Evaluating the Global Climate Change Regime: A Croatian Case Study
Master’s Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Brandeis University Graduate Program in Global Studies Sajed Kamal, Advisor
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in Global Studies
By Sasha Gerhardson
February 2014
ABSTRACT
Examining the Effectiveness of the Global Climate Change Regime in Croatia: Pre and Post EU Accession
A thesis presented to the Graduate Program in Global Studies
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Brandeis University Waltham, Massachusetts
By Sasha Gerhardson
This paper explores the need for an improved global climate change regime, utilizing the country of Croatia as a case study for illustrating how the implementation of climate change agreements is currently contingent on national assimilation of such policy. Through an in-depth analysis of Croatia in relation to the existing global climate change regime, it is underlined that climate agreements will repeatedly struggle to be effective without global participation as domestic participation is concurrently reduced without inclusive collaboration. In resolving this critical issue, focus is placed on the need for structural reforms, better incentives for global cooperation and raised awareness of common public good in an increasingly globalized world.
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Table of Contents
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….……1
Chapter I: Climate Change’s Global and Local Effects…………………………………………...6
The Crisis of Climate Change: Underling the Importance of the Global Climate Change Regime…………………………………………………………………………………….6
The Effects of Climate Change on Croatia: Motivations for Compliance with the Global Climate Change Regime…………………………………………………………………..9
Chapter 2: Croatia and the Global Climate Change Regime…………………………………….14
The Influence of Globalization…………………………………………………………..14
The International Climate Change Regime: A Structural Overview……………….……17
Croatia’s Implementation of the Global Climate Change Regime………………………23
Chapter 3: The Role of the State…………………………………………………………………27
The Relationship between the State and the Global Climate Change Regime…………..27
Croatia and the Global Climate Change Regime: An Analysis of the State’s Role……..31
Evaluating Climate Change Assistance Received via Croatia’s EU Accession…………42
Chapter IV: Improving the Global Climate Change Regime…………………………………….50
Recommendations for Croatia…………………………………………………………...50
Reworking the Global Climate Change Regime: A Broader Approach………………....52
The Root of the Problem: Reshaping Global Governance……………………………….61
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….67
Works Cited……………………………………………………………………………………...68
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Introduction
"Global warming is real and human activity is the main cause. The consequences are mainly negative and headed toward catastrophic, unless we act. However, the good news is that we can meet this challenge. It is not too late, and we have everything we need to get started." -Al Gore, March 21st, 2007
This statement made by Al Gore fittingly summarizes the urgency of the global climate change issue as well as the ready potential for effective solutions. Of these solutions, strong multilateral cooperation on behalf of states and institutions worldwide is arguably the most important. As a problem that is truly global in nature, climate change does not acknowledge state borders and large greenhouse gas emissions produced by one country can have disastrous, long- term effects on nations around the globe. What’s more, within the present international system, nation-states do not have to compensate for the consequences of climate pollution, providing no concrete incentive for nations to curb emissions. This is particularly disconcerting as the
International Panel on Climate Change’s latest Assessment Report confirmed that greenhouse gases have increased 70% between 1970 and 20041.
Likewise, twelve of the warmest years on record have occurred in the last fifteen years.
Of these aforementioned emissions, less than twenty countries make up about 75% of global C02 emissions.2 Thus, it is troubling that compliance with climate policy or agreements is almost solely determined by a nation’s domestic position on climate change and sustainable development. This approach has led to very little being accomplished in terms of global
1 Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Rep. N.p.: IPCC, 2007. Print. 2 "International Energy Statistics." International Energy Statistics. US Energy Information Administration, n.d. Web. 4 Apr. 2013.
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greenhouse gas reductions and only reiterates the need for a reformed, deeply-integrated climate change agreement that would work to establish swift yet equitable targets for all countries.
At present, two heavily-disputed and essentially voluntary international environmental agreements exist to combat the issue of climate change: the Kyoto Protocol and the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Both entities, which combined formulate the global climate change regime, are certainly steps in the right direction and establish critical groundwork for future agreements, however, it is imperative that a much stronger global climate change agreement is set into force in the near future. There is now promise of such an agreement as negotiations concerning a legally-binding treaty have carried on for several years to devise a replacement for the soon-expiring Kyoto Protocol. The premise of this agreement was decided at the Doha climate talks of 2012, wherein it was recognized that a climate treaty will be created by
2015 and set into force by 2020. Whether or not this treaty will appropriately factor in the glaring criticisms of the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC remains yet to be seen. It is possible that even though a general consensus has been reached on the direct correlation between human activity and climate change, calamitous events of unknown proportions will need to occur before true action is taken. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the international responsibility of addressing climate is realized and major reductions are made utilizing the advantages of a global climate change regime.
Due to the nature of these existing agreements and the lack of global coercion, it is recognized that the state plays an integral role in determining the overall effectiveness of the global climate change regime. Essentially, despite the existence of targets, each nation state ultimately decides the extent to which these targets are met or attempted to be met. In a rapidly globalizing world where the role of the state is said to be diminishing, this is an interesting
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phenomenon. Considering these points, Croatia provides a distinct case study for examining the relationship between nation state and global climate change agreements, also underlining the concept of regional regime implementation in addition to local. Croatia only recently made the transition to a functioning market economy and democracy after several years of war in the
1990s, yet it recently gained EU membership and as such, is subject to the EU’s stringent environmental policies. These policies required Croatia to undertake significant reforms in the years leading up to its 2013 accession, subsequently improving the nation’s ability to meet the goals outlined in both climate agreements.
Moreover, Croatia’s booming tourism industry continues to constitute an increasingly larger portion of the GDP yet the main tourist draw, the extensive coastline and low-lying historical towns, face acute risks on behalf of climate change. The projected effects of climate change within Croatia have instilled incentive to act within the government, industry and civil society, however, the funding, reforms and capacity needed to make deep emissions cuts inhibits swift, effective action. Although Croatia is now part of the EU, often touted as a leader on climate change, the successes brought about by EU climate policy are minimal in the broader, global scope without collective action for a common public good. This point emphasizes the complex relationship between states and the global climate change regime in that due to the global nature of climate change, there is an unwillingness of most states to significantly mitigate
GHG emissions without equivalent cooperation on behalf of other nations, particularly those that are major emitters.
However, there is also an unlikelihood that, absent an international agreement, each nation would formulate appropriate national policies that would cooperatively reduce emissions to safe levels. Two facets of globalization work to explain this improbability: economic
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globalization and the tragedy of the commons. However, at the same time, globalization also works to disseminate global public opinion about climate change, further pressing governments around the globe to act and participate in mitigation or adaptation measures. Nevertheless, examining the integration of the current global climate change regime at a national level highlights the weaknesses of Kyoto and the UNFCCC as well the urgent need for reform to effectively ensure broad state cooperation and implementation. A Croatian case study emphasizes this point, but the conclusion applies universally in light of this global problem that is need of a truly global solution.
Economist Nicholas Stern recently produced a publication analyzing climate change wherein the following points were established: climate change threatens access to the basic necessities of life for people worldwide but in a unevenly distributed manner; scientific research has proven that business-as-usual (BAU) paths for addressing climate change will have serious, perhaps permanent, consequences that will continue to worsen as climate change accelerates; and finally, that the benefits of early action greatly outweigh the costs with the possibility of GHG stabilization and economic development occurring in unison.3 Such conclusions directly underscore the importance of an effective global climate change regime, especially as the level of greenhouse gases becomes increasingly unstable.
Achieving the goal of steep emissions reductions (that are fairly appropriated) via a globally binding treaty will require involvement on behalf of all nations and economies.
Moreover, cooperation will need to occur at national, regional and international levels with high levels of integration. Such a goal will be feasible with properly informed and engaged nations around the globe who can prepare their economies for such change. In the interim period before
3 Stern, Nicholas. Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change. Publication. London: London HM Treasury, 2006. Print.
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such a global agreement is reached, countries should abide by the UNFCCC and Kyoto to not further damage the Earth’s environment. Similarly, these existing agreements should continue to review their effectiveness and further monitor emission production and reduction processes in meeting targets.
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Chapter I: Climate Change’s Global and Local Effects
The Crisis of Climate Change: Underling the Importance of the Global Climate Change Regime
To comprehend the importance of an effective global climate agreement, it is necessary to underline the climate changes that have already occurred and those that are projected to transpire in the near future. Over thousands of years, shifts in solar output, volcanic eruptions and changes in the Earth's orbit result in natural changes to Earth's climate. Data reflecting such changes over thousands of years has been collected by analyzing various proxies such as pollen grains and microfossils. However, unprecedented, rapid climate changes beginning after the
Industrial Revolution are largely the result of human activity, specifically activities resulting in the production of greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and synthetic CFCs. Although the reality of climate change remains a point of public contention, data from NASA states that 97% of peer-reviewed scientists agree human activity is the cause of current global warming trends4.
The steady climbing of emission levels is disconcerting due to the greenhouse effect: as heat rays are radiated off of the Earth, GHGs absorb this heat and create a heat-trapping effect, subsequently warming the Earth. Of the aforementioned greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide is of the greatest concern due to the sheer scale of CO2 entering the atmosphere from the burning of coal and oil as well as from deforestation. The lengthy residence time of CO2 in the atmosphere is also problematic as some CO2 may remain in carbon sinks for thousands of years even if
4 "Climate Change: Consensus." Global Climate Change. NASA, n.d. Web. 11 Apr. 2013.
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emissions are reduced in the near future. According to the NOAA’s Earth System Research
Laboratory in Mauna Loa, the monthly average of CO2 in the atmosphere for October 2013 was
393.66 ppm (350 ppm has been suggested to be the safe upper limit for CO2)5. To put this in perspective, this number has increased 25% from when the Mauna Loa observatory first began recording the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere in 1958 and the rate of accumulation is expected to only increase in coming years. Moreover, recent reports have shown that CO2 levels surpassed
400 ppm for the first time in May 2013; exceeding such levels has not occurred since the
Pliocene era, during which sea levels were almost 30 feet higher than today6.
Climate change is further escalated by several positive feedback mechanisms that occur in conjunction with climate change. To illustrate this point, the melting of reflective glaciers and sea ice leaves lower albedo surfaces such as dark soil or sea water more exposed. These low albedo surfaces absorb greater amounts of energy from visible light rays and further warm the
Earth. Additionally, as the atmosphere continues to warm due to GHGs, the warmer air is better able to retain water vapor more so than colder air. This is problematic as water vapor is also a greenhouse gas, further adding to the heat trapping effect that warms the Earth.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, utilizing information gathered from over 1,000 scientists around the world, has predicted that there will be a temperature increase of
2.5 to 10 degrees Fahrenheit within the next 100 years1. Similarly, the American Meteorological
Society recently stated that there is a 90 percent chance that global temperatures will increase anywhere between 6.3 to 13.3 degrees Fahrenheit within the next century. When such temperature changes do occur, the current effects we are experiencing from climate change will
5 "Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide." ESRL Global Monitoring Division - Global Greenhouse Gas Reference Network, Oct. 2013. Web. 17 Nov. 2013. 6 Kunzig, Robert. "Climate Milestone: Earth's CO2 Level Passes 400 Ppm." National Geographic. National Geographic Society, 09 May 2013. Web. 10 Sept. 2013.
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increase in severity with the added risks of famine, water scarcity and species loss. Natural disasters are also predicted to become more intense, for instance, increased “...heat and water in the atmosphere and warmer sea surface temperatures... [will provide] more fuel to increase the wind speeds of tropical storms.”7 Additionally, higher sea levels will also heighten the risk of coastal flooding during storms.
In addition, the IPCC’s 2012 report, “Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and
Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation,” stated that with climate change, temperature extremes are likely to increase globally, with an increase in the number of warm days and nights versus those that are cold. Due to this increased warming, "...a 1-in-20 year hottest day is likely to become a 1-in-2 year event by the end of the 21st century in most regions.”8 This will be particularly problematic in areas already facing deadly heat waves such as those witnessed in
Europe.
Thus, in underlining these threats and realities of climate change, there is a clear need for deep greenhouse gas reductions at a global level. These reductions can occur via various routes such as the substitution of cleaner energy sources, carbon sequestration or reforestation.
However, in order to successfully mitigate and adapt to a truly global issue, strong international collaboration is needed. Leaving nations to address the issue is problematic in that certain nations may need to reduce their existing GHG emissions up to 80% by 2050, while other developing countries may need to only make minimal emissions cuts whilst still being deeply affected by climate change.
7 "The Rising Cost of Natural Hazards : Feature Articles." Earth Observatory. NASA, n.d. Web. 12 Sept. 2013. 8 Field, Christopher B., et al., eds. Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
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The Effects of Climate Change on Croatia: Motivations for Compliance with the Global Climate Change Regime
Within “The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an
Interdependent World,” Harold Jacobson and Edith Weiss accurately outlined the factors that affect state compliance of international agreements:
“A country’s physical conditions, its history, and its culture establish basic parameters that affect implementation and compliance. The economy, political institutions and public opinion have an affect but it is generally indirect. These factors operate through proximate variables. In our view, the most important proximate variables are administrative capacity, leadership, NGOs, knowledge and information. All these factors, of course, are shaped by the country’s preexisting traditions, legislation and regulations in the area involved.”9
As such, upon examining the effects of climate change in Croatia and the implementation of the global climate regime, it is important to overview the political, economic and social background as well.
A nation of over four million, the once war-torn Croatia acquired independence from the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. According to the UNDP’s Human Development
Indicators, Croatia is ranked 47th worldwide for their Human Development Index and has a per capita GDP of $18,100.10 It is worth noting that Croatia’s HDI value increased 12%, in conjunction with a per capita GNI increase of 16% since the early 1990s and the period of war.
The Croatian economy has struggled in recent years with “...negative GDP growth in
2012, alongside falling levels of Foreign Direct Investment [and a] credit rating downgrade to
9 Jacobson, Harold, and Edith Weiss. "Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords." The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World. By Paul F. Diehl. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997. N. pag. Print. 10 "Human Development Reports: Croatia." United Nations Development Programme. N.p., n.d. Web. 09 July 2013.
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‘junk’ status by Standard & Poor’s (S&P).”11 Struggling with a rigid labor market, the country’s employment rate hovered around 22% during 2013 and the World Bank ranked Croatia 89th out of 189 countries in 2013 for its ease of doing business, indicating that the regulatory environment is not very favorable for businesses12 (however, this is an improvement from just one or two years ago, when Croatia ranked over 100). Moreover, Croatia has continually had issues with corruption, recognizing an urgent need for governmental reforms. Croatia’s most recent
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) was 0.00713, indicating a lower level of human poverty.
Yet, projected climate change effects within the agricultural and tourism sectors may disproportionately affect Croatians who are already considered to be part of the lower-income population.
From an environmental protection standpoint, Croatia is not far behind its EU counterparts. Approximately 10% of the country’s territory is protected14, a percentage that is only slightly less than most EU member states. Furthermore, approximately 1,000 sites in
Croatia have already been identified for Natura 2000, an initiative based upon EU legislation to combat habitat and species loss within the union15. According to the World Bank, there are 290 active environmental NGOs throughout Croatia, yet there remains a need for increased public participation as civil society is not yet thoroughly involved in policy formulation.
In regard to climate change, Croatia is experiencing warmer temperatures with a 1°
Celsius increase expected to occur by 2025 and a 3.5° Celsius increase (during summer seasons)
11 Oreskovic, Luka. "If Croatia Is to Gain the Full Benefits of EU Funding, It Must Learn Lessons from Other New EU Member States." Web log post. London School of Economics and Political Science. N.p., 16 Jan. 2013. Web. 05 July 2013 12 "Economy Rankings." Doing Business. The World Bank, June 2013. Web. 05 Sept. 2013. 13 Country Briefing: Croatia Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) At a Glance. Rep. Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), n.d. Web. 14 "Forest Growth (CLIM 034) - Assessment Published Nov 2012." European Environment Agency (EEA). N.p., n.d. Web. 9 Dec. 2012. 15"Croatian Knot in the European Net." Natura 2000. State Institute for Nature Protection, n.d. Web. 8 Dec. 2012.
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expected to take place between 2040 and 2070.16 Decreased rainfall of 27 mm is also expected in certain parts of the country during the autumn season. More frequent severe weather events are also an impending concern for Croatia with continued warming. These predicted climate changes will have a multitude of effects on Croatia that will in turn affect the nation’s stance on the global climate change regime and deep reduction of emissions.
As climate change inevitably continues, several sectors of Croatia’s society will be deeply affected including: tourism, coastal resources, freshwater resources, health, agriculture and local fisheries.17 Of particular importance is the effect that climate change will have on
Croatia’s tourism industry, the sector that constitutes almost one third of the country’s employment and about a quarter of Croatia’s GDP. Significant increases in temperature, extreme weather events and rising sea-levels may shift the current influx of tourists out of the area to cooler, less affected regions of Europe. In addition to Croatia’s beaches, tourists are drawn to the picturesque historical towns dotted along the coastline, however, the majority of these towns are also only one or two meters above sea level, leaving much of the areas prone to flooding or submersion.18 Rising sea levels would also likely be an incredibly costly effect of climate change due to the disturbance of Croatia’s sea ports, the contamination of drinking water with saltwater, the loss of wetlands and the coastal erosion of beaches.
Climate change is also predicted to have considerable effects on human health in Croatia.
For instance, the 2003 heat wave in Croatia resulted in a 4.3% increase in mortality.19 What’s more, vulnerable groups such as the elderly are finding their conditions increasingly jeopardized due to higher temperatures and extreme weather events. The Proceedings of the National
16 A Climate for Change: Climate Change and Its Impacts on Society and Economy in Croatia. Rep. 1st ed. Zagreb: UNDP, 2008. Print. Pg. 38. 17 Ibid. Pg.49 18 Ibid. Pg 79 19 Ibid. Pg 90
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Academy of Sciences’ 2012 study, “Summer Temperature Variability and Long-Term Survival among Elderly People with Chronic Disease,” focuses on this issue and although the research was conducted in the United States, the findings remain relevant to Croatia’s elderly population.
The study found that “...for each 1° Celsius increase in summer temperatures, elderly individuals suffering from diabetes are 4% more likely to die than their healthy counterparts”20 with similar elevated percentages recorded for conditions such as COPD (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease) and myocardial infarctions. Increased risk of geriatric morality also coincided with long- term ozone exposure. According to the World Bank, Croatia is facing a rapidly aging population with 17% of the population currently 65 years of age or older.21 This percentage has been steadily increasing since the 1990s with estimates projecting the number to rise to 20% by 2020.
At the same time, the working population (ages 15-64) and those who are able to provide elderly care, continues to decline. Of the elderly population at risk, those who live in urban areas will face greater risks due to the “heat island” effect present in cities (there are approximately 127 cities located throughout the country).
Further emphasizing the many effects of climate change on Croatia are the stresses that will be placed on the country’s water resources. This is especially problematic in that Croatia’s wetlands, integral to the removal of pollution from water, would be negatively affected.
Similarly, if river flows are reduced as sea levels rise, there will be less power available for
Croatia’s booming hydroelectric sector, which comprises over half of all electricity production.
Both of these issues will be compounded by increased likelihood of droughts. Croatia’s
20 Zanobetti, Antonella, Marie S. O'Neill, Carina J. Gronlund, and Joel D. Schwartz. "Summer Temperature Variability and Long-term Survival among Elderly People with Chronic Disease." Summer Temperature Variability and Long-term Survival among Elderly People with Chronic Disease. PNAS, 8 Mar. 2012. Web. 09 Dec. 2013.
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agricultural sector will also unquestionably suffer from imminent climate changes. An increased number of severe weather events will ultimately lead to large financial losses as well as a decline in food security and employment for a country that is largely rural. Additionally, fluctuations of fish populations in reaction to warmer waters will also directly affect Croatia’s fishing industry.
Finally, warmer temperatures will translate to a higher risk of forest fires and a decline in the economic value of Croatia’s forests. This is problematic in that Croatia’s highly successful nature-based tourism industry is directly dependent on the health of these forests, comprising
47% of the total land area. Forest fires are already very common in the Karst region (943 forest fires were recorded from 2005-2008 alone) and as prevalence is directly related to precipitation levels, a drier climate will certainly increase the number of forest fires.
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Chapter 2: Croatia and the Global Climate Change Regime
The Influence of Globalization
Directly pertinent to the globalization phenomenon, the key issue within the global climate change regime is best explained by Garrett Hardin’s tragedy of the commons: “…when there is a common resource that can be used freely by all, each user fails to think about how his actions might harm others; each loses sight of the common good.”22 Therefore, each country has the financial incentive to engage in activities that produce large quantities of emissions with little regard for the environmental effects in other countries and the depletion of finite natural resources. Internationally, even the highest-polluting countries are not forced to pay for the consequences of their negative environmental externalities, in that one country cannot “sue” another for the traveling effects of their pollution. Since countries do not have to pay for environmental consequences outside of their own borders, they have less incentive to reduce emissions-producing activities. As a result of these harmful GHG emissions, the costs of resource use, adaptation and mitigation measures go up for all as a negative externality. Due to the presence of this externality, “…most democracies have succeeded in passing some kind of regulation to limit pollution, recognizing that social benefits far exceed the costs.”23
As prescribed within studies of globalization, the solution to the commons dilemma is social control of shared resources or the restriction of resources and pollutants by responsible
22 Stiglitz, Joseph E. Making Globalization Work. London: Penguin, 2007. Print. Pg. 162. 23 Ibid. Pg. 165.
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entities, a notion that further supports the usage of climate treaties. As Joseph Stiglitz points out, privatization of the environment is not a viable option due to the difficulty of enforcing property rights and the inherent creation of inequalities. Instead the answer is a form of global public management, including global regulations on usage and actions that cause environmental harm in the way of climate change. That being said, for multilateral climate agreements to be fully effective, cooperation truly needs to be global as a pervasive free-rider problem exists: if one country takes steps to reduce emissions, the benefit is global regardless of other countries’ mitigation efforts. The presence of this issue reduces countries’ incentives to participate unless cooperation is completely inclusive.
More often than not, there is a negative association made between the process of globalization and environmental degradation. However, many of the problems linking climate change to globalization are not caused by the process of globalization itself but by how globalization has been economically managed. To be more specific, the issue stems from the promotion of market fundamentalism by financial institutions. Trade liberalization and the hyper-growth of multinational corporations increases the need for standardized international environmental policies, such as those put forth in climate agreements. Economic globalization has offered opportunities for rapid development in select countries via deregulation, free movement of capital, privatization and commoditization, however, these practices also concurrently threaten our environment. This point is emphasized by the IMF’s and the World
Bank’s structural adjustment programs for lower income countries, wherein these governments must cut back spending on social goods such as environmental programs, increase pressure on natural resources by increasing exports and cause financial instability by liberalizing financial
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markets and eliminating tariffs or quotas on imports.24 Worth noting is the fact that economic globalization also offers opportunities for income increases that would allow for enhanced environmental protection.
On a different note, the globalized economy also paves the way for the globalization of knowledge. New, more efficient environmental technologies and increased public awareness of climate change travels globally through the channels of globalization. As a result, countries are experiencing increased pressure to participate in climate treaties and other forms of mitigation.
This heightened awareness can be largely attributed to the negative externalities that global warming has upon mankind; concerns over public health or property and the sustainability of
Earth for our future generations are often discussed as reasoning for mitigation. This raised environmental consciousness coincides with the growth of environmental NGOs that use various lobbying techniques to place additional pressure on countries regarding the adoption of environmental policies or treaty signatures.
Conversely, the globalization of knowledge also involves transference of cultural practices such as mass consumerism. As a result, more individuals are aware of environmental issues but more are also drawn to the environmentally-destructive consumer lifestyle. Likewise, the globalization of governance is also relevant to climate change in that there is an increase in multilateral agreements and an increased presence of non-state actors such as NGOs. With globalization, inter-state relationships also become more complex against the backdrop of global governance institutions yet more and more of these institutions are unable to effectively respond to increasingly global challenges such as climate change.
24 Lechner, Frank, and John Boli. The Globalization Reader. Chichester, West Sussex: J. Wiley & Sons, 2012. Print. Pg. 486.
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Lastly, it is not simply globalization affecting the environment, the reverse also occurs.
Many facets of the environment affect the “…pace, direction and quality of globalization.”25
Exemplifying this idea would be the availability or scarcity of natural resources within globalized trade or how existing environmental standards may impact international trade.
Additionally, the state of our environment melds the way in which society responds to globalization, evidenced by social movements and the evolving demand for improved global environmental governance structures.
For globalization’s critics, the notion of subsidiarity has become increasingly popular in terms of economic, cultural and political decisions. Under this principle, supporters believe that
“...all decisions should be made at the lowest level of governing authority competent to deal with it.”26 This ‘localization’ however, is likely not applicable with climate change as the lowest level of governing authority would in fact be global institutions considering that the climate is a global common good. However, though governance is required at a global level for climate change, the role of the state is highly integral to the success of international climate regimes, a notion that will be illustrated through the study of Croatia’s implementation.
The International Climate Change Regime: A Structural Overview
As emphasized, due to the global nature of emissions, it is necessary for mitigation of
GHG emissions issue to occur at global, cooperative scale to prevent free-riders and unfair competition over varied emissions controls. Similarly, adaptation to climate change, particularly in developing countries, must also be carried out on a multilateral scale as long periods are required for reversal of climate change effects, when they are reversible at all. If adequate action
25 Najam, Adil, David Runnalls, and Mark Halle. Environment and Globalization: Five Propositions. Rep. Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2007. Print. Pg. 7. 26 Lechner, Frank, and John Boli. The Globalization Reader. Chichester, West Sussex: J. Wiley & Sons, 2012. Print. Pg. 492.
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is not taken, there is the distinct possibility that policy options will be severely limited in the future due to the need for major and immediate emissions reductions. Thus enters the need for the global climate change regime.
Multilateral climate agreements have two important outcomes, the first being the creation of epistemic communities or transnational networks of experts assisting policy and second, the rise of a global civil society working to incite social change on behalf of nation states.27 At present, the UN is the most relevant global governance structure addressing climate change via the induction of the UNFCCC and subsequently, the Kyoto Protocol. One of the key resolutions arising from the 2005 World Summit addressed the General Assembly’s approach to environmental activities. The resolution stated that the UN:
[Recognized] the need for more efficient environmental activities in the United Nations system, with enhanced coordination, improved policy advice and guidance, strengthened scientific knowledge, assessment and cooperation, better treaty compliance, while respecting the legal autonomy of the treaties, and better integration of environmental activities in the broader sustainable development framework.28
Under the auspices of the United Nations, the UNFCCC, or the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change, became operational in 1994 and serves to encourage industrialized countries to stabilize their GHG emissions to a level wherein they are no longer causing anthropogenic intrusion into the global environment. The UNFCCC also established a time frame for the attainment of these emissions levels so that vulnerable ecosystems may have time to adapt and a country’s economic sustainability is not threatened. Unlike with the Kyoto
27 Fisher, Dana. National Governance and the Global Climate Change Regime. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Print. Pg. 4. 28 Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly during Its Fifty-ninth Session: Volume III. Publication. N.p.: United Nations, Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services, 2006. Print. Pg. 45.
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Protocol, the UNFCCC does not set binding emissions targets. Instead, initial signatory countries were to introduce domestic policies that would work to reduce their GHG emissions to 1990 levels. However, in the period before the Kyoto Protocol was created, few signatories of the
UNFCCC succeeded in reaching 1990 levels with “…overall carbon dioxide emissions in OECD countries [rising] 9.7% above 1990 levels by 1997.”29
As the UNFCCC’s voluntary targets clearly struggled to encourage international reductions in GHG emissions, the UNFCCC’s first and second Conference of Parties (COP-1 and COP-2) centered upon devising a legally binding climate change treaty. The introduction of this treaty, or the Kyoto Protocol, occurred at the COP-3 and underlined that “industrialized countries have a legally binding commitment to reduce their collective greenhouse gas emission by at least 5% compared to 1990 levels by the period of 2008-2012.”30 Developing countries were not subject to reductions under Kyoto as to not hamper their development. Through the
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol increased accountability for developed nations with common but different responsibilities in the form of reduction targets.
Ingrained in the Kyoto Protocol are global flexible mechanisms that encourage each country to reach their emissions reduction level. These flexible market-based mechanisms include emissions trading on the carbon market, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and
Joint Implementation. Joint Implementation (JI) and CDM both work to further increase the efficacy of the carbon market, which was worth over $30 billion by 2006. The CDM is an emissions offset program where developed, industrial countries obtain credits for financing initiatives that reduce emissions in developing countries. The program was designed to promote
29 International Energy Agency. The Road from Kyoto: Current CO2 and Transport Policies in the IEA. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 200a. 30 Fisher, Dana. National Governance and the Global Climate Change Regime. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Print. Pg. 36.
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sustainable development by allowing developing countries to reduce their emissions without accruing large costs. On the other hand, Joint Implementation allows developed countries to invest in climate change projects within other industrialized nations in return for carbon credits.
The Kyoto Protocol’s fate, which was to be determined at the UNFCCC’s 18th
Conference of Parties in Doha, was resolved as of December 2012 when it was declared that the
Protocol will be sustained until 2020. However, key polluters such as the US, China, Canada,
Japan and Brazil did not choose to commit to binding reduction targets. Thus, those members that did agree to the second period of commitment only amounted to a small level of cumulative
GHG emissions. It was also concluded at the COP-17 and the COP-18 that an improved climate change accord would come into force by 2020 inclusive of GHG emission targets across the board, as opposed to discounting GHG reductions in developing countries. The most recent
COP-18 in Warsaw was surmised as “…keeping governments on a track towards a universal climate agreement in 2015 and including significant new decisions that will cut emissions from deforestation and on loss and damage.”31 However, without commitments from some of larger emitters such as the US, a new agreement may fail to serve its desired purpose.
In terms of Kyoto’s strengths, one of the most advantageous aspects was the introduction of the carbon trading system. This system created a worldwide value for carbon with incentives for clean energy investment and offered large cost savings for countries using carbon trading to reduce the cost of meeting Kyoto’s commitments. Moreover, it is important to point out that
Kyoto established the basic foundation for future climate change agreements including monitoring, compliance and reporting measures. Thus, despite its conflicts, the relevancy of
31United Nations. Climate Change Secretariat. UN Climate Change Conference in Warsaw Keeps Governments on a Track towards 2015 Climate Agreement. N.p., 23 Nov. 2013. Web. 10 Dec. 2013.
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Kyoto is upheld as it is the only globally-reaching binding agreement that addresses climate change.
On the other hand, Kyoto’s chief weakness is the method in which targets were decided for each member and the feasibility of such targets. As a result, there has been a lack of commitment from major polluters such as the US. The US remains one of largest global emitters of greenhouse gases, emitting 50% more GHGs than all developing countries combined during the 20th century (Stiglitz, pg. 163). However, the US refuses to participate primarily due to the effect on US industries and the lack of required emission cutbacks in developing countries. The
United States’ stance on Kyoto sends a strong message as the country’s wealth and technological capacity would have made it relatively easy to meet Kyoto’s commitments.
During the first period of Kyoto (2008-2012), the basis on 1990 emissions levels meant that Kyoto was not functional in many developing countries that had industrialized since 1990.
In the recently established second period of the Kyoto Protocol (2013-2020), little change was made in regard to emissions cuts outside of Europe and Australia. However, the UN climate talks in Doha also pioneered the notion that industrialized, developed nations should compensate for losses in the developing countries most affected by climate change, particularly small-island states. Whether or not such a concept will be incorporated into the 2015 new climate agreement remains unknown, however, it is likely to face strong opposition from countries such as the US.
Although it is not a global climate change agreement, it is important to acknowledge the role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as the leading international body for the synthesis of scientific climate change research. The Panel provided the basis of research for the establishment of the UNFCCC and Kyoto with the groundwork for these agreements laid out in the IPCC’s first two Assessment Reports. Created by the United Nations Environmental Program
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(UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in the late 1980s, the IPCC is designed to “…provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts.”32 The presence of the IPCC is critical within the global climate change regime as it provides important information for setting emissions targets and other standards for action.
For instance, the IPCC has designed several long-term emissions scenarios useful for the design of international climate policy. These scenarios are viewed as a form of economic forecasting that factors in the social and political, providing data that can be used to predict emissions outputs that will purportedly occur in the future contingent upon identified driving forces. Critical driving forces outlined in the scenarios include technological changes, the level of international cooperation and the quality of environmental education provided.
Although the IPCC has established over 40 scenarios, the four main storylines are A1,
A2, B1 and B2. The A1 and A2 storylines following “business as usual” behaviors, however, A2 incorporates international cooperation while A1 does not. B1 and B2, on the other hand, are both inclusive of heightened environmental awareness but B2 does not factor in international cooperation. For those supporting a stronger global climate change regime, Storyline B1 is certainly the best scenario. This storyline describes a future with “...a high level of environmental and social consciousness combined with a globally coherent approach to a more sustainable development.”33 Under this scenario, large investments are made into resource efficiency, environmental sustainability and social equity, particularly through welfare availability.
Research, along with clean technology and development, are strongly emphasized within the B1
32 "IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change." IPCCC. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Oct. 2013.
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storyline to increase energy efficiency. High taxes and the dematerializing of society are two other key aspects of this scenario. This particular storyline provides a potential insight into what the future may hold if sweeping changes are made regarding the approach to sustaining our environment on a global scale.
Outside of the UN’s frameworks, other international regimes not specifically tailored to climate change also offer an opportunity for multilateral communication and cooperation on the issue. This is notable as some of the major emitters that are not party to the UNFCCC or Kyoto participate in these forums. For instance, the G20’s ability to draw in those from finance and industry has allowed it to make strides on low-cost measures for emission reduction.34 Other UN agencies and global development banks also contribute to the multilateral approach to climate change.
Croatia’s Implementation of the Global Climate Change Regime
Croatia became a party to the UNFCCC in 1996 and was designated an Annex I country.
As of 2012, Croatia had reduced its GHG emissions by -9.1% (excluding Land Use Land-Use
Change and Forestry (LULUCF), or established carbon sinks), only a short ways behind the combined EU figure of -15.4%.35 Within the UNFCCC's Initial Report of Croatia (1990), a report that also outlines the benchmark amounts for future Kyoto targets, CO2 was the most prominent GHG at 73.7% of GHG totals. N2O amounted to 12.3%, CH4 was 10.9% and HFCs,
PFCs and SF6 combined were 3% of the GHG total. The energy sector accounted for 70.7 percent of the total GHG emissions in the base year, followed by agriculture at 13.8% , industrial processes at 13.4%, waste was 1.8% and solvent products were 0.3 percent. These distributions
34 Keohane, Robert, and David Victor. The Regime Complex for Climate Change. Rep. no. 10-33. Cambridge: Harvard University, 2010. Print. The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements. Pg. 6. 35 Changes in GHG Emissions excluding LULUCF. Digital image. UNFCCC. UNFCCC, n.d. Web. 10 Oct. 2013.
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have changed little over time as a recent report to the UNFCCC revealed that as of 2007, the energy sector was responsible for 73.5% of GHG emissions while industrial processes accounted for 12.6% and agriculture accounted for just over 10%.
Croatia’s energy sector’s unwaveringly levels of GHG emissions could be attributed to the fact that renewable energy was not well-integrated into this sector and thus, Croatia relied heavily on fuel combustion methods for several years after 1990. Albeit, Odyssee Indicators
(supported by the European Commission) ran a report that lasted from 1995 to 2010 and data indicated that Croatia’s energy efficiency index increased by 14.5% during this period, particularly in sectors such as transport. The household efficiency index also showed a small improvement due to increased efficiency of heating devices and appliances.
Under the first period of the Kyoto Protocol, signed by Croatia in 1999, Croatia pledged under Annex B to reduce its emissions by 5% (from the base year of 1990) over a five-year period that ended in 2012. For the assigned amount under Kyoto, Croatia added 3.5 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent to its 1990 (base year) levels for GHG emissions, however, there was great contention in adding this amount. Beginning in November 2009 and lasting until 2011,
Croatia had remained under a trading ban for UN-backed carbon units due to the country’s unresolved dispute with the UN regarding Croatia’s GHG limit for the five-year reduction period. The main contention in this argument is that in 1990 Croatia was still part of Yugoslavia, making their 1990 baseline inaccurate. As a result, Croatia had temporarily filed an appeal as it felt there was discrimination “…in relation to other countries in transition which were eligible to use the flexibility under Article 4.6 of the Convention.”36
36 Croatia. Ministry of Environmental Protection, Physical Planning and Construction. Fifth National Communication of the Republic of Croatia under the United Nation Framework Convention on the Climate Change. N.p., Jan. 2010. Web. 20 Nov. 2012.
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Within this first period, Croatia met the reduction target; although emissions have increased since 1990, the period of war greatly reduced emissions from 1991 until 1994 (wherein
GHG emissions dropped almost 30% below 1990 levels), allowing room for growth from 1995-
2012 while still maintaining Croatia’s ability to meet the 2012 Kyoto target. The country’s target for the second commitment period of Kyoto was recently established as 20% compared to 1990 levels, in line with the EU’s commitment. With emissions increasing and relatively fragmented policies, it remains unknown whether or not Croatia will be able to meet this pledge. The country’s accession to the EU may increase Croatia’s ability to meet the target contingent upon many factors. Croatia did not utilize Kyoto’s flexible mechanisms within the first target period due to ability to reach the set target using domestic measures alone, however, the Croatian government has stated that “…after 2012 Croatia is going to intensively use mechanisms of international climate change agreements, in particular emission trading through the EU trading scheme.”37
Although the Montreal Protocol is not directly related to climate change, it is worth including due to the effectiveness of the agreement, both globally and within Croatia. Croatia ratified the Montreal Protocol in 1991 by notification of succession. Internally, Croatia did not produce substances that deplete the ozone, however, it did import them and therefore consumption of these ozone-depleting substances (ODS) was monitored and reported annually following ratification.38 Croatia also fully complied with the Montreal Protocol’s by-law, which phased out the consumption of ozone-depleting substances completely by 2005. Moreover,
Croatia had access to the Montreal Protocol’s Multilateral Fund and utilized this access to
37 Croatia. Ministry of Environmental Protection, Physical Planning and Construction. Fifth National Communication of the Republic of Croatia under the United Nation Framework Convention on the Climate Change. N.p., Jan. 2010. Web. 20 Nov. 2012. Pg. 106. 38 Environmental Performance Reviews: Croatia. Rep. Geneva: United Nations, 1999. UNECE. Web.
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implement the National Program for the Phase-out of ODS in 1996 as well for additional funding for institutional strengthening projects.
Also of indirect relevance to climate change agreements, Croatia, which imports more air pollution than it exports, ratified the Convention of Long-Range Trans-boundary Air Pollution in
September of 199239. Under this convention, Croatia’s objectives include increased global cooperation regarding trans-boundary air pollution, ratification of the eight additional protocols and ensuring that Croatia’s national policy is in line with international standards. Within Croatia, the main culprits for trans-boundary air pollution include refineries, petrochemical firms, cement production and power plants. Since ratification, Croatia has had difficulties with implementation due to lack of monitoring resources and minimal finances available for compliance. The UNECE
Environmental Report of Croatia also states that Croatia has created few reports on air-polluting emissions and has limited air quality monitoring.
39 "Status of Ratification of The 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution as Of 24 May 2012 ." Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution. UNECE, 24 May 2012. Web. 10 Oct. 2013.
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Chapter 3: The Role of the State
The Relationship Between the State and the Global Climate Change Regime
Evidence from existing environmental treaties shows that these voluntary agreements are most useful when “…they [work to] enhance governmental concern, provide a forum for governments to harmonize international policies, and improve national capacities to cope with environmental threats.”40 International environmental agreements such as Kyoto are applied at the state level to control worldwide use of environmental resources and global production of environmental harm. While negotiated multilaterally, the actual implementation of these treaties has been determined largely by the state, creating a large variety of outcomes. Additionally, the
Kyoto Protocol was not set to enter legal force until it had been ratified by at least 55 parties to the UNFCCC; in establishing such a stipulation, the UNFCCC demonstrated the power of the state and how Kyoto’s goals are largely contingent upon the relationship between domestic societies and the environment. The Montreal Protocol is an excellent model of an effective international environmental treaty whose success was largely attributed to national governments’ decision to put the treaty into practice. With the Montreal Protocol, “…167 countries around the world implemented national policies that banned the use of ozone-depleting chemicals produced in their countries.41” Thus, despite the global nature of the Montreal Protocol, the treaty was only effective wherein nation states chose to make it so via domestic policy.
40 Fisher, Dana. National Governance and the Global Climate Change Regime. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Print. Pg. 5. 41 Ibid. Pg 4
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In examining international environmental agreements from a domestic level, two popular theories exist explaining the relationship between civil society and the environment. Firstly, categorized under political sociology, is the idea of an environmental state wherein well- developed states undertake environmental protection as a state responsibility if states that have the capacity to assume such duties.42 Additionally, under the environmental state theory, environmental protection can serve as an opportunity for economic growth. Secondly, there are the theories of environmental sociology, which propose that environmental issues are largely a result of capitalism and rapid industrialization. Some proponents of environmental sociology also suggest that environmental protection is adverse to economic growth or that limits may need to be placed on economic growth to ensure resource sustainability.
As argued by Dana Fisher, the two aforementioned theories do not explicitly address the relationship between the domestic and international global environmental issues and the various entities influencing policy-making in this area. The decisions of nation-states regarding ratification of international environmental agreements are dependent upon the interaction of different domestic actors within a complex global environmental system. These domestic actors can be divided into the categories of: industry, science, civil society and the state.43 It is acknowledged that although these four actors have large impacts on the domestic position on an environmental treaty, each nation’s stance is also influenced by interactions with other nations and international organizations.
Further reiterating the role of the state, the International Forum on Globalization wrote that the “… proper role of global institutions is to facilitate the cooperative coordination of
42 Frank, David John, Ann Hironaka, and Evan Schofer. “Environmentalism as a Global Institution: Reply to Buttel.” American Sociological Review 65, no. 1 (2000a): 122-27. 43 Fisher, Dana. National Governance and the Global Climate Change Regime. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Print. Pg. 15.
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national policies on matters where the interests of nations are inherently intertwined- as with action on global warming.”44 Examining this dynamic of state sovereignty from a variety of theoretical perspectives gives further insight into common state behavior towards the global climate regime. For example, from a realist perspective, the global climate change regime is challenged by a consistent pursuit of national interests on behalf of all states, inciting limited international cooperation and a tendency to defect from international agreements. However, the realist position that states are in a constant state of anarchy is also strongly challenged by the existence of climate change governance in itself. Additionally, a neoliberal institutionalist lens offers that treaties such as Kyoto do not have enough incentives to attract significant participation.45 Finally, constructivism purports that within the climate change regime, a state’s approach is dependent upon the collective scientific facts, normative issues and individualized subjective responses.
Despite the indications of political globalization, a ‘world state’ does not exist and the state structure is still “…not subject to any higher authority [and] no state has the right to expect compliance from any other state.”46 While the United Nations serves as the entity most similar to the aforementioned world state, it does not have any overarching authority over members and its effectiveness is completely determined by the prerogatives of its member states to enforce compliance with the UN’s decisions or resolutions. Incongruously, the event of political globalization is demonstrated best by the actions within the state system. Illustrating this is the fact that the nation-state is the sole political unit utilized within our world and is considered the
44 Lechner, Frank, and John Boli. The Globalization Reader. Chichester, West Sussex: J. Wiley & Sons, 2012. Print. Pg. 484. 45 Eckersley, Robyn. 'Soft Law, Hard Politics and the Climate Change Treaty' in Christian Reus-Smit (ed.), The Politics of International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 80-105. 46 Lechner, Frank, and John Boli. The Globalization Reader. Chichester, West Sussex: J. Wiley & Sons, 2012. Print. Pg. 219.
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utmost justifiable and workable political structure. Furthermore, the basic model of the state is also universal47 albeit diverse in its individual realization. The rise of intergovernmental organizations designed to address issues that are common amongst states is also indicative of political globalization.
Whether or not the current role of the state (within such agreements) will remain the status quo is uncertain with rapid globalization and as nation states continue to risk losing relevance within the globalizing economy. Moreover, development and environmental issues are closely linked and the “…industries most heavily reliant on environmental sources…are growing most rapidly in the developing world.”48 The institutions and borders of states are becomingly impinged upon by the four “I”’s: investment, industry, information and individuals.49 At present, many multinational corporations possess revenues that are far larger than whole state economies, giving these corporations more power in the world economy than many states. As underlined by
Kenichi Ohmae, the best option for state governments to counteract the effects of the borderless economy is to encourage states to “…cede autonomy to the wealth-generating region states [and to] catalyze the efforts of those region states to seek out global solutions…and to function as ports of entry to the global economy.”50 How this gradual decline of the nation state within the global economy will affect the global climate change regime remains an unknown that will likely be factored into new climate agreements. Yet, for the time being, sovereign states will establish the implementation for such global climate change agreements.
47 Ibid. Pg 220. 48 Ibid. Pg. 407. 49 Ibid. Pg. 221. 50 Ibid. Pg. 227
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Croatia and the Global Climate Change Regime: An Analysis of the State’s Role
Within “National Governance and the Global Climate Change Regime,” Dana Fisher carries out a quantitative analysis of the relationship between nations’ contributions to climate change, the environment and the economy. This analysis is conducted to validate whether or not the established, typical indicators for economic growth negatively correlate with a nation’s contribution to climate change via CO2 emissions, as would be expected by most scholars of environmental sociology. Concurrently, this analysis also examines the validity of the environmental state theory, which posits that environmental protection positively correlates with environmental protection.
Although Fisher’s quantitative modeling will not be applied for the purpose of this thesis, it is constructive to overview the results as she investigates the basis of the environmental protection stance of democratic, market-economies. Fisher explicitly looks at OECD countries but the data’s conclusions can be extrapolated and applied to Croatia as well as the majority of
EU countries, all of which are functioning democracies with market-based economies. In measuring the material and environmental protection outcomes of OECD countries for her quantitative analysis, Fisher used total CO2 emissions per capita as the dependent variable, using data obtained from the International Energy Agency (IEA). CO2 was chosen as opposed to other greenhouse gas emission sources as it is “…understood to account for over half of the effect of greenhouse warming”51 and is the GHG most in need of reduction. For the independent variables, Fisher used four sets of indicators, the first being economic measures, the second ecological efficiency measures, the third environmental institutionalization measures and the fourth being independent measures of environmental impact.
51 Fisher, Dana. National Governance and the Global Climate Change Regime. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Print. Pg. 52.
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For the economic independent variables, Fisher looked at GDP per capita (as of 1999) and the total primary energy supply per capita- both of which are regarded as select economic indicators by the OECD. The total primary energy supply (TPES) per capita is most able to demonstrate a country’s contribution to CO2 emissions via energy usage. The ecological efficiency set of indicators (as created by the OECD) are included to illustrate a nation’s willingness to protect the environment, implying whether or not CO2 reductions are likely to be made. These indicators include the amount of municipal waste in kilograms per person, the amount of industrial waste in kilograms per US $1,000 GDP, the percentage change in total primary energy supply from 1980-1997 and finally, the amount of motor vehicle travel per capita as there is direct correlation with CO2 emissions.
The third set, or the environmental institutionalization measures, consists of indicators that reveal a nation’s stance on environmental protection. These indicators include the percentage of total area dedicated to national parks or protected areas, the number of country chapters of international environmental NGOs and the percentage of GDP made as national contributions to intergovernmental environmental associations. Lastly, the two independent measures of environmental impact used by Fisher are the country’s ecological footprint, utilized as an all-inclusive gauge of environmental performance, and a nation’s sustainability index, designed to describe a nation’s ability to manage environmental issues.
Fisher then used these indicators within a multiple regression analysis, wherein independent variables were controlled to reveal the influence of each variable on CO2 emissions.
The results stated that “…straightforward economic indicators such as GDP proved not to have significant effects on CO2 emissions,”52 dismissing the correlation between CO2 emissions per capita and economic output. The two indicators that did account for a large portion of the
52 Ibid. Pg. 52.
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differences in CO2 emissions within OECD countries was the motor vehicle travel per capita and the amount of industrial waste. Both of these indicators are much more reflective of national policies and the ecological efficiency of national economies as opposed to levels of affluence.
Hence, Fisher’s model promotes the notion that it is indeed in the state’s ability to shape the economy in such a way that is climate friendly, further supporting the idea that climate agreements such as Kyoto and the UNFCCC are largely contingent upon state action. As such, it can be inferred that Croatia, a developed, democratic market-economy similar to the OECD countries used in Fisher’s analysis, can control emissions using policy mechanisms without greatly affecting economic growth or GDP.
Aside from the quantitative analysis, Fisher also performed an in-depth qualitative analysis to measure national political outcomes and social dynamics, better explaining the variations in CO2 emissions amongst democratic and developed market-economies. The analysis works to explain differing decisions to participate in the global climate change regime. The method behind this analysis was to investigate the various domestic and international interactions between social actors within the global environmental system and in response to the Kyoto
Protocol. These interactions are largely excluded from the environmental sociology and environmental state theories, the basis of the aforementioned quantitative analysis.
For the qualitative analysis, Fisher used the political engagement of a country in the global climate change regime as measured by intention to ratify the Kyoto Protocol as the first dependent variable. The status of a domestic-level climate change regime for reducing GHG emissions was used as the second dependent variable, measured by the change in national CO2 emissions from the time when the Kyoto Protocol was established.53 These two dependent
53 Ibid. Pg. 55.
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variables work together to establish the level of realized commitment by a state by examining both political and material results.
The independent variables within this analysis consisted of four social actors which are critical in composing the domestic position on an environmental treaty: the market, science, civil society and the state. Fisher’s first independent variable, the state, measures the role and strength of the state in implementing climate change policy. The market, on the other hand, is evaluated in terms of the industry’s response to climate change, ranging from autonomous to collaborative.
Thirdly, the civil society independent variable is determined by the level of external or internal involvement between civil society and policy-making. Finally, science in relation to domestic climate change policy-making is deemed either marginal or essential.
In examining Croatia’s response to the global climate change regime, environmental sociologist Dana Fisher’s method of qualitative analysis can be scaled down and utilized to explore the connection between a Croatia’s social actors and the larger global environmental system. For the first dependent variable, Croatia’s political outcome would be represented by its decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. For the second dependent variable measuring material results, GHG emissions (measured in Gg CO2 equivalent) rose just under five percent from 1997 to 201154. Of note, the overall emissions between 1990 and 2011 decreased almost 11 percent.
In terms of science as a social actor, within Croatia it would likely be considered somewhere in the middle between peripheral and central to domestic climate change policy decisions. This is largely due to reduced capacity for research and development (R&D) infrastructure and minimal funding as opposed to an overwhelming influence of the market sector or skepticism. Aside from the fact that less than 1% of the GDP is spent on R&D, Croatia
54 Summary of GHG Emissions for Croatia. Rep. United Nations Climate Change Secretariat, 2011. Web. 05 Sept. 2013.
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has also suffers from ‘brain drain’: “…as a small country, with a rather small cultural scene and a still insufficiently consolidated market, [Croatia has] difficulties in retaining its creative potential.”55 It is apparent that major reforms are needed on behalf of the government, particularly away from an overly-centralized funding system for grants.
However, an awareness of the need for technical expertise in reducing emissions is growing, with slow but positive growth trends in the availability of information regarding energy efficiency, pollution education and renewable energy. Much of this information is made available through consultancy firms and academic institutions. For example, research at the
University of Zagreb has calculated the cost of emissions reductions for industry sectors, promoting the availability of information for businesses. However, the need for increased research is further underlined to better support national projects and climate collaboration. There is a severe need for access to original data through data sharing components so that prior data may be used for later study of energy use or emissions reductions.
Since climate change skepticism is low and Croatian citizens are generally concerned about climate change, funding for R&D has the potential for growth, particularly with EU acceptance. At present, the Croatian government funds environmental research and development via several state agencies including the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports
(whose budget increased by over 50% from 2003 to 200856), the National Foundation for
Science, Higher Education and Technological Development for the Republic of Croatia, the
Croatian Institute of Technology and the Unity Through Knowledge Fund. Moreover, the
European Union’s Seventh Framework Program (FP7) worked to build research funding from
55 Croatia. Rep. European Commission, n.d. Web.
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2007-2013 with emphasis on informing policy-makers throughout the creation of environmental policy in addition to industry leaders and Croatian citizens.
In evaluating the strength of the state in implementing climate change policy according to
Fisher’s analysis, the result is apt to be medium on a scale of weak to strong. Firstly, the Croatian government’s overall issue with transparency and fragmentation also carries over to climate policy in that there is a lack of coordination and funding. Such impediments reduce the effectiveness of the National Environmental Strategy and the NEAP (National Environmental
Action Plan). Monitoring quality of emissions is also quite poor and implementation measures are disengaged by weak legislation and a lack of sanctions. The many environmental structures and institutional frameworks established by the Croatian government are not necessarily utilized due to a lack of inspectors and overall cooperation amongst inspection bodies. Increased funding and support capacity is needed to accommodate the new environmental protection policies being put forth in Croatia.
Nonetheless, it is apparent that EU membership has served as a catalyst for increased climate regulations and as such, in recent years the Croatian government has made significant steps in working to reduce emissions. Aside from ratifying Kyoto, meeting the 2012 target, and ratifying the UNFCCC, Croatia has worked to increase the country’s renewable energy potential
(a target of 35% was set for 2020) and increase energy efficiency, also enacting climate-forward policies such as signing on to the Air Protection Act. Igor Raguzin, Head of the Division for
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency of Croatia’s Ministry of Economy, Labor and
Entrepreneurship (MELE), stated in 2008 that MELE is “...proud of the steps it is taking with others in the government sector, with international organizations with businesses and with
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Croatian citizens to ensure that Croatia’s energy needs are met in order to facilitate human and economic development and protect the environment.”57
Outside of the EU, the Parliament of Croatia is “....the deciding body for the adoption of the Energy Strategy, the Energy Efficiency Master Plan...and, in general, has been supportive of climate change mitigation.”58 The Energy Efficiency Master Plan and Croatia’s reformed Energy
Strategy both work to help Croatia meet international commitments, increase economic development and improve sustainability. Within the government, the MEPPPC, or the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Physical Planning and Construction, has been the critical agency of
Croatian government implementing climate change policy. For example, through the MEPPPC and the 2003 creation of the Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency Fund, the Croatian government installed a fee on carbon and other GHG emissions, charging approximately 2 Euros per ton, a price that was later increased to 2.50 Euros.
Preceding EU accession, Croatia underwent institutional strengthening for environmental protection capacity. Croatia’s policies towards the environment were based upon the country’s
Strategic Development Framework as well as the National Environmental Strategy and the
National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP). Under the Declaration of Environmental
Protection, Croatia made an explicit commitment to sustainable development as well as the signing of international treaties addressing environmental protection. The 1994 passing of the
Law on Environmental Protection also provided legislative support for environmental protection as it “…determines environmental protection objectives and principles, sets out the rights and
57 A Climate for Change: Climate Change and Its Impacts on Society and Economy in Croatia. Rep. 1st ed. Zagreb: UNDP, 2008. Print. Pg. 218. 58 Ibid. Pg. 215.
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responsibilities of actors…stipulates who is liable for environmental pollution and has to clean it up, and defines environmental inspections.”59
Other exemplary measures include the government’s provision of energy audits to stimulate demand for energy efficiency and in 2007, and the Croatian government created incentive to expand renewable energy via feed-in tariffs. As a result, hydro and wind power increased in popularity within industries. Moreover, for several years, the Croatian Environment
Agency, a government agency, has worked to gather data on climate change in the absence of other scientific bodies. Moreover, the Ministry of Economy, Labor and Entrepreneurship
(MELE) is also working to reduce energy usage of all government actors, embarking on projects such as establishing building codes for increased efficiency within government buildings. It can therefore be surmised that the Croatian government is progressing in terms of regulations, particularly under the EU, for reducing emissions but room for much improvement still remains in terms of efficiency. To illustrate, issues still exist in regard to the “...ad hoc nature of communication between ministries on climate change issues”60 and instead, a more integrated national structure or entity is needed to address climate change issues.
Industry, the third social actor, remains largely autonomous of climate change policy but evidence demonstrates a desire for more collaboration, most likely to better align with EU environmental policies. Data demonstrates that Croatian industry ran largely unchecked by climate change policy prior to EU accession. While the 2012 Kyoto target was met, it was largely due to record emission-lows during the period of war followed by emissions reductions caused by the recent economic recession in Europe.
59 Environmental Performance Reviews: Croatia. Rep. Geneva: United Nations, 1999. UNECE. Web.Pg. 3 60 A Climate for Change: Climate Change and Its Impacts on Society and Economy in Croatia. Rep. 1st ed. Zagreb: UNDP, 2008. Print. Pg. 217.
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Prior to accession, Croatian business interests were largely excluded from the climate policy process, leaving “...stakeholders within the business sector [expressing] the desire to be included earlier and more purposefully in discussions on new legislation and regulations.”61 Such exclusion and lack of consultation minimizes the potential for reduction opportunities on behalf of businesses and leaves certain industries more vulnerable. Moreover, Croatia has seen little centrally-organized activity related to emissions reduction with the industrial sector (except for state-run utilities). However, the Croatian Chamber of Economy, largely representative of businesses in Croatia, was directly involved with the development of the National Allocation
Plan (establishing GHG emission quotas) and other energy efficiency measures. One case of industry progress towards support of climate policy would be INA, the largest oil and gas company and petroleum distributor in the country, which reduced its CO2 emissions by 12% in
2010 out of stated commitment to emissions reductions62.
The abovementioned carbon fee instilled in 2007 by the government also worked to involve Croatian industries in the climate change issue as did the implementation of a motor vehicle emissions fee. These fees, in conjunction with actions leading up to EU accession, raised awareness within Croatian industries, particularly the state-run industries. As of 2013, some of the largest industry emitters in Croatia have joined the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), including the massive state-owned utility company HEP or Hrvatska Elektroprivreda. HEP plans on investing almost $5 billion in power generation, with emphasis on hydro and wind, hoping to become entirely self-sufficient by 2017 as opposed to importing electricity. Other industries such as agriculture that are not included in the ETS will also have to reduce emissions to 11% above
2005-levels by 2020 under EU policy. At present, 73 installations are required to provide
61 Ibid. Pg. 219. 62 "Climate Change." INA D.d. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 Sept. 2013.
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allowances corresponding with their emissions under the ETS and beginning January 2014, flights within Croatia are also considered under the EU ETS. However, despite EU influence, there still remains a need for increased stakeholder involvement for reducing emissions, pricing carbon and introducing new technologies to Croatian industries.
Civil society is strongly supportive of climate change policy, however, the interaction between civil society and this policy is largely internal and lacking a public voice. The UNDP’s
2008 Human Development Report of Croatia emphasized that “...the Croatian public is relatively well aware of climate change issues and indicate at least some willingness to act.”63 To reiterate, a survey within the report revealed that 90% of participants in a survey possessed willingness to use sustainable transport and 86% were willing to cut down on electricity consumption.
Furthermore, a similar public opinion survey revealed that 96% of Croatians categorize climate change as a serious problem.64 In public opinion surveys, concerns about climate change were particularly strong for the higher-risk coastal regions of Croatia, wherein several major industries reside including tourism, fishing and ship-building.
Public opinion is an important factor affecting a state’s implementation of the global climate change regime as it presses governments to act and partake in climate agreements. This opinion is affected by a variety of sources, including the media, the economy, political influences, local weather events or trends and the ability of scientific entities to communicate with the public. In instances of public skepticism within Croatia and otherwise, the urgency of
63 A Climate for Change: Climate Change and Its Impacts on Society and Economy in Croatia. Rep. 1st ed. Zagreb: UNDP, 2008. Print. Pg. 225. 64 Ibid. Pg. 26.
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climate change “... should be more perceptible to the public during the next decade as the distribution of temperature anomalies continues to shift toward higher values.”65
From a top-down approach, the Croatian government’s MELE has worked with the
Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency Fund to promote the “One Ton Challenge,” aiming to reduce energy consumption amongst Croatian citizens.66 Additionally, information is made available to the public via energy labeling of products (another requirement of the EU acquis), allowing consumers to make educated decisions regarding energy-efficient products.
Furthermore, Croatia signed the Aarhus Convention in 2007 which establishes the rights of the public in terms of access to information about the environment and the right to participate in environmental decision-making. This Convention mandates that governments must actively provide information to the public regarding the environment and also the provision of opportunities for the public and NGOs to comment on projects affecting the environment.
On this note, NGOs have also played a critical role in providing information about climate change policy and energy efficiency to the Croatian population. For example, the
Croatian Expert Society for Solar energy works to spread solar energy throughout Croatia and the Croatian NGO, Knowledge for the Environment, works to promote public education on climate change. EU funding in light of accession has been critical to the continued support and expansion of NGOs as national development plants for NGOs are minimal. Climate change is also slowly being introduced into the educational curriculum of Croatian schools, including at the University level.
Based on the usage of Dana Fisher’s qualitative analysis, Croatia’s domestic approach to climate change and subsequently, its effect on the global climate change regime, is not
65 Hansen, James, Makiko Sato, and Reto Ruedy. "Perception of Climate Change." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109.37 (2012): n. pag. PNAS, 29 Mar. 2012. Web. 66"The One Ton CO2 Challenge." UNDP Croatia. UNDP, 4 June 2007. Web. 04 Sept. 2013.
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particularly effective in responding to the issue. There is definitive evidence of support on behalf of civil society and the government social actors, with the government’s approach to climate change and international agreements directly shaped by Croatia’s recent membership. However, the effective collaboration of these actors with climate change policy has yet to be seen. The science and industry actors, on the other hand, are less conducive to effective climate change policy but will likely increase in engagement with continued EU membership. Croatia remains challenged by the lingering effects of the recent war that inhibited structural adjustment and growth, EU accession thus provides an opportunity for Croatia to adopt the more effective policies and programs of the EU, inclusive of those regarding climate change. With Croatia’s membership, the EU works to help the Croatian government to define priorities and implement measures using an approach that is in line with EU environmental safeguards and also ensures the participation of all relevant stakeholders. Improvements in each of these areas to increase cooperation at a national level in regard to climate change will positively affect the political outcomes of the global climate change regime.
Evaluating Climate Change Assistance Received via Croatia’s EU Accession
As emphasized throughout this chapter, Croatia’s recent EU membership has played a large role in compliance with global climate change agreements and climate change mitigation in general. Briefly underlining this assistance provides a greater understanding of Croatia’s future within the global climate change as a nation state and also as part of a regional bloc. Prior to joining the European Union, eligible countries must accept the EU’s Community acquis and integrate the policies, treaties and laws set forth by the acquis into their national legislation. For
Croatia’s entrance, the acquis was split up in 35 chapters including one chapter for energy and one chapter for the environment. In light of “Europe 2020,” the EU’s sustainable growth
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strategy, policies addressing the environment are formulated to be disseminated throughout all chapters of the acquis, however, the environment and energy chapters are the only sectors directly pertinent to climate change.
As set forth by the Community acquis, environmental & energy policies center upon future sustainability via mitigation, adaptation, utilization of the polluter-pays principle, shared responsibility and inclusion of environmental considerations into the EU's larger policy scheme.
The Environment acquis (Chapter 27) alone has more than 200 legal acts addressing issues such as water quality, air quality, industrial pollution and climate change. The Energy acquis (Chapter
15) centers upon improving the efficiency and competitiveness of the energy market but also includes measures for environmental protection. As such, it has required considerable effort on behalf of Croatia to take the necessary steps to implement and enforce these chapters of the
Community acquis.
To assist Croatia in meeting the rigorous entrance requirements, the EU introduced various programming tools that also worked to increase cohesion between the two entities and better achieve regional sustainable growth. It is worth nothing that EU programming factors in
Croatia’s individual social, economic and political situations in an effort to maximize the effectiveness of the EU’s involvement. Since 2007, Croatia has primarily received pre-accession aid from an EU instrument known as the IPA (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance) which has replaced other EU pre-accession assistance programs. The IPA serves to stabilize incoming members, simultaneously increasing the capacity for development both nationally and across state borders. For the environmental sector, the IPA’s assistance is based off the Environment and Energy acquis chapters with funding being channeled to those areas deemed most in need of assistance for meeting entrance requirements.
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Several mechanisms are utilized to enact IPA assistance in Croatia including the Strategic
Coherence Framework (SCF), which dictates EU funding, and Multi-annual Operational
Programmes that are used to identify and address the most needed areas of intervention as outlined in the Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD). Within the IPA’s MIPD for
Croatia, the need for addressing climate change is stated, expressly by reducing emissions resulting from economic development. Institutional capacity-building and improved adaptation and mitigation measures for climate change are also included in the MIPD’s strategy. The document, spanning from 2011 to 2013, also specified that reducing GHG emissions and promotion of sustainable development will be incorporated into all relevant areas of the IPA’s assistance.67 Nonetheless, the IPA continues to focus most of its environmental programming on improving the country’s waste and water sectors.
Prior to the inception of IPA programs, the EU's ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession) facilitated projects within Croatia to further strengthen the country's institutional capacity in addressing identified environmental issues, albeit emphasis was again placed on waste and water issues.68 ISPA program application was phased out in July of 2011.
The EU's LIFE program, an instrument designed to facilitate environmental conservation projects, also worked to further improve Croatia's environmental policies with programming beginning in 2000. For example, a LIFE project entitled “Capacity Building for Implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol in the
Republic of Croatia” was completed recently. This project successfully drafted National
Inventory Reports over several years and created new environmental legislation addressing
67 Commission Implementing Decision of 17.6.2011 Adopting a Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) 2011-2013 for Croatia. Rep. European Commission, 17 June 2011. Web. 15 Oct. 2013.
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issues such as GHG emission trading allocations and carbon taxes.69 Directly addressing Kyoto’s flexible mechanisms, this project created a National Registry that “…[contains] accounts within which units are held in the name of the government or in the name of the legal entities authorized by the government to hold and trade units.”70 This Registry allows Croatia to add to or move its holdings of Kyoto units (or tonnes of CO2 equivalent emissions) as it tracks the locations of the
Kyoto units constantly; Croatia’s National Registry also settles emission trades via account transfers, serving as the basis for the carbon market operations. Once more, the creation of this
National Registry is integral to Croatia’s 2013 accession as the EU has set up an emissions trading scheme amongst its members with EU trading legislation presiding over Kyoto’s.
A separate LIFE project, “Sustainable Development of Croatian Capacity in Combined
Heat and Power (CHP) Sector,” was also carried out to better use fossil fuels and reduce GHG emissions. Furthermore, the “...study helped define pollution indicators and evaluate future strategies and measures needed for improving the efficiency of the CHP system.”71 Additional environmental programming through LIFE+ was established for 2007-2013, however, following its EU accession, Croatia is no longer taking part in LIFE programming.
Moreover, the EU’s CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) program was designed to assist exclusively South-Eastern European countries from 2000 until 2006. CARDS conducted the project, “Support for the Further Approximation of
Croatian Legislation with the Environmental Acquis,” which established Croatia’s National
69 Capacity Building for the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in the Republic of Croatia (CRO Climate Cap) The Layman's Report. Rep. N.p.: European Commission, n.d. Print. PROJECT LIFE04 TCY/CRO/029. Pg. 7. 70 "Registry Systems under the Kyoto Protocol." UNFCCC, n.d. Web. 18 Apr. 2013.
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Allocation Plan (NAP) and set up the National Greenhouse Gas Emission Registry.72 Prior to
CARDS, Croatia was a long-term beneficiary of PHARE (Programme Pologne et Hongrie- Aide a la Reconstructuration Economique), a program providing pre-accession preparation for countries hoping to join the EU. PHARE executed two key initiatives, the “Establishment of Air
Quality Monitoring and Management System”73 project and the “Enhanced Environmental
Inspection for Enforcement of New Environmental Legislation” project, both of which served to enhance public awareness and provided capacity-building as well as investment support. Croatia also received EU funding via humanitarian aid after the Yugoslav Wars in the early 1990s and through OBNOVA (or “Recovery” in Croatian), however, this funding was primarily used for refugees and no contribution was made to the issue of climate change.
Regionally, Croatia’s Ministry of the Environment and Nature Protection undertook the project “Climate Change Enabling Activity (Phase II),” which essentially served to enhance a mission that was completed in 2002 entitled “Enabling Croatia to Prepare Its First National
Communication in Response to Its Commitments to the UNFCCC.” Within “Climate Change
Enabling Activity,” technological needs and further capacity building measures were outlined as well as designed, evaluated and managed.74 For instance, a report was created which outlined the criteria which needed to be addressed for implementation of GHG emission reduction technology. National activities promoting public education regarding climate change and better access to information via web site creation were also instilled.
72 "The CARDS Programme (2000-2006)." Europa. European Union, 02 May 2007. Web. 08 Aug. 2013.
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Additionally, this Ministry office also took part in a regional project, “UNDP/GEF
Capacity Building for Improving the Quality of Greenhouse Gas Inventories (Europe/CIS
Region),” that involved twelve other European countries. This particular project focused on institutional strengthening of GHG inventories and increased capacity for engaging such national inventories including improving methodologies and emissions factors. The IPCC or the
Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change provided oversight for the implementation of this project which works to “…help countries to reduce uncertainties and improve the quality of inventories for subsequent National Communications”75 for the UNFCCC.
Finally, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Physical Planning and Construction’s
“Logical Framework Matrix,” which assesses various modes of preparation for the Impact,
Vulnerability and Adaptation Strategy (IVAS) to Climate Change. The IVAS initiative works to fulfill UNFCCC objectives surrounding impact evaluation, vulnerability and Croatia’s ability to adapt to the changes that global warming will bring to its environmental and economic sectors.
IVAS utilizes two sectors of activities with Component 1 focusing on modeling software and equipment while Component 2 centers upon stakeholder engagement, the modeling of climate scenarios and various forms of assessment such as evaluation of past research activities, taxation/subsidy options, capacity-building needs and so on.76
The EU’s massive cap and trade system is also an important addition to Croatia’s implementation ability. This system aims to increase the price of emitting GHGs and to encourage polluters to using cleaner forms of energy as opposed to fossil fuels. The system operates via capping emissions created by industries and requiring the subsequent purchasing of
75 "UNDP/GEF Capacity Building for Improving the Quality of Greenhouse Gas Inventories (Europe/CIS Region)." Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 Apr. 2013.
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regulatory permits, ultimately forcing energy efficiency by continuously decreasing the set caps.
Those who surpass the allotted amounts are subject to large fines. However, amidst Croatia’s
2013 entrance, the EU’s attempt at formulating a global model for carbon trading has shown increasing weakness due to an overabundance of issued permits, poor policy support and a widespread recession throughout much of Europe that is causing industries to cut back on production, therefore causing excess allowances. Trading totals within the carbon market in 2012 amounted to 62 billion Euros- considerably less than the 96 billion total in 2011.77
As of May 2013, permits for purchase were valued at fewer than four Euros, reduced considerably from 30 Euros per permit in 2008. The decreasing cost simultaneously eliminates incentives for industries to use cleaner fuels or buy into clean technologies. As such, the burning of inexpensive coal has expanded. Conversely, when the carbon market was at an all-time high in 2008, companies within the EU spent billions to utilize renewables. The issues surrounding the EU's carbon market have also discouraged large-scale carbon trading in other regions such as the US.
Despite such setbacks, emissions throughout the EU have fallen considerably since the
ETS was established in 2005.78 This progress indicates that Europe will probably meet its
(binding) reduction goal of 20% from 1990 levels by the year 2020. However, ETS reforms will likely be needed if the EU is to meet its target of 80% reduction in carbon emissions by 2050.
Whether or not the European recession has played a major role in recent reduced emissions is a point of contention. In addition to the cap and trade system, the EU has introduced carbon taxes including a tax on international airline flights. Moreover, the EU's proposed six-year budget is
77 "European Carbon Market to Remain Oversupplied until 2027." Press Releases. Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, 19 Sept. 2013. Web. 08 Nov. 2013.
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designed to be increasingly green by allocating at least 20 percent of the entire budget from
2014-2020 to climate-related action.79 These changes will be incorporated into Croatia’s national approach to climate change, both in terms of the global agreement and otherwise.
79 "Supporting Climate Action through the EU Budget." European Commission. N.p., n.d. Web. 28 Oct. 2013.
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Chapter IV: Improving the Global Climate Change Regime
Recommendations for Croatia:
It is difficult to propose solutions for Croatia’s implementation of the global climate change regime alone- progress needs to largely be made on behalf of the entire global climate agreement structure. Action for deep GHG reductions beyond the pledged 20% by 2020 would be ideal, but massive reductions are unlikely due the creation of unfair competition in light of other countries who do not take action. Moreover, deep reductions by a smaller emitter such as
Croatia will do little in the grand scheme of the climate change problem and potentially limit necessary ongoing economic development. However, national steps to mitigate emissions and reduce the effects of climate change through adaptation would make future implementation of such agreements easier. Exemplary actions could include use of REDD incentives to stimulate faster growth of renewable energy, higher-density national planning to reduce emissions, usage of community forest user groups and increased adaptation measures via better forecasting, fortifying coastlines and diversifying crops.
However, in reflecting on Chapter III and the state roles of science, state, civil society and industry in the global environmental system, the interaction amongst these actors greatly affects political responses to international environmental policy making and evidence for improvement exists. For instance, a working group that functions between Croatian ministries should be established to addressed climate change in a more integrated and coordinated manner.
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This will also reduce waste of public funding and encourage the introduction of climate change policy into all aspects of government planning. Data should also be made more available for research purposes; one option for increasing data availability may be through cooperation with the Croatian Environmental Agency, which currently manages national data. Similarly, Croatia must meet modeling needs to simulate the effects of climate change, further aiding policy- making and assessing climate risks. Lastly, businesses should also be more involved in the discussion of new policy implementation for climate change.
Costs for reduction of emissions beyond 1990 baseline levels are estimated to be around
EUR 115 and EUR 536 million or less than 1% of the GDP.80 As such, further investments within industrial efficiency, sustainable transportation, renewable energy and usage of GHG sinks are required to fully engage Croatia on a national level and as part of the global climate change regime. Such investments will require collaboration on behalf of the public and private sectors with continuous government involvement. Additionally, improved public involvement is mandatory in effective climate change policy, perhaps best communicated via the mass media.
Unlike many of its EU constituents, Croatia has yet to adopt a beneficial Pressure-State-
Response (PSR) framework, which produces environmental performance reviews as well as environmental indicators to demonstrate the pressures exerted on the environment by human activities that cause GHG emissions. The Pressure-State Response (PSR) framework also documents the relationships between these environmental indicators and various international treaties. Future adoption of the PSR framework could prove incredibly useful for Croatia’s involvement within climate change IEAs.
80 A Climate for Change: Climate Change and Its Impacts on Society and Economy in Croatia. Rep. 1st ed. Zagreb: UNDP, 2008. Print. Pg. 232.
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Although Croatia’s national implementation still requires improvement, both Kyoto and the UNFCCC possess flaws that limit more effective state implementation, in Croatia and otherwise. As a new member of the environmentally-conscious EU, Croatia is becoming increasingly committed to the concept of a global climate change regime. If stronger foundations for global cooperation are laid, it can be surmised that future, binding climate change agreements will likely foster effective participation from both smaller polluters such as Croatia, to major emitters such as the US and China.
Reworking the Global Climate Change Regime: A Broader Approach
With the successor to the Kyoto Protocol set to take effect in 2020, a global awareness of the flaws related to Kyoto and multilateral climate change governance is needed to formulate a more effective replacement. Cooperation at a national, regional and multilateral level is critical, as is incorporating a variety of actors in creating strategies to address both immediate and long- term issues. The process of achieving deep emission cuts will be costly: The World Bank
“…estimates annual costs of stabilization at 500-550ppm CO2e to be around 1% of GDP by
2050 - a level that is significant but manageable.”81 Moreover, in the interim period before the new agreement takes effect, it is critical that the international community continues to support existing commitments. Economist Joseph Stiglitz states that to make binding treaties such as
Kyoto work, we must address the issue of major emitters lack of involvement, fair targets for developing countries, better target enforcement and cost reduction for reducing emissions to increase compliance. Underlining these points is the idea that “…a compromise will have to be found between targets based on emissions per dollar of GDP and targets based on emissions per capita” (Stiglitz, pg. 176).
81 Stern, Nicholas. Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change. Publication. London: London HM Treasury, 2006. Print. Pg. xii.
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In improving compliance, stronger incentives for reaching set targets should be established and countries should be increasingly pressured to participate in such treaties. For example, trade sanctions were inclusive within the highly-effective Montreal Protocol but not within Kyoto. Discussions of strict enforcement for a global climate change agreement (Kyoto and post-Kyoto) have yielded little progress but better enforcement would likely produce significant results. At present, those who do not meet targets are legally required to subtract their emissions deficit from their next-phase emission target in addition to a hefty penalty. How this will translate to the post-Kyoto regime remains unknown as targets have not yet been determined. Some may in fact threaten to withdraw support.
Another prospective option for compliance would be for countries to restrict or place duties on imports of goods that are emissions-intensive, such as those imported from certain US companies. It is worth noting that the WTO has set precedents for the US in that the United
States does not pay for its pollution and energy-intensive businesses are essentially being subsidized- an issue that can be remedied by imposing countervailing duties. These duties, within the US and other high-emitting countries, would increase the pressure to sign climate agreements. The likelihood that such strict compliance measures would be included in future climate agreements may increase as the need for addressing climate change becomes more urgent.
The efficacy of Kyoto and future climate treaties could be further improved upon by addressing deforestation, which amounts to just under a quarter of global CO2 emissions.
Reducing deforestation would also prevent offsetting a large portion of the emissions reductions gained through the Kyoto Protocol. Although carbon is released into the atmosphere during the process of deforestation, the reverse is also true: the planting of forests removes CO2 from the
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atmosphere as the forests serve as carbon sinks, absorbing and storing carbon. At present, Kyoto does give credits to countries for planting trees but provides no incentives for limiting deforestation and maintaining countries’ forests. In contrast, the UN’s REDD (Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) initiative, gives developing countries the opportunity to maintain state forests by providing attractive incentives. REDD is not built into either of the global climate change agreements, however, such an initiative should certainly be factored into the post-Kyoto agreement. In the short-term, there will have to be continued heavy reliance on developed countries’ funding for preventing deforestation.
Similar to the provision of carbon credits for the planting forests within the current carbon trading system, compensation or carbon offset payments could be worked into the trading system for the prevention of deforestation. Without such inducement, it would likely be hard to implement any restrictions as deforestation is lucrative for loggers, particularly in developing areas with limited other forms of employment. An excellent indicator for this strategy would be
The Rainforest Coalition, an entity through which Costa Rica and several other developing nations proposed to abide by GHG limits if they received compensation for not cutting down their forests and planting new forest areas. The Rainforest Coalition’s focus on sustainable use of forests and the creation of viable economic alternatives for tropical forest resource-owners should be a principle incorporated into future treaties.
Furthermore, the value of preserving forests will likely be high: if deforestation was reduced by 20% in 2005, when carbon trading was approximately $30 per ton within the carbon market, the “…annual value of this avoided deforestation [would’ve been] between $30 and $40 billion a year. By comparison…all foreign assistance to developing countries was around $78
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billion in 2004.”82 To reiterate, large expanses of rainforests in the certain developing countries such as Costa Rica also absorb billions of dollars of carbon emissions, further validating the argument for compensation. The provision of compensation for such environmental services would also allow developing countries to develop the social infrastructure necessary to combat illegal logging.
Other recommendations that have been put forth regarding an improved climate change regime include faster adoption of new technology and better production standards. Joseph
Stiglitz has also purported the idea of a “common tax” under which countries would be subjected to taxes that reflect the rates of the emissions (CO2 and otherwise) they generate when burned.
The use of a common tax system would avoid Kyoto’s issue of setting national target levels and would allow each country to subsequently collect the revenue it receives from the taxes, limiting pollution-reduction costs. This notion parallels with recommendations for a Tobin tax supportive of climate change or carbon taxes on certain activities such as air transport.
Additionally, Jagdish Bhagwati proposed a potential solution to the issues inherent in current climate change agreements: within “In Defense of Globalization,” Bhagwati supports the idea of utilizing a Superfund, in which polluters will have to pay for previous environmental pollution with payments going directly into an international Superfund. The Superfund will be used to pay for carbon-free technology as well as research and development. Under this scenario, countries would essentially be buying permits for all emissions, leaving the market forces to work. This quality would likely attract developed countries such as the United States and improve the overall global reduction of GHGs.
Due to the widespread resistance to rapid, deep emission cuts within climate treaties, the inclusion of cost-effective adaptation measures is a necessity. While data is unavailable regarding
82 Stiglitz, Joseph. "The Most Global Issue." Our Planet Magazine (2007): 7-9. UNEP. Web. Pg. 8.
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projected adaptation costs in many countries, a 3-4 degree Celsius global temperature rise is expected to cost billions each year in OECD countries alone, with estimates for creating new infrastructure that is climate change-resistant ranging between $15 and 150 billion each year.83
Thus, the ability to limit future costs is made possible not only through mitigation but with early adaptation measures as opposed to reactive policies. Examples of early-action adaptation measures include changing crop rotations, water conservation, relocation of ports, removal of townships from low-lying areas and climate change-proofing infrastructure.
In examining the role of adaptation within the global climate change regime, one can surmise that progress in the area is fairly slow. Firstly, there is the Adaptation Fund of the Kyoto
Protocol, which works to help developing countries adapt to the effects of climate change and increases long-term resilience. Similarly, the Cancun Adaptation Framework was also established to push adaptation measures further up the UNFCCC’s agenda. Yet the Adaptation Fund also remains greatly underfinanced, leaving adaptation measures to be largely carried out using regular development aid from USAID, the World Bank and so on as “…sustainable development itself brings the diversification, flexibility and human capital which are crucial components of adaptation.”84
In terms of mitigation within the global climate change regime, a more cooperative, integrated strategy is needed to encourage clean (low-carbon) energy versus GHG-producing activities. Such mitigation measures may range from setting dates for countries to establish carbon capture and storage at coal plants to establishing percentages for the incorporation of renewables into a nation’s energy profile. Renewable energy is particularly promising for
83 Adapting to Climate Change in Europe – Options for EU Action. Tech. Brussels: EU Commission, 2007. Print. Pg. 9. 84 Stern, Nicholas. Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change. Publication. London: London HM Treasury, 2006. Print. Pg. 22.
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mitigation due to the level of existing multilateral cooperation through channels such as the
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and UNEP’s Global Bioenergy Partnership.
At present, only a quarter of global energy is considered alternative or renewable, leaving much room for progress and reform. Investment into the renewable energy sector has also consistently increased. However, to improve mitigation significantly, a great increase in climate finance is a necessity. As of June 2013, “…the total disbursed funds for climate change initiatives, both within and outside of the UNFCCC, [only added] up to only $2.1 billion.”85 In contrast, the
International Energy Agency recently published that delaying climate action until 2020 (in exchange for avoiding $1.5 trillion in low-carbon investments) would require $5 trillion in investments through 203586.
The scaling up of climate funding is also germane to improving the development agenda, an entity that is closely linked to climate agreements due to the complex relationship between climate change, poverty and sustainable development. At the latest COP-19 in Warsaw, there was discussion surrounding the gathering and scaling up of funding for the support of developing countries’ emissions reductions (the US, the UK, EU and several other nations announced contributions of public climate finance). This discussion is directly in line with the agreement that arose from Agenda 21 at the 1992 Rio Summit in that “…developing countries will shoulder important environmental responsibilities and, in return, developed countries will take on serious commitments to help fund and support them in the process.”87
The COP in Copenhagen also demonstrated progress in this area as industrialized countries pledged to provide developing countries with $100 billion by 2020 in addition to the
85 "The Global Climate Change Regime." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 19 June 2013. Web. 10 Oct. 2013 86 Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map. Rep. Paris: IEA, 2013. Print. Pg. 83. 87 Drexhage, John. Climate Change and Global Governance. Issue brief no. 2. N.p.: International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2008. Print. Pg 4.
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UN’s creation of the High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Financing. Despite this show of commitment, a framework has yet to come to fruition and the $100 billion will likely need to be tripled to realistically help developing countries reduce their emissions enough to meet global targets.88 Additionally, the Green Climate Fund, a finance mechanism designed to support
UNFCCC goals, is a relatively new funding instrument used to assist developing countries in regard to climate change. The entity works to “…promote the paradigm shift towards low- emission and climate-resilient development pathways by providing support to developing countries to limit…greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the impacts of climate change.”89
As of its creation, there have been few pledges of funding and a controversial focus on the private sector.
Consequently, it has become clear that better avenues for providing funding to developing countries must be found. Increased funding would provide opportunities for low- carbon technology to enter developing countries, simultaneously reducing the risk of expensive retrofitting later on. For example, the Energy Charter Treaty, created to increase energy investment and trading in European and Asian countries, offers a potential model for clean energy investment in developing countries. Underscoring these examples is the fact that continued investment in climate funding will help to “green” developing economies and greatly reduce future adaptation costs. Overall, the involvement of developing countries within the global climate regime will be cemented by the intersection of sustainable development, foreign direct investment and official development assistance.90
88 Venugopal, Shally, and Aman Srivastava. "Moving the Fulcrum: A Primer on Public Climate Financing Instruments Used to Leverage Private Capital." World Resources Institute. N.p., July 2012. Web. 08 Sept. 2013. 89 “Mandate and Governance." Green Climate Fund. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 Sept. 2013. 90 Drexhage, John. Climate Change and Global Governance. Issue brief no. 2. N.p.: International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2008. Print. Pg 5.
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With the recent extension of the Kyoto Protocol, improvement of Kyoto’s Clean
Development Mechanism would also assist in improving the climate change regime, both in developing and developed countries. Much criticism has been directed towards the CDM due to
“…its lengthy and expensive project approval procedures, its exclusion of many categories of…mitigation activities, and its methodologies for calculating whether projects actually reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”91 In reforming the CDM, the sustainability of offset credits must be ensured and industrialized countries should be persuaded to better use CDM offsets in meeting reduction targets. Moreover, the CDM approval process should also be enhanced, perhaps shifting more governing power to the industrialized countries providing financing. Another reform option would be to further expand the selection criteria for CDM credits, allowing even more opportunities to reduce emissions. In addition, Kyoto’s carbon market mechanism is burdened with many challenges and minus an agreement that is legally-binding, it may be difficult to convince companies or nations to fully utilize a carbon market. However, the EU has demonstrated that by instilling cap and trade policies, emissions trading can be quite successful.
With reform and regulation, the carbon market may be able to significantly assist countries’ reductions.
To strengthen national and regional efforts to reduce emissions, nations should work together to create better global institutions for monitoring emissions. Currently, developed
(Annex I) countries must provide national emissions reports once every year while “there are no fixed dates for the submission of national communications of non-Annex I Parties, although these documents should be submitted within four years of the initial disbursement of financial
91 Options for Reforming the Clean Development Mechanism. Issue brief no. 09-01. Cambridge: Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, 2009. Print. Pg.1.
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resources to assist them in preparing their national communications.”92 The quality of reporting on behalf of non-Annex I parties is also purportedly much poorer, compounded by the fact that many developing countries only submit reporting once per decade. Hence, there is room for great improvement in national reporting communications and such reforms will greatly increases the transparency of global climate agreements.
High-quality monitoring will increase confidence that all actors are participating and that climate funding from developed nations is being put to appropriate use. In developing successful reporting on behalf of all, the international bodies must take the limitations of developing countries into close consideration. This is inclusive of limited domestic technological capacity, an aversion to capping emissions and certain developing nations’ dislike for concessions that may encroach on national autonomy. The Bali Action Plan and the COP in Copenhagen proposed methods for enhanced transparency via the international measuring, reporting and verifying of emission reductions, nevertheless, implementation has yet to occur. In one scenario, effective monitoring on behalf of other global institutions such as the IMF may be used as a model for the UNFCCC’s monitoring. In a similar vein, economic institutions such as the World
Bank and the UNDP may also widen their support of providing climate-friendly development solutions that also promote climate change adaptation.
If the current state of the global climate change regime remains the status quo, once climate change impacts are truly divisive, there will be little to be done without incurring enormous costs and drastic adaptation strategies. Hence, there is continually growing support for the precautionary principle, wherein “…international agreements covering…environmental protection are increasingly based on proactive or preventative measures which encompass
92 "National Reports." National Reports. UNFCCC, n.d. Web. 04 Sept. 2013.
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collective action and burden sharing.”93 Yet, the qualm many nations face in becoming party to agreements such as Kyoto is whether or not to place global interests above national interests in the form of competitive market advantage (often, nations that do not commit to emissions cuts have a competitive advantage over those that do, at least in the short term). Despite this fact, several nations that have carried out emissions cuts under Kyoto also have high standards of living that have not been threatened by curbing emissions.
The Root of the Problem: Reshaping Global Governance
With the pressures of globalization, “…international institutions…provide an ad hoc system of global governance, but it is a far cry from global government and lacks democratic accountability.”94 Considering the state of global governance today, it could be argued that certain issues surrounding the global climate change regime can be attributed to a much larger governance problem. International environmental agreements and institutions are part of a global governance movement designed to encourage cooperation amongst transnational actors in addressing pressing global issues and building a system of sustainable societies working to achieve public good. Multilateralism rose in relevance following World War II’s unprecedented violence, particularly through the creation of the United Nations, an entity essentially built to discourage future wars. The relevance of the global governance system waxed and waned in the decades following its inception and in present day, global governance receives mixed reviews.
Some believe the system is broken, “…bureaucratically unwieldy, unnecessarily expensive, and
93 Fisher, Dana. National Governance and the Global Climate Change Regime. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Print. Pg. 23. 94 Lechner, Frank, and John Boli. The Globalization Reader. Chichester, West Sussex: J. Wiley & Sons, 2012. Print. Pg. 212
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weakened by poor personal recruitment”95 with deeply flawed architecture and a lack of global legitimacy.
Conversely, others such as Francois Rivasseau, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the EU to the US, believe that “...global governance is not broken [and it is working] better than expected, better than ever.”96 Illustrative successes range from technical improvements such as better targeted sanctions to the FAO’s reports of steadily declining undernourishment in developing countries. Additionally, global access to antiretrovirals has increased dramatically and the IMF’s lending capability has greatly increased. The G8 has also been able to better regulate the financial sector and the EU continues to enlarge with new mechanisms being created to deal with the Eurozone’s existing financial difficulties. Despite what stance one may take, it is certain that in today’s world, there is a grave need for effectual global governance- whether or not the current system is successful remains up for debate.
Aside from architectural failures, several argue that there is a crisis of trust in international governance. A large divide appears to exist between the expectations of citizens and the ability of global governance to provide appropriate solutions. As globalization continues at a rapid pace, the traditional answers ingrained into global governance structures no longer apply, making it obsolete. For instance, the UN is routinely challenged by member states and other parties, making it difficult for the entity to exercise much international power. Thus, it could be
“…presumed that the [existing] sets of policy responses are no longer adequate in regard to the environment,”97 particularly in regard to enforcement. Moreover, as the international order shifts from a unipolar world to a nonpolar paradigm, wherein many states possess large amounts of
95 Reforming the United Nations."Foreign Affairs. 1 Sept. 1995. Web. 18 Sept. 2013.
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power and the future concentration of power remains unknown, the resulting vacuum further destabilizes trust within global governance.
Further contributing to a lack of confidence in world governance is the speed of global communication, particularly in response to tragedies that garner international attention. As technology advances, information transfer occurs at a rapid pace via social media and other mediums yet international solutions are not immediately available in response. Due to the slow provision of solutions, frustrations mount towards the institutions designated to handle global issues. Thus, new technologies impact global governance in unexpected ways and can be destabilizing to the system. The legitimacy of global governance institutions is additionally undermined by the weakening of traditional borders, growing global inequalities and an increasing larger world population to rule. Essentially, “...states, people, and businesses need an international system to provide physical, economic and legal security,”98 yet to achieve their purposes, international institutions must undergo reform.
Reforms within the UN would directly influence the global climate change regime as all key climate change agreements are linked to the intergovernmental organization. In reforming institutions of global governance such as the UN, one of the major issues faced is accommodating the voices of emerging powers and ensuring that institutions adapt as the distribution of power changes. For example, in the UN’s case, reforms would need to consider the particulars of member governments and other invested parties to prevent future system gridlock, particularly in terms of the UN’s relationship with state sovereignty. Within the current system, approval is needed for 2/3 of the General Assembly and the acquiescence of current permanent members is also necessary. Such widespread approval is difficult on behalf of the
98 Reforming the United Nations."Foreign Affairs. 1 Sept. 1995. Web. 18 Sept. 2013.
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international community, leaving the current architecture in place. As such, reforming the organization will not be effective unless members of the organization agree to collectively broaden the scope of the UN’s powers in addressing national and transnational issues.
Of the many options for UN reform, expanding the Security Council may work to increase the legitimacy of the UN due to increased representation and better demonstrate the shifting of global power. However, inclusion of new permanent members or rotating members may also cause historically conflicting nations to balk during the decision making process for the sake of national interests. Permanent regional membership with countries rotating representation may also work to improve UN governance; however, the likelihood that countries such as
“...Britain and France would cede their historical status as permanent members...to [another]
European representative”99 is contentious. The veto power of the five permanent members concurrently inhibits reform and supplementary members would increase the number of countries able to use such powers for national interests. An agreement in limiting the scope of veto powers poses a potential solution to this issue. Reforming the socioeconomic bodies of the
UN such as the ECOSOC to better address poverty and other development issues would also contribute to addressing climate change as improving socioeconomic status may reduce dependence on less environmentally efficient practices.
What is more, improving the fiscal status of the UN by assuring payment of annual contributions could also improve the ability of the United Nations to effectively address climate change. To this end, changes would most likely need to be made in terms of fairly determining member contributions as “…the formulas for assessing contributions…are out of date and disadvantage certain powers, notably the United States.”100 Alternative financing through
99 Ibid. 100 Ibid.
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methods such as global taxes would also provide fiscal relief from reliance solely on dues and contributions.
Improving regional-level cooperation may also positively influence global governance, as shown by the EU, Latin America’s alliances, Pan-African entities, the Arab League and the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Furthering this idea, amplified collaboration between regional bodies and global institutions would also improve the efficacy of world governance. The EU’s successful work with the IMF is demonstrative of this point.
Finally, reforming global governance must include the education of individuals and further investment in public action or good.
Conversely, if gradual reforms are not enacted by member agreement, continuous deterioration of the climate change problem may eventually force change in response to emergency situations. The presence of such pressure will most likely improve and reform international organizations (the recent economic crisis is illustrative of this). Otherwise, nations will need to begin drastically reducing reliance on global governance, simultaneously relinquishing the opportunity for international cooperation or the usage of international instruments to reduce demands on states. This method is particularly divisive because despite what definitive failures exist in regard to the UN and global governance in general, it must be acknowledged that such institutions are useful for global issues and the global environmental system would likely face much more harm without them.
Finally, additional guidelines for the reform of global governance may include the
International Forum on Globalization’s principles for democratic and sustainable societies. These core principles include: a new democracy wherein governments serve communities versus corporations; ecological sustainability for future generations; equal distribution of common
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heritage resources such as physical resources and public services; the preservation of human rights; the provision of livelihoods and food security; equity amongst nations; promotion of diversity; and abiding by the precautionary principle.101
101 Lechner, Frank, and John Boli. The Globalization Reader. Chichester, West Sussex: J. Wiley & Sons, 2012. Print. Pg. 487.
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Conclusion
As illustrated in the case of Croatia, Kyoto and the UNFCCC have set important precedents in creating global climate regimes that work to reduce GHG emissions using a variety of methods and frameworks. Through the establishment of these agreements, the global community has succeeded in creating a functioning carbon market, encouraging environmental compliance on behalf of GHG-emitting industries and pushing climate change legislation further up on national agendas. However, a much more effective global climate change regime is needed and urgently.
At present, the outcomes of Kyoto and the UNFCCC are almost solely determined by nation state or regional (in the case of the EU) incentive for implementation. As such, the national incentive for the necessary amount of GHG reductions is minimized by the lack of complete global collaboration, resulting in a weak global climate change regime fraught with free-riders. This issue is particularly disconcerting due to the pervasive, global nature of the problem and the unequal distribution of climate change effects. A reformed regime will need to impose deep reductions of GHG emissions in a just manner that will incite cooperation by all nations.
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Works Cited
A Climate for Change: Climate Change and Its Impacts on Society and Economy in Croatia. Rep. 1st ed. Zagreb: UNDP, 2008. Print. Adapting to Climate Change in Europe – Options for EU Action. Tech. Brussels: EU Commission, 2007. Print. "Agenda 21 - Croatia." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 02 Mar. 2013.
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"European Carbon Market to Remain Oversupplied until 2027." Press Releases. Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, 19 Sept. 2013. Web. 08 Nov. 2013.
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17 Dec. 2013.
"The Global Climate Change Regime." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 19 June 2013. Web. 10 Oct. 2013 "The One Ton CO2 Challenge." UNDP Croatia. UNDP, 4 June 2007. Web. 04 Sept. 2013. The Rising Cost of Natural Hazards : Feature Articles." Earth Observatory. NASA, n.d. Web. 12 Sept. 2013.
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"Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide." ESRL Global Monitoring Division - Global Greenhouse Gas Reference Network, Oct. 2013. Web. 17 Nov. 2013. "UNDP/GEF Capacity Building for Improving the Quality of Greenhouse Gas Inventories (Europe/CIS Region)." Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 Apr. 2013.
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