADULTHOOD

Abi - Participant 07, Session 1

Rp3 -

0 0

~ Rp2 -

Rpl - ‘

‘ I — — — — - Scallops Sm3 I I I ] F I I I I I I I I 5 10 15 20 25 30 Activity

Figure 21.8 Scalloptng in learning a statistics operation (Tan. 1998,’ 2000)

student perfonned with skills that at maximum were and Marvin noted that their wuggle showed a only reprcsentational systems (Rp3). This optimal ‘reaction’ to something that they did, but they could level first emerges at 6 or 7 yearsofage, and theadult not articulate either the cause of the reaction student was capable of much more sophisticated (unknown variable Xa) or the nature of the wuggle’s activity, including high levels of abstraction, which change in activity (unknown variable ~h) (Granort, she regularly demonstrated in other class activities. Fischer, & Parziale, 2002). They used a sketchy The reason for the low level that she and all other mapping skill as a shell to bridge their construction students demonstrated in this study is that the task ofan understanding of these two factors: required only this level — nothing more! Yan further asked how interaction with the teacher [(X) ~ (14) affected learning. He foundthat the upwardarcof the scallop often followed the teacher’s response to a Exploration of the wuggle guided by this shell led relevant question, especially for the intermediate- them to a series of more explicit skills based on the level students: the scaffolding provided by the shell, starting with the realization: ‘When it comes teacher’s response allowed the student to build up over here and as soon as it gets underueath part of understandingofthe task, The support offeredby the the shadow there, it starts changing its behavior,’ instructor through clues and priming facilitated This statement of a causal relationship began to fill the temporaryrises in skill level evident in scalloping. in the shell: Just as a teacher can provide a scaffoldto support a student’s construction of nrmderstanding, people [SHADOW IT (WUGGLE) can support their ow-n skill construction through a (ON WUCCLE) CHANCE(S) bridging recently discovered mechanismn called L BEHAVIOR (15) (Fischer & Bidell, 1998; (iranott, l993a; Granott & Parziale, 2002; Parziale. 1997), A bridging shell Aswith all new kno\vledge, the new skill remains a alloxvs people to bootstrap themnselves to new temporary one until it can be reconstructed several knowledge by creating a temporary target or open- times with sufficient variation so that it stabilizes, In ended shell for what is as yetunconstructed. The shell a similar manner, adults rise bridging fi’equently to is a framework (an attractor in dynamic systems guide their o\vn learning. This process of bridging terms) for guiding a cun’ent level of perfonnance cries out for research to unpack how adults guide through thesearch space to thenext higherlevel — like their own learning amid development. (Note that bold an algebraic skill fonnula with unknown variables font indicates sensorimotor skills, which are based that aperson uses to guide discovery during problem- in action. The levels prior to representations involve solving. In the svuggletask, dyadscontinually created actions, which fonn the basis for represenlalions.) shells that helped bridge their exploration of the The examples’ with wriggles and computer pro- wuggle to higherlevels. For example, the dyad Kevin gramns demonstrate that knowledge is not simply a ADULT COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: DYNAMICS [N THE DEVELOPMENTAL WEB 511

stable accomplishment. In both studies, people consolidation is pervasive in adulthood and playsan moved to high skill levels in a short time, hut when important role in adults’ cognitive development. they encountered a small change in the task, they One demonstration of forward consolidation is the instantly fell backto lower levels. General skills must pattern of emnergence of perfonnance of skills at a be built throughthis repetitive process ofdoing and given level. ‘Fhe skills that emerge at one optimal redoing a task to stabilize and generalize it, When- level predominatenot when they emerge, but years ever a task is changed, tlmere is l,ackward transition latcm; often upon emergence oftime next oprimal level, and reworking. gradually leading to a more stable or even the one after that (Fischer, Kenny, & Pipp. representation(Bever, 1982; Duneker, 1945; Fischer, 1990; Kitchener et al,, 1993). In other words, the 1980a; l980b; Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Granott, consolidation of skills at a given level takes place 1993a; 1998; Granott, Fischer, & Parziale, 2002; with the emergence of the next level. In reflective Werner, 1948). The point here is that people do not judgment, skills for stage 6 first spurted at age 20, simply work up to a level of skill and then keep it the usual age when the optimal level of abstract available for all similar circumstances. For knowl- systems (Ab3) emerges. llowever, students at that edge to become readily accessible across tasks and age only produced about half of their arguments at domains, it has to be reconstructed multiple times, stage 6, as shown in Figure 21.6. Not until five years probably with its flexibility detennined in largepart later at age 25 did stage 6 performance jump to by the rangeof variations in thetasks when aperson nearly 100%, (Age 25 was also when stage 7 has to reconstruct it. performance jumped to 50% as the optimal level of Knowledge disappearseasily andhas to be recon- principles, Ab4. emerged.) structed. It is unstable, Relatively stable knowledge The number of years that it takes adults to move comes only with extensive generalizing reconstruc- from optimal level to consolidation of functional tion for familiar tasks and situations, (Knowledge level varies greatly across domains and individuals. can be stablein the community without being stable For reflectivejudgnent, Table 21,4 describes the age in the individual.) With so little research on the range between emergence of an optimal level for a naturally dynamic variation in individual activities stage and the consolidation ofthat skill at functional and knowledge in the real world, scientists and level, These ages are based mostly on research with educators have too easily treated knowledge as American students who have a college education or stable, even fixed — thus perpetuating amyth of stable plan to attend college, and of course they vary for individual knowledge that permeates human people from other cultural or educational groups. For language and culture (Lakoff& Johnson, 1980). example, stage 5 reasoning emergesin many students as earlyas IS years of age under high support, but in low support (functional) situations, it is not seenuntil Forward Consolidation somewhere between 18 and 30 years of age. Simi- larly, stage 6 may appear at 20 years under optimal The phenomenon of forward consolidation involves support, but it is not consolidated at functional level a differentpatternof movement during adult develop- until 25 to 40 years. Note that theages for functional ment: The optimal performance that comeswith high level involve only adults who actually showed those contextual support is gradually consolidated into stages in research. Many adults never reach the functional performance without contextual support. highest stagesin anyparticular domain, as evidenced Most cognitive-developmental research examines even in research with college-educated adults, only conventional forw-ard progression within the It takes years for an individual adult to move from same contextual condition: from lower optimal emergence of an optimal performance to consolid- performance to higher, or from lower functional ation of a functional performance. Darwin took performance to higher, or from lowerperformance on several years of intense thinking with high self- a standardized test to higher. When young adults face, scaffolding and long immersion to move from the for example, a difficult dilemma, such as whether theory of coral reefs to the principle of evolution chemical additives to food are helpful or hannflml, or by natural selection, even though the coral-reef whether an unwed, poor, young woman who is theory was later seen as an instance ofthe principle pregnant should consider giving up the child for (Fischer & Yan, 2002). The extension ofthat theory , they will show a higher level of reasoning to hundreds of problems in biology went on for with optimal contextual support than withoutit. They the rest of his life. Forward consolidation is both a cannot sustain the optimal level on their own, but they challenging cognitivejourney anda significant intel- can remember it vaguely and build a bridging shell lectimai accomplishment, whetherforan extraordinary that eventually leads them to consolidation and thinker or an ordinary adult, mastery of the higher level skill without support. As Why are there such gaps in the timing and shown in the developmental web in Figure 21.5, perfonnance of reflectivejudgment and other skills? forward consolidation takes place along the strands Catastrophe theory (a kind of dynamics) helps to so that the optimal portion will gradually be turned explain these nonlinear processes. When a number into the functmonal portion. This kind of forward of influences act together, they can produce a 512 DEVELOPMENT INADULTHOOD

Table 21,4 Appro.titnate agesfor optimal andfunctional levels ofreflectivejudgment Stage ofreflective judgment Emergenceof optimal level Emnergence of functional level Pm-c-reflective judgment Stage 3 (level Rp3) 6 to 7 years Middle school and high school age .12 to 17 years

Quasi-reflectivejudgnment Stage 4 (level AbI) 10 to 12 years Late high school, college, and above 16 to 23 years Never for many people and domains StageS (level Ab2) 14 to 16 years Early graduate school 19 to30 years or older Never for many people and domains

Reflective judgment Stage 6 (level Ab3) 19 to 21 years Advanced graduate school 23 to 40 years or older Never for many people and domains Stage 7 (level AM) 24 to 26 years Advanced graduate school 30 to 45 or older. Never for many people and domains. Note: this table includes only the last five ofthe seven stages, which are the ones that adults use most. I Ages for emergence offunctional level vary widely, and so these estimates are coarse. Sources: reviews and research by King and Kitchener (1994), Kitchencr and Fischer (1990), Kitchener et al. (1993), as’ well as Basseches (1984), Colby et al, (1983), Cook-Greuter (1999), Davison (2002), Fischer, Kenny, and Pipp (1990), Peny (1970), Rest et al, (1999), and Vaillant (1977).

nonlinear pattern with a complex shape that includes action, The range ofvariation is especially broad and powerful discontinuities called catastrophes (van pervasive in adulthood, even more so than in der Maas & Molennar, 1992; Zeeman, 1976). childhood. Catastrophe theory describes how a developing At least three reasons account for this broad pathway can bend back on itself over time as it variation, First, adults have a wider range of skills progresses, giving a distinctive scalloped shape to the available because they are capable of going all the ascending pathway. This backward bending shows a way from elementary sensorimotor actions to com- remarkable parallel to the spikiness and gappiness in plex abstractions. Second, the high-level abstractions the development ofoptimal level in a given domain ofwhich adults are capable are especially subject to or in the confluenceof integrating domains, as shown the influences of culture and education, even more in Figures 21.3 and 21.6 (Fischer & Bidell, 1998; than the basic skills of childhood. Third, adults tend Rose & Fischer, 1998). In a sense, the cognitive to specialize in particular domains, based on their life capacities pressed into service under high-support choices and situations — entering one job and not conditions are unstable until the person has consol- another, one avocation and not another, one family idated them through extensive experience and role and not another, practice. The instability takes two forms: (I) dcve- lopmnent of optimal performance shows sudden jumps and drops; and (2) the level appears and disappears with variation in contextual support. CONCLUSION: RICHNF.SS AND COMPLEXITY Backward transition and forward consolidation as OF ADULT DEVELOPMENT well as other growth processes form foundations for the dynamic phenomena of adult development. These dynamic processes operate within the strands Accumulated evidence indicates that Piaget’s fonnal of the developmental web, and they create the wide operations is not the end ofhuman cognitive develop- range of levels of everyday skill. Skills range from ment. Instead, development over the 60 years of large drops to basic levels in backward transition to adulthood is an important part of the whole picture high levels of new skill constructed on these basic ofhuman cognition. Adult cognitive development is actions. They range from low levels of automatized rich and dynamnic, like a complex web that is con- actions to functional levels of unaided actions and stantly changing with multiple levels, strands, net- further up to optitual levels of supported actions. works, and directions. The wisdom and intelligence They even extend to the high reaches of collaborative of an adult cannot he captured by one developmcntal .1.~ ADULTCOGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: DIW4MICS IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL WEB 513

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