feature article

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formed in May 1975 to “promote cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability,” as written in Article 1 ECOWAS and Mediation of the 1993 ECOWAS Revised Treaty. ECOWAS is now better known for its in West Africa: involvement in conflict prevention, Toward an Enhanced Capacity management, and resolution through mediation and peacekeeping. Between the by Samuel Atuobi 1990s and early 2000s, ECOWAS inter- vened in such a manner in four member Samuel Atuobi is a Researcher and Head of states: Liberia, , Guinea- the International Institutions Program based Bissau, and Côte d’Ivoire. More recently, at the Research Department of the Kofi ECOWAS has been involved in mediation Annan International Peacekeeping Training in two additional member states, Guinea Centre in Accra, Ghana. and Niger; in addition, the resurgence of political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire following the disputed November 2010 election ABSTRACT: calls for ECOWAS’s reengagement to The Economic Community of West restore stability. African States (ECOWAS) has been ECOWAS’s involvement in the mediation involved in mediation in West Africa for of interstate conflicts in West Africa raises the past two decades. Over the years such a number of questions. First, where does mediation efforts have produced mixed the organization derive its mandate to results, successes and failures alike. This mediate in member states? Second, how article provides the background to has this mandate been pursued and how ECOWAS mediation and recommends effective has it been? And third, what can the following for the future: (1) All be done within policy circles to improve stakeholders should support ECOWAS’s mediation processes in West Africa? This efforts to establish a mediation-facilita- article attempts to answer these questions tion division to bridge the gap between its by discussing ECOWAS mediation and mandate and capacity; (2) ECOWAS offering suggestions for the consideration should combine president mediators with of policy makers. The article recognizes professional mediators who have exper- ECOWAS’s efforts to improve mediation tise and experience in creating win-win and conflict prevention processes but solutions; (3) ECOWAS should develop posits that a gap remains between its enforcement capacity for decisions mandate and the capacity to successfully arrived at through mediation; and (4) mediate regional crises (see Nathan 2007 ECOWAS should explore traditional for a similar argument). modes of conflict resolution to supple- ment modern methods. The first section examines ECOWAS’s mandate to mediate in regional conflicts

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while the second looks at ECOWAS’s role would be used to resolve any conflict in selected West African conflicts since the between two of its member states (in its 1990s. The third sections draws lessons Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of from these cases. Finally, the fourth Defence, Article 17). In 1993, ECOWAS section offers recommendations for the again committed itself to the principle of consideration of policy makers toward peaceful settlement of disputes among the enhancement of peacemaking member states, including the use of capacity in West Africa. The article mediation (in its Revised Treaty, Article concludes by suggesting that ECOWAS 4). Then, in 1999, in order to develop a and the entire West Africa region stand to more comprehensive peace and security benefit from a more institutionalized and architecture, ECOWAS adopted the professional approach to mediation and Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for conflict prevention. Conflict Prevention, Management,

t ECOWAS has made efforts to improve mediation and conflict prevention processes but a gap remains between its mandate and the capacity to successfully mediate regional crises.

THE MANDATE OF ECOWAS TO Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security. MEDIATE IN INTERSTATE CONFLICTS In Article 58 of this protocol, ECOWAS This article defines mediation as a committed itself to “employ, where third-party intervention to assist groups appropriate, good offices, conciliation, in conflict to arrive at a mutually accept- meditation and other methods of able settlement. In West Africa, a region peaceful settlement of disputes.” Under characterized by conflicts, mediation has Article 4 of the Mechanism, the Authority been used to limit the spread or escalation of Heads of State and Government, the of crises with a regional dimension and to Mediation and Security Council, and the promote an environment for better ECOWAS Commission have specific roles relations between conflicting parties. to play in mediation and conflict preven- Given that ECOWAS is a regional body, tion, resolution, and management in mediation in West Africa should be West Africa. understood within the context of its The Authority of Heads of State and mandate to mediate in conflicts, promote Government, the highest decision-making peace and stability, and protect civilians. body of ECOWAS, is mandated to act on ECOWAS’s mandate to mediate in all issues relating to conflict prevention, conflicts in its member states to promote management, and resolution. On its peace and security in West Africa has behalf, the Mediation and Security evolved over time and is captured in Council decides on all matters relating to number of protocols and documents. In peace and security, conflict prevention, 1981, ECOWAS declared that mediation and authorization of the deployment of

30 ecowas and mediation in west africa t ECOWAS and the entire West Africa region stand to benefit from a more institutionalized and professional approach to mediation and conflict prevention. military and political mediation missions. mediation with the participation of major The Commission implements decisions stakeholders. Preventive diplomacy, of the Authority and the Mediation and according to ECOWAS, is considered to Security Council relating to conflict be an operational conflict-prevention tool prevention, management, resolution, to deal with imminent conflict. It is to be peacekeeping, and security in West used to promote conflict resolution Africa.1 In line with this responsibility, the within member states through good president of the ECOWAS Commission offices, mediation, conciliation, and deploys fact-finding and mediation facilitation based on dialogue, negotia- missions and appoints members of the tion, and arbitration. Council of Wise. This body, formerly named the Council of Elders, is made up ECOWAS MEDIATION: FROM MANDATE of eminent personalities from all fifteen TO PRACTICE ECOWAS states who use their good ECOWAS interventions in the 1990s, offices and experience to play the role of beginning with the Liberian conflict, were mediators, conciliators, and facilitators on initiated with a rudimentary and weak behalf of ECOWAS (as in Articles 17 and mandate. The organization’s security 20 of the Mechanism). Members of the architecture and authority to mediate in Council are not necessarily professional regional crisis evolved gradually in mediators. response to conflicts in the region. This may explain in part the reason why some Next, in 2001, ECOWAS made further conflicts (such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, attempts to improve its systems when it and Côte d’Ivoire) have been protracted called on its member states to institution- in spite of ECOWAS intervention. alize national mediation in Article 36 of its Protocol on Democracy and Good The conflicts in which ECOWAS has Governance. In spite of this call, such intervened that are examined here share efforts in West African states and within similar characteristics: they were civil ECOWAS itself have been slow and conflicts based on a struggle primarily for responses to conflicts in the region have political power and, at times, over been largely ad hoc. resources. While ECOWAS’s approach in these situations has been similar (using Finally, in 2008, the ECOWAS Conflict mediation, peacekeeping, or the threat of Prevention Framework (ECPF) was military intervention), each engagement adopted to institutionalize and enhance has produced different outcomes. The mediation capacities in West Africa. The following cases detail ECOWAS media- ECPF, among other documents, commits tion in six of its member states: Liberia, ECOWAS to the development of a Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Côte comprehensive preventive diplomacy d’Ivoire, Niger, and Guinea. architecture that seeks to address gaps in

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Liberia Patriotic Front of Liberia was the biggest Conflict broke out in Liberia in December of the rebel groups. At the time there were 1989 when the National Patriotic Front of allegations that Côte d’Ivoire was backing Liberia led by Charles Taylor launched a the rebellion. rebellion, ostensibly to overthrow the Second, four more rounds of mediation government of Liberia under the presi- by ECOWAS under the auspices of the dency of Samuel Doe. At the height of the late Côte d’Ivoire President Félix conflict the number of both internally Houphouët-Boigny led to the displaced persons and refugee flows into Yamoussoukro IV Accord in October neighboring states grew dramatically. For 1991 to salvage the peace process. A major example, the population of the Liberian false step was the selection of the then- capital of Monrovia grew from 600,000 in president of Côte d’Ivoire, who was 1991 to approximately one million at the alleged to be supporting one of the height of the crisis, while refugees flowing factions, to mediate in the conflict. The into neighboring countries were esti- fairness of the mediator was in doubt. It is mated at 700,000 (Ero 1995). In response therefore not surprising that the to the unfolding catastrophe, ECOWAS Yamoussoukro IV Accord suffered intervened in Liberia in line with its setbacks due to continued fighting mandate to promote peace and stability between the rebel groups amidst doubts within member states, prevent the about ECOMOG’s impartiality (Ero regionalization of the conflict, reduce 1995). Mediation efforts continued in human suffering, and protect civilians. 1992, this time with the participation of ECOWAS’s approach was to set up a the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) in now the African Union) and the United August 1990 that approved the formation Nations (UN). Joint efforts from of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring ECOWAS, OAU, and the UN resulted in Group (ECOMOG) to intervene militar- renewed talks in Cotonou, Benin, and ily in the conflict as peacekeepers (Ero Accra, Ghana, in September and October 1995). In addition to peacekeeping, from 1994, respectively. Both mediation efforts 1989 to 1997, when the first post-conflict resulted in some agreements but failed to elections were held, ECOWAS mediation resolve the conflict largely due to lack of efforts resulted in thirteen peace agree- commitment by the main factions (Ero ments. This article reflects on the major 1995). peace agreements and why some of them One important reason for the failure of failed to bring peace to Liberia. most of the peace agreements was the First, the Lomé Peace Agreement in inability of ECOWAS to enforce the February 1991 led to the formation of the agreements and or support the parties in Interim Government of National Unity, their implementation. The last of the which was conceived earlier under the agreements during Liberia’s first civil war ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia in (from 1989 to 1997) was the Abuja Peace December 1990. But mediation efforts Agreement of 1995. The reason why unravelled as Taylor refused to cooperate Abuja may have held is likely because with the interim government because he Taylor saw the possibility of him coming believed he could capture state power to power through elections. Indeed, the through military action; Taylor’s National

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1997 elections paved the way for Taylor to overthrow the All People’s Congress become the president of Liberia. government, led by President Joseph Momoh, and restore democracy. The In 1999, a second civil war started with conflict lasted until January 2002, during the formation of new rebel groups, the which some 70,000 people lost their lives Liberia United for Reconciliation and and 2.6 million people were displaced Democracy (LURD) and the Movement (Kaldor and Vincent 2006, 4). for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), which considered Taylor’s government The search for peace in Sierra Leone was undemocratic and sought to overthrow it. prolonged as a result of military coups With this resumption of conflict in (1992, 1996, and 1997) that brought Liberia (from 1999 to 2003), ECOWAS leaders to power who preferred military embarked on another peacemaking and solutions over negotiations. However, military intervention. The most signifi- when a democratically elected govern- cant outcome of ECOWAS mediation ment took office in February 1996 (under held in Accra was the signing of the ), negotiations Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2003. began, and the Abidjan Peace Accord was The agreement was signed between the signed in November 1996. ECOWAS government of Liberia, LURD, MODEL, played a less visible role in the 1996 peace and Political Parties. This agreement, negotiation. Instead, it was hosted by the unlike previous ones, made room for the government of Côte d’Ivoire and driven participation of civil society groups in the by the OAU (Lord 2000, 23). But, follow- negotiations and their eventual inclusion ing a military coup in May 1997 that in the transitional government. The overthrew Tejan Kabbah and led to his agreement also facilitated the formation exile to Guinea, which made the imple- of a government of national unity, which mentation of the Abidjan Peace Accord led the country until general elections impossible, ECOWAS became more were held in October 2005. engaged in the quest for peace. The organization met with the military The success of the 2003 peace agreement leadership of Sierra Leone and adopted a could therefore be attributed to the unity six-month peace plan in Conakry, of purpose of West African leaders, most Guinea. The primary objective of the plan of whom were now committed to lasting included the ending of hostilities and the peace, and to the inclusion of civil society restoration of the government of Tejan organizations in the peace-building Kabbah. When the military junta in Sierra process and the transitional government. Leone refused to comply with the peace The combined efforts of ECOWAS and a plan, ECOWAS worked through its strong UN peacekeeping force made it military wing, ECOMOG, to depose the possible to sustain the peace. military junta and restore Kabbah to Sierra Leone office in February 1998. This paved the way for another round of peace talks in While ECOWAS was trying to resolve the May 1999 in Lomé under the auspices of conflict in Liberia, another conflict broke Togo President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who out in neighboring Sierra Leone in March was at the time the chairman of 1991. A rebel group known as the ECOWAS. In the Lomé peace talks, Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by ECOWAS was part of the mediation , began a rebellion to

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committee alongside the UN and OAU, Senegalese province of Casamance (BBC among other interest groups (Lord 2000, News 1998). Compared to the conflicts in 30). The Lomé Peace Accord of July 7, Sierra Leone and Liberia, this was not a 1999, gave amnesty to the rebel leadership large-scale conflict. It lasted for just and instituted a UN peacekeeping force eleven months, but it had a devastating with a robust mandate. After an attempt effect on the people of Guinea-Bissau by the RUF to violate the peace agree- (Massey 2004, 1). ment, its leader, Sankoh, was arrested by ECOWAS got involved in mediating the UN forces and imprisoned.2 The Lomé conflict with backing from the OAU and Peace Accord remained the key road map UN, alongside other mediators, most to peace in Sierra Leone until the war was significantly, the community of declared over in January 2002. The first Portuguese-speaking countries (CPLP) post-conflict elections were held in May (Massey 2004). Initial mediation efforts 2002, contributing to the restoration of by ECOWAS produced a cease-fire democracy. agreement in August 1998 and the Abuja It should be noted that the peace was Accord in November 1998. The key sustained in Sierra Leone largely due to highlights of the agreement were the the presence of a UN peacekeeping force deployment of ECOWAS forces, forma- with a sufficiently strong mandate and tion of a government of national unity, personnel to enforce the peace agree- and the holding of elections by March ment.3 This is because, like in Liberia, the 1999. While efforts were underway to rebel leadership in Sierra Leone showed a implement this Abuja Accord, a coup lack of commitment to respect the peace d’état on May 7 1999, ousted President agreements it had signed. Vieira, brought the peace process to an end, and prompted the departure of Thus, in looking for ways to improve ECOWAS forces from Guinea-Bissau. negotiated outcomes in West Africa, Thus, the case of Guinea-Bissau is similar ECOWAS and the international commu- to that of Sierra Leone in that a military nity needed to become better at designing coup disrupted efforts by ECOWAS to peace agreements that would have the implement a mediated solution. It is true commitment of conflicting parties. therefore difficult to assess whether this The peace process in Sierra Leone also solution would have succeeded in showed that there is the need for a strong establishing a lasting peace. In any case, peacekeeping force to enforce peace ECOWAS’s involvement in Guinea-Bissau agreements in West Africa. helped avert large-scale conflict as was Guinea-Bissau experienced in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In June 1998, Guinea-Bissau became the Côte d’Ivoire third ECOWAS member state to become Côte d’Ivoire was the fourth country to involved in violent conflict, triggering the experience violent conflict in West Africa need for mediation and peacekeeping. after the establishment of ECOWAS. The The conflict began when President João conflict in Côte d’Ivoire began on Bernardo Vieira fired the head of the September 19, 2002, when a section of the armed forces, Brigadier Ansumane Mane, military started a rebellion (which was accusing him of allowing arms to be initially believed to be a mutiny) in smuggled to rebels in the southern

34 ecowas and mediation in west africa several cities including the capital of immensely to upholding a level of Abidjan. The result of the rebellion was a stability in the country. country divided into the rebel-held north The elections of November/December and the government-controlled south. 2010 marked the last stage of the peace ECOWAS’s initial response resulted in a process and were designed to bring about preliminary agreement in September lasting stability. Instead, such hopes have 2002 and a cease-fire agreement signed in been dashed as violence has broken out Bouake, Côte d’Ivoire, the following over disputed results. As of the time of month, leading to talks in Lomé in this writing in January 2011, both November 2002. The Ivorian peace presidential candidates, Alassane Ouattara process follows the same pattern as the and Laurent Gbagbo, are claiming the previous cases described above: several presidency. Renewed hostilities in Côte mediation processes were undertaken d’Ivoire call for renewed negotiations. resulting in numerous, in this case ten, The resurgence of conflict in Côte peace agreements. What further compli- d’Ivoire shows that perhaps the previous cated the peace process was the prolifera- peace process did not address all the tion of actors. Although ECOWAS was fundamental causes of the conflict. On the lead mediator in the conflict, other the other hand, it can also be argued that actors such as France, the African Union the current post-election dispute and (AU), and the UN played roles at different violence in Côte d’Ivoire is another stages of the conflict. For instance, the example of election-related violence in role of France led to the Linas-Marcoussis Africa (similar to that of Kenya and Peace Agreement in January 2003. Zimbabwe) and may have nothing to do Equally, the role of AU through Thabo with the previous peace agreements. Mbeki, then-president of South Africa, Either way, there is therefore the need to resulted in the Pretoria I and II ensure that the quest for peace this time Agreements in 2005. Finally, in 2007, the around creates the opportunity for lasting mediation process reverted to the stability. leadership of ECOWAS. The then-chair- man of ECOWAS, Blaise Compaoré, Niger became the lead mediator and brokered ECOWAS became involved in Niger when another peace agreement, the the sitting president, Mamadou Tandja, Ouagadougou Peace Accord of March attempted to change the country’s 2007. This accord provided for a power- constitution. He sought to run for a third sharing arrangement in which the leader term in office in 2009 in contravention of of the rebellion, Guillaume Soro, became the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy the prime minister of the sitting presi- and Good Governance, which prohibits dent, Laurent Gbagbo. unconstitutional change of government. Again, the Ivorian peace process has ECOWAS’s response to this situation was shown ECOWAS’s commitment to to suspend the country from its member- peacemaking in West Africa. Further, it ship while appointing a special represen- shows that the efforts of ECOWAS always tative to resolve the crisis. General need to be complemented by the AU and Abdulsalami Abubakar, a former presi- UN. For instance, the presence of a UN dent of Nigeria, took charge of the Niger mission in Côte d’Ivoire has contributed crisis. ECOWAS requested that “Niger

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contravention of ECOWAS norms and authorities suspend indefinitely the the formal engagement was ended, holding of legislative elections scheduled ECOWAS continued its engagement with for October 20, 2009, in favor of dialogue the new military leadership in trying to with other leading political parties on work toward returning the country to resolving the political crisis in the constitutional rule. country” (ECOWAS 2009b). The state- Guinea ment by ECOWAS added that “failure by President Tandja to comply with the Following a coup d’état on December 23, decisions of the Authority would lead to 2008, ECOWAS joined with the AU, UN, the automatic and immediate imposition and EU to condemn the situation in line of full sanctions.” Niger did not comply with the ECOWAS Protocol on with the above decision of ECOWAS. Democracy and Good Governance. On Rather, on October 20, 2009, President January 10, 2009, ECOWAS also sus- Tandja went ahead with the legislative pended Guinea from its meetings until election, which was boycotted by the constitutional rule was restored opposition. In a move to demonstrate (ECOWAS 2009a). The security situation that ECOWAS would not tolerate the in Guinea deteriorated over time: first, on continuing refusal of Niger to comply September 23, 2009, security forces in with its decisions, the regional body Guinea opened fire on supporters of stated that it would no longer recognize opposition parties who had gathered at a the presidency of Tandja (BBC News stadium in Conakry. The demonstration 2009). was organized by the opposition to protest against the apparent intention of The refusal of Niger to comply with Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, the leader ECOWAS’s decision is a further demon- of the junta, to stand for presidential stration of the unwillingness of ECOWAS election in January 2010. Human rights member states to comply with the groups estimate that more than 150 decisions of the organization, its medi- people were killed and 1,700 injured ated solutions, and the principles to (International Crisis Group 2009). which they have signed. Usually ECOWAS Second, the attempted assassination of continues to engage members who refuse Camara on December 3, 2009, exacer- to comply with its decisions because there bated the already tense political atmo- is a limit to what the organization can do; sphere. As a result, the military launched it does not possess the capacity to remove a crackdown on people they believed an erring president by force, for example. could be linked to the attempt. Following Even if it had this capacity, ECOWAS these developments, on December 13, believes in mediated solutions and is 2009, ECOWAS threatened to intervene in unlikely to apply force unless it is Guinea with “preventive deployment absolutely necessary, especially where force” for civilian protection (Ouedraogo West African populations are at risk. 2009). On the political front, ECOWAS A coup d’état in February 2010 ended appointed President Blaise Compaore of formal ECOWAS mediation in Niger with Burkina Faso to mediate in the Guinean a call on the new military leadership to crisis. ECOWAS engagement in Guinea work toward the restoration of democ- continued until elections in October racy. Although all coup d’etats are in

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2010, when the opposition leader won that have been seen in the past few years and was installed as president. have lacked the institutional structures that would have provided expert support ECOWAS mediation efforts have suc- for designing peace agreements that could ceeded in Guinea for two major reasons. hold in the field. Thus, often, peace The first is the patience of ECOWAS and agreements have broken down as soon as the international community to continu- there were signed. ously engage the military leadership and opposition parties in Guinea in spite of Third, in West Africa there has been an initial challenges. The second point is the overreliance on mediators who are realization of both ECOWAS and the presidents. Usually, mediators have been military leadership in Guinea that chosen either because they are the chair violence or the use of force was not the of ECOWAS or because of a belief that best alternative to negotiated settlement. they could use their influence as elders (Initially ECOWAS had threatened to use and experienced leaders in the region. For force if the military junta did not show example, between 2002 and 2006, to be a commitment to the restoration of mediator in the Ivorian conflict was “to democracy (Ouedraogo 2009)). validate one’s own diplomatic credentials, to raise the profile of oneself and one’s LESSONS FOR IMPROVING MEDIATION country, and to show oneself a champion PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES IN of political correctness and of democracy. WEST AFRICA What is validated here is the function Several lessons can be drawn from this [and position] of the mediator, not the history of ECOWAS’s mediation. First, success of the mediation” (Dévérin 2006). most of ECOWAS’s interventions, Most often, once a president becomes the especially in the 1990s, began on an ad chair of ECOWAS, he or she automati- hoc basis and were backed by a weak cally assumes the role of mediator in the mandate. Both the Liberian and Sierra region’s conflicts. This logic ignores the Leonean conflicts took place at a time fact that mediation is a challenging when ECOWAS’s security architecture endeavor that requires training and was still evolving—before the revised professionalism. The point also needs to ECOWAS treaty of 1993 and the other be made that sometimes it is difficult to protocols that mandate ECOWAS to guarantee the neutrality of a president mediate and resolve regional conflicts. As mediator, and the choice of someone a result, most often there was lack of perceived to be biased complicates the consensus among leaders of West Africa conflict rather than solves it. There is a on how the crisis should be resolved. In tendency for sitting presidents to propose fact, some leaders in West Africa were solutions instead of allowing the parties alleged to have offered support to some to do so themselves. Under such circum- rebellions (Liberia, for example). stances, parties to the conflict sign peace agreements out of reverence for the Second, although ECOWAS’s security president mediator but are unlikely to architecture and mandate to intervene in follow through with the implementation. regional conflicts are now relatively Sitting presidents who serve as mediators well-developed, there are gaps between its may also not have the luxury of time to mandate and its capacity to intervene. allow mediation processes to take their The mediation processes in the region

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course, leading to a rush to have an leverage in West Africa. In this issue, it is agreement, which may end up being expected that when the ECOWAS Standby premature and difficult to implement. Force (ESF) becomes fully operational it The mediation process of the Ivorian will have the capacity to intervene in conflict, in which twelve mediators were conflicts to enforce ECOWAS decisions current or former country presidents and restore stability. (from Togo, Mali, Ghana, Gabon, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Congo, RECOMMENDATIONS: TOWARD AN Burkina Faso, and two from Senegal) and ENHANCED PEACEMAKING CAPACITY most were also chairs of ECOWAS or AU IN WEST AFRICA (Dévérin 2006), is a good example of the Based on the lessons identified above, the overreliance on president mediators in article makes several policy recommenda- West Africa conflict. tions. First, to address the gap between mandate and capacity in mediation A fourth lesson is that there is lack of processes in Africa, this article echoes commitment by parties to conflicts in calls for setting up mediation-support West Africa to respect mediated agree- units within the AU and regional organi- ment by ECOWAS. The cases above show zations. Such units would be staffed by that parties to conflicts in the region will personnel with adequate skills who would respect ECOWAS’s settlements only when provide technical support for African it is in their interest. This shows the mediators. Within ECOWAS there is a absence of a culture of respect for gradual policy shift toward closing the agreements in the region, which needs to gap between the mandate of the organiza- be addressed. Most often, the rebel tion to mediate in conflicts and its leadership in West Africa is unable to capacity to do so. Under the ECPF, bring members of its groups to follow the ECOWAS has crafted a new vision of implementation of agreements the leaders preventive diplomacy through which it have signed, perhaps because the leaders intends to address such capacity gaps. The have weak control over their followers. In process has already started to set up a some cases where the peace agreements mediation-facilitation unit to provide address the needs of the rebel leadership technical and expert mediation support rather than the entire group and the for the Council of Wise and Special populations affected by the war, it is not Mediator. The proposed ECOWAS likely to be respected and implemented. mediation-facilitation unit should be Fifth and finally, ECOWAS still does not properly mandated and resourced to have the capacity to enforce its own discharge the function of providing decisions without the involvement of professional mediation support to external actors, especially the UN. In ECOWAS. The implementation of the Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire, ECPF should lead to the availability of the UN had to take over the peacekeeping skilled and professional mediators with missions and the implementation of the the necessary institutional and financial peace agreement. Although within the support to peace mediation in West global context there is nothing wrong Africa. Efforts by ECOWAS to set up a with joining hands to solve a regional mediation-facilitation division should crisis, ECOWAS’s ability to enforce its therefore be supported by all stakeholders own decisions would help improve its as one of the measures to help bridge the

38 ecowas and mediation in west africa t People still hold their cultures and traditions in high esteem, [so] it is important for ECOWAS to explore what contribution traditional conflict resolution methods can offer. gap between mandate and capacity and to for ECOWAS to explore what contribu- improve mediation in West Africa. tion traditional conflict-resolution methods can offer. For instance, the Second, there is the need to address the capacity of traditional rulers, in particu- challenges associated with using president lar, in conflict resolution can be built, and mediators. To improve peacemaking in they can be supported to utilize their own West Africa there is the need to combine traditions to aid national and regional president mediators with professional mediation efforts. mediators who have expertise and experience in mediation and who have CONCLUSION greater neutrality. In the long term, Faced with the challenges of conflict and however, appointment of mediators in political instability, ECOWAS has West African conflicts should be based on undergone the necessary transformation the competence of the mediator to help that has positioned it as the leading the parties work toward win-win institution for conflict prevention, situations. management, and resolution in West Third, there is the need for ECOWAS to Africa. The organization’s involvement in further develop the capacity to enforce its mediation is part of a comprehensive decision arrived at through mediation. To approach to the promotion of peace and this end, it should ensure that the ESF is stability within its sphere of influence. well-equipped, has adequate personnel, ECOWAS’s involvement in mediation in and is fully operational. It also requires West Africa is clearly defined in several that the civilian dimension of the ESF be important documents, but what has not given equal attention as the military yet emerged is a clearly defined approach component to ensure that ECOWAS has and practice of mediation. For two the full capacity of future missions or decades, ECOWAS mediation has been ad intervention. This is in recognition of the hoc and has revolved around president fact that ECOWAS has made a lot of mediators. Such an approach has been progress with regard to its military short of professionalism and strong preparedness under the ESF, but the same institutionalization. There is the need to cannot be said of its civilian component. step up the implementation of the preventive diplomacy component of the Fourth, in view of the difficulties encoun- ECPF, which will lead to a marked tered in resolving conflicts in West Africa improvement in mediation processes and in light of the fact that the region within West Africa. In doing this, there remains largely traditional in which will be the need for a shift in thinking people still hold their cultures and within the policy-making field and traditions in high esteem, it is important recognition of the need for a comparable

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amount of investment in the training of Ouedraogo, Brahima. 2009. Guinea: W. mediators as has been devoted to the African bloc calls for preventive troops. training of the military for peacekeeping. Associated Press, December 13. It is hoped that if the set of recommenda- tions proposed in this article is imple- ENDNOTES mented, ECOWAS will be in a good 1 The 29th Ordinary Summit of Heads of position to contribute more effectively to State and Government of ECOWAS, held in peace and security in West Africa. Niamey, Niger, in January 2006, approved the transformation of the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat into the ECOWAS Commission. The purpose of the transformation was to REFERENCES enhance the power of the Commission and BBC News. 1998. Behind the Guinea-Bissau strengthen its influence and its degree of conflict. BBC, October 22. supranationality. ———. 2009. Niger anger over ECOWAS 2 Foday Sankoh was arrested by UN forces in snub of President Tandja. BBC, December 23. 2000 and imprisoned. He died in 2003 while Dévérin, Yveline. 2006. The dynamics of still facing charges of war crimes at the UN mediation in . Pambazuka News, Tribunal on Sierra Leone. Issue 269 (www.pambazuka.org/en/category/ 3 At full strength, the UN peacekeeping features/37059). mission in Sierra Leone numbered about ECOWAS. 2009a. Final communiqué, 19,000. Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Abuja, January 10. ———. 2009b. Final communiqué, Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Abuja, October 17. Ero, Comfort. 1995. ECOWAS and subregional peacekeeping in Liberia (www.jha.ac/articles/ a005.htm). International Crisis Group. 2009. Guinea: Military rule must end. Africa Briefing No 66, October 16. Kaldor, Mary, and James Vincent. 2006. Case Study Sierra Leone. United Nations Development Programme, Evaluation Office. Lord, David (ed.). 2000. Paying the price: The Sierra Leone peace process. Accord Issue 9, Conciliation Resources. Massey, Simon. 2004. Multi-faceted mediation in the Guinea-Bissau civil war. Scientia Militaria 32(1). Nathan, Laurie. 2007. Mediation in African conflicts: The gap between mandate and capacity. Africa Mediators’ Retreat: 11-22 (www.hdcentre.org/files/Mediation African Conflicts Gap Between Mandate Capacity Laurie Nathan.pdf).

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