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The Dynamics of Vote Buying in Developing Democracies: Party Attachment and Party Competition in Southeast Asia

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University of South Carolina Scholar Commons Theses and Dissertations Summer 2019 The Dynamics of Vote Buying in Developing Democracies: Party Attachment and Party Competition in Southeast Asia Matthew Louis Wagner Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd Part of the Political Science Commons The Dynamics of Vote Buying in Developing Democracies: Party Attachment and Party Competition in Southeast Asia by Matthew Louis Wagner Bachelor of Arts University of Minnesota, Morris 2004 Master of Arts San Diego State University 2011 Master of Arts University of South Carolina 2015 Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science College of Arts and Sciences University of South Carolina 2019 Accepted by: John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, Committee Chair Anu Chakravarty, Committee Member Tobias Heinrich, Committee Member Lee Walker, Committee Member Cheryl L. Addy, Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School c Copyright by Matthew Louis Wagner, 2019 All Rights Reserved. ii Dedication There must be a beginning of any great matter, but the continuing unto the end until it be thoroughly finished yields the true glory (Sir Francis Drake, 1587). To my mother, for her unwavering patience, support, and love. To my father, for taking me to the library as a boy, and teaching me the value of education. iii Acknowledgments A task of this size is impossible to undertake alone. I would first like to thank my dissertation committee - Anu Chakravarty, Tobias Heinrich, John Hsieh, and Lee Walker for their support throughout my time as a graduate student at the University of South Carolina. I would also like to thank other faculty in the political science department, Chris Witko, Dave Darmofal, Brad Epperly, Laura Woliver, Tim Peterson, Doug Thompson. Because of them, I am not only a better scholar, but a better person. Allen Hicken at the University of Michigan, and Tom Pepinsky at Cornell University: thank you for listening to my half-baked ideas, and answering my numerous emails. I would also like to thank the faculty in the Department of Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Malaya. As well as the Malaysian-American Commission on International Education. Both generously gave their time, making my stay in Malaysia a memorable one. Also, the members of Monarchy MMA, thank you for letting me train with you for awhile. As well as the staff at Prince Court Medical Center in Kuala Lumpur, for keeping me alive when I would have otherwise died. My fellow graduate students: Kristin Bryant, Will Christiansen, Adam Cox, Stephanie Davis, Josh Deroche, Jim Heenehan, Matt Lawson, Malori Musselman, Wendell Mayes, Ardeshir Pezeshk, Sean Rodgers, Michael Seese, Ryan Strickler, and so many others. Without your friendship I would not have survived graduate school. I would also like to thank Mayra Gonzalez, Cleve Langsdale, Rebecca Lovelace, Jessie Rodriguez, and Matt Young, for giving me balance in life outside of the academy. iv Abstract Broadly defined, what factors explain changes in party competition in developing democracies? The dominant theoretical paradigm used to explain changes in party competition in established democracies does not offer much leverage in emerging ones. The literature argues that linkages between voting blocs and parties erode and cleavages shift, allowing for new voter blocs or even new parties. However, if social groups, parties, and party systems are different in emerging democracies than in established ones, does this mean the dynamics of party competition are also different? Also, what does is the role of voters in these systems? My dissertation outlines a theory for how changes in competition occur. Over time, voters form partisan attachments to parties based upon what parties say and do. Using extensive fieldwork my dissertation maps the broad contours of clientelism in Malaysia. I demonstrate that clientelism, as part of the party brand, has been a significant part of the electoral strategy for Malaysia’s longstanding dominant coalition. Nonetheless, in recent years programmatic platforms of opposition parties have become more popular, culminating in a substantial decline of Malaysia’s longstanding ruling coalition in the 2018 elections. This finding challenges much of the existing literature, which treats Malaysia as a case where ethnic political parties are the driving force behind electoral politics. However, in failing to account for clientelism and the way it is changing, this literature misses a major factor driving party competition. This has broad implications for democracy in Malaysia. v Preface This dissertation is original, unpublished, independent work by the author. vi Table of Contents Dedication .................................. iii Acknowledgments ............................. iv Abstract ................................... v Preface .................................... vi List of Tables ................................ x List of Figures ............................... xii Chapter 1 Introduction ......................... 1 1.1 Existing Explanations . 4 1.2 A Brief Overview of the Theory . 10 1.3 The Nature of Clientelism . 12 1.4 Clientelism and Economic Development . 13 1.5 Clientelism and Party Competition . 15 1.6 Measuring Clientelism . 18 1.7 An Outline of This Project . 21 vii Chapter 2 Competitive Party Systems: A Theory of Partisan Attachment in Southeast Asia . 26 2.1 Introduction . 26 2.2 Social Cleavages in New Democracies . 30 2.3 Problems With a Cleavage-Based Theory of Party Competition . 36 2.4 A Theory of Partisan Attachment and Party Competition . 42 2.5 Partisan Realignment and the Implications for Competition . 57 2.6 Instances of Partisanship and Clientelism in Malaysia . 58 Chapter 3 Vote Buying and Party Competition: Clientelism in Malaysia .......................... 65 3.1 Introduction . 65 3.2 Who Do Parties Target? . 68 3.3 Electoral Politics in Malaysia . 72 3.4 Non-Clients and the Middle-Class . 80 3.5 A List Experiment in Malaysia . 87 3.6 List Experiment Results and Analysis . 89 3.7 Discussion . 99 Chapter 4 The Political Dimensions of Malaysia’s BR1M Pol- icy: Party Brands and Party Competition . 102 4.1 Introduction . 102 4.2 Redistribution and Party Competition . 105 4.3 Cash Transfer Programs and Party Competition . 107 viii 4.4 Party Brands . 109 4.5 How Attachment Erodes . 114 4.6 BR1M Policy . 116 4.7 Variables, Data, and Methods . 123 4.8 Analysis . 128 4.9 Discussion . 132 Chapter 5 Conclusion . 135 Bibliography ................................ 142 Appendix A Material for Chapter 4 . 175 Appendix B Material for Chapter 5 . 188 ix List of Tables Table 2.1 Social Cleavages in Southeast Asia: 1946 to 2016 . 38 Table 2.2 Ownership of Share Capital of Limited Companies: 1969 to 2006 (Percent) . 60 Table 3.1 Summary Values for List Experiment Data . 90 Table 3.2 Difference in Means Test for Sensitive Item . 91 Table 3.3 Difference of Means Between Treatment and Control Groups . 95 Table 3.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimator: Unconstrained Model . 96 Table 3.5 Maximum Likelihood Estimator: Constrained Model . 97 Table 4.1 Total BR1M Handouts in Millions and Total Amount Spent in Ringgit: 2012 to 2014 . 119 Table 4.2 Total BR1M Handouts in Millions and Total Amount Spent in Ringgit: 2015 to 2017 . 119 Table 4.3 Summary Statistics for the Posterior Distribution: 2013 Election . 126 Table 4.4 Summary Statistics for the Posterior Distribution: 2018 Election . 126 Table 4.5 2013 Model Statistical Outcomes . 129 Table 4.6 2018 Model Statistical Outcomes . 129 Table A.1a Subgroup Analysis of Sample Data: Part 1 . 184 Table A.1b Subgroup Analysis of Sample Data: Part 2 . 185 x Table A.1c Subgroup Analysis of Sample Data: Part 3 . 186 Table A.1d Subgroup Analysis of Sample Data: Part 4 . 187 Table B.1 Change in Number of Seats in the 2013 Election . 188 Table B.2 Change in Number of Seats in the 2018 Election . 189 Table B.3 Urbanization and Malay Population by State . 189 Table B.4 Bayesian Model Averaging Output . 190 Table B.5 Frequentist Linear Regression Model for the 2013 Election . 192 Table B.6 Frequentist Linear Regression Model for the 2018 Election . 193 xi List of Figures Figure 1.1 Mean of V-Dem Vote Buying Measurement Compared to Malaysia 20 Figure 2.1 A Sequential Theory of Party Competition . 43 Figure 2.2 Barisan Nasional Vote Share: 1974 to 2018 . 59 Figure 4.1 Handouts by Level of Urbanization in 2012 . 121 Figure 4.2 Handouts by Level of Urbanization in 2017 . 121 Figure 4.3 Handouts by Number of Malays in 2012 . 121 Figure 4.4 Handouts by Number of Malays in 2017 . 121 Figure 4.5 Distribution of BR1M by State in 2012 and 2017 . 125 Figure 4.6 Posterior Distribution for the 2013 Election with 95% Credible Intervals . 130 Figure 4.7 Posterior Distribution for the 2018 Election with 95% Credible Intervals . 131 Figure A.1 Dewan Rakyat Results 2004 . 175 Figure A.2 Dewan Rakyat Results 2008 . 176 Figure A.3 Dewan Rakyat Results 2013 . 176 Figure A.4 Dewan Rakyat Results 2018 . 177 Figure B.1 Pooled Model Posterior Distribution . 191 xii Figure B.2 Convergence Diagnostics for the 2013 Model . 194 Figure B.3 Convergence Diagnostics for the 2018 Model . 195 Figure B.4 Predicted Probabilities for the 13th General Election with 90% Confidence Intervals . 196 Figure B.5 Predicted Probabilities for the 14th General Election with 90% Confidence Intervals . 197 xiii Chapter 1 Introduction Seymour Lipset (1963, 220) made the observation that “in every modern democracy conflict among different groups is expressed through political parties.” Formally speaking, “what might be seen as a fairly simple and straightforward process, the translation of social conflict into political and party alternatives, turns out to be quite fraught and complex” (Mair 2006b, 372). More on this point, political parties exist because divisive interests in society also exist (Neumann 1956). Which subsequently makes for a messy political space, with consistent fluctuations between stability and instability within the party system.
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