ALLIANCE FOR THE ALBANIANS NON-PAPER - SDSM-DUI GOVERNMENT ASSAULTS ON THE RULE OF LAW: BREACHING EUROPEAN VALUES IN THE NAME OF EU INTEGRATION

As a resolutely pro-European force and a strong believer that has no other perspective besides EU and NATO, the Alliance for the Albanians has demonstrated on every occasion since its establishment in 2015 that it is ready to make any sacrifice to materialise the Euro-Atlantic perspective of North Macedonia.

The Alliance for the Albanians has acted as a reliable partner in implementing the Przino Agreement and the EC’s Urgent Reform Priorities deriving from the Priebe Report. It has also played an important role in putting an end to the Gruevski regime, consolidated by VMRO-DPMNE with the help of its Albanian partner, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), amid state capture, international isolation and politically staged events against innocent Albanians. In January 2019, the Alliance for the Albanians voted in favour of the constitutional reforms that completed the ratification process of the Prespa Agreement, despite having strong concerns on the constitutional amendments and the agreement itself which attempted to create a Macedonian nation-state and ignored the country’s multinational character.

With the Prespa Agreement ratified, a dark page of the country’s history has been turned. North Macedonia now needs a paradigm shift to materialise the societal transformation called for in the EU enlargement strategy “A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans” (February 2018). This requires moving from rhetoric to action, and taking drastic measures to end state capture and strengthen the rule of law, while rooting out corrupted politicians.

North Macedonia’s path towards the EU has been spelled out by the Council of the EU in its conclusions on enlargement of 26 June 2018. EU leaders have explicitly linked the decision to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia’s to the country’s demonstrating tangible and sustained results on:

- accountability for the attack on Parliament of 27 April 2017; - judicial reforms and proactive investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in corruption and organised crime cases, including at high level and in relation to the wrong-doings revealed by the 2015 wiretaps; - intelligence and security services reform and; - public administration reform.

A failure to deliver on these conditions will result in another refusal by the European Council of June 2019 to open accessions talks with North Macedonia. It will also lead to disappointment and disillusion among North Macedonia’s citizens, and therefore undermine popular support for the European project as a whole, in a state that is unable to affirm the EU’s common values in the functioning of its institutions.

The process that led to the ratification of the Prespa Agreement and ongoing processes that are crucial for the opening EU accession talks have been marked by multiple assaults on the rule of law, signalling a new state capture by the SDSM-DUI government.

1. Accountability for the attack on Parliament on 27 April 2017

The attempted coup of 27 April 2017 orchestrated by the Gruevski regime was an unprecedented terrorist attack on democracy. Among the over 100 people injured, the most seriously damaged was the leader of the Alliance for the Albanians, Ziadin Sela, who was one of the key targets of the mob and was left for dead in the corridors of Parliament, owing his life only to the courageous intervention of Parliament security officer Abdulfetah Alimi.

33 people were charged with “terrorist endangerment of national security” and with involvement in violence, including former and current VMRO-DPMNE elected officials, senior police officials, security officers, mobsters and other VMRO-DPMNE supporters. Abdulfetah Alimi, one of the few heroes of the night of April 27th, was charged for handing over keys to a hierarchical superior, the chief of security of Parliament Speaker.

On 18 December 2018 Parliament passed through a shorted procedure a controversial amnesty law backed by the ruling coalition and VMRO-DPMNE that led to the selective amnesty of 15 of the accused, including all five MPs initially charged: Krsto Mukoski and Sasho Vasilevski, who opened the Parliament main door, as well as Ljuben Arnaudov, Ljupco Dimovski and convicted war criminal Johan Tarculovski who allowed the crowd in. Most of the above MPs were part of the two thirds majority that voted the start of constitutional reforms on 19 October 2018 and completed them on 11 January 2019, thus raising reasonable suspicions that the ruling coalition had bought their votes in exchange for freedom.

In February 2019, the Public Prosecutor's Office indicted five people suspected of being the organisers of the attack: former Prime Minister , former Parliament Speaker Trajko Veljanoski, former Transport Minister Mile Janakieski, former Labour Minister Spiro Ristovski and former intelligence officer Nikola Boskoski. While Gruevski has conveniently fled to Hungary in November 2018 despite the government possessing clear indications that he was preparing his escape in the preceding weeks, Veljanovski has avoided jail with support from the ruling coalition. In total violation of the Constitution and of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, the ruling coalition failed to put to vote the court’s request to lift Veljanovski’s immunity. Nikola Boskoski is hiding in Greece.

On 15 March 2019, the Criminal Court pronounced jail sentences towards 16 people who didn’t benefit from amnesty, including police, security and intelligence officers as well as some mobsters. Abdulfetah Alimi was sentenced to seven years in jail.

Accountability for the attempted coup of 27 April 2017 has not been established. With Gruevski walking free in an EU member state and with Veljanovski and the five other MPs still in office, political accountability has been denied by the SDSM-DUI coalition. Worse, the whole process has become an absolute farce with the sentencing of Abdulfetah Alimi, which constitutes a direct attack on the leader of the Alliance for the Albanians by the ruling coalition and an intolerable attempt to share the responsibility of April 27th between Macedonians and Albanians in the eyes of the public.

2. Judicial reforms and proactive investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in corruption and organised crime cases

Despite significant support by citizens, the Albanian opposition, the EU and the US, the Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) has failed to rebuild trust in the criminal justice system following the 2015 wiretapping scandal.

The SPO was established by Parliament in September 2015 as an autonomous body, with a limited duration of five years (with possibility of extension) and a deadline to file indictments by 30 June 2017. Although it received more than 540,000 audio-files of intercepted communications and six boxes of transcripts, the SPO managed to file only 20 indictments by the statutory deadline. The SPO also took over a number of sensitive cases from the Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO), including Coup, Sopot, Spy, and Smiljkovci Lake murders (Monster), and has initiated investigations and indictments in a dozen of other cases after the statutory deadline.

However, the number of convictions is negligible. Moreover, with the exception of the Titanic 3 case involving MP Ejup Alimi, the SPO has largely spared DUI officials in its indictments during the statutory period, whereas DUI was a pillar of the Gruevski regime and is involved in large scale corruption.

In this context and just a few days before the 11 January 2019 vote on the constitutional reforms, the ruling coalition passed on 28 December 2018 through a shortened procedure a law amending the Criminal Code.

This law has put into question many SPO cases by introducing lower penalties in some crimes, requalifying others and allowing further expirations of the statute of limitations.

The ruling coalition initiated in March 2019 another attack on the SPO through a draft law regulating the future status and competencies of SPO. According to this draft, SPO would lose its autonomy by becoming part of the PPO while its prosecutors would be elected by the Council of Public Prosecutors controlled by SDSM and DUI through their political appointees. Its mandate would also be significantly weakened. The most concerning proposals are that the SPO successor would be divested of cases filed for indictment after the statutory deadline of 30 June 2017 and it wouldn’t be able to process wiretapping materials after 15 September 2020, while those materials wouldn’t be accepted as evidence in the cases filed for indictment after 30 June 2017.

These (draft) laws sponsored by the ruling coalition mean that a significant number of corrupt politicians targeted by the SPO will not be held to account. This includes some of the eight former VMRO-DPMNE MPs which traded their votes in exchange for tailor-made laws ensuring freedom for them or their relatives, as well as a significant number of SDSM, DUI and VMRO-DPMNE officials indicted or investigated by SPO. Among them are the DUI leader Ali Ahmeti, Deputy Prime Minister for EU Integration Bujar Osmani, former UBK chief Saso Mijalkov and his business associate Jordan Kamchev, former Deputy Prime Minister Zoran Stavrevski, VMRO MP Antonio Milososki, T-Mobile CEO Zarko Llukovski and GROM party leader Stevco Jakimovski. The draft law on SPO would also mean that highly sensitive cases such as Smiljkovci Lake murders (Monster) and Magyar Telekom which involves former SDSM Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski, former DUI Deputy Prime Minister Musa Dzaferi and DUI leader Ali Ahmeti will remained unsolved.

A few weeks ahead of the Presidential election of 21 April 2019, this move by the SDSM raises suspicions that another tailor-made law is being processed in exchange for support to their presidential candidate by DUI and other smaller parties involved in corruption, while giving enough concessions to VMRO-DPMNE to ensure their participation to the election which risks failing in case they would boycott. Albanian opposition parties which are running in the presidential election with a joint candidate, have been completely side- lined in the working groups that will bring the draft law to Parliament, while DUI is represented by former Minister of Justice Blerim Bexheti who was at the center of the 2015 wiretapping scandal for fixing appointments in the judiciary together with Saso Mijalkov.

3. Intelligence and security services reform

The Alliance for the Albanians has consistently raised doubts about the reform and de-Gruevisation of the Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence (UBK) taking into account the influence in the dedicated state commission of criminalised officials of the VMRO-DUI regime.

The draft law on the reform of UBK establishing a National Security Agency as an independent body raises a number of concerns. First, the appointment of its Director at the sole discretion of the Prime Minister raises questions in terms of check and balances. Second, the draft law doesn’t address enough the thorough vetting process of agents needed to eliminate influences from the Yugoslav and Gruevski era as well as from foreign powers, which are key elements to take into consideration before North Macedonia becomes a NATO member. And third, the name of the agency (and of many other agencies that were renamed after the entry into force of the Prespa Agreement) is unacceptable: North Macedonia is a multi- national state according to the Constitution and the term “national” in this context can be understood as referring to only to the Macedonian nation.

4. Public administration reform

Over the past few weeks, and especially following the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission in February 2019, there have been daily disclosures on nepotism in the public administration, public companies and universities, indicating a new state capture by the SDSM-DUI coalition.

Although the Anti-Corruption Commission will investigate a number of cases, these constitute only the top of the iceberg, given the ruling coalition has been massively using short term appointments to place party militants in the administration and breached in a systematic manner the rules on civil servants’ appointments, promotions and dismissals. The administration has been captured by the ruling coalition and is used as a voting machine.

In lieu of a conclusion

In their September 2017 report, the Senior Experts' Group on systemic Rule of Law issues made clear that the mistakes of the past should not be repeated. This recommendation featured prominently in the EC 2018 Progress Report on North Macedonia and guided the formulation of the related Council conclusions on enlargement.

However, in practice, mistakes of the past are being repeated in North Macedonia. Worse, systematic breaches to the EU’s common values of democracy, the rule of law and the respect for fundamental rights, enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, are being made in the name and for the sake of EU integration, too often with the silent approval of the EU itself.

This is too high a price to pay. Regardless of how noble and beneficial the end is, the means should not and cannot violate the EU’s core accession criterion: the rule of law. Now that the Prespa Agreement is behind us, there is no place for complacency. Otherwise the commitments from the EU enlargement strategy to support the transformation of the Western Balkans will remain empty promises. Corrupt politicians who have little interest in EU membership and have manipulated this process to build their legitimacy and consolidate their power will continue to work against any political change that will threaten the model of cosmetic reforms that has enabled them to capture the state in the name of Euro-Atlantic integration and stability.

The Alliance for the Albanians has made painful compromises in relation to the constitutional reforms for the entry into force of the Prespa Agreement for the sake of a greater cause. However, now that NATO and the EU doors have been opened to North Macedonia, the Alliance for the Albanians will distance itself from the captors of the state as it cannot and will not be part of further assaults on the rule of law led by the SDSM-DUI coalition.

In order for North Macedonia to respond to the conditions spelled out in the Council conclusions on enlargement of 26 June 2018 and obtain the opening of EU accession talks at the June 2019 European Council, the Alliance for the Albanians calls on all parties to commit to the below blueprint:

1. Accountability for the attack on Parliament on 27 April 2017

(1) EU to pressure Hungary to execute North Macedonia’s extradition request for Nikola Gruevski. (2) PPO to issue a new request to lift Trajko Veljanovski’s immunity and Parliament to vote it. (3) Abdulfeta Alimi to be released of all political charges against him.

2. Judicial reforms and proactive investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in corruption and organised crime cases

(4) Albanian opposition to become part of the working groups on the draft law on the future of SPO. (5) The draft law to ensure the long-term continuity of the SPO, in accordance with the 2017-2022 National Judicial Reform Strategy, and SPO to remain an autonomous body accountable to, elected and resourced by Parliament in order to ensure full accountability for the crimes revealed in the wiretapping scandal. (6) SPO to remain in charge of all cases of wrong-doings revealed by the wiretapping scandal and other sensitive cases taken over from PPO, without time limitations for indictments and for the use of wiretaps as evidence.

(7) Parliament to address the limitations existing in the legislative framework that may prevent the ongoing SPO investigations from being completed and leading to indictment, in line with the recommendations of the OSCE’s First Interim Report on the activities and the cases under the competence of SPO. (8) Prosecutors which have held political functions and are directly or indirectly related to political parties should be excluded from membership to the Council of Public Prosecutors.

3. Intelligence and security services reform

(9) The draft law on the Security Agency to establish check and balances in the appointment of the Director which should be done jointly by the President and the Prime Minister. (10) The draft to put in place a thorough vetting process for employees of the agency to eliminate Yugoslav, Gruevski era and foreign influences. (11) The name of the agency to reflect the multi-national character of North Macedonia by using the term “state” instead of “national”.

4. Public administration reform

(12) The capture of the administration to stop immediately, starting with the immediate resignations of all SDSM-DUI officials family members unduly appointed in state institutions. (13) Anti-Corruption Commission to enforce legal frameworks to guarantee professionalism and human resources policies based on meritocracy.