Measuring Progress in the Struggle Against Violent Jihadism
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Articles Al-Qaida and the Pakistani Harakat Movement: Reflections and Questions About the Pre-2001 Period by Don Rassler
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 11, Issue 6 Articles Al-Qaida and the Pakistani Harakat Movement: Reflections and Questions about the pre-2001 Period by Don Rassler Abstract There has been a modest amount of progress made over the last two decades in piecing together the developments that led to creation of al-Qaida and how the group has evolved over the last 30 years. Yet, there are still many dimensions of al-Qaida that remain understudied, and likely as a result, poorly understood. One major gap are the dynamics and relationships that have underpinned al-Qaida’s multi-decade presence in Pakistan. The lack of developed and foundational work done on the al-Qaida-Pakistan linkage is quite surprising given how long al- Qaida has been active in the country, the mix of geographic areas - from Pakistan’s tribal areas to its main cities - in which it has operated and found shelter, and the key roles Pakistani al-Qaida operatives have played in the group over the last two decades. To push the ball forward and advance understanding of this critical issue, this article examines what is known, and has been suggested, about al-Qaida’s relations with a cluster of Deobandi militant groups consisting of Harakat ul-Mujahidin, Harakat ul-Jihad Islami, Harakat ul-Ansar, and Jaish-e-Muhammad, which have been collectively described as Pakistan’s Harakat movement, prior to 9/11. It finds that each of these groups and their leaders provided key elements of support to al-Qaida in a number of direct and indirect ways. -
9/11 Report”), July 2, 2004, Pp
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page i THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page v CONTENTS List of Illustrations and Tables ix Member List xi Staff List xiii–xiv Preface xv 1. “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” 1 1.1 Inside the Four Flights 1 1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense 14 1.3 National Crisis Management 35 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 A Declaration of War 47 2.2 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992) 55 2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996) 59 2.5 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63 3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71 3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing 71 3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation— ...in the Law Enforcement Community 73 3.3 . and in the Federal Aviation Administration 82 3.4 . and in the Intelligence Community 86 v Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page vi 3.5 . and in the State Department and the Defense Department 93 3.6 . and in the White House 98 3.7 . and in the Congress 102 4. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS 108 4.1 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 108 4.2 Crisis:August 1998 115 4.3 Diplomacy 121 4.4 Covert Action 126 4.5 Searching for Fresh Options 134 5. -
The Al Qaeda Network a New Framework for Defining the Enemy
THE AL QAEDA NETWORK A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING THE ENEMY KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN SEPTEMBER 2013 THE AL QAEDA NETWORK A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING THE ENEMY KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN SEPTEMBER 2013 A REPORT BY AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ABOUT US About the Author Katherine Zimmerman is a senior analyst and the al Qaeda and Associated Movements Team Lead for the Ameri- can Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project. Her work has focused on al Qaeda’s affiliates in the Gulf of Aden region and associated movements in western and northern Africa. She specializes in the Yemen-based group, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab. Zimmerman has testified in front of Congress and briefed Members and congressional staff, as well as members of the defense community. She has written analyses of U.S. national security interests related to the threat from the al Qaeda network for the Weekly Standard, National Review Online, and the Huffington Post, among others. Acknowledgments The ideas presented in this paper have been developed and refined over the course of many conversations with the research teams at the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project. The valuable insights and understandings of regional groups provided by these teams directly contributed to the final product, and I am very grateful to them for sharing their expertise with me. I would also like to express my deep gratitude to Dr. Kimberly Kagan and Jessica Lewis for dedicating their time to helping refine my intellectual under- standing of networks and to Danielle Pletka, whose full support and effort helped shape the final product. -
Won't You Be My Neighbor
Won’t You Be My Neighbor: Syria, Iraq and the Changing Strategic Context in the Middle East S TEVEN SIMON Council on Foreign Relations March 2009 www.usip.org Date www.usip.org UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE – WORKING PAPER Won’t You Be My Neighbor UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20036-3011 © 2009 by the United States Institute of Peace. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions. This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author ([email protected]) or [email protected]. This is a working draft. Comments, questions, and permission to cite should be directed to the author ([email protected]) or [email protected]. UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE – WORKING PAPER Won’t You Be My Neighbor About this Report Iraq's neighbors are playing a major role—both positive and negative—in the stabilization and reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq. In an effort to prevent conflict across Iraq's borders and in order to promote positive international and regional engagement, USIP has initiated high-level, non-official dialogue between foreign policy and national security figures from Iraq, its neighbors and the United States. The Institute’s "Iraq and its Neighbors" project has also convened a group of leading specialists on the geopolitics of the region to assess the interests and influence of the countries surrounding Iraq and to explain the impact of these transformed relationships on U.S. -
Islamlowydesign II.Indd
Lowy Institute Paper 05 joining the caravan? THE MIDDLE EAST, ISLAMISM AND INDONESIA Anthony Bubalo Greg Fealy Lowy Institute Paper 05 joining the caravan? THE MIDDLE EAST, ISLAMISM AND INDONESIA Anthony Bubalo Greg Fealy First published for The Lowy Institute for International Policy 2005 by PO Box 7143 Alexandria New South Wales 1435 Australia www.longmedia.com.au [email protected] Tel. (+61 2) 8338 0050 Copyright © Lowy Institute for International Policy 2005 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means (including but not limited to electronic, mechanical, photocopying, or recording), without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Cover and text design by Shane Grantham Printed and bound in Australia Typeset in Esprit Book 10 National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication data Bubalo, Anthony 1968- . Joining the caravan? : the Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia. Bibliography. ISBN 1 921004 11 8. 1. Islam and politics - Indonesia. 2. Indonesia - Foreign relations - Asia. 3. Asia - Foreign relations - Indonesia. 4. Indonesia - Foreign relations - Australia. 5. Australia - Foreign relations - Indonesia. I. Fealy, Greg. II. Lowy Institute for International Policy. III. Title. (Series : Lowy Institute Paper ; no. 5). 327.598 Anthony Bubalo is a research fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy. His principal fi eld of research is the politics of the Middle East. Dr Greg Fealy is a research fellow and lecturer at the Australian National University specialising in Indonesian Islam and politics. -
Updated List Is Attached to This Letter
TERRORISM U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control What WhatYou YouNeed Need To To Know Know AboutAbout U.S. The Sanctions U.S. Embargo Executive Order 13224 blocking Terrorist Property and a summary of the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (Title 31 Part 595 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations), Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations (Title 31 Part 596 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations), and Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (Title 31 Part 597 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations) EXECUTIVE ORDER 13224 - BLOCKING PROPERTY AND PROHIBITING TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS WHO COMMIT, THREATEN TO COMMIT, OR SUPPORT TERRORISM By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c) (UNPA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and in view of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1214 of December 8, 1998, UNSCR 1267 of October 15, 1999, UNSCR 1333 of December 19, 2000, and the multilateral sanctions contained therein, and UNSCR 1363 of July 30, 2001, establishing a mechanism to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1333, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, find that grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, including -
Are Efforts to Reduce Terrorism Successful?
AI Reduce Terrorism INT 7/15/04 12:12 PM Page 1 are efforts to reduce terrorism successful? Lauri S. Friedman, Book Editor Bruce Glassman, Vice President Bonnie Szumski, Publisher Helen Cothran, Managing Editor Detroit • New York • San Francisco • San Diego • New Haven, Conn. Waterville, Maine • London • Munich AI Reduce Terrorism INT 7/15/04 12:12 PM Page 2 © 2005 Thomson Gale, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson and Star Logo are trademarks and Gale and Greenhaven Press are registered trademarks used herein under license. For more information, contact Greenhaven Press 27500 Drake Rd. Farmington Hills, MI 48331-3535 Or you can visit our Internet site at http://www.gale.com ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this work covered by the copyright hereon may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means—graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, taping, Web distribution or information storage retrieval systems—without the written permission of the publisher. Every effort has been made to trace the owners of copyrighted material. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Are efforts to reduce terrorism successful? / Lauri S. Friedman, book editor. p. cm. — (At issue) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7377-2334-3 (lib. : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-7377-2335-1 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Terrorism—United States—Prevention. 2. Terrorism—Government policy— United States. 3. War on Terrorism, 2001– . I. Friedman, Lauri S. II. Series: At issue (San Diego, Calif.) HV6432.A74 2005 363.32'0973—dc22 2004042421 Printed in the United States of America AI Reduce Terrorism INT 7/15/04 12:12 PM Page 3 Contents Page Introduction 5 1. -
MEI Report Sunni Deobandi-Shi`I Sectarian Violence in Pakistan Explaining the Resurgence Since 2007 Arif Ra!Q
MEI Report Sunni Deobandi-Shi`i Sectarian Violence in Pakistan Explaining the Resurgence Since 2007 Arif Ra!q Photo Credit: AP Photo/B.K. Bangash December 2014 ! Sunni Deobandi-Shi‘i Sectarian Violence in Pakistan Explaining the Resurgence since 2007 Arif Rafiq! DECEMBER 2014 1 ! ! Contents ! ! I. Summary ................................................................................. 3! II. Acronyms ............................................................................... 5! III. The Author ............................................................................ 8! IV. Introduction .......................................................................... 9! V. Historic Roots of Sunni Deobandi-Shi‘i Conflict in Pakistan ...... 10! VI. Sectarian Violence Surges since 2007: How and Why? ............ 32! VII. Current Trends: Sectarianism Growing .................................. 91! VIII. Policy Recommendations .................................................. 105! IX. Bibliography ..................................................................... 110! X. Notes ................................................................................ 114! ! 2 I. Summary • Sectarian violence between Sunni Deobandi and Shi‘i Muslims in Pakistan has resurged since 2007, resulting in approximately 2,300 deaths in Pakistan’s four main provinces from 2007 to 2013 and an estimated 1,500 deaths in the Kurram Agency from 2007 to 2011. • Baluchistan and Karachi are now the two most active zones of violence between Sunni Deobandis and Shi‘a, -
VERORDNUNG (EG) Nr. 881/2002 DES RATES Vom 27. Mai 2002
VERORDNUNG (EG) Nr. 881/2002 DES RATES vom 27. Mai 2002 (*) über die Anwendung bestimmter spezifischer restriktiver Maßnahmen gegen bestimmte Personen und Organisationen, die mit den ISIL (Da'esh)- und Al-Qaida- Organisationen in Verbindung stehen, zuletzt geändert durch die DURCHFÜHRUNGSVERORDNUNG (EU) 2016/2262 DER KOMMISSION vom 15. Dezember 2016 (**) DER RAT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION – gestützt auf den Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, insbesondere auf die Artikel 60, 301 und 308, gestützt auf den Gemeinsamen Standpunkt 2002/402/GASP zu den restriktiven Maßnahmen gegen Osama bin Laden, Mitglieder der Organisation Al-Qaida und die Taliban sowie andere Einzelpersonen, Gruppen, Unterneh- men und Organisationen, die mit ihnen in Verbindung stehen, mit dem die Gemeinsamen Standpunkte 96/746/GASP, 1999/727/GASP, 2001/154/GASP und 2001/771/GASP1 aufgehoben wurden, auf Vorschlag der Kommission2, nach Stellungnahme des Europäischen Parlaments3, in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe: (1) Am 16. Januar 2002 nahm der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen die Resolution 1390(2002) an, in der er feststellte, dass die Taliban auf die in mehreren vorausgegangenen Resolutionen gestellten Forderungen nicht reagiert hatten, und die Taliban dafür verurteilte, dass sie die Nutzung Afghanistans als Basis für die Ausbildung von Terroristen und terroristische Aktivitäten zugelassen haben, und in der er ferner das Al- Qaida-Netzwerk und andere mit ihm in Verbindung stehende terroristische Gruppen für ihre terroristischen Handlungen und die Zerstörung von Sachwerten verurteilte. (2) Der Sicherheitsrat beschloss unter anderem, dass das nach seinen Resolutionen 1267(1999) und 1333(2000) verhängte Flugverbot und einige der Afghanistan auferlegten Ausfuhrbeschränkungen aufgeho- ben und der Anwendungsbereich des Einfrierens von Geldern und das Verbot der Bereitstellung von Mitteln, die nach diesen Resolutionen auferlegt worden waren, angepasst werden sollen. -
Serviciul De Informații Și Securitate
Republica Moldova SERVICIUL DE INFORMAȚII ȘI SECURITATE ORDIN Nr. OSIS68/2011 din 15.11.2011 privind listele persoanelor, grupurilor şi entităţilor implicate în activităţi teroriste Publicat : 25.11.2011 în MONITORUL OFICIAL Nr. 203-205 art. 1789 Data intrării în vigoare Versiune în vigoare din 20.06.14 în baza modificărilor prin OSIS54 din 10.06.14, MO160-166/20.06.14 art.867 În temeiul articolului 14 alineatul (4) din Legea nr.190-XVI din 26 iulie 2007 cu privire la prevenirea şi combaterea spălării banilor şi finanţării terorismului (Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, 2007, nr.141-145, art.597) şi întru implementarea Rezoluţiilor Consiliului de Securitate al Organizaţiei Naţiunilor Unite nr. 1988 (2011) şi nr. 1989 (2011), ORDON: 1. Se aduce la cunoştinţa entităţilor raportoare şi autorităţilor publice abilitate cu prevenirea şi combaterea spălării banilor şi finanţării terorismului: Lista persoanelor şi entităţilor asociate cu „Taliban”, menţinută de Comitetul Consiliului de Securitate al Organizaţiei Naţiunilor Unite, instituit prin Rezoluţia 1988 (2011) (anexa nr.1); Lista persoanelor, grupurilor, întreprinderilor şi altor entităţi asociate cu „Al-Qaida”, menţinută de Comitetul Consiliului de Securitate al Organizaţiei Naţiunilor Unite, instituit prin Rezoluţia 1267 (1999) (anexa nr.2); Lista persoanelor, grupurilor şi entităţilor care intră sub incidenţa articolelor 2, 3 şi 4 din Poziţia comună 2001/931/PESC privind aplicarea de măsuri specifice pentru combaterea terorismului, (anexa nr.3). 2. Informaţii suplimentare privind persoanele, entităţile, grupurile şi întreprinderile incluse în anexele nr. 1 şi nr. 2 urmează a fi consultate la adresa: www.un.org. 3. Se stabileşte că versiunile electronice ale listelor persoanelor şi entităţilor implicate în activităţi teroriste se plasează în reţeaua Internet la adresa www.antiteror.sis.md şi se distribuie, la cerere, autorităţilor publice, entităţilor raportoare şi altor persoane interesate. -
Pakistan Page 1 of 17
Pakistan Page 1 of 17 Pakistan Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2004 Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor February 28, 2005 Pakistan is a federal republic. Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf overthrew the elected civilian government in 1999. The Supreme Court later legitimized the overthrow, but ordered Musharraf to restore elected government within 3 years. Musharraf assumed the Presidency by decree in 2001. In 2002, a controversial national referendum affirmed Musharraf as President for 5 years. Elections for the National Assembly were held in 2002. Domestic and international observers termed the elections deeply flawed. Musharraf's Pakistan Muslim League (PML) won a plurality of seats and formed a governing coalition with several smaller parties. Indirect Senate elections in February 2003 gave the governing coalition 55 of 100 seats. In December 2003, the National and Provincial Assemblies passed the 17th Amendment to the Constitution. The Amendment transfers a number of powers from the Office of Prime Minister to the President, affirms Musharraf's presidency through 2007, sets the terms under which the President could dissolve the National Assembly, and exempts Musharraf from a prohibition on holding two offices of state until the end of the year, allowing him to remain as Chief of Army Staff. In October, over opposition protests, Parliament passed another bill that exploits a loophole in the Constitution to extend the exemption until 2007. The judiciary was nominally independent but remained subject to corruption and political pressure. Police have primary internal security responsibilities, although paramilitary forces, such as the Rangers and the Frontier Constabulary, provide support in areas where law and order problems are acute. -
Abu Ubaida Al-Banshiri
Abu ‘Ubayda al-Banshiri Ali Amin ‘Ali al-Rashidi, better known as Abu ‘Ubayda al-Banshiri, was born in May of 1950 in Cairo, Egypt. At 46, he was al-Qa’ida’s military commander and second-in- command when he perished in a ferry accident on Lake Victoria on May 21, 1996. After acquiring his nom de guerre in Afghanistan while fighting the Soviets in the 1980s, al- Rashidi became a founding member of al-Qa’ida. He was intimately involved in al- Qa’ida’s expansion to the African continent, as well as the operational planning of their activities there. Al-Rashidi’s documented history begins with the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat in October of 1981. ‘Abd al-Hamid ‘Abd al-Salam, al-Rashidi’s future brother-in-law, was one of the several assassins along with a National Police officer.1 The assassins were members of an early incarnation of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, also called al-Jihad. In the ensuing crackdown on radicalism, al-Rashidi was dismissed from his job as a National Police officer, and arrested briefly for exhibiting extremist tendencies and having alleged ties to al-Jihad.2 In 1983, al-Rashidi married Hafsah Sa’d Rashwan, the sister of ‘Abd al-Salam’s wife. According to testimony provided by al-Rashidi’s wife, his involvement in jihad actually began shortly after this time. She states that they were in a poor financial situation two months after their marriage, during which time he was working in construction but contemplating a move to Saudi Arabia.