We negate,

Resolved: The should grant permanent membership on the Security Council.

Our sole contention is Moderating Indian Policy.

Kim ‘12 of the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies explains that acquiring a permanent seat on the Security Council has become India’s foremost foreign policy objective in recent years. Thus, India has dramatically moderated its dangerous foreign policy approach to make obtaining a permanent seat more likely.

This moderation has re-framed Indian policy for the better in two regions.

First, in Africa.

Vira of the Small Wars Journal outlines that while India has traditionally viewed Africa as important to its interests economically, regional challenges in , Afghanistan, and the Indian Ocean are becoming more pressing. Simultaneously, Taylor ‘12 of the Chatham House corroborates that as India develops, its interests diverge from Africa as India seeks to conform as a in the world order.

While Africa is becoming unimportant to India developmentally, Narlikar ‘10 of the University of Cambridge argues that India allows Africa to free-ride off its economic initiatives on the continent because it needs many of these African nations’ political support. Specifically, Kermeliotis ‘11 of CNN writes that much of India’s actions in Africa is designed to get their necessary support for India’s bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Thus, Sharma ‘18 of the Nikkei Asian Review finalizes that India is willing to give concessionary lines of credit and no-strings-attached loans to African nations because of its need for African support for the council seat.

These lines of credit improve the lives of the poorest in Africa.

Mishra ‘18 of the ORF quantifies that India has given $8 billion in Lines of Credit to Africa, reaching 44 different countries across the continent. For example, Pattanayak ‘17 of the Financial Express writes that India developed a line of credit for subsidizing cooking gas, providing basic necessities to 15 million poor families. Similarly, Panjetan of the Exim Bank of India explains that a Line of Credit provided by India gave access to potable water for 2 million people in Tanzania.

Second, in Pakistan.

The India-Pakistan border and Kashmir region has been rife with conflict for generations. In spite of continued skirmishes, the Associated Press from this year finds that progress has been made in de- escalation, with both sides engaging more diplomatically with one another, going as far as to return diplomats. These improvements are explained by Khan ‘15 of the Naval Postgraduate School, who

explains that non-permanent members like India are beholden to regional interests, as they must take a conciliatory attitude in order to be elected to temporary membership on the council. Conversely, he finds that elevating a nation to permanent membership removes these constraints, allowing India to act in its own interests and not the interests of the region. Indeed, Kim continues that India has only been willing to de-escalate and diplomatically resolve the Indo-Pakistani conflict because it needs to look good internationally to be elected as temporary member on the Security Council.

Thus, granting India a permanent seat on the Security Council would unlock India’s hegemonic ambitions, and violate the fragile progress with Pakistan.

Khan* ‘15 concludes that giving India a permanent seat on the Security Council would embolden India to invade Kashmir to force Pakistan to cave to India’s claims in the region because the UNSC seat would shield India from international repercussions. Problematically, this has the potential to dramatically escalate to a war in the region, as Talmage ‘19 of the Washington Post reasons that India or Pakistan would try to get the upper hand by using small conventional wars, utilizing the risk of escalation to make the other side back down. Unfortunately, Talmage concludes that countries usually disagree where the threshold is for a conventional-nuclear outbreak, ensuring that war is extremely likely to break out if both countries continue retaliating.

Ultimately, Sethi ‘16 of FirstPost writes that even a moderate nuclear Indo-Pakistani conflict would kill more than 20 million people as well as creating a nuclear winter that would devastate agriculture worldwide.

Thus, we negate.

Outside of the up’s and down’s of Indo-Pakistani conventional conflict, Johnson ‘19 of Harvard University explains that India has historically sought to weaponize Pakistan’s water supply to cripple the nation’s agro-, but have held back thus far. That’s because Tahir ‘19 of the Daily Times writes that cutting off Pakistan’s water supply would diplomatically ruin India’s bid to become a permanent member of the Security Council. However, Sarwar ‘11 of the Institute of Strategic Studies explicates that with permanent membership, India would be able to cut off access to Pakistan’s water with no repercussions, as the veto would give them protection against any redress that Pakistan takes.

Using water as a weapon has catastrophic effects on Pakistan’s poorest.

Raza ‘18 of the Diplomat writes that as much as 70% of Pakistan’s economy relies on agriculture, making the economy heavily reliant on water supply. Thus, Gettleman ‘19 of the New York Times continues that diverting Pakistan’s water would devastate hundreds of millions of people reliant on agriculture.

Outline:

Kim - UNSC seat is India’s #1 foreign policy objective

This priority has framed Indian policymaking in two specific areas of the world:

A. Africa

Vira - India has traditionally cared about Africa but more pressing issues like Afghanistan, etc Taylor ‘10 - India/Africa’s interests diverge as India becomes more of a superpower because India wants to be seen as a global superpower and not a developing nation Narlikar ‘10 - India is willing to let Africa free-ride for political gain

Kermeliotis ‘11 - much of the reason India is diplomatically engaging in India is to get votes for UNSC perm seat Sharma ‘18 - India needs African support for UNSC perm seat, so its investing in Africa with no-strings attached, concessionary loans

! = lines of credit Chaturvedi ‘16 - India provided $6.74 bil in Lines of Credit for Africa Pattanayak ‘17 - 15 million poor families given access to things like cooking oil through India’s lines of credit Panejtan - 2 million people in Tanzania given access to clean water

B. Pakistan

AP - de-escalation now Khan ‘15 - temporary members are beholden to interests of the region, while perm seat means they can ignore regional interests Kim ‘12 - India wants to make others like them, so they have engaged in quiet diplomacy with Pakistan

! = water Johnson ‘19 - India historically sought to weaponize Pakistan’s water Tahir ‘19 - cutting off supply ruins India’s bid for UNSC Sarwar ‘11 - aff means India cuts off water

Raza ‘18 - 70% econ relies on ag Johnson ‘19 - means millions of people are affected

Kim ’12 – permanent UNSC is the highest priority of India’s foreign policy—India won’t anger even if bad for India Kim, Chan-Wahn. “India’s quiet diplomacy seeking a permanent UN Security Council seat.” Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. 2012. https://www.posri.re.kr/files/file_pdf/71/273/2881/71_273_2881_file_pdf_1201-06_03_Issue.pdf //RJ With a permanent UNSC seat as the highest priority of its foreign policy, India has lobbied in every direction. However, whether India will achieve its goal is unclear. Even though India has been endorsed by all five permanent members, daunting tasks still remain. Not all of the G4, an alliance of India, , , and , wishing for accession to permanent member status, has garnered support from the five permanent members as India has. In particular, China is strongly opposed to Japan’s accession; therefore, all of the G4 nations becoming permanent members seems doubtful. India’s sole accession to a permanent seat will be even more difficult. Vira – Africa is important to India but regional challenges are becoming more pressing – India’s priorities are shifting away from Africa Vira, Varun. “India and UN Peacekeeping: Declining Interest with Grave Implications.” N.d. Small Wars Journal. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/india-and-un-peacekeeping-declining-interest-with- grave-implications?fbclid=IwAR0NeTHIb7v7WiW_nMvy52PiqJBiFeKPdWQsjq7rWUa- unXW757MTuhkLGo //RJ Ideals and traditions are, however, not easily abandoned, and peacekeeping is deeply engrained in India’s perception of itself on the international stage. Moreover, as India’s Security Council bid inches closer, there still remains an attachment to the sentiment best expressed by retired Indian Lt. Gen Satish Nambiar, a UNPROFOR force commander in former Yugoslavia who stated that, “India has no immediate interests in Sierra Leone. But that is not the point. We have to look beyond our immediate interests. As a great country we have certain commitments; if we aspire to be permanent members of the UN Security Council it cannot come on a platter – we must develop a stake in strengthening the Security Council set-up and such missions help do just that.”[8] The entrance of China as a peacekeeping power has also complicated Indian calculations. From once deeply opposed to international intervention on principle, China since the 2000s has rapidly expanded its UNPKO participation. By 2011, China was the largest troop contributor among the P-5 countries, expanding from 120 military and police personnel in 2003 to 2,146 by 2008. Since the UNTAET mission in East Timor in 2000, China has allowed lightly armed peacekeepers, and since 2008 has pushed for the deployment of combat contingents. On one level India welcomes Chinese participation as helping plug key resource gaps, but on another resents the disproportionate attention Chinese contributions receive. Additionally, with China and India both competing heavily for influence and resources in Africa, where UNPKOs are concentrated, it cannot help but become part of a broader competition. UNPKOs, however, now come with lowered expectations. Expecting a permanent seat as a transactional reward was overly optimistic and Indian planners now recognize the host of other obstacles affect India’s bid – opposition from China, the Kashmir dispute, the Indian nuclear program etc. – and a growing body now favors alternative alignments outside the UN. The ‘African ’ argument too is not entirely convincing. Africa is important to the Indian strategic interest – the East African coastline is within India’s ‘near abroad,’ Africa accounts for about a fifth of Indian oil imports, and trade ties are rapidly expanding, but regional challenges in Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean, and southeast – all more core to the Indian strategic interest – are growing ever more pressing. In net terms, UNPKOs are but one component of Indian defense diplomacy with Africa, which in turn is a small component of India’s total economic and political outreach. That too must be seen in comparative terms; in FY2009-2010, India’s Rs400bn of aid to Afghanistan was almost twenty times the size of its aid to the entire African continent – giving some indication of priorities.[9] Taylor ’12 – India’s interests diverge from Africa’s as India develops Taylor, Ian. “India’s Rise in Africa.” Chatham House. July 2012. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23255618.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Af0f243d52061085ba569a507fd9 b3c1d&loggedin=true //RJ

Yet paradoxically, as India develops, its interest in South—South solidarity declines (except as related to its desire to retain a support constituency for Indian global ambitions), and this trend may have some implications for Indo-African relations. Securing access to new markets is central, and in this, India is in competition not only with African capitalists and established external actors, but also with other ostensibly 'southern' players such as Brazil and China. Equally, as

India becomes more powerful and is received more regularly at the top table of global politics, its interests diverge from those of Africa.141 How these tendencies develop will depend, of course, on whether adapting to international norms becomes a central plank of Indian foreign policy. Rhetorical allegiance to a Southern-oriented foreign policy certainly allows New Delhi to deflect domestic criticism of its international relations and dress up its linkages with regions such as Africa as being driven by a normative South—South agenda. Yet if such a shift occurs and India's elites perceive their interests to lie in alignment with the current world order, then it would be more difficult to establish common positions with Africa, as well as to continue to assert India's importance in global governance as a leader and coordinator for the wider South. Problematically for India if it adheres to a form of Third Worldism, the North— South agenda is in fact cross cut and permeated by a multiplicity of issues not adequately reflected in current alignments (as exemplified by IBSA). And as India develops, the basis of a residual Indian foreign policy grounded in notions of Third World coalition-building dissipates as the significant structural heterogeneity and differentiated interests among this disparate group of states become ever starker. Management of this conundrum will be central to India's Africa policies, particularly as 'old strategies that have contributed to India's pathway to power cannot b lessly abandoned ... if India is to continue its march to '.142

Narlikar, Amrita. “India’s Rise to Power: Where does East Africa fit in?” University of Cambridge. December 2010. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25767296.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A603ff4ba1a4cafde214fc4eb638d 30e8&loggedin=true //RJ

It is important to note that while all the above examples suggest a spirit of 'co-development' emanating from the Indian side, they should not be taken to mean non strategic behaviour. Indian willingness to incur the costs of freeriding (for instance through the grant of preferential market access to LDCs, or the support for the cause of African countries in the WTO via support for their coalitions, capacity building and technical assistance) is not driven by charity. One official in the Ministry of External

Affairs stated rather pragmatically, 'There is no such thing as unconditional aid,' but then went on to emphasise that India had consciously tried to veer away from the stigma accompanying Western aid by emphasising the importance of 'partnership' in the process and steering clear of good governance conditionalities akin to those accompanying aid from the Bretton Woods institutions. Maintenance of friendly diplomatic relations with difficult regimes may fit in easily with India's commitment to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference, but the fact that those relations also fit well with India's self-interest is not incidental. Freeriding by Africa in trade, or aid and investment in East Africa, effectively form part of a bargain that brings important gains to India as well. Most concretely, and in the realm of , an important benefit is improved maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region for India (a gain of considerable importance in the context of a rising China) (Vines and Oruitemeka 2007). Another important gain includes greater legitimacy and prestige in international institutions. Other concrete benefits include the support that India receives from the African politicians and bureaucrats that it trains who go on to occupy high-level positions in Africa. Moreover, there is also the hope of future gain, for instance support for a seat for India in a reformed Security Council.

Sharma, Raj. “India risks ‘losing’ Africa to China.” Nikkei Asian Review. Sept. 2018. https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/India-risks-losing-Africa-to-China //RJ

India and China have competed for influence in Africa for decades. But in the last 10 years, New Delhi has been left far behind by Beijing's dramatic push, spearheaded by cheap loans, huge infrastructure projects and

widespread investments in natural resources. China's commitment was highlighted by the Sept. 3-4 Africa summit in Beijing attended by 53 African states, at which president Xi Jinping pledged $60 billion in economic aid to the continent, on top of the $60 billion he said had been disbursed since 2015. India is responding to Beijing's challenge. But it needs to do much more. It should capitalize on its long-standing assets in the continent, notably a big diaspora, diverse business ties and (in many countries) a common use of English. It must also react to an emerging Chinese naval presence with security-linked initiatives of its own, such as military training. And it needs to work closely with potential allies, including Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. Since the two Asian giants have similar interests in Africa -- energy, economic cooperation and maritime security, New Delhi's traditional soft- power approach may no longer suffice to safeguard its interests, especially after Beijing dropped a long-standing policy of zero military engagement and opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017. Djibouti is unlikely to be China's last military base in Africa. China is the continent's largest aid provider and biggest creditor, holding 14% of African sovereign debt. There is a real chance that when some of the African countries are unable to pay back loans, Beijing will seek control of strategic assets under its "debt- trap" diplomacy. With 10 million Chinese workers now on the continent, their protection is a growing concern for Beijing, especially after incidents in which such employees were injured or and even killed in clashes. The growing presence of China's nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean worries India. China has maintained that its submarines have been deployed for anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, but this claim is surprising in Indian eyes since deploying submarines to tackle piracy is unusual. Meanwhile, India has repeatedly lost out to China on economic projects, especially in the crucial energy sector. In 2006, for example, ONGC, the Indian public-sector oil group, unsuccessfully bid for an oil block in Angola which went to a Chinese-led consortium. Total Indian investment in Africa is around $40 billion, far less than China's figure of more than $100 billion, including schemes under the global Belt and Road Initiative. China claims its aid for Africa is "free of political conditions" unlike that provided by most Western countries. This supposedly unconditional respect for sovereignty is often referred to as the "Beijing Consensus." But in fact, China does impose conditions on African states, notably adherence to the One China policy, under which other countries are to abandon official ties with Taiwan. India, on the other hand, does not impose political conditions on Africa, to which it has promised $10 billion between 2015 and 2020. While China has focused on heavy infrastructure investments, India concentrates on building human resource and administrative capacity with schemes such as pan- Africa e-network and Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC). It advances a New Delhi Consensus, which focuses on capacity building and local job creation. India believes that unlike China it strives for more balanced relations with African capitals and for "win-win" cooperation. This level of respect is not without self- interest. India needs support from the 54 African countries in its decades-old bid to secure a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. India needs to do much more to counter Chinese influence on the continent, even given its limited resources. First, it should encourage its companies to invest more in Africa by expanding value-added processing plants to reduce dependence on imports of finished goods, boost employment and promote a stronger business culture. China's investments are top- heavy -- relying mainly on government-to- government links. India can do more to develop bottom-up nongovernmental links, not least through its 3 million strong diaspora. This is India's underused "heritage resource." These people are integrated into African societies and can be a link between India and Africa. Chinese workers in Africa, working largely segregated lives, cannot do this. India must widen its political outreach. The recent decision to open 18 new African embassies is welcome; it takes the total to 47, not far short of China's 52. The India Africa Forum Summit, the pre-eminent bilateral gathering, is too focused on development and should be expanded to include political and security dialogue. The most significant actions will be in security, where New Delhi needs both to expand its own presence and to boost cooperation with partners. India is already, since 2016, engaging with the U.S. to jointly train troops from the African countries for UN peacekeeping operations. Meanwhile, India and France have signed a strategic pact in March 2018 to use each other's military facilities including opening of naval bases for warships. This accord gives India access to French military bases in the Western Indian Ocean, which gives access to the African coast. Together with Japan, India must do more to respond to China's BRI infrastructure push. The two countries should put more resources into the Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), an economic cooperation program announced last year for linking eastern and southern Africa with East Asia. India and Japan should, for example, establish well-equipped hospitals in Africa under the AAGC to reverse the medical tourism as thousands of African patients yearly visit India for cheap treatment. Not surprisingly, China has tried to persuade India to go slow on the AAGC and merge its projects into schemes overseen by the BRICS (the loose association of Brazil, , India, China and ), in a move to keep Japan out. India should also explore increasing cooperation with European states, including France, Germany and the U.K., which

have long histories of working in Africa. Education, training and measures to counter climate change, reduce poverty and boost agriculture are all potentially fruitful fields. Several east and southern African countries are members of the British Commonwealth, a good forum for the U.K., India and African states to develop ties, especially when the U.K. seeks to revive the Commonwealth after Brexit. Finally, India can exploit the recent backlash in some African states against China, with protests against Beijing's economic dominance, ties with unpopular rulers and the sometimes-poor working conditions for Africans on Chinese projects. Many Africans see India as a kindred spirit; a country that faces similar problems, such as the legacy of colonial rule, which it has overcome through methods which Africans can emulate. New Delhi needs to put stronger bottom-up foundations under its relationship with Africa.

Kuo, Lily. “In the race for Africa, India and China aren’t all that different.” Quartz. Oct. 2015. https://qz.com/africa/533049/in-the-race-for-africa-india-and-china-arent-all-that-different/ //RJ

“Our partnership is not focused on an exploitative or extraction point of view, but is one that focuses on Africa’s needs and India’s strengths,” said Vikas Swarup, a spokesman for the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, alluding to criticisms that China exploits the region’s resources. India’s minister of commerce and industry described Africa and India as “old friends and old family,” drawing a distinct line between China’s relatively recent entry into the continent and the 2.16 million members of the Indian diaspora that have been living in Africa for generations. Last week, prime minister claimed that India has emerged as a major investor in Africa, “surpassing even China.” It’s an attempt to catch up to China, one of the Africa’s largest trading partners, now that India needs more energy and commodities to fuel its industries, as well as diplomatic support for strategic moves like India’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Another summit focusing on India-Africa economic ties will be held in Nairobi next month. Then in a little over a month, South Africa will host the 6th Forum on China-Africa cooperation.

Kermeliotis, Teo. “India bids to be Africa’s ‘new best friend’.” CNN. 2011. http://edition.cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/08/25/india.charm.africa.china/index.html //RJ

India is turning to the one billion-strong continent in order to diversify its trade and expand its diplomatic relations. Alex Vines, head of the Africa program at think tank Chatham House, says that much of India's diplomacy in Africa is designed to get African support for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. "That's one of the reasons India has over the years invested so heavily in contributing peacekeepers to U.N. missions in Africa," he says. "For example, there's still a significant number in the Democratic Republic of Congo, so that's all part of, kind of, Indian policy."

Taylor, Ian. “India’s Rise in Africa.” Chatham House. July 2012. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23255618.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A7daa2fb0131c1684f508e1a51e7 a11f6 //RJ

At the policy level, trade has been a crucial element of these meetings, operating alongside New Delhi's commitment to liberal multilateralism which seeks to open up global markets for Indian exporters. This is reflected in India's close coordina tion with leading African countries on the Doha Round of negotiations at the WTO and in Indian membership of the India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), formed in 2003.57 Such alliances have 'created a new dynamic in international relations, drawing together the three most powerful of the southern hemisphere in a regional axis for the first time',58 and raise important questions vis-a-vis global governance.59 According to one analysis, such processes may reflect a wider movement whereby the engagement of emerging economies such as India may allow African economies to bypass the conditionalities imposed upon the continent by the western-led international financial institutions.60 Accordingly, such activity may also signify the nascent formalization of the global South's growing resistance to the North's agenda-setting.61 India's penchant for multilateral trade agreements may also serve to profit some African economies by precluding economically predatory—if not destructive— behaviour arguably intrinsic to the WTO's unified methodology.62

Taylor, Ian. “India’s Rise in Africa.” Chatham House. July 2012. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23255618.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A7daa2fb0131c1684f508e1a51e7 a11f6 //RJ

Unlike the West and China, India funds projects directly rather than supplying grants, 2 in a non-transferable method of aid that is arguably open neither to abuse nor to conditionalities.83 However, unlike Chinese aid, Indian assistance does not offer predatory African regimes the opportunity to avoid governance reform.84 Indeed, emanating as it does from the world's largest democracy, aid from New Delhi arguably reinforces good governance and accountability when there is political space to do so,85 although it should be noted that India has 'attached more weight to solidarity with fellow developing countries and the defense of its own national security interests without a reference to ideology at the operational level'.86 In other words, outright democracy promotion is not yet embedded in India's foreign policy, largely because of the persistent influence of Nehruvian views on state sovereignty. This stance does seem to be changing,87 but at present it does appear that if India is not currently feeling the heat of Western opprobrium to the extent of China in Sudan, it is most likely only because India is hiding behind China to the extent that it is a smaller investor and trader, it is a democracy and considered more multilateral in its foreign policy. India may one day face the same pressure and the same dilemmas as China over the balance between sovereignty and, for instance, concern for human rights.88 Of course, Indian aid to Africa is not an expression of altruism. India, like all other countries, actively uses its development assistance to promote specific political objectives. Indian aid not only helps to facilitate an increase in Indian economic activity across Africa, but also serves to project India as a major power and gain a support constituency. Indeed, New Delhi views Africa as a source of potentially vital support (and important voting power) in international institu tions. As part of this, Indian diplomacy seeks to encourage the belief that India is a long-time supporter of Third World interests. In this context, Indian policy makers are looking to portray New Delhi as the largest, wealthiest and most diverse non-western democracy.89

Vira, Varun. “India and UN Peacekeeping: Declining Interest with Grave Implications.” N.d. Small Wars Journal. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/india-and-un-peacekeeping-declining-interest-with- grave-implications?fbclid=IwAR0NeTHIb7v7WiW_nMvy52PiqJBiFeKPdWQsjq7rWUa- unXW757MTuhkLGo //RJ Ideals and traditions are, however, not easily abandoned, and peacekeeping is deeply engrained in India’s perception of itself on the international stage. Moreover, as India’s Security Council bid inches closer, there still remains an attachment to the sentiment best expressed by retired Indian Lt. Gen Satish Nambiar, a UNPROFOR force commander in former Yugoslavia who stated that, “India has no immediate interests in Sierra Leone. But that is not the point. We have to look beyond our immediate interests. As a great country we have certain commitments; if we aspire to be permanent members of the UN Security Council it cannot come on a platter – we must develop a stake in strengthening the Security Council set-up and such missions help do just that.”[8] The entrance of China as a peacekeeping power has also complicated Indian calculations. From once deeply opposed to international intervention on principle, China since the 2000s has rapidly expanded its UNPKO participation. By 2011, China was the largest troop contributor among the P-5 countries, expanding from 120 military and police personnel in 2003 to 2,146 by 2008. Since the UNTAET mission in East Timor in 2000, China has allowed lightly armed peacekeepers, and since 2008 has pushed for the deployment of combat contingents. On one level India welcomes Chinese participation as helping plug key resource gaps, but on another resents the disproportionate attention Chinese contributions receive. Additionally, with China and India both competing heavily for influence and resources in Africa, where UNPKOs are concentrated, it cannot help but become part of a broader competition. UNPKOs, however, now come with lowered expectations. Expecting a permanent seat as a transactional reward was overly optimistic and Indian planners now recognize the host of other obstacles affect India’s bid – opposition from China, the Kashmir dispute, the Indian nuclear program etc. – and a growing body now favors alternative alignments outside the UN. The ‘African soft power’ argument too is not entirely convincing. Africa is important to the Indian strategic interest – the East African coastline is within India’s ‘near abroad,’ Africa accounts for about a fifth of Indian oil imports, and trade ties are rapidly expanding, but regional challenges in Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean, and southeast Asia – all more core to the Indian strategic interest – are growing ever more pressing. In net terms, UNPKOs are but one component of Indian defense diplomacy with Africa, which in turn is a small component of India’s total economic and political outreach. That too must be seen in comparative terms; in FY2009-2010, India’s Rs400bn of aid to Afghanistan was almost twenty times the size of its aid to the entire African continent – giving some indication of priorities.[9]

Taylor, Ian. “India’s Rise in Africa.” Chatham House. July 2012. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23255618.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Af0f243d52061085ba569a507fd9 b3c1d&loggedin=true //RJ

Yet paradoxically, as India develops, its interest in South—South solidarity declines (except as related to its desire to retain a support constituency for Indian global ambitions), and this trend may have some implications for Indo-African relations. Securing access to new markets is central, and in this, India is in competition not only with African capitalists and established external actors, but also with other ostensibly 'southern' players such as Brazil and China. Equally, as India becomes more powerful and is received more regularly at the top table of global politics, its interests diverge from those of Africa.141 How these tendencies develop will depend, of course, on whether adapting to international norms becomes a central plank of Indian foreign policy. Rhetorical allegiance to a Southern-oriented foreign policy certainly allows New Delhi to deflect domestic criticism of its international relations and dress up its linkages with regions such as Africa as being driven by a normative South—South agenda. Yet if such a shift occurs and India's elites perceive their interests to lie in alignment with the current world order, then it would be more difficult to establish common positions with Africa, as well as to continue to assert India's importance in global governance as a leader and coordinator for the wider South. Problematically for India if it adheres to a form of Third Worldism, the North— South agenda is in fact cross cut and permeated by a multiplicity of issues not adequately reflected in current alignments (as exemplified by IBSA). And as India develops, the basis of a residual Indian foreign policy grounded in notions of Third World coalition-building dissipates as the significant structural heterogeneity and differentiated interests among this disparate group of states become ever starker. Management of this conundrum will be central to India's Africa policies, particularly as 'old strategies that have contributed to India's pathway to power cannot b lessly abandoned ... if India is to continue its march to great power'.142

Pattanayak, Banikinkar. “India’s Lines of Credit to Africa touches $8 billion.” Financial Express. May 2017. https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/indias-lines-of-credit-to-africa-touches-8-billion/682818/ //RJ

Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Tuesday pledged greater engagement with Africa, seeking to build on economic ties that have grown by leaps and bounds in recent years. Talking at the first of a series of annual meetings of the African Development Bank (AfDB) in India, Modi said the country has so far extended 152 lines of credits worth close to $8 billion to as many as 44 African countries. At the third India-Africa Forum Summit in 2015, India also committed $10 billion for development projects in Africa over a five-year period. “In the sports arena, India cannot compete with Africa in long- distance running. But I can assure you that India will always stand with you, shoulder to shoulder, supporting you in the long and difficult race for a better future,” Modi said here. The statement comes amid mounting suspicion about massive Chinese investments in Africa and also its growing global ambitions. Recently, India boycotted China’s One Belt, One Road project, which purportedly aims to create the world’s largest platform for economic cooperation. In 2015, China announced a new strategy that aimed to create mutual prosperity between China and Africa. China has backed this proposal up with a commitment of $60 billion of new investment in major capital projects, according to Forbes. India joined the AfDB (as a non-regional member) in 1983, but it’s the first time that the country is hosting AfDB’s annual meetings. Indian exports to Africa, too, jumped to $23 billion in 2016-17, against $14 billion in 2007-08. Similarly, India’s imports from Africa rose to $28 billion in 2016-17 from $20 billion in 2007-08. India’s commodity trade with Africa in 2015-16 was higher than that with the US, Modi said. Between 1996 to 2016, Africa accounted for nearly one-fifth of Indian overseas direct investments. India is the fifth-largest country investing in the continent, with investments over the past 20 years amounting to $54 billion. ‘Working with Japan, US to help Africa’ Modi said India is also working with Japan and the US to support development in Africa. Indian and Japanese research institutions have come up with a vision document in consultations with think tanks from Africa. “The idea is that India and Japan, with other willing partners, would explore joint initiatives in skills, health, infrastructure, manufacturing and connectivity,” Modi said. DBT in cooking gas saves $4 billion The PM said India has saved over $4 billion in the past three years by paying cooking gas subsidies directly to the poor rather than indirectly through price concessions — a strategy that is being replicated in other areas as well. Under the ‘Give it up’ campaign (which asks people to give up gas subsidy voluntarily so that that can be extended to the poor), over 10 million Indians have volunteered to do so. This has helped in giving more than 15 million connections to poor families. Finance minister Arun Jaitley said: “The Indian Ocean might separate us geographically, but the partnership and collaborations will be the modern bridge between the two oldest civilisations, with the bank (AfDB) being the strongest pillar.”

Panjetan, Nadeem. “How we are making a difference in Tanzania.” Export-Import Bank of India. N.d. https://www.eximbankindia.in/blog/blog- content.aspx?BlogID=11&BlogTitle=How%20we%20are%20making%20a%20difference%20in%20Tanzan ia //RJ

Exim Bank on behalf on Government of India has extended the following Lines of Credit for water projects amounting to USD 1038.65 mn in Tanzania since 2012. To implement the water sector development programme and to

succeed in the mission, the Government of Tanzania sought cooperation from India. Exim Bank on behalf on Government of India has extended the following Lines of Credit for water projects amounting to USD 1038.65 mn in Tanzania since 2012. Water supply schemes to Dar-es-Salam – USD 178.13 mn Extension of Lake Victoria Pipeline to Tabora, Igunga and Nzega – USD 268.35 mn Rehabilitation and Improvement of Water Supply System in Zanzibar – USD 92.13 mn Water Supply Scheme for 17 Towns in Tanzania – USD 500 mn The first Phase is operational and is providing potable water to 2 million people in Dar-es-Salaam. Through the Lines of Credit, the objective of increasing the water production and distribution capacity of in Tanzania was achieved. The water production and distribution capacity of Upper Ruvu water supply system increased from 82 million litres per day to 200 million litres per day and supply more water to the Dar-es-Salaam region. The first Phase is operational and is providing potable water to 2 million people in Dar-es-Salaam. The other projects which are underway are expected to supply clean water to many more regions of Tanzania.

Mishra ‘18|Indian LOC’s to Africa has sharply increased and reached 44 different countries Mishra, Abhishek, Observer Research Foundation, May 25, 2018, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/changing-nature-india-lines-of-credit-africa/

Value of Indian LOCs to Africa over the years: Over the years, there has been a sharp increase in LOCs committed to African countries. In 2004, LOCs to Africa were valued at $304 million while in 2011 LOCs to Africa were valued at $4.3 billion. In 2012, 17 LOCs were made operational and 12 of these LOCs were directed to African countries. Under the first India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS-I), India announced a grant of $500 million (INR 2,700 crores) to assist capacity building in Africa through setting up of specialised institutions, extending scholarships and training programs, and implementing the Pan African e-Network Project (PAeNP). Under IAFS-II, India announced a grant of $700 million (INR 3,300 crores). Under IAFS-III, India provided an additional $10 billion in concessional credit over the next five years, i.e. till 2020, and a grant assistance of $600 million. Speaking at the first annual meeting of African Development Bank (AfDB) in May 2017, Indian PM Narendra Modi said that Govt. of India has extended total 152 LOCs worth close to $8 billion in 44 African countries.

Talmage, Caitlin, Washington Post, March 5, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/05/are-nuclear-weapons-keeping-india-pakistan- crisis-escalating-or-making-it-more-dangerous/

India and Pakistan fought three conventional wars – in 1947, 1965, and 1971 – before acquiring nuclear weapons. Though they’ve fought one war and had several crises since 1998, all have been smaller in scale. This is probably not a coincidence, as political scientists Devin Hagerty and Sumit Ganguly have argued. Nevertheless, the recent crisis shows that even if both sides have robust nuclear arsenals, governments don’t necessarily maintain the status quo — especially when there are poorly controlled militants operating in a border area that both sides consider vital. Just as in the Cold War, India and Pakistan may try to use the risk of escalation to get the upper hand, hoping the other side will back down. So while it’s true that the fear of nuclear escalation may reduce wars and crises, nuclear weapons also could make such events more dangerous if they happen. Like the , India and Pakistan may also believe that they can sometimes operate safely below a conventional-

nuclear firebreak. But if they disagree on where that threshold lies, all bets are off, as Paul Kapur has emphasized.

Kim ’12 – India pursuing quiet diplomacy with Pakistan to win their vote for the permanent council Kim, Chan-Wahn. “India’s quiet diplomacy seeking a permanent UN Security Council seat.” Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. 2012. https://www.posri.re.kr/files/file_pdf/71/273/2881/71_273_2881_file_pdf_1201-06_03_Issue.pdf //RJ

Quiet diplomacy is also seen in India’s relations with Pakistan. Pakistan has invaded India as many as four times. It has directly or indirectly supported militant groups that constantly conduct terrorist activities against India, primarily in Kashmir. A series of terrorist attacks in Mumbai were allegedly conducted by Pakistan-based terrorist groups. India took a harsh stance immediately after the attacks, but returned to its usual soft stance over time. India’s primary reasons for maintaining appeasement policies toward Pakistan are national security and peace-building in , but Pakistan’s continuing opposition to India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC was another reason. In order to ease Pakistan’s opposition, India tried to address issues quietly rather than amplifying conflicts with Pakistan. Quiet diplomacy can be interpreted as preventive diplomacy, but its major goal is to ease conflicts and create an environment for conversation. After a prolonged hiatus following the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, India and Pakistan created a mood of reconciliation through “cricket diplomacy” at the end of March 2011. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani accepted the invitation of Manmohan Singh, Indian Prime Minister, to watch the Cricket World Cup semi-final between the two countries in Mohali, India. Since then, the two nations have released each other’s prisoners and have continued working toward amicable reconciliation. India has superior military power to Pakistan. Still, India has only defended against Pakistan’s invasions and terrorist attacks, and has never invaded or attacked Pakistan first. Whenever India has had any conflict with Pakistan, India has taken a short cool-down period, and then returned to engagement policies to improve its relations with Pakistan. India’s efforts have paid off at the end of 2010, when Pakistan back India for a nonpermanent UNSC seat.

Khan ’15 – India would use its permanent membership to ensure favorable decisions for itself over Kashmir, dooming multilateralism Khan, Aamir. “UNSC’S EXPANSION: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONS AND THE WORLD.” Naval Postgraduate School. Dec. 2015. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf. //RJ

India has a complex and troubled relationship with Pakistan. It began with the single dispute of Kashmir215 in 1947, but after half a century and four wars, more disputes have emerged in the process, and there is a likelihood of further proliferation of these disputes. The entry of India into the UNSC as its permanent member would greatly upset Pakistan’s economic and foreign policy objectives and would have the following implications for Pakistan. Kashmir is the major dispute between Pakistan and India. Pakistan wants a just resolution of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the spirit of UNSC resolutions—the UNSC resolution maintained the issue of Jammu and Kashmir be determined through plebiscite as per the wishes of the people of Kashmir. The U.N. HLP report also refers to the Kashmir dispute as one of the “oldest and unresolved disputes on the UNSC agenda.”216 To silence the popular demand of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, India has deployed a huge military contingent, which is involved in the worst kind of human right violations. According to Noorani, “Indian Security Forces have systematically, and with impunity, perpetrated outrageous violations of human rights in the [Kashmir] valley.”217 Today, Pakistan and India are nuclear power; even small conflict may conflagrate to nuclear exchange which will devastate the entire South Asian region. Without settlement of the Kashmir dispute, use of force cannot be ruled out. Noorani contends that, “It is reasonable to conclude that relations between India and Pakistan will never be normal until the Kashmir dispute is settled.”218 Without resolution of the Kashmir dispute, India does not qualify to be a member of the UNSC. India has refused to implement the resolutions of the UNSC over settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It would be unjust to award membership of the council to a country that has violated its resolution. As a permanent member of the UNSC, India can influence favorable decisions at the UNSC over Kashmir.

Furthermore, India, due to its strong conventional military, can resort to the use of force on the pretext of pre-emption or hot pursuit to coerce Pakistan to change its stance on Kashmir in favor of India. India has been able to draw out the issue of Kashmir for over 68 years, intending to wait for the opportune moment to accrue maximum benefit. The permanent seat at the Council is one such moment through which India can extract a favorable outcome. The UNSC Resolution 38219 is the oldest resolution of the UNSC, which is still waiting for its final and just disposal. India has rejected the role of the international community and considers the Kashmir dispute to be a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, however, the bilateralism has failed because of India’s brinkmanship and failure to accept Kashmir as a disputed territory.

Khan, Aamir. “UNSC’S EXPANSION: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONS AND THE WORLD.” Naval Postgraduate School. Dec. 2015. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf. //AR Regional representation at the UNSC has fragmented regional peace and divided countries in various groups at the regional level. The selection of countries as permanent members to improve representation of the underrepresented regions would create division within the region and would change regional balance and make council ineffective with regards to its primary responsibility of maintaining peace. The new permanent members from various regions would tend to guard their national interest and, as a result, would paralyze the council in the security field. For example, the new members from Africa, Asia, and would block resolutions that with current membership could pass. Permanent membership runs counter to the democratic spirit of accountability and equality. The permanent members are not accountable to their electors and therefore do not feel obligated to look after the region. In democracy, elected members are accountable to their electors—in this the member states—but in case of permanent membership, the permanent members are not accountable to their electors and thus feel no obligation to look after their regions’ interests. The new permanent members should be accountable to the regional countries to strengthen the .

Sethi, Abheed."Global cost of India-Pakistan nuclear war: 21 million dead, ozone layer destroyed and more", Firstpost, 2016. https://www.firstpost.com/india/global-cost-of-india-pakistan-nuclear-war-21- million-dead-ozone-layer-destroyed-and-much-more-3025642.html //RJ

If India and Pakistan fought a war detonating 100 nuclear warheads (around half of their combined arsenal), each equivalent to a 15-kiloton Hiroshima bomb, more than 21 million people will be directly killed, about half the world’s protective ozone layer would be destroyed, and a “nuclear winter” would cripple the monsoons and agriculture worldwide. As the Indian Army considers armed options, and a member of Parliament (MP) of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) urges a nuclear attack, these projections, made by researchers from three US universities in 2007, are a reminder of the costs of nuclear war. Talk of war began after a terrorist attack on an army garrison in the Kashmir town of Uri claimed the lives of 18 Indian soldiers. The Indian Army said the attack was carried out by four terrorists from the Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of Mohammed) group, based in Pakistan. Pakistan’s defence minister Khawaja M Asif responded to threats from India by saying, “If Pakistan’s security is threatened, we will not hesitate in using tactical (nuclear) weapons.”

AP, "India-Pakistan tensions: All the latest updates", Al Jazeera, 2019 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/india-pakistan-tensions-latest-updates-190227063414443.html

India has said that it was returning a key diplomat to Pakistan's capital amid an easing of tensions between the nuclear neighbours, but also demanded that its archrival take concrete steps against armed fighters operating from its territory. India's high commissioner to Pakistan was to return to Islamabad on Saturday, Indian External Affairs Ministry spokesman Raveesh Kumar said in a statement. Pakistan had announced earlier in the week that its high commissioner to India was returning to New Delhi. The moves come after the two countries recalled their diplomats for consultations as tensions flared after a February 14 suicide attack on a convoy of Indian paramilitary soldiers in Pulwama in India- administered Kashmir that at least killed 40 soldiers.