TH E MARCH O N P ARIS AND

TH E OF TH E MA NE 1 9 1 4 BA T T L E R ,

TH E M A RC H O N PARIS

AND T H E

BATTL E O F TH E MARN E

1 9 1 4

V ’ UCK ALEX AN D ER. ON KL

GBN IRAIODI RST

W ITH PO RTRAIT AND MAPS

AND JOTES BY TH E H ISTO RI CAL SE CTION (M ILITARY BRANCH ) O F TH E C O M M ITT E E O F IM PE RIAL DEFE NC E

LONDO N E D W A RD A RN O L D

1 920

! A (I r ig ht: famed]

AU T H OR’ S PRE F A C E

TH E following review of events was completed on the r r 1918 The b o ok s which s th . 6 Feb ua y , have ince been s e r s as r publi h d on the pe iod dealt with , uch Majo ’ r Bircher s valuable cont ibution on the Battle of. the r - rs r r Ma ne , that of Field Ma hal F ench (which appea ed ’ in the summer of and General Maurice s Forty

Days in have not been taken into account . The temptation to enter into the controversies raised by ’ r r - Crusius s r has Gene al Baumga ten wo k been avoided , although it undoubtedly contains facts of great import ance ; so also with the books of Field-Marshal von Biilow r s s r and Gene al von Hau en . Only opinion fo med at the time are recorded ; those arrived at later have mi been o tted . These limi tations seem most necessary in order that the appreciation of the situation as it appeared to the rt rs r Ar 1914 r c r headqua e of the Fi st my in may be e o ded , f r una fected by othe influences . With this in view , the more important orders and documents have been re r r t p oduced ve batim in the tex . The point of view of the Army Commander as regards the dangers of a crossing of the Marne at the beginning of r 1914 is r hi r r s Septembe , , set fo th in the t d pa t of thi r - r nswan as . r r No de h eview Majo Gene al v . , a Swede , made many apposite remarks in his book Strategisches ” r as aus dem Weltk iege , and has developed them much as the r i s s info mation at h s di po al allowed . AUTH OR ’ S PREFACE

The mutual relations between the headquarters of the Ar s r First and Second mie we e as helpful as possible . r fr Whe e opinions dif e ed each stood by its own , and it is fo r future hi storians to inquire which party had the r r greater reason on its side . The gene al situation afte the necessary regrouping of the German Western Ar r my seemed by no means unfavou able , inasmuch as the political and strategic objectives of the war became limited to taking the greatest possible advantage of the r i s r r st ateg c weakness of the enemy . To di cove whe e this lies is the principal duty of the supreme command war in . VON LUC K K, Generalo r be st.

BERLIN ,

Februar 92 . y, 1 0 C O N T E NTS

’ AUTHOR S PREFACE

BIBLIOGRAPH Y

’ NOTE ON VON K LUCK S MILITARY CAREER

INTRODUCTORY — I . BRUSSELS ANTWERP — II . BRUSSELS SOMME TH E BATTLES WITH TH E BRITISH EX PEDITIONARY — — ’ ’ FORCE TH E PURSUIT GENERAL D AMAD E S ARMY 34

’ I TH E III . TH E INWARD WHEEL AGA NST ENEMY S MAIN — — FORCES PARIS CROSSING TH E MARNE THE MARCHING AND FIGHTING CAPACITY OF TH E ARMY THE 3IST AUGUST TH E INTENTION OF TH E SUPREME COMMAND To FORCE TH E FRENCH SOUTH -EASTWARDS FROM PARIS

I D M ATTACK OF TH E V. RESERVE CORPS TOWARDS A MARTIN CONCERNING TH E MEANS OF COMMUNICATION WITH TH E SUPREME COMMAND AND THEIR INSTRUCTIONS 109

I V. TH E BATTLE ON TH E OURCQ

- — TH E CRISIS AND TH E BREAK AWAY TH E MARCH BACK TO TH E AISNE TH E RIGHT-FLANK MARCH OF TH E FIRST ARMY TH E FRENCH ATTACK viii CONTENTS

CH APTER — V . l I TH E BATTLE ON TH E OURCQ Con inued. TH E BRITISH ADVANCE TH E GAP IN TH E WESTERN WING OF TH E GERMAN ARMIES TH E WITHDRAWAL TO TH E AISNE CROSSING TH E AISNE TH E FIRST ARMY IN POSITION NORTH OF TH E AISNE

TH E ATTACK BY TH E ARMIES OF MAUNOURY AND FRENCH ACROSS TH E AISNE RETROSPECT

APP IX : O OF BA OF TH E FI T A 1914 END RDER TTLE RS RMY , L IS T O F IL L U S TRA TION S

PORTRAIT

GENERAL VON KLUCK

MAPS

P OF TH E B OF 23RD MA ATTLE MONS, AND AUGUST, 1914 Facing page 46 — MAP OP TH E BATTLE OF SOLESMES LE CATEAU Between pages 56 and 57

GENERAL MAP In pocket at M BIBL IOGRAP H Y

Secret and other pap ers ofthe First Army Commander from9

u ust t o 15th Se temer 1914 . A g p b , Memorandumby the Chiefo fthe General Staff ofthe First Army

the O erations rin the same erio ate 29th Ma 1915 . p du g p d , d d y , s s De patche ofSir J ohn French o f1914 .

Die Sch achten an der Marne v om6 b is 12 Se temer 1914 . Mittl l p b ,

u d n hor anon o s . n Soh 1916 . A t m , u y u i s o e n e e e Fir t m 191 . Herma n St emann . D r r . 7 g K g v lu ,

o one . i A s 19 4 u s C E . Z ei Jab re We t rie . t 1 to A u l l K gl w l k g ugu , , g

1916 .

D i notes oft st n e aly he Fir Army Comma d r . Die Marnesch esso e e osto c 1917 Dr . at r o . R acht . Pro r W l f l K lb k , r e is es s de s n or- nera St at ch au dem e t rie . . Nor n wa Ma Ge g W l k g V , j l the S e i sh r w d A my . ’ S e e ei s r tre . t g mann Weltkri eg und die Marneschlacht . Kal Bl b u De Fe i s i i in e r D e r e ch acht . r n Fr nch u 1914 . Man O a b ldz g, l g l y Mao e r e . j G d l . 1916 L i oi i t e Revue des a ct re de la Marne . Lo is Ma e n in h dew V u d l , m des . e on Se t mer 1916 . p b , ’ L Illustration f 1th e e er o 1 S t m 1915 . p b , ’ ’ ' ’ Jo s is é f a to t . 5t u Magaszn de l actimt et de l énergie nationales . 1 h Se temer 1917 p b , NO TE ON VON KL U C K ’ S MIL ITARY CAREER

EX AND ER K K r on 20th 1846 AL VON LUC was bo n May , , at O

' Mimster in West halia r r h p , and was the efo e two mont s r B ow H is r r iil . younge than his ival , von fathe was a r 55th nf r Government a chitect . He joined the I ant y e 13th r 1865 R giment on Octobe , , and a few months later took part in the Main Campaign of the war of 1866 Fahnrich r r r as (p obationary office ) . He was p omoted an 16 A s 1866 Second Lieuten t on th ugu t , . In this r r r - r ar ank he se ved in the F anco Ge man W , and was wounded in the armand body at the Battle ofColombey i s 14 A s 1870 Nou lly on the ea t side of Metz on th ugu t , , r t e r r ss 2nd r eceiving h I on C o , Class . He was p omoted r 1873 rr r Lieutenant in Octobe , , and ma ied Ba oness r t r In Fanny von Donop a yea la e . He became Captain 1878 r In 1887 - In 1893 , Majo , Lieutenant Colonel , com s r r C 0 manding in the la t ank an Infant y N . . . School for 1896 wa efiHOble r m. d some ti e In he s by the Kaise , o Landwehr r 1 B r in and given c mmand of Dist ict No . e l . was r 1896 f He p omoted Colonel in , given command o 24th r S r r the Fusilie Regiment , and ho tly afterwa ds promoted Major-General and made Commander of the 23rd f r In ant y Brigade . His next step to Lieutenant General and Commander of the 37th Division came in A r 190 2. r o r rs p il , He emained in this p sition fou yea , when he was advanced to General and the command of xi VON KLUCK ’ S MILITARY CAREER

Arm r s 1st r 1913 was the V . y Co p . On Octobe , , he Arm s r 27th r 1914 made an y In pecto , and on Janua y , , r r Generaloberst p omoted to the ank of . O r It will be bse ved that , unlike von Bulow , he had f r r r r was no Sta f se vice , and p actically his whole ca ee s r r war pent with t oops . On outb eak of he was appointed r r Ar r 1915 Commande of the Fi st my . Ea ly in he was , r r afte being wounded , it is believed , elieved of his com n t re - e mand and o employ d in the field . TH E MARC H O N PARIS

I N T ROD U C T O R Y

TH E following reflections are based on the daily notes of Arm r ffi m s r the y Commande , the o cial docu ent , and othe

r s r . r sou ce mentioned in the Bibliog aphy Thei object , so far as the prOVISIonal state of historical investigation rm s is s e s pe it , to explain and uppl ment the book and h f h s rs a s r s . O p mphlet al eady publi ed t e e , the fi t volume ’ of Stegemann s history frequently unveils the secret motives of the higher command wi th striking per acit sk il i ll bfin s o ut Strae e C h r fi y , and fi y g the t gi o e th o e 5tions ence of e _ p r . They are founded on a Memorandum by the com

m er rs Ar r hi was and of the Fi t my , the o iginal of w ch raft h was wr r d ed by the C ief of the Staff . It itten du ing the position warfare on th e Ai sne in the winter months 1914 1915 s an s r s of , whil t the m i event we e till vivid in r s s the memo ie of all tho e who had taken part in them . This Memorandum was completed and circulated to er hi r ea rs fo r e r s SO a c tain of the ghe l de th i comment , th t any doubts or contradictory reports as to the work and di rs Ar h s s lea ng of the Fi t my mig t be finally di po ed of , r s r it s r and the g eat achievement of all its co ps, caval y

r s r r r co p , and thei commande s placed definitively in thei r t ue light .

For ur s s r the p po e of thi Memo andum , the campaign

was s s— r ss s divided up into ection B u el , the Somme , the r r r A s v s G and Mo in , the Ou cq , and the i ne . Such a di i ion INTRODUCTORY

ta hi s r r seems sui ble , and t eview of those g eat times r p actically conform to it . The stage which historical research has reached A r 1915 is S to that time (about p il , ) hown by r r is r int oduction to the Memo andum , which the e quoted verbatim This account of the operations of the from the beginni ng of the advance until along the Aisne was occupied is based entirely on r r Ar r r s eco ds of my Headqua te s . It was pos ible s r as give an unbia ed desc iption of each situation , r Ar r rs r intelli it appea ed to my Headqua te , f om the gence and operation reports in their possession at time and in the light of whi ch their dec r r s fo med . It was , howeve , not pos ible to criticize these in their connection wi th the situation as a whole ; neither coul d the fighting of corps be described by any means without bias in r s nor re s s r e pect , the ult adequately app eciated . do thi s it would have been necessary to examine records o fthe neighbouring armi es and of Great He r rs as s s r qua te , al o tho e of co ps and di r Ar r r we e not available at my Headqua te s . accuracy of the account given in thi s has been concurred in by the corps commanders of rs Ar or r Fi t my , , if they we e not available , by Gen ” ff rs r s ff Sta office of thei ta . The time now seems to have arrived to review r r r sou ces of info mation al eady available , in amplify them from the point of view of the hi s r r and to ex bit the document , o de s , and a put aside at an earlier period owing to lack r r space , and to place in a clea e light the e

CH APTER I BRUSSELS— ANTWERP

N 2nd A s 1914 r nf r O the ugu t , , the fi st co e ence of commander of the First Army with Generalmajor r Kuhl took place . The latte had been appointed Chi ef of the Staff he was formerly employed as Ou master- General in the western section of the n r f r Ge e al Sta f at Be lin . He left the same day ss for rs Ar Stettin , which was the place of a embly Fi t r r Ar r Headqua te s , and the my Commande f 4th A next day . On the ugust the ferences between the Chief of the Staffand the Deput Chief of the Staff with regard to the general work 6 the . First Ar my Staff were concluded with complet m AS r r Ar s unani ity . the ight flank of the Ge man mi rs Ar s r ar in the west , the Fi t my had a mo t impo tant p wi r ' to play in the execution of a de movement , p obabl of an enormous wheel through Belgium and Ar tois 3 11 1 r r was r r t pe haps into Pica dy . It evident that la ge t ac of country woul d have to be traversed with heavj O I fighting , and that many bstacles would have to n

’ r R u ove come . apidity of movement wo ld be the p condition of success in attaining the ultimate o hi was s rs rs Ar w ch to di pe e fi t the Belgian my , then r is di r r B it h Expe tiona y Fo ce , and finally to fall on r Ar s F ench mie . At the outset the order of battle of the First d r include the II III . , and IV . Co ps , the III . BRUSSELS— ANTWERP 5

r l 0th 11th 27th Landwehr Reserve Co ps, and the , , and s r s s s r Brigade ; the IX . Co p was as igned to it ho tly r r was a r ll r w afterwa ds . The e no he vy a ti e y ith the r r s r s s n two Rese ve Co p , and thei e tabli hment of machi e s s : s r gimcompanies wa mo t inadequate the III . Re e ve s r r r Corps had seven and the IV . Re e ve Co ps only fou . The total strength of the First Army at that time was r 32 r s r 142 battalions of infant y , squad on of caval y , r s r r 21 r i 110 . batte ie of a tille y , and pionee compan es r r s s The impo tant auxilia y unit , uch as ammunition S columns , and the medical , upply , and communication r war r r s . t oop , we e quickly placed on a footing Unde i the able direction of the. Chief of the Staff and h s Deputy and of the Chiefs of the Medical and Supply

r s s rmi ffr s o r ani z Se vice , the ta k of fo ng the di e ent Staff , g r s S r ing thei dutie , and inculcating the pi it in which

rr w r r these would be ca ied out , ent quietly fo wa d ;

s s r r and enthu ia m , al eady intense and glowing , we e z_ eal r s ai ed to the highest pitch . By the evening of th e 7th August the Staff of the Ar was r r f r r my eady to leave Stettin by ail o Grevenb oich . The rail transport of the troop s fo r the Western front was rr r r u ca ied out with a ema kable p nctuality . The civilian population and the troops vied with one another r s r in pat iotic demon t ations , and the food given to the troops by the population and by the indefatigable Red r ss r r s r r C o wo ke s con ide ably exceeded thei needs . The Staff settled down to hard work and an unin terru ted r r s p life of confe ences , impo tant deci ions , and examination of intelligence ; recreatio n was cut down s to an ab olute minimum . The composition of the fs s r Staf eemeda mo t happy one , and an eventful futu e r was so p oved that it .

rs Ar r The Chief of the Staff of the Fi t my , Gene al BRUSSELS—AN TWERP

m r s ajo von Kuhl , was a notable man , of mo t r r cha acte and wide views . Mentally and phy r r was impe tu bable , and , in addition c r ultivated mind , he possessed a pe sonal the battlefield which from time to time evoked a ca r Ar r f om the my Commande . B r Colonel von e gmann , the Deputy Chief , fr r displayed an equal indif e ence to dange , and had

‘ s for r s inexhau tible capacity wo k , was con picuous a most careful guardian of that vital factor in the r of an a my , the collective system r h r eplenis ment , lines of communication wo k , and r r r r t r po t gene ally , besides being a stu dy p o ecto r s r r r inte est of those se vices at Headqua te s . r hi s G Colonel von Be endt , in capacity as mm di artiIlSr hi co an ng the y , gained the ghest c the manner i n which his armof the service r in all the impo tant fighting , both in position warfare ; he showed an exemp bravery in all the battles and mi nor skilful use of his artillery were (1 r s r b illiant succes es in F ance , on the Vistula , on B r r t Danube , in the alkans , and in No the n I aly . was his lot to take part in the most critical of r s r war g eat t uggles of the . Generalleutnant Telle was already well known to Ar r r my Commande , both by his pa ticipation in siege manoeuvres at Posen in 1907 of the pioneers in the First Army C his intelligent and con had Shown to the active day and night due to him that , to the o f s action , ob tacles a BRUSSELS— ANTWERP

ers ss in r d and /d put ight , no le _ the pe io of open M r In r r r s s ri r ar than that of t ench wa fa e , thu en u ng the p im y

' BOnditions Of rr war ar — ca ying on a of movement with l ge ' M ' maSseS 13i ffé nch r r I si h r . wa fa e his n g t and ene gy i fiSpHed the unselfish labours of the famous pioneers of the First Army In addition to the above must be mentioned with r r Ar mi ss r se g atitude and p aise the my Com a y Litty , who early death was a severe loss to the Administrative Stafl Dr Ar r r r s . of the my , and the Di ecto of Medical Se vice ,

hel s e r T , who e whol hea ted devotion to the medical

rr s is r r s r a angement wo thy of the g eate t c edit . With an Army StaffSO admirably suited to their r r r s War fac zvith wo k , the va ying fo tune of the could be edj s fi Al l rs r the utmo t con dence . its membe we e men of r s ss r l r hi s mi ea ne tne and st ong wi l . Thei c ef kept in nd the words of Moltke : If one considers how small an ’ s ss is s amount of ucce due to one individual self , and

‘ through what weak instruments God manifests H is r ss is S r s g eatne , it a imple matte to be mode t . The

immortal master . o fthe art of war goes on to ascribe “ the chief credit fo r a successful undertaking to t he brave troops who know how to win victory wherever ~ ” one sends them . AS the result of experience in peace and war during ’ r rs s mi r s r a long life and fo ty yea tudy of lita y hi to y , the Army Commander set down a few reflections which were communicated to corps headquarters The governing factors of rapid and successful

ar r are r hl war - r s r s w fa e tho oug y t ained , di ciplined t oop

and he e all time t full mployment of available . Hence s s rs all r we obtain peed without ha te in leade of anks , and that fostering o f innate bravery which is the r s ss s r th g eate t of all a et . Du ing e deployment of the 8 BRUSSELS—AN TWERP

Ar r my and the times , so p egnant with cons r S r r r s r that will follow it , eve y pa e hou , eve y pa e Should be and must be consistently devoted t taining and increasing the fighting qualiti es r s r use r s t oop . P actice in the of thei weapon in q

o r r r r bivouacs , whe eve it may be , both befo e

r r r w ll s in the inte vals of active wa fa e , i help tho e whose training has be en unavoidably interrupted f r f u e s ull proficiency in thei ef ective s . This applie Landwehr all fighting units , to the , and to the lines Trai n r rr communication and t oops . If ca ied out in t r s r r r s ight pi it and not ove done , it will inc ea e the self - confidence and so strengthen hi s moral i s f Th is the foundation of fighting ef iciency . achievement within human possibility is practi war provided the subordinate commanders k

S n — success b i gle object in view namely , y a ai nst su eri or numbers is r g p . It a g ave ’ regard a reported fightin g inferiority of one s opponents as s r r mi r r is s a neces a y p eli na y to victo y . It the cau e of mi ssing many an opportunity and of Spoiling the chances o r r of btaining a apid though difficult success , when eve y s r t atom of t eng h ought to be put into the fight . There are countless ways of raising and maintaining

r r he the fighting powe of an a my . T y depend on the r r r its rs s r r cha acte and ene gy of leade . Thu pa ticula attention must be paid to keeping the marching capacity th e at s r s of men the highe t pitch , by gua ding again t s s s af the many in idiou influence may f ect it , ‘ that especially sore feet and other internal and external — r s s r fittin s . inju ie cau ed by long ma ches , ill g boot , etc A r the s gain , a constant watch should be kept ove upply of food and ammunition and over the medical care of ‘ r n Ar ff all a ks , including the my Sta . Neglect of any BRUSSELS -ANTWERP 9 of these matters will dimini sh the fighting strength of

r All s - r e s the A my . wa tage of man powe must be j alou ly s as r ss r s a guarded again t , eve y po ible ifle mu t be av ilable ra o ur decisive moment of the ope tions . In

r hi s is r r milita y situation , t a matte of ha d and e necessity points of tactical interest were also added W r o thy of attention . It was hoped

‘ on these lines issued by corp s com nd to divert the overflowing and light enthusiasm of the troops to a consideration of r s s s r se iou ne s of the day befo e them .

important Army Order was dr afted during ine - hour railway journey from Stettin to and ss 10t h A s r i ued on the ugu t , afte concentration area : Army will deploy on the extreme right As soon as the a ssembly in the is Ar b e completed , the my will

ar s Aix - - w d la Chapelle , and , avoiding Dutch will hold itself in readiness on the roads north e leading across the Meuse between Vis é and The movement of the Army on Aix -la - Chapelle passage across the Meuse must be carried out The concentration in a very narrow area length of the columns during the advance will r an r ra r o ganization d p epa tion . G eat be made on the marching power of the

order was based on the following instructions deployment issued by the Supreme Command The main forces of the German Army Belgium and Luxemburg into 10 BRUSSELS— ANTWERP

ra r is to r r F nce . Thei advance be ega ded as a r ill — pivoting on the a ea Thionv e Metz . Should B offer resistance to the advance through its te is Ar Liege to be taken by the Second my , so as the main roads which are covered by that f Fo r this purpose the 11th Infantry Brigade Of r 14 r r III . Co ps and the th Infant y B igade of the Corps (First Ar my) have been placed under the o r r n r s As of the Gene al commandi g the X . Co p . r r r - the IX . Co ps , tempo a ily allotted to the S Ar has r r rs Ar my , moved fo wa d , the Fi t my is to ad

r s Aix— - towa d la Chapelle . When Liege has been and as soon as the First and Second Armi es position on the roads of advance level wi th the general advance of the main forces will be 0 r by the Sup eme Command . The Second Army wi ll march with its r r r Ar r on Wav e , and the Fi st my will eceive march on Brussels and to cover the right flank of C Ar mi Its r o f es . advance , togethe with that the Sec ” Ar w r r my , ill egulate the pace of the gene al wheel .

11 r * s s 2nd 4t . r i The Caval y Co ps , con i ting of the , 9th r s s was r e and Caval y Divi ion , at fi st placed und the Second Ar my ; when the advance began it was to h under the immediate orders of the Supreme and advance north of Namur towards the line r ss s— r r r r di r th B u el Cha le oi , in o de to scove

, a Ar fo r of the Belgi n my , to watch any landing troops and fo r the arrival of French force s in was s r Ar Belgium . It al o to keep Fi st my Hea

r supplied with info mation . e 7th 15 A s Meanwhile , b tween the and th ugu t ,

r It was n er H o he e Kavallerie Korps II . u d co mman of ner a d Ge al v o n der M r witz .

12 BRUSSELS— ANTWERP

r r r r r e const ucted by the X . Co ps fa the no th at Lixh The bridge at Argenteau had been destroyed and the r o ur s ss uncert ai at He stal was in pos e ion . The situation about Liege prevented the issue of any defini t r rs s s hi r s tor o de , be ide w ch the oad , which had been

r r i r . up and blocked , needed a g eat deal of epa Th only preparations that coul d be made were those fo

- — m f ul r r Ai At 9 . the dif ic t ma ch th ough x la Chapelle . p the following Order arrived from the Supreme Command The march of the First Ar my to it s position of deploy ment abreast of Liege by the roads mentioned in th

r r . r deployment o de s will begin at once . The IX Co p will still be under the orders of the commander of th Ar rr rs Ar thi Second my . On the a ival of the Fi t my ” r r r co ps will clea its f ont . The 13th August was therefore fixed as the date fo the march through Aix - la - Chapelle instead of the URI and the necessary movements were ordered r s r l e to the advance of the co p . Thei r 11 we e to reach their following dest inations : The . r e r IV r s r He zog n ath ; the . Co p , Bi k ; and the III . tr 111 s r Weiden . The de ainment of the . Re e ve r r s IV . Rese ve Co p could then take place at statio r r r advance of the p esent concent ation a ea , and ul r r s s as r wo d follow the othe co p as oon eady , and ’ s s r r at lea t a day ma ch inte val . O n s 10th A s th e this ame day , the ugu t , impo instructions for the march through Ai x were issued : The march through the town as r s r can be fo e een , take place by th ee

C r s 11 r r . 1 r II o p and . Rese ve Co ps by the — — genrath Richterich western side of ’ — Adams s inn hill 341 (General Staff BRUSSELS— AN TWERP 13

— of Euchen—Wurselen through the centre — russ r s a d apelle (P ian) Mo e net ; and the IX . n — den - Haaren eastern side of

- - — AS - r s Aix la Chapelle Eynatten . ! ketch map of the oute to be followed accompanied these instructions ] Major

' nra omm a Aix - Ge e l von Stumpff , the C and nt of la ar s r s r the Chapelle , will m k the line of the e oad th ough

' r s are t o use town , avoiding any mention of what co p

and s - r a s them , will block the ide o d ; he will send a Sketch of the road sections allotted to each of the corps s r r fr i s as soon a the o de o the advance given . He will also ensure that the march through the town proceeds s . wi rr r smoothly and thout inte uption , and that the t oop s r r s a s u e no othe oad th n tho e allotted to them . The troops themselves will be ordered to carry out any instructions that he may give ; any disorder is to be r ss s r r immediately supp e ed w ith the utmo t igou . The — well - ordered execution of the march through Aix la Chapelle is a preliminary essential fo r the success of the Ar r ss movement of the my ac o the Meuse , which will r ar s take place immediately afte w d . At s O r s was u s the out et of the pe ation , it of the tmo t r s s r impo tance that no time hould be lo t . Di ection s were attached to these instructions detailing offi cer s and troops to a ssist the Town - Commandant and fo r

di the ' to wn for bid ng billeting in , except the highest s and fo r arr e fo r co mmunica Staff , angem nt keeping up

Ar r s tion with the Second my and with the IX . Co p , as well as an estimate of the probable duration of the r hr the h a s r ma ch t ough town , w ich would t ke eve al s n day . Taki g into account the careful preparations by — Corps headquart ers and the march discipline of firs t ch ess r s r th s rr n for t oop , eve y ing eemed a a ged the move ment of over troops with all their baggage 14 BRUSSELS — ANTWERP through the defile formed by a town only r s r n fo r r in b eadth . The time of ta ti g the ma ch ’ the corps destinations beyond the town were stated .

On the 11th August the Situation around r r appea ed unchanged . The commande of the Army considered that there was not sufficient

rt r ul sa a ille y , and so no one co d y how long r r r r r r befo e the no the n fo ts we e captu ed . r s for befo e they had fallen , it was impos ible the Corps to clear the roads between Aix-la -Chapelle and o r for r t Meuse , the advance no h of Liege to be r r Neve theless , the Sup eme Command took a

r u S a chee f l view of the itu tion , as was shown order quoted above for rapid preparations to b fr r r r o the advance . F om info mation eceived 11th A the evening of the ugust , the Belgian — appeared to be deployed on the front Antwerp Lo r r wa r . s s . Namu . The II Caval y Co p still about St wi th its 9th Cavalry Division s outh -west of r r s was r The I . Caval y Co p ma ching on Dinant . Al though the general idea of the initial movements o f the right wi ng of the German Armi es was now r r s easily app eciated , the ci cum tances in which rr w r r di fli cult had to be ca ied out e e ve y . The com plicated advance through Aix -la- Chapelle had to b e

' begun before the ammunition and supply columns r s fini she detrainin r of the leading co p had d g , and befo e the fighting troops of the corps following in the second s r r line had been a sembled , so that the sepa ate co ps coul d not be given sufli cient time to complete their r r r s concent ation and close up . Both the Rese ve Co p had di r r r e , imme ately afte a ailway jou ney lasting som BRUSSELS— AN TWERP 15

s s r days , been obliged to make a mo t exhau ting ma ch r in the hottest weathe . The march -formation of the First Army consisted of r s r r a deep column of two co p on each of the th ee oads ,

se r r Ai x - - passing clo to one anothe th ough la Chapelle , and which did not greatly diverge between there and

s r o r fo r the Meu e , no th of Liege , even some way beyond

r A r was r the rive . Gene al appointed to look afte each s r r s ss s r of the e th ee oad , and to i ue all the neces a y r for the r routine orde s ma ch . Billeting and supply columns were hurriedly sent forward from the railway

s as Ar r r r r ba e , the my Commande had o de ed that eve y man was to be fully rationed by the time the Meuse

s r r s r s wa reached . Howitze batte ie we e put into po ition r r Ar r apelle by o de of the my Commande , against air attacks ; and all the roads along the ontier on the right flank of the advance were Ar d r s r r ked . The my Comman e al o o de ed that roads of advance Should be thoroughly inspecte d l r r r s r s r o fu ly epai ed , and all b idge and othe con t u

red or s collectively in detail , the e careful supply of such a mass of all passing through such a com most valuable mine of s ri r s s hi to cal pu po e . full of mi litary activities the Ar my Com v er witnessed such a stirring Spectacle as of enthusiastic and endless columns through

the fur ther deployment of the Army to be s r as ss r apidly po ible , the A my Commander r or s s s Sh the T ain , the upply ection of it , oul d 16 BRUSSELSm AN TWERP supply of food Should be carried in rear of the secor s the r r rs divi ion , and emainde of the fi t echelon of tl ammunition columns and Train should move at the er s of each column . The econd echelon of transport each pair of corps was to be massed and to march at

r di s r ar r s r r : ce tain tance behind the e co p . In o de to ea

di fli culties r s r r s the of thei advance , Re e ve Co p ,

r w r r as r l al eady mentioned , e e to be det ained nea t r as ss r s l i f ont po ible , and we e them elves to fix the eng

r r s r r i of thei ma che . In addition to much othe p elimina r r a his wo k , Gene alleutn nt Telle , in capacity as chi r r s Ar r mom of the pionee s of the Fi t my , unde took the

s s s necessaI nai sance of the Meu e and its canal , and the rr s fo r ri n r r 00] a angement b ngi g up b idging mate ial , structin r r r r r r ss n s f< g b idges , and p epa ing ive c o i g , and r the r f< secu ing safety of the latte . The initial plans the attack on Antwerp were also considered at Grev eI r r s b oich on the basis of the app eciation available .

‘ r n 12th Au ust r On the mo ni g of the g , while the naissances and the preliminary troop - movements

n r rr rr th bei g apidly ca ied out , the news a ived of

r Ev e née s of Fo t g , which lie The bombardment of Forts Fleron and Chaudfont s s r outh of those just mentioned , and on the ea te n was i of Liege , to beg n that evening . The line of r - r was r r on the no th east f ont , howeve , al eady

r fo r r Ar into , thus giving oom the Fi st my t 9 am r ar n wi . . fo w d . O the follo ng day at wi rr w r took place , thout inte uption , to a s — rs Vi e He tal on the Meuse . The main b advanced guards of the corp s reached their

as s : 11 r s . follow . Co p Sippenaeken , IV r s and III . Co p Lontzen . BRUSSELS - ANTWERP 17

- r le r Martin Fou on Comte , on Lixhe and Visé ; the cent e — — corps were to march by Chevemont Hagelstein Neuf chateau on Argenteau ; those on the left -hand road by — — — — Crosenb erg Henri Chapelle Clermont Battice Barchon rs The s - s r on He tal . la t named place on each of the th ee s r s Ar r rs road we e in the Meu e valley . my Headqua te r r r Ai x - - moved f om G evenb oich to la Chapelle , the Ar my Commander being hospitably received by Von r r r Sandt , the P esident of the Boa d of Gove nment . Von Sandt held a similar position at Brussels after it s r r s rs r occupation , and afte wa d at Wa aw , whe e he s r his s was uccumbed to the st ain of dutie . He a great ss lo .

r e r The IX . Co ps evacuat d in good time the count y

s r . r s was r outh of the oad on which the III Co p ma ching , and direct communication between these two corps was s s r s r s s e tabli hed . The b idge ove the Meu e at Vi é and Ar r r r s r genteau we e epo ted to have been de t oyed , though that at Herstal was capable of limi ted use ; at r s r r r Lixhe , no th of Vi é , a tempo a y b idge had in the s r c and s meantime been con t u ted , at Vi é one was in s r course of con t uction . At m Ar r r r . r p . Second my Headqua te s epo ted ss the capture of Fort Ponti e . Situated in a command s s h ing po ition on the left bank of the Meu e , it ad till now barred th e section of the river between Liege and the Dutch frontier which had to be crossed by the

rs Ar s r r r Fi t my . The pa sage of the ive by la ge bodi es s was r r s and oop now ende ed fea ible , valuable time thus gained for the deployment of the First Army the development of the plan of campaign in the

r Emmich General a r Gene al von , with mj o Luden as r a - r r B ig de Commande , had b oken the chain of the r - r r r r s S on no th easte n f ont of the fo t es , in pite 2 18 BRUSSELS “ AN TWERP

r r s r r n of thei mode n con truction . Fo ts Lie s and Lanti s ss r l r r ds r we t of Ponti e , we e sti l tempo a ily a i tu bing r s Ar r facto in the calculation of the my Commande . Information concerning the Belgian Army gave th impression that three o r four divisions were in the are: — r r s r Louvain Wav e , with advanced t oop on the f on — r s s di s ] Diest Ti lemont ; be ide these , a vi ion had bee

r r r Frencl located at Antwe p and anothe at Namu . troop train s appeared to be on their way to Brussel

r ur— r wer and to the f ont Nam Dinant , whilst the B itish said to be disembarking in small numbers at Ostend * r r r s r s Cav alr and with la ge fo ce at Dunki k and Calai . ; ’ reported a strong concentration of the enemy s cav alrj s russ ea t of B els .

At r s r Ar r thi the eque t of the Fi st my Commande , Second Army Commander ordered the 9th Cav alr] for s r Division , which ome time had been on the igh

M s - s r thi bank of the eu e south we t of Liege , to ejoin r der r z di command of Gene al von Ma wit . His vision were suffering from want of oats and shortage of ammuni , tion : they were helped out of their difficulties by r - r r colunm r r ] moto t anspo t , apidly o ganized and take r r Lek Ow efli cien fo wa d by Captain von , a highly ’ A r r s membe of the Army Commande s taff . r r fi r his ub lishe< Majo Gedel , a F ench of ce , in book p r 1916 1914 : d< in Janua y , , La Campagne , La Bataille

‘ 1a r r Ar Ma ne , gives the st ength of the Belgian my a r war r the outb eak of as men , ifles s th1 r s 324 102 m . sab e , guns , and achine gun On 3rd August this army of Six infantry and one division was apparently disposed as follows : 1st sion on the march from Ghent to Thi enen (Tirl

No British tro ops landed at these ports until so

i . T r e i n h E F. is a he erio n est o e B. em t p d qu . d b k d

Havr e.

20 BRUSSELS - ANTWERP

hi r r r w of t s gove ning law of open wa fa e , and ill r r r r d amatic and ove whelming p oofs of its t uth , ’ o ur side and on the enemy s- Lege arti s prcecept 14 A On the th ugust , the leading Ar — my namely , the II IV . , and III . r r the Meuse , and the two Rese ve Co ps s ss econd line , began to pa the Belgian Aix- - 15 la Chapelle . On the th , the II Maest r at Bilsen , twelve miles west of Memb rii en w reache at gg , hile the III . r r r Tong es , and so we e close to the c ossings The Army was thus clear of the narrow some defile between Liege and the Dutch r m r r ag ee ent with the Sup eme Command , the Fi st was given time to close up as soon as it was in posse

‘ the line r of of the Deme . A r r r fte the fall of Fo ts Lie s and Lantin , the

' f- that still held out on the south west and southern of Liege were qui ckly taken with the help of the wi r r r ho tze s . The IX . Co ps was placed unde the r Ar r of the Fi st my , and the b igades of the II r IV . Co ps , which had been employed against r r s l th 14 r 6 . ejoined thei co p on the On the th , r r nk Ar VII . Co ps , on the ig ht fla of the Second r r eached Lantin , close to the fo t of that name on r - r r li r hi no th weste n f ont of ne of fo ts , w ch was now r r broken th ough . The Belgians we e some way s hi the line of the Meu e , be nd the Gette , on the — r r , Diest Ti lemont and at Wav e , w r r s r s at Louvain fa the west . The la t fo t on the r mf r r ci cu e ence of Liege fell du ing the day , and was r r fortress at Buy captu ed . It appea ed that

r . r s r s F ench I . and II Co p in the Namu ection of Meuse were still sendi ng reinforcements from the so BRUSSELS—ANTWERP 21

r nk r s west on to thei left fla , on the ight of the Belgian . It was hoped that a rapid advance of the right wi ng of the German Ar mies would defeat any hostile plans in

r o r s r s . that dist ict , at least e iou ly affect them U p eacht s s rs Ar In view of thi ituation , the Fi t my continued 17 A s hi s the Ar its advance on the th ugu t , w l t Second my

t r . r s r hal ed . The advanced gua d of the II Co p eached r - s r Ke mpt , on the Hasselt Die t ailway ; that of the Stev ort r s rs r . IV . Co ps , ; that of the III Co p , Go sum , - r t r s r s north west of St . T ond ; tha of the IX . Co p , B u t - r r hem , south east of St . T ond ; that of the III . Rese ve

r . r r s . Co ps , Visé ; and that of the IV Rese ve Co p , St r - s And é , the two last named being on the ea t of the s r Ar r r was defile leading we twa ds . my Headqua te s r Ai x— - s s r moved f om la Chapelle to Glon , pas ing th ough

r nf r Liege , whe e a co e ence was held between the com

rs r r s s mande of the Ge man ight wing , con i ting of the rs Ar s Ar Fi t and Second mies , and of the Chief of the my

At m r r rr r p . . the following o de a ived f om the Supreme Command : The Fir st and Second Armi es r r r r and the II . Caval y Co ps (Ma witz) will be unde the rs r Ar r of the commande of the Second my, du ing r s advance no th of the Meuse . Thi advance will 18th A s is s r the ugu t . It mo t impo tant that forces reported to be in position between — ont Wavre Should be shouldered away from to initiate further operations of r ss s— r s r B u el Namu , and mea u es ” s r r nk s A r ecu e thei fla again t ntwe p . e given fo r thus unexpectedly placing r r unde one commande . The com considered that the measure

command , and that it might 22 BRUSSELS— ANTWERP apparently have b een avoided if timely directions ’ rm Marwitz s r been sent to both a ies , and if Caval y C had been placed at the di sposal of the First It could have been foreseen that the Second r nk r suppo ted as it was on both fla s , would p oba confronted more especially wi th tactical whereas the First Army would be faced by re - r p eminently st ategical in its aspects . It r s re possible that , owing to the p es u of the situation r Ar r r the Fi st my , dive gent opinions might c op which would make matters still more difficul t for r Howeve , the second sentence of the S order coincided with the views of the First r mande and his Chief of the Staff . 17th A r r On the evening of the ugust , the fou co p

i the first line arrived wi thin striking di stance of Ar Belgian my on the Gette . r r r The Gette , a t ibuta y of the Deme , flows in a win course through wide meadows ; in many places r bottom is soft , so that it can only be c ossed bridges, o r where improvised ones have been s r r r Dyke and wi e fences hinde f ee movement . First Ar my was concerned with the lower reach t r r r s r s eam , whe e it fo ms a alient towa ds the lending itself to a concentric attack from tha r th ough the villages of Haelen , Geet Betz , r r and Ti lemont . The b eadth and r s r r va y , owing to ide b anches . The g oun s er r s r we t n bank ove look the easte n bank ,

r s B i and nea Die t and Haelen , also west of ud ngen r of Ti lemont . Ar r r for 18th A ss The my O de the ugust , i ued m r r rs s . . A my Headqua te at Glon , at p on the was as follows BRUSSELS— ANTWERP 23

— 1 The is s s Tirle . enemy in po ition on the line Die t — r r r s re r r r mont Wav e , with st ong fo ce in a , p obably nea 2 Ar wi - rr Louvain . . The my ll attack to mo ow and ’ l s r w r enve op the enemy left wing , d iving him a ay f om r 11 r s s s A . ntwe p The . Co p will end one divi ion by r — — r h r r Bee ingen Pael Vee le , and the ot e by Ke mpt — ’ s r s Th e . Lummen Die t ound the enemy flank . IV Corps will march by Herck la Ville and Rummen to wards Haegen and Geet Betz ; it will leave three batta as ar r t r r r lions , ection of cav l y , and th ee bat e ies of a tille y r Ar r at Stevoo t , at the disposal of the my Commande ,

am The r s r by . . III . Co p will move by Nieuwe r rs r r Th e ke ken and Go sum on Budingen and Nee linte . r s r r r r IX . Co p will ma ch f om about St . T ond on Oplinte r s r r s r its and Ti lemont , and will keep a t ong e e ve on left flank to act against a possible enemy advance from the r s - s r a ea outh we t of Ti lemont . 3 2nd r s s . The Caval y Divi ion will be at the di posal Ar r r in of the my Commande . It will move past Vee le , r r r r o de to cut off the et eat of the enemy . 4 r s r ss — . The co p will c o the line Pael Lummen St r 8 a . m T ond at . .

5 e rs r s r . With the xception of the fi t line t an po t , the train and ammunition and supply columns will not ss — go beyond the line Ha elt Looz . 6 Ai r r s s wi rr . econnai sance ll be ca ied out by the

. r s r r r s A r II Co p to the no th of Deme towa d ntwe p , by the r s t s . r s A rs IV Co p towa d e cho and Maline , by the

. r s s r and r s III Co p in the Louvain di t ict , by the IX . Co p the r a r — r in a e Ti lemont Wav e . 7 Th . e s r r s wi ar s III . Re e ve Co p ll m ch by Bil en on ev erst : r s r rs at s t Co p Headqua te Bil en . 8 Th . . e e s r r s wi r Ar g IV . R e ve Co p ll ma ch by genteau r s : r s r rs r s on Tong e C o p Headqua te at Tong e . 24 BRUSSELS— ANTWERP

9 Ar r rs Stev . my Headqua te will be at a hi r are m. . , by w ch time the co ps to be phonic communication with it . 10 Ar r Vamont . The Second my is to each r wi r s - rr ight ng , the VII . Co p , by midday to mo ow . First Army is to be under the orders of the S Ar r my Commande . All times wi ll be given according to German stand time . Si ned KLUCK ( g ) V . .

These orders seemed a suitable introduction to s co - r r objects of the offen ive . The ope ation of F ench wi r s l r or s th Belgian t oop wou d be p evented , was at lea t r Ar hinde ed , although the Second my had had to halt r 17 r 18 du ing the th . F om midday on the th its VII .

r wi r r r s r s Co ps , th st ong ese ve of the IX . Co p , would r rs Ar A r r cove the left flank of the Fi t my . fu the attack r r r wi s r r rs on a b oad f ont , p obably th upe io numbe , to — gain ground towards Louvain Brussels was provided fo r ; the Belgian Ar my would be brought to battle in a difli cult - r r r low lying count y , and fo ced away f om An r as r its s twe p , well as cut off f om communication r r s r r r In with that fo t ess . By placing a t ong ese ve r echelon behind the left flank , p ecautions had been taken to prevent any Interference with the attack of r r ss the IX . Co ps and also of the III . Co ps . The ma of ’ Marwit z s Cavalry Corps was under the sole orders of Ar r a d l r the Second my Commande , n emp oyed in ope a i ls h r i s s r s t ons e ew e e w . k , th objective a long way we twa d 17 r s s r r s On the th , all the fighting t oop of the Re e ve Co p s defiles of the Fir t Army were clear of the Meuse . The rs Ar was r r s r r s Fi t my o ganized in two g oup , fou co p in r r r r r r r f ont and two in ese ve . St ong fo ces f om the latte BRUSSELS— ANTWERP 25 would Shortly have to wheel up towards the south fr ont r was r s of Antwe p. Such the gene al ituation at the

The enemy withdrew in places before contact wi th the in r o s r r s k g t o p , though in f ont of the II . Co p at r s r s r of the IX . Co p at Ti lemont con ide able was r r r r fi st offe ed . The eti ement of the r was rr ent e ca ied out in good time , and the on the flanks showed good leadership and ’ r s Ar the enemy s pu po e . The Belgian my an apparently prepared position on the

e r s - hi r St . G o ge gh g ound west of

ing of the 18th the pursuing troops of the — had reached the l ine Hersselt Montaigu — — Georges Glabbeek Suerbempde Tirle French troops had been observed with the The cautious withdrawal of the Belgian s to the conclu ion that , at the moment , it rs r s s r r r Flande the Ge man had upe io numbe s , erred to take advantage of the r A r r r ound ntwe p , athe than accept A r r r mbat in the field . fu the apid f the First Army towards Brussels woul d no r s Ar up the ituation , the Second my following , rs Ar on the left of the Fi t my . moment the Belgian frontier was crossed of the Army had suffered by treacherous r ul r s the pa t of the pop ation , appa ently in tigated r s r r by the local autho itie . Fi ing f om behind

was rr rr an act of daily occu ence , and ho ible

s i r r of off ce s and men , in which Belgian soldie s r r r r lothing pa ticipated , we e f equent . Inte BRUSSELS~ANTVVERP

was sr r Pr national law completely di ega ded . tions warning and threatening the population r r s effect , so that a seve e and inexo able sy tem had to be applied by the commanders s s to put an end to thi tate of things . r r the ua s unde ma tial law , shooting of individ l rni s s r s the bu ng of hou e , became nume ou along r w r S r behind the f ont , but e e low in emedying the was s w r or r r It advi able , hethe in out of qua te s , to r a for s a ifle h ndy , even the divi io s r ome way behind the f ont . Each the Army Commander had to be r w S of infant y , ith machine guns and ingle r for r s eady action . These evil p actice on t r V

the , population ate into the ve y itals of until the southern frontier of Belgium The communications and country in rear and its reserves had to be protected again s r sometimes bestial , attack in a most tho ough so as to prevent their repetition against tTOOps f r late . Meanwhile the Lines of Communi cation H eadq ua r r r Aix -la- we e moved fo wa d to Chapelle , and on the r was that a ea extended up to the Meuse . They dered the most valuable services to the during the advance to the Seine a r as on the Ou cq , well as in the 19th followed . On the , a was completed at Visé , an move the Lines of Communication r r Aft Tong es and then to St . T ond . s l 0th Landwehr r head , the B igade river - crossings between Visé

BRUSSELS— ANTWERP

4 2nd r . The Caval y Division will be in front of the right wi ng early in the mornin

r A r r r rec advance th ough e schot towa ds B ussels , noitring towards Antwerp and westwards on both si r s s of B us el . 5 Th e s r r r . III . Re e ve Co ps , moving th ough Hass will reach Lummen with its advanced r r s IV Headqua te s at Ha selt . The . r r r r ma ching by St . T ond , will each Do ma advanced guard : Corps Headquarters at r —St r is The line Ke mpt . T ond not to be passed 2 m hi r r r p . . , by w ch time the t anspo t of the f ont n will have left that li e . 6 r Ar r . The ight wing of the Second my will e r - rr G ez Doiceau to mo ow . 7 Ar r r . my Headqua te s will be at Winghe r s r wi m Geo ge , and co ps ll be in telephonic com unication am with it by . . 8 Ai r r rr . econnaissances will be ca ied out by the II r r An r . Co ps towa ds twe p ; by the IV . ~ westerly direction past the north of Bruss r s r r r III . Co ps in a we te ly di ection south of B us r - r di r and by the IX . Co ps in a south weste ly ection r Wav e . Si ned KLUCK ( g ) v . .

19 r r r n On the th , the co ps eached thei destinatio s m S s r r . o de ed , only eeting light oppo ition in places ’ r s 1st 2nd 3rd enemy s fo ce , consisting of the , , and nf r r r as r S I ant y Divisions , eti ed , thei ituation demanded , r r - r r At erch in a weste ly and no th weste ly di ection . W ter the 2nd Cavalry Division engaged the Belgian 5th 6th I r hi r and nfant y Regiments , w ch appa ently BRUSSELS— AN TWERP 29

r 2nd lr II . Co ps in the fight the Cava y Division went into A r r ed r billets at e schot , while the infant y advanc gua ds r s H a eht~i s v l Ar e L e e d. of the II . Co ps pu hed on to g my r rs r r r Headqua te moved fo wa d to Louvain . P oclama tions by the Belgian Government inciting the civil

' to fire the r population on enemy we e found in this town , as r s s r s r s as well co p e of women with ifle in thei hand , ll r ki ed du ing the fighting . A r r s 1st 2nd 3rd fte the p e ence of the Belgian , , and Infantry Divisions in front of the First Army had been s s r r r rr e tabli hed, confi mato y info mation a ived of the r r s r r r advance of F ench fo ce , thei ight flank moving f om r r r u r r r r Cha le oi towa ds Gemblo x ; fu the , a epo t came in that the French 5th Cavalry Division had retired from ’ r Perv ez s r fire Marwitz s nea , with heavy lo s , unde the of 4th 9th r s and Caval y Divi ions . The position of the First Ar my seemed to be in accord wi th the needs of the r S r r r wi gene al ituation . Se ious inte fe ence th the advance

r A r ul r r r r f om ntwe p co d hencefo wa d sca cely be fea ed . r ss s 20th i s B u el was to be occupied on the , wh l t the 111 s r r s as s r . w A rs Re e ve Co p to pu h on th ough e chot , r A r s . r r s r obse ving ntwe p , and the IV Re e ve Co p th ough r Ti lemont . An order from the Second Army Commander for the 20th demanded the line Ninove—Gembloux to be r r ss s — r eached , and the B u el Gembloux ailway to be

r ss 9 am r r . s c o ed by . F om the ve y po ition of the r s r r s s co p , the nea e of the e two objective coul d not be r r r nor r r eached by the time o de ed , the fa the one within r da hi s r r the cou se of a y . T o de could not therefore be

s f r complied with , in view both of the neces ity o care fully maintaining the strength of every man and horse for r the heavy fighting to come , and of the g eat demands r r rs that had al eady been made on thei powe . The 30 BRUSSELS— ANTWERP

troops woul d therefore have to be allowed considera r In r s r r mo e time which to each the line o de ed . After offering onl y slight opposition the divisions retired across the Dyle on the 19 r r fr move which , combined with info mation gathe ed

r r rr inte cepted lette s , seemed to indicate the a ival Br s r iti h t oops on the Belgian left flank . Ar r r ss r am In the my O de i ued f om Louvain at 8 . . 20th A s r s r r the ugu t , the co p we e info med that the and Second Armies would continue the advance day towards the line Ninove—Gembloux and tha

. r r VII Co ps , on the ight wing of the Second — would march by ArthenneS Ok emb o urg- northern r — r — r r r for of Wav e Rosie es Ohain . The ma ch o de s First Army were :

. r s V r s r II Co p by ilvo de and Koning loo , gua ding flank against Antwerp and Ganshoren (north -wes t r s s r s r r — r B u sel ) ; IV . Co p by Ko tenbe g cent e An r s r r r n de lecht (we t of the capital) ; III . Co ps by Te vue e — r -Dro o eb o sch s r ss r s Boitsfo t g ( outh of B u els) ; IX . Co p — l — r v er sche r H u z e . by O y Hoeylae t La Wate loo . The II r s rr r s s b and IV . Co p will a ive on a level with B u sel y r s ll r s r — x noon ; the III . Co p wi c o s the B ussels Gemblou a r s wi r at r m. . ailway at . , and the IX Co p ll c oss it e m 11 r ll r r s . . The . Co ps wi send out pat ols towa d — r Al s . r r the line Te monde o t , the IV Co ps towa r r s the III . Co ps towa d Enghien , and the r Ittres r l e Ai r r th ough and B aine Comte . econnais rr t r sances will be ca ied out by he II . Co p railways and roads in the area Vilvorde (no — — — — Brussels) Termonde Al ost Ninove Brussels — n r r s th e r vain A twe p ; by the III . Co p in a ea

— — - r s s Ninove Renaix Mons B us el ; by the IX . — — r r - r the area Louvain Mons Cha le oi Wav e . BRUSSELS— ANTWERP 31

nd r s r in r wi The 2 Caval y Divi ion , wo k g in conce t th r s r r r s the II . Co p , will pat ol all the p acticable oad immediately in front of the right wing of the First

r i r ss s and A r A my , and, advanc ng between B u el ntwe p , r s r s will di scover the line of advance of the B iti h t oop . r r 111 s r Thi s duty is of u gent impo tance . The . Re e ve r s will r r s Co p E ma ch by Blankelae and Die t to Betecom , preparatory to covering the flank of the Army towards IV R s r r wi r Tirle r . An twe p . The e e ve Co ps ll ma ch by r wi it s r mont , and each Roosbeek th advanced gua d . The ammunition c olumn s and train of the leading corp s ” s r r A rs — r mu t be fo wa d of a line e chot Ti lemont by noon . At the moment of issuing thi s order a report came in r n r . f om the II Co ps that , owing to the occupatio of

r r had nl r Wespelae by the enemy , the co ps o y eached in — r r s the l e Lipseveld Wacke zeel on the p eviou day , the

19 r s th , and that , in view of the fighting and the ma che

s difli cul ties of the la t few days , in addition to the of the

s s r s r ul nl r far s upply e vice , the co ps co d o y ma ch as a r rr 20th A r . s Vilvo de in the cu ent day , the eque t was also made that a Shorter march mi ght be ordered for the r s 21st as r r s co p on the , the ea divi ion had to push up

r di di s to the head of the column to elieve the lea ng vi ion . 2nd r s The Caval y Divi ion , advancing between A r r sse s rri r n ntwe p and B u l , a ved , du i g the day , at Wolwerthem r its r had , whe e p esence been anxiously Ar r . r s awaited by the my Commande The VII . Co p of Ar r h s the Second my , ma c ing in clo e touch wi th the I X . r rs Ar r s Chain Co ps of the Fi t my , eached we t of . The

Ar r Second my began the attack on Namu . On the 20th August the disposition of the First Army was therefore as follows : 2nd Cavalry Division about lwerthem r Wo ; II . Co ps advanced guard at Vilvorde ; 111 . Reserve Corps advanced guard west of Aerschot in 32 BRUSSELS— ANTWERP deep march formation opposite the s outh front of A r r n s ntwe p fo ts , without bei g mole ted or noticed

rr s . r s the ga i on ; IV . , III , and IX . Co ps we t Br l - r usse s , facing south west towa ds Enghien , the

r n r s Co ps bei g in touch with the VII . Co p of the Sec Ar r r s r my ; IV . Rese ve Co p about Ti lemont as gen r r Ar so ese ve of the my , placed that it could reach

r Ar r r h s o r pa t of the my f ont to no t , we t , south in o r r s A two ma ches . The map in the ppendix to this di s s r w will make these spo itions ea ie to follo , and s as r the ituation it appea ed at the time . Of the initial movements of the Ar my up to the of the first great stride from Ai x -la - Chapelle to Brus the Memorandum says as follows : “ By the occupation of Brussels the first ob j ec

the Ar my has been obtained . The unexpected s ness and moothness of the advance , while both c ombatant and non -combatant troops to

r r r utmost conceivable st ain , completely su p ised Belgian Army and frustrated all its hopes of sup from the forces of England and Fr r s r s ope ation by Belgian , B iti h , r t oops , which h r B have failed , and the apid occupation of elgium

r ss . s r the eby been made po ible In pite , howeve , s s r s s isolated ca e of obstinate esi tance , the Belgian h s o ur r s so always managed to e cape g a p , that

' has not been decisively beaten no r forced A r has r ss r ntwe p . It , neve thele , been so seve that a comparatively small force will b it in An twerp and prevent it from ta s deci ive fighting . The adv BRUSSELS—ANTWERP

r r s Ass s di r local autho ities and the P e s . isted by ol e s in r r rr plain clothes , it waged an ext emely agg essive gue illa

r r r s s r wa fa e , making the oad un afe behind the f ont , and ” ele hone p cables . an Army been mobilized and deployed

r r r r s r sul th ee days ea lie , a mo e sweeping and deci ive e t r e n l At r woul d p obably have b e gained . the outb eak war i s s r s rt and of time alway of the g eate t impo ance , ’ r S a s is r s in ce tain itu tion it vital . Remembe Napoleon

Vitesse,

A rdi rs s h Sir r cco ng to the fi t de patc of John F ench , the r s r F r commanding B iti h Expeditiona y o ce , to the S r r for War“ 7th r 1914 ec eta y of State , dated Septembe , , it appears that the plan of landing the British Army on the was s Belgian coast abandoned at the out et , and s r r - s n r s in tead the mo e secu e landing place , Du ki k , Calai , L Boulo ne ' r ar h and , g ] we e selected , in g eement wit the r r A r s F ench Gove nment . fte a con ultation between Field -Marshal French and General JOffre it was agreed that the British should t hen move up to a deployment

— — and as s r zone Conde Mons Maubeuge , , will be een late , by the 22nd August the British Ar my was ready to give or was c its battle , at least ompleting deployment , in s r s r Ar r thi a ea . The de i e of the my Commande to attack and disperse the British and Belgian divisions before a rs was f leaving Fl nde not to be ulfilled .

W hat Na o eon ro te to Marsha Massenao n 18th A ri 1809 p l w l p l , , ’ t tes e J e rec mnde e ri s me om anous . t w , a I as a han ritin to the etter i en in dw g, l g v

1508 7 .

’ no mention o f these ports in Sir J o hn French s and the tw first-nam orts ere not se AS i b o ed p w u d . w ll e c was o s esse ith the i e that the R F had Klu k b d w d a E . the aces he names here and that its commnications pl , u nd est w . CH APTER II BRUSSELS—SOMME — The Battles with the British Expeditio nary Fo rce The — ’ ’ Pursuit General dAmade s Army

N 20th A s as was r O the ugu t , mentioned in the p evi r Ar r was l chapte , the my Commande stil counting the possible co - operation of British troops with Ar s r Belgian my . In the e ci cumstances , the dispositions of the First Army at that date ap S : r r ss 11 meet the ituation IV . Co ps at B u els ; . r s s S Vilvo de and ea t of Malines , oppo ite the

r An r d 2nd f ont of the twe p efences , with the Division at W olwerthemin front of the above two 111 s r r s s s Aersch the . Re e ve Co p we t and ea t of

- A w r s r r s outh east of nt e p ; the IV . Re e ve Co ps s s r we t and ea t of Ti lemont ; the III . C

l . r s r ss . B u e s . The III IV , and II Co p to give battle at any moment against the front — them—Termonde and towards the line Al ost Ninove r r on the othe hand , the IV III . , and IX . could tu n fight southwards with their right flank covered by 11 s r r s as as . and III . Re e ve Co p well by the s r r s o r r s The IV . Re e ve Co p in one two ma che rdi r s s r employed , acco ng to ci cum tance , eithe

r s- W olwerthemor b f ont Maline , eyond the line B r s r l r . u Wav e . The IX Co p about Wate loo co d also regarded as a general reserve fo r op north o r west ; o r it might be treated as the pivot s - s wheeling movement to the outh we t . 34

36 BRUSSELS— SOMME

Army against Antwerp east of the Dyle Canal b etwef - s s r ; Louvain Maline , and , if neces a y , to be able to co tinne its advance in a westerly direction (the bend in tl road at Haecht was believed to be under fire from tl

A r r s s r Cor guns of the ntwe p fo t ) . The IV . Re e ve ] its r Tl occupied Louvain with advanced t oops . interval between the leading and rear di visions of b o1 the Reserve Corp s was to depend o n the length Ofthe ’ r rs Ar was s s o s day s ma ch . The Fi t my thu in uch a p tion that the great maj ority of the troops could have - r much needed est . r r s di r was s tl The O de al o ected , as now fea ible , r s r r ss throu second line t an po t of the II . Co ps to pa g 111 s r r s rs In the . Re e ve Co p and join up with the fi t r s r r s for r 1 t an po t of its co p , and that of the IV . Co ps r r ss s o r it s c“ outhern s r s assiI move th ough B u el ubu b , p

r l Louvain in good time , and avoiding the line of ma ch r s r r r for uardiI the III . Co p . Special o de s we e given g the corp s ammunition depots against the populatiOt also for protecting the bridge near the Gette at H aele

s r r s fo r r rest oratic by the III . Re e ve Co p , and the apid r r s r the of the ailway b idge we t of St . T ond , with

s r the Line of Communication t oops , so that it rr r rr Ar r r r ca y loaded moto lo ies . my Headqua te s mained at Louvain . The report that arrived on the 21st that the count] ’ — — a s far as theline Ghent Audenarde Tournai was ole: was r s Ar Con of the enemy impo tant . On thi the my mander h ad to make up his mind as to the di rection was A rdi 1 which the advance to be continued . cco ng r s r rs Arm the o iginal in t uctions , the duties of the Fi t ; b esides that of covering Antwerp and s r as communication , we e , has been BRUSSELSw SOMME

Armi es against the Belgian Army and the British force s d rr o r whi ch wa suppose to be about to a ive , with with

r An r s r s t oops . advance of B iti h t oop Lille district would now have to be taken and it therefore seemed necessary to move

rs r - s r r wi the Fi t Army mo e in a south we te ly di ection , th its a ss s left fl nk pa ing we t of Maubeuge , and keeping

r Ar . touch with the VII . Co ps of the Second my What ’ r r r s , would11318! eve the di ection of the enemy advance the Fi st r s r s A my would then be in a po ition to tu n outh , west , est im A s r S for to attack h . l o , mo e pace would be gained on the right to t he — towards Tournai and Douai whi ch would e First and Second Armies from interfering ’ other s movements in the case of a further

s ar s wheel outhw d . nder of the Second Army regarded the f r 2l st a di fe ent point of view , and on the the following Army Order : The Second vance on the 22nd to the line Binche S r 23rd ing the Samb e on the , r Ar r s r the Thi d my to c os the Meuse . The Fi st

s s r An r r l whil t ob e ving twe p and holding B usse s , nf r it co o m to this movement that , if needed , able to operate west of Maubeuge in support Second Army after it has invested the north ” r s a r r ss r f ont of th t fo t e . In eply to rs Ar r h s r o by the Fi t my Commande , t ese in t u e upheld with the argument that otherwi se Ar my might get too far away and not be able ” Ar th r Second my at e ight moment . r of the Second Army did not take into ossib le Speedy appearance of British probably due to the following co mmu BRUSSELS— SOMME ni cation issued by the Supreme Command on

A s r the ugu t , and eceived on evening of the 21 ran : Alandi ng of B ritish troops at Boulogne advance from about Lille must be reckoned It is believed that a disembarkation ofBritish tro ” has a/big scale not yet taken place . l A more accurate appreciation ofthe Situation wz arrived at by First Army Headquarters at Louvai] as fu r was S r Ar as vs the tu e to how . The B itish my , n owknow according to the above mentioned dispatc Sir r ass Mom of John F ench , was embled on the r 21st 22ndA s Condé Canal , and nea Binche on the /ugu t The Commander of the Second Army urged that tl rs Ar ul s In r : Fi t my sho d keep clo e to the Second , whe e it really needed a greater freedom of manoeuvre in ord rr it s as w i was s rimaril to ca y out allotted t k , h ch till p

r a r e we of a st ategic n tu e , and intended to op n the s s s s n to tactical ucces e . The deci ion of the Seco Army Commander had its influence on the course l r s r s for s en the ope ations again t the B iti h , and day b arrassed the plans of the First Ar my Command and his f Chief of the Sta f . At noon on the 21st August a report arrived 2 r ss 2nd 4th and 9th i Louvain by wi ele that the , , Caval Divisions were a ssembled under General von der Marwf r Ath and r r r rs n nea , we e unde the o de of the Seco

Ar r s r r rs An n my Commande . Thu , eg ettably , the Fi t was not to have any large body ofcavalry at its a serious deprivation in view of the need f operations during the wheeling movement Ar my . Ar r r 21st ss d r The my O de of the , i ue f om

a a The autho r antedates the as sembly there by d y . ‘ only acavalry brigad e at Binche . X BRUSSELS— SOMME 39

m nf r r s air r s s p . . , i o med the co p that econnai sance d Termonde evacuated by the enemy and the dir s was free in the ection Ghent O tende , as A r —Ath— r area udena de Tou nai . South of the enemv forces were advancing in a northerly

and Maubeuge , and the Second to advance on the 22nd August with its right

r r s . VII . Co ps , moving f om Nivelle to Binche Cavalry Corps was to march with its 2nd

erb rak el - r , half way between G ammont A r it s 4th s its udena de , Divi ion by Enghien , and ° s Divi ion by Soignies . he First Army was also to wheel to th e” left in support advanced guards of its Corps ” A . “

‘ i i r s r s H ea ugrters at D lb eck . p dq ; IV Co p ,

Corp s Headquarters at Enghien ; III . r r — s Tho icou t Chaus ée Notre Dame Louvignies , a r s r rs at o . He dqua te Rebecq Rogn n ; IX Co p ,

— r s r r at r née Mignault , Co p Headqua te s B aine is Ar r rs er at a Comte . my Headqua te w e to be Louv in

w e h r r s s till midday , h n t ey would move th ough B u sel The Ar r r r to Hal . my Commande would then be nea e the front of the Army and in close touch with the Corps

a r rs He dqua te .

111 s r r s was s The . Re e ve Co p to end a detachment of all arms early in the morning to th e neighbourhood

Six es s h a s r of Campenhout , mil out of M line , to p otect m s r s the a munition and supply column of the II . Co p , hi 22n The w ch were to follow their corps on th e d. 111 R s r r s w s mi . e e ve Co p a to advance at dday and occupy a position astride the reach of the Dyle Canal between u s r r to r Lo vain and Maline , in o de gua d the flank of Ar a s A r r s rt r the my gain t ntwe p , Co p Headqua e s at 40 BRUSSELS— SOMME

d r r was Thil onck . The IV . Rese ve Co ps to r s s B us el . — The order also directed long distance reco nnai s r r s r to be made by the III . Re e ve Co p th ough w r s A to Op yck , by the II . Co p to the line lost r — s be ge Lessine , and by the IV . , III . , and IX . Ath— s— r s r the line Mon Giv y , six mile no th of the Mau r was beuge fo ts . Communication to be maintained with the Cavalry Corps on the whole front of thi s wide r ss r econnai ance zone . To the devoted and unti ing s r s a activity of the flying ection of the II . Co p was llotted — — the area Audenarde Courtrai Lille ; to that of the r r r — — III . Co ps , the a ea Tou nai Lille Douai ; and to that r s r s— of the IX . Co p , the a ea Valencienne Maubeuge

s r s r Sole mes . Repo t we e to be sent in immediately o r r r to Louvain Hal . The fo mation and di ection of march of the Army were such that it coul d be employed ’ r r s S acco din g to its commande own V iew of the ituation . The Second Army intended to reach the line Binche

ur Mellet d ing the day . The presence of British troops in front of the Second Army was established in the course of the 22nd August : s a r r was r r s r a qu d on of caval y epo ted at Ca teau , no th * and r s r hi east of Mons , a B iti h ae oplane , w ch had r r ss i was come f om Maubeuge on a econnai ance fl ght , s s— was hot down . The Mon Condé Canal found to be s sur occupied between Mon and Ville Haine , though , r r s as far as on the othe hand , the count y we t of it the s r w r s Schelde , as al o Lille and the ail ays leading westwa d ,

r r r r r s we e epo ted f ee of the enemy . The p e ence of British troops in front of the First Army was also r r r s ce tain , though it was not ce tain whethe the mas

This agrees with British acco u nts that co ntact first to o k place

at Casteau. BRUSSELS— SOMME 41

r M b the British Army had yet arrived nea au euge .

" seemed to the First Army Commander all the more outflanking the British left wing Army well away to westward as

ui r r When , on inq ing of the Sup eme Command , it was understood that the First Army woul d remain for the time being under the orders of the Second Army r r ff f r Commande , a Gene al Sta O fice was sent to the latter to represent the arguments against adopting the march direction ordered for the left wing of the First Ar Ar r as my . The Second my Commande gave his for ordering the close co - operation of the First cond Armi es that the latter had all its leading lr a r a eady in action on the S mb e , with heavy laces : als o that the Third Army mi ght find ifficult s n r ss ituation whe c o ing the Meuse . then suggested that the left wing of the First a s r s might adv nce by Mon towa d Bavai , but in r s rs On the othe hand , the idea of u ing the Fi t Army to invest the north -east front of Maubeuge was s r abandoned , and in tead it was di ected to send a division to take up a position at Givry to s r r s as Ar was uppo t the VII . Co p , the Second my to attack on the 23rd with its right wing moving from

r s r Binche towa d Sol e .

General von der Marwitz assembled hi s three cavalry di s s r —Ath— r vi ion in the a ea Renaix Leuze , tu ning with the mass of his corps from a southerly to a north e t r r w s e ly di ection . The proposal of the First Army Commander to keep his Army out on the western flank away from the Second Arm was s r se s the y , thu efu d , and thi at a time when 42 BRUSSELS— SOMME fateful crisis on the western wing of the German armies was r rs r app oaching . Had the Fi t Army been f ee and r ul r unt ammelled , it wo d p obably have been in a position to o utflank and crush the British Army by coming in s fr s s again t it om the we t , and , inve ting Maubeuge , r r Ar to fo ce it back on to the F ench Fifth my , and r r take them both in ea . The increasing length of the co mmunicati manded a careful organization in rear On the 22nd August the Supreme Command 20 battalions and 4 s quadrons ‘ of Landsturmtr

s s s r its di po al , and on the ame day they we e over to the Commander of the Lines of to be us ed between Ai x - la - Chapelle and the All the Landwehr troops thus freed from commun

r r s r r r wo k we e to be ent to einfo ce the III . Rese ve to increa se the force covering the rear of the ’ and on the 24th the 27th Landwehr Brigade

r s - s s for s to Waen ode , outh we t of Die t , the ame The detachments left behind by the fighting guard the communications were to be relieved a

as s r r r r . po sible , and sent fo wa d to ejoin thei units

ss s r s -r s s a i t the wo k of upply , a light ailway y tem to the corps was successfully opened fo r traffi c on

22nd A s — for r i ugu t that the II . Co ps to N nove

fo r. r s rs Castr Vollezeel ; the IV . Co p at fi t to hi for r s Eng en ; and the III . Co p to Hal . The was ordered to restart navigation on the - as Hal Tubize Canal rapidly as practicable . Intendant w as responsible for keeping the store in Bruss els well suppli ed and maintaining

Ar r rs rr s When my Headqua te a ived at Hal , in t r for fo r we e issued masking Maubeuge , and

44 BRUSSELS— SOMME

22nd/23rd both these cavalry detachments sent recon no itrin dr s r s s g squa on towa d Soignie . Nothing was ’ definitely known of General Joffre s plan of campaign . It was believed that one or two German corps with r r s r s r a caval y division we e oppo ed to the B iti h fo ce , and this seemed to be confirmed by the reports of air r nn ss s r s r eco ai ance and pat ol . On the afte noon of the 23rd General French received information that the Germans were attacking the Mons line the right fr r r wing om Mons to B ay was especially th eatened , ’ s o r H ai s r its that Gene al g I . Co ps had to bend back * r s Br 5th r ight flank to the outh of ay , and the Caval y

r r r r B c B igade had to withd aw southwa ds f om in he , hi r w ch was immediately occupied by the Ge mans . ’ At Mons itself the right wing Of General Hamil ton s 3rd s 23rd Division was in po ition on the . It was

hr outflank ed r r t eatened with being , and Gene al F ench therefore ordered it to retire southwards before dark

m. r s At 5 . . wa r if the II Co ps se iously menaced . p General Joffre sent the unexpected information that at least three German corps were advancing against r r s r was r n the f ont of the B iti h fo ce , and one th eateni g to o utflank it from Tournai ; and that the French Fifth Army and the two French Reserve Divisions were

r r r as r al eady in et eat , the Ge mans had obtained pos session o fthe Sambre crossings between Charleroi and

r 22nd A r r r r Namu on the . cco ding to his epo t , Gene al French had already in view another position farther r r its r r n in ea , ight esti g on Maubeuge and its left on

r s enl ain - Cu gies , we t of J , on the Maubeuge Valenciennes

V ’ o n Kluck s mi stake as to the p ositio n o fthe right o f the

. Co r s has een no tice in the re io s oo tno te No t ein I p b d p v u f . b g here b e ima ine it to b e it did not ha e to en ac as he w g d , v b d b k

s tates . BRUSSELS— SOMME r r the r r r a r oad . On hea ing of F ench et e t , and ealizing r r r r s Ar to the Ge man menace , he o de ed the B iti h my r s s ar n 24th ma ch back to thi new po ition e ly o the . The foundation for the important battle of Mons ' ’ was b the Ar r r for 23rdAu ust ss laid y my O de the g , i ued 22nd s s s r m . f om Hal at p . . on the It eem be t to give it in full fo r the benefit of future historians : 1 A s r r s ar was r . quad on of B iti h cav l y encounte ed

- s r h - s s r to day at Ca teau , no t ea t of Mon , and a B itish aeroplane coming from Maubeuge was ’ sh ot down near hi r Ar r r Eng en . In f ont of the Second my the e appea ‘ to -day to be only three cavalry divisions and a weak >I< r infantr fo ce of y . 2 Ar has - . The Second my advanced to day to the

— r - s a and line Binche Mettet , no th we t of Din nt , to rr is r ss r r as its mo ow it to p e fo wa d e t of Maubeuge , r r s r r ight wing , the VII . Co p , moving f om Binche th ough

r Sol e . 3 rs Ar . The Fi t my will continue its advance to mrr r - s r a s o ow to the a e no th we t of Maubeuge , ma king r r ss that fo t e . 4 r s r a r . The II . Co p will e ch La Hamaide , ma ching r r ra r s f om Ninove th ough G mmont ; the IV . Co p will march to Basecles and Stambruges by Ath and Chi evres ; r s w r s s the III . Co p ill each St . Ghi lain and Jemappe by Lens and Jurb 1se The rising ground on the s outhern s a is e r s ide of the can l to be occupi d . The IX . Co p will

r o fthe Ar r s cove the movement my towa d Maubeuge , and for this purpose will advance across the line Mons Thieu towards the north and north -western front of

As we know fromnarr atives ofGerman o fficers who took part in the action the resence o fthe ritish on the Mo ns Cana came as , p B l acom ete s r rise The German ca ar had re o rte th e co ntr pl u p . v l y p d u y ’ ’ clear for fifty miles (t ide Captain Bl o ems Vormarsch 46 BRUSSELS— SOMME

n r its r Maubeuge , keepi g its main fo ce on ight flank . — The line Ath Roeulx will be crossed by the leading r I r a V . . m t oops of the III , and IX Co ps by . . ! The lines of demarcation for the corps were then s s r s r given . ] Reconnai sance by co p caval y will be rr r s A — r ca ied out by the II . Co p to the line lost Audena de — Renaix Leuze ; by the IV Corps to the line Fort Maulde r s—V s r Fo t Fline alencienne ; and by the III . Co ps to the r r — Air r s line Fo t Cu gies Bavai . econnaissance will be r s r r ass r made by co p in thei own econn i ance a ea , the r s r s r for i III . Co p a ea belonging al o to the IV . Co ps th s r s Ar Ai r r r pu po e . The my Detachment will epo t on the r — r —Le —A s s— s a ea Douai Camb ai Cateau ve ne Valencienne . r s r rs s r r r s am Co p Headqua te will end in thei epo t by . . 5 s r r s r . The IV . Re e ve Co p , ma ching by Hal , will r r s its r s r each Bie ghe with advanced gua d ; the III . Re e ve Corp s will guard the right flank of the Ar my and its s rr A r communications again t the ga ison of ntwe p . It will take up its position so that it can at the same time guard Brussels against possible raids orders will be issued for the distribution of the

r s r rr s t oop . On thei a ival , the two battalion Reserve Corps now garrisoning Brussels will b i 6 r fur r . Du ing the the against the Forts of Maul de and r s s s ur fall to the IV . Co p , and tho e again t C gies to ‘ r s o ss s s s III : Co p . Rec nnai ance of the e place will - rr ss begun to mo ow if po ible . 7 An air r s r s . econnai sance by the II . Co p r r -fires r epo ted bivouac , p obably Belgian , about r r r r G ootenbe ge . The II . Co ps and IV . Rese ve will clear up this matter and protect their march a

8 Ar r . my Headqua ters will be

BRUSSELS— SOMME 47 whi ch the Army Cable Detachment will have established a 11 am r s communic tion by . . The IX . Co p will leave b ehind one battalion and two machine guns at Soignies ” am rds fr r Ar r rs 8 . o . from . onwa gua ding my Headqua te r s 22nd A s a r r Du ing thi advance on the ugu t , epo t reached Ar my Headquarters that a detrainment of had been in progress at Tournai since the previous It therefore seemed not unlikely that strong * r s r s r ar hr fo ce we e being ent fo w d t ough Lille . The advanced guards of the corp s were thereupo n

— - halted on the road Leuze Mons Binche to enable preparations to be made for the Army to wheel west s h s r . r r rr the wa d T u , had the conjectu e p oved co ect ,

r s was in a s h r IV . Co p po ition to w eel at once f om about r s r r s Leuze towa d Tou nai , the ight divi ion of the III . r s c r h La Co p ould have moved by the afte noon y Hamaide , r s th e r s followed late by the leading divi ion of II . Co p ,

24th r ar s r s and on the the e divi ion of the II . Co p and the s r s left divi ion of the III . Co p would have been up in r the r line , followed du ing evening by the leading t oops s r r s of the IV Re e ve Co p . It would have been the duty r s a th a a of the IX . Co p to w tch e c n l position between hi s a . nd s e St G lain Mon , to k ep touch with the Second

Arm r r y , and to gua d the left flank and ear of the First Ar ss s s my ; to a i t it in doing thi , it would have been

s r as s r a r s uppo ted by t ong a det chment of the III . Co p as s a the itu tion might demand .

ar r r the In the e lie cou se of campaign , the mobility of the different Army Corps had reached such a pitch as fully to warrant the confidence m it di splayed by the hi r . r r s ghe command Eventually , howeve , the p e ence

Th e troo s in estion ere ofco rse French— w p qu w , u , t o battali ons ofthe l 76 th er it ’ T r o rial Infantry Regiment (viak Mairesse s Tournai at LaRetrait e de Mons 48 BRUSSELS— SOMME

of onl y one French infantry brigade was r r was r r l Tou nai , and that it eti ing on Li le . The r r the efo e continued its advance . ’ On this day Marwitz s Cavalry Divisions watered th r s ho ses in the Schelde , we t of Renaix . Oats lay s stooks in abundance in the field . The obstinate fighting for the crossings of the

23rd A us b o Condé Canal on the ug t , in which r s was r as suffe ed heavy lo ses , the p elude , ’ r r rt r rr d F ench epo s , to a fou days uninte upte The B ritish Expeditionary Force fought exo while British pris on ers extolled the Germans s B like devil . y the evening the IV to immediately north of the line H r s r r s s t ing a p ai ewo thy g a p of the itua ion , they pushed on beyond the appointed end of the d march and crossed the canal between Condé s s 111 r s its s Ghi lain . The . Co p fought with s r r ll divi ion about Te t e ti well into the night ,

its left . division was able to cross the canal Quaregnon- Jemappes and press forward to r s r 0 The IX . Co p had occupied the southe n edge r r r s and taken St . Sympho ien . St ong fo ces

in action on both sides all along the line . The Sec Ar r r W i r my eached Binche with its ight ng , d iving it L enemy out of . i In their appreciation of the situation on the 23rdA s Ar r r of the ugu t , my Headqua te s at Hal co that the following points demanded anxious attenti ’ Exploitation of to -day s successes by continuin exert a uni forml y strong pressure with the IV r and IX . Co ps .

I w S N 1 . 9 t as tated a e ee ote 7 . s o , p T b v

that it was already o ccupied by the Germans .

50 BRUSSELS— SOMME

r r s r 2 a r The IV . Rese ve Co ps will ta t at .m. and ma ch r th s At 6 a s r r A . . m fi st by to Ligne . it will end fou mo e s r ss s r r rr s battalion to B u el to einfo ce the ga i on . The

r r r ss s r - G r Jarotski Gove no of B u el , Majo ene al von , will r r rs ra Beseler r be unde the o de of Gene l von (III . Rese ve r s s r r s s r s Co p ) . The IX . Re e ve Co p will ho tly be ent r s A r up th ough Liege again t ntwe p . General von der Marwitz has been ordered to advance

r r r s r r on the ight flank of the A my towa d Denain , in o de b ar r s r r s to the B iti h line of et eat to the we t . Constant communication between corp s commanders and Army Headquarters at Soignies is ab solutely neces r r rs s sa y , and the co ps commande mu t keep in constant wi r s s ul touch th thei telephone tations , ho d r— rs or r s them , by moto ca othe mean . The s r r s s and IV . Re e ve Co p will send to Soignie 10am r at . . , and should the e be no tel nication r s the IV . , III . , and IX . Co p will send representatives to Army Headquarters between 7 am” 8 . and . In Spite of the usual constant un certainty as to ’ war the Ar m enemy s situation in , in my Com and opini on there were two salient ideas by which operations for the following days should be The forcing of the British towards Maubeuge a

s r of it by mean of the IV . , III . , and IX . Co p

, has r s been al eady poken of) , i s r r th , the apid advance of the ight wing IV s r r s con unc the II . and . Re e ve Co p , in j r r r Caval y Co ps . The manne in which the Army was able to escape the destruction thus fr r o it will sho tly be seen . - r s r The above mentioned t an po t of the IX . Corps by Aix -la -Chapelle towards Antwe BRUSSELS— SOMME simplified the work of guarding the communications ; rr s r r s r until it a ived the IV . Re e ve Co p had unfo tunately to go short of a complete infantry brigade used fo r this r se pu po . u r r s In view of the nce tainty of the gene al ituation , the Army Commander was anxiously wishing that ’ Marwit z s r r s s e Caval y Co p hould advance on D nain . On this day it had reached the Schelde about Berghem s and r r r r r and Potte , had the e eceived an o de f om the Second Ar my Commander to continue its advance on Courtrai— an operation whi ch might well have been entrusted to a regiment of cavalry with s ome guns

s At the r s rs Ar and machine gun . eque t of the Fi t my r r ra Commande , the Sup eme Command placed Gene l

der r s s the rs Ar von Ma witz at the di po al of Fi t my . Al though most valuable time had been thrown away and the fighting strength of the men and horses wa sted by the protracted movement of hi s corps away to the r - s l r ss r r no th we t , it cou d , neve thele , hencefo th confo m to the movements of the right wing of the First Army and should be able by an exceptional effort to reach the r r 24th a ea no th of Denain by the . The Second Army intended to continue l ts attack on 24th its r i r r s the , ight w ng moving f om Binche on Me be 11 At am mi h the 24th . . . ( dnig t) on the order was received from the Second Army ss 8 m and m i ued between p . . p . . 23rd: r s a e on the The IX . Co p will dvanc immediately ’ west of Maubeuge to o utflank the enemy s left wing ; r s d r the III . Co p will move in echelon behin the IX . Co ps ” r s s and confo m to its movement . In addition to thi , an r r s r r s r s o de was ent di ect to the IX . Co p that the co p was r r to be ala med and advance at once . In eply to s was s IX this , a me sage ent back that both the . and 52 BRUSSELS— SOMME

r s r r s III . Co p we e al eady in a battle po ition facing the

r r r - V r —St s enemy , the fo me on the f ontMons ille s . Ghi lain , and that the advance ordered was therefore impractic

able . 24th A s r s On the ugu t , afte ome heavy fighting , the in r s r s r h lead g t oop of the IV III . , and IX . Co p eac ed nain — s— r— nl — r a line O g Elouge Dou Ge y Ha veng . The Br r s r r d s itish fo ce , e timated at f om two to th ee ivision , * r r r s— was d iven back towa ds a line Cu gie Bavai . The r r r r II . Co ps took Condé afte a sho t encounte with h rr r r r s ul Frenc te ito ial t oops . The Fo t Ma de and s r r r Fline , both being without a tille y , we e occupied as was r Cur s without a fight , also the undefended Fo t gie IV r r s r on the following day . The . Rese ve Co p eached - s Ath r s r — o r Ligne , south we t of . The main B iti h fo ce , r r r fi acco ding to a copy of o de s found on the eld , the — whole Expedi tionary Force was believed to be between A Valenciennes and Maubeuge . weak detachment of troop s from the Lille garrison was reported on the line — u — r r der r Menin Ro baix Tou nai . Gene al von Ma witz s r r f r r r r had di pe sed a F ench in ant y b igade nea Tou nai . According to a Second Army wireless message taken up rs Ar r r ni s Ar by Fi t my Headqua te s at Soig e , the my r had decisively beaten the enemy in f ont of it , and was r s continuing its victo iou advance . After the severe opposition offered by the British Ar my ’ t e - St hi s fur r in h two days battle of Mons . G lain , a the and even stronger defence was to be expected on the s— — line Valencienne Bavai Maubeuge . ’ r In the meantime , f om the enemy s point of view s as ll r Sir the ituation had developed fo ows , acco ding to ’ r At 24th A John F ench s despatch . dawn on the ugust ,

Why drive themback if it were intended to envelop them! The retire ofco rse or er y d, u , by d . BRUSSELS— SOMME 53

2nd r s s s r di s the B iti h Divi ion , uppo ted by all the vi ional

r r . r s r r a tille y of the I Co p , began a demonst ation f om r rd h s 1st s Ha mignies towa s Binc e , whil t the Divi ion at s - s r r m Peis ant , south we t of Binche , p epa ed to ake an advance : these movements were against the front of th e

r . r . r s Ge man IX . and VII Co ps Unde the suppo ed r es s r s r s r s p otection of th e demon t ation the B iti h II . Co p — r r ra r s r— r r h eti ed to a line F me ie Dou Qua ouble , its ig t di s 3rd s ffr s r vi ion , the , u e ing heavy lo s in the ope ation . r s r s r r The B iti h II . Co p then held the pa tially ent enched s r s r r r po ition on that line , whilst the I . Co p eti ed du ing ’ r line Maub eu e— a the mo ning to the g Bavai . By midd y General French arrived at the conclusion that the Germans were directing their main attack against the r s r 5th s was B iti h left wing , whe e the Divi ion being ’ r ss r r Al lenb s r heavily p e ed , and whe e Gene al y Caval y vi s s r r a s s Di ion , uppo ting it , had had ve y he vy ca ualtie during an attack of the 9th Lancers and 18th Hussars s r a r The 19 a r r again t Ge man inf nt y . th Inf nt y B igade , whi ch hadbeen previously guarding the communications * and had been sent by rail to Valenciennes on the 22nd 23rd A s r the /ugu t , cove ed the left flank of r s r s r r r B iti h II . Co ps outh of Qua ouble , f om the mo ning 24th r s A r s of the onwa d . lthough g eatly exhau ted the corps effectively carried out its retreat with the assist a r s s r nce of the Caval y Divi ion , and by du k had eached a s s po ition we t of Bavai . Thus the British Army was again ready to meet the r rs Ar s its 1 r s Ge man Fi t my in a econd battle , with . Co p and r s Br between Maubeuge Bavai , its II . Co p about y — and Jenlain left flank supported by the 19th Infantry — Brigade and its Cavalry Division astride the Rhonelle s rea t m .

T ence e mar e o Con é h th y ch d t d . 54 BRUSSELSL - SOMME

Sir John French writes as follows in his despatch on 25th : the events of the next day , the r r s ll r r The F ench we e ti eti ing , and I had no support except such as was afforded by the Fortress of Mau beuge ; and the determined attempts of the enemy to get round my left flank a ssured me that it was his intention to hem me against that place and surround

s s r r me . I felt that not a moment mu t be lo t in eti ing r s to anothe po ition . ’ I had every reason to believe that the enemy s r s r a s fo ce we e somewhat exh u ted , and I knew that they s r ss s r r i . h s had uffe ed heavy lo e I hoped , the efo e , that pursui t would not be too vigorous to prevent me effecting my object .

r r was ul r The ope ation , howeve , f l of dange and di f r r r r ficulty , not only owing to the ve y supe io fo ce in r s a s i r s my f ont , but al o to the exh u t on of the t oop . The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to a position in the neighbourhood

a r r r s r r r r of Le Cate u , and ea gua d we e o de ed to be clea — — am of the Maubeuge Bavai Eth Road by . . Tw o r r s r caval y b igades , with the Divi ional Caval y r s r r s of the II . Co p , cove ed the movement of the II . Co p . The remainder of the Cavalry Division with the 19th r r r B igade , the whole unde the command of Gene al

A r s . llenby , cove edthe we t flank The 4th Division commenced its detrainment at 23rd r Le Cateau on Sunday , the , and by the mo ning of the 25th eleven battalions and a brigade of artillery

s ff r a fo r s r with Divi ional Sta we e av ilable e vice . I ordered General Snow to move out to take up a s hi s r s s s his r s po ition with ight outh of Sole me , left e ting r — r ie on the Camb ai Le Cateau oad south of La Chapr . In this position the division rendered great help to the BRUSSELS— SOMME 55

r C r s effective reti ement of the II . and I . o p to the new

s po ition . Although the troops had been ordered to occupy r —Le — r s the Camb ai Cateau Land ecie position , and the

r r the 25th r r r g ound had , du ing , been pa tially p epa ed ‘ r r — and ent enched , I had g ave doubts owing to the information I received as to the accumulating strength — of the enemy against me as to the wisdom of standing

r the e to fight . Having regard to the continued retirement of the

r h r s F enc on my ight , my expo ed left flank , the tendency ’ s r C r s th e . of enemy s we te n o p (II ) to envelop me , and ,

re s r s mo than all , the exhau ted condition of the t oop , I determi ned to make a great effort to continue the r r s s s a s s et eat till I could put ome ub tanti l ob tacle , uch as o r the s r s the Somme Oi e , between my t oop and the a r the r r r r s enemy , and ffo d fo me some oppo tunity of e t

r r r rs r r r s and eo ganization . O de we e , the efo e , ent to the Corps Commanders to continue their retreat as soon as they possibly coul d towards the general line Vermand

—St - . Quentin Ribemont . The a r r r Al r r r c val y , unde Gene al lenby , we e o de ed

er r r to cov the eti ement . r 25th far Th oughout the , and into the evening , the r s it s r dr I . Co p continued ma ch on Lan ecies , following the road along the eastern border of the For et de ’ r a rr r s 10 Mo m l , and a ived at Land ecie about o clock . I had intended that the corp s should come farther west so as e a r s to fill up the gap b tween Le C teau and Land ecie , but the men were exhauste d and could not get further r s in without e t . r a h The enemy , howeve , would not llow them t is r s and u m r r was r ha e t , abo t p . . a epo t eceived t t the 4th Guards Brigade in Landrecies was heavily attacked 56 BRUSSELS— SOMME by troops of the 9th German Army Corps who were comi r r r o ng th ough the fo est on the no th of the t wn . hi r o o T s b igade f ught m st gallantly , and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in issuing fr om the

r rr r s s s fo est into the na ow st eets of the town . Thi lo has been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to At the same time information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his 1st Division was also s r heavily engaged outh and east of Ma oilles . I sent urgent messages to the commander of the two French Reserve Divisions on my right to come up to the assist r l . r ance of the I Co ps , which they eventual y did . Pa tly ss s l ul owing to this a i tance , but mainly to the ski f manner in whi ch Sir Douglas Haig extricated his corps from an exceptionally difficult position in the darkness r r s r of the night , they we e able at dawn to e ume thei r r ss -on- s ma ch south towa ds Wa igny Gui e . m r s 6 . . By about p the II . Co p had got into position r r r f r with thei ight on Le Cateau , thei le t in the neighbou of r hood Caud y , and the line of defence was continued 4th r r r thence by the Division towa ds Se anville s , the left ” r being th own back . These were normal measures demanded by the r r ci cumstances , but the chief facto that enabled the British Army to escape was that the German First Army lacked the effective means of making it stand and

‘ fi ht— r s s i g namely , the th ee divi ion wh ch composed ’ rwitz s r r s Ma Caval y Co p . The change of command havin g taken place when it was on the march Ath

- ur r s r s r Schelde Co t ai , thi co p did not come unde the direct orders of the First Army till the eveni ng of the 24th r rs Ar , and even though the ight flank of the Fi t my s s for r wa con tantly being kept back the pu pose , the Cavalry Corps was unable to accomplish its task of

BRUSSELS— SOMME

first taking the British Ar my in flank and then getting hi be nd it . m r s fr ni s . The Army Orde i sued om Soig e at p . on the 24th hadto count on the British Army accepting — — s battle on theline Maubeuge Bavai Valencienne . The was on hi s ss r based t a umption , and afte giving di r r r rr ran as s : ections al eady efe ed to , follow

4 r . The IV . Co ps will attack between the Canal de and Rhonell e r s t r s the st eam , ilencing the bat e ie r s r co - r Cu gie ; the III . Co ps , ope ating with it , ~ wing by La Bouv erie Blaugi es Both these corps will be across nain — r —A s am r s An 5 . a line O g g e thi by . . The IX Co p r r will cove the attack on Maubeuge , and pa t of the left

n o fo the r s r its wi g III . Co p , acco ding to the extent of

- cc r . advance , will ope ate in the attack on Bavai The r s - r s II . Co p will advance to morrow through the Fo e t of s s sufli cientl a s Rai me , and will get y south of V lencienne ’ s s to enable it to attack the flank of the enemy po ition . r ss — s s r a at 6 am It will c o the Somain Rai me ailw y . . 5 s h s s . r r s marc The IV . Re e ve Co p will by Ba ecle and Blaton to -morr ow and arrive at Condé with its ar 9 am s advanced gu d at . . , when it will be at the di posal Ar r of the my Commande . 6 . r r r The II . Caval y Co ps (Ma witz) will advance south of Denain towards the rear of the British posi and r s r r s r s tion , cut the B iti h line of et eat we twa d . 7 r s . Fo t Maul de and Flines are to be silenced and e er fire r s so r a k pt und by the II . Co p , that the late dvance the - s r s of IV . Re e ve Corp will not be interfered with

8 Ar . my Headquarters wi ll move from Soignies a s 10 am 25th A to bout ea t of Condé at . . on the . BRUSSELS— SOMME

s r r r company of the IV . Re e ve Co ps will eport there for 11 am r duty at . . Repo ts will be sent by telephone to 10 am At 11 a r r . . m Soignies up to . . ep esentatives r s s r r cal of all the co p , except the III . Re e ve Co ps , will for r r s o de s at Thivencelle , ea t of Condé . Si ned V ON LU C ( g ) K K .

outflank in r Ar o r The g of the left of the B itish my , s r s r d the a sumption that it emained in po ition , appea e ’ to be guaranteed by the combined efforts of Marwit z e ’ r r Linsin en s r caval y mass and Gene al von g II . Co ps The r s r G r r . A IV Co p , unde ene al Sixt von min , the III r r r r r . Co ps , unde Gene al von Lochow , and pa t of Gene a ’ s r r r ss r r a ainsi von Quast IX . Co ps , we e to p e fo wa d g r s r s r r r s the B iti h f ont , whil t the emainde of the IX . Co p u watched Maubeuge , keeping in to ch with the VII r s Ar l Re Co p of the Second my . The who e of the IV . s r r s r r r was r in e ve Co p , unde Gene al von G onau , eady

rs s r r b e the cou e of the day , and mo t of it even ea lie , to l e s s o r s emp oy d to we t , outh , ea t , a Ar r th of the my Commande . The mobility of as shown by its wonderful marching feats was improved by the excellent measures adopted r rs co ps commande . At 2 am 25th r air . . on the an impo tant arrived : enemy columns of all arms were in re

' the r s — r oad Bellignies Bavai , La Flameng ie

i s- r Gommegn e Bavai . The di ection in which the ment was being made beyond Bavai had not yet been r r ss Ar r n dete mined ; neve thele , the my Commande bega to suspect that the British were withdra At a he r was or . m t A Maubeuge . . my r s r r advance in a mo e outhe ly di ection , the II . s the line Le Cateau and we t of it , the IV . BRUSSELS— SOMME 59

th r s r r s e . Pomme euil and Land ecie , and III Co p to

r s and r Th e s - was s Ma oille Be laimont . la t named al o r s - r to cove the west and outh west f ont of Maubeuge ,

- s r s s r s r . whil t the IX . Co p inve ted the no th we t f ont In rs the r r h a recia the cou e of mo ning , howeve , t at pp s r r ar tion of the ituation p oved to be w ong , and it appe ed that the enemy was withdrawing strong forces through r s and s r s Bavai towa d Le Cateau , malle detachment s s s — s r r through Sole me in a outh we te ly di ection . To r him s s r r b ing to a tand till , in addition to the o de ’ r r s a r r s b ar al eady mentioned to Ma witz C val y Co p , to ’ the r r s s et eat of the enemy column , the following r r rs r ss r e as ope ation o de we e i ued f om Thivencell , e t of m Condé , at p .

r s i s the s— s The IV . Co p given Valencienne Solesme Le Cateau road in addition to those already allotted to the r s a s s r as it ; II . Co p will dvance we t of thi oad and far s as ss r s is r outh po ible ; the III . Co p elieved of the watchl n n wi its duty of g Maubeuge , and , movi g th

r its r r ss main fo ce on ight wing , will ma ch if po ible to

e n r s th e r s a r b yo d Ma oille ; IX . Co p will t ke ove the covering of these movements from both the north s and s - s r s a and for we t outh we t f ont of M ubeuge , s r s wi its r r thi pu po e ll extend ight flank , confo ming

r s r to the advance of the III . Co p , up to the Samb e

A r r s r ss about ulnoye . It will make p epa ation to c o the

a r so as its a r S mb e , to be able to continue advance l te in a southerly direction outside the range of the r r ss ar r fo t e tille y . ’ During the day Marwitz s Cavalry Corps drove back the French territorial troops at Bouchain and Denain andforced the British columns which were retiring in a r - s r r r s s r no th we te ly di ection f om Sole me on Camb ai , to r o ffs r s r s was a tu n outhwa d . The IV . Co p able to ttack 60 BRUSSELS— SOMME

Br s r s the iti h t oops at Sole mes , but they did not e i r r the v llage till afte nightfall , afte putting r s obstinate esistance . The Second Army thi reached the district between north -east ofAvesnes Chima v .

Ar r r as has my Headqua te s at Thivencelle , a d r r been mentione , was gua ded by an infant y m r fr pany . This co pany was fi ed at o hedgerows in the immediate neighbourhood of r r r r s Headqua te s . The culp its we e at once hot , an n s r At 6 m houses and belongi g bu nt . p . . the Commander drove fromhis headquarters at ss r - s r to Condé , pa ing ove the half de t oyed b r r r fo t ess , and then th ough Valenciennes r l r Vende f iend y) , Que enaing and g the flames comi ng unplea santly near up as they were with petrol) ; thence to immediately behind the fr ont of the 8 r r r was s IV . Co ps , whe e the e till fight in - r ss tak g place in the semi da kne . that Solesmes would be a suitable place for Army Head quarters as soon as it had been occupied by our tr After the lights of the long column of motors had rs h f r put out , and the ca wit di ficulty tu ned , the ' found b illets and straw to sleep on late in th ss r of s at Hau y , two miles no th Sole mes . comfortable bed which coul d be found was a Ar r r s r the my Commande . The F ench peasant we e

t rr r ss r r . e ified , but became somewhat ea u ed late Army Headquarters were thus up at the front in r Ar very cent e of the my . By the evening of 25th

62 BRUSSELS— SOMME between Cambrai and Le Cateau on the front - Reumont formed the crisis of the s everal da rsui r has in pu t of the B itish , which been termed the Battle of Early in ’ Marwitz s Cavalry Corp s attacked — Beauvois Qui evy against the ene s er direction r r we t ly , Tfo cing pa t

r s the adv a southwa d , and holding it till r r s arr s the infant y co p ived on the cene . The “ engaged strong British forces ; on the fr ont Tro isv ille— 9 am Reumont at about . . , and go difficul t position against a well - entrenched s r r was r r r r The IV . Re e ve Co ps the efo e o de ed an o utflanking attack against the northern s s r s r thi po ition , and the III . Co ps a imila attack its s r outhe n flank . “

r r r s r s The fo me co p , howeve , came up again t r r r s r r s t oops nea Cattenie e , fl and the latte co p , r r r r H o nnech to ma ch on Ma etz , did not get fa the than j the 26th so o utflank in o eratiOJ on , that the attempted g p

No e 2 9 ee 7 . S t p . ' T e ri is e e o nin ofthe 26th ant 1 h B t h wer not retreating o n th mr g , ma e o d n movement westwards . man Two i isio ns o o s h the . Ger fthe . C r hi c i d v II p , w III aso atta e l ck d . The entrenchments made by the British were o fthe mo st desic i o a e in t e ri t and ript o n . S me h d b en dug h gh inha itants the ro i e o n the scantiest co er and ; d d l v , b y p v y ‘ cases t o a oi ama e t o cr0 s ere s o site as to b e use , v d d g p , w d an ero s d g u .

I] The British p o sitio n in fact ran east and west . TIAccor ding t o the narrative o f Captain Wirth q there were no French tr00ps o n the l eft Division s o far east as this at the time ofthe se e e en rv Corps . G rman cavalr y driv back by BRUSSELS— SOMME 63

ff . r r s not e ective . By evening the IV Rese ve Co p succeeded in forcing back its opponent in a southerly s Cor s r in r whil t the IV . p T d ove the ight r s s r he B iti h po ition . The II . Co ps beat back ” r h r s amrai strong F enc fo ce at C b . j; A cavalry patrol entered Lille without meeting any s r r r r r oppo ition . St ong enemy fo ces eti ed du ing the 26th in front of the Second Army fromLandrecies and A s s r s s V r i s 27th ve ne towa d Gui e and e v n . On the Ar was rs its r h the Second my to continue the pu uit , ig t r La r s wing ma ching by Leval , nd ecie , and Catillon on

ond Army Commander ordered that Maubeuge invested by two of his own divisions and one the rs Ar rs Ar r r f Fi t my . Fi t my Headqua te s r or r s r howeve , of the opinion that one two e e ve ons woul d be quite sufficient fo r the investment

r r ss hi was rr s f r fo t e , w ch ga i oned only by indi fe ent it therefore passed on the order of the Second r r Commande to the Sup eme Command , and at the same time asked whether the subordination of the First Army to the Seco nd Army Commander was to r r r r emain in fo ce . The eupon the Sup eme Command r s rs Ar elea ed the Fi t my , making it independent of the Ar r h Second my Commande , and decided t at the Second Ar s s w its r my hould inve t Maubeuge ith own t oops alone .

A r r r s r the r s cco ding to the epo t eceived , whole B iti h x r r e s s six r s E peditiona y Fo c , con i ting of infant y division

one r s t o sev eral r and caval y divi ion , in addition F ench

’ e es e IV. R rve Co rps acco unt do es not agree with this ; its got no farther than Wambaix (t ide narrative of Captain 7th Res er e Di isio n Staff in Vo n der Saae z ur Aisne v v , l 64 BRUSSELS— SOMME

rr r r irs Te ito ial divisions , was in f ont of the F t On the 26th August more than prisoners r s 7 t r s B iti h , field bat e ie , and one heavy r r r r Ar ' a tille y we e taken by the Fi st my . 1 If r r 27th held thei g ound on the , the enveloping r ound both flanks by the II . and III . Co r r s r r might b ing about anothe con ide able victo y . Let us now turn to the despatch of Sir J on the operations during these days of the Battl Solesmes : During the fighting on the 24th and 25th r r caval y became a good deal scatte ed , but by mornin g of the 26th General Allenby had succeeded r r s r concent ating two b igade to the south of Camb ai . The 4th Division was placed un der the orders the General Officer Commanding the Second r Co ps . 24th t e r r r On the h F ench Caval y Co ps , co r r r r e of th ee divisions! unde Gene al So d t , had s r A s billet no th of ve nes . On my way bac was Bavai , which my Poste de Commandement 23rd 24th the fighting of the and , I visited r e r r t his cc - r So d t , and ea nestly eques ed ope ation s r r mi r uppo t . He p o sed to obtain sanction f om Ar r fl my Commande to act on my left ank , but said

Act a three ritish in antr i isio ns 3rd 4th and u lly B f y d v ( , , the 19th n antr ri a e the I f y B g d , ’ So rdé t s French Ca ar Co r s o ht at Le C v l y p , f ug r as adl en e caval y w h r y gag d . The ritish ost 38 ns inc in on o ne 60- o n er T B l gu , lud g ly p u d ’ t e ren ost o ns s ee Maor ec e s no t batery . Th F ch l n gu ( j B k Royal Regiment o fArtill ery at Le Cateau Ivo n Kluck ignores the presence ofthe

the east o fhis . Cor s and the French III p ,

e and as o si e Cor s . Bapaum Arr ut d his II . p BRUSSELS —SOMME 6 5 — r re r This horses we e to o ti d to move befo e the next day . Al though he rendered me valuable assistance later on r e r r was for the in the cou s of the eti ement , he unable reasons given to aflord me any support on the most — the 26th cr a . . itic l day of all viz , At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing th e bulk of his strength against the left r s 4th of the position occupied by the II . Co p and the s Divi ion . At this time the uns o ffour German Ar my Corps g . r s Sir r mi we e in po ition against them , and Ho ace S th Dorrien reported to me that he judged it impossibl e to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in s an face of uch attack . I sent himorders to use hi s utmost endeavours to break o ffthe action and retire at the earliest possible as was ss for s him moment , it impo ible me to end any s r r s uppo t , the I . Co p being at the moment incapable of

movement . Q The r lr r s r r Sordé t F ench Cava y Co p , unde Gene al , was our r r r r coming up on left ea ea ly in the mo ning , and I sent an urgent message to him to do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank ; hi s r s but , owing to the fatigue of ho se , he found himself n r u able to inte vene in any way . There had been no time to entrench the position r r r s s a r p ope ly , but the t oop howed a m gnificent f ont rr fir e w r to the te ible hich conf onted them .

r l r s The a ti le y , although outmatched by at lea t r fou to one , made a splendid fight , and inflicted heavy s s r s lo se on thei opponent . At r length it became appa ent that , if complete was r r annihilation to be avoided , a eti ement must be attempted ; and the order was given to commence it about 5 66 BRUSSELS— SOMME

m r p . . The movement was cove ed with the devoted intrepidity and determination by the art s su r which had it elf ffe ed heavily , and the fine done by the cavalry in the further retreat from position a ssisted materially in the final completio s s f r r thi mo t di ficult and dange ous ope ation . Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered r rs heavily to engage in an ene getic pu uit . I cannot clo se the brief account of this glori stand of the British troops without putting my deep appreciation of the valuable service r Sir r m - rr by Gene al Ho ace S ith Do ien . I say without hesitation that the saving of left wing of the Army under my command on morning of the 26th August could never have b accomplished unless a co mmander o frare an ss r er re coolne , int epidity , and det mination had been p r r to pe sonally conduct the ope ation . The retreat was continued far into the night of

— — troops halted on the line Noyon Chauny La ’ rsui then thrown off the weight of the enemy s pu t . On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to General Sordet and the French Cavalry Division whi ch he commands fo r materially assisting my retirement and ss ul r s r succe f ly d iving back ome of the enemy on Camb ai . ’ r d Amade s 6l st 62nd Gene al al o , with the and r s r r F ench Re e ve Divisions , moved down f om the neigh ’ b ourho o d of Arra s on the enemy s right flank and took r ss r ff r r r s r s much p e u e o the ea of the B iti h fo ce . This closes the period covering the heavy which commenced at Mons on Sunday a A us r ug t , and which eally constituted ” battle . the 26th rs Ar r its By the evening of the Fi t my , afte BRUSSELS— SOMME 67

r s r a g with the B iti h and F ench , had g ined ’ ws : r Marw tz s r r o On the ight , i Caval y Co ps the district west of Cambrai ; Vo n Lin ’ s s . r s r ss r r s r ingen II Co p , p e ing fo wa d inces antly th ough ’ r r rmi s— r Gronau s Camb ai , had eached He e Ma coing ; Von s r r rr r r t r ro IV . Re e ve Co ps a ived at C evecoeu af e a p digi ous march from Valenciennes through Cattenieres ; r r the r s r a r fa the to the left , IV Co p eached the line C ud y s— r s r Troisville Reumont ; the III . Co p eached Honnechy it s a r s and r s rr with dvanced t oop , the IX . Co p a ived at

r r ss s a r Ar the Samb e c o ing at L nd ecies . The my had thus made a considerable advance with its right wing s s with con tant fighting ; at the ame time , it had kept h Ar touch wit the Second my . During the day the operation staff of Ar my Head quarters had hurried from Solesmes to the front of the 8th s - e ra r r Divi ion (Lieut . G ne l Hildeb and) in the a ea ui —Viesl h s r Q evy y , in the otte t pa t of the battle in that r ffr r neighbou hood , which o e ed the welcome oppo tunity of watching the local fighting and als o of meeting

ra Ar r e r Gene l Sixt von min and Gene al Hild b and . The Army Commander still hoped to b e able to outflank r s wi s the B iti h on both ng . The Chief of the Staff and ceiv ed a generous but harmless baptism h s r Ar t is vi it to the f ont , and the my 8 r r s shr honou ed by a B iti h apnel , which between himand three members of his Staff h a e s s wit out doing any d mag . It eemed unnece sary s r r to go any clo e to the f ont line .

A r r r s s r r rs for fte etu ning to Sole me , ope ation o de the 7th r r Ar r rs m i we e issued f om my Headqua te at p . . As constant reports were comi ng in that the enemy was r r the r s was r r in et eat , II . Co p o de ed to advance

2 am r r s ar s r at . . f om He mie tow d Manancou t and from 68 BRUSSELS— SOMME

Mar o n o r r r rs con c i g t wa ds Guyencou t , no th of Ville Fau , or r re in de to continue the attack on the enemy , p sumab l r r r r IV y et eating , whe eve he was met . The . Reserve Corps (Von Gronau) was to advance in the gap r s r between the II . and the IV . Co p . The IV . Co ps (Sixt von Armin) was allotted as zone of manoeuvre the — — — areas Caudry Ligny Walincourt Vendhuille and Reu t- r — r r mon Se ain Bellicou t . The III . Co ps (Von Lochow) r r was to move to south of the IV . Co ps beyond Ma etz , r r A which it had been unable to each the day befo e . — — line roughly E snes Caudry Reumont was to be passed * 5 am r at . . The leading division of the IX . Co ps (Von r r was rr Quast) , ma ching by Land ecies , to a ive with the h r r r 10 am r eavy co ps a tille y at Le Cateau at . . , whe e it woul d be at the disposal of the Army Commander ; its other division was to be left opposite the ’ Marwitz s r r of Maubeuge . Caval y Co ps was to r t r s r in f on of the II . Co p and hinde the ’ retreat r r r le . r The e we e thus on the ight and of the First Army two almost equally strong r r g oups in touch with one anothe , which would s r r r ui Ar the neces a y vigou into the pu s t . my H r rs r in s s qua te ema ed in Sole me . The retreat of the enemy in a westerly direction of the Somme appeared to have been the timely pressure of the right wi ng t r r s mr hi When the lat e c os ed the Som e , p obably wit n

Thi s s eems a air ate start for the urs it as the action was f ly l p u , en o at m As ir ohn Fr ench rote in hi s rst de8 atch : bro k ff 3 p. . S J w fi p The enemy had himself suffer ed to o heavi ly to engag e in an ” eti rs i energ c pu u t. TThis mi sdirecti on ofthe cavalry kept it away from ’ It was oppo sed by General Sordé t s Caval ry Corp s with

success .

INo retreat westwards was ever contemplated .

ti see t o t e was ase o n Caais . s ll ms think tha th R E F. b d l

— 70 BRUSSELSm SOMME

25th Liege , on the . In conjunction with the III serve Corps and some Landwehr troop s which s r was r the expected ho tly , it to take ove serving the An twerp garrison : this combined investing

r was r r Beseler fo ce unde the command of Gene al von . It was hoped that the Supreme Command would now

rr r r r s r r s hu y fo wa d the b igade of the IV . Re e ve Co p hi was s r s w ch till back in B ussel , so as to enable the unsupported and open right flank of the First Army to ul r be maintained at f l fighting st ength . Repeated f r s applications o thi had not yet been complied with . A further request fo r the addition of heavy artillery s r r s r to thi weakened co ps was made . T oop we e ordered to take the utmost care to husband their ammunition and to make a special point of picking up s ss any left on the battlefield . In view of the po ible interference with passing sup ply columns by the s population o r by is olated detachment of the enemy , all the men with the transport columns and train

r s r r given ifle , a p ecaution al eady advocated in s t r time . The communication be ween the co p Lines of Communication Headq uarters wer r 27th r s imp oved on the , and by eque t of railways leading to Paris were reconno r lli - o ng stock found on them examined . Chi ef of the Staff and hi s General ss Ar Hagen , who had been a ociated with the my — mander when Inspector General of the Eighth

s r s s r Di t ict , and who e excellent qualification we e well

s r s u known to him , upe vi ed all the lines of comm nication matters mentioned above in a most thorough and far r r r s r seeing manne , in o de to expand and t engthen the r r Ar s r vital a te y of the my . The offen ive wheel th o the lands of the Flemi ngs and the Walloons towards Somme and Picardy which had fallen to the lot ‘ of — 1 BRUSSELS SOMME 7/1 j First Army could now be continued with complete con fidence s and t , in view of the uccesses gained the abundan r i f r s e n o cements expected , thank also to its excellent r s r r r rs i n t oop and thei tho oughly eliable leade , both the s r r r s enio and junio ank . l/With admi rable foresight the Chi ef of the Staff of the Army issued instructions to the various corps regarding the importance of the Somme line in their s s s immediate vicinity , as al o of the ection of the Oi e r r r and below La Fe e . ; The valley of the ive the canal of the Somme forms a considerable obstacle below

r . s s s fi r s Pe onne Thi double ob tacle , in place fteen ya d r is rr s s b oad , inte upted by wampy pond and meadows , r wi r r t r s cove ed th unde g ow h . The high g ound lie well

r r so r r fire r back on the no the n bank , that a tille y f om it on to the southern bank would not be sufli ciently effective ; nevertheless its occupation as soon as possible was r r s r r impo tant . The fo tification of Pe onne we e s b ut mi s mr ob olete , they ght be u eful on e e gency ; the bed of the river widens out like alake as it passes the

s r s was r town , and the old ca tle , whe e Loui XI . captu ed r es r d 1468 is fo r by Cha l of Bu gun y m , well adapted a s r a s e r Fé re tubbo n loc l defence . The ob olet fo t of La might have artillery m it ; the section of the Oise below is r r r a r w it ve y impo tant f om milita y point of vie . From La Fere to Chaun y an attack against the hi gh r r f ul g ound along the southe n left bank would be di fic t , though below Chauny the high gr ound on the northern right bank commands the flat country on the opposite s r r N r ide of the ive . Between oyon and Rivecou t , r r below Compiegne , the thickly wooded ight bank ove a s r r s s wide t etch of count y , whil t the wood on

s r th e r r ft bank , ituated away f om ive and the r s r a canal , togethe with tho e of Ca lepont, L igue , and e mi ha r r Compiegn , ght make a defence of t t a ea ve y 72 BRUSSELS— SOMME

i ffi ul r r six to d c t . The Oise , which va ies f om fifteen feet is r r r Fé re r to depth , thi ty ya ds b oad at La , inc easing r s r r s fifty ya d at Compiegne , and to one hund ed ya d at its junction with the Seine . The Oise Canal , which r r r Fé re accompanies the ive f om La down to Janville , - r r s r above Compiegne , is twenty fou ya d b oad as r r Chauny , and f om the e to the junction yards broad ; the breadth at the locks is six and a r s ya d .

’ 27th A r h On the ugust , afte the day s fig ting , Ar my stood in two groups ready to attack s r i po ition . The II . Co ps , echeloned beh nd r was cast r Saill Co ps , of Combles nea Sailly r rv r s was cou t ; the IV . Rese e Co p at r was s the IV . Co ps we t of Vendhuille , a at Naur oy ; the leading troops of the

s r back at Bu igny , no th of Bohain . The Seco r i Catill was to advance , its ight wing mov ng by - s r south ea t of Le Cateau , th ough Bohain towa

St . Quentin . In the Army Order issued at Solesmes that

. m r s r at p . the Somme c o sings we e allotted follows :

r s r r II . Co p , B ay and westwa ds , inclusive

' Corbie ;

' IV s r r s r . Re e ve Co ps , Cappy and Eclu ie ; r s i . u r s r r IV Co p , Fe lle e , Cle y , and Pe onne

. r s r r s III Co p , B ie and St . Ch i t ;

. r s r rt IX Co p , Epenancou t , Falvy , and Bethancou . Corps were to march by the following roads — — . r s u r r II Co ps , Comble Monta ban west of Ma icou t r r s s r s B ay , and oad to we twa d ; — — - . r r s s r s IV Rese ve Co p , Fin Manancou t south ea t — - side of Combles- Maurepas so uth east side o f Maricourt ; BRUSSELS— SOMME 7 3 — r s r — s s r r s IV . Co p , Lie amont Moi lain Cle y and Ville — Faucon Peronne — — — r s H ar iert s r r III . Co p , g Roi el Hancou t Ca tigny — — Brie and La Verguier Vendelles Poeuv illy - - s —A h es—St r s Estree en Chau sée t i . Ch i t ; r s w r r its IX . Co p ill each Pont u with advanced — r ar r — r rt gua d , m ching by P emont B ancou Jon court Belleenglise

h e r s r e s s M T co p we e to k ep clo e on the heel of the

re r r a r s ret ating enemy with thei caval y and field b tte ie , so as to increase his general disorder and be able to attack him at the So mni e cro ssingsffl The cavalry of r s was s r r s s the III . Co p to ecu e the c os ing at Falvy and r fo r r s r Bethancou t the IX . Co p , in addition to econ n itrin its . r r s o g own line of ma ch th ough Ne le and Ham . r s was a r its The IX . Co p to p t ol out to left flank beyond e r s ss r St . Qu ntin towa d Ju y and La Fe e , and get into

r Ar touch with the ight flank of the Second my . The Cavalry Corps was to advance across the Somme west and hold the river crossings open for the It was also to reconnoitre up to the Oise and r s Ami s 18 r was towa d en . The th Pionee Regiment to r s r r r its accompany the IV . Co p and be tempo a ily unde r r o de s . Ai r r ss s r r s econnai ance we e to be made by the II . Co p r a Al r — s—Ami s in the t i ngle be t Doullen en , by the IV .

r s r ra —A s - r Co p in the a ea B y mien Montdidie , by the — — — . r s r ra r s r III Co p in the a ea B y Montdidie Ne le Pe onne , s th s r . r e and by the IX Co p in ecto between Ham , Fé re Ar r rs r Noyon , and La . my Headqua te we e to s s 28th be at Sole me up to noon on the , when they would m r ove to Ville s Faucon . By these orders the Army Commander hoped to be

Fort nate t e o s d T u ly h c rp id nothing ofthe kind . he B ritis h retreat romLe a as i n o es f Cate u w pract cally u ml ted . 74 BRUSSELS— SOMME

able to outflank the Somme salient from north east by pushing forward his right wing and thus r r Br the c ossings , with the II . Co ps at ay a s r r s r the IV . Re e ve Co p and the Caval y r s r r r B ay and down t eam f om Pe onne , the r r Pe onne , the III . Co ps above the bend of the S r r s r m at B ie and St . Ch i t , and the IX . Co ps , co ing up on r the following day , at Falvy and Bethancou t . On the morning of the 28th the Cavalry Corp s was surprised in its billets by the French 6 1st and 62nd

s r s s r r r r e Re e ve Divi ion . The F ench , howeve , we e out d r r f om the field at Manancou t by parts of the II . and

s r r s r s and IV . Re e ve Co p . Othe unit of the II . IV .

s r r s r Re e ve Co p , the latte being * r s r r fo ced back t ong enemy fo ces , with a westerly di rection from the front “S r — r Mo val that is to say , in the di ection of for r the II . Co ps on the Fo r reasons not yet unders from its own line of advance towa rds the crossin h ad r r been allotted to the IV . Rese ve Co ps , so latter had to continue its advance behind instead of r s war r s s on the left of the II . Co p . The dia ie of the e r s r two co p will throw further light on this matte . The intention of the Ar my Commander to use a corps reinforced wi th heavy artillery as a strong right r had eluctantly to be abandoned . The r s r s s er III . Co p epul ed ev al battalions

r r r t ied to advance f om St . Quentin and also d ove back t r r 3r r s . the F ench d Caval y Divi ion By evening , af e r r s r r sho t though f equently eve e encounte s , the left illi res t r bank of the Somme from Feu é o St . Ch ist was in r ss r Ge man posse ion . In f ont of this line stood the French 3rd and 5th Cavalry Divisions and roughly

The 6 1st and 62nd Reserve Divisio ns mentio ned abo ve . BRUSSELS— SOMME 75

r s s s r Al eight infant y battalion , mo tly Re e ve pine h s r was rs d r r r C a seu s . It unde too that fu the F ench s it forces were to be detrained near Amien and south of . On the morning of the 29th Army Headquarters

r . moved to Pe onne , which had been taken by the IV

the afternoon of the 28th a wireless message

' ved at Army Headquarters at Villers Faucon Majesty the Commander -in -Chief which ran The First Army is to - day approachi ng the v i torious r r q ma ch , afte winning r s s a s to ie again t the Belgi n , the

oh r a Ar . I cong atul te the my on

s ss s s r ss r a t ucce e , and wi h to exp e my impe i l r g atitude . At this perio d the Headquarters of the First Army

‘ summed up the situation as follows : The left wi ng of the main French forces is retreating in a southerly and south - westerly direction in front of the victorious

(1 r Ar i s ars s Thi d m e . It appe to be of deci ive s r r of thi fo ce , whethe r r o r r a r r s et eating in position , fo ce it way f om Pa i , outflank r s e and it . Compa ed with thi new objectiv , the attempt to force the British Army away from the coast is of mi nor At mi 28th s s s a recia dday on the , on the ba i of thi pp was r s a r tion , it p opo ed to the Comm nde of the Second Army that a W heel inwards should be made by the two Ar r s s r Ar mies towa d the Oi e , the Fi st my moving on — Ar Compiegne Noyon , and the Second my with its ri ht ui r r g flank on Q e zy and Chauny . Du ing that r rr r evening , howeve , a communication a ived f om the Supreme Command entitled General Directions fo r the

Sti t e h i ea t a t . . was ase n a o rts ll d h t he B E F. b d o Cal is and p near it . 76 BRUSSELS— SOMME

r r u r Fu the Cond ct of the Ope ations . It renewed opposition by the French and British forces on Ai s wi r r the ne , th thei left wing advanced ab east of a — r — s t r r line St . Quentin La Fe e Laon , al o la e on the Ma ne , r r s A r with the left flank esting on Pa i . concent ation of fresh forces on the lower Seine was also considered An r Ar possible . immediate advance of the Ge man mies . on Paris was to prevent the French Army getting any r r r s r s est and stop the fo mation of f e h concent ation . rs Ar r r s r The Fi t my , with the II . Caval y Co p unde its r r w r s r s r o de s , ill ma ch west of the Oi e towa d the lowe s r r cc - r Seine . It mu t be p epa ed to ope ate in the fighting Ar r s s for of the Second my . It will also be e pon ible the r r nk Ar p otection of the ight fla of the mies , and will take steps to prevent any new enemy concentration * r in its zone of ope ations . Ar r r r The Second my , with the I . Caval y Co ps unde its r rs i r o de , w ll advance ac oss the r s l s s r Maub eu Pa i . It wi l al o inve t and captu e g r as cc - r La Fe e , also Laon in ope ation with Ar my . All the Armies will mutually cc-operate with another and support each other during the fight The strong resistance which is expected to be met on Aisne and later on the Marne may necessitate a wheel inwards of the Armies from a south - westerly to a ” r r southe ly di ection . These directions implied that the First Army continue its advance in a south - westerly direction for si the time being . They did not exclude the pos bility r s s Ar m of a wheel inwa ds to the outh , uch as the y r s r Commande had contemplated , hould the gene al s r Information on ituation make it appear necessa y . i

The Firs t Arm ai ed as i b e seen to re ent the co ncentra y f l , w ll , p v ’ tio n o fGeneral Mauno ury s Army north-east ofParis

78 BRUSSELS— SOMME c r fu er r a e lly watched by offic s of all g ades , so that th marching capacity was kept up to a high pitch r l excellence . The t ave ling kitchen hi r r asset in t s espect , and b ought up plenty r or r s - food at eve y long halt e ting place . ’ Field -Marshal Count H aeseler s words was es that both man and horse are capable of a ” s war achievement in .

s r war r r nfir hi s The hi to y of the fu the co ms t . r r r far the va ious F ench autho ities so available , it app r r that the enemy , et eating with heavy fighting day n r r s ight , was in a state of ext eme dep e sion .

To sum up : the occupation of the Somme area ma the conclusion of the fighting with the Britis for s r the time being . In pite of the g eat rs Ar r s had s Fi t my , the B iti h e caped the

s r attempt to envelop them . They continued thei ’ r r s r s Ar r d Amade et eat outhwa d . The my of Gene al was surpris ed while still in the act of co and a considerable part of it had been As in the fighting against the Belgia operations against the Armi es ’ r d AInade r Gene al , apidity of attack had been the decisiv cc - r ope ation between the Belgians , had been prevented ; each had been taken in ‘ des a while still deploying , and defeated . j The p General French shows clearly the embarrassed state

’ General Maunoury to ok o v er fro mGeneral dAmade o n the The rench st and n e i isio ns i 27th Au st . F Gl 62 d Reser D h ch gu v v , w

orme art o fhis Arm had een attac e see . b ut not f d p y, b k d ( p ers e di sp d . TThe British who fought Mo ns o nward h BRUSSELS - SOMME 79

* is Ar as s his A s i s h . of my , al o that of llie Th gallant r Ar s B itish my , with such excellent fighting qualitie , had to change its base from the Channel ports to az aire s r as St . N on the coa t of B ittany . With luck Cal i r s ss r r s would come into Ge man po se ion , p ovided t oop from another part of the Western theatre coul d be set r for r s f ee the pu po e .

i el Nothi ng to this effect can b e fo und in the despatch . F d Marsha French sa s ritin ofe ents to the 30th Se temer l y , w g v up p b e re not se ere ress e e ene W we v ly p d by th my .

- mmn in f r co n eni nce on the e t the A ie s NOTE 1 . Co e c o e orce g v l f , ll d f at Mons ere as o o s : In Con é the French 8 4th T erritoria 1 w f ll w d , l Di i sion ne t to this aon the Cana the ri tish 19th n antr v ; x , l g l , B I f y i These ere no t attac e on the 23rdA st Then came Br gade. w k d ugu the ritish 5 th Di ision hich acco r in to the German Genera B v , w , d g l StafMono ra h Di e Schlacht bei Momwas at tac e the 8th and f g p , , k d by

7th German D1v i sions and art ofthe 5th Di i sion . Ne t on the , p v x ri ht was the ritish 3rd Div ision ho in a sai ent ro n Mo ns g B , ld g l u d a f - i r i i This Di ision was at c s ar south east as V ll e s Gh slan . v taked t h G rman i si n vi z ar fth 5 th h h hree and a a e i o s . t o e t e 6 t by lf d v , , p , , 1 Th h w i h ten 8th an 1 h e ritis . o r s h c the in d 7t . C e e e B I p , x d d l arther so th -eastwar s to Peissant was on attac e arti er f u d , ly k d by ll y , Th i i i covered by the 16th Dragoons . e Bri t sh Cavalry Div s on was in rear ofth e e t an and was no t in action o n th e 23rd the l f fl k, ; 5th Ca ar ri a e was in a ance fthe riti h i ht n v l y B g d dv o B s r g fla k .

NOTE 2 —The ritish att e o f Le atea the o i ia G rman . B B l C u ; ff c l e tit e chlahten andGe echte is o esmes -Le at a Th i l (vide S c f ) S l C e u . e Al l ed

orces en a e ere rom ri ht to e t : . Cor s 5th and 3rd f g g d w , f g l f II p ( Di isions ith the 19th n antr Bri a e its ri ht in Le Cateau v ) , w I f y g d , g the 4th i n its t o n Esn s Th r wa h Di i s o e e . e e s t en a a in the v , l f g p ’ ront ine to Camrai co ered Sordet s Ca ar Co r s and ri tis h f l b , v by v l y p B 4th Ca r ri Thro h amrai an i val y B gade . ug C b d west o f t the French 84th Territoria Di ision was s o r eti ri n ith the 6 1st and6 2md l v l wly g , w Reser e Di isio ns hich had come ro mArras and a a me v v , w up f B p u , sti arther e t Th ritish Cor s was a e . o t s n m ll f w s . B I p b u eve iles east ofthe Cor s and no t en a e i n the att Co nne tion . e. c et e n II p , g g d b l b w e the two or s s t t nd and r C C p wa kep by he 2 3 d avalry Brigades . CHAPTER III THE INWARD WHEEL AGAINST THE ENEMY ’ S MAIN FORCES— PARIS— CROSSING THE MARNE

N 29th A s rs Ar ossessi O the ugu t the Fi t my , now in p or r r r of the bend of the Somme , moved fo wa d towa ds the A r r r v e , a t ibuta y of the Somme , and ’ against the Army of General d Amade became

. s r r s s extended . The IV Re e ve Co p , which at thi r s was r c was in a dange ou situation , nea Combles cv the right flank of the Army from th r was and the II . Co ps engaged in heavy fighting r and r r . r r P oya t . The IV Co ps the Caval y Co ps occupied with a less severe encounter on the — Rosieres Meharicourt against hment r r Al eurs the F ench VII . Co ps and pine . enemy was thrown back along the whole front pursued well into the night of the 30th August by r s far as r r nn II . Co p as Ville s B eto eux . Corps reported strong forces in bivouac near and was about to attack a position close by A r s r u nc e t eam , but found it evac ated by the en The detrainment of more troops was Ami s r s en , Mo euil , and outh of it , and Roy r r we e found to be occupied . The F ench Comm in - Chief was apparently puttin g in any troops s s s r r di po al , in addition to unit withd awn f om Ar r s r s rs . pa t of the f ont , again t the Fi t my the next few days the presence of the following 80

82 PARIS— CROSSING TH E MARNE

took part in the battle of the Second Ar my at St . * s its r was r r Quentin , whil t infant y employed as ese ve ’ r behind the right wing of General von Biilo w s A my . h r r r s r The eavy a tille y of the IX . Co p emained with its s 18th leading divi ion , the , about Roye . By the morning of the 30th it was realized that the ’ L Army of General d Amadej was not r emaining on our s A r r r Am s ide of the v e , and the fo ce nea ien , estimated r s was r r r r to be one co p , eti ing in f ont of the IV . Rese ve r r r Ar Co ps . Info mation f om the Second my pointed to the fact that the enemy was delivering his main s its r attack again t ight flank on St . Quentin . The First Army Commander therefore had to consider the possible necessity of wheeling inwards from a south s r s r r or - s r we te ly to a outhe ly di ection , even a south ea te ly

s ul Ar ss s . one , ho d the Second my need immediate a i tance The left wheel of the First Army which such a situation would demand was prepared for by the Army ' Order ss m 30th A Re a . . i ued at . on the ugust . The IV s r r r r e ve Co ps and the II . Co ps we e to move in the r Ami s— r di ection en Mo euil , and the IV III . , and half r s r r r s the IX . Co p we e to move with the ight towa d

' Braches on the Avre above Moreuil and with the left s - s r s to Roye and outh we t of it , the co ps thu being in

echelon to the left . At am Ar r ss r r . . the my Commande i ued fu the

r s fo r r r s s inst uction the ma ch . The IX . Co p , le s the

17 r r a r to ui s r . th Infant y B ig de , to ma ch G ca d , the III r s r — - sur Co p by the oad Roye Noyon , and IV . to Roye r r s nk r r Matz . The II . Co ps to p otect thi fla ma ch f om r r r A r r r inte fe ence f om the v e , and the IV . Co ps f om the di r Ami s ection of en . Thus the movement intended

e o Battl fGuise .

“ ’ Genera Mauno ur not Genera dAmade. 1 l y , l PARIS— CROSSING THE MARNE to envelop both the flanks of the retreating enemy had Ar s r developed into a wheel of the my to outhwa ds , and thanks to the skilful leading of the corps commanders s r no difficultie we e met with . t m r ss s rr r d A . p . a wi ele me sage a ived f om Secon Ar my Headquarters : Enemy decisively beaten to -day ; s r r s r r r Br s t ong fo ce eti ing on La Fe e . The iti h , who r rr s s - s r are we e ba ing the Oi e outh we t of La Fe e , also r r n s r s s - r et eati g in a outhe ly , and ome in a outh easte ly , r r the r di ection . The enemy in f ont of Thi d and r Ar s is s in r r Ar Fou th mie al o et eat . The Second my will rest on the 31s t August except that the bombard ” r s r rr ment of the fo t of La Fe e will be ca ied out . At m r r ss s rr s p . . anothe wi ele mes age a ived a king — “ for the cc operation of the First Army : To gain the u a s r r s f ll advant ge of the victo y , a wheel inwa d of the Army pivoted on Chauny towards the line La Fere

' ” is ur ntl s r ge y de i ed . Second Army Commander obviously placed a value on the importance and resisting power of r s r La Fe e , Laon , and Reim than they p oved to s r . H is r s was ontrar o de e ve eque t , which c y, t the

could not , be to take in a southerly and south -east During the evening of the 30th August the Supreme Command was therefore informed that : The First Ar my has wheeled round towards th e Oise and will advance on the 31st by Compiegne and Noyon to exploit the success ” Ar the r of the Second my . On mo ning of the 31st the

his is o T T c rrect . he . Cor s ent s o th the remain er a I p w u , d httle east ofso uth . PARIS— CROSSING THE MARNE answer arrived by wireless : The movement by the First Ar my is in accordance with the wishes of r the Sup eme Command .

TH E MARCHING AN D FIGHTING CAPAC ITY o r TH E A MY R .

The further course of the campaign was to make the greatest possible demands on the capacity of

r r - t anspo t and supply columns , the life blood of Ar my . It was the constant anxiety of all the c rs r ffi mande to maintain thei e ciency . The r s s s r the d aught animal kept ati facto y , thanks abundant supply of cats in the fields and the shown in conveying it thence to the store f rs - ss ff r s Of ice and non commi ioned o ice s , in pite r s g eat lack of technical knowledge that exi ted , they could to reduce the difli cul ties of this all s r r war e vice . But at the outb eak of the , on which to form the Supply Service were was r r s r r s adequate , and it the efo e not u p i ing that

r s s r - r r r t ouble of a di c editable cha acte a ose . The whole sale increase of the establishment of train personnel which the General Staffhad fo r years been trying to obtain had not become a fact ; the growth of thi s Service to its p resent enormous size began only when r s r ur the hou of mobilization had t uck , and of co se no correspondin g development of organic power was s r r s and s possible . The t ictest supe vi ion mo t detailed orders were necess ary to make up for this lack of r As r l a r e o ganization . a esu t of accumul ted expe ienc , r r helped by imagination , it g adually became clea to all that the constant preparedness of the Army and the

86 PARIS— CROSSING THE MARNE

r s r r s Thou otte , and pa sing th ough the Fo e t of Laigue 5th r u r met the Division , the ight col mn of the III . Co ps , r A r Ai s r r nea ttichy , no th of the ne . The I . Caval y Co ps belonging to the Second Army had arrived at Noyon on 30th A was r r the ugust , and o de ed to advance on the 31st through Ribecourt on the Oise towards s Soisson .

‘ Thus on the evening of the 31st the Ar my stood in r r r In r two la ge g oups in echelon , the left g oup f ont , r r s consisting of the Co ps of Ma witz , Lochow , and Qua t , r Ai r r s s on the lowe sne ; and the ight g oup , con i ting r r s Ar of the Co ps of G onau , Lin ingen , and Sixt von min , echeloned behind from Ailly on the Selle through Maignelay to Moreuil and Lamotte in the woods west s r r s r r of Noyon . The IV . Re e ve Co p cove ed the ight ’ s r Biilow s Ar r flank , whil t the caval y of my p otected the left and als o kept up communication between the Ar r Ar r r r two mies . Fi st my Headqua te s moved f om r Pe onne to Noyon . On the l st September the Army came into close touch w t r r r r s Ar r r i h st ong enemy ea gua d . The my O de of the previous evening had stated that the western flank of the French Army had retired on the 31st from La Fere thr ough Soissons ; the enemy -apparently the —— British Army v was in retreat from the line of the Oise

— — - bet ween Noyon Verberie through Senlis Crepy en

‘ — r r s s r r Valois Ville s Cotte et , whil t a weake fo ce was

r r s r r r . withd awing towa d Cle mont in f ont of the II . Co ps Another effort was therefore made to attack the British r r 1st r Ar was in et eat on the Septembe , and the my ordered in a s outherly direction as follows

r di s r r . s The IV . Rese ve to the t ict no th of St Ju t en - ss r n as r r Chau ée , cove i g befo e the ight flank s of the Ar my and the line of communication . PARISm CROSSING THE MARNE 87

The r s s r s . s II . Co p by E t ee St Deni and Remy till its leading troops are across the Oise about r r ss s Ve be ie and Le Meux . Reconnai ance to be made on the right flank to the line Clermont Creil—Senlis

r — r The IV . Co ps by Compiegne Gilocou t and by Thourotte—Pierrefonds towards the southern side r s of the Fo e t of Compiegne . r s A - The III . Co p by ttichy Taillefontaine and Vic r s Vivie e .

The r s . A - its 17th IX . Co p by mbleny Longpont , r si r a r Infant y Divi on ma ching by Ch uny , afte r r th e having eached St . Simon nea j unction of r w the 31st the C ozat Canal ith the Somme on . r s r r ss A s The IV . , III . , and IX . Co p we e to c o the i ne and the Oise respectively with their advanced r s 8 am 1st e r gua d at . . on the S ptembe .

’ Marwi tz s Cavalry Corps was to move through rs r s a s r w i s Ville Cotte et ag in t the F ench flank , h l t the cavalry of the Second Ar my was ordered to advance through the wooded country between rs r s ss s Ville Cotte et and Soi on .

As r s s m s t s e r a e ult of the e ovement , h II . Co p , sup ported by the Cavalry Corp s whi ch kept west of A h s r h h the ttic y di t ict , became involved in eavy fig ting for the possession of the important Oise crossings at r r r r s was Ve be ie and St . Sauveu . The IV . Co p in r r action at Gilocou t late in the afte noon , and the II . r s rs r s the Co p at Ville Cotte et . Owing to fighting at ’ Marwitz s Cavalry Corps was unable to reach le - its 4th s tive Nanteuil Haudouin ; Divi ion ,

the r ear guard action fo ught by the British 4th (Guards) i e T e o s 6th n antr r a . h tw ri a e ere O o se I f y B g d b g d w pp d , entence ofthis ara ra h p g p , The fighting lasted from o ff ist e und ur b d . 88 PARISfi CROSSING THE MARNE

’ after making a successful surprise attack on the enemy s o at r r s biv uacs Ne y , became se iou ly engaged with r r r s r s r s r -le supe io fo ce nea Ro ie e , no th of Nanteuil * ui rr ss s Haudo n , and incu ed heavy lo e . r r rs Ar The fo ces in f ont of the Fi t my , now known to r s r r r be B iti h , had eti ed f om about Compiegne and Noyon

r nl — r - en - s- Fert é in the di ection Se is C epy Valoi La Milon , and the western flank of the French presumably through s r r Soissons in a outhe ly di ection . On the evening of the l st September the Army was disposed as follows :

s r r s IV . Re e ve Co p about Quinquempoix ; r s s r r r II . Co p outh of Ve be ie to St . Sauveu ; r s r - en - s IV . Co p about C epy Valoi ; r s nn s— rs r s III . Co p Vaucie e Ville Cotte et ; r s its 17 r IX . Co p about Longpont , with th Infant y s n s Divi io at Champ .

IV r r s its r r Ami s The . Rese ve Co p in ma ch th ough en r r s s s had captu ed an eno mou quantity of upplie , and

‘ s o fcats s r was in Noyon a va t amount , t aw , and hay

found . In the meantime La Fere had been evacuated by the and Ar r its r s was enemy , the Second my , afte e t day r l st r its r ove , advancedon the Septembe with ight wing r r its r r ss s to B ancou t and caval y to no th of Soi on . On the 2nd September it was to continue the pursuit in a

As is noto rio us the German i th Cavalry Division left two -thirds

ofits ns at Ner anda an o ne the o thers in Ermenonv ill eW o od. gu y , b d d The ritish ost o e itis acco nt o fthis action B l n guns . For th Br h u s Ma e io ns a i rs otterets and ee . r T a t t e C R J ca nal 1919 . h c , y , V ll Ncry (to reach whi ch place the German 4th Cavalry Division mad e aforced march oftwenty -six ho urs) were the o nl y serio us attempts in t e re treat made by the Germans t o interfere with the R EF . h at er Le Catea f u .

90 PARIS— CROSSING THE MARNE — the two corps will be Vaumoise Betz — The line Verberie Villers Cotterets wi ll be or 8 am .

“

. r s s r 3 am w The IX Co p , ta ting at . . , ill r s east of the III . Co ps and of the wood of Villers r r h 17 s l in o de to old the enemy . Its th Divi ion wi l r echeloned to the left . It will also cove the left of the Ar my and make reconnaissances to its left

r r keeping touch with the I . Caval y Co ps ;

. r r s s r 1 a . m. The IV Rese ve Co p , ta ting at , r r r r each C eil ea ly in the mo ning . It will send patrols west of the Creil -Paris road towards the no front of Paris ; The Cavalry Corps will advance between the r s s r and IV . Co p and uppo t the attack

he r with t left wing of the II . Co ps . It will send patrols to watch the north and north - east fronts of s ss as oon as po ible , Arm r rs 11 am y Headqua te will move at . . ” Noyon to Compiegne .

r r rs r v r These ope ation o de we e , howe e , also as the British Army escaped from the envel ment just in time and retired across the

— - - line Meaux La Ferte s ous Jouarre and mi rs r s Coulom e . The II . Co p came in French infantry and a British — s Ognon Montepilloy , ea t of Senlis a r s st ong oppo ition , but , with Cavalry Corp s coming to the scene fr om was defeated and pursued as far as Pontarm

is T e There were no British tro o ps near Senl . h the 2nd September was entir ely unmo lested by ’ S it e o f Vo n c s or ers for attac hich p Klu k d k, w

German columns mas sing o n their advanced g uards . PARIS— CROSSING THE MARNE 91

A chance of dealing a decisive blow against the B Ar was r for ritish my now no longe to be hoped , and it was therefore decided to move the two corps on the r r left wing , the III . and IX in the gene al di ection of Chateau Thierry against the flank of the French — retreating fr om Braisne Fismes on Chateau Thierry 11 r Ar f ont of the Second my . In cc-operation with the Second Army it mi ght be damage the French western flank very con The First Army by its deep formation was in a position both to cover the flank and rear of such an attack and also to hold in check the garrison of Paris the r s B iti h . on the fighting east of Senlis the on the 2nd September : Strong r r 11 a r r s m. in et eat , about . , f om B ai ne - Tardenois on Chateau Thi erry and east Fere -en -Tardenois large bivouacs still am - s s . . South we t of Beauvai enemy s s s . Ea t of Beauvai r r s r s r s l caval y advancing towa d Cle mont . Di t ict we t and north of Beauvais clear of the enemy. Ar r rs s m 2 m In the my O de is ued at p . . and p . . r r s r nf r f om Compiegnp e the co p we e kept well i o med of the s r r r event , and the latte O de stated that the Army was to cross the Aisne that day with its r nk r ss s ight fla moving th ough Soi on , and that the r IX . Co ps would incline towards Ché teau Thierry in r r r r o de to take the et eating enemy in flank ; the III . Corps would also make for Chateau Thierry and advance as far as ss s r r r po ible , ending on ahead caval y with a tille y , i r r s s s r nfant y on ca t , and al o machine guns , to uppo t r s w s s the IX . Co p ; it a al o to reconnoitre the Marne as far as Vareddes r s . The IV . Co p was to advance that 92 PARIS— CROSSING THE MARNE day a os r II r F se Ma tin ; the . Co ps would continu nl r r east of Se is and the IV . Rese ve Co ps r r r s et eat of the enemy the e to the we t . Ma Cavalry Corp s was to remain on the right flank Ar r r r s r my , and econnoit e towa d the no th and s r s r s r r s r ea t f ont of Pa is , al o towa ds the Ma ne up t e from Paris and along the right bank of the Oise towa — Beauvais Pontoise . On the evening of the 2ndSeptember the Situa appreciated at First Army Headquarters in C and resulted in the following Operation Orders b s 9 45 m i sued at p . 1 are r r r . Enemy columns in et eat f om the line — r as r Nanteuil Damma tin well as towa ds Meaux . The ’ r cc - r Marwitz s r r II . Co ps ope ating with Caval y Co ps has r r is r r fo ced back the enemy at Senlis . The e no fu the

r as m s r info mation at hand to the ene y outh of the Ma ne ,

r — r - s - rr o on the line Meaux La Fe te sou Joua e . atandnorth 2 Ar - r s . The Second my to day eached a line outh

— - Soissons Reims ; to morrow it will advance with right flank moving from about Soissons towards Chate rr Thie y . 3 r wi . The IX . Co ps ll continue its attack aga the flank of the enemy retreating in front of the Sec Army through Fere - en - Tardenois on Chateau

r . The III . Co ps will advance south of the IX

r hi rr r and the di ection of Chateau T e y . Caval y i r r s s mach ne guns , and infant y on ca t will be ent ahead to attack the enemy when he crosses r Ma ne . 4 ni . r . The III and IX . Co ps will commu cate one another regarding the procedure of this If contact is not o b taine

94 PARIS - CROSSING THE MARNE

Army Headquarters will move to La Ferte Milon - rr 10 a to mo ow at . m. Special instructions have been issued regulating the communications behind the front and the movements ” r s s of the T ain and upply column .

TH E INTENTION o r TH E SUPREME C OMMAND TO FORCE TH E ENCH OUTH- EAST A D S OM A S FR S W R FR P RI .

During the night of the 2nd/3rd September a wireless message arrived from the Supreme Command : The intention is to drive the French in a south- easterly r r r r Ar w di ection f om Pa is . The Fi st my will follo in echelon behind the Second Ar my and will be responsible for r Armi ra the flank p otection of the es . The gene l r s A s 28th r r d rs di ection of ugu t , which had o de e the Fi t Ar s i r s r my to move we t of the O se towa d the lowe Seine , r r e r s had the efo e b en abandoned , and the wheel inwa d of the First Army towards the Oise and its passage of th e river about Compiagne and Noyon on the 31st August in order to exploit the success of the Second Ar my had evidently been approved by the Supreme 2nd r h Command . On the evening of the Septembe , w en ’ s s r that day movement had been completed , the fou corps of the First Army and the Cavalry Corps were r r — r r - still in the egion of C eil La Fe te Milon , no th east r r fo r r s of Pa is , eady any ope ation we t of the capital ,

s o r s . r again t it , east of it , whil t the IX Co ps , like an arm Ar r was of the my eaching out to the left , making the most creditable efforts to fulfil its mi ssion and hold up the western flank of the retreating French Ar my by hi rr Chateau T e y . The First Army Commander considered that to force the enemy away from Paris in a south-easterly direction (which woul d involve the passage of the Marne PARIS~CROSSING TH E MARNE and the Seine) woul d be a difficult and risky under r ul r s s taking . The e wo d p obably be initial ucces es , but it woul d be scarcely possible in the circumstances to continue the offensive until the enemy was decisively r r An r r defeated o pa tially annihilated . othe g oup of four or five di visions was needed by the Armi es on the

r r r r ff r Ge man ight wing , in o de e ectively to gua d the right flank against Paris and protect the long com muni cations rs Ar mi of the Fi t and Second es , if the r advance was to be continued into the centre of F ance . r r r The Sup eme Command , howeve , seemed to be fi mly convinced that the garrison of Paris need not be taken into account for any operations outside the lin e of forts * a is r r r s of the capit l . It t ue that all the epo t up to s r i s date eemed to confi m th point of view , but the Situation of the flank armies mi ght and would be most dangerous as soon as the French Higher Command was in a position to move amass of troops from a part of the r r s r hr r f ont whe e they could be pa ed t ough Pa is , and a s use r thence begin big offen ive , making of the g eat facilities for deployment from behind its extensive lin e r s The r r of fo t . Sup eme Command , howeve , had no — n s th r r to the ri sk s r s st anxietie wi ega d he e ugge ed , and evidently placed complete confidence i n the accuracy of its intelligence servi ce on that point At First Army Headquarters thi s view Of the general situation also adh erentS; Al r r r found many l the mo e u gently , the e r the rs Ar Co mmand renew his r s fo e , did Fi t my en eque t for the long- delayed transfer to the front of the Brigade

The Supreme Command o rders ofthe 2nd/3rdSeptemb er quoted a bove ordered the First Army to follow in echelo n b ehi nd the S econd Army and to b e resp onsible for the flank protection ofthe Armi es . hese ro i e a i T p v d d ganst attack from Paris direction . Von c did not carr o ut t ese o e is e i for Klu k y h rd rs . H xplanat on his iso e i ence o o s e o d b d f ll w b l w . 96 PARIS - CROSSING THE MARNE

r r r of the IV . Rese ve Co ps etained by the r r s fo r r Gene al of B ussel , and the elief by and Landw’ ekr troops of all the active unit communications , so that they also might r A ur r r to the f ont . f the app eciation of the First Army in these critical days was fin trated into a memorandum sent by the Commander to the Supreme Co inmand on the r s r Septembe . Thi will be quoted late on . 3rd r and r s On the Septembe the IX . III . Co p ordered to move in accordance with the instruo contained in the first sentence of the above r s r r r wi ele s o de of the Sup eme Command . The IX . had crossed the Marne on the previous evening a rr whi heavy fighting at Chezy and Ch teau Thie y , 17th Infantry Division had reached At thi s time the leading troops of the

— — - - — line Pontarme Montab y Lagny le Sec Fosse Martin r s r — - Rouv es , we t of Ma euil La Villeneuve sous r —Troesnes La Fe te Milon . The Second Army had crossed the Ai sne with its r W s r ss was ing pas ing th ough Soi ons , and a good d h rs Ar march be i nd the main body of the Fi t my . Third Ar my was apparently to the left rear of r s s Second . Compa ing thi ituation with the sentence of the wireless order of the Supreme Co theconclusion was inevitable that if the First ’ s r now a day ma ch ahead of the Second , was h ul imo s in echelon be ind it , it wo d then become p force the enemy in a s outh -ea tion whi ch had been begun the pr r the 18th Infant y Division of the IX . occupation of the Marne crossings at and rr rs Ar Thie y . It fell to the Fi t my to appl

PARIS— CROSSING THE MARNE

and that the enemy was being decisively beaten r was s — whole f ont . That such not the ca e pa that the German left wing to the south -w drawn from the front of the French line 0

was r r Ar r r not ealized at Fi st my Headqua te s , to the scanty information which was given to r r s ra the gene al situation of all the a mie . The of the advance frequently made it difficult to s r r the telephonic cable leading to the ea , often destroyed by the inhabitants o r by o ur r s times accidentally by own t oop , and s r way . Communication with the Sup eme C had therefore to be carried on mainly b y t i r r r i n s ations , which aga n we e ove wo ked _ touch with the Cavalry Corps and

r h Ar a mies , a fact w ich the my frequently made aware of by pe Ther e was consequently no means for the exchange of vi ews so urgently needed b etwe Headquarters and the Gene ral Staffof the r s Command . Neve theless , no doubt exi ted at “ Ar my Headquarters that the protection of the of the a rmies was increa sing in importance as

‘ ha r s 0 advanced , and t t the t oops at the di posal r Ar r r Fi st my , which , unde fo ce of had to be us ed for purposes of attack

t ecti n ul s f th o sim taneou ly , would not su fice in

fo r s r r o f r thi . The einfo cement the ight wing by

r r r r r g oup of about two co ps appea ed , the efo e , to ” s absolutely indispen able . These reflections found expression in a wireless m sent to the Supreme Command on the mo rnin 4th r ran as s : Septembe , which follow — PARIS C ROSSING TH E MARNE s ig ns

rmi s e r rt of_decisi v e . v ie tories far A es , who epo s have so — ’ . a al s fr su r been freq uently fo lloWed b y ppe o ppo t . The r Ar r Fi st my , which has been fighting and ma ching s its r r . incessantly , has eached the limit of endu ance It is through its efforts alone that the crossings of fo r r Ar s been opened the othe mie , the enemy has been compelled to continue hi s Th r r r e IX . Co ps has won the g eatest me it hi s r s e old action in t e p ct . It is now hoped dv anta e g will be taken of this success . u r 2220 The message of the S p eme Command No . , in accordance with which the First Army was to follow rr in echelon behind the Second , could not be ca ied out r r r unde the ci cumstances . The intention to fo ce the enemy away from Paris in a south-easterly di rection r rs Ar m was only p acticable by advancing the Fi t y . The necessary flank protection weakens the o flensiv e s r Ar r r t ength of the my , and immediate einfo cements are r r r r the efo e u gently needed . Owing to the eve S s for changing ituation , it will not be pos ible the commander of the First Army to make any further important decisions unless he is kept continuously f the situation of the other armi es who are s far not o advanced . Communication with ” Ar my is constantly maintained . evening of the 3rd September the following Orders were issued to corps fromLa Ferté

v r s e ision of the IX . Co p has b en in ground s outh-east of Chateau Thierry ez r y on Montmi ail . 100 PARIS—CROSSING THE MARNE r r n r r e et eati g columns . The enemy epo t d on the - r mi r r to day f om Meaux to Coulom e s , appa ently r s r t oops , bivouacked thi evening no th of The area between Coulommi ers and the of Vieils Maisons was reported by airme r r t r the enemy . B itish caval y was encoun e r r e- - Jo arre noon no th of La Fe t sous u . j Ar r r my has eached the Ma ne , with its a rr immediately east of Ch teau Thie y . To to advance with its right flank r Confremaux rr r th ough and Co obe t , and the I . Cav r ro a rr o r r Co ps f m Ch teau Thie y t wa ds Montmi ail . The First Army will continue its march across M r - rr r r a ne to mo ow , so as to fo ce the F ench rd r r eastwa s . If the B itish offe opposition they r be d iven back . “ Th r cc - r e . . IX Co ps , ope ating with the VII will advance through Chezy -sur

' r a Th ville , and along the oad Ch teau r r towa ds Montmi ail . r hr B s The III . Co ps will move t ough oi M

Sab l onni éres r . r towa ds St Ba thelemy , and by n Vieils Maiso s and Montolivet . “ r ll r r The IV . Co ps wi c oss the Ma ne at La sous -Jouarre and Saacy and advance in the dire ction of Rebais . he r r ri r th T . II Co ps , cove ing Pa s . Is to each - rr r e-sbuS - rr to mo ow west of La Fe t Joua e , its advanced guards forward as far as the

- Ferté - - rr Meaux La sous Joua e .

T ere the 1s and nd i is ions T e ot e s o hes e w t 2 D v . h h rs eemt been well hi dden . TThis was the 5th Cavalry B the Marne .

PARIS— CROSSING THE MARNE

r r r r fiv e wi eless o de of the Sup eme Command , the of the Army were thus to make a long march in r - r s r t fo mation south eastwa d , flank p o ection rr II r ca ied out by the . Co ps and the IV . with the 4th Cavalry Division and the infantry b t r r 5th r expec ed f om B ussels on the Septembe . 4th r the On the Septembe IV . , III . , and IX . — reached the line Rebais Montmi rai r r r Le Petit and Le G and Mo in . The Caval y rr r e- - rr r a ived at La Fe t sous Joua e . The II . Co ps r r Ar r r ight flank co ps of the my , c ossed the Ma ne r r r eached T ilpo t , east of Meaux . Air reports stated that strong enemy forces continui ng the retreat southwards from the Coulom r r r dist ict , and also f om about Montmi ail , leaving r r r gua ds to cove thei movement . The Second r r - - — r eached the line Pa gny la Dhuis Epe nay , the r r th A my eached Reims . On the evening of Septemb er the Second Army had reported that

' r r d enemy in f ont is hastening back , utte ly ” the r to south of Ma ne . Ar r r r The following my O de , which is he e r r Fert é ab idged , was issued f om La Milon at 4th r the Septembe , on the assumption that the Command still persisted in its resolution to enemy back from Paris in a south - easterly dir r r a The IX . Co ps advancing th ough Ch teau attacked the enemy in flank on the 2nd a r r l Septembe , and b ought him to a standsti l . r r i mr this Co ps d ove h mback on Mont i ail . French columns are in retreat this ev eni r r r Montmi ail th ough Este nay . advance with its right flank 103

advance tomorrow If the British can

r ar ret eat they e to be attacked . The inove as follows r s r r n Co p , afte fo ci g the enemy back at will move with its right flank by Vezier—Neuvy to about Esternay : it will — — ntmirail Maclaunay Sezanne road which ongs to the Second Army ; its r . r s The III Co p will advance with, ight flank by r a Verou e as far as St . Ba thelemy and La Ch pelle g Sancy ; r s n r i r The IV . Co p to the vici ity of Choisy econno t ing — towards Coulommiers Rozoy as well as to its front ; r r ss ar 5 The II . Co ps will c o the M ne and advance to the lower reaches of the Grand Morin below mi rs r the Ar r Coulom e , cove ing flank of the my f om the eastern front of Paris ; will advance to - morrow ui n to the area It wi ll be rth of th e a The 4th Cavalry Division on the right flank will r r r rs s r r emain unde the o de of the IV . Re e ve Co ps - rr r r th e r r to mo ow . The emainde of II . Caval y Co ps s r s will advance we t of the IV . Co p , and then in the 1 probably be to the Seine ; s ow to Rebai . on the 5th

r s h IV . , III . , and IX . Co p , wit the s r s r , fo med the t ong wing of attack to - s r r e the enemy in a south ea te ly di ection , and two PARIS-“ CROSSING THE MARNE

r R s r 4th co ps , the II . and IV . e e ve , with the Cav s r s the Divi ion towa ds the south , con tituted cove r In r s was flank against Pa is . addition the II . Co p s r s r po ition to attack the B iti h , who we e believed t mm rs r r south of Coulo ie and of the G and Mo in , shoul s r they make a tand the e .

The conclusion of this advance marked the culmina in r r Ar po t of the ope ations of the Fi st my , uninterrupted progress from the frontier of the Province to the far side of the Grand Morin and r to the middle eaches of the Seine . r h s r r r or S r Ma c e , whethe of eco d length ho t , alternated with occasional local rest days and incessant fighting under conditions that did possible credit to the mental capacity and p endurance of the subordinate leaders and the gall r s r r t oop unde thei command . The Army was unquestionably capable of carrying

r r sf r s o fu the succes ul ope ation , but was not in a p to cc- operate in extensive movements of the whole s r r fr demanding till g eate ef o ts . If the marches and battles of the corp s and r s r s r s are r t an po t column and T ain eviewed , it w found that they establish a record of achie which has seldom been obtained in the history The sea son of the year favoured the as regards the provision of an r s most pa t , whole ome supply health of the troops was all that co After the movements ordered for had r ss rr r begun , a wi ele a ived f om

r s s r mand with f e h in t uctions . Sen 4t r r the h Septembe , it eached

106 PARIS— CROSSING THE MARNE would be able to halt and regain freedom f S r i as well as an o fensive pi it . Tak ng r r r r side ation , it seemed p efe able fi st to f r ove the Seine , and to postpone till of the First and Second Armi es round to face the ea r r B r r f ont of Pa is . efo e the enemy fo ces now centrating at Paris could be sufficiently str ong r fo r r ni the eady battle , the e would be time to fi sh

offensive against the Seine . Thi s appreciation was based on the assumption t far r Ar r r so as was known at Fi st my Headqua te s , r German Armies we e advancing V ictoriously along mlthreatentlc r whole f ont , so that the enemy could not have considerable forces available with whi ch to threaten r r the Ge man flank . To what extent this acco ded with the actual situation coul d not be judged at First Arrngr ~ r r r r 4 r to Headqua te s , as was epo ted on the th Septembe r the Sup eme Command . A r r cco dingly , the suggestion set fo th above submitted both to the Supreme Command and to See Ar r r r r s h owev e my Headqua te s ; p epa ation , fo r carrying out * wheel ordered by r r for to o de ed day , Since it had already started and fighting was in

’ The r r in places . IV . Rese ve Co ps and the r r —B Co ps would be halted , the latte on the Rozoy B r azoches oad . r r on r r The IV . Rese ve Co ps , getting the o de to ’ 10 m r r its at a . . , had al eady eached day s obj 22nd r r leading division , the Rese ve Infant y — being in the area Marcilly Chambry with the

Cavalry Division on its extreme northern flank .

The movement ordered was hardly awheel (S chwenkung ) . PARIS—CROSSING TH E MARNE 107

confirmed the fact that the enemy was con his retreat on the whole front from Paris to the

eveni ng of the 5th September detailed in rr r m r n a ived f o the Sup eme Comma d , and it appeared that the enemy was transporting r r Belfo rt~Toul s r f om the f ont we twa ds , and wi r r r r o ur r thd awing t oops f om the f ont of Thi d , Ar s r and Fifth mie . The Sup eme Command , very strong enemy forces were Paris to protect the capital The bearer of these

- Lieut . Colonel r S ne al ituation , r Ar r r amazement of Fi st my Headqua te s , Ar V r s all the mies to be advancing icto iou ly , hat the left wi ng of the German Armi es — and Seventh Armi es was held resses , so much so in the enemy in front of it to r r s ss his g ound . The e was con equently a po ibility that the enemy would move troops by rail from his eastern n r s r wi g towa d Pa is . ect was thus gi ven to the Situation r Ar s Fi st my . It was inten ified by a iv edlate in the evening of the presence r s r r fo ce about Damma tin , to the no th

ATTAC o n TH E IV E S E E O PS T R S K . R RV C R OW A D D AMMARTIN

r r r r Enemy fo ces had been al eady epo ted at , and

Dammartm 4th r of , on the Septembe to Head fthe r r s r s IV . Rese ve Co p , which was e ponsible 108 PARIS— CROSSING THE MARNE for the protection of the flank north of the Marne small detachments of the corps were sent out 5th r s s r s towa d St . Soupplet , and southwa d to the 4th Cavalry Division to reconnoitre towa enemy columns were seen to be advancing s r r r m r di t ict of St . Ma d . The Co ps Com ande , Ge r r von G onau , the eupon decided to attack , so as to r r up the situation mo e definitely about Damma tin , r r h afte a seve e fig t , the enemy — on the whole front of the corps namely r Soupplets to the high g ound one and a half teSecondA1 r 4th r n of Pencha d . The Caval y Divisio , r r no th of the IV . Rese ve , also came r s re fo ces , whose attack it succes fully — r r r Ognes B egy . The st ength of the F ench mated at at least two and a half di vision r r r r r r st ong fo ce of heavy a tille y . In o de advanced troops should not come within r o f r s r ange the Pa i fo ts , and to avoid an env of the right flank by the enemy forces in front 0 4th r s r r r r Caval y Divi ion , Gene al von G onau o de ed the pursuit was not to be continued beyond a ui — r as r re C sy Ive ny , and that as soon it was da k a would be made to behind the Therouane stream — - a-Tresmes r line La Ramé Gué . This ope ation laCe p without any molestation by the enemy , * di d r not follow up at any pa t of the line . The first enemy attack against the imperilled r Ar r of the Fi st my was thus epulsed , thanks

Thi s is ard o ee Les hams de h ly c rrect . S C p J - e i i . R o sse L ne here a i i es cri t on ofthe u l p , w v v d d p o fthe German retirement atro s is i en and by p l g v , , i se s tes ta . t e r attac e h m lf (p h F ench k d the IV . a ain on e or i o e e d g th m n ng fth very n xt ay .

110 PARIS —CROSSING THE MARNE

It was also to be prepa Ar r r r s for of the Second my . Fu the , it was e ponsible r Ar r the flank p otection of the my , and had to p event r s r n r any f e h enemy concent atio s in its zone of ope ations , r S r a which , b oadly peaking , meant the a ea Compi gne A — — — — r bbeville Dieppe Rouen Mantes C eil . The Second Ar r r my , with the I . Caval y Co ps , was to advance by Fé re r r La and Laon on Pa is . It had to captu e Maubeuge r r wi and late La Fe e , and then , in conjunction th the r Ar r Ar mi Thi d my , to take Laon . These th ee es had cc - r h r to act in ope ation wit one anothe , giving mutual ’ r t e r r suppo t in h fighting in each othe s secto s . Then followed the statement that the strong resistance whi ch would be offered on the Aisne and later on the Marne mi ght necessitate a wheel inwards of the Armi es from a south -westerly to a southerly di rection ! r Ar r The Fi st my , as has been shown , at fi st continued its advance from the Somme in a south-westerly r A r n di ection . cco di g to the above intention was to move the three Ar mies in a more r r r r weste ly di ection , so that the fu the advance of the Fir st Army would have to be made west of the Oise towards the line Rouen- Mantes at a formidable part of di ul r the Seine . Its imme ate objective wo d be to dest oy r r any enemy fo ces in that neighbou hood , and , if possible , to drive them into the Seine and occupy the Seine r r c ossings . It was an att active objective , but not to r h be attained , since , the st engt of Ar mies being what it was , an advance — Beauvais Vernon coul d only be made r possibility that pa t , if not the whole , of might at any moment have to PARIS— CROSSING THE MARNE 111

Armi s r r es , which tood in need of t ansfe ence

r s fr r . s fo ce om the easte n wing , was a deci ive s r s r A to any exten ive ope ation of this natu e . rre rs Ar r rs cu nt at Fi t my Headqua te , that it (1 that the Ar my Should late r come in and British Ar mi es by advancing r — r — s Seine D eux Etampe , was set as s s s ba ele s , in view of the hopele s inadequacy ch a purpose of the forces of the German western s s r s ul r for Be ide , t oop wo d have to be etained s r r - s r — s of ob e vation no th ea t to no th we t , ms ss ni , and an endle line of commu cations r to be gua ded . Towards the end of August and beginning of September the First Army Commander had considered that a restraini ng influence mi ght have been exercised with r by the Sup eme Command , with a view to s r A the r t ategy . pause in ope ations ime for the arri val of several r rr n fo r the f om Lo ai e , time the occupation of r fo r r s r st ict , and time a eal inve tment of Pa is r s r in ight bank of the Seine and the Ma ne , an artillery bombardment of the north -ea stern Paris with all the heavy artillery of the First (1 as much of that of the Second Army as AS t e Ar i re got up . soon as h mes had r r s r r s rr and ecupe ated , and t ong fo ce a ived e in aine , and wh n all active units on the l es of communication had been relieved by Landwehr and

' Landsturm r s r r r s s t oop , and the b igade f om B u sel was b c w its r s war ul ak ith co p , then a of movement co d r s r ea onably be begun again . The enemy , of cou se , woul d likewise be able to recover again and bring PARIS—CROSSING THE MARNE

o r ul r man euv e , but this wo d appea to unquestionably so as soon as a sufli cient force transferred to the German right flank as r nf r s above . The despatch of ei o cement to th Army in the East at the expense of the Western Armi es A th as happened in ugust , would be avoided until r Ar s Af r l F ench my had been deci ively b eaten . te tha a provisional release of part of the Armi es in Franc

W l ti ould be begun , and fu l attention could be given r r Ar r r Mucl einfo cing the my in Easte n Ge many . ’ r r r s r might occu in the political wo ld . P e ident Poinca é r for s hastil Gove nment , in tance , which had been j removed to Bordeaux on the appearance of the r r r i ight wing in f ont of Pa is , might man fest inc

r s towa d peace . r r i Whethe , howeve , a check ng of the advance of German right wing would be considered necessary the Supreme Command depended ent S W r ituation as a hole . If F ench r rr r r t ansfe ed on a la ge scale behind the f ont , and attack against the flank of the First Ar my was at

r ss . . W p obable , a halt was e ential . The hole plan i r for campa gn , which depended on apid execution ” ' s W ul thereb b reak succe s , o d y do Commander Was qui te unaware of

' r fact that the Fou th , Sixth , and Sev s being held up ea t of the Moselle , and thus r hi enemy there freedom of manoeuv e . Had t s r s r known in time , the idea of c o sing the Ma ne any large forces of the First Army would not have b entertained On the 29th August the First Army had begun wheel from a south -westerly di rection towards and des ired

114 PARIS — CROSSING THE MARNE the movements were begun whi ch were altered on the evening of the 4th Sep order for the Ar mi es of Kluck and Biilow to the north and east front of Paris fr om the hi r r su Seine , w ch appa ently was the e lt of the report from First Army Headquarters sent on r 4th r mo ning of the Septembe . The diffi cult backwards wheel of the Army was to commence that led to the bloody battle on the and brought the B r ff r r Maunour and a on , in its e o t to fo ce y b Therouane r the and on Damma tin , and is Ar h my . CHAPTER IV THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ — The Cri sis and the Break away The March Back to the Ai sne

BEFORE describing the important events that occurred during the second week in September with the help Ar r rs r 1915 of my O de and of the Memo andum of , and showing what calls were made on the moral strength and manoeuvring capacity of the corps of the First Ar r r s s s r r my and its Caval y Co p , it eem an app op iate ’ moment to discuss the enemy s appreciation of the

general situation . ’ * “ A o r r Gedel s The r cc ding to Majo book , O igin of — the World War and its Progress on the Belgian North r r - r as F ench Theat e till Mid Septembe , well as r r rs 4th r othe autho ities , it appea that on the Septembe r as r r r s r r Gene al Gallieni , Gove no of Pa i , o de ed the r Ar r Maunour F ench Sixth my of Gene al y , which was r r r s r s r unde his o de s , to hold it elf in eadines to ma ch its billeting area between the northern front of and c r hi the advan ed position of Damma tin , w ch was r a r r t ast ong one , and ( ppa ently) fo tified wi h heavy artiller ‘ r rni the 5th r y . j Ea ly on the mo ng of Septembe , Maunoury was to attack the flank of the German First r-in - hi rs fr The Commande C ef , Ma hal Jof e , had ’ a wireless report of Gallieni s decision on the

This is e French o o mentione in the O enin a es th b k d p g p g .

‘ ' This s I wa not the case . THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

r 4th t r r mo ning of the Sep embe , and he the eupon issu * the following Operation Orders on the evening the 4th 1 r r . Eve y advantage is to be taken of the dange situation of the German First Army by a comb movement of all forces of the Al lied Ar mi es on r r Al l r r ext eme left (F ench) wing . p epa ations 5th 6th be made on the to begin an offensive on the . 2 r . The gene al position to be occupied by evening of the 5th is as follows (a) Al l the available strength of the Sixth will be in a position of readiness in the north -e r cro zone of Pa is , so as to be able to Lizy and May - en -Multien in the g Chateau Thi erry ; the available forces of General cavalry will be under the orders of General Maun ss to a ist this movement . The opponent will be Kluck . T (b) The British Army is on a line Ma Coulommi ers ready to attack facing east in the r i r di ection Montm ail . The opponent will be Von Kluck ’ ‘ . l (c) The Fifth Army will extend Slightly to its left — — and take up a general line Courtacon Esternay S ready to attack in a general direction south to

, r r s r Conneau the II . Caval y Co p (Gene al ) ible fo r maintaining touch wi th the The opponents here wi ll be Von Kluck a right flank of the Fifth

’ — i The Author s Neta This is an ext ract and not authent cated . ( o r ers a re e i a in in his d g e gen rally w th the v ersio n given by M. B b a l e o L Bataill e de aMarn and other French auth rs . ) " 1 This last phrase does not o ccur in the publis hed French versions

l 118 TH E BATTLE ON TH E OURCQ

According to Major Gedel the French Sixth Army a long and exhausting march on the 2nd Septe had assembled north of Paris as follows r r i 55th Damma tin , Gene al Lamaze w th the r r r Rese ve Divisions , and a Mo occan B igade ; at . w r i r r bet een Damma tin and St . Den s , Gene al Vautie 14 r 63rd with the th Division of the VII . Co ps and the ’ r n r r Rese ve Divisio ; and no th of Clayes , Gillet s Caval y r 61st 62nd r r B igade . The and Rese ve Divisions unde General Ebner reached Pontoise on the 4th September

r s r e in a ve y exhau ted condition , and we e to mov to A th 45th Al r ttainville on the 6 . The ge ian Division (General Drude) marched on the eveni ng of from Bourg -la -Reine to Dammartin as the r Ar r Rese ve of the my . Finally , the IV . Co p General Boelle was being detrained fr om the t e 7th r h Septembe at Gagny , south of Le Taken all round there were ten ini a and the cavalry of General Sordé t and includi ng the eight or nine battalions of Zouaves r rr 9th r Spahis , which we e to a ive on the . Fo ming r rr s r 83rd 85th 8 pe manent ga i on of Pa is were the , , and 92nd Territorial Divis ions and the -A mi r Ro narich of Vice d al . And yet the assembly of such a mass of troops o flank of the German western wing had been * r t sec e . i

r s Pluta ch , in his Maxim of Kings and Com ” r Chab rias A ni mande s , says that the the an named as the greatest commander he who knows best ’ hi hnes The going on be nd the enemy s . ! vital imp

’ is ro imate correct E en Von c s atin hi ch a , v by Klu k d g, w pp x ly they came up gradually and were rushed o n t o the battlefield . ” T e e e e er ass e e h y w r n v mbl d . THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ 11

intell igence service in modern war was brought * s s in s r on thi occa ion a mo t vivid manne .

TH E RIGHT- FLANK MARCH o r TH E FIRST ARMY 5! 11 m Or ss . The Ar my der quoted below and i ued at p . 5th r r h r r s on the Septembe f om eadqua te s at Rebai , r no w ff s n behind the f ont of the , until , o en ive wi g rs Ar was r of the Fi t my , based on the belief that the e was as r r r ni r yet no g eat dange th eate ng the ight flank , and that a march back to cover it could be carried out rr Iii s s without inte uption . any ca e , ome big move would have to be made without delay to meet the he Order ran as follows : rs Ar wi the Fi t my , in conjunction th the s n r has forced back the Briti h a d. F ench Ar s are r r ed to it to the Seine , both mie o de ed by upreme Command to remain facin g the eastern r s ff s s of Pa i , and to act o en ively again t any enemy tions from Paris : the First Ar my between the r Ar and the Ma ne , the Second my between the Air r r s s r and the Seine . epo ts tate that t ong r are r r r fo ces in et eat on Tou nan and Rozoy , as r r r s r r f om Cou tacon towa d P ovins , and f om No net -sur - g Seine . r r s r s s in o de to fulfil thi f e h ta k , face right as follows r s r r r The II . Co p will ma ch in two columns by T ilpo t r i rr and a to Ge m gny , and by Pie e Levée Monte ux to

The com ete ai re o fthe German ntell i ence De artment pl f lu I g p , fin er Mao r Ni o ai has een re ent re erre to in the German d j k l , b f qu ly f d ’ ress in er s as ir l s ri s i se i p (t ide H . B d W w a K eg b er cht rs tatter n cht sagen diirften b ut Vo n Klu ck might at least have kept in to uch with the 61st and 6 2nd Reserve Divisi o ns who retired b efo re hi s e t an l f fl k . 120 THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

Isles -les -Meldeuses ; it will send b ack its transport via La Ferte -sous -Jouarre along the road Vendrest r C ouy . r r to The IV . Co ps will each the vicinity of Doue rr r r r r mo ow ; and its t anspo t will emain whe e it is . r s r e The III . Co p will go to the vicinity La Fe t r to - rr trans ort in il Gauche mo ow . Its p h two echelons , w l

’ move to Charly -sur-Marne along the north bank of the M r r — res ec a ne , and to the neighbou hood Lizy Clignon , p tiv el y . r r l r The IX . Co ps will emain in its bi leting a ea to

rr r r mo ow , and move its t anspo t via Nogent to the r h r r Th e r s r no t e n bank of the Ma ne . t an po t will be

— — - parked east of the road Coupru Domptin Charly sur Marne ; II r r r r The . and IV . Co ps will leave weak ea gua ds r r behind on the G and Mo in . 3 T e r r . h movements of the t anspo t columns and trains will be regulated daily by Army Headquarters fur r r r As s Ar until the o de s . oon as the my l eted s r s s r p its change of po ition , f e h in t uctions issued for the communications with the advanced at Chauny . 4 r r r rr for . Co ps Headqua te s will a ange Officers to superintend the orderly crossing of r r r Marne by the t anspo t columns and t ain . 5 r r s are r 00 . The Ma ne b idge to be st ongly

' : r Liz and r at once by the II . Co ps at y Ge migny ; IV r s r - s - rr — . Co p at La Fe te sou Joua e Saacy and di r r b inclu ng the ailway b idge ; y the III . r -sur- r No ent r Cha ly Ma ne and g ; and by the IX . Co p C -sur - r a rr hezy Ma ne and Ch teau Thie y , including r railway b idge . II r r 6 . . The Caval y Co ps

THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

* r h Vareddes r s r west and no t of . The fi st t ong forcement to deal with the new opponent had rr a ived on the scenes . r r m C r s By an O de issued at p . . the IV . o p w withdrawn across the Marne to the district north r - s - rr s t La Fe te sou Joua e , so that in case of neces i y could be put into the fight , the enemy having now r s r r r At m b ought upe io fo ces into action . p . . r s r r s the IV . Co p was o de ed to move again that ame so ul s night , that at dawn it wo d be in a po ition to att cr - n - l — r e u . a oss a line Rozoy M tien T ocy Thus , on r t th r r e 7 . mo ning of h Septembe , the II Co ps , the ser r s r s Br Re ve Co p (still without its B us els igade) , r Therouane the IV . Co ps stood b etween the and

Ger o ne r ar r th g g (a t ibut y of the Ou cq) , with r r r n 4t r athe inte mi gled , with the h Caval y immediately to the north of them : they were

Ar Maun our the r up the my of y , of st ength a

position . of which nothi ng was known at r r r ss r r r Headqua te s . The p e u e of supe io r r r first pe ceptible f om the ve y . T

The situation on the front of the III . and IX on the evening of the 6th was as follows i The

There were no English forces withi n ten miles of Vared Cor s o n nor did any ofthemcome in co ntact with the II . p

th T e i e is ro a meant . 6 . h Moro cc an Br a l , g d p b b y ’ ’ Vo n c s o n acco nt ofMaunour s Arm ta en T Klu k w u y y, k ’ Mao 118 i s ro es that it was 0 r Gedel s o o ot e o n . j b k, qu d p , d p v

6th/7th Septemb er sup erior in force to his tro o ps . ’ e IVo n Kluck s memory app ears t o fail himher . Vo n Biil ow Mein B ericht z ur Marnes chl acht ' Co r s o n t andIX . handed himo v er co mmand o fthe III . p o f the 7th s ent amessa e the 6 th b ut at a. m. o n , g

o f an I o s o n O rc is r ent r e ire e . X C r ; III d . p u q u g ly qu d sidera l ei or Sen Co r s in irection La Ferte b y r nf ced . d p d THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ 123

oked during the morning from west of the — rac nne t e d r s r s r T o in h i ection E ca de Seu , whe e r s r s stood eady about E te nay . In pite lr h r o r r a eady begun the wit d awal as de ed , the ided to make a counter-attack in order to the progress of the Second Ar my fighting

r n r as its t Mo i . The III . Co ps had l o begun r r fire , but , in view of heavy a tille y which r h r wi r s fo r ss s ont of it , toget e th a eque t a i t r s s the IX . Co p , it decided to hold it elf s ar S aa — s r in the - ea cy Montceau , to uppo t By an Order of the 6th September at m r s was r p . . , the III . Co p to take ove otectio n r th e r s of the ight flank of IX . Co p . Ar r un 1v o ted its Second my , wheeling o d , p on ‘ mi r flank at Mont ail , intended to continue the its r the Seine with cent e and left wing ,

r -le - ra moving on Ma igny G nd . The III . and thus came in front of the right wing of the at 1 m Ar r r ss 0 . By an my O de i ued p . se corps were therefore withdrawn — éres Montmirail on the northern r a a h Mo in . They g ined touch ag in wit the Ar r Second my at Montmi ail , and , r r its s r o action , we e to confo m to in t u r hi had Caval y , w ch advanced to o r r the y , cove ed the ight flank of Corp s against the enemy forces advancing fr om

Von uo l n his o o area ote com ains itt er that B l w, b k l dy qu d, pl b ly the First Arm inst ea of ein eche one ehin the Seco n y, d b g l d b d d ” Ar m as o r ere was eche o ne in ro nt o fit —its e t Co r s y, d d, l d f l f p I “ . she itse com ete in o n o f ( X ) pu d lf pl ly fr t o fthe right Co rps (VII . ) ” the Secon Ar d my .

Vo n Biil ow as a o e o te s a s the ere ace n er hi s T , b v qu d , y y w pl d u d or ers hen Von c ent north o t e e e n h 6th s e not . d w Klu k w ( , p 124 THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

r r mi r about Tou nan towa ds Coulom e s . It gave 2nd r s r the Caval y Divi ion to the I . Caval y had been sent forward by the Second Ar my Comman r r into the Montmi ail dist ict .

TH E FRENCH ATTACK

A r r r r S r cco ding to a epo t f om the up eme Command , General J o flre had ordered the general attack of the French Armi es for the 7th September in * the r e about decisive battle . If this was t ue , the fat r s ni rs Ar of the F ench offen ive , in the opi on of the Fi t my r r Commande , would depend on the st ength and success of the attack delivered from Paris against the flank r Armi r r r r ul s of the Ge man es . In o de not me ely to ep e r r the enemy in that qua te , but to defeat him by an outflankin r- r r g counte attack f om the no th, the IX r r r r r r and III . Co ps we e o de ed to ma ch ea ly on the morning of the 7th September in the direction La F —Cr r r Milon ouy , and thei elations to the as regards instructions given them by it were 0 The critical nature of the situation dema for rs Ar r r step , Fi t my Headqua te s believed Ar rs Second my , in the cou e of the wheel it to make in accordance with Supreme Comma 7 m 4th r ul issued at p . . on the Septembe , wo d r r As south of the Marne in a weste ly di ection . r r r s of fact , howeve , it came up against st ong e i M r and did not get beyond the Petit o in . The Lines of Communication Headquarters

It is stated by vario us German writers that aco py of ’ o e as e J oflre s rd rs w captur d . 1 Vo n c sent a As state in the o otnote . 22 T d f , p , Klu k o s i n o t emto b e sent t o himand thus to Vo n Bul w ak g fr h , the right flank o fth e Second Army .

THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

consisting of the 22nd Reserve Division and the

nf r s r r Tro ssel I ant y Divi ion , unde Gene al von , on r — areddes line T ocy V . This formation of group s had become unav oid in r s r because , ow g to the inc ea ing g avity of the di visions had to be thrown into the

as they became available , and they r r r r sepa ated f om thei own co ps . It retained till the Ar my arrived on the Ai sne to prevent the cros sing and congestion of

f s r adding to the di ficultie of the withd awal . At m r s r r p . . Gene al von Lin ingen o de ed r s A —Ac — r ac o s a line ntilly y T ocy . This planned as a wheel pivoting on the left which the weight of the enemy ’ sattackwas and whi ch was suffering heavily s r r of ho tile a tille y . The attack made good progress ; its r r s Bas back th ough Ville s St . Gene t and Le B and the 22nd Reserve Division too k and held A considerable part of the offensive wheel ha

rr s n o ca ied out , though a deci ion was by rr a ived at . In order to give as much support as possible to r left wing , which was being seve ely cut up by ’ e r r fire r t e fo en my s a tille y f om about Meaux , h Operation Order was issued from Vendrest at r r are il The IV . Rese ve and II . Co ps heav y e —Vareddes r on a line Betz , no th of Meaux . The e has been reinforced north of Meaux and our left taken in enfilade by heavy artillery fire from di r ection . IX C r il r r r The III . and . o ps w l p ess fo wa d i far r med ately as as possible to suppo t it , and THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ 127

* wing of the Ar my must come into action by s ow morni ng at the late t . s s III r s esternmo t divi ion of the . Co p will

s r s r r the ho te t oute to Lizy . One infant y h s s the r r of t i divi ion , with heavy a tille y of

r s as as s r r Co p , well ome caval y , will ma ch - s - rr r r s r r e La Ferte sou Joua e oad towa d T ilpo t . es ss s r - g at U y and St . Jean , we t of La Fe te sous r h s r have been dest oyed . T i b igade with fir s silence r s r r gun e hould Tthe B iti h a tille y . issances wi r ll . be made and p otective

ul o mmiers r , whe e the enemy rds r r r the lowe G and Mo in . the r up with II . Caval y r r r - r which , with a tille y , will ope ate to day f om r r r r s s r T ilpo t . The othe th ee divi ion will ma ch the orders of General von Lochow by the shortest ” rds r — r towa La Fe te Milon C ouy . m r Ar r r r p . . anothe my Ope ation O de was r s s e which , togethe with the fact publi h d in the m r r s r s s r r : p . . O de , show up the c i i in a clea e light

General of Infantry von Linsingen will continue s r r s in command of the II . , IV . , and IV . Re e ve Co p

- ~ to day according to the former group - formation of com m s are r and . The following units ma ching up to his

1 2nd 24th . The Battalion of the Regiment , less h i - s one company , wit a mach ne gun ection and two n s r ar hi r in gu f om Ch ly to Lizy , w ch has been gua d g

fi * at is Th the . andIX . Cor s hi ch had een e t ehin ith , III p , w b l f b d w Von B l o fi w . German Boll seems to convey do ubt that this 128 THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

Army Headquarters will arrive thi s evening and aw * s r in t uctions at Lizy . 2 r r s . The II . Caval y Co p will come r r - un enfiladin T ilpo t to day , its g s g the r no th of Meaux . 3 r ar . e The III . and IX . Co ps on the march - r r — r the south east towa ds La Fe te Milon C ouy . s r 1s f divi ion of the III . Co ps sending an in antry and the corps heavy artillery to Trilport to

enfilade r s r r r Meaux the B iti h a tille y no th of . T di s main body of the vi ion is on its way to Lizy . I wish to express my warmest praise to the Gen and the troops under their command for their

achievements . Si ned VON LU C ( g ) K K .

Anxiety as regards a sweeping victory still upon the Army Commander and his Chief who was constantly examining the situat s V r point of iew . The wheel back of the Fi s r s had al eady accompli hed much . On the 7th the 6th Infantry Division reached sur - r r Ma ne and the IX . Co ps was back h Ar r r close to C ezy . my Headqua te s r r r s Vend est , whe e they we e able be t to t r s - r 0 wi h all pa t of the battle f ont . The of Crépy -en-Valois as far as La Ferte Milon wa r s nl s r clea of the enemy , as al o Se i , C eil , and r r r r on the othe hand , st ong fo ces we e about - 7th le Haudouin on the evening of the .

The situation must have b een considered v ery serio us for

Headquarters Guard to b e sent into the fight . of eau There was no British artill ery north M x . i Moroccan Brigade was where Von Kluck located Br tish .

130 THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ and La Ferté - sous -Jouarre Crouy so as to come into action on the right r r r Ar mi the g oup unde Gene al Sixt von n , n A s r r r ntilly . It is de i able that a tille y with

should be sent on ahead . r w ar 2 am r The IX . Co ps ill st t at . . f om the south a h rr r r r Ch teau T ie y and ma ch no th of the II . Co ps Ferté La Milon . r r 4th r The II . Caval y Co ps (less the Caval y Divisi wi ll cover the left flank of the Army towards the 1

' Grand Morin and Coul ommi ers ; it will also operate ’ about north of Trilport against the enemy s artiller r position no th of Meaux . Ar r r are r r my Headqua te s to emain at Vend est . A r r V battalion of the infant y b igade of the I . serve Corp s marching from Brussels and a b of the 2nd Grenadi er Regiment arrived this at Villers Cotterets and are attached to the group ” ra Ar Gene l Sixt von min . At am 8 r r . . on the th Septembe anothe r r ss r 5th O de seemed nece a y , by which the Division was sent through Cocherel towar in o rder to stop an attempt of the enemy t r r ur r th ough at that pa t of the line . F the , mn r r r r colu of the IX . Co ps was o de ed towa ds its r t lu r s r il and igh co mn towa d La Fe te M on . The enemy was reported to be advancing fro Coulommiers and south of it towards La Ferte r r and Rebais . The Gua d Caval y covering position on the Petit Morin and the 2nd Cavalry Division at La One regiment of infantry batteries) of artill ery was to b r column of the IX . Co ps to be THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ 131

r -soul ouarre as of La Fe te , Ar r f the my Commande . The for transport columns was -en - r — Ta denois Fismes . rder concluded by pointing out that the factor of the day lay in the arrival into r r r M the IX . Co ps on the f ont La Fe te ilon The corps must under no circumstances be from coming into action on this front by any mi r of the enemy on Coulom e s . r to he e anticipate a little , and to n the evening of the 8th the 6th Infantry into action in support on the right flank r r A h t Cuve gnon , no th of ntilly , and t at r s r IX . Co ps was in a po ition of eadiness that evening ’ envelop the enemy s northern wing on the 9th — attacking from the line La Ferte Milon Mareui l on r r 6t r ight and to the no th of the h Infant y Division . enemy had sent forward reserves fr om t da audouin o the Bois Roi , an envelop ss r s flank seemed a u ed , e pecially eserv e r s r B igade of the IV . Re e ve 11 the 8th from Brussels via e ; it was to march on the 9th through Baron r r th l . 8 0th the enemy in ea On the , the Br h r i igade (Colonel von Lent e) , ma ch ng r r eached R ibecou t . von Lochow was to take over t he command r r s r r ent e g oup , consi ting of the IV . Rese ve Co ps 8t nf r s s h I ant y Divi ion , on thi day . the flank of the Ar my on the Marne and its est of the Ourcq an effective envelopment of THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

TH E BRITISH AD VANCE During the morning of the 8th September it beca evident that the British were advancing towards r r r r r Ma ne , while st ong fo ces we e ma ching r r r - - rr —St G and Mo in on La Fe te sous Joua e . r r a Rebais on O ly . The secu ity of the fl nk the Army did not yet seem sufficiently provided r r r s by the II . Caval y Co ps along the Ma ne we t of r -s - rr r r Fe te ous Joua e , and by the I . Caval y Co ps on r r the Petit Mo in between La Fe te and Villeneuve .

r r was r r r o de the efo e sent to the IX . Co ps at a to occupythe line oftheMarnefrom La Ferté - sous - Jouarre ’ No ent -IAr taud r his to g , so as to gua d it against t r s flanking movement of the B iti h , but in the end an infantry brigade and two field artillery r r r we e sent , and the Gene al Rese ve at aux- Lions was handed over to the C mander : The Marne bridges were to fo r r s r dest uction , and , if nece sa y , to be r in the latte case , the fact was to be r r qua te s .

h French ' attemt r Meanw ile , the p to b ea front at Trocy on the morning of the frustrated without the assistance of the 5th hi r Division , w ch was eady at hand in suppo Ar r in the evening , my Headquarte s went to Milon in order to be close to the critical part At s s battle . du k an audaciou detachment of

o osite ri a e ri a e Six batteries each . A c mp b g d B g d K of six attaions six atteries and a mac b l , b , al was formed to reinforce the cav ry . 18th Decemer It is mentio ne b , d e io n xplanat .

134 THE BATTLE ON TH E OURCQ

N t -le - r en of an euil Haudouin , and the g oup of G Ar mi — 16 r Br Sixt von n the th Infant y igade , and

7th 4th r s s- and Infant y Divi ion would , if he cc - r t i s fit , ope a e by tak ng the offen ive . The of this wing of attack was therefore five and a infantry divisions and the 4th Cavalry Division ’ Le el s r Br addition to p Infant y igade . B Ar r r r y the same my Ope ation O de , the left r r was r r unde Gene al von Linsingen , o de ed to ma its r der r position , and Gene al von Ma witz was to p the left flank of the Ar my on th e Marne with his ’ Cavalry Division* and Von Kraewel s Comp Br r r - - igade f om Mont euil aux Lions . Ar my Headquarters would move to 9 am 9th . . on the , to which place telephonic tion would be established . r r r The IX . Co ps had al eady eceived special fr om Vendrest giving the general situation a ’ and Ar r above , stating the my Commande s intent all the available leading troops of the Corps t if possible , come into ac ion on that day , the s s 6th r s fl as i t the Infant y Divi ion , on the ank o Colonel von der Schul enburg had already a r r two battalions . The emainde of the IX . b e r h r r to b oug t fo wa d , so that it might come into a r 9th s ea ly on the , as tated above .

TH E GAP IN TH E WESTERN WING o r TH E GERMAN ARMIES

t am 9th r Arm A . . on the Septembe y r rr r r In quarte s a ived at Ma euil . Ea ly in the

‘ his General von Quast had advanced with IX .

s 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions mu t b e meant . THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ 135

ntr vi s s Landwehr y Di ion , ome battalions der r 4th a r Schulenbu g , and the C val y make the enveloping attack towards right wing moved south ré - en - s r s du C . of py Valoi , th ough the Boi Roi Up till m was r r s 2 . p . the attack still making good p og e s , and the enemy did not seem to have any more strong re ’ his di s s Le el s r r serves at po al . p B igade had eached s— -le - r r Baron , on the Senli Nanteuil Haudouin oad , befo e o s o ur e r meeting any ppo ition , and ind fatigable ai men — reported that the roads in the area Senlis Chantilly r — r r C eil Compiegne we e clea of the enemy . While the progress on the wing of attack was thus all s r r s that could be de i ed , impo tant development on the ft Ar h was s r s r le wing of the my , w ich e iou ly th eatened,

fo r r r Ar r called fu the action by the my Commande . The Second Army had had to withdraw its right wing on 8th r s r n the on Fontenelle , nea the ou ce of the Dolla am 9th r r Dollan] , and at . . on the epo ted that it was withdrawi ng its right wi ng on that day to the r —Le r r s r ss line Ma gny Thoult . The I . Caval y Co p , p e ed

was r r r - en - r by the enemy , eti ing pa tly on Condé B ie r r ss r A r r r r and pa tly ac o the Ma ne . epo t f om Gene al der M r s 1020 m r von a witz , de patched at . a . . and eceived 11 m st r r r s r at a . . , ated that a st ong fo ce of B iti h infant y * was r ss r ui r advancing ac o the Ma ne at Nante l and Cha ly . r r s Ar Unde these ci cum tances , the left wing of the my er r s was r r 11 am und Gene al von Lin ingen o de ed at . . o s r — ul s t be ent back to a line C ouy Co omb , left of the r r 5th r lowe Ou cq ; and the Infant y Division , which — The whol e B ritish Expeditionary Force was crossing 1st Caval ry ri a e o o e the l st and 2nd Di isio ns at Char the B g d , f ll w d by v ly ; 3rd and 5th Di isio ns at Nant eul l and Saac 4th Di ision at v y, v LaFerte” so s Jouarre and east ofit u . 136 THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

was r had not yet been put into the battle , to ma ch Trocy towards Dhuisy to attack the British f r ss the r B r r c o ing Ma ne . y an o de issued at this division was placed under the orders of Genera der r was r 0 Ma witz , who gua ding the left flank Ar r - - rr w my at La Fe te sous Joua e , and ith * Br r h - s At igade no t ea t of that place . r r r m had sent in a epo t , eceived at p . . British forces on thi s side of the river were being whi ch was entirely in accordance wi th the wishes Ar r the my Commande . The wi ng of attack was still advancing between r il Cré -en - r Fe te M on and py Valois . F om a teleph conversation with the Chi ef of the Staff of the r it appea ed that , owing to the state of the r r the Ou cq , it was not yet necessa y to Ar left wing of the my . With the consent r r the r r r Headqua te s , g oup unde Gene al von r r r r r s the efo e emained in its fo me po ition . r r 1 m r mes Sho tly afte p . . the following wi eless arrived from the Second Ar my : Airmen report advance of four long enemy columns towards 9 am r r r at . . thei advanced t oops we e on ’ — r — — -l r aud Cit y Pavant Nogent A t . The in r r its r beginn g to et eat , ight flank on D retreat widened the gap between the two s r up till now had been c eened , into a in the western wing of the with every possibility of a further — Chateau Thi erry to about Epernay th r r Ar the b eadth of f ont of an my . Not t

Th s the ritish w e u , B Como site ri a e p B g d , I .

1 38 THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ whi ch was taken down in the form of a mi nute in still existin g records of Fir st Army Headquarters : s is r Th e The ituation not favou able . Fifth is held up in front OfVerdun and the Sixth a r — r r f in f ont of Nancy Epinal . The et eat o Army behind the Marne is unalterable : its r is r the VII . Co ps , being fo ced back and not r r s eti ing . In consequence of the e facts , all are to be moved back : the Third Ar my to north -east of

a r Ar con unc Ch lons , and the Fou th and Fifth my , in j — through the neighbourhood of Clermont - eh Ar g r s r r Ar s r r towa d Ve dun . The Fi st my mu t the efo e r r d r ss s—Fé re - en - r s eti e in the i ection Soi on Ta denoi , in extreme circu — r - Laon La Fe e . (Lieut . Colonel proximate line to be reached by bit of charcoal on the map of G h f C ief of the Staf . ) r St uentin so nea , r uh r r . . begun . Gene al von K l ema ked that the of the First Army was in full swing and that a r r s would be a ve y delicate ope ation , e pecially Army was in an extremely exhausted condition s rmi s unit inte ngled . To thi Lieut . replied that there was nothi ng else to mitted that , as the fighting stood at would not b e convenient to retir e in the and better to go straight back to b s ss the left flank at lea t on Soi ons . fact that these directions were to remain less of any other communications that mi ght ” r and that he had full powe s . It must be repeated that information of such a throwing an entirely different light on the whole THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ 139

- H entsch shoul d have been given b y Lieut . Colonel r r Ar t to the Commande of the Fi st my .

THE WITHD RAW AL TO TH E AISNE i r r r s r F om F ench sou ce now available , it is clea that General Maunoury had so early as the eveni ng of the 8th considered the advisability of aretreat to a position —St s—Le of defence on the line Monthyon . Soupplet ss s A r of rs Ar Ple i Belleville . tactical victo y the Fi t my over the M y of Maunoury on the extreme left wing o ' r r s s r of the F ench fo ce eemed indeed ce tain , and it l was possible that by the continuation of the offensive the 9th a far -reaching success might have been ob It is probable also that the British could not come forward very rapidly at first after the fight * ontb ert o in r s r s r . Neve thele s , afte the in t uctions r a r r the Sup eme Comm nd , the e could be no longe as ess for r r r r t to the nec ity the et eat o de ed . considerable successes of the Army might influence the course of the operations r Ar s s e Ge man mie fighting to the ea t of it was , s rs Ar r the tandpoint of the Fi t my Commande , r not to be igno ed . In the opinion of the the Supreme Command provided with r was s howeve , not the ca e . The the two Armies on the right wing r s r still wide , thu uncove ing the rs Ar s e Fi t my , whil t the Second Improve its situation as it con in r - s r r a no th ea te ly di ection . of the success already begun

Fo rce advanced ten t o fifteen miles s o the supposed German success at 13 . 7 o o otn te . p , f ) THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

against Mauno ury could be reaped with certainty within the next few days ; but the breaking away from the enemy and the reorganization of units which ss r as as r o would then be nece a y , well the b inging up f r r r f esh supplies of ammunition and food , moving fo wa d the trains and making the communications being measures requiring time to carry enable the British force only temporarily held Mo ntb ert oin and other British columns imme

as as Of r east of it , well the left wing the mo e ’ Ar r d Es ere my of Gene al p y , to come up r r r Ar alr and in ea of the Fi st my , which had mi its rs r the li ts of powe of endu ance . assumed that the enemy would make

s s r Ar mi take , the Fi st my would then have to itself from the other Ar mies by a withdrawal in a r r r s o r r weste ly di ection towa d Dieppe , in mo e f r w r s A s— in as able ci cumstances to a d mien any c e , r rr s s ma ch , with a co e ponding wa tage of man It would have been a very different matter had group of two or three corp s from Lorraine o r Als s r r s r so long de i ed , been eady at hand to uppo t O s r Armi s ffen ive of the weste n wing e , After following up to a certain extent it Mauno ur rs Ar withd y , the Fi t my might then have through Clermont and Compiegne by short and fo rtab le r r s r r r r s ma ches , p otected by t ong ea gua d r r r r ni heavy a tille y , and have eo ga zed in a r r r r r position on a new f ont , p epa ato y to sta ting offensive above o r below Soiss ons in conj uncti s Ar the newly a sembled my . r In view of the completely alte ed situation , the r s t e r s Commande , fully consciou of h t emendou uences q of his decision , decided to b

142 THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

- - — Nanteuil sur Marne Nogent By order r r Ar Sup eme Command , the Fi st my is to be with towards Soissons and west of it behind as to cover the flank of the Armies ; the Second is in retreat to behind the Marne on both sides r Epe nay . I wish to express to the men of the First Ar my hi mi r for t r for ghest ad ation hei devotion to duty , and r hi r ff e thei exceptional ac evements du ing this o ensiv . The Army will to - day continue the movement r r r r r o de ed , f om the lines al eady eached , the main body — moving up to and north of a line Gondrevill e south

- - — east of Crepy eu Valois La Fert r Ou cq line . di von Linsingen , inclu ng ll r Lochow , wi ma ch east of the M w r ilon , and then , ith its ight flank — — LaFerte Milon Villers Cotterets cross half miles north - east of Villers Cot ’ General Sixt von Ar mi n s group will

— — ' right flank on the An tilly Vauciennes Taillefontaineq ’ A r r r ll ttichy oad . Gene al von Quast s g oup wi keep ;

to the west of it . ’ r r Kraewel s Br The II . Caval y Co ps , with igade r wi r th cove the left flank of the thd awal . The 4 C Division has been ordered to move ahead to the

’ to occupy the bridges between Compiegne and So The Reserve Brigade of 11th Landwehr r der c r B igade of Von ” S hulenbu g r march by Compiegne to Vic for the same pu pose .

i r r r s add tion to the ea gua d holding up the enemy , advance wi ll be further obstructe d by breaking up roads and demolishing the bridges over THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ 143 A by the column it is now with , to the isne , Pre s r s r . pos ible , its t an po t will accompany it ry measures for reorganizing corps units will take

- rr to mo ow . Headquarters will move to - day to La Ferte r r s r 7 am - rr O de s will be i sued the e at . . to mo ow

g . Si ned VON LUC ( g ) K K .

T 9th Ar hus , on the evening of the , the my Com mander was able to watch the columns of his whole Ar r o n l 0th re my on the ma ch again , and the the

’ shufflin t e r s t r g of h smalle unit began , af e which it was that Same day to start re-forming the larger

rs r The enemy at fi t did not follow up at all , and late only with hesitation ; it was conjectured that this was ’ s Maunour s Ar u ted state of y my , the i ts ni hi s mong u ts , and expectation of s r r s T s u p i es . hat this e timation of the the French Sixth Army was correct is shown 1 the battle given to representa ss r r f r by the F ench Gene al Staf late on , r r r A r app op iately quoted he e . cco ding

' of it given in the Kiilnzsche Z eitung of 6th r 1914 1323 was s Decembe , , No . , it as follow By the evening of the 8th it was obvious that m s r move ent ea twa ds had failed . Instead of out r r Maunour ad the Ge man ight wing , y h to be est h s was s s he im elf enveloped . To e cape thi

r r r t e r s s o de ed all the t oops of h IV . Co p till on to hi s left flank at Nanteuil troops were sent up by rail and st some were sent in motor-buses THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ r r r s o r s r -r e equisitioned f om Pa i , el e by ma ch out . rr r the time they a ived , howeve , the situation become much worse : Ger the Nanteuil - Senli s road as far as Baro

r r r s aftern ing the et eat on Pa i . Late on the 9th o ur r r r r IV . Co ps had to eti e f om about and one wondered what the situation might r Ar following mo ning . The Sixth my CO r r s howeve , begged his commande s to tand at all co in order not to lose the frui ts of the victory on ” r Ma ne . It can be seen from this how seriously the of the First Ar my on the Ourcq was r r h r r r r F enc Headqua te s , and , fu the , that Reserve formation of four to six divisions brought about the destruction of the Frenc and thereby coul d have transformed the situation of the right wing of the German Or r s r The de of the Day , i sued by Gene ’ r r afte the five days battle on the Ou cq , s tradi cts in places the above account of the situation of his Army ; it runs as follows : Fo r five complete days the Sixth Army has fought wi thout cessation o r rest against a numerous whose fighting spirit had been raised to an ex c hi s r r pit h by fo me successes . The fight was v s rr r one ; and the hea y los es incu ed , the g eat r needed , and the lack of est and even food r r r desc iption . You have , howeve , bo ne the r s a fo titude , con tancy , a r s mr s r of mine can adequately p ai e . Co ade , you

A simil ar rein orcement of General Maunour o r of f y ,

ha French o ha e een e a r it ul in resul ts . Mars l , w uld v b qu lly f u f

146 THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

During the l 0th September t he withdrawal of Army came to a standstil l with the main body of marchi ng columns in the area north of the woo ry r re s count about Ville s Cotte ts , whil t guards halted south of the woods on an

- - — line east of Crepy en Valois Gru r r th uppe Ou cq . The plunge of the Army into the forest zone must have made it di ffi ul for di s r r r c t the enemy to cove thei whe eabouts . ’ ’ Marwitz s r r s Kraewel s Br Caval y Co p , with igade , r Ar th cove ed the left flank of the my , and by was in the vicinity of the upper Crise near ’ whilst Lepel s Reserve Brigade and Landwehr Brigade protected the the Compiegne , and the bridges over the r r The Ar as o de ed . r r Valse y , whithe the Chie summoned to discuss the s r r arran e /latera unit in thei ight places again , to g r r r s movements , the withd awal of t ains ac o s and Ai s r fur r the ne , and to egulate the the details of n food and ammu ition supply , and the question r billeting a eas . r r was rr for t e The et eat ca ied out , h most r r r without any f iction . The g eat st ain which

’ naturally been put on the c olumns and tra occa sional stimulus necessary to The enemy did not pursue in the he had clearly expected the bat 9 h 10th r the t and Septembe , an self behind time as soon as the The onl y exception to with a strong force THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ 147

’ took place on the front of Marwitz s Cavalry an r ro r his “ d the othe t ops unde command , movement on the r oads to be used by them was arly cramped by the baggage columns and r r g ahead of them ; howeve , he e , too , the from the enemy was accomplished without

r s se iou damage . On the evening of the 10th September the Army Commander described the Situation between the upper r —Ai s s — r r r Ou cq ne and Oi e Ma ne , and explained the fu the

duties in front of ! the Ar my in the followin g Army Operation Order issued from Coeuvres -et -Valsery at

order marks an all-round Slackening of the on the First Army as right flank guard of di and it in cates that , though s s s s rs s nts till ub i ted , the fi t teps being taken to get the divisions back again to r r r r s r p ope co ps , while the t an po t columns and were being moved up on to the high ground r Ai s rr r r r s no th of the ne a anged in thei o iginal fo mation , as to clear the river-crossings for the fighting troops : runs as follows :

Ai r- r r s r r I . epo ts tate that du ing the afte noon the has been in pursuit with strong forces of all arms i ll r -en - r u . r y St F ont and Chezy O xois . Smalle re s s r s also een about Coulomb , Vend e t , and ’ A strong force of enemy s cavalry with r r has a tille y been in action about Billy ,

cavalry out ofl and captured anumber ofGerman the 9th o n the l oth o in to th e ro ein ; , w g g und b g the action between the two cavalries was entirely divisions captured a long column of 148 BA R THE TTLE ON THE OU CQ,

r r r r - wi r the and late , fa the to the no th east , th pa t of

n Ar and r r s r left wi g of the my the Caval y Co p . The e are no air -reports at hand yet from the country west

r r A r r u r ss r of the lowe Ou cq . F ench B igade of c i a ie s with artillery appeared on the western wing of the ’ Ar Le el s r Br r r my . p Rese ve igade had to eti e yesterday r r r r s v on Ve be ie , afte a victo iou action in the icinity ul s r r r Ar of R ly again t supe io numbe s . The Second my r r n s s Of s is eti i g behind the Ve le on both side Reim . 2 - rr r Ar r Ai . To mo ow the Fi st my will c oss the sne s s s r r r r s at Sois on and we t of it , leaving st ong ea gua d r nk r r on the southe n ba , and will begin the eo ganization I

of its units . 3 r 5 am 7th 22nd . Sta ting at . . the and the Re Divisions wi ll cross the Ai sne at Fontenoy and P r Ar r in f ont of the left wing of the my , unde s r r von Lin ingen . The IV . Rese ve Co ps s s r r a semble outh of Nouv on . Leaving thei 5 am t he . . , following units will take up e rearguard positions : the 5th Infantry ’ Kraewel s r the v r B igade , and hea y howitze batta

; or of the III C ps , between Belleu and Billy ; the Infantry Division between Saconin - et -Breui l and Crise ; the 8th Infantry Division from north -east r - et - r Lave sine to Saconin B euil . 4 r r r . Of the g oup unde Gene al Sixt von the 7th Infantry Division will take up a re position to the west of Laversine in touch r s r 5 am th . . . 8 Infant y Divi ion Sta ting at , Infantry Division will move from Vivieres Ressous -le-Long and Fontenoy to the neighb s r s r of Pa ly , and e t the e . 5 r r r s . Of the g oup unde Gene al von Qua t , r r 5 am w Infant y Division , ma ching at . . , ill move

150 THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

Ar Our s r mi r r s my on the cq , al o on the p eli na y ope ation r r i r r befo e b eak ng away f om the enemy , the withd awal

Ai s s r f r r to the ne , and the mea u es taken o cove ing the r Ar rs ight flank of the Second my by the Fi t . In the i r r 10th r meant me , ea ly in the mo ning of the Septembe w r s r r o a i ele s message f om the Sup eme C mmand , e am rr d spatched at . . , a ived Ar r r r r Second my has eti ed to behind the Ma ne , ight r r Ar wi flank Do mans . Fi st my ll place itself in echelon i r beh nd it in a position of eadiness . Envelopment of the right flank of the Second Army is to be prevented s r by offen ive measu es . At 9 am hi r r e about . . t s o de was supplement d by another : Fighting on the whole front fav oura Security of right flank of Second Army by an o r Ar r Af r of Fi st my u gently needed . te the Of Army Headquarters at Coeuvres -et -Valsery mation was received that the First under the orders Ofthe Second Ar my ur r f the notice . In view of the Ar r m my Commande at p . . Ar my would be ready to take As ll wi have been seen , howe Operation Order issued from Coeuvres -et - Va another offensive at this moment was out of the

’ Ar m r r r tion . The y Commande the efo e decided to every unit of the Army on to Ai r sne befo e anything else , and not tions for another offensive until thi and till after the corps had fini shed th and the most necessary fighting supplies ha ed rs Ar ul plenish . The Fi t my wo d not be employment in any other way before the t r t r embe at he ealiest . TH E BATTLE ON THE OURCQ 15 1

On the evening of the 10th (Second) Ar my Head quarters communicated that the Second Ar my was to be withdrawn behind the Ai sne by the 12th with its T ui s - s s h r Ar left wing at h zy outh ea t of Reim , the T i d my r -le - — r h to the line Mou melon Petit F anc eville , and the — Fourth Army to behind the Rhi ne Marne Canal as far as Revigny .

CR OSS ING TH E AIS NE

1 On the 11th September the movements ordered for crossing the Ai sne and re - forming the corps were com pleted without any appreciable di sturbance by the s the r enemy . That evening a divi ion of IX . Co ps r h A s r s r stood no t of the i ne at Be neuil ; the IV . Re e ve r s s r r Co p , le s the B igade of Von Lepel , was at Nouv on ; 4th r s s r - s the Infant y Divi ion about Pa ly , no th we t of 6th r s r r s Soissons , and the Infant y Divi ion at Ta tie s , ea t r Of A s r of Nouv on . South the i ne , the othe half of the r r 3r h r . d 5t IX . Co ps , the IV Co ps , and the and Infant y Div isions heldentrenchedpo sitions on aline Cuise Lamotte Passing through s r s Ar r the po ition of the IV . Co p , the my Commande was s its - r able to convince him elf that battle fo mation , as s mi s s alway , was e nently uited to the ituation ; and er A s r lat , in the i ne valley at Pommie s , he watched the 22nd Reserve Division crossing the river below Soissons o r r r was in the m st excellent o de . The e no sign of s s or r r s m unea ine s anxiety , and eve ywhe e the a e keen , r r s s r s for r s ente p i ing pi it in pite of the need a e t . Ar r rs r my Headqua te went to Fontenoy . Thep otection s Ar la s of both flank of the my y in afe hands . The with drawal r s r r i to r r of the t ain p oceeded well acco d ng o de s . ’ ‘ The enemy s advanced guards did not come up against 152 THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

our r r ll Ar r fire st ong f ont ti the evening . tille y without r l any se ious fighting fol owed . On the morning of the 11th September the following Order arrived from the Second Army Commander : The Second Ar my is to reach the Vesle on both sides 12 r The rs Ar of Reims by the th Septembe . Fi t my will continue its withdrawal to behind the Aisne on the 11th 12 13 r , and on the th and th will close in , cove ed by Ai r the sne position , up to the ight flank of the Second Ar r r 11th s my . F om the mo ning of the the Ve le at Br s r ai ne and Fismes will be held by a composite b igade , detailed from the Second Accordin g to a later message the right flank of the Ar was a -sur- s Second my to go to Ch lons Ve le . The 13th Infantry Division was to remain at Braisne and r r r r s Fismes , with the I . Caval y Co ps fa the to the outh . The enemy was followin g the right wing of the Second Ar r -en - r As r r s my , and had eached Ville Ta denois . ega d Ar m ' r r the Seventh y , j info mation came f om its com r ff r s mande to the e ect that the XV . Co p was on its r s way by ail to St . Quentin , and the la t of its fighting r s rr 13 r t oop might be expected to a ive by the th Septembe . r r s Had this happened ten days ea lie at Soisson , the fortunes of the campaign would have turned very r r r r - Armi s mate ially in favou of the Ge man ight wing e , r r r s and t ansfo med the gene al ituation .

At this time Vo n c s e t was at Soissons ten mi es as the Klu k l f , l ies is e crow fl fromBra n . TThis was in pro cess o ffor mation to fill the gap b etween the

Fi rst and Seco n Armi es and e ent al comrise the X V. Co r s d , v u l y p d p

es e Cor s . and IX . R er and VII . v p

154 BA R THE TTLE ON THE OU CQ,

r 4th r i Co ps . The Infant y Div sion will take position of readiness on the gr ound about 8th r r The Infant y Division of the IV . Co ps will thr ough Pernant and through Mercin -et -Vaux r r r are r th Pommie s , whe e the e two b idges , and r T e 7th r to no th of Juvigny . h Infant y Division march through Ambleny and Fontenoy to the r r 17 nf r s south of Ta tie s . The th I ant y Divi ion of IX r . Co ps will go into position along the fr om Attichy to Bitry ; the 18th will Attichy and Vic to Autreches and Reserve Brigade will move from CO 6 r der r th . Gene al von Ma witz with Cavalry Divisions will be responsible for ft Ar r le flank of the my as befo e , and will get into r r r s with the B igade of the VII . Co ps at B ai ne . 4th r s r r Caval y Divi ion , suppo ted by the IX . Co ps , r r nk Ar gua d the ight fla of the my . 7 Ai s r r are . The ne b idges allotted to co ps t prepared for demolition by them and held after have been crossed : if the enemy presses forward are to be be di smantled after the crossing has Army Headquarters will be at Juvigny ; Infantry Division will detail a company as r rs ss m O de will b e i ued at 6 p . . I myself shall be

r r am . Nouv on f om . . onwards U C (Signed) VON KL K .

With the conclusion of these movements the

t - 12th r r within the three days 9 h Septembe , in th e strides had regained touch the same time breaking o ff THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ 155

Ar l between the two mies was closed , though on y by a r thin line of t oops . Mention must also be made of the movements of the r ns r di r mmuni t a po t , inclu ng all the t ains , a tion , and s r r r baggage column , which , du ing its withd awal f om r A r Mo in to the ilette , clea ly showed that by r its r ad g own to wo k , and had aecom s r ta k , demanding g eat physical and s r prai eworthy and devoted manne . t e r s the rs r h III . Co p , fi t line ma ched r r th ough Ma gival to Chavignon , the Leuilly through Vauxaillon and is r s ; of the II . Co p the from Juv igny thr ough second line from Crecy -au- Mont r r s to B ancou t . The econd line r s r uill f the III . Co p had to be clea of Le y t e rs r was and h fi t line of the II . Co ps not to l r am r s y befo e . . ; of the IV . Co p the from Vezaponin to Crecy-au e second line from Troisly Loire to Coucy -le r r and emained halted ; and of the IX . Co ps the r r A r ma ched f om Nampcel to udignicou t , and (1 r r r i - ul - - line f om Ble ancou t to Sa nt Pa aux Bois . etion r s r as r equally to the t an po t to the fighting t oops , both drew closer to the Second Army in their

TH E ATTACK BY TH E ARMIES OF MAUN OURY AND FRENCH ACROSS TH E AISNE

On the morning of the 12th September strong column s reported advancing northwards from the neigh on the 156 THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

r r r r r uppe Ou cq , which we e clea ly the B itish , who could nl r r r o y move slowly in la ge bodies . Weake fo ces of ’ Maunoury s Army were reported to be advancing in a northerly direction about Mortefontaine and Coeuvres et - r r r r r Valse y , and f om the Ville s Cotte ets dist ict . — — ' The area Roye Montdidi er Noyon on the rl ght flank of the Ar my and west of the Oise was clear of the enemy . During the afternoon the enemy approached the Ai r fire sne , and by that time st ong gun had developed r Ar s on the whole f ont of the my , e pecially opposite the r A r IX . Co ps . se ious attack by the enemy was all the more probable since it was of great the point of V iew of General Maun r r Ar F ench , to defeat the Fi st my r s ul rr At 1 fo cement co d a ive . Operation Order was issued : The Army wi s s r has dir its po ition . The IX . Co ps been ect the right flank of the Ar my on the front Nampc A r —A r di s r r 1 udignicou t ut eches . The t ibution of f ont sectors is as follows :

r r r IV . Rese ve Co ps on the high g ound at Nou r r s -en -Al IV . Co ps on the high g ound at Cui y to the heights of rPasly (both inclusi ffies hi r s r s r Cu . II . Co p f om to about C v e

I r s r r III . Co p on the high g ound no th of C r r with one di vision in ese ve . ’ ‘ r Marwitz s Cavalry Co ps at Vailly .

s s r r r The po ition we e st ong , the ight flank was safely

r r p otected and the left flank , owing to the fo mation r r r of the III . Co ps as o de ed above , could be ar r r r f the eastwa ds , by that Co ps and by

r r Caval y Co ps , so as to enable a junction to be made s r r rr i with the VII . Re e ve Co ps , which was hu y ng up

158 THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

At 5 m o n r 1 about p . . the afte noon of the 2th the ’ nf r r r s enemy s i ant y , both F ench and B iti h , was able to — cross the Ai sne on the front Attichy Soissons ; farther * r r was east , howeve , only a caval y advance made . At this period the following Order arrived from the Second Army Commander : The enemy forcing back the right flank division has crossed the Vesle and gained r rr rs Ar the high g ound of St . Thie y . The Fi t my will s end as strong a force as possible to -day in the direction rr r r r of St . Thie y , towa ds the ea of the enemy . The remainder of the Ar my will cover the right flank of thi s r A r r s r ope ation . epo t will be ent he e immediately of ” h r r r Ar w at is o de ed . Such an advance by the Fi st my r hi rr s r towa ds St . T e y was the le s p acticable as mean while the 13th Infantry Division of the Second Army had had to withdraw from its advanced position in the face of strong enemy forces with its right flank mo

‘ B r - et - mi on ou g Co n . The Fi rst Army could only accept battle in s or r position it now occupied , abandon the st ong s r r r r r T e of the Ai ne and eti e fa the to the no th . h gap between the Second and First Armies would have to be fi r Ar lled by pa t of the Seventh my now moving up , whose leading troops were to arrive south of Laon on the 13 wi r r th . The follo ng message was the efo e sent at 8 50 Ar r : r s Ar . pm. to the Second my Commande Fi t my — heav ily attacked on front Attichy So issons ; a battle is - rr is i r expe cted to mo ow . It hold ng the no th bank r A the Ai sne f om ttichy to Condé . The left wing can

r r r r s . fu the p olonged , but any advance towa d St T ” is out of the question .

1 “ Vo n Kluck omits mention ofthe seizure ofthe bridge at by the advanced guard ofthe 11th Infantry B THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ 159

12th September marks the beginning of trench rs Ar A r e for the Fi t my on the isne . Befo e eluding this briefly outlined account Ar fu s r the my , it may be use l to de c ibe transition to position - warfare by means of r r ss r made and the o de s i ued , and the eby ’ rs Ar its s te how the Fi t my , by many day Ai s was founda ne , called upon to lay the eventual establishment of the German r A s s r r f om the i ne to the Y e . Ext acts r r t Ar r m a Memo andum , w i ten by the my Commande Ar r the Second my Commande , will also be added .

RETROSPE CT

r Ar r rs hi r F om my Headqua te , w ch at that time we e close up to the front at Juvigny and behi nd the artillery

s r s Ar r r r position of the IV . Co p , an my Ope ation O de i 12 on the even ng of the th , stating that the my had succeeded In crossing the Ai sne m front of r s r r s r r ight wing of the IV . Re e ve Co p , and fu the that

r s was r r r r s r VII . Co p eti ing f om about B ai ne towa ds The First Army was to maintain and strengthen itions r rr . The IV . Co ps , by a angement with r r s s r Rese ve Co p , was to uppo t it with heavy r r - s r f om about no th ea t of Nouv on , and the (1 s s r the s r al o uppo t IV . Re e ve Corps r h r ‘ rs f om the hig g ound west of Mo ain . was Of r s co - r the duty the III . Co p , ope ating with the

. r r r o utflankin and I Caval y Co ps , to p event the g ’ Ar Le el s r the left wing of the my . p B igade was to from Comp1égne towards the north bank of the r A s in the di ection of ttichy , as al o the 10th

ehr r r r B r B igade f om Ribecou t . oth b igades The more o r 160 THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ less wholesale abandonment of the northern bank of A s its r 1 s ul the i ne , with many av ne that co d be utili zed for was defence , to be modified in such manner as the Ar r my Commande thought fit . In the present condition of infantry armament it woul d have been advisable to leave a strong covering of modern li ght machine gun s in nooks in the ravines on the slopes of the Aisne during the crossing of the r r 11th A dr ive on the . few hun eds of these effective weapons would have checked at the outset the attempts r hi of the enemy to c oss , and thus gained time in w ch to strengthen the defence by sending reinforcements r n r r r * whe e needed . Even a few gu s and t ench mo ta s would not have been out of place . In Spite of the measures mentioned ab prisin g enemy forced his way on to at Attichy and Vic during the 13th r r r r a tille y , and epeated F ench a s r s r r again t the f ont of the IV . Re e ve Co ps . IV ‘ s r r r r r r r and . Re e ve Co ps we e the efo e o de ed the enemy back on to the ridge immedi ately a “ Ai r wi r sne . The IV . Co ps ll suppo t this r as nf r re st ongly possible , and will send one i ant y and a field-artillery b rigadej ‘ from Tartiers to N r r s - r to the IV . Rese ve Co p . The battle f ont r r s W l r its r latte co p i l be sho tened , ight r - s r no th we t of Roche , and its left on the easte n edge

Fontenoy . On the evening of the 14th the Army Commander repeated the order to continue reinforcing those positions

Thes e ea o ns accor in to the German Genera Sta mo no w p , d g l ff ” ra h Lfittich-Namr ere rst sed in the attac o n Fort g p u , w fi u k

Flé ro n Lie e . , g ' es 1 Three batteri .

162 THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

the l 6th cc - r s . r was on , ope ating with the IX Co p , it ’ r 4th v d ive back the enemy s left wing . The Ca a r r r Division cove ed the b idges at Chauny , Cond en , ui r r r Ar Q e zy in ea of the my . If onl y these three Corps had arrived in line of the western wing of the Armies ten (1 on the Marne The reinforcement at last made good the nume r r Of s r disp opo tion the oppo ing fo ces . With the ’ elusion of the many days Battle of the Ai sne r s s warfare ' r final t an ition to po ition . j It b ought it all the characteristics of the most obstinate warfare with continual alternation of rest and r r r fire fighting , all unde an incessant a tille y . vast amount of work required for constructing s s r s s r r po ition in the numbe le s ecto s of the f ont , ’ ported by poi nts dappui both fo r defence and attack ; the constant pulling out of mobile r r especially afte the IV . and II . Co ps had b elsewhere ; the bui lding of shelters and dug-outs and below ground fo r man and horse ; the repair of out roads ; far-reachi ng measures for the care health of the troops and for their food - supply the front line up to strength and replenis ammunition depots ; provision of fortress .

i The us a i e This is an interesting admiss on . u l All d has een that at the Marne there ere ort -six di isi b , , w f y v - ow Von c te s at l east fort y one German . N Klu k ll — e e as a o t thr ee cor s that is six i isions . nc w b u p , d v 1‘ During the whol e p eriod ofthe Battl e o fthe Ais s n er the or ers ofVon Bfil ow b ut as the atter wa u d d , , l his o r ers so that he had e ent al t o a ea to the d , v u l y pp l mand to prevent Vo n Kluck fromrepeating THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ 163 regul ating the means of communication and the system r f hi r — new of t a fic be nd the f ont all these began , and u r r s as co ntless othe impo tant ta ks well . r s r r With the g owth in the t ength of the field wo ks , r r r s r r co ps commande s , in the inte est of the welfa e of thei r r ar r r s fer t oops , int oduced egula system of elief the men s r r far on outpo t fighting in the f ont line . Unde the seeing leadership of the General Commanding the r r in Pionee s , Gene alleutnant Telle , the excellent and defatigable Pioneers gave every assistance to the r r i and s infant y in thei d g ging , with the utmo t devotion carried out the most dangerous operations above and r un r - r r ni r below g o d in t ench wa fa e , and in mi ng ope a r on r r r late . Pionee depots g ew , as it we e , out of r r r ul r g ound . The a tille y with its f ly matu ed experience supported the infantry as much as

‘ s its wn shortness in pite of o of ammunition , r s r Ar at c isi was also ove come , and the my to undertake extensive operations at Bailly and ni hi r The lines of commu cations , w ch , as befo e , er r Bertrab r r Gene alleutnant von , inc eased thei

ghest pitch . Ai r the Battle of the sne was ove , mitted a richl y deserved rest and on to be given to the corps Ofthe First s s r tho e sons of Hol tein , of the Ma ches of ur r S g , of Pome ania , Saxony , and chleswig , r r neve failed in thei duty . In the meantime

r r r r rs s ho semen , unde thei celeb ated leade , r r r for rs r s r no thwa ds , whe e yea a mie f om anchored the northern wing of the German Armies firmly in that blood-soaked soil from rs to the coast . This was the basis 164 BA R THE TTLE ON THE OU CQ, condition for the inevitable future offensive against the enemies in the West . From the time of its departure from the concentration area between the Rhin e and the western frontier of r r Ai x- - rr Ge many , no th of la Chapelle , up till its a ival on r r r rs Ar the G and Mo in , east of Pa is , the Fi t my , its r a i points , advanced gua ds and m in bod es , fighting r r r on the majo ity of days , had cove ed in about thi ty r 312 days a distance of ove miles , and , if the distance Ai far r 375 r back to the sne is added , ove miles , in va y ing r r r s - o de of battle and without a e t day . r r s r hl The names of its leade s , Gene al G onau , Ku , r Armi Linsingen , Lochow , Ma witz , Sixt von n , and r r Quast , came b illiantly to the f ont , gained by them in commanding such unsurpa troops brought them during the following years to Ar Ar r command of mies and my G oups , and to s - r leading position on the decisive battle f onts . During the September fighting far the greater n of the success , tactically speaki g , fell to the r Ar r Weste n my , but st ategically the enemy r the uppe hand , since he was able to compel the Supreme Command to arrange a completely grouping of the Western Army at another part of th It is clear that the gallant Sixth French under M

s r r r r r imple ope ation to pe fo m , whe eas the co p First Army were called upon to carry out on strained their capacity of manoeuvre to the ut and whose complications and di fli cul ties were as have seldom been met with in the history of

166 THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

in the direction of Fismes with as strong a force as to e possible , exploit the success of the l ft wing of the Ar III r r r Second my . The . Co ps , at the u gent equest Of Ar r r r the Seventh my , and in acco dance with the o de Ar r r r of the Second my Commande , the efo e attacked - on r — r - to day the f ont Condé Vailly and no th east of it , r r r in suppo t of the VII . Rese ve Co ps . The enemy is in strength on the whole fr ont of the r Ar r i r s Fi st my , and makes inte m ttent attacks in va iou r Ar r places . The ight wing of the my , the IX . Co ps , r r r t which had been d awn back , was yeste day th ea ened r by an enveloping attack f om about Compiegne on Cuts . As r r n the IX . Rese ve Co ps , belongi g to the Seventh Ar r Ar o my , has al eady been sent by that my to Noy n , there is a possibility of preventing the enveloping r movement and fo cing the enemy back again . r IX r C r s are r The IX . Co ps and . Rese ve o p , the e r - r fo e , to attack to day and d ive back the enemy , but r fl r r r the ight ank will be withd awn again afte wa ds , and the IX r r far . Rese ve Co ps , so as it is at the disposal of the r Ar wi r h Fi st my , ll be echeloned back no t of

Ifthe absence of any clear report by First Headquarters regarding the danger threatenin right flank of the Armies has given rise m r it ust be stated that , unfo tunately , nothing in r r r r n B natu e of a clea epo t could be obtai ed . cavalry and air reconnaissances h ave failed during the r r r past few days . It appea s , howeve , that only st ong r r r r F ench caval y is advancing no th of the Oise , st ength r r s r f om two to th ee divi ions . The st ong r s r s r r r n fro a m , p eviou ly epo ted , is ma chi g v r r b r re on Noyon . The II . Ca al y Co ps has een o de d

to march towards Chauny . TH E BATTLE ON TH E OURCQ

I request a decision as to whether the centre of the Ar Ai s r An o flensiv e my is to hold the ne line o not . of r s s or r r e the left wing towa ds Fi me , even me ely an ene g tic r r Ar suppo t of the ight wing of the Seventh my , is only s of Ai s A r a pos ible if the line the ne is held . withd aw l ’ rs Ar r r of the Fi t my , in a di ection due no th , in face of n the e emy immediately opposed to it , would place the Seventh and Second Armies inanexceptionally dangerous r r hi t situation . The st ong fo ces of the enemy , w ch un il h rs Ar w now ave been held by the Fi t my , ould gain a r for r r O er f ee hand fu the p ations .

r r h Taking eve ything into conside ation , I t ink it preferable for the First Army to hold on to the Ai sne s1 for wi its po tion the time being , th left flank sup r v Ar its r n po ting the Se enth my , and ight wi g bent back , R s r r s r with the IX . e e ve Co p echeloned no th of the s as s r Oi e , oon as the th eatened enveloping attack has r ul r extensrv e o r been ep sed . If a mo e echel n fo mation r r rr r s r s o r is o de ed , it can only be ca ied out by f e h fo ce , s A s el e by giving up the line of the i ne , in which case it should be borne in mind that strong enemy forces are clo se up to the First Army on the whole of its front ; w r r h is rs s and if the idea of ithd awing due no t pe i ted in , s e w it cannot be combined with an offen iv of the left ing , or with the duty of protecting the flank of the Seventh Armi and Second es . Si ned VON LUC ( g ) K K .

The tu crary subordination of Ar mi es to the com

— “ m N m . r r n Ar selddmL e f dEO

mande of a neighbo i g my will " oun - - m n. “ w —r . . m w u u-m .. fi dimi ri i éh Or terminate a strategical or hi gh tactical THE BATTLE ON THE OURCQ

ander mul taneousl t reliev e m of the si u o afi y w hi l fl P' coM nd If r r of such a p ocedu e , which

’ ’ r durin the war r r late g , was not ega ded r r r Ar r r as desi able with la ge mode n mies , anothe cou se , r r ul wo thy of ecommendation , wo d have been to place the Chief of the General Staff in temporary command — ri h Armies r s fl n ‘ , of the g t v g in the a ea Noyon Reim ’

r H is r r fortune . ofwar unde Maje—sty s o de s . The is on thOfOfi h r the side of g measu es . With the establishment of the First Army on the high ground along the northern bank of the Aisne an r ss r r opp e ively heavy bu den , both in a st ategic and s was r r sh ul r its tactical sen e , emoved f om the o de s of famous corp s and their capable commanders of all r r r e r g ades . The he oic t oops could look back on th i r fu r long campaign with memo ies ll of glo y , toil , and devotion to duty against enemies worthy of their steel ; fr they could think , not without emotion , of the suf e ings Of r r h thei wounded com ades , and of those left be ind on r r for the nume ous battlefields , who had given thei lives

r r fo r r for r 1r the Empe o , the Count y , and Honou . The r r s f high cou age and devotion to duty emain stead ast . To work for v 1ctory in happy combination one with r th e 0 anothe was thought of all . N one set value on r individual glo y .

1 70 ORDER OF BATTLE OF FIRST ARMY

CORPS To tal troops ie and Reser e 124 attaions 82 s adrons 96 atteri es F ld v b l , qu , b , 12 i neer Co s P o y . Lan eh r 18 s a r n a s 3 o s 0 tterie . dw qu d , b Lan st rm 0 0 d u n — N E r a ai ns . and 4 I er m ari OT . a e tt o 3 V e te or etai e to J g b l III . w p ly d l d

Di ision f Ca ar Cor s . 2nd v o II . v l y p

COR III . PS

25 a ai ns 6 s a rons 24 atteri es 4 ioneer Co s tt o . ( b l , qu d , b , P y )

5ih Di vi si on 6 th Di visio n 9th Infantry Brigade 1 1th Infantry Brigade

8th e t . 2 th R e R g 0 gt . 48 th 3 5th l oth Infantry Brigade 12th Infantry Brigade th 24th R t e . 12 R egt . g 52nd 64th (Each regiment of3 batta (Each regiment o f3 batta li ons and a machi ne -gun lio ns and a machine-gun a man . m n co p y ) co p y . ) rd r m 3rd J age r Battu . 3 Hus sa s (Regi ental Staff

a r . 3rd Hus sars (3 s qu d o ns ) and 3 s quadro ns ) . 5 th Fi eld Artillery Brigade 6th Fi eld Artillery Bri gade 18th Fi eld Artillery R egt 3rd Fi eld Artill ery Regt : at ri es and A t n a r a A t i n 3 te . ei 3 t i e nd I . b e lu g ( b I b lu g ( b te s

h ammni tio n co mn . h amm o n c m lig t u lu ) lig t uni ti olu n) . n ho i t ers A te i n 3 at A tei . teri es II . b lu g ( w z ) II b lu g ( b 54th Fi el Artl ll ery R egt and li ght ammni tio n d m u A t i n . co n . I . b e lu g lu ) 39th Arti er Re II . ll y gt

A i n . Engineers I. bte lu g attn A n h 3rd io neer B . . tei o i t ers l s t Co y . P II b lu g ( w z ) . n a n n r 5th Divi sio nal Bridgi g Tr in . E gl ee s : 1 1 on r t Me di cal : 2 15 Co y 3rd Pi ee Ba tu . 1 t and 3rdMe i ca Co s . 31 s d l y 9 , 9 , 6 th Di i sio na ri in Train v l B dg g . Medical 2ndMe ica Co d l y .

ion 3rd i o neer Ammni tio n Col mns Searchli ght Sect , P u u antr and 4 No . . n 3 . Battu. II I f y Arti l er 5 6 8 ti on . 3rd Tel ephone Sec l y , , ho i t er 9 ho it 7 th Aero plane Section . ( w z ) ; ( w

2nd G ar o o t Arti z er . 1st Battn . u d F l ) - 4 co manies and o o t Arti er 1 8 . l ery R egt . ( p F ll y o mn Trains : light ammunition c lu ) . a - o i e Ho s i t s 1 6 . Ammunitio n Columns : N . I . F ld p l mn - S Co s 1 3 . antr l and 2. o . n N . I I f y upply lu r 1 2 3 4 Trans o rt Co mns 1 Artille y , , , p lu

Ho rs e D e ot 1 . (ho witzer) . p OF BATTLE OF FIRST ARMY 1 7 1

Corp s Troop s

10th ri a e o o a - B g II. e 7 1 . N . Fi ld H spit l s 2 d 2th R t 3 attaio ns 1 e . m g , b l Supply Colu ns 4 6 . 52nd Trans mn port Colu s 4 7 . a n Lan hr l st Sq ro we . Horse D epo t 2. u d d m t r l st Lan s t r at e . Co r s r Train d u B y III i in 3 . p B dg g * Co r s . i e ak m 2 p er Co ns 1 . F ld B y lu , 27 th Bri gade Lan hr attai ons e : 53rd e t . 3 dw R g , b l 11th Brigade 55th 2 th a ro n L hr o e t . attai o n d S an e . 3 s. 2n R g , b l qu d dw 35th This ri a e nti six ( b g d , u l 1st Sq uadro n Guard Land t eenth day of mo bili za a f ehr . tion was at di s o s o . w , p l VII 2nd Lan s t rm a r fo r rai a d u B tte y III . lw y

o r r t on . C ps . p o tec i

O S IV . C RP

25 b attali ons 6 s adrons 24 atteries 4 i oneer Co s . ( , qu , b , P y )

7ih Di vi si on 8 th D iv i si on 13th Infantry Bri gade 15th In fan try Brigade

26th Re 36 th e t. gt . R g 6 6th 93r d h r attn 4t J a e B . 14th Infantry Brigade g 16 th nfantr ri a e 27th e t I y B g d R g . d e t 16 5th 7 2n R g . l 5 3rd (E ach r egiment of 3 b atta Each re mnt of 3 at a - ( i e t li on s and a machin e gun g b lio ns and 1 machine-gun company . ) man co . l oth H ss ar s (Staff and 3 p y ) u a 1 th H s sars 3 s ro ns . s a ron s 0 ( q ) qu d ) . u u d 8 th Fi eld Artillery Brigade 7th Fi el Arti er ri a e d ll y B g d t 74th Artillery R eg . : 4th Fi e Arti er e t : R g . ld ll y A tei n 3 atteri es I . b l g ( b A tei n u I . b l g (3 batteries u and light ammnition an d i ht ammnition u l g u o mn c lu ) . column ) . A tei n . . g A i t r II b lu . te n h o i e II b lu g ( w z ) . 75th Ar till ery R egt 40th Fi eld Arti llery Regt A te n . I . b ilu g A tei n . I . b lu g A tei n ho i t er . II . b l g ( w z ) A tei n u II . b lu g . Engi neers : n n E gi eers d 4 h i oneer 2n and 3rd Co ys . t P

1 st Co . 4th i n er a y P o e tt . B u Battu . th Di v i si na 7 o ri gin g Train . n l B d 8th Divi sio nal Bri dging Trai . Medical Medi cal l and i a st 3t d Me ca o s 2nd Me i c Co . d l C y . d l y

ttache A d . 1 72 ORDER OF BATTLE OF FIRST ARMY

Corps Troop Searchli h Sectio n 4t n g t h Pio eer Ammuniti on Columns

att . o o t Art r - B u F ill e y l 8 . 4th Tel epho ne Sectio n 9th Aero an S c i n a pl e e t o . Tr ins B l st attn . 4 h t o o t Arti l er o . i e o s i tas F l N I . F l H p l 16 m y d R e t . 4 co anies and i ht S Co umns g ( p l g upply l 13 . ammniti o n co mn an rt n . Tr s o Co m 1 u lu ) p lu s 3 . Amm ni tio n Co mn o r e D u lu s : H s epo t 1 . o n an r an 2 - N . 1 . t d No i e s i ta l . . . H s 7 12 I f y II F ld o p l . Arti er 1 2 3 and 4 Co mn S s 46 . ll y , , , upply lu ho wit er ran r m - . T s o t Co ns 4 7 ( z ) p lu . an No . nf tr and r 3 4 . o e D o II I y H s ep t 2. Ar ti er 5 7 Cor n Train 4 6 8 s ri i . ll y , , , p B dg g ho i t er and 9 i e ak er Co mns 1 and 2 ( w z ) , F ld B y lu . (howitzer) .

RE ER E COR S IV . S V P

2 at i n 6 r ns 12 ateri es 5 ta o s s a o t . ( b l , qu d , b )

7th Reser ve Divi si on 22nd Reser ve Divi si on 13th Reserve Infantry Brigade 43rd R eserv e Infantry Brigade t at ai n 7 h . a 3 t o s . 2 R egt (3 batt lio ns and 7 1 st R egt . ( b l ) 2 a 4th e t . a tai ns nd MG . Co y ) . 9 R g ( b t l o h t 36 t e . atta n M. C . R g (3 b lio s ) . 4th e r n v at 1 R se v e I fantry Brigade 11th R eser e J ager B t n. h a h n ant r ri a 6 6t e t . t n 44t eserv e e R g (3 b tali o s ) . R I f y B g d d n attaio n . 2 e t . 2 t 3 s 7 R g (3 battalio ns and 3 nd Reg . ( b l ) M m at ai an . C . 2 t o d 8 d Re gt . (3 b l ns 4th s rv R e e e a er at . G. J g B tu M.

1st Reserv e H eav Cav ar R e t 1 st Res erv e Ja er Mo nte R e t . y l y g . g u d g h e rv i A ill er 7 t R se e Fi eld Ar till ery R egt . 22nd R eserv e F eld rt y A I . b teilung (3 batteri es and R egt . i h amm n at eri es an d t ni tio n co mn . A teil 3 t l g u lu ) . I b u g ( b

A i h amm n ition co mn . II . bteilun g (3 batteri es an d l g t u lu ) i ht amm t o A tei n 3 atteries and ni i n o . l g u c lumn ) II . b lu g ( b Engi nee rs light ammunition column 4th Co 4th i o neer Ba n En ineer s y . P tt . g e r 7 th R es erv e Divi si o nal Bri dg 1 st R eserve Coy . 4th Pi on e

i n ai n Battn . g Tr . ‘ 4 h i neer Medi cal 2nd Reserve Coy . t P o

4th Re ser e i a att . v Med c l Co y . B u 22md R eserve Divisional Bridg M 11 r i a C th Rese ve Med c l oy .

1 7 4 ORDER OF BATTLE OF FIRST ARMY

Train s Trains

- - 6 mns 4 6 . . s i als 1 . Co N . i e H t S o o . I F ld p No . II upply lu - r mns 4 Supply Columns 1 3 . Tran spo t Colu - Tran s or mn s 1 . H o rse D e o t 2 p t Colu 3 p .

D 1 C r s rid i n Train 2. H o rse epot . o p B g g - mns 1 and . . i H s i as 12 ie ak er No II F eld o p t l 7 . F ld B y Colu

E E E CO III . R S RV RPS

25 i s ar ns 12 atta on 6 s o atteri es . ( b l , q u d , b )

5 th Reser ve Di vi si on ! 6 i h Reser v e Di vi si on 9th R es erve In fantry Brigad e 1l th R eserv e Infantry Brigade 8th e t R g . 48 th l oth Reserve In fantry Brigade 12th Re t g . 52n d (Each regi ment o f 3 batta lio ns andamachine-gun com pany 3rd Res erv e Jager Battu . 2nd R eserve D rago ons . 5th R es erv e Field Artill ery Regt I . Abteilung (3 batteri es and ligh t ammunition column) . II . Abteilun g . l Engineers s t and 2n d Coys . 3rd Reserve 4th Coy . 3rd Pi onee r Battn . Pi o neer Battu . 5th R eserve Divisi onal Bridg 6th Re s erve Divi sional Bri dg ing Train . M Medi cal 1 i . 3rd Reserve Med cal Coy . 6 th Reserve Medi cal Coy

Corp s Tr o op s E ngin eers T h ne i n 3rdReser e e e o Sect o . v l p 5th Reserv e Train Ammunition Columns Fi eld H ospital Reserve 5th Reserve Ammuniti on ti ons 1 8 19 and 20. Column : , , Infantr y R eserve Secti ons 9 7 8 an d 9 . and 10 , , . 6 th R eserv e Train Arti l er R es er e Sections 2 l y v ,

11 , an d 12. 6 th R es erve Ammunition Column : 46 47 48 and 49. Infan try Reserve Secti ons , , , Fi eld Bak ery Reserve 27 an d 41 .

5 an d 16 . Artillery Reserv e Sections 46 18 and . ORDER OF BATTLE OF FIRST ARMY 1 75

IX ; CORPS

25 attai ons 6 s a rons 24 atteries 4 ioneer Co s . ( b l , qu d , b , P y )

17 th D i vi si on 18 th D i vi si on 33rd Infantry Brigade 35th Infantry Brigade

5th e t 84th e t . 7 R g . R g

76th 86 th n 34th Infan try Brigade 36 th Infantry Brigade

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Genera H a ane w h o has st een i en th e hi h imortant l ld , ju b g v g ly p co mman o fM e so o tamia at th e time o fth e o t rea o fth e Great d p , u b k W ar was in Co mman o fth 1 6 h n antr ri a e at S h o rnc i fe d e t I f y B g d l f . This B rigade fo rmed par t o fth e 4th D ivisio n and l e ft fo r France to o in th e re s t o f th e E e diti nar Fo rce o n th e 2 2 nd o fA s t j xp o y ugu , ro cee in o n an in to L e Cate au h ere th e D i is io n o rme th e p d g l d g , w v f d n F r mth ence e treme e t o fth e a ie armi in h en a e me t . o x l f ll d es t at g g , rin the amo s retreat anda ance to th e Aisne their mo ements du g f u dv , v ere o n i h h h rce O n O cto b er th w b u d up w t t o se o fth e rest o ft e fo . 7 h mr and as t e ro th ri a e e t the Aisne and mo e to S t . O e w B g d l f v d , s o o n invo lved in the vio lent fighting alo ng th e River L y s which co ntinu ed until G eneral Haldane l eft to take o ver the co mmand o f th e rd D i is io n 3 v . O ri ina inten e fo r the ofcers and men o fhis ri a e this g lly d d fi B g d , reco rd o fthe fi rs t phase o fth e W ar by th eir commander has b e en co nsidered likely to intere s t that w ide public that canno t read to o m ch a o t tho se m nth s Man o o s ha e een u b u emo rable firs t mo . y b k v b and i et b e ritten o n the reat retreat b ut fe w are i e w ll y w g , l k ly appear with the cachet o fs u ch adis tinguish ed career in th e W ar that o fSir A mer Ha ane yl ld .

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d. n t W i h stratio n s s 6 e . t . 7 Illu . Th is iar i v e s a mo st ci and s es tiv e acco nt o f The Times . d y g lu d ugg u recent camai n i n S o th - W es t A rica and o fth e di fic ties to p g u f , f ul by th e fo rce unde r G e ne ral Bo tha be fo re that un " ns wres ted fro mth e G erma .

L O N D O N : EDW ARD ARN O L D