SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Monthly January 2006 22 December 2005 This report is available online and can beFORECAST viewed together with Update Reports on developments during the month at www.securitycouncilreport.org Contents of this issue Overview for January...... 1 Welcome to the third Monthly Forecast from Security Council Report. Great Lakes Initiative...... 3 Our previous reports and updates issued during the months of November and Sudan/Darfur...... 7 Lebanon/Syria...... 10 December are available on our website, www.securitycouncilreport.org. This Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)...... 13 issue previews the month of January 2006. The United Republic of Tanzania, Georgia (UNOMIG)...... 16 represented by Ambassador Augustine Mahiga, will have the Presidency. Western Sahara (MINURSO)...... 18 Lebanon/Israel (UNIFIL)...... 21 Council Working Group on Sanctions...... 23 Notable Dates in January Afghanistan...... 25 Somalia...... 26 December 2005 Reports Due Relevant Document 31 December SG report on Darfur (monthly) S/Res/1590 Overview for January January 2006 Reports Due Relevant Document Key Issues to watch in January will be: 3 January SG Report on 1640 compliance (Ethiopia and Eritrea) S/Res/1640 Ethiopia/Eritrea 10 January Group Of Experts on DRC S/Res/1616 Amazingly, Eritrea has managed in a few 13 January ISAF (International Security Assistance short weeks to squander the high moral Force in Afghanistan) quarterly report due S/Res/1623 ground it enjoyed as a result of the Boundary 31 January SG report on MINUSTAH Commission ruling in its favor, by taking out (UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti) S/Res/1608 its legitimate frustration over delays in imple- 31 January SG report on UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) S/Res/1244 mentation of the ruling against the UN 31 January Sudan Sanctions Committee report due (every six months) S/Res/1591 peacekeeping operation on the border, 31 January SG report on Darfur(monthly) S/Res/1590 UNMEE. (See our December Forecast for details) January 2006 Mandates Expire Relevant Document 20 January AMIS (AU Mission in Sudan(Darfur)) PSC/PR/Comm(XLII) Eritrea’s increasingly bellicose statements 24 January UNOCI (UN Mission in Cote d’Ivoire) S/Res/1609 and actions against the UN, its failure so far to 31 January UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Gerogia) S/Res/1615 comply with resolution 1640 (2005) and its 31 January UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) S/Res/1614 refusal to even talk to envoys, have proved 31 January DRC Group of Experts mandate expires S/Res/1616 counter-productive. January 2006 Other Important Dates Relevant Document By contrast, Ethiopia has complied with 8 January Presidential and Legislative Elections in Haiti Council demands to redeploy its troops. 16 January Presidential Inauguration in Liberia 23-24 January AU Summit (Khartoum) The re-imposition of sanctions against 25 January Palestinian Parliamentary elections Eritrea, once the 3 January deadline set by 31 January-1 February International Conference on Afghanistan the Council in resolution 1640 has passed, (London) is now likely.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org  Eritrea’s position is significantly further Great Lakes Initiative tions of international humanitarian law. Also weakened by the decision released on 19 The regional dimensions of the security it found that the DRC had violated interna- December 2005 by the Claims Commission issues in the Great Lakes region have long tional law by attacking the Uganda embassy. set up under the 2000 Algiers Agreement, to been recognised but there seems to be a The Great Lakes meeting in January has arbitrate compensation claims in respect of new energy and enthusiasm for integrating potential for both sides to demonstrate that the 1998 hostilities. The Commission has the Council’s approach. this phase of regional history is past and that ruled that Eritrea had no lawful justification in they are now committed to working out the Tanzania, as Council President in January, is terms of self defence for attacking Ethiopia implications of the ICJ ruling in a cooperative promoting the idea of a Ministerial open and as a result must pay compensation to way. They will be conscious that there will be Council meeting to develop some new Ethiopia for the losses it incurred in the war. severe downsides for both sides if they seek thinking about the approach the Council The extent of the compensation remains to to use the meeting to inflame the situation. should take to the DRC situation and be determined by the Commission as does related issues of concern to Burundi, Uganda Sudan/Darfur the compensation which is payable by and Rwanda. The issues underlying resolutions 1625 and Ethiopia to Eritrea for breaches of interna- 1631 are also likely to come to the fore in tional humanitarian law by Ethiopian forces In addition, this initiative is aimed at explor- January, at least in informal discussions on which the Commission also ruled. ing some innovative ideas on how to develop between Council members, on Darfur. The this new interest in a regional approach. The At time of publication the Council was UN and AU have sent a joint mission to practical implementation of resolutions 1625 considering drastic revisions to the UNMEE Sudan to consider how to carry forward their (2005) “Conflict prevention in Africa” and mandate and deployment. Both the UN troop respective mandates in Sudan. The task of 1631 (2005) “Cooperation between the UN contributors and the Council are angry at protection of civilians in Darfur continues to and regional organisations” to the specific Eritrea’s attempt to dictate which countries’ be a heavy one. Options for supporting needs of the Great Lakes region is one personnel may serve in UNMEE and are AMIS will need to be explored. And, as the possibility under serious examination. New determined not to allow such a precedent to peace talks progress in Abuja, the possibility ideas about integrating peacekeeping be set. Despite the Council’s very strong of a more robust operation perhaps involv- capacity and standby capacity also seem response in S/PRST/2005/62, Eritrea has ing both the AU and UN, with the bulk of the likely to be discussed. remained obdurate, even refusing to meet resources funded by assessed contributions, with UN Under Secretary-General Jean-Marie Cross border situations involving groups like may become an important element in Guéhenno. However, withdrawal of the force the LRA in northern Uganda and associated providing the security guarantees necessary altogether is most unlikely. Council members humanitarian and protection issues will also to clinch the deal. are apprehensive that this course could be be addressed in the open debate. It will be Issues being monitored closely, but not enough to release the hair trigger currently sensitive. Uganda is opposed to a country necessarily on the January Work Pro- restraining the parties from open war. specific focus. But the regional framework gramme, will include: offers a potentially more pragmatic and The net result is likely to be a withdrawal of productive approach to this issue, provided UNMEE from current positions, which actually Haiti the process is given time, outcomes are well benefit Eritrea, to positions inside Ethiopia. Elections will take place on 8 January and in prepared and all concerned approach it The force will then serve as a preventative trip view of the history of violence the Council with a willingness to compromise and resolve wire, essentially a benefit to Ethiopia. will be monitoring progress closely. Issues the issues. Various options have been pro- looming in the background include not only In the short term, in light of recent events, posed, including by Under Secretary-General the state of electoral preparations, but also Eritrea now runs the risk of being branded the Jan Egeland, and by Canada. respect for the rule of law by the transitional aggressor should any hostilities occur. Look- Government. The dismissal of members of Finally, both the DRC and Uganda will be ing to the long term, however, the Council is the Judiciary, in response to a Supreme contemplating how to respond to the 19 likely to want to try to keep doors open in Court ruling that the Government did not like, December 2005 International Court of Justice Asmara for the Secretary-General at least. is troubling many observers. The Council, (ICJ) ruling in a case of regional importance, And it will not want Ethiopia to profit from its preoccupied with events in other parts of DRC v. Uganda. In its decision the Court failure to comply with international legal obli- the world, has let this issue ride for now. But found that Uganda’s military intervention in gations. Some reflection of these points is this sort of action is a breach of resolution the DRC in the late 1990s and early 2000s likely to be part of the mix as the Council 1542. had violated the principle of the non use of works through this thorny problem in January. force in international relations and that its armed forces had committed serious viola

 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Lebanon/Syria and the AU mediators will find uncomfortable. The Council will be watching closely Syrian The expected recommendations from the cooperation levels with the UNIIIC during Secretary-General that the force needs to be SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT January, especially in light of the transition to expanded may be unpopular with some Monthly a new Commissioner. But there is no reason members, particularly the US. jan.2006 at this stage to expect any interim report. FORECAST Afghanistan Next steps await recommendations from the The international conference in London on has been postponed with no new date Secretary-General under resolution 1644 Afghanistan in late January, while offstage as set yet. However, the idea is emerging, pro- (2005) on three issues relating to the Hariri far as the Council is concerned, will certainly moted by Tanzania as Council President for investigation: not be out of mind. The conference will be will January, of a major focus in the Council in n the appointment of a new Commissioner be an important prelude to Council consider- January on the regional dimensions of the to replace Detlev Mehlis; ation of the situation in February/March. And Great Lakes situation. n the options for UNIIIC assistance to in addition the Council will receive in January Lebanon in respect of investigations of A Council mission visited the Great Lakes the quarterly International Security Assistance other recent terrorist assassinations in the region of Africa in early November. Four main Force (ISAF) report. country; and themes came out of that visit. n possibilities for international assistance Timor-Leste n In Burundi, Council members were some with the trial of suspects. As reported in our December issue, a report what surprised at the government’s appar- of the Secretary-General is still awaited on ent desire to see the UN Operation in With respect to assistance to Lebanon, the Justice and Reconciliation. It remains unclear Burundi (ONUB) wound up quickly. But Council and the UN Secretariat are conscious when this will appear. Council members remained concerned at that a major issue will be to find appropriate the dangers posed to stability in the models that are genuinely supportive, but do The January Work Programme will also country by an early withdrawal. The not represent an open ended commitment. include a number of issues which are regional dimension was an important The UN is aware that Lebanon is not the only expected to proceed with relatively little element in this. country that could justify claims for such controversy, such as: n In the DRC, the mission helped to clarify assistance and it is concerned not to appear n Georgia (renewal of UNOMIG mandate) the need for the Council to take a firmer unbalanced or to become overly intrusive. n Western Sahara (renewal of MINURSO line against armed groups in eastern DRC mandate) Liberia provinces, particularly the Rwandan Hutu n Lebanon/Israel (renewal of UNIFIL mandate) Inauguration of the newly elected President rebels Forces démocratiques pour la n Middle East Consultations (The Palestinian is scheduled for 16 January. The defeated libération du Rwanda (FDLR). Those elections on 25 January is likely to make candidate George Weah has withdrawn groups continue to resist disarmament the regular monthly briefing of particular threats to disrupt the process. But, given all requirements and their presence gives significance) that has been invested by the UN in Liberian rise to concerns by regional neighbours, peace and reconciliation, the Council will be Various Sanctions related issues and to justifications for violating the DRC ready to react very quickly if the situation will arise, including: arms embargo. deteriorates. n Somalia (report of Monitoring Group) n A sharper appreciation of the regional n DRC (renewal of mandate of Group of dimensions of security and stability in the Côte d’Ivoire Experts) Great Lakes emerged. This includes risks Now that a Prime Minister has been n Appointment of new Chairs to various from foreign fighters in the DRC and also appointed, the Council will be watching for Committees the threats posed by the Ugandan rebel real progress on the road map towards n Possible reviving of the activities of the group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), elections in 2006 as set out in resolution 1633 Council’s Working Group on General elements of which, after several months (2005). The mandate for UNOCI will be Issues Related to Sanctions. of activity in the DRC, recently crossed the renewed, but the difficult issues for the border back into south Sudan. Council to grapple with during January will n The Council mission seems to have be around the size of the force and the clarified the inter-linkage between effective humanitarian/human rights context in which it Great Lakes Initiative sanctions enforcement by neighbours, must operate. The report of the Secretary- Recent Developments and the need for action within the DRC to General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention An international conference on the Great educe regional security concerns. of Genocide, Juan Méndez, is likely to pres- Lakes region, initially scheduled for December, ent some challenges which both the Council

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org  Four main lines of activity consequently in international relations and that its armed to demonstrate in public before the Council emerged in the Council: forces had committed serious violations of that it is meeting benchmarks in the peace n ONUB’s mandate was temporarily rolled international humanitarian law. Also, it found process. over and finally renewed in late December that the DRC had violated international law by n Burundi may welcome the opportunity to in resolution 1650 (2005). This included a attacking the Ugandan embassy. showcase its progress, especially to particularly interesting regional character- encourage foreign investment. But the Expected Council Action istic. Provisions were included to permit challenges posed by the DRC based rebel The Council will want to listen to the open cooperation and transfer of forces between group Front national de libération (FNL) Ministerial level debate before finalising spe- ONUB and the United Nations Mission in mean that it also has a strong interest in cific outcomes. The debate will be preceded the Congo (MONUC). regional solutions to security issues. by an “Arria style” meeting with NGOs. n With encouragement from Uganda, n Rwanda will be enthusiastic about any- Rwanda and Burundi, Council members Council outcomes are expected to include: thing that pressures its enemies amongst adopted resolution 1649 (2005) tightening n a general resolution on the Great Lakes, the armed groups in the DRC, but will be sanctions against foreign militias in the which could cover the implementation at looking for opportunities to expand its DRC. The resolution also indicates that the regional level of resolution 1625 (2005) influence in the region. MONUC could play a role in forcibly on conflict resolution and peacebuilding in n Both the DRC and Uganda will be contem- disarming the militias. Africa, and of resolution 1631 (2005) on plating how to respond to the ICJ ruling. n While the ONUB resolution strengthens cooperation with regional organisations; The Great Lakes meeting in January has the ability of the two UN forces in the region and potential for both sides to demonstrate (MONUC and ONUB) to cooperate, that n a decision on further harmonising (or that that phase of regional history is past idea is also related to a trend of discussion regionalising) the mandates and effective- and that they are now committed to work- in the Council that the Great Lakes could ness of UN peacekeepers in the region, ing out the implications of the ruling in a benefit significantly from a new kind of possibly along lines of the approach cooperative way. They will be conscious security partnership between the UN and adopted in resolution 1609 (2005) with that there will be severe downsides for the AU and the emerging proposal of respect to Côte d’Ivoire and other opera- both if they seek to use the meeting to some form of “regional ready response” tions in West Africa. inflame the situation. capacity. In this regard it is noteworthy that n The regional approach will inevitably also the African Union (AU) has also signalled The Council will also hear more about the bring into focus the security issues often willingness to send troops to the DRC to regional implications of the situation in north- raised by Uganda concerning cross- help disarm militias. ern Uganda. In this context, Council members border threats. Uganda has in the past n Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian may follow up on Under Secretary-General made several suggestions for military Affairs Jan Egeland briefed the Council on Egeland’s briefing. cooperation and assistance on Congo- the situation in northern Uganda, among Key Issues lese soil. n other issues, on 19 December. Mr. Egeland The perennial issue before the Council is to Inevitably, the regional discussion will indicated that the LRA constitutes a threat ensure that the transition process in the DRC extend to the wider dimensions of the to regional peace and security and recom- is successfully completed and that stability in humanitarian situation in the north of the mended that the Council should appoint a the Great Lakes region is reached. A related region, including the incursions from panel of experts to examine the activities issue is the removal of the threats to regional Sudan by the LRA into the DRC and of and the sources of support for the stability posed by the existence of irregular Uganda. Uganda has argued, in a letter to group. armed groups, often of foreign origin. the Council dated 13 December, that the security problem is essentially resolved Parallel to the developments in the Council, in The Council mission and the Tanzanian initia- and is now a purely internal matter. It the DRC the constitutional referendum took tive have encouraged members to think more criticised countries such as Canada for place on 18 December, as part of the transi- widely about opportunities for the Council to seeking the inclusion of the northern tional process. The transition will be concluded be more effective by acting in a more regional Uganda issue in the Council’s agenda. with elections in June 2006. rather than purely country-specific mode. Canada, in a letter dated 16 December 2005, argues that the threat to regional Finally, on 19 December 2005, the Interna- The ambitious Council agenda on the Great peace and security remains real and that tional Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a ruling Lakes in January is a very important develop- the humanitarian threat is grave. in a case of regional importance, DRC v. ment. But it will give rise to additional issues n It seems that this whole set of issues will Uganda. In its decision, the Court found that and political sensitivities. benefit from an open airing. The regional Uganda, during its intervention in DRC, had n For the DRC, its constitutional referendum approach proposed by Tanzania may offer violated the principle of the non-use of force will be over. It may welcome the opportunity

 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org all concerned a pragmatic and productive southern Sudan and a potential dimension solution, provided the debate is well pre- for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) as pared and all concerned approach it with well. For both practical and political SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT willingness to compromise and resolve reasons this option would probably over- Monthly these issues. In this regard the elaboration stretch the possibilities for action in jan.2006 and application of the principles in resolu- January, although as occurred in Under FORECAST tion 1625 will be a helpful framework. Secretary-General Egeland’s briefing, it is International pressure finally succeeded in bound to be discussed. Action may be Council Dynamics bringing about the Lusaka Ceasefire Agree- reserved for a later discussion; and There is no division inside the Council on the ment in July 1999 among all six countries. n establishing a process to sustain the need to approach the issues in the Great Subsequently, fractures in the Rwanda- proactive regional approach on these Lakes on a regional basis. There is recogni- Uganda alliance resulted in clashes in the city issues over several months so that the tion that this will help to ensure that the of Kisangani. The assassination of Laurent- Ministerial meeting momentum does transitions in the DRC and Burundi are suc- Desire Kabila in 2001 brought to power his not fade. cessfully concluded and to build international son, Joseph Kabila. support for regional reconstruction and Key Facts A peace agreement on the Burundian conflict development. In the early 1990s, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi was signed in Arusha in August 2000, estab- and the DRC all experienced political turmoil Leadership in Great Lakes matters in the lishing a three-year transitional period. In the and instability. The conflicts in all four coun- Council has traditionally been taken by following years, virtually all Hutu armed tries quickly developed inter-linkages through France, in view of its commitments to groups joined the process, apart from the the cross-border movement of combatants francophone countries. More recently, FNL, and the Council established ONUB in and refugees, and a regional dimension Tanzania has also displayed willingness to 2004 to assist with disarmament and demo- emerged. take a key role in Great Lakes issues in the bilisation, patrol the borders and monitor the Council, particularly given its role in the Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime in Zaire (now ceasefire. Burundian peace process and its proximity to DRC) faced increasing opposition after The 2002 Sun City Agreement established a the troubled region. decades of a brutal and authoritarian regime power-sharing mechanism in the DRC, a uni- in 1993-94. At the same time, ethnic turmoil In this context, action against foreign fighters fied government and elections. Subsequent escalated in Burundi and Rwanda, pitting has also been assisted by the concerted agreements on troop withdrawals were Tutsis against Hutus. Kampala was fighting demands from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi signed with Uganda and Rwanda in mid to against rebels opposed to President Yoweri and the DRC. They have been pressing late-2002. The war formally ended with the Museveni, largely the Allied Democratic even more strongly that foreign fighters in signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agree- Forces (ADF) who also used bases in eastern Congolese territory be disarmed. ment in December 2002. Zaire. Options MONUC supports the Congolese govern- Rwanda and Burundi suffered cross-border The Council is showing signs of an important ment in the transition. It also supports the raids carried out by Hutu extremists from evolution in its approach to handling issues Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) against Zaire and ethnic Tutsi Rwandans were with regional dimensions. This gives it a irregular armed groups in the eastern prov- attacked in North Kivu by Rwandan Hutu number of options not previously available, inces of the Kivus and in the Ituri region. It has extremists. Laurent-Desire Kabila seized the such as: also been involved in the voluntary disarma- opportunity to overthrow Mobutu largely with n substantively addressing, in the context of ment and integration of former armed groups Rwandan and Ugandan support in 1997. resolutions 1625 and 1631, not only the into the FARDC. regional dimensions of the south and However, relations between Kabila and his 2002 also marked the emergence of a new central parts of the region, but the northern two main supporters, Rwanda and Uganda, crisis, the escalation of the longstanding sector as well. This would mean focussing began to sour in 1998. The crisis led to conflict in the region of Ituri, in the Orientale on the security, humanitarian and IDP military intervention from both countries, but province. The crisis once again exposed the issues across the Uganda/DRC border Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia came to regional dimensions of the conflict in the and also within northern Uganda; Kabila’s aid. Kabila also turned to Hutu forces DRC with the involvement of Rwanda and n extending the discussion of the LRA issue in the Kivus to counter Rwanda. Rwanda and Uganda. The conflict created such a humani- to include the Sudan dimension as well. Uganda responded by sending troops and tarian disaster that the Council authorised This has the logic of following the approach supporting the creation of rebel groups. the deployment of an Interim Emergency of dealing with all the key linkages. How- Multinational Force (IEMF) in 2003. Militia ever, this brings in issues associated with

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org  leaders eventually signed the May 2004 addressed conflict prevention, Selected Letters Kinshasa Act of Engagement. particularly in Africa. • Letter dated 16 December 2005 from • S/Res/1602 (31 May 2005) requested the Permanent Representative of In 2003, the Council imposed an arms that the Secretary-General submit Canada to the President of the embargo on all armed groups operating in a plan for restructuring ONUB’s Security Council. the Ituri region and in the Kivus, as well as mandate and size. • S/2005/785 (13 December 2005) is the against armed groups not party to the • S/Res/1596 (3 May 2005) expanded letter from Uganda to the Council. Agreement. In 2004, it established a Sanctions the DRC arms embargo and added • S/2005/667 (25 October 2005) Committee and a Group of Experts. In 2005, travel bans and assets freeze to the contains a letter from the Joint the Council extended the embargo to any sanctions regime. Commission with recommendations recipient in Congolese territory and adopted • S/Res/1565 (1 October 2004) further to the Council. expanded MONUC’s mandate to targeted travel and financial sanctions, now Reports of the DRC Group of Experts include seizing arms, monitoring strengthened. compliance with the arms embargo • S/2005/436 (26 July 2005) As identified by the ICJ and by the Council and assisting the government. • S/2005/30 (25 January 2005) • S/2004/551 (15 July 2004) Group of Experts on DRC sanctions, there is • S/Res/1545 (21 May 2004) established an intimate connection between the illegal ONUB. Reports of the DRC Panel of • S/Res/1533 (12 March 2004) Experts on Illegal Exploitation exploitation of resources, the presence of established the DRC Sanctions of Natural Resources foreign fighters and the perpetuation of Committee and the Group of Experts. • S/2003/1027 (23 October 2003) conflict in the Great Lakes region. The illegal • S/Res/1493 (28 July 2003) imposed • S/2002/1146 (16 October 2002) exploitation of natural resources is chan- an arms embargo and authorised • S/2001/1072 (13 November 2001) nelled into funds for the purchase of arms MONUC to use all necessary means to • S/2001/357 (12 April 2001) and the maintenance of armed groups, which fulfil its mandate in the Kivus and in Ituri. Security Council Debates in turn guarantee that the exploitation • S/Res/1484 (30 May 2003) authorised • S/PV.5331 (19 December 2005) Under continues. The process creates synergies IEMF’s deployment. Secretary-General for Humanitarian between fighting and economic activity, • S/Res/1445 (4 December 2002) Affairs Jan Egeland briefed the Council which then protract the conflict. Against this welcomed the signing of peace on the situation in northern Uganda. background, the fact that DRC borders have agreements with DRC’s neighbours remained porous, despite Security Council and further expanded MONUC with a new concept of operations. Historical Background sanctions measures, is understandable. • S/Res/1291 (24 February 2000) added 21 December 2005 The Council strength- Rwanda and Uganda have continued to have Chapter VII protective powers to ened sanctions in the DRC and renewed security concerns for almost a decade, MONUC’s mandate. ONUB’s mandate. • S/Res/1279 (30 November 1999) directly linked to the presence of fighters in 18 December 2005 Voting in the DRC con- the DRC. The failure to disarm the FDLR and established MONUC. • S/Res/1011 (16 August 1995) partially stitutional referendum began. the LRA prompted renewed threats of inter- lifted the 1994 Rwanda arms embargo vention from Kigali in 2004 and from Kampala 1 November 2005 A list of individuals subject for supplies to the government. in 2005. to targeted sanctions in the DRC was Reports of Council Missions adopted. UN Documents to the Region September 2005 President Museveni of Selected Security Council Resolutions • S/2005/716 (14 November 2005) • S/2004/934 (30 November 2004) Uganda threatened to send troops into the • S/Res/1649 (21 December 2005) • S/2003/653 (17 June 2003) DRC should MONUC and the FARDC fail to strengthened sanctions in the DRC • S/2002/537 and Add.1 (14 May 2002) disarm the LRA. against militias which refuse to disarm. • S/2001/521 and Add.1 (30 May 2001) • S/Res/1650 (21 December 2005) • S/2000/416 (11 May 2000) August 2005 Pierre Nkurunziza was elected renewed the ONUB mandate and • S/1995/164 (28 February 1995) president of Burundi. permitted cooperation and force • S/1995/163 (28 February 1995) transfers between ONUB and MONUC. May 2005 The Council expanded the DRC • S/1994/1039 (9 September 1994) • S/Res/1641 (30 November 2005) is a arms embargo to include any recipient within short technical rollover of ONUB’s Selected Secretary-General’s Reports the entire country’s territory, and imposed a mandate. • S/2005/728 (21 November 2005) is travel ban and assets freeze. • S/Res/1631 (17 October 2005) the latest report on Burundi. addressed the cooperation between • S/2005/603 (26 September 2005) is February 2005 Referendum approved the the UN and regional organisations. the latest report on the DRC. Constitution of Burundi. • S/Res/1625 (14 September 2005)

 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org May 2004 ONUB was established. and Angola sent troops to assist the govern- ment. March 2004 The Council established a DRC SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Sanctions Committee and a Group of Experts. May 1997 Laurent-Desire Kabila, with support Monthly from Rwanda and Tutsi rebels, captured July 2003 The Council imposed an arms jan.2006 Kinshasa. He was sworn in as president. FORECAST embargo on armed groups in the Kivus and Zaire was renamed DRC. Ituri or those not party to the Global and MONUC: Duration All-Inclusive Agreement. 1996 Zairian rebels asserted control over 30 November 1999 to present much of the eastern provinces. May 2003 The Council authorised the deploy- ONUB: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission ment of a multinational force in Ituri. 1994-1996 Rwandan Hutu extremists carried Carolyn McAskie (Canada) out attacks against Rwanda and the civilian April 2003 The final act of inter-Congolese population of Zaire. A government of national ONUB: Force Commander political negotiation was signed. The interim unity was inaugurated in Rwanda. The Derrick Mgwebi (South Africa) constitution was adopted, establishing a Council partially lifted the arms embargo ONUB: Size and Composition of Mission transitional government until elections. for the Rwandan government. Total authorised strength: 5,650 military December 2002 The parties to the Inter- 1994 Rwandan genocide took place. The personnel, including 200 military observ- Congolese Dialogue signed a Global and ers; Current Strength (31 October 2005): aftermath displaced hundreds of thousands All Inclusive Agreement. 5,642 total uniformed personnel. Military of Hutus into Zairian territory. The Council contributors: Algeria, Bangladesh, Bel- modified UNAMIR, authorised Opération September 2002 The DRC and Uganda gium, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Chad, signed the Luanda Agreement on troop with- Turquoise and imposed an arms embargo China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, drawals. in Rwanda. Rwandan Tutsi forces achieved Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Jor- victory. The Council created the international dan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, July 2002 The DRC and Rwanda signed the tribunal for Rwanda. Malaysia, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Pretoria Agreement on troop withdrawals. Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Paki- 1993 Ethnic turmoil escalated in Rwanda April 2002 The Sun City Agreement was stan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, and Burundi. The Council established the signed. Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, “UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda Russia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, February 2001 Rwandan and Ugandan with- (UNOMUR) and UNAMIR. South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, drawal began. Togo, Tunisia, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia 1986 Museveni took power in Uganda and ONUB: Cost and Duration January 2001 Joseph Kabila was sworn in as installed a no-party system; the LRA began president. fighting. $307.69 million (gross) between 1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006 August 2000 The Burundian Arusha Peace Other Relevant Facts and Reconciliation Agreement was signed; MONUC: Special Representative of the transitional government was established the Secretary-General and Head of Mission in Burundi. Sudan/Darfur William Lacy Swing (US) February 2000 Fighting continued in the DRC, MONUC: Force Commander Recent Developments largely for natural resources, pitting govern- The situation in the western Sudanese region Babacar Gaye (Senegal) ment against rebels and Rwandan against of Darfur continues to deteriorate, with reports Ugandan forces. The Council added Chapter MONUC: Size and Composition of Mission of spill over in neighbouring Chad and VII protective powers to MONUC’s mandate. fragmentation in rebel leadership. Janjaweed Authorised maximum strength: 17,000 Arab militias reportedly continue to operate in December 1999 The Council established military personnel; Current strength (31 coordination with Khartoum in violation of MONUC. October 2005): 16,221 total uniformed personnel, including 15,197 troops, 724 Council demands. As a result, millions of July 1999 The DRC, Angola, Namibia, military observers, 300 police; Main troop civilians have suffered, and the delivery of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe signed the contributors: Pakistan, India, Uruguay, humanitarian aid has been disrupted. Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. South Africa The ceasefire, monitored by the African Union August 1998 Insurgents backed by Rwanda MONUC: Cost Mission in Sudan (AMIS), remains shaky. and Uganda rose up against President US$383.188 million for 1 July 2005 – AMIS has suffered setbacks on the ground, Laurent-Desire Kabila. Zimbabwe, Namibia 31 October 2005 (A/RES/59/285 B)

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org  including the abduction and killing of troops. The Council will also receive the report from In the final weeks of 2005, the situation in It has also struggled with underfunding and the joint AU-UN assessment mission. We south Sudan remained calm, but fragile. The lack of expertise. There are reports of funding expect that Council members will begin to implementation of the north-south CPA cutbacks from the EU and the US and indica- focus on various options such as co-deploy- continues at a slow pace, with the adoption of tions from the African Union (AU) that funds ment possibilities between the UN and AU, a constitution for the region. will be exhausted by March or April. and also the feasibility of the transfer or In March, the Council created UNMIS to sharing of AMIS responsibilities with UNMIS. An AU-UN assessment mission visited support the implementation of the CPA. It is Darfur in December to consider the future of Council Members will be conscious of the mandated to, inter alia, assist with disarma- peacekeeping in the region, including the AU Summit in Khartoum (22-23 January) ment, demobilisation and reintegration deployment of UN troops. and will want to ensure that the AU members (DDR) of combatants as well as with security- receive positive signals about the valuable sector reform. Sources of concern are delays During his 19 December briefing to the contribution which AMIS has made and also in troop deployment and that, at the time of Council, Under Secretary-General Jan a clear message about the need for a more writing, Khartoum and the UN had not con- Egeland asked for an expanded and more robust presence in the future. At time of cluded a Status of Forces Agreement that effective security presence. writing it is unclear whether this will be done will define the legal status of UNMIS in Sudan. The parties—Khartoum and rebel Justice by way of Council action or by members But Khartoum also faced a separate conflict and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudan acting individually. in Darfur in 2003, against the SLM/A and the Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)— Key Facts JEM. At the heart of the conflict are issues resumed peace talks on the sharing of power Civil war broke out in southern Sudan in 1962. such as economic marginalisation and land and wealth in late November, under AU aus- It ended with the 1972 Addis Ababa agree- rights. The Government of Sudan responded pices. Some progress is reported on ment, which gave south Sudan autonomy by sending troops and recruiting the Janja- wealth-sharing, but there is still a consider- and freedom of religion. The origins of the weed, who engaged in brutal attacks against able distance between the parties’ positions. war are related to struggles between the the civilian population. The Council was briefed on 13 December by largely Arab-Muslim north and the economi- A ceasefire was signed in April 2004 in the Chief Prosecutor of the International cally marginalised south. N’djamena, Chad, and is monitored by AMIS Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno Ocampo, In 1983, fighting broke out again with the with UNMIS support, mostly on planning and on the Darfur investigations. The Prosecutor Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army technical advice. Peace talks have dragged said that, so far, the security situation made (SPLM/A) under the leadership of John on for more than a year, over seven succes- trips to the region and witness protection Garang. The Intergovernmental Authority on sive rounds, with no peace agreement. impossible, and that future cooperation from Development (IGAD), in particular Kenya, Khartoum would be critical. But Khartoum The situation in Darfur poses risks to the launched in 1993 mediation attempts that has established a new specialised tribunal to transition. The Council has consistently called culminated in the Machakos Protocol in 2002, try to eliminate the ICC jurisdiction and for a political solution to the conflict and, in followed by five other protocols. The Council announced on the day of the Ocampo particular, on Khartoum to protect civilians expressed support with an extraordinary briefing that it would not cooperate with the and to disarm the Janjaweed. meeting in Nairobi in November 2004. ICC investigation. The Council imposed an arms embargo The signing of the Comprehensive Peace At the time of writing, Council members against non-state parties to the conflict in Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 began the are about to renew the mandate of the 2004. In March 2005, it extended the embargo transitional process. The agreement estab- Panel of Experts until March, when a review to all parties, imposed a travel ban and assets lished the sharing of public positions between of the sanctions regime is due, and adopt freeze against violators, a ban on military incumbents and southern rebels. It also a Presidential Statement welcoming the flights over Darfur, and established a Sanc- determined the equitable sharing of oil resumption of peace talks. The Sanctions tions Committee and a Panel of Experts to revenues. Committee received the Panel of Experts’ monitor compliance. final report on Darfur. A Government of National Unity (GNU) was Sanctions violations are ongoing, especially inaugurated in July 2005, and John Garang Expected Council Action regarding the flights ban and Khartoum’s became First Vice-President. With Garang’s In January, the Council will receive the regular support to the Janjaweed. In addition, Dar- sudden death in the same month, Salva Kiir report of the Secretary-General on the imple- fur’s porous borders with Chad and with the was sworn-in in August. Other political groups mentation of the mandate of the UN Mission rest of Sudan cannot counter the flow of in Sudan tried to take part in the process. in Sudan (UNMIS). It will also receive the arms. monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur.

 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org The Committee has been inoperative in Dynamics are likely to be influenced by the preparing a list of individual violators or signals the AU may send regarding its willing- adopting its own guidelines. Problems with ness to partner with or transfer responsibilities SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT gathering information, including the lack of to the UN. Council members will be sensitive Monthly cooperation from some members of the to the issue, particularly since great political jan.2006 Sudanese government, marked the first capital was invested by the AU in its initiatives FORECAST Panel’s tenure. as a mediator and as a peacekeeper in the n replacing AMIS with UNMIS, and expand- region. The Council referred the situation to the ICC ing UNMIS’ mandate accordingly. This in March, per the recommendations of the Sensitivities on the part of Sudan will also can be done by raising UNMIS troop levels International Commission of Inquiry (ICI). play a role, but will probably be much less and/or redeploying troops from south influential than in the past. AU members have Sudan; or Key Issues seen the difficult experience AMIS has n maintaining separate missions, while The key issue for the Council is how to sup- encountered in Darfur and are likely to be mandating increased cooperation includ- port both the north-south transition and less supportive. And the dynamics in the ing joint operations. provide in addition – probably in conjunction Council will also be impacted by the depar- with the AU – a more robust presence in The range of options will be affected by the ture of Algeria, Sudan’s closest ally on the Darfur involving UN forces. developments in the political negotiations in Council during the entire period in which it Abuja. The elements necessary to clinch a A related issue is whether this can be done has been seized of Darfur. deal may play a role in determining the kind using UNMIS forces or whether additional Some members of the Council are eager to of force structure that will be required. forces will need to be generated by DPKO. start preparing a list of individual violators to Underlying Problems The discussions will involve complex techni- be targeted for travel and financial measures. For UNMIS, it is clear that risks remain in the cal issues relating to mandates, command Due to the opposition from a few Council implementation of the CPA. Under the CPA, and control, application of generic UN peace- members, it is unlikely, however, that the for example: keeping principles and not least funding. Council will move at this point to impose n the reshuffling of public positions threat- This will involve innovative thinking about the individual sanctions. ens traditional power structures; practical implementation of a partnership Regarding any action with respect to Sudan’s n the south will maintain a separate army, with a regional organisation. non-cooperation with the ICC, the US oppo- with its own chain of command; The issue of applying pressure for compli- sition to the Court is likely to be an important n the south will be able to decide whether it ance with sanctions will remain on the table. but not necessarily overriding factor. desires to secede in 2011; and There are differences within the Council n Abyei, a historically contested area on the Options as whether this will be an effective lever in north-south border, will become a sepa- In addition to beginning work on the future terms of promoting a solution to the conflict rate political entity and will decide its fate in UN/AMIS partnership arrangements, the in Darfur. the 2011 referendum separately. Khartoum extension of the mandate of the Panel of has, to date, failed to implement the Council Dynamics Experts on sanctions, some of the options decision of the Abyei Boundary Commis- Positions inside the Council on the future of laid out in our December issue continue to be sion, which is final and binding. AMIS and UNMIS in Darfur are still evolving. plausible and include: However, proposals are expected as soon n action to approve the Sanctions Commit- The south is plagued by intertribal fighting as the report of the assessment mission is tee guidelines; and disgruntled armed groups that did not circulated. A sense of urgency is added by n an extension of the arms embargo to take part in the peace process. Furthermore, the deteriorating situation and by the fact Sudan’s entire territory; and/or the region is in desperate need of economic that the Secretariat would need several n pressure, perhaps by way of a statement development, but mines have hindered months before it could generate forces for a criticising the announcement by Khartoum investment prospects. The division of minis- large operation in Darfur. of its decision not to cooperate with ICC, tries in the GNU left energy in the hands of the on Sudan to begin to cooperate with north, causing deep discontent in the south. There is some reluctance inside the Council the Court. to increasing UNMIS’ troop levels, with a The activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army preference to instead redeploy troops from Some of the options on the future of AMIS (LRA) in the south also raise concerns over the south into Darfur. Other members con- and UNMIS in Darfur include: Sudan’s porous borders. Sudan and Uganda sider that the mandate in the south is already n incorporating AMIS’ responsibilities and announced they would start cooperating in as much as can be managed with current troops into UNMIS with a new UN mandate; that regard in November, and Under Secre- force levels. tary-General Egeland urged the Council on 19 December to take up the matter.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org  Regarding Darfur, risks come from weak Historical Background Other Relevant Facts command structures among the rebels. The 13 December 2005 The ICC Chief Prosecutor UNMIS: Special Representative of the SLM/A, in particular, has broken up largely Ocampo briefed the Council. Secretary-General and Head of Mission along ethnic lines. Even in the event of a Jan Pronk (Netherlands) 29 November 2005 Darfur peace talks peace agreement, fragmentation could offset resumed. UNMIS Force Commander any improvements in security on the ground Major-General Fazle Elahi Akbar in the absence of a more robust peacekeep- 11 August 2005 Salva Kiir sworn in. (Bangladesh) ing presence. 30 July 2005 John Garang died. UNMIS: Size and Composition UN Documents of Mission 9 July 2005 GNU was inaugurated, John Selected Security Council Resolutions Maximum authorised strength: up to Garang sworn in. 10,000 military personnel; Strength as of • S/Res/1651 (21 December 2005) 31 October 2005: 3,519 troops and 228 renewed the mandate of the Panel of 20 June 2005 Trials began at the special military observers; Key troop contributors: Experts to March 2006. Darfur Sudanese court. Bangladesh, India, Nepal • S/Res/1627 (23 September 2005) 28 April 2005 AMIS increased to 7,731 per- renewed UNMIS’ mandate until 24 UNMIS: Cost March 2006. sonnel. 1 July – 31 October 2005: $315.99 • S/Res/1593 (31 March 2005) referred 31 March 2005 The Council referred Darfur to million (gross) the situation in Darfur to the ICC. the ICC. AU’s Chief Mediator • S/Res/1591 (29 March 2005) Salim Ahmed Salim (Tanzania) strengthened sanctions in Darfur. 29 March 2005 Further sanctions imposed in • S/Res/1590 (24 March 2005) Darfur. Head of AMIS established UNMIS. Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe (Nigeria) • S/Res/1574 (19 November 2004, 24 March 2005 UNMIS established. AMIS Force Commander adopted in Nairobi) expressed support 25 January 2005 ICI report concluded that for peace processes. Major-General Festus Okonkwo (Nigeria) international crimes had been committed in • S/Res/1564 (18 September 2004) AMIS: Size and Composition Darfur. established the ICI. Total authorised strength: 6,171 military • S/Res/1556 (30 July 2004) established 9 January 2005 CPA signed. and 1,560 police personnel; Strength as an arms embargo in Darfur and of 20 October 2005: 5,618 military requested monthly reports. 19 November 2004 The Council met in Nai- personnel and 1,176 police personnel; Selected Presidential Statements robi. Key troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Ghana • S/PRST/2005/48 (13 October 2005) 20 October 2004 AU expanded AMIS’ man- AMIS: Cost expressed concern with the current date to include civilian protection. situation in Darfur. $466 million ($290 million pledged); Selected Secretary-General’s Reports 18 September 2004 ICI established. Largest donors: Canada, EU, US • S/2005/719 (16 November 2005) is the 1 September 2004 Parties to the Darfur con- latest report on Darfur at the time of flict called for AU peacekeepers. writing. • S/2005/579 (12 September 2005) is 30 July 2004 The Council imposed the first Lebanon/Syria the latest regular report on Sudan. arms embargo on Darfur. • S/2005/411 (23 June 2005) assessed Recent Developments April 2004 Darfur N’djamena Ceasefire Agree- UNMIS’ deployment. On 13 December, Detlev Mehlis, the • S/2005/285 (3 May 2005) reported on ment signed. Commissioner for the UN International Independent Investigation Commission UNMIS’ assistance to AMIS. September 2003 Naivasha Agreement on • S/2005/57 (31 January 2005) assessed (UNIIIC) on the assassination of former Security Arrangements (ceasefire between risks in the CPA implementation and Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, briefed north and south) signed. proposed UNMIS. the Council on his second report containing February 2003 Rebels rose up in Darfur. new findings and detailing progress of the investigation. The report noted Syrian “reluc- July 2002 Government of Sudan and SPLM/A tance and procrastination” in its cooperation signed the Machakos Protocol. with UNIIIC and several Syrian attempts to “hinder the investigation internally and procedurally.” However, Mehlis also noted that Syria had made available for questioning

10 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org five Syrian officials suspected by the Com- The Council is also expected to consider the mission. The interviews took place at the UN conclusions of the Terje Roed-Larsen report offices in Vienna. The second report on the implementation of resolution 1559. SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT reinforced the conclusions of the first report Monthly Key Facts that members of Lebanese and Syrian On 2 September 2004, by a majority vote, jan.2006 intelligence and security services had been FORECAST the Council approved resolution 1559, involved in the assassination. sponsored by the US and France, following individual sanctions and triggering further Prior to the expiration of the UNIIIC mandate, allegations of Syrian support for an unconsti- Council consideration, lay with Mehlis. UNIIIC the Lebanese government requested that: tutional prolongation of the term of Lebanese was requested to report to the Council at n UNIIIC be extended by six months with the President Émile Lahoud. The resolution any time if its Commissioner considered that possibility of an additional extension; called on all remaining foreign forces to Syrian cooperation did not meet the require- n the mandate of UNIIIC be expanded to withdraw from Lebanon and all Lebanese ments of resolution 1636. investigate all assassination attempts that and non-Lebanese militias to be disbanded With respect to the separate issues dealt took place in Lebanon since 1 October and disarmed. It also supported the exten- with in resolution 1559, the second semi- 2004; sion of the Government of Lebanon’s control annual report on its implementation was n and an international tribunal be estab- over all Lebanese territory and a free and fair released on 24 October. Roed-Larsen indi- lished to judge the perpetrators of the electoral process. Terje Roed-Larsen was cated that a progressive approach to the Hariri assassination. appointed Special Envoy for Verification of disarmament of the militias by the Lebanese the Implementation of Resolution 1559 with On 15 December, the Council unanimously government should be seen as satisfactory, the task to produce semi-annual reports. adopted resolution 1644, under Chapter VII: but mentioned that the transfer of weapons Rafik Hariri was at that time prime minister n expressing its ongoing concern about and personnel between Syria and Lebanon in and opposed the decision to extend Lahoud’s Syrian cooperation connection with Palestinian militias was a term. He resigned a few days later under n urging Syria to cooperate without delay problem. pressure. n extending the mandate of UNIIIC by six Finally, there have been more than 15 bomb- months and allowing the Commission to Following the 14 February bombing in Beirut ings and assassination attempts, mostly provide technical assistance to Lebanon that killed Hariri, the Council unanimously against anti-Syrian voices in Lebanon since for the investigation of other assassina- adopted resolution 1595 establishing the 1 October 2004. In an 11 October letter to tions UNIIIC to help the Lebanese authorities in the President of the Security Council, the n requesting the Secretary-General to work their investigation of the murder. In parallel, Committee to Protect Journalists called on with the Lebanese authorities and report Lebanese demonstrations against Syria’s the Council to expand the probe to include back to the Council on ways to expand the 29-year presence in Lebanon, coupled with attacks against Lebanese journalists that mandate and on the nature of the interna- international pressure, led the Syrian had occurred in recent months. tional assistance needed for the trial of the government to withdraw its intelligence and perpetrators military apparatus from Lebanon in April. Key Issues n requesting reports from UNIIIC on the Approval of a replacement Commissioner is UNIIIC’s first report, made public on 20 progress of the inquiry every three months. unlikely to be a controversial issue. Tradition- October, concluded that Lebanese and ally the Secretary-General, who makes the Expected Council Action Syrian officials had been involved in the appointment, advises the Council in advance The issue is likely to be before the Council assassination of Hariri. Upon request from of his intended appointee and the Council, by again in January because the Secretary- the Lebanese Government, the Secretary- letter, confirms its agreement. This is usually General has to appoint a new Commissioner General agreed to extend the mandate of the preceded by informal consultation with to replace Detlev Mehlis, who is returning to UNIIIC to 15 December. interested Council members. his post in Germany. On 31 October, the Council unanimously Determining the nature of the international There is also always the possibility of the adopted resolution 1636 establishing a assistance to the Lebanese judicial system Commissioner reporting to the Council if targeted sanctions regime, of travel bans will be a major issue for the Council, espe- further difficulties arise with Syria. and asset freezes, against individuals to be cially bearing in mind its increasing reluctance designated as suspects in the Hariri assas- A decision on the extension of the mandate in recent years to establish and fund interna- sination. It also decided under Chapter VII and on the nature of international judicial tional tribunals. that Syria must fully cooperate with UNIIIC. assistance which may be provided will also There was a clear threat of “further action” if Regarding resolution 1559, the Roed-Larsen be required. This will follow once the Secre- the requirements of the resolution were not report is becoming increasingly stale. It may tary-General’s report is received. met. The resolution further specified that the be an issue as to whether to take up this initiative, both in terms of implementing the matter at all.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 11 Council Dynamics UN Documents regarding the modalities of cooperation Consideration of the Roed-Larsen report will Security Council Resolutions with the UNIIIC • S/2005/272 (29 April 2005) First semi- be complicated by the fact that some mem- • S/RES/1644 (15 December 2005) annual report on the implementation bers are of the view that the problem of the extended UNIIIC’s mandate by six of resolution 1559 Lebanese militias should probably be left to months and requested reports on the • S/2005/203 (24 March 2005) Report the Lebanese government at this stage. progress of the investigation every of the Mission of Inquiry into the There will be concerns by some members three months. Circumstances, Causes and • S/RES/1636 (31 October 2005) urged that the history of Lebanon shows how for- Consequences of the 14 February Syria to cooperate with the investigation eign interference using sectarian divides bombing in Beirut that killed Hariri and and established sanctions against can be catastrophic for Lebanese stability. 22 others suspects in the assassination. They will argue therefore, that the Council • S/2004/777 (1 October 2004) • S/RES/1595 (7 April 2005) established should remain cautious, particularly with Secretary-General’s report on UNIIIC. regard to the disarming of militias. resolution 1559 • S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) Other With respect to the UNIIIC investigation, urged Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon however, the important fact in terms of and the disbanding of Lebanese and • S/2005/783 (13 December 2005) Council dynamics is that all three resolu- non-Lebanese militias. Letter from Lebanon requesting an international tribunal and the expansion tions—1595, 1636 and 1644—have been Presidential Statements of UNIIIC’s mandate adopted by consensus. • S/PRST/2005/61 (12 December 2005) • S/2005/762 (6 December 2005) Letter condemned the killing of journalist In January, the absence of Algeria’s voice in from Lebanon requesting an extension Gebrane Tuéni in Beirut of the UNIIIC’s mandate the Council may change the dynamics in the • S/PRST/2005/26 (22 June 2005) • S/2005/717 (15 November 2005) Letter Council on how to respond to possible future welcomed the Lebanese parliamentary from Syria regarding its cooperation UNIIIC findings that Syria had hindered the elections and supported the call for with UNIIIC investigation or had still not fully and uncondi- enhanced assistance and cooperation, • S/2005/715 (14 November 2005) Letter tionally cooperated. However, Russia can be in support of a credible governmental from Lebanon programme of political and economic expected to continue to put proposals • S/2005/693 (1 November 2005) Letter reform. through a critical examination. from Syria • S/PRST/2005/22 (7 June 2005) • S/2005/627 (4 October 2005) Letter Expansion of the scope of the investigation condemned the 2 June terrorist from Syria to include all assassination attempts since 1 bombing in Beirut that killed Lebanese • S/2005/219 (31 March 2005) Joint October 2004 will also be controversial. Much journalist Samir Qassir. Statement from the meeting of the • S/PRST/2005/17 (4 May 2005) will depend on the Secretary-General’s report. Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council reiterated its call for the full • S/2004/706 (1 September 2004) Letter Underlying Problems implementation of resolution 1559, from Syria The Lebanese Government does not yet acknowledged Syrian withdrawal from • S/2004/699 (31 August 2004) Letter fully exert control over all its territory, espe- Lebanon and welcomed the deploy- from Lebanon cially in the south. There is also a lack of ment of Lebanese Armed Forces to positions vacated by Syrian forces. progress on disbanding and disarming the Historical Background • S/PRST/2005/4 (15 February 2005) Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias as 13 December 2005 Mehlis presented his called for by resolution 1559. However, condemned the Hariri assassination. • S/PRST/2004/36 (19 October 2004) second report to the Council. On 15 Decem- Hezbollah is an important component of on the implementation of resolution ber, the Council adopted resolution 1644. Lebanese political life and still holds legiti- 1559. macy to the eyes of many Lebanese as a 12 December 2005 The journalist Gebrane Reports liberation group against the Israeli presence Tuéni was killed by a bomb in Beirut. in the Sheb’a farms area. • S/2005/775 (12 December 2005) Second UNIIIC report 5 – 7 December 2005 Five Syrian officials The security situation is also affected by • S/2005/673 (26 October 2005) Second were interviewed by UNIIIC in Vienna. regular cross-border incidents in the south. semi-annual report on the implementa- 31 October 2005 The Council unanimously Hezbollah, the Israeli Defence Force and tion of resolution 1559 adopted resolution 1636. Palestinian armed elements continue to • S/2005/662 (20 October 2005) First violate the Blue Line between Israel and UNIIIC report 29 October 2005 Following the recommen- Lebanon. • S/2005/393 (16 June 2005) Memoran- dations made by Detlev Mehlis when he dum of Understanding between the briefed the Council, Syria created a special government of Lebanon and the UN judicial commission to deal with all matters relating to the mission of UNIIIC.

12 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 26 October 2005 The second semi-annual 2 September 2004 Following allegations of report of the Secretary-General on implemen- Syrian manipulation of the Lebanese elec- tation of resolution 1559 became public. toral process, the Council passed resolution SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT 1559 with six abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, Monthly 20 October 2005 The initial report of UNIIIC China, Pakistan, Philippines and Russia). was published and its mandate was extended jan.2006FORECAST until 15 December. The report deplored the Other Relevant Facts lack of Syrian cooperation with the commis- UN Special Envoy for Verification of visited Côte d’Ivoire between 29 November sion and revealed that the assassination the Implementation of Resolution 1559 and 3 December. After numerous interviews, could not have occurred without the knowl- Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway) he declared that the ethnic orientation of the edge of Lebanese and Syrian security UNIIIC Commissioner conflict could lead to “massive and serious services. violations of human rights”. To be appointed 12 September 2005 The Secretary-General Size and Composition of Commission On 15 December, sanctions imposed by agreed to extend the Commission’s mandate To be decided resolution 1572 (2004) expired and, on the by 40 days. same day, the Council adopted a resolution Funding extending those measures for a year and 29 April 2005 The Secretary-General, in his The funding comes from the regular creating a new Group of Experts of five first semi-annual report on the implementa- budget and was approved by the members. The resolution also contained tion of resolution 1559, advised that the Advisory Committee on Administrative provisions for an embargo on the export of withdrawal of troops, military assets and intel- and Budgetary Questions of the Ivorian diamonds and requested the rebel ligence apparatus was underway. However, General Assembly. Forces nouvelles to provide an inventory of there was no progress on the implementation Appointment process their weapons. This resolution did not impose of the other provisions of the resolution. The task of recruiting the members was individual targeted measures stipulated by entrusted to DPA, in cooperation with 26 April 2005 Syria confirmed the withdrawal paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 DPKO (Office of Mission Support). of Syrian troops, apparatus and assets from (2004). In light of the positive news of the UNIFIL and ESCWA (Economic and Lebanon. The Secretary-General dispatched Social Commission for Western Asia) appointment of the prime minister, Council a UN mission to verify this. in Beirut also provided technical members now appear to agree that the assistance and logistical support. activation of these measures should wait and 7 April 2005 Passed unanimously, resolution be considered in the light of progress with the 1595 established UNIIIC, based in Lebanon, Activities establishment of the new government. to assist the Lebanese authorities in their The modalities of cooperation with the investigation of the assassination. Lebanese government are defined in Expected Council Action a Memorandum of Understanding In January, the Council is expected to receive 29 March 2005 Lebanon confirmed its full between Lebanon and the UN. the seventh progress report of the Secretary- cooperation with the investigation commis- General on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire sion in a letter to the Council. (UNOCI). The mandate of UNOCI will expire 24 March 2005 The report of the Fitzgerald on 24 January. The Council is expected to Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) Mission of Inquiry into the 14 February Beirut renew it and, depending on the Secretary- bombing concluded that an international Recent Developments General’s recommendations, consider an investigation was needed. The November 30 Presidential Statement increase in the troop level and a possible modification of the mandate 15 February 2005 The Council requested urging the Ivorian parties to reach an agree- ment on the appointment of a prime minister from the Secretary-General to report urgently Key Facts and indicating the Council’s readiness to on the circumstances, causes and conse- The failure to conduct presidential elections impose targeted sanctions on individuals— quences of the bombing. before the end of President Laurent Gbag- broadly interpreted as the Council’s last bo’s constitutional term of office on 30 14 February 2005 Rafik Hariri and 22 others warning—appears to have had an impact. October 2005 resulted in a crisis that led to were killed by truck bomb in Beirut. On 4 December, Charles Konan Banny, the action by both the African Union and the governor of the Central Bank of West African 20 October 2004 Rafik Hariri, Prime Minister, Security Council. It was decided in resolution States, was appointed interim prime minister resigned under pressure from Syria. 1633 (2005) that: of Côte d’Ivoire. n President Gbagbo would remain in power 3 September 2004 President Lahoud’s term The Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on for a maximum of 12 months after his term was extended by three years, thereby abort- the Prevention of Genocide, Juan Méndez, ended; ing the presidential electoral process.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 13 n a new prime minister acceptable to all The progress of government formation will n consider the redeployment of troops from parties would be appointed to exercise also be a possible issue. The designation of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to Côte executive powers; key ministries such as finance, defence and d’Ivoire, as allowed by resolution 1609 n an International Working Group (IWG) interior are likely to be controversial and could (2005) “within the authorized personnel responsible for the evaluation and moni- result in backsliding in the peace process. ceiling of a given mission”—an option that toring of the peace process be set up and would require addressing various finan- And the issue of possible renewed violence produce a road map leading to elections; cial, procedural and political obstacles; will be closely monitored as the resolution is n a new type of mediation would be con- n a technical roll-over and continued discus- being prepared. ducted daily by a subgroup of the IWG sions; and composed of the Secretary-General’s Finally there is the issue of past human rights n mandate renewal without change. Special Representative in Côte d’Ivoire, violations, which simmers below the surface, A further option would be for the Council to the Secretary-General’s High Represen- notwithstanding the decision to defer any decide to consider the report of the interna- tative for the Elections in Côte d’Ivoire, and individual sanctions at this stage. tional commission of inquiry on serious representatives of ECOWAS and the violations of human rights and humanitarian African Union; and Council Dynamics law in Côte d’Ivoire from 19 September 2002. n the threat of sanctions against individual For the past year, the Council took its cue The report was requested by Presidential spoilers would be strengthened. from the AU mediator and followed his recommendation to refrain from activating Statement of 25 May 2004 and transmitted At its 6 December meeting in Addis Ababa, sanctions aimed at individuals. Frustrated by to the Council in December 2004. The Coun- the IWG decided to provide the prime minis- the parties’ failure to advance the political cil has not considered the report and, thus, ter with the right to enact legislation until the process, the Council by late November the report has not yet officially been made end of the transitional period arising from appeared ready to act on its earlier decisions. public. resolution 1633 (2005). The IWG will hold its In light of the parties’ compliance with the The Council may also decide to invite the next meeting on 15 January in Côte d’Ivoire. demand to appoint a prime minister, however, Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the the Council seems now to be willing once Sanctions against individuals found to be Prevention of Genocide to brief on his recent again to give the parties the benefit of the obstructing the peace process, violating trip to Côte d’Ivoire. doubt and to postpone further the possibility human rights, publicly inciting hatred and of the imposition of these individual mea- Depending on the developments on the violence and violating the arms embargo sures. For similar reasons, while some ground, another option would be for the provided for by resolution 1572 (2004) have members of the Council have argued for Council to activate the targeted sanctions not come into effect for specific individuals inviting the Special Adviser on the Prevention against individuals found to be obstructing because of differences within the Sanctions of Genocide for a briefing, others felt that the peace process, violating human rights, Committee and because the AU mediator such a briefing at this moment could be publicly inciting hatred and violence and has believed that this might be counterpro- counterproductive for the political process. violating the arms embargo provided for by ductive. The Group of Experts repeatedly resolution 1572 (2004). recommended to the Council that it act on its Furthermore, Russia, China and Algeria have earlier decisions in this regard. been opposed to sanctions against indi- Underlying Problems viduals violating human rights, as well as to The lack of financial and human resources Key Issues additional measures related to the function- for UNOCI to help in the implementation of Discussions are underway on whether an ing of the arms embargo, such as the audit of all components of the roadmap is a real increase in the troop level of UNOCI would the country’s cocoa revenues, recommended problem and has been raised by the Secre- be necessary and feasible. The Secretary- by the Group of Experts. China and Russia tary-General. General has been requesting a substantial have also been opposed to an increase in increase in the troop level and is very likely An Independent Electoral Commission was troop levels of UNOCI and measures that to renew this recommendation in January, created in 2001 with the task of conducting would facilitate the tightening of the arms given the current needs in terms of security the electoral process and clarifying questions embargo. and with regard to the implementation of the regarding nationality, identification and roadmap. There is some opposition within Options naturalisation. According to the terms of the the Council on this matter. With regards to the renewal of UNOCI, the Linas-Marcoussis and Pretoria agreements, Council has the following options: this commission’s composition was amended A further issue is the question of a possible n increase the troop level and modify the in order to achieve a better representation mandate change to permit UNOCI troops to mandate to allow the mission to better of all the parties. However, because of dis- better monitor the arms embargo. monitor the arms embargo and to protect agreements between the parties within the the civilian population more effectively; Commission over the election of its bureau,

14 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org the Commission is still not operational. Côte d’Ivoire and renewed UNOCI’s Since 15 July, it has been headed by Antonio mandate until 24 June. Monteiro, the High Representative for the • S/RES/1600 (04 May 2005) welcomed SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Elections in Côte d’Ivoire, appointed by the the Pretoria Agreement and extended Monthly UN Secretary-General. If the commission UNOCI’s mandate by one month. • S/RES/1584 (1 February 2005) jan.2006 does not become quickly operational, it could FORECAST authorised UNOCI to monitor the arms jeopardize the elections due in October embargo and created a Group of by the Peace and Security Council of 2006. Experts to provide information to the the AU on 6 October 2005 Human rights violations have continued, and Sanctions Committee. • S/2005/598 (21 September 2005) there has been little or no progress on • S/RES/1572 (15 November 2004) Communiqué on Côte d’Ivoire issued established an arms embargo and disarming rebels in the northern half of the by the Peace and Security Council of called for sanctions against individuals country. the AU on 14 September 2005 found to be obstructing the peace • S/2005/584 (13 September 2005) The obstruction of the work of UN peace- process, violating human rights, Report of the High Representative for keepers has also hindered the peace publicly inciting hatred and violence the Elections in Côte d’Ivoire, from 8 process. For this reason, the Council has and violating the embargo. to 18 August 2005 • S/RES/1528 (27 February 2004) emphasised in resolution 1643 (2005) that • S/2004/567 (13 July 2004) Letter established UNOCI. activities impeding the actions of UNOCI notifying the Council about the appointment of the Special Adviser would not be tolerated. Selected Presidential Statements • S/PRST/2005/60 (9 December 2005) on the Prevention of Genocide The failure to consider and make public the endorsed the final communiqué of 2004 report of the international commission the IWG of 6 December 2005 and Historical Background of inquiry on serious violations of human reaffirmed that the prime minister must 6 December 2005 The second meeting of the rights has led to questions being raised on have all the necessary powers IWG was held in Abidjan. the ground, especially by members of civil described in resolution 1633. 4 December 2005 Charles Konan Banny, the society, about the value of UN investigations • S/PRST/2005/58 (30 November 2005) governor of the Central Bank of West Africa and UN’s commitment to transparency. urged the parties in Côte d’Ivoire to find a candidate for the position of prime States, was appointed interim prime minister UNOCI does not have good intelligence and minister. of Côte d’Ivoire. lacks technical skills to fulfil its mandate • S/PRST/2004/17 (25 May 2004) asked 8 November 2005 The first meeting of the regarding the monitoring of arms embargo the Secretary-General to establish an newly established International Working on land. international commission of inquiry to investigate all human rights violations Group was held. UN Documents committed in Côte d’Ivoire since 19 30 October 2005 President Gbagbo’s consti- September 2002, and determine Selected Security Council resolutions tutional term in office ended. responsibility. • S/RES 1643 (15 December 2005) • S/RES/1633 (21 October 2005) Most recent Secretary-General’s Report 18-21 October 2005 The chairman of the endorsed the decision of the AU Peace • S/2005/604 (26 September 2005) Sanctions Committee for Côte d’Ivoire led and Security Council of 6 October consultations in the country to determine if Reports of the Group of Experts 2005, extended President Gbagbo’s on Côte d’Ivoire individuals could be subjected to sanctions. term by 12 months, supported the • S/2005/699 (7 November 2005) 6 October 2005 The AU’s Peace and Security creation of the IWG, called for the • S/2005/470 (20 July 2005) designation of a prime minister and Council decided to extend Gbagbo’s man- reaffirmed its readiness to impose Selected Letters to the President date by 12 months. The Council endorsed of the Council sanctions. this decision on 13 October. • S/RES/1632 (18 October 2005) • S/2005/768 (8 December 2005) Final 24 June 2005 The Council approved resolu- extended the mandate of the Group communiqué of the second meeting tion 1609, which extended UNOCI’s mandate of Experts to 15 December 2005. of the IWG • S/RES/1609 (24 June 2005) extended • S/2005/707 (9 November 2005) Letter and increased the mission’s military and civil- the mandate of UNOCI for seven mentioning that the lack of funding for ian police contingents. months, further detailed the mandate the High Representative for Elections 11 April 2005 The Pretoria Agreement was and increased the contingents. activities was worrying signed by all Ivorian parties. This peace • S/RES/1603 (3 June 2005) endorsed • S/2005/639 (11 October 2005) agreement reinforced the terms of the the Pretoria Agreements, established a Communiqué on Côte d’Ivoire issued High Representative for the Elections in previous two agreements and stipulated that elections would be held in October 2005.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 15 15 November 2004 The Council approved Georgia (UNOMIG) provided for the creation of a demilitarised resolution 1572, which imposed an arms security zone and a restricted weapons embargo as well as sanctions restricting Expected Council Action zone. It also requested the deployment travel and freezing assets of all persons Following the receipt of the quarterly report of a CIS peacekeeping force and UN designated by the Sanctions Committee from the Secretary-General, the Council is observers to monitor the implementation of who pose a threat to the peace process. expected to renew the mandate of the UN the agreement. The Council then expanded Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), the UNOMIG’s mandate accordingly. 9 November 2004 The AU mediation initiative which expires on January 31. led by President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa While UNOMIG and CIS forces have parallel began. Key Facts mandates, particularly regarding monitoring The conflict in Abkhazia started in the sum- the ceasefire and patrolling the security 30 July 2004 The Accra III Agreement, which mer of 1992, when secessionist groups zone, they are independent. The 2,000-strong consolidated the implementation of the Linas- began to fight for independence from CIS operation, comprised of Russian troops, Marcoussis Agreement, was signed. Georgia. The origins of the Abkhaz conflict provides security for UN personnel, while 27 February 2004 The Council adopted are linked to Abkhazia’s incorporation into the 120 UNOMIG observers monitor CIS resolution 1528 establishing UNOCI. Georgia after the latter became part of the activities and can investigate violations of Soviet Union. Since independence in 1991, the agreement outside the buffer zones. 13 May 2003 The Council adopted resolution Georgia has faced multiple internal seces- 1479 establishing the UN Mission in Côte However, there has been no progress on the sionist movements, notably in South Ossetia, d’Ivoire (MINUCI) with a mandate to facilitate fundamental points of contention: the final Ajaria and Abkhazia. The Abkhaz have his- the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis political status of Abkhazia and the return of torically had close links with Russia and Agreement. 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) during the Soviet period sought, unsuccess- driven out of the region in 1993. The ceasefire March 2003 A government of national recon- fully, to be put under direct rule by Moscow. remains weak, with frequent reports of viola- ciliation was formed. International diplomatic efforts have followed tions from both sides. 24 January 2003 The Linas-Marcoussis the 1992 outbreak, mostly under the auspices The Council has historically reaffirmed Agreement (S/2003/99) was signed between of the Organisation for Security and Coopera- Georgia’s territorial integrity. Tbilisi’s position the Ivorian Government and all political tion in Europe (OSCE), the Commonwealth of has emphasised the territorial integrity of forces, under a French initiative. Independent States (CIS, comprised of for- Georgia, albeit with the possibility of increased mer Soviet Republics and largely under 19 September 2002 A mutiny in Abidjan by autonomy for Abkhazia. The Abkhaz de facto Russian leadership), and the UN. A Group army officers grew into full-scale rebellion. authorities have consistently opposed any of Friends consisting of Russia, the US, compromise on Abkhaz independence and Germany, France and the UK has been the Other Relevant Facts have been fearful of ethnic imbalance after main focal point for peace talks, with Russia Special Representative of the the return of Georgian IDPs. Secretary-General being the main facilitator. At the initiative of the Special Representative Pierre Schori (Sweden) The parties signed a ceasefire in July 1993. of the Secretary-General Heidi Tagliavini, a High Representative for the Elections The Council then created UNOMIG, but the paper on “Basic Principles for the Distribution collapse of the ceasefire led to interim Antonio Monteiro (Portugal) of Competencies between Tbilisi and reductions in UNOMIG’s activities. Georgia Size and Composition of Mission Sokhumi” was submitted to the parties as a then joined the CIS. Authorised Strength: (24 June 2005 - 24 basis for substantive negotiations in Decem- January 2006) 7,090 military personnel The parties in late 1993 asked that interna- ber 2001 after intense negotiations within and 725 police officers;Current Strength tional peacekeeping forces with Russian the Group of Friends. The paper encountered (31 October 2005): 7,558 total uniformed participation be deployed and in February strong opposition from the Abkhaz side, and personnel, including 6,704 troops, 193 1994 signed a quadripartite agreement this opposition was criticised by the Council. military observers, 661 police supported recognising the right of voluntary return of by 341 international civilian personnel, Diplomatic efforts have focused mainly on displaced persons and a declaration on 385 local staff and 192 UN Volunteers; containment issues such as building confi- practical matters such as transportation, Key Troop Contributing Countries: dence and achieving agreement on the energy and communications. Togo, Senegal non-resumption of hostilities, and on the Cost In May 1994, the parties agreed to the return of refugees instead of making prog- 1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $438.17 million Moscow Ceasefire Agreement. The ceasefire ress towards substantive solutions such as

16 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org the status of Abkhazia. A few positive pros- either as part of the Group of Friends or pects in that regard emerged with the bilaterally. Abkhaz acceptance of the return of Geor- SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Furthermore, in view of the stagnation of the gians to its Gali district. Outstanding points Monthly operation and the situation on the ground, still linger, however, particularly on the Council members have begun to raise jan.2006 adoption of a document on non-resumption FORECAST questions about the wisdom of maintaining of hostilities, the opening of a UN human the status quo. Given the recent interest by natural gas and electricity. It is also keen on rights office in Gali and the use of the the US in revitalising UN peacekeeping in maintaining influence in the oil-rich Caspian Georgian language in schools in Abkhazia. situations where peace processes are region and countering the incursions of The emergence of new leadership in Georgia stalled, the Council may begin to look into Chechen rebels in Georgia. and Abkhazia in the past two years has con- possible changes of that mandate. tributed to a more optimistic environment. UN Documents Options Observers have noted that Tbilisi now prefers Selected Security Council Resolutions One option, which at this stage seems the a less confrontational approach, building • S/Res/1615 (29 July 2005) extended most likely, is to renew the mandate of upon common interests between the sides. UNOMIG’s mandate until 31 UNOMIG through the passage of a resolution January 2006. The relationship between Moscow and Tbilisi, that will be almost identical to the ones • S/Res/1077 (22 October 1996) created on the other hand, has soured over recent passed every six months during the last a UN human rights office. months. Georgia has repeatedly accused few years. Another option would be to • S/Res/937 (27 July 1994) expanded Russia of partiality and support for the renew the mandate for another period but UNOMIG’s mandate. Abkhaz, and the Georgian parliament has contingent on specific political steps to be • S/Res/881 (04 November 1993) threatened to vote to expel the peacekeepers taken by the parties prior to a further exten- approved an interim reduction in Russia maintains in Abkhazia and in South sion. Any suggestion of the change in the UNOMIG’s mandate. Ossetia under a CIS mandate. Furthermore, status quo is likely, however, to encounter • S/Res/858 (24 August 1993) established UNOMIG. Georgia has approached NATO for member- strong opposition from Russia. ship, which in turn may intensify Russian Secretary-General’s Reports concerns. Underlying Problems • S/2005/657 (19 October 2005) is the Abkhazia has achieved the appearance of latest report. Russia warns that exerting too much pres- de facto independence. However, it has • S/1994/818 (12 July 1994) contains sure on the Abkhaz could lead to the nonetheless been economically isolated from the recommendations for the mandate deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the rest of the world, apart from links with of UNOMIG. the region. Those concerns, according to Russia. Widespread lawlessness, the activi- • S/1994/80 (25 January 1994) contains Moscow, have led it to extend benefits to the ties of Georgian paramilitaries and the options for UN presence on the Abkhaz, such as passports and pensions, porosity of the border have raised concerns ground, including the deployment of which according to observers would deepen as to the future stability of the region. UNOMIG as an observer force Abkhazia’s de facto independence. together with a multinational peace- One critical aspect is the geopolitical impor- keeping operation. Key Issues tance Georgia has enjoyed with its role in the Letters The immediate issue before the Council is delivery of Caspian Sea oil. Bilateral relations, • S/1994/583 (17 May 1994) contains the renewal of UNOMIG’s mandate. None- particularly with the US, have improved the Moscow Ceasefire Agreement. theless, the continuation of the de facto significantly. US interests in the region stem • S/1994/397 (05 April 1994) contains independence of Abkhazia begs the ques- mostly from its investments in oil extraction the declaration on measures for the tion as to whether the Council will explore any in the Caspian Sea and in counterterrorism. settlement of the conflict and the action to encourage effective peace talks. US-Georgian relations are boosted by quadripartite agreement. Georgia’s participation in the coalition in • S/1994/32 (14 January 1994) contains Council Dynamics Iraq, and the use of its ports to transport a communiqué from the parties Russia has been in the lead on issues related military equipment to Afghanistan. detailing their acceptance of the to UNOMIG for the duration of its operation. deployment of peacekeepers with But several permanent members of the Russia also has both economic and a Russian contingent. Council in addition to Russia—France, the strategic interests in the region. Economic UK and the US—have been engaged in the ties with Georgia are also prominent, given situation outside of a strict Council context, Russia’s position as the main supplier of

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 17 July 1993 A new ceasefire was reached under Historical Background Western Sahara (MINURSO) July 2005 The Russian Federation began the the Sochi Agreement. phased handover of military facilities to Geor- Expected Council Action October 1992 The ceasefire collapsed, and gian authorities. In January, the Council will be briefed by the inter-ethnic fighting in the Russian North Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy to West- May 2005 A protocol on strengthening the Caucasus erupted. ern Sahara, Peter van Walsum, as requested 1994 ceasefire was signed. September 1992 Both parties signed a in Security Council resolution 1634 (28 Octo- January 2005 Sergei Bagapsh elected de ceasefire and peacekeeping plan. ber 2005), which also extended the mandate facto president of Abkhazia. of the UN Mission for the Referendum in August 1992 Conflict between Georgian Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April May-August 2004 Tensions increased with troops and Abkhaz separatist forces began. 2006. breakaway South Ossetia. April 1991 Georgia became independent This is expected to begin a process of dis- March-May 2004 Tensions arose between after a popular referendum. The Abkhaz cussion about the future of MINURSO. Tbilisi and the de facto autonomous region population, however, voted to remain part of of Ajaria, culminating with the resignation of the Soviet Union. Key Facts Ajarian leader Aslan Abashidze. Between 1884 and 1976, Western Sahara 1990 South Ossetia declared independence, was colonised by Spain. During the late January 2004 Mikhail Saakashvili was elected seeking unification with North Ossetia, period of Spanish administration, Sahrawi president of Georgia. Russia. resistance movements, such as the Popular August 2003 Georgia sent troops to Iraq. 1978 The Abkhaz Autonomous Socialist Front of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro, republic sought unsuccessfully to secede (or Frente Polisario), seeking self-determi- May 2003 Construction of the Georgian sec- from Georgia and joint the Russian Republic. nation, obtained support from the United tion of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline began. Nations, including mention in successive 1931 Abkhazia was incorporated into September-October 2002 Renewed tensions General Assembly resolutions of the right to Georgia by Soviet authorities. over Chechen fighters on Georgian soil self-determination. emerged. The Russian Federation warned of 1921 Georgia became part of the Soviet As Spanish control of the territory weakened, possible military action. Russian special Union. Morocco and Mauritania expressed claims forces launched cross-border raids without Other Relevant Facts over the territory. The International Court approval from Tbilisi. Special Representative of the of Justice (ICJ), in an Advisory Opinion December 2001 The “Basic Principles for the Secretary-General and Head of Mission requested by the General Assembly, ruled Distribution of Competencies between Tbilisi Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland) that there was no basis of territorial sover eignty on the part of Morocco or Mauritania and Sokhumi” was submitted to the parties. UNOMIG: Size and Composition which overrode the right of the inhabitants to 132 total uniformed personnel, October 2001 Renewed fighting between self-determination. Abkhaz separatists and Georgian paramili- including 120 military observers taries. Russia accused Georgia of harboring (31 October 2005); Main military Morocco moved forces into the Spanish Chechen forces. A UN helicopter was shot contributors: Germany, Pakistan, Sahara in late 1975. As Franco was dying, Jordan down in the Kodori Valley, Abkhazia. Spain agreed to hand over Western Sahara Duration to Morocco and Mauritania without con- February-May 1994 The Moscow Ceasefire August 1993 to present. ducting a referendum on self-determination. Agreement and the quadripartite agreement Cost Morocco’s movement into the territory was were signed. As a result, CIS peacekeeping deplored by the Security Council in resolution 1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $36.38 troops were deployed and UNOMIG’s man- 380 (6 November 1975). date was expanded. Agreement was also million (gross) reached on practical measures on topics Other Facts The actual Spanish withdrawal from such as transport and communications. Size of CIS troops: about 2,000; Western Sahara in 1976 was immediately Contributors: Russia followed by the founding of the “Saharan September 1993 The ceasefire collapsed. Arab Democratic Republic” (SADR) by the Georgia became a member of the CIS and Polisario. Serious fighting broke out between agreed to the establishment of three Russian the Moroccan and Mauritanian armies on military bases on its soil. one side, and the Polisario on the other side. August 1993 UNOMIG was established to In 1979, Mauritania dropped its claims on monitor the ceasefire.

18 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Western Sahara, and the Mauritanian sector But a secondary issue is looming. Because was taken over by Moroccan troops. the peace process has been stalled for so long, questions are likely to be raised SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT In 1979, the Organisation of African Unity Monthly (OAU) called for a referendum in support of about MINURSO’s future. Options include the right of self-determination of the Sahrawis. jan.2006 complete withdrawal or a change of man- FORECAST In 1982, after 26 OAU member states recog- date. In either case, Council members will nised SADR, it was admitted to the OAU create a deep political crisis. Moreover, the also be weighing possible impacts on Council of Ministers. In protest, Morocco, a costs—both financially and in Moroccan lives regional stability. founding member of OAU, withdrew from as a result of the occupation—make it the organisation. Council Dynamics extremely difficult to give up the territory. Leadership on the issue has traditionally But this must be set against the strong tide in After the establishment of a ceasefire in 1988, been through a group of friends of Western the UN, and especially in African politics, in the parties agreed on a settlement proposal, Sahara composed of France, Spain, the support of the right of self-determination of including the holding of a referendum on US and Russia. former colonised territories. self-determination. MINURSO was created in 1991 to implement this referendum, including France has always supported Morocco. Underlying Problems a process of identification of eligible voters, Although the US also has strong ties with The main challenge to the process has and has been renewed regularly since 1991, Morocco, it has remained more neutral over long been the criteria for eligibility to vote. for periods up to six months. the years and was a strong supporter of Originally, it was expected that all Saharans the Baker plan. At present, France and the counted in a 1974 census and aged 18 years After several years of disagreement over the US seem to support a solution based on the would have the right to vote. This solution met identification process, in 2001 James Baker, Moroccan idea of an extended autonomy the Polisario’s demand for a limited voting the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy at for Western Sahara. pool excluding those it has regarded as the time, suggested a framework for the foreign to the territory. Morocco, however, has referendum. The Polisario rejected the terms The US has been active in attempting to wanted to expand this pool to make all of the referendum, because it would allow all improve the atmosphere for future progress. residents eligible. The problem has become settlers to vote, including Moroccan residents US diplomats conducted negotiations that more acute with the growth of Moroccan who by then outnumbered the Sahrawis. led to the liberation of Moroccan prisoners settlers over the years. Baker then produced a revised plan, but this by the Polisario in August 2005. On the other was rejected by Morocco. hand, the US is keen to explore new options, Human rights issues also lie in the back- including a rationalisation of peacekeeping ground as Moroccan authorities still detain Van Walsum recently characterised the operations where peace processes are about 150 political prisoners, and there are situation as “quasi-irreconcilable.” Morocco stalled. The threat of MINURSO’s termination around 500 Sahrawi civilians who have “dis- and the Polisario agree on the desirability of a may be an option that Council members see appeared.” Also, approximately 150,000 referendum. However, Morocco opposes as a lever to induce the parties to reach an Sahrawis are living in refugee camps near the including the option of independence. The agreement. However, there is bound to be Algerian town of Tindouf, where allegations of Polisario position is based on long-estab- controversy about this option. human rights violations by Algeria have been lished UN decolonisation principles, flowing reported. In his last report, the Secretary- from General Assembly resolution 1514 Council dynamics are also likely to be General called on the parties to allow the (1960), that the right of self-determination impacted by wider considerations. Counter High Commissioner for Human Rights to must include independence among other terrorism objectives, such as the Trans- approach the parties. Morocco has also options. Morocco has signaled that it may Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative, point to called for investigations with regards to the be willing to accept some form of autonomy the value of securing a lasting solution for Polisario’s alleged torture of Moroccan pris- in Western Sahara, but the Polisario insists Western Sahara sooner rather than later. oners it later released. that a referendum as envisaged in the final The Polisario also has allies, such as Algeria Baker plan should be part of the process. and Russia (as well as key AU members Key Issues outside the Council, including South Africa The first issue for the Council will be to deter- and Nigeria). But Algeria is leaving the mine whether there are any new options to Council at the end of 2005. bring the parties back to the negotiating table, Morocco’s refusal to consider independence including exploring any leverage that would as an option in the referendum stems from a affect their positions. fear that the loss of Western Sahara would

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 19 UN Documents Historical Background MINURSO was withdrawn and the military Selected Council Resolutions 6 November 2005 The King of Morocco, component was reduced. Mohammed VI, announced the launching of • S/RES/1634 (28 October 2005) 29 April 1991 Resolution 690 established a process of consultation with the parties on extended MINURSO until 30 April 2006 MINURSO with the mandate to implement granting autonomy to Western Sahara. and requested the Secretary-General’s the settlement proposals during a transitional Personal Envoy to provide a briefing 11-17 October 2005 The Secretary-General’s period in which the referendum would be within three months. Personal Envoy to Western Sahara visited the organized. The plan also created an identifi- • S/RES/1598 (28 April 2005) extended cation commission to determine voters. MINURSO’s mandate by six months. region and met with the parties. • S/RES/1495 (31 July 2003) supported 18 August 2005 The last 404 Moroccan pris- 30 August 1988 The two parties agreed on the peace plan proposed by Baker as oners were released by the Polisario. the UN “settlement proposals,” which pushed an optimum solution on the basis of for a ceasefire and the holding of a referen- agreement between the parties. 29 July 2005 The Secretary-General appointed dum to enable the people of Western Sahara • S/RES/690 (29 April 1991) established Peter van Walsum as his Personal Envoy. to choose between independence and inte- MINURSO. • S/RES/658 (27 June 1990) endorsed 11 June 2004 James Baker resigned from his gration with Morocco. position as Personal Envoy to Western the settlement proposals. 1984 Morocco withdrew from the OAU to • S/RES/621 (20 September 1988) Sahara. Álvaro de Soto, Special Representa- protest against the presence of the Polisario authorised the appointment of a tive for Western Sahara at that time, took over at the OAU summit. Special Representative to Western the political process. Sahara. 1982 The SADR was admitted to the OAU. • S/RES/380 (6 November 1975) July 2003 Baker returned with a revised ver- deplored Morocco’s movement into sion of his plan, including safeguards that 1979 Mauritania renounced all claims on the territory. won Algerian and Polisario support. Moroc- Western Sahara. Morocco took over the • S/RES/377 (22 October 1975) can settlers were able to vote, but Morocco Mauritanian sector of Western Sahara. requested the Secretary-General to rejected the plan. consult with the parties. 27 February 1976 Morocco annexed Western 23 May 2003 Baker proposed another plan Sahara. The SADR was founded and Most Recent Secretary-General’s Reports (Baker Plan II) which provided for a referen- announced an armed struggle to achieve the dum in four to five years time and offered the right of self-determination. Fighting broke out • S/2005/648 (13 October 2005) between the Polisario and the Moroccan and • A/60/116 (12 July 2005) inhabitants a choice between independence, • S/2005/254 (19 April 2005) autonomy or complete integration with Mauritanian armies. The population fled to • S/2005/49 (27 January 2005) Morocco. The plan was accepted by Polisa- refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. rio, Algeria and the Security Council but was Selected Letters to the President 26 February 1976 Spain withdrew from of the Council rejected by Morocco. Western Sahara. • S/2005/605 (27 September 2005) 20 June 2001 Baker presented a “Framework Letter from Algeria 14 November 1975 Spain ceded Western Agreement” (Baker’s Plan I), in which the ref- • S/2005/602 (23 September 2005) Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania after the erendum would be replaced by a vote on Letter from Morocco signature of the Madrid Accord. limited autonomy. Morocco would control the Selected Exchange of Letters between territory while the Sahrawis would have had 6 November 1975 The “Green March” over the Secretary-General and the President of the Council exclusive competence over local issues. The the border between Western Sahara and framework was accepted by Morocco but Morocco moved around 350,000 Moroccans • S/2004/492 (15 June 2004) announced the resignation of Baker and charged rejected by the Polisario. into the territory. Álvaro de Soto with the task to September 1998 The process of identifying 31 October 1975 Moroccan troops crossed continue the political process. eligible voters was completed. the frontier and clashed with Polisario • S/1997/236 (17 March 1997) guerrillas. appointed James Baker as Personal September 1997 The Secretary-General’s Envoy to Western Sahara. Personal Envoy, James Baker, conducted a 16 October 1975 ICJ Advisory Opinion was Other successful round of talks between the parties issued. • A/1514(XV) (14 December 1960) which led to the adoption of the Houston 1973 Frente Polisario was formed and Declaration on the Granting of Accords. launched its first raids against Spanish Independence to Colonial Countries May 1996 The identification process was sus- colonisers. and Peoples • Advisory Opinion of the International pended. The civilian police component of Court of Justice (16 October 1975)

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 20 Other Relevant Facts In retaliation for a PLO attack in March 1978, Special Representative of the Israeli forces invaded Lebanon and occupied Secretary-General the southern part of the country. A few days SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Francesco Bastagli (Italy) later, the Council adopted resolutions 425 Monthly (1978) and 426 (1978), urging Israel to cease Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy jan.2006 its military activities and withdraw its forces FORECAST Peter van Walsum (Netherlands) from Lebanon. It also decided to establish Israel based on the Israeli occupation of Size and Composition of Mission the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (31 October 2005) the Sheb’a farms, a small piece of land (UNIFIL), with the mandate of: 235 total uniformed personnel, including considered part of Syria by the UN but part n confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces; 27 troops, 202 military observers and of Lebanon by Hezbollah. n restoring international peace and security; 6 police, supported by some 131 and international civilian personnel and 97 From June 2000 to January 2001, the troop n local civilian staff assisting the Government of Lebanon to strength of UNIFIL was increased in order regain its authority over the area. Key Troop Contributing Countries to redeploy over the territory that Israel left. But the Secretary-General noted at the end France, Russia, Egypt, Korea, China, Israel withdrew in June 1978. Control of the of 2000 that, out of the three components Ghana, Malaysia south was taken over by a militia allied to of UNIFIL’s mandate, one only remained: Cost Israel, the South Lebanese Army (SLA). the restoration of peace and security in the 1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $ 47.95 In 1982, Israel invaded again, reaching area, given recurrent incidents along the million (gross) Beirut. From 1982 until 1985, UNIFIL’s main Blue Line. Therefore, the strength of the force role was to provide protection and humani- was reduced following resolution 1337 Useful Additional Sources tarian assistance to the local population. (2001), and the mandate modified to one Western Sahara, Anatomy of a Stalemate of monitoring. by Erik Jensen, Lynne Rienner Publishers, In 1985, Israel undertook a partial withdrawal, November 2004 but retained a self-proclaimed “security zone” The Council has continued to extend UNIFIL in South Lebanon, controlled by the Israeli every six months. The Council requested Endgame in the Western Sahara: What Defence Forces (IDF) and the SLA. the Secretary-General in January 2005 to Future for Africa’s Last Colony? by Toby make recommendations on a possible review Shelley, Zed Books, 2004 The armed group Hezbollah was founded in of the UNIFIL mandate, and he concluded 1982 and quickly focused on expelling Israeli that nothing needed to be changed for the forces from Lebanon. In South Lebanon, time being. Hezbollah fought a guerrilla war against Lebanon/Israel (UNIFIL) Israel and the SLA. Despite the impasse, Key Issues Expected Council Action the Council kept renewing UNIFIL’s mandate For the Council, an important issue is for On 31 January, the mandate of the United on a regular basis, accompanied by Lebanon to be able to regain full control Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Presidential Statements calling for the over all its territory. This was restated in will expire. The Council is expected to implementation of resolution 425 (1978). resolution 1559 (2004) which called on all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from receive the report of the Secretary-General In May 2000, Israel proceeded with the Lebanon and all Lebanese and non- around 20 January, discuss the recommen- complete withdrawal from South Lebanon, Lebanese militias to be disbanded and dations in consultations and extend the in compliance with resolution 425 (1978). The disarmed. Terje Roed-Larsen was appointed mandate of UNIFIL by six months. SLA was dismantled. The UN drew a border Special Envoy for Verification of the Imple- demarcation between Lebanon and Israel, Key Facts mentation of Resolution 1559. This resolution known as the Blue Line. In the aftermath, Following the Cairo Agreement signed in was applied not only to the areas occupied UNIFIL’s mandate was renewed in order to 1969 between the Palestinian Liberation by Syrian troops, but also in the south to verify the Israeli withdrawal and help the Organisation (PLO) and the Lebanese replace Hezbollah. It is an issue, therefore, Lebanese forces to deploy into the area government, which granted the Palestinian whether the UNIFIL mandate renewal would vacated by Israel. Because of violations of militants the right to operate on Lebanese be the appropriate opportunity to take up the Blue Line by the IDF, the deployment soil, and after being expelled from Jordan the outstanding recommendations in the of UNIFIL and of the Lebanese forces in in 1970, the PLO went to Lebanon and Roed-Larsen report. established bases in the south from which the south was halted. Hezbollah filled the it conducted operations against Israel. vacuum, conducting militant activities and Allegations that Hezbollah hampers the providing social services for the population. work of UNIFIL had been addressed in the Today Hezbollah justifies its action against

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 21 last consultations about UNIFIL in July and required the government to “deploy the • S/RES/425 (19 March 1978) called 2005. It remains to be seen whether this Lebanese army in the border area adjacent for strict respect for the international issue will be addressed in the Secretary- to Israel.” So did resolution 1559. The Leba- integrity, sovereignty and political General’s report. nese government has not tried to forcibly independence of Lebanon, urged disarm Hezbollah. Prior to Israeli withdrawal Israel to withdraw from Lebanese A further relevant issue arises from the fact territory, and established UNIFIL. in 2000, Lebanon justified its position by that both Lebanon and Israel have been the fact that Hezbollah was fighting for the Selected Presidential Statements actively keeping the Council apprised of liberation of the south, then occupied by • S/PRST/2000/21 (18 June 2000) incidents across the Blue Line. The incidents Israel. After 2000, Hezbollah focused on the recognised that Israel withdrew from are not insubstantial. Israeli occupation of the Sheb’a farms and all of Lebanese territory. • S/PRST/2000/18 (23 May 2000) Finally, in other circumstances the issue became involved in Lebanese politics. Its strongly endorsed the report of the of the long duration and cost of UNIFIL electoral success as a political party now Secretary-General of 22 May 2000. might have been raised. However, because makes it difficult for the Lebanese govern- • S/PRST/2000/13 (20 April 2000) ment to implement the provisions of resolution of the current situation in Lebanon and welcomed the decision of Israel to the level of Council support for Lebanon in 1559 (2004) and the Taif Agreements. withdraw its forces from Lebanon. other contexts at this time, it seems unlikely UN Documents • S/PRST/2000/3 (31 January 2000) that any change in the size of UNIFIL or in called for the implementation of the structure of its mandate would be Selected Security Council Resolutions resolution 425 and expressed concern considered. • S/RES/1614 (29 July 2005) extended at the continuing violence in South the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 January Lebanon. Council Dynamics 2006 with no change. Selected Secretary-General’s Reports Because of sensitivities about Council • S/RES/1583 (28 January 2005) • S/2005/673 (26 October 2005) Second involvement in the substance of Middle extended the mandate of UNIFIL until semi-annual report on the implementa- East issues relating to Israel and its neigh- 31 July 2005 and expressed intention tion of resolution 1559 (2004). bours, Council members participating in to review the mandate and structure • S/2005/460 (20 July 2005) Report on the Quartet (a group leading the diplomatic of UNIFIL. • S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) on UNIFIL from 21 January 2005 to 20 effort on the Middle East and the Palestinian the Syrian withdrawal. July 2005. question and composed of the Secretary- • S/RES/1461 (30 January 2003) • S/2005/272 (29 April 2005) First General, the European Union, Russia and extended the mandate of UNIFIL and semi-annual report on the implementa- the US) are unlikely to want to link the took note of the completion of the tion of resolution 1559 (2004). implementation of resolution 1559 to the reconfiguration of UNIFIL. • S/2005/36 (20 January 2005) Report question of the UNIFIL mandate. Rather, it is • S/RES/1337 (30 January 2001) on UNIFIL from 21 July 2004 to 20 more likely that they will prefer that renewal extended the mandate of UNIFIL by January 2005. be seen as an essentially technical exercise. six months, reduced the level of its • S/2004/777 (1 October 2004) Pursuant military personnel and endorsed the to Security Council resolution 1559 Similarly, it seems unlikely that the Council reconfiguration of UNIFIL. (2004). will take up the substance of the cross • S/RES/1310 (27 July 2000) extended • S/2001/423 (30 April 2001) Interim border issues being raised by Lebanon the mandate of UNIFIL by six months report on UNIFIL that proposed a plan and Israel. It would not be welcomed by the and endorsed the understanding that for the reconfiguration of the force. Quartet, on the grounds that it is not possible the Force would redeploy in South • S/2001/66 (22 January 2001) recom- mended a reconfiguration and a to see what concrete or practical measures Lebanon. reduction of the Force. the Council could take that would assist the • S/RES/523 (18 October 1982) • S/2000/590 and Corr.1 (16 June 2000) situation. extended the mandate of UNIFIL by 3 months and authorised it to conduct concluded that Israel withdrew It is likely therefore that a consensus will humanitarian tasks. completely from Lebanon. readily be found among Council members on • S/RES/520 (17 September 1982) • S/2000/460 (22 May 2000) Report that verified the implementation of the simple renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate. condemned the Israeli incursions and demanded an Israeli withdrawal. resolutions 425 and 426 (1978). Underlying Problems • S/RES/516 (1 August 1982) authorised Other The Lebanese government still does not the deployment of military observers in • S/2005/755 (5 December 2005) Letter have full control over South Lebanon. The and around Beirut. from Lebanon listing all Israeli violations 1989 Taif Agreement that ended the • S/RES/426 (19 March 1978) approved of Lebanese sovereignty during Lebanese civil war required the “disbanding the report of the Secretary-General on November 2005. of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias” the implementation of resolution 425. • S/2005/747 (1 December 2005) Letter

22 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org from Lebanon on Israeli violations of Palestinian guerrillas agreed not to attack the Blue Line on 21 November 2005. civilians in northern Israel, and which • S/2005/746 (1 December 2005) Letter recognised Israel’s right to self-defence but SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT from Lebanon listing all Israeli also Hezbollah’s right to resist the Israeli Monthly violations of Lebanese sovereignty occupation of southern Lebanon. Although during October 2005. jan.2006 Lebanon and Syria did not sign the FORECAST • S/2005/731 (22 November 2005) Letter document, the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring from Israel on Hezbollah’s attacks 19 March 1978 The Security Council passed Group (ILMG), with members from the US, against Israel across the Blue Line that resolution 425, which called on Israel to France, Israel, Lebanon and Syria, was set occurred on 21 November. withdraw from all Lebanese territory and • S/2005/725 (17 November 2005) up to monitor the truce. established UNIFIL. Letter from the Secretary-General 18 April 1996 An Israeli attack on a UN expanding the scope of the mandate 14-15 March 1978 Israel launched a major base at Qana resulted in the death of over of his Personal Representative Geir O. invasion of Lebanon, occupying land as far 100 Lebanese civilians seeking refuge there. Pedersen to the whole of Lebanon. north as the Litani River. • S/2005/715 (14 November 2005) Letter 11 April 1996 Israel launched Operation 13 April 1975 The Lebanese civil war began. from Lebanon on Israeli violations of Grapes of Wrath, bombing Hezbollah bases Lebanese sovereignty from 1 to 9 in southern Lebanon, the southern district of November 2005. Other Relevant Facts Beirut and the Bekaa valley. • S/2005/216 (31 March 2005) Letter Special Envoy to the Secretary-General for Implementation of Resolution 1559 from the Secretary-General on the 25 July 1993 Israel launched Operation appointment of Pedersen as his Accountability, the heaviest attack since • Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway) Personal Representative for southern 1982, in an attempt to end the threat from Secretary-General’s Lebanon. Hezbollah and from the General Command Personal Representative to Lebanon of the Popular Front for the Liberation of • Geir O. Pedersen (Norway) Historical Background Palestine in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL Force Commander 21-22 November 2005 Hezbollah and the IDF engaged in a heavy exchange of fire 22 October 1989 The Taif Agreement was • Major-General Alain Pellegrini (France) along the Blue Line. adopted by members of the Lebanese Size and Composition of Mission National Assembly. It covered political reform, • (31 October 2005) 2,009 troops, 29 June 2005 Hezbollah and the IDF engaged the end of the war in Lebanon, the establish- assisted by some 50 military observers in a heavy exchange of fire in the Sheb’a ment of special relations between Lebanon of UNTSO; and supported by 101 farms area. and Syria and a framework for complete international civilian personnel and 19 June 2005 Hezbollah won all seats in Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon 294 local civilian staff • Troop contributing countries: France, Southern Lebanon in the parliamentary 6 June 1985 Part of Israeli troops withdrew Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Poland, elections. but some remained in a security zone in Ukraine 13 May 2005 Repeated shelling occurred South Lebanon. Cost (approved budget) across the Blue Line by both Israel and 1982 Hezbollah was created. • 1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $99.23 Hezbollah around the Sheb’a Farms. million (gross) 15 September 1982 Israeli forces occupied 26 April 2005 Syria pulled out from Lebanon. West Beirut. Useful Additional Sources 2 September 2004 The Council approved Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm, 6 June 1982 After an assassination attempt resolution 1559, calling on all remaining ICG Middle East report No. 48, 5 December against the Israeli ambassador to the UK, foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon, all 2005 and intense exchange of fire across the Lebanese and non-Lebanese forces to Israel-Lebanese border, Israel launched a disband and disarm and supporting the full-scale invasion of Lebanon called extension of the control of the Government Operation Peace for Galilee. Council Working Group of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory. on Sanctions 13 June 1978 Israeli forces had withdrawn 16 May – 7 June 2000 Israeli forces withdrew from Southern Lebanon. However, the The lack of a settled, generic policy on both from South Lebanon. territory was not handed over to UNIFIL but to the implementation of targeted sanctions 26 April 1996 The US negotiated an under- the SLA. and the working methods of the sanctions standing under which Hezbollah and committees is not surprising given the Council’s traditional situation-specific

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 23 approach to issues. But this approach well as assessing the possibility of report- Council for consideration due to disagree- has not precluded Council members in the ing by regional organisations as an alter- ment among the five permanent members past from establishing general principles native to the reporting by individual states, over a few outstanding issues. It seems to guide their approach to issues. In the and duration and lifting of sanctions (one that some members are reluctant to agree sanctions context, an initial start in this of the issues on which the WG had great to a set policy which might limit their flexibility regard was made in recommendations difficulty agreeing when in the context of in dealing with emerging trends. Among the agreed by the Security Council’s Working time-bound sanctions); unresolved issues is whether, as a matter of Group on General Issues Related to Sanc- n assessment of the unintended impact of policy, sanctions should be for a specific tions. The Working Group, first established sanctions and ways to assist affected duration and renewable by a decision of by a Note of the President in 2000 untargeted states (an issue of major the Council depending on whether the target (S/2000/319), was asked to examine a concern to a number of states); of the sanctions has complied. There are number of issues with a view to improving n improving national implementation of strongly opposed views on this issue, partly the effectiveness of sanctions and transpar- sanctions (which aimed to address the due to experiences over the years in arriving ency in the work of the committees. A issue of capacity-building assistance to at consensus in the Council as to when the number of these issues were set out states); target of sanctions has complied with the earlier in a Note by the President of the n enforcement of targeted sanctions (along Council’s demands, and being able to reach Council on 29 January 1999 enumerating the lines of recommendations that agreement on the lifting of such sanctions. practices to improve the work of the sanc- emerged from the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin This problem is more acute when the action tions committees (S/1999/92). The issues and Stockholm processes); and required of the target is not made sufficiently before the Working Group included: n de-listing procedures and the legal clear in the resolution. n the working methods of sanctions com- consequences of listing and de-listing There have been renewed efforts to reach mittees and inter-committee coordination; secondary sanctions (which the Council agreement on the non-contentious issues n the design of sanctions resolutions, includ- is now threatening to use against violators in the Working Group. It would seem worth- ing the conditions for the maintaining/ of sanctions measures) while for these agreed upon issues to be lifting of sanctions; So far, a number of the recommendations in reported to the Council and subsequently n monitoring and enforcement of sanctions; the draft paper prepared by the Working approved. Not only will some guidelines n targeted sanctions; Group in 2002 are being implemented in an facilitate more effective action by the n assisting member states in implementing ad hoc manner by some sanctions commit- Council, they will also create greater trans- sanctions; tees. But they have never been reviewed, parency in the work of sanctions committees n capacity of the UN Secretariat; and debated and approved by the Council itself. and consistency in their procedures, foster n humanitarian exemptions However, without a Council-endorsed policy, greater coordination among them, and The Working Group’s (WG) mandate was even at the level of guidelines, implementa- make the broader UN membership aware of expanded and extended to 31 December tion is erratic and varies from committee to what to expect when sanctions are violated. 2005 by a Note of the President of the committee. These inconsistencies contribute A course of action that includes the progres- Council, dated 23 December 2004 (S/2004/ in varying degrees to a lack of cooperation sive establishment of a clearer sanctions 1014). This had followed a report by the by some member states with the sanctions policy would enhance the integrity of the then Chairman contained in a Note by the committees. sanctions process and help provide credibil- President of 21 December 2004 (S/2004/ ity to the Council’s stated resolve to enforce The Council has also benefited from the 979), in which it was recommended that its own sanctions measures. work on targeted sanctions facilitated in the WG continue its efforts to agree on the recent years by the Swiss, German and The current mandate of the Working Group outstanding issues which had prevented Swedish governments—the Interlaken, expires at the end of 2005. At the time of the Council from adopting a comprehensive Bonn-Berlin and Stockholm processes— writing, it appears that the Council will renew sanctions policy. The report also noted that in the design of its sanctions measures, it for another year. In that context, the Council the WG’s prior work had not taken into including a requirement that the sanctions may also wish to address the need to consideration the increased sanctions committees assist states in achieving improve the capacity of the UN Secretariat to activity of the Security Council after 11 optimum capacity to implement the sanc- facilitate the work of the sanctions commit- September 2001. Hence, the expanded man- tions measures. tees and the monitoring mechanisms. In as date of the WG, inter alia, included the much as there has been a significant increase following issues: While the Working Group had completed in the work of the sanctions committees and most of its work some time ago, it has been n improving cooperation between sanctions of monitoring mechanisms in recent years, stymied in providing a final report to the committees and monitoring bodies, as the Secretariat’s capacity has not kept pace.

24 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org UN Documents Next Steps for the Security Council Selected Notes by the President of Following the meeting in London, the Secre- the Security Council tary-General will recommend to the Council SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT • S/2004/1014 (23 December 2004) the future shape of the UN presence in the Monthly • S/2004/979 (21 December 2004) country, and the mandate and size of the UN jan.2006 • S/2003/1197 (22 January 2004) Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), FORECAST • S/2000/319 (17 April 2000) the mandate of which expires in March militias. NATO’s projected increase in troop • S/1999/92 (29 January 1999) 2006. At present, UNAMA manages UN relief levels from 9,000 to about 15,000 in 2006 Other and reconstruction in coordination with the could pave the way for a reduction in US • Chairman’s Proposed Outcome Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) and military personnel. (26 September 2002) A draft paper assists the latter with capacity-building and prepared by the Chair of the WG institution-building related to law and order, The Council expects a quarterly report from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ security and governance. ISAF for January, but this report is usually not committees/sanctions/Prop_out10.pdf taken up for discussion by the Council. There will be support for retaining a central role for the UN in helping the Afghan govern- UN Documents ment to coordinate international assistance. Selected Security Council Resolutions There is no agreement among Council mem- Afghanistan • S/Res/1623 (13 September 2005 bers on whether there will be reductions in extended ISAF’s mandate until 13 Expected Council Action staff. UNAMA has fulfilled part of its mandate October 2006. No Council action is expected in January. (including the elections), but the tasks ahead • S/Res/1617 (29 July 2005) However, important developments taking continue to be daunting. The security situa- strengthened sanctions against the place off stage will have an impact when tion in Afghanistan as well as the safety of Taliban and al-Qaida. the Council takes up the situation again in UN staff are major constraints. • S/Res/1589 (24 March 2005) extended early 2006. UNAMA’s mandate until 24 March UNAMA is only part of the international 2006. The London Conference presence in Afghanistan, and this is reflected • S/Res/1510 (13 October 2003) The UK, the UN and the Afghan government in substantial previous decisions by the expanded ISAF’s mandate beyond will co-host an international conference in Council. The Council’s involvement also Kabul. London from 31 January to 1 February to includes a sanctions regime through • S/Res/1401 (28 March 2002) created adopt a new Compact built on four pillars— resolution 1267 (1999) against the Taliban UNAMA. namely governance, security, counter- and al-Qaida. The military picture includes • S/Res/1390 (28 January 2002) narcotics, reconstruction and development. the NATO-commanded 9,200-strong Inter- strengthened sanctions against the This will mark the end of the transitional national Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Taliban and al-Qaida. period in the country as envisaged in the initially authorised by resolution 1386 (2001) • S/Res/1386 (20 December 2001) authorised ISAF to provide security 2001 Bonn Compact. to provide security in Kabul, and by resolution in Kabul. 1510 (2003) to support the Afghan govern- The Compact is intended to underscore • S/Res/1373 (28 September 2001) ment in the maintenance of security country- Afghan ownership over future priorities created a comprehensive package wide, and the 20,000-strong US-led counter- and investments in the country. It contains of measures to curb terrorism. insurgency coalition (Operation Enduring benchmarks and a timeline for each of the • S/Res/1333 (19 December 2000) Freedom, or OEF), present in the country with four pillars, which together represent a strengthened the sanctions against the consent of the Afghan government to the Taliban and imposed sanctions consensus between the government and fight particularly Taliban and al-Qaida ele- against al-Qaida. the international community of states. As ments. • S/Res/1267 (15 October 1999) the Afghan government reaches the bench- imposed sanctions against the Taliban. marks, donors will be committed to disbursing On 8 December, NATO members decided to Selected Reports of the the pledges made during the conference. increase ISAF peacekeeping and reconstruc- Secretary-General tion activities in the country. It is gradually Afghanistan is one of the world’s top five • S/2005/525 (12 August 2005) is the expanding operations from the northeast to recipients of aid. As of March 2004, a total of latest report. the entire country through Provincial Recon- approximately US$10 billion had been • S/2002/278 (18 March 2002) contains struction Teams (PRTs). It is expected that recorded in pledges made over the years recommendations for UNAMA’s OEF will retain the most dangerous counter- from 2002 to 2005. The main donors are the structure. insurgency activities while ISAF will assist US, the EC, Japan, the UK and the World Selected Presidential Statement Afghan forces with tasks such as disarming Bank. • S/PRST/2005/56

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 25 Historical Background top contributors: Germany, Italy, Canada, In April 2005, IGAD decided to send a peace- 18 September 2005 Parliamentary elections France, the UK, Spain. keeping mission in Somalia, the IGAD Peace were held. ISAF: Duration Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), in response to the invitation of President October 2004 Hamid Karzai was elected 20 December 2001 to present Yusuf. However, capacity issues among President. IGAD members have prevented the practical March 2004 The Berlin pledging conference realisation of this initiative. In an effort to assist took place. Somalia IGAD, the African Union endorsed the mis- sion in May. However, a major issue is the January 2004 The Loya Jirga adopted the Expected Council Action composition of such a force. Various Somali new constitution. The Council will receive the interim report of factions object to troops from neighbouring the Monitoring Group on the arms embargo August 2003 NATO took over ISAF’s com- states and, given that most IGAD members currently in force in Somalia. At this stage, mand. are neighbouring states, this is a serious however, we do not expect any strengthening problem. March 2002 The Council established UNAMA. of the sanctions regime or immediate action against violators. An arms embargo was also established in January 2002 The Tokyo pledging conference 1992, as well as a Sanctions Committee took place. Key Facts and a Monitoring Group. The embargo is Since 1991, Somalia has had no effective December 2001 The Bonn Compact was ineffective, and no measures against viola- central government and, despite efforts adopted. The Council authorised ISAF. tions have been imposed. Challenges in this by the UN in the 1990s, virtually no end to context arise from the lack of functioning November 2001 US-supported forces continuous inter-clan warfare. The Inter- customs in Somalia. The TFG has nonethe- marched into Kabul. governmental Authority on Development less repeatedly asked for exemptions to the (IGAD)—comprised of Djibouti, Ethiopia, embargo to allow it to increase security in the October 2001 The international offensive Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and country with the assistance of IGAD troops. against the Taliban began. Uganda—sponsored negotiations in 2004 The Monitoring Group reported that Yemen September 2001 Al-Qaida carried out attacks that led to the formation of the Transitional and IGAD-member Ethiopia had provided on US soil. Federal Government (TFG) under Abdullahi Yusuf. However, this arrangement cannot arms to the TFG. Yemen publicly admitted to August 1999 The Council imposed sanctions be considered a peace agreement in the having done so at the request of President regime against the Taliban and al-Qaida. regular sense. Yusuf, but Ethiopia denied the allegations. Another IGAD-member, Eritrea, has also 1996 The Taliban seized control of Kabul. Unresolved issues such as the location of been identified in media reports as breaching Other Relevant Facts the TFG and a unified national army continue the embargo. Both TFG and opposition to create tensions that have prevented the Special Representative of groups have imported arms in breach of the the Secretary-General and TFG from assuming an effective governmen- embargo, according to the Group, and a UNAMA’s Chief of Mission tal role. Despite the formation of the TFG and military build-up is currently taking place. Jean Arnault (France) of a National Assembly, virtually every politi- The Group identified individual violators and Size and Composition of Mission cal actor in Somalia is involved in factional politics and remains dependent on private recommended sanctions on charcoal and Current strength: 199 international militias. fishing to curb financing of arms purchases. civilians, 729 local civilians, 12 military Regarding the humanitarian impact of the observers, 7 civilian police, 41 UN The Council created the UN Operation in proposal, the Group stated that the majority volunteers. Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1992 and authorised of the revenues from those activities is Duration the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to diverted to arms purchases, and only a small 28 March 2002 to present. create a stable environment for the delivery percentage thus reaches the population at Senior ISAF Civilian Representative of humanitarian aid. The death of US and large. The Group also stated that enforcing in Afghanistan Pakistani troops in 1993 and lack of progress the proposed sanctions would be easier, Hikmet Çetin (Turkey) in peace talks precipitated the withdrawal since it would require cooperation from non- ISAF: Size and composition of UNOSOM and the establishment in 1995 Somali third parties involved in trading those of a limited UN Political Office for Somalia Current strength: 9,200 troops. commodities. (UNPOS) located in Nairobi. Contributors of military personnel: 35 The Sanctions Committee Chairman, Ambas- NATO and non-NATO countries. Current sador Lauro L. Baja of the Philippines, visited

26 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Kenya (where the Monitoring Group’s office Options is located), Ethiopia and Yemen in late The options that may be considered when November to discuss compliance with the the mandate of the Monitoring Group comes SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT embargo, but only in Yemen was the Chair- up for renewal in May include: Monthly man able to meet with senior authorities. n targeting secondary sanctions against jan.2006 He provided a briefing to the Sanctions named individuals with specific responsi- FORECAST Committee in mid-December. bility for exports or imports of arms to • S/Res/794 (03 December 1992) Somalia; Key Issues authorised UNITAF. n picking up the recommendations of the The key issue is whether Council measures, • S/Res/751 (24 April 1992) established Monitoring Group on extending the in this case the arms embargo, can be UNOSOM I and a Sanctions sanctions regime to fishing and charcoal; permitted to be flouted so extensively. Committee. n concluding that, instead of acquiescing to Another issue is whether to strengthen the • S/Res/733 (23 January 1992) imposed Ethiopia and Eritrea for fear of adverse an arms embargo. arms embargo by targeting its financing implications for the wider relationship with from charcoal production and fishing. Presidential Statements them, it is less dangerous to Council • S/PRST/2005/54 (09 November 2005) authority in general to send a clear Council Dynamics • S/PRST/2005/32 (14 July 2005) Most Council members are concerned with message about the unacceptability of Reports of Council Missions the ongoing challenges to the arms embargo violating international law by establishing • S/1994/1245 (03 November 1994) and see the risks to the integrity of future a secondary sanctions regime; and/or sanctions regimes if violators publicly and n deciding that the risk of continuing with Secretary-General’s Reports persistently flout obligations that are imposed unenforced and regularly flouted sanc- • S/2005/642 (11 October 2005) is the by the Council and are binding under interna- tions exceeds that of removing them. Just latest report. tional law. However, there is an underlying as the Council withdrew UNOSOM in • S/26738 (12 November 1993) resistance among some Council members 1994, it could decide to step back from presented recommendations for UNOSOM following attacks. against enforcing sanctions regimes in Somalia completely. general. Council members as a whole will Reports of the Panel of Experts/ Underlying Problems Monitoring Group be very conscious that two of the alleged Conditions in Somalia remain dire. The violators, Ethiopia and Eritrea, are the focus • S/2005/625 (22 August 2005) humanitarian situation remains grave. of even more difficult Council attempts at • S/2005/153 (14 February 2005) • S/2004/604 (11 August 2004) the present time to secure compliance with Piracy, lawlessness, drug trafficking, militant • S/2003/1035 (04 November 2003) resolutions and commitments. There will Islamicists and Somaliland’s self-declared • S/2003/223 (25 March 2003) therefore be some reluctance to press the independence are important aspects of this Letters from the Secretary-General to Somalia sanctions issue too hard at this picture. President of the Council time. Some Council members, and the US in par- • S/24868 (30 November 1992) But equally there will be no appetite for ticular, are concerned with the possibility that recommended that UNITAF rewarding the Somali factions by any Somalia might become a safe haven for ter- be deployed. loosening of the arms embargo at this stage. rorists. Background The expected focus of the Sanctions Com- UN Documents September 2005 Somaliland held internation- mittee will be on getting more information Security Council Resolutions ally monitored elections. on individual violators. There is willingness • S/Res/1630 (14 October 2005) June 2005 The TFG moved to Jowhar. to leave the customs aspect of sanctions renewed the Monitoring Group’s to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, estab- mandate. May 2005 The AU authorised IGASOM. lished pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001). • S/Res/1407 (03 May 2002) requested a panel of experts. April 2005 IGAD decided to send troops to On the issue of IGASOM, should it ever even- • S/Res/954 (04 November 1994) Somalia. tuate, there is willingness in principle in the determined UNOSOM II’s withdrawal. 10 October 2004 Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was Council to consider a limited exemption to • S/Res/897 (04 February 1994) revised elected president and the TFG was estab- the arms embargo for IGAD troops. But the UNOSOM II’s mandate. ongoing uncertainty surrounding the mission • S/Res/814 (26 March 1993) lished. leaves a degree of scepticism at this stage. established UNOSOM II under July 2002 The Panel of Experts was Chapter VII. requested.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 27 April 1995 UNPOS was established. wounded. The US announced withdrawal April 1992 UNOSOM I and a Sanctions from Somalia by March 1994. Committee were established. November 1994 The Council decided to ter- minate UNOSOM II by March 1995. June 1993 Pakistani troops were attacked, 24 January 1992 The Council imposed an arms were killed. embargo. February 1994 UNOSOM’s troop levels were decreased. March 1993 UNOSOM II was established. 1991 Civil war broke out; Somaliland declared independence. October 1993 18 US Rangers were killed and December 1992 The Council authorised their bodies mutilated, while 75 more were UNITAF.

Other Relevant Facts Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNPOS François Lonsény Fall (Guinea) Special Adviser of the Secretary- General for the Horn of Africa Mohammed Sahnoun (Algeria) Size and Composition of Mission 5 international civilians, 3 local civilians

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