Emotion, Philosophical Issues About Julien Deonna,1† Christine Tappolet2∗ and Fabrice Teroni1

Overview Emotion, philosophical issues about Julien Deonna,1† Christine Tappolet2∗ and Fabrice Teroni1

We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain—how different are emotions from moods, sensations, and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, empha- sizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgments and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then address the question of the social dimension of emotions, explaining how the traditional nature versus nurture contrast applies to them. We ﬁnish by exploring the relations between emotions, motivation and action, concluding this overview with a more speciﬁc focus on how these relations bear on some central ethical issues. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Howtocitethisarticle: WIREs Cogn Sci 2015. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1342

INTRODUCTION the episode of anger described above may differ from other affective phenomena using three central magine that you overhear someone making fun of distinctions in the philosophy of mind: those between Ia close friend of yours. You take offense. Anger mental dispositions and mental episodes, between flares up. Physiological changes, involving a variety of experiences and other mental states, and between processes controlled by the autonomic nervous system, intentional and nonintentional states. In the second are triggered. Your heart pounds and you hold your section, we turn to the question of the nature of breath. Your brows narrow as you stare at the author emotions themselves. The general issue here concerns of the joke, your attention fixed upon him. Your body the sense in which emotions are evaluations and how feels tense and you clench your fists. Thoughts cross best to characterize this aspect of them in psycho- your mind in quick succession. What a mean thing to logical terms. For instance, should we think of them suggest about your friend, you think. Should you walk as judgments, perceptions or something else? Does away, be rude, or do something more extreme such as getting angry consist in judging that the joke was hitting the offender? offensive or perhaps in perceiving the offensiveness Anger, like other emotions - fear, disgust, sad- of the joke? The third section is concerned with the ness, surprise and admiration, for instance - raise epistemological role of emotions in relation to evalua- fascinating philosophical issues. In this overview, we tive judgments. For instance, does your anger provide concentrate on the following ones. The first section reasons for thinking that the joke was offensive? We considers the question of how emotions such as then consider, in the fourth section, various ways in which we can apply the nature versus nurture contrast †N.B. As is the norm in philosophy, the order of the authors is to emotions. To stay with our example, does culture purely alphabetical, all the three having contributed equally to the play a role in the way you get angry or are angry, and paper. if so, what is it? The relation between emotions and ∗Correspondence to: [email protected] motivation is the topic of the fifth section. What is 1CISA and Department of Philosophy, Université de Genève, the relation between your anger and your desire to Geneva, Switzerland be rude or even to hit the offender? This then leads 2CRE and Department of Philosophy, Université de Montréal, us to the sixth and final section, in which we theorize Montreal, QC, Canada about the variety of roles emotions play in ethics and, Conflict of interest: The authors have declared no conflicts of interest more specifically, whether we can appeal to them to for this article. elucidate moral motivation and moral judgment. Can

© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Overview wires.wiley.com/cogsci we think of your angry reaction toward the joke as country both count as affective dispositions, e.g., they having moral significance? may invite different analyses. Second, while it is generally thought that many if not all affective episodes are manifestations of affective dispositions—one’s present EMOTION AND THE anger at one’s uncle’s seemingly inconsiderate behav- AFFECTIVE DOMAIN ior is a manifestation of one’s lack of patience for his When we inquire into the nature of emotions, one of selfishness—this leaves the question of explanatory the first issues concerns how similar they are to neigh- priority completely open. Do emotional dispositions boring phenomena such as moods, sentiments, pas- really have a psychological reality over and above that sions, desires, feelings, and the like. Confronted with of these episodes? Or should we try to explain them similar taxonomical issues in other areas of the mental, in terms of emotional episodes? Should we on the philosophers have equipped themselves with notions contrary explain the episodes in terms of emotional and distinctions that allow making some progress with dispositions, i.e., do episodes constitutively depend respect to this issue. These are: the distinction between on the dispositions they manifest? Alternatively, there what takes place or happens (mental episodes) and may be reasons to refrain from any such priority more stable conditions (mental dispositions); the dis- claim so as to preserve the possibility of there being tinction between states with a phenomenal or qual- interesting (explanatory, epistemic, or otherwise) 6 itative character (experiences) and those with no relations between them. such character; the distinction between states that are The second distinction can also be put to use. directed at things beyond themselves (what philoso- Emotions are paradigmatic states with qualitative or phers call intentional states) and those that are not. phenomenal character. There is something it is like 7–9 The distinction between episodes and disposi- to have them: they are experiences. Observe that tions helps demarcate two sorts of affective phenom- they differ from affective dispositions in this respect ena. On the one hand, there are affective phenomena too—lack of patience for one’s uncle’s selfishness does that have an onset, wax, wane, and then disappear not feel like anything independently of the emotions after what is often a short period of time. On the other it may give rise to—as well as from other mental hand, there are stable and relatively long-lasting states episodes such as judgments, perhaps, as it is at least that characterize the manner in which people tend not obvious that it feels like anything to judge that 10,11 to engage affectively with the world.1,2 For example, two and two make four. This is of course not to if you say ‘Sam is angry with his father’, you may say that emotions are the only affective experiences, be understood either as saying that Sam is currently since, as we shall see, moods qualify too. undergoing an episode of anger, or as saying that he Scrutiny of the phenomenal dimension of the has a disposition to get angry with his father, although emotions raises some of the most traditional and he is presently happily thinking about his mother or central questions in the field. First, are all emotions even asleep. Having the disposition to get angry at conscious phenomena? One plausible claim is that one’s father in this way implies that one is likely to we need not be conscious of an emotion in the sense enter in a variety of episodes of anger (these are the of being aware of it in order to undergo it. One manifestations of the disposition) in circumstances need not realize one is afraid to be afraid, as one’s involving the parent in question (these are its trig- attention in fear is typically directed toward what one gering conditions). Most philosophers, but not all,3,4 is afraid of. Second, should we leave room for a more use the term ‘emotion’ to refer to episodes—a prac- dramatic claim, i.e., that we can undergo emotions , tice that might not follow ordinary usage—and use without feeling anything?10 12 While the former claim , the technical term ‘emotional disposition’ to refer to is accepted by a vast majority of philosophers,12 13 the more or less stable manners to engage affectively with latter has not proven as popular. In psychology, how- the world. ‘Cares’, ‘concerns’, ‘attachments’, ‘senti- ever, some have found it helpful to distinguish feeling ments’, and ‘personality’ or ‘character traits’ are ordi- an emotion and having it, as there may be behav- nary terms that are sometimes used to characterize ioral or neurophysiological evidence of an emotion’s subsets of these dispositions. occurrence without any evidence that the subject is This distinction between episodes and dispo- feeling it.14,15 Now, whether or not having an emotion sitions, which is in itself not controversial, raises is feeling, the nature of emotional phenomenology a number of interesting philosophical issues. First, raises fascinating questions such as the following. Is should we draw further distinctions among the affec- this phenomenology sufficiently rich so as to support tive dispositions and, if so, what are the relevant a significant proportion of the distinctions amongst criteria?5 Although arachnophobia and love for one’s types of emotions we find in ordinary language? Many

© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Cognitive Science Emotion, philosophical issues about philosophers and psychologists have thought not,16,17 and have a phenomenal character. They may have arguing that one and the same phenomenology is, the same duration as emotions (although this is not taken on its own, compatible with emotions we typical of them), but contrary to emotions they are ordinarily consider to be very different. Furthermore, not intentionally directed toward anything. It certainly while many emotions obviously involve experiencing feels like something to be grumpy, but it is not clear alterations of one’s bodily condition along various that one can be grumpy about or at something. dimensions (muscular, physiological, endocrinal, etc.), Amongst the lively debates surrounding these can the phenomenology of all emotions be captured issues, the following should be singled out. Is there in bodily terms?3,13 Finally, is it a characteristic trait really a categorical difference between emotions and of undergoing emotions that it feels either good or moods at the level of their respective intentionality, bad to undergo them, i.e., that they have either a or is it rather a mere difference in degree?29–31 positive or a negative hedonic tone? This last question Should we not say, e.g., that grumpiness is in fact a is intimately related to the project of explaining what sort of irritation directed at the world at large and is called the valence of emotions.18,19 thus that moods have just less specific objects than The third distinction, between states that are emotions?3 And what should we say of the following directed at something (states that have intentionality) very common sort of case: while angry at your boss, and states that are not (states that have no intention- you are made to remember a very funny joke. We may ality), can also be used to draw further boundaries surmise that part of the way it feels to be angry endures within the affective realm. Observe that there appears while you remember the joke. Still, should we say that to be a striking contrast between paradigmatic bod- you are angry at your boss and amused by the joke, or ily sensations on the one hand and emotional expe- that you are in an irritated mood that will be redirected riences on the other.8,20,21 The former, like tickles or towards your boss as soon as your attention is drawn , a shiver down the spine, are not directed at anything away from the joke?28 32 or at least not anything outside the body. This is certainly not the case of one’s run of the mill emotions, such as fear, anger, admiration, and amusement, which EMOTIONS AND EVALUATIONS rarely if ever target one’s own bodily condition(s) but Emotions are about something; they are intentional are rather about worldly objects, events and states of states. This may, as we suggested, help distinguish affairs. One is angry at one’s father, admires a moun- emotions from moods and sensations, but it is certain view, is amused by the joke, regrets that Jeanne tainly not distinctive of them. You could imagine your could not come to the party, and so on. Still, while boss or believe that your boss asked you to stay after it is clear that emotions are about worldly objects, it hours. So is there something distinctive and original is unclear whether this aspect of their intentionality to the intentionality of emotions? There are some sub- is or is not purely derivative from the thoughts that stantive reasons to think so. Emotions appear after accompany these emotions. Why not say that my fear all to be some sorts of positive or negative attitudes of the exam just consists in a thought being directed toward the world. Can we say more? at the upcoming exam and accompanied by sensa- It looks as if the distinct types of emotions tions typical of fear but which have in themselves no are distinct types of positive or negative evaluations intentionality?22–24 Or should we say that it is a nonin- of what they are about.33 It makes a lot of sense tentional displeasure arising out of the realization that to think of, say, anger as a way of evaluating an one’s desire for not being examined in the near future object as offensive or obstructive, as it makes sense is frustrated?25 However one wants to answer these to think of fear as an evaluation of an object as dan- questions, we shall see in the next section that there gerous, of amusement as an evaluation of an object is another aspect of emotional intentionality that may as funny, and of shame as an evaluation of an object be original to them (i.e., nonderivative). as degraded.34,35 This readily explains many aspects Before we turn to that, this is the place to observe of the way we consider emotions in everyday life. that the fact that emotions are directed outside the If emotions are evaluations, we understand why we body explains why philosophers have been on the sometimes criticize (‘you shouldn’t be afraid’) or rec- whole reluctant to assimilate them to assortments of ommend (‘you should show some compassion’) emo- bodily sensations, a claim which is rightly or wrongly tions. The idea, then, is that a type of emotion can associated with William James.26,27 If this contrast at be about a great variety of objects (you can fear the the level of intentionality distinguishes emotions from snake, the exam, your uncle, death, etc.), but that it sensations, it also distinguishes them from moods. always evaluates it in the same way (as a threaten- Moods, it is often claimed,28 are episodic in nature ing object). This would constitute the distinctive and

© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Overview wires.wiley.com/cogsci original intentional aspect of emotions—in philosoph- been made forcefully by Ronald de Sousa32 and has ical jargon, the evaluative property in light of which been turned into a variety of perceptual approaches to the particular object is apprehended is called the for- the emotions.13,45–52 This would not only be faithful mal object of the emotion.36 to the phenomenal dimension of emotions, it would in According to some classical ways of understand- addition account appealingly for the other problems ing why emotions qualify as evaluations, the idea that faced by the more intellectual takes on evaluation this constitutes an original aspect of their intention- discussed previously. In particular, one may now think ality appears difficult to maintain, however. Consider of phobias on the model of some illusions we are for instance the very simple suggestion, apparently familiar with in the realm of perception. In the same held by the Stoics, that emotions are evaluative judg- way as experiencing a stick half-immersed in water as ments—to be angry at your boss is to judge that he bent does not force one to judge that the stick is bent, is offensive or obstructive, to be ashamed of your- experiencing one’s boss as offensive need not lead self is to think that you are degraded.37,38 Emotions one to judge that she is offensive.39,40 In both cases, would relate to the world in a way with which we one can know better. Moreover, representing danger are familiar from our ordinary judgments, and there or offensiveness perceptually may be supported by would accordingly be no original aspect to their inten- cognitive capacities of the kind that animals possess. tionality. Be that as it may, the judgment approach has While the perceptual model is very appealing, it a number of potential problems. First, one may won- faces some important challenges.53–55 Observe, first, der whether undergoing an emotion requires that the that although perceptual experiences have, like emo- subject make the relevant evaluative judgment. Some- tions, a salient phenomenology, it is not obviously of times we feel emotions despite not endorsing the sort the right sort to help shed light on emotional expe- of evaluation they contain, as is the case when we riences. In experiencing an emotion, it feels like one react in a way we know is inappropriate. A spider is reacting to or taking a stance toward what is rep- phobic, e.g., does not need to judge the spider to be resented. This appears to differ significantly from the dangerous to fear it.39,40 One can be tempted, there- kind of purely receptive phenomenology characteristic fore, to adjust one’s way of conceiving of the emotions of, say, ordinary auditory or visual perception. Hon- by claiming that emotions, as opposed to judgments, oring one of the central promises made by the per- do not involve the subject’s endorsement of the rele- ceptual model will then be harder than might first vant evaluation. Perhaps thinking of the object in the appear. Second, in perception, properties are thought relevant evaluative terms is enough.35,41 To be angry to be causally responsible for the perceptual experi- at your boss is nothing more than thinking of him as ences. But what exactly are the properties that emo- offensive. The temptation should be resisted, however. tions allegedly perceive, and can they play the relevant For, second, understanding the emotions in terms of causal role? If they are evaluative properties, as com- judgments or thoughts simply misses the fact that emo- monly conceived within the models under discussion, tions are specific types of experiences. To judge that this raises the following worries. The idea appears someone is offensive, if it feels like anything, need not to presuppose a controversial form of realism about feel anything like experiencing an episode of anger. evaluative properties, i.e., the claim that these prop- This is perhaps even clearer in the case of a mere erties are ‘out there’ and apt to cause psychological thought to the same effect in which the subject does responses. In addition, it appears to presuppose a view not endorse the evaluation.8,42 Third and relatedly, of what perception consists in that is liberal enough to evaluative judgments and thoughts are not obviously welcome the claim that evaluative properties can be available to at least some nonhuman animals to which perceived. Third, observe that many of our emotions we surely want to ascribe emotions.43,44 are elicited by thoughts about events or objects that It is with these worries in mind that one may are spatially and temporally quite distant from us. The try to understand the distinctive evaluative aspect of fact that accounting for these cases in perceptual terms emotions along different lines. We should not appeal is not straightforward reveals an important disanalogy to judgment or thought, but rather to perception, between emotions and perceptions. While the former perhaps the paradigmatic type of mental states in depend on other mental states56 so as to have a subject relation to which we speak of experience. The idea is matter, the specificity of the latter resides precisely in that, in the same way as an object may visually strike their being independent on this count. One cannot be you as being scarlet, it may emotionally strike you as angry at one’s boss without representing her in another being offensive or dangerous, and that the underlying way (through imagination, memory, belief, percep- similarities run sufficiently deep so as to warrant talk tion, etc.). But no additional mental state needs to play of emotion in terms of perception. This analogy has this role in order to visually represent one’s boss.

These challenges may very well be met by the or justification for such judgments. If the answer to perceptual model—perhaps the above remarks are any of these questions is positive, this would mean that premised on too conservative a view of perception, for emotions play a significant role in our capacity to gain instance. According to one such less conservative view, evaluative knowledge. Exploring whether this is the perception consists at bottom in systematic causal case allows revisiting some of the approaches to the covariations selected by evolution between environ- nature of emotions we have presented above. mental conditions and mental responses. The way in The possibility of asking any of the above ques- which Jesse Prinz has applied this view of perceptions about the relations between emotions and evalu- tion to the emotions has attracted a lot of attention.13 ative judgments does not even arise if one identifies the Alternatively, the issues raised may provide the incen- former with the latter. If emotions themselves already tive to look for other theoretical options. Two very require that one deploys the relevant evaluative con- general strategies suggest themselves. One may first cepts, then one is left wondering how these have been look for alternative ways of understanding the sort of acquired and, more generally, what sort of under- evaluation that the emotions consist in or incorporate. standing the subject has of them and under which Instead of trying to assimilate them to more famil- circumstances they are justified. This allows us to iar types of mental states like judgments, thoughts, acknowledge two of the great selling points of the idea or perceptions, it may be insisted that emotions are that emotions are perceptions of evaluative properties. sui generis types of evaluation: perhaps, as has been First, regarding the meaning or understanding , recently claimed, distinct types of attitudes.53 57 If so, of evaluative concepts, the perceptual model is in we should definitively try to say more about what a position to draw an illuminating parallel. In the they are, since we appear otherwise to be back at our same way as a person born blind will lack some starting point. Second, one may think that the prob- central ingredient of what it means for something to lems faced by the approaches discussed in the forego- be described as being of this or that color, a person ing all stem from the idea that emotions are evalua- devoid of any emotional repertoire will lack some tions, and should for that reason lead us to reconsider central ingredient of what it means for something to it. This may prompt some to return to more tradi- be described as of this or that value. Perhaps this tional approaches that emphasize the feeling dimen- truth is even more blatant in the case of emotions: 24,25,58 sion of emotions. Still, capturing the distinctive what concept of the amusing or the admirable could sort of evaluative intentionality involved in emotions, be had by someone incapable of feeling any kind of although it remains disputed that there is one, is at the amusement or admiration?53,60 centre of contemporary philosophical debates regard- Second, regarding the question of the poten- 59 ing the nature of emotion. tial justificatory role that emotions have vis-à-vis the relevant evaluative judgments, the perceptual anal- 45,50,61 EPISTEMOLOGY AND ogy is also very promising. When a perceptual state presents an object as having a certain property, UNDERSTANDING this appears to constitute a reason for judging that So far, we have been concerned with the nature this object has that property, perhaps even to justify of emotions (‘What are they?’). We shall now turn that judgment provided no evidence to the contrary our attention to epistemological issues surrounding is forthcoming. The same may be said of emotions: them (‘How do they contribute to knowledge?’). We when an emotion presents an object as having a certain have seen in the previous section that we should not evaluative property, this appears equally to constitute account for the nature of emotions by identifying them a reason for judging that this object has that prop- with evaluative judgments. That being said, emotions erty, perhaps even to justify that evaluative judgment clearly often give rise to evaluative judgments—your provided there is no evidence to the contrary (e.g., enjoyment of the movie may lead you to judge that is one is not on drugs, not biased, not in a completely was good, and your anger at your boss may lead you foreign social environment nor, more generally, affec- to think of her as a disrespectful person. This is not in tively imbalanced, etc.). If this is along the right track, dispute. What is much disputed is whether emotions the perceptual model can pride itself in having found can do more than just causally bring about these a plausible source for both our understanding of eval- judgments. We may wonder, first, whether emotions uative concepts and our knowledge about them. play a role in our understanding of the evaluative While this is indeed quite plausible, some ques- aspect of these judgments, i.e., in our mastery of the tions must still be answered. It is after all a truism that evaluative concepts they contain. Second, we may emotions can lead us astray and that the judgments wonder whether they can serve as reasons or evidence they prompt us to make in the heat of the moment are

© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Overview wires.wiley.com/cogsci often of a dubious epistemic standing.55,62,63 Emo- in the light of the particular sentiments, concerns, or tions are perhaps not to be trusted, and their reliability attachments that relate us to people, institutions, or cannot be taken for granted in the way the reliability other objects. of perception can be. Observe how this fact is mir- Amongst the issues raised by the foregoing obser- rored in the sorts of questions we readily ask about vations about the epistemological role of emotions, people’s emotions as opposed to people’s perceptual the following are especially pressing. First, what is the experiences.64 If someone refers to Marie having seen exact role played by emotional dispositions (cares, the pony car in the parking lot as an explanation of concerns, sentiments, etc.) or conative states (desires why Marie has judged that the pony car was parked and wishes) with respect to emotions? Do they merely there, this explanation is satisfactory in the sense that explain causally why emotions occur, or do they pro- we think of such perceptual states not only as reasons vide distinctive justifying reasons for them? Could my for such kinds of judgments, but also as natural end enmity for my boss justifies my being angry at what points in the search for epistemic explanations. By she now tells me? The issue is made especially difficult contrast, suppose that you are asked why you judged as the answer appears to depend on one’s conception a person’s action to be unfair and that you respond by of the nature of the evaluative properties to which mentioning your indignation at the action. Citing this emotions allegedly respond.53 Suppose that the offen- emotion may go some way toward providing a reason sive nature of one’s boss’ remark entirely depends on for the judgment, but it certainly cannot be seen as a one’s enmity for her or more generally on one’s wish natural end point in the search for epistemic explana- for not being the target of such remarks. If so, then tions. For it would be natural to continue questioning of course mention of the disposition or the wish will the person: ‘Yes, but why such indignation?’. We go quite a long way toward justifying the episode of would then expect the person to make reference to anger they elicit. This is because they will partly con- some features of the situation in the light of which the stitute the remark’s offensiveness. By contrast, if the unfairness is made manifest or at least intelligible.53 evaluative properties at stake are more independent On this basis, one may be led to think that the epis- from emotional dispositions and conative states, as temological role of emotions differs from that of some realists would have it, then we should carefully perceptions. Emotions constitute reasons for evalua- distinguish their causal contribution to the occurrence tive judgments, but they also respond to reasons and of emotions from their potential contribution to their are themselves capable of being justified or unjustified. justification. Second, if evaluative properties prove to Perceptions, however, constitute reasons, but do not be relatively independent from emotional dispositions in addition respond to reasons and are not themselves and the like, then important issues arise as to whether capable of being justified or unjustified in this way. and to what extent these psychological conditions dis- The fact that emotions respond to reasons tort one’s appreciation of the evaluative landscape.63 appears to be intimately related to the fact, empha- If emotions are to be a sort of mechanism for detecting sized in the previous section, that they fundamentally evaluative properties, it better be the case that they depend on other mental states. Recall that what the reach a level of reliability compatible with such a emotions are about is always accessed through other status. Third, if as we have suggested emotions are mental states (perceptions, beliefs, memories, etc.). We themselves capable of being justified or unjustified, may indeed think that the sorts of reasons to which can they still play a justificatory role vis-à-vis the eval- emotions are responsive are at least partly provided by uative judgments they elicit? Or are the reasons that the content of the mental states on which they depend. justify these emotions also and uniquely responsible The above question, ‘Why such indignation?’, is at for the justification of these evaluative judgments? least partly answered by mentioning, say, that one has Two very different pictures suggest themselves seen the person being subject to a humiliating physical here.53 According to one of them, emotions are super- treatment. In addition, observe that a further part fluous routes to judgments because these judgments of the answer is provided by another source of what may have the same epistemic credentials indepen- looks like reasons for emotions and the judgments dently of emotions. If there are reasons to judge that they give rise to, namely the variety of emotional one’s boss’ remark is offensive, these reasons support dispositions (cares, concerns, sentiments, character the relevant judgment irrespective of whether they in traits, etc.) of which emotions are manifestations as addition elicit an emotional reaction.62 According to well as conative states such as desires and wishes.64 the other picture, emotions play a noneliminable role An episode of indignation may thus be explained by in transmitting reasons to evaluative judgments. This one’s care for social justice. More generally, our emo- role may consist, first, in the fact that emotions lock tional responses are very commonly made intelligible attention to features of the environment one would

© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Cognitive Science Emotion, philosophical issues about have missed but for their occurrence,32,65 and main- Likewise, Schadenfreude and the Japanese emotion tain attentional focus on them in such a way that one is ijirashii are types of joy that are exclusively focused in a good epistemic position to make the relevant eval- on two subsets of what may elicit joy: the misfortunes uative judgments. The second sense in which emotions and the accomplishments of others, respectively. If so, may constitute a noneliminable way of transmitting then cultural influences on emotions should be under- reasons to judgments of value is that of contribut- stood as harnessing our basic emotional repertoire ing essentially to one’s understanding of the evaluative and channeling it in directions that are considered of dimension of these judgments, an idea we have already special import within the relevant culture. Such an mentioned in connection with the acquisition of evalu- approach is in the interesting position to account for ative concepts. If this is the case, is might well be that important cultural variations in the emotions (includ- emotions are indispensable to acquire knowledge of ing significant differences regarding how prevalent value. an emotion is), while preserving intact the idea that human emotional lives build on a set of universally shared emotional capacities. NATURE VERSUS NURTURE This may constitute too superficial a reaction to We have started this overview trying to distinguish the pervasiveness of the social forces exerted on the emotions from other inhabitants of the affective emotions, however. Consider for instance the great realm. We have observed that we may distinguish variety of ways in which emotions find expression different types of emotions according to the type in different social, cultural and historical contexts. of evaluation they respectively make. We shall now Contrast how pride is expressed in a competitive, see that there are broader structural distinctions to achievement-oriented society with the way it was stig- be drawn within the emotional domain. The central matized and hence repressed in the medieval Christian question in this area regards the existence of a divi- world. Or think of the momentous differences in the sion between emotions that are relatively impervious ways grief is expressed in Iran and in Switzerland. to contextual influences and emotions that are very How emotions get expressed in different settings, it much permeable to such influences. might be thought, contributes essentially to the very One way of addressing this question is through identity of the emotions one feels. From these obser- the very intuitive distinction between emotions that vations, it is perhaps a small step to the claim that, look relatively simple or basic (fear, anger, and joy) in shaping the way emotions are expressed, a subject and emotions that look more complex (regret, pride, or the group to which she belongs do not merely and nostalgia). While this is a very ancient distinction, channel the natural manifestations of biologically psychologists nowadays pursue this insight by trying determined responses in specific directions. They to find out which emotions have distinctive biological more fundamentally contribute to fixing the very signatures, be they discoverable through the relevant nature of the emotions. Grist is brought to the same facial expressions, brain circuits, evolutionary func- mill when we recognize the importance of the com- , tion, motivational role, or patterns of physiological municative function of emotional display,71 72 and activation.66–68 The viability of this project can be how it can be more or less consciously bent to serve put into question.69 However, those who find it con- a variety of personal or communal ends.66 Emotions vincing that some parts of the emotional domain are would thus be more profitably understood in light in this sense primary have interesting resources at of the ends we pursue in shaping them than as given their disposal to articulate the relations between the biological building blocks. emotionally basic and the emotionally more complex. These thoughts fit naturally within a tradition While there are different ways to go about according to which emotions, considered at what- articulating these relations, the following one, nicely ever level we care to look at (brain, physiology, developed in Jesse Prinz,13,70 proves especially attrac- and phenomenology), fail to have any distinctive , , tive. Drawing from the distinctions we made in the profile.17 73 74 If that is the case (i.e., if the responses foregoing between the kind of evaluation that an emo- underdetermine the specific type of emotion the sub- tion type involves and the variety of objects that it can ject may be experiencing) then it is up to the sub- take, we can be led to think that some types of com- ject herself or perhaps even to members of her complex emotions result from a particular inflection of a munity to determine which it is. And, obviously, the more basic type of emotions. Indignation is a type of response itself won’t exert much pressure on the direc- anger: both indignation and anger evaluate in terms of tion this determination process takes. According to offensiveness, but the former focuses on one type of this form of constructionism about emotions, it is offensive objects, i.e., immoral actions of others. up to the subject or members of her community to

© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Overview wires.wiley.com/cogsci determine which emotion is taking place by interpret- actions, such as revenge when we are angry, or flight ing a response largely on the basis of relevant and/or when we are afraid. The hedonic tones of emotions salient cultural norms as well as of contextual features are also plausibly taken to have a motivational effect. of the situation in which the emotion takes place.75–77 But the question is whether the motivations involved For example, the negative and high-arousal emotional in emotion are specific behavioral dispositions that response one has when witnessing someone courting feed directly into the motor system, or whether they one’s partner may be constituted into an episode of are states, such as desires, that only have an indirect righteous indignation in one cultural context, and into influence on what we do. one of pathetic jealousy in another. Now, if this is According to the first approach, an emotion true, observe that determining which emotions we feel like anger or fear comes with rigid behavioral dis- is not a matter of being more attentive to what goes positions to perform a limited number of actions. on within us, but rather a matter of subsuming what- In the case of anger, these are the kinds of behavior ever we feel under the relevant personal or communal we associate with aggression and revenge, such as norms. menace, attack, and fight, while in the case of fear, the Does the evidence force us to adopt such a pieces of behavior standardly referred to are flight, far-reaching form of constructionism about the freeze, and fight.73,79,80 These dispositions are taken emotions? Or can the different ways in which our to be triggered by a narrow range of stimuli, such emotional life lends itself to social influences—in par- as the sight of a competitor or a predator, and are ticular the social dimension of the emotions’ triggers thought to be characterized by rapid and automatic as well as that of their expressions—be addressed manifestations, which occur independently of thought within a framework that acknowledges the universal and decision.66,79–81 and innate character of at least some of our emotions? The thesis that emotions involve behavioral The tension between these two poles structures much dispositions is plausible in the case of most nonhu- of the recent debates in the area.78 man emotions.82 However, even if human beings occasionally manifest the same kind of behavior as EMOTIONS AND ACTION frightened squirrels and marmots, it is obvious that what human beings do when they experience anger It is often taken for granted that emotions move us or fear is much more varied. Anger might make you to action. The term ‘emotion’, which comes from the shout and hit the table with your fist, but it might also Latin ex, which means out, and movere, which means get you to talk with your lawyer. Panic might make to move, suggests that emotions are tightly related you run out of a building on fire, but it can also get to motivation. In any case, anger is often thought you to call for help on your cell-phone. This is why to come with aggressive behavior, while fear is com- many have thought that the relation between fear and monly related to specific responses such as flight. action is an indirect one. The nature of the connection between emotions and On this alternative approach, emotions are motivation is a central question in emotion research. taken to involve states, such as motives or desires, There are many ways to conceive of the relation, but which have an indirect influence on action. They influ- the most central from a philosophical point of view is ence the agent’s decision process by setting specific in terms of the essential nature of emotions. Is there 13,83,84 an essential relation between emotions and motiva- goals. Following Aristotle, anger has been taken tion, or at least between emotions such as anger and to involve a desire for revenge (Ref 85, II, 2, 1378b). fear and motivation? If so, one could not undergo Fear, however, is often thought to involve the desire to an emotion like anger without being motivated to avoid harm or loss. These desires inform the agent’s aggressive behavior. In fact, it might be tempting to decision process and result in action only on the hold the even stronger thesis that the very concept basis of this decision process. Given your other goals, of emotion is one of a state that involves motivation. and given what is taken to be feasible, the desires in Putative cases of emotion lacking any motivational question might well have no effect on what you do. component would be ruled out by definition. You might be angry at whoever stole your bicycle but To address the question of the relation between since you fail to know who it is, no revenge follows. emotion and motivation, one first has to reflect on This is a plausible account of the motivational impact the nature of the motivation at issue. It is generally of emotions, but the question arises as to how to agreed that emotions such as anger or fear facilitate interpret it. Should we take it that emotions like anger action, in the sense that bodily changes prepare us for or fear, or maybe all emotions, are essentially tied to action and increase the probability of certain type of desires? Or is the relation a weaker one?

A first family of cases that are difficult to essence. And more generally, it is far from clear that square with this conception are emotions that involve it is part of the essence of emotions in general that so-called ‘expressive actions’.86–88 Consider Jane, who they involve motivation. Thus, it is unlikely that the out of hatred gouges holes in the eyes of her rival ordinary concept of emotion is such as to exclude cases on a photograph. It is plausible to assume that in which there is no motivation. Still, it has to be Jane’s hatred involves a desire that sets the goal of acknowledged that many emotions standardly come harming that person. The problem is that the desire with both behavioral dispositions and specific desires. in question would fail to explain what Jane does, This is the main reason why emotions have been a given the assumption that she does not hold that central topic in ethics. harming a photograph does real harm. According to Peter Goldie’s plausible suggestion, expressive actions such as Jane’s are explained by wishes, understood EMOTIONS AND ETHICS as conative states which involve imagining that one With only the slightest exaggeration, the philosoph- 3 satisfies a desire. What Jane desires is to scratch out ical community might be seen to be divided into her rival’s eyes, but since that is out of question, she two opposite camps. On the one side, we have the scratches out the eyes in the photograph imagining rationalists, who put their trust in the faculty of that by harming the photograph, she achieves her goal. reason, and find fault with most, if not all, emotions. Alternatively, it might be argued that Jane’s action can On the other side, we have the sentimentalists, who be explained in terms of the misfiring of a primitive often combine a suspicion of the power of reason disposition to harm that is often present in hate. Given with various claims about the importance of emotions the visual similarity between the photograph and the in our lives. Rationalists consider most emotions real person, the primitive disposition to harm is likely to be a threat to rationality, whether theoretical or to be triggered as much by the photograph of someone practical. Episodes of anger, envy and fear have thus as by the real person. been accused of interfering with proper reasoning, Another family of problematic cases are emo- of favoring irrational and imprudent behavior, and tions directed at fiction. We often feel anger or fear of eliciting immoral actions (Ref 33, bk. viii). Senti- when reading a novel or watching a film. These emo- mentalists, however, hold that far from constituting tions appear to have a tenuous link to motivation. an obstacle to rationality and morality, emotions are For instance, as Kendall Walton observed, you might both crucial to the proper functioning of reason, and shriek and clutch your chair when you watch a film essential to pro-social and moral action. Following the in which a green slime oozes over the earth, destroy- work of Ronald de Sousa32 and Antonio Damasio,91 ing everything on its path, but you don’t run out of most contemporary emotion theorists have adopted the theatre or call 911 for help.89 According to some, the sentimentalist stance.92 such as Walton himself, such cases do not involve gen- The debate between rationalists and sentimen- uine emotions, but only ‘quasi-emotions’. However, talists is far from settled. This is particularly striking it might well be that such emotions are genuine ones in ethics, where the opposition between moral ratio- even if they fail to involve the typical desires and eval- nalism and moral sentimentalism continues to define , uative judgments found in real-life cases.82 90 If this is the battleground. Moral rationalism, which is often correct, even an emotion like fear would not be essen- traced back to Immanuel Kant,93 can be character- tially related to a motivation. ized, very roughly, as the claim that moral judgments Similar difficulties arise from emotions that are are grounded in reason. By contrast, moral senti- directed at the past. You can surely be angry at mentalism not only denies that moral judgments are an ancestor who lost the family estate by gambling, grounded in reason, it also claims that the ground of but even though such anger might involve the desire moral judgments lies in our sentiments. Thus, David to get back at your ancestor as well as expressive Hume, the most prominent moral sentimentalist, action, it is far from clear that anger directed at famously states that ‘morality [ … ] is more properly the past needs to do so. Moreover, there are kinds felt than judg’d of’ (Ref 94, book III, part I, section of emotions that are less obviously connected to III) and explicitly argues that moral distinctions are motivation, such as admiration, joy, relief, and awe. not derived from reason. It would appear that you can admire a landscape To make progress in this debate, two questions without having any particular desire or wish regarding need to be settled. The first concerns the nature of the landscape. So, even if emotions such as anger emotions. It is only if emotions are taken to be entirely and fear appear standardly tied to desires and thus nonintentional states, which have nothing to do with to action, it is not obvious that this is part of their rationality, that a radical contrast between moral

© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Overview wires.wiley.com/cogsci sentimentalism and moral rationalism can be upheld judgments, utterances or facts is supposed to be (see Emotion and the Affective Domain section). The accounted for. This makes for a problem. As we second question concerns the exact role emotions are have observed above, the recent consensus in emo- supposed to play in our ethical lives. Given the diver- tion theory is that there is ground to question these sity of emotion types—think of the difference between assumptions and to adopt an intentional account of hate, guilt, and compassion, for instance—and the emotions, such as the judgmental or the perceptual complexity of each particular emotion episode, it theory. should not come as a surprise that emotions have There are other ways to conceive the relation been taken to play quite different roles in our ethi- between moral judgments and emotions. On a promis- cal lives. Moreover, there are many sorts of entities ing account, which can be traced back to Franz which are likely to have interesting relations to emo- Brentano,103 moral concepts can be analyzed in terms tions. For instance, one can think about the relation of the concept of emotions that are fitting or appro- between emotions and (1) moral judgments, such as priate to their object. There are different ways to spell the judgments concerning what agents ought to do or out what has become known as neo-sentimentalism judgments about what is good or bad, admirable or or fitting attitude analyses. In a nutshell, the claim despicable, and so on, (2) moral motivation and is that equivalences like the following hold in virtue action, (3) moral reasoning or deliberation about of the concepts that are involved: x is fearsome if what to do, (4) moral facts, such as the fact and only x is such as to make fear appropriate, and that an agent ought not to cheat, supposing that similarly x is admirable if and only if x is such as there are such facts, as well as (5) character, and to make admiration appropriate.104–106 In order to in particular virtuous and vicious traits, such as spell out such approaches, one must of course spec- courage and cowardice. Emotions also play a ify what it is for emotions to be appropriate. This role with respect to a number of goods,suchas has proven particularly tricky, for a good account autonomy47,94,95 or wellbeing.58,96 Here, we focus on needs to avoid an important objection, which empha- the role of emotions in moral judgments and in moral sizes that an emotion such as admiration might well motivation. be appropriate with respect to something that is far According to a number of philosophers, moral from admirable. It can for instance be useful to judgments, or at least a specifiable group of these admire one’s rich acquaintance’s yacht if one wants judgments, are reducible to, constituted by, or iden- to be invited on board, but this has little to do tical with emotion.97,98 Observe in passing that these with its genuine admirableness.106,107 In response, it approaches represent the exact inversion of judgmen- has been argued that the notion of appropriateness tal theories of emotions, according to which emo- at stake has to be defined in terms of the notion tions are constituted by or identical to evaluative or of the correctness of emotions with respect to their normative judgments (see Emotion and the Affective objects.108,109 Domain section). This option has been attractive to The main attraction of an approach along proponents of moral noncognitivism, the view that these lines is that it promises to make room for two moral judgments do not have the function of stating apparently conflicting features of moral judgments, facts and thus fail to be genuinely truth-assessable. namely their motivational force and their cognitive As a view about judgments, moral noncognitivism is character. Moral judgments appear to be on a par distinct from, but congenial to, two important but with paradigmatic cognitive judgments, such as judg- controversial doctrines, which consider emotions to ments about shapes and colors, but they also appear be central to ethics: expressivism (or emotivism), the to have a special relation to motivation. In principle, semantic thesis that the function of moral sentences is we expect that someone who judges that he ought to express emotions,99–101 and projectivism,theview to help a friend will be motivated accordingly, and that morality per se is a projection of our emotions the same is true if someone judges that it is shame- onto the world.102 ful not to help. Someone who fails to be motivated In general, moral noncognitivism, as well accordingly appears to suffer from a kind of practical as emotivism and projectivism, are premised on irrationality, such as weakness of will.110 This feature two assumptions about the nature of emotions: of moral judgments is something that can, it appears, first, that emotions lack representational content, be explained in terms of the connection between the which can be assessable in terms of truth or cor- judgment and the motivation standardly involved in rectness; and, second, that emotions are essentially emotion. motivational states, so that by establishing a link The account of moral judgments in terms of fit- to emotion, the motivational power of evaluative ting or appropriate emotions postulates a conceptual

© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Cognitive Science Emotion, philosophical issues about connection between moral concepts and emotion con- such as shame and guilt. Finally, virtue ethicists, who cepts. Other accounts are more empirically oriented. focus not so much on right action as on character, They aim at establishing causal relations between have underlined the role of a great many emotions 132 emotions and moral judgments. Experiments in social in the exercise of virtues and vices. Courage, for psychology suggest that emotions have a huge impact instance, is plausibly taken to involve not so much as on our moral judgments. Whether we consider a the absence of fear as the right degree of fear. Virtue practice to be morally doubtful depends at least in part ethicists have also been the first to promote the idea on whether we feel disgust toward that practice.111,112 that emotions cannot just be taken as given, but need However, the causal relation between emotions and attention and education, an idea that can be traced 22,114,120,133,134 moral judgments should not be taken to go in one back to Aristotle. direction only, for the judgments we make given our education and socialization are likely to influence our emotional reactions. What we see as morally CONCLUSION wrong, for instance, will tend to trigger negative In spite of the importance of emotions in the work reactions. of a great many major figures in the history of Quite generally, recent debates suggest that both philosophy—Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, our emotions and our rational faculties contribute to Hume all offer detailed accounts of the emotions— our moral judgments. The difficult question concerns contemporary philosophical interest in the emotions the exact contribution of emotions and reason in is relatively recent. Yet, since the seminal works of moral judgments. Insofar as the central notion in David Lyons,16 Robert Gordon,135 and Ronald de neo-sentimentalism is that of an appropriate emo- Sousa,32 the philosophical literature on emotion has tion, which is fitting to its object, this approach exploded. From what used to be considered a rela- makes room for rational assessment of emotions. tively unimportant and extremely messy terrain likely The same is true of recent suggestions concerning to defeat any attempts at systematic theorizing, emo- the causal mechanisms that are responsible for moral tions have become one of the favorite playgrounds judgments. According to one of the most promi- of philosophers, who have recognized the importance nent recent accounts, which has been proposed by of deepening our understanding of this fundamental Shaun Nichols, the mechanism responsible for ‘core aspect of human life. This is manifest in the variety moral judgments’, which concern prohibition of and richness of the debates around which the contem- harm, depend both on our emotions and our rational porary philosophical discussions are structured. How capacities.112 should we understand the relations between emo- Philosophers have also been interested in the tions and other affective phenomena? What is dis- roles of specific emotions, such as pity, compassion tinctive in the way emotions relate us with our sur- and sympathy112–114;love,85,115–117 and respect,118,119 roundings? If we endorse the idea that emotions dis- on the positive side, and shame120,121; guilt122,123; play an intimate relation to evaluative properties, how disgust124;envy125; resentment and indignation,126,127 best to model this relation? Are emotions apt to play on the negative side. Even though the focus has significant epistemological roles vis-à-vis the evalua- mostly been on their motivational impact, each of tive judgments they typically lead us to make? How these emotion kinds raises specific questions regarding should we understand the kinds of social influences their moral importance. Moreover, depending on the to which emotions unquestionably lend themselves? favored ethical theory, different kinds of emotion Do emotions motivate us essentially, or is their rela- have been considered central.128 Thus, deontologists, tion to motivation much looser? What sort of link according to whom the right action is defined in terms to motivation do moral judgments have and how of absolute rules, have tended to focus on the attitude does this constrain our conception of the relations of respect, and more specifically on the Kantian notion between emotions and morality? In the short space of of respect for the moral law.129 From a consequen- this overview, we have had more than one opportu- tialist perspective, according to which the right action nity to highlight how deeply connected these various is the one that has the best overall consequences, issues are. The relevance of these questions to human the focus has been, mainly following Hume,130 on endeavor justify the renewed interest among philoso- fellow-feelings such as pity and zcompassion, but also phers to take up the complex challenges emotions on what Mill131 considered internalized punishments, constitute.

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