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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents General (R) John P. Abizaid introduction Joins Editorial Board 1 General (R) John P. Abizaid Joins Editorial Board the combating Abizaid studied at the University of Jordan By Erich Marquardt Terrorism Center is in Amman on an Olmsted scholarship, a pleased to announce military award offered to only a handful Reports that General (R) of young Army officers each year. 1 Al-Qa`ida in Yemen’s 2008 Campaign John P. Abizaid Additionally, he holds a master’s degree By Gregory D. Johnsen has joined the CTC in Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard 5 The LIFG’s Current Role in the Sentinel’s Editorial University. Abizaid is widely considered to Global Jihad Board. Abizaid, who be an expert in the field of Middle Eastern By Alison Pargeter recently became the affairs. 7 Al-Qa`ida’s Finances: Evidence of Distinguished Chair Organizational Decline? of the Combating His experience and knowledge of the region By Matthew Levitt Terrorism Center, retired from the United makes him a valuable addition to the CTC 10 The UK’s Experience in Counter- States Army in May 2007 after 34 years of Sentinel’s Editorial Board. Radicalization active service. By James Brandon Erich Marquardt 12 AQIM’s Expanding Internationalist After graduating from the United States Editor-in-Chief, CTC Sentinel Agenda Military Academy at West Point, Abizaid By Andrew Black rose from infantry platoon leader to 14 Nanomanagement: A Challenge to become, at that time, the youngest four- Those Combating Terrorism star general in the Army. At the time of Reports By Major Tommy Sowers, U.S. Army his retirement he was the longest-serving Al-Qa`ida in Yemen’s 16 After Action Report: Politics 101 for commander of United States Central 2008 Campaign Small Units in Counter-Insurgency Command. As commander of Central By Major Jeremy Gwinn, U.S. Army Command, Abizaid oversaw 250,000 U.S. By Gregory D. Johnsen troops in a 27-country region. 19 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity following the dramatic escape of 23 al- 25 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts During his distinguished career, he Qa`ida suspects from a Political Security commanded units at every level, serving prison in Sana`a in early February 2006, in the combat zones of Grenada, Lebanon, there has been a fear that Yemen could Kurdistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan once again become an active theater of and Iraq. Units under his command have operations for Islamic militants. That included the 1st Infantry Division, a brigade fear has now been realized. During the in the 82nd Airborne Division, and two past few months, al-Qa`ida in Yemen has About the CTC Sentinel Ranger companies. Abizaid worked on the embarked on an aggressive propaganda The Combating Terrorism Center is an Joint Staff three times, the last as director. campaign that has been accompanied by independent educational and research From 1997-1999, Abizaid served as the 66th a series of equally aggressive attacks. institution based in the Department of Social commandant of cadets at West Point. Sciences at the United States Military Academy, Tourist convoys, army checkpoints, oil fields, the U.S. Embassy and most recently West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses Abizaid is highly decorated and has been a housing compound for foreigners have the Center’s global network of scholars and awarded the Defense Distinguished Service all been targeted as part of the group’s practitioners in order to understand and Medal, the Army Distinguished Service stated goal to “expel the unbelievers from confront contemporary threats posed by Medal, Legion of Merit and the Bronze the Arabian Peninsula.”1 terrorism and other forms of political violence. Star. He also holds military honors from countries such as Germany, Poland, France, Romania, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, Australia 1 This phrase has appeared at the top of all four state- The views expressed in this report are those of and Egypt. ments released by The Soldier’s Brigade of Yemen on the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, February 24, 2008, March 21, 2008, March 30, 2008 the Department of the Army, or any other agency and April 7, 2008. All statements were accessed via the of the U.S. Government. al-Ikhlas website.

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Given Yemen’s reputation for violence and The United States has failed to understand to Washington, President Salih made the journalistic clichés that accompany the situation in which President `Ali sure the United States knew what side his nearly every English report of a country `Abdullah Salih’s regime sees itself, country was on. Yemen followed Salih’s teeming with guns and its importance as and instead of helping to ensure regime words with actions, arresting anyone it Usama bin Ladin’s “ancestral homeland,” stability it has seemed more eager to suspected of harboring sympathy for al- it may seem that this latest series of threaten the country for perceived Qa`ida. It also worked hand-in-hand with attacks is merely a continuation of the betrayals such as the Jamal al-Badawi U.S. intelligence services, coordinating past. This, however, is not the case. case.3 Both countries have also failed to the November 2002 strike on al-Qa`ida’s Al-Qa`ida in Yemen took a major step understand that Yemen is witnessing head in Yemen, `Ali Qa’id al-Harithi, forward in January 2008 with the which was conducted by an unmanned publication of the first issue of its online “In retrospect, however, CIA drone. Yet this represented the journal Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of zenith of U.S.-Yemeni cooperation, as Battles), which articulated in bold, broad al-Ahdal’s capture marked a Pentagon leak, intended for domestic strokes the group’s new strategy. Instead the end of the first phase of political consumption, destroyed the cover of the large, one-time attacks favored by story on which both countries had agreed. the previous generation, this group under the war against al-Qa`ida Salih paid a high price domestically for the leadership of Nasir al-Wahayshi has in Yemen.” allowing the United States to carry out an initiated a policy of constant offense attack in Yemen, and it took more than a consisting of small, continual attacks. year for the government to publicly admit Al-Qa`ida in Yemen seems to understand that it had authorized Washington to act. that there is no one knockout blow that something both new and dangerous. Al- The United States was still paying the will force Westerners out of Yemen and Qa`ida in Yemen was defeated by the price for hubris a year later in November bring the government to its knees, but close cooperation of the United States 2003, when Yemen captured Muhammad rather that it must maintain a constant and Yemen during the first phase of the Hamdi al-Ahdal, al-Harithi’s replacement, barrage of activity. war (2000-2003), but it learned from the at a wedding in Sana`a. Instead of being loss. Now, while al-Qa`ida in Yemen has granted direct access to the prisoner, U.S. The Mistakes adapted to the changing environment, officials were forced to work through The past four months should not have both the United States and Yemen appear intermediaries. come as a surprise to close observers ready to fight what it was instead of what of the situation in Yemen, as the group it has become. In retrospect, however, al-Ahdal’s has grown increasingly bolder and more capture marked the end of the first phase active since it was reorganized by al- The First and Second Phases of the war against al-Qa`ida in Yemen. Wahayshi. The latest attacks illustrate In the immediate aftermath of the With most of the suspected militants the dangers of lapsed vigilance of which September 11 attacks, Yemen, like many either in jail or drawn to the fighting in both the U.S. and Yemeni governments countries, was eager to appease the United Iraq, al-Qa`ida faded into the background are guilty. It also demonstrates the fallacy States. It had unpleasant memories of alongside a host of other more pressing of attempting to isolate counter-terrorism the last time it thwarted U.S. policy and concerns faced by Yemen. For Yemen, from other U.S. policy objectives; this can was eager to avoid repeating the same al-Qa`ida and Islamic militancy has be done on a spreadsheet, but not always mistakes.4 During a November 2001 visit always been largely a Western problem in the minds of foreign counterparts. that affects the country indirectly, but is lish language reporting on the country was focused on nowhere near as pressing as a religious There is also a lesson on the dangers of al-Qa`ida attacks against foreigners, the majority of the uprising among Zaydis in the north or negligence. Yemen is quickly becoming Arabic reporting on Yemen focused on protests in the economic woes that exacerbate tensions a failed state. It is running out of oil and south. between the north and the south. These recently it has increased production in an 3 The United States withheld aid to Yemen once it be- latter two issues are security challenges attempt to ease budget shortfalls. Yet, it came public knowledge that Jamal al-Badawi was free. It that directly threaten the survival of is only borrowing against its future, and is likely that the public nature of U.S. disapproval was a the regime, while al-Qa`ida, at least in even this is not sufficient. Disaffected contributing factor to Jabir al-Banna’s surprise appear- Yemen’s calculus, does not. youth in the south have taken to the ance in court in February 2008. Yemen security report- streets to protest the lack of jobs and rising edly reacted to the public snub by the United States by Both Yemen and the United States slowly prices. Not surprisingly, these protests have encouraging al-Banna to appear in public. Despite their began to act as if the threat from al-Qa`ida turned violent and further exacerbated long- past crimes and continued support, neither al-Banna nor had been neutralized. Yemen became standing tensions between the north and the al-Badawi are part of the current al-Qa`ida campaign in increasingly more occupied with putting south. The nearly four-year-old al-Houthi Yemen. down the al-Houthi uprising in the Sa`da revolt continues to sporadically flare-up 4 Yemen served on the UN Security Council during the governorate and with implementing bitter despite the numerous cease-fires and half- 1990-91 Gulf War, and its continued abstentions on se- economic reforms that led to riots and 5 hearted peace negotiations. As a result, curity resolutions threatening Iraq won it the displeasure widespread dissatisfaction. On the U.S. the Yemeni government may now be too of the United States, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. All three side, there were a lack of clear policy goals. concerned with its own survival to give the cut off aid to Yemen, while the latter took the even more During a November 2005 trip to the United 2 al-Qa`ida issue the attention it deserves. damaging step of expelling roughly 750,000 guest work- ers, which cut off worker remittances and helped desta- 5 Gregory D. Johnsen, “Salih’s Road to Reelection,” Mid- 2 For example, in early April when much of the Eng- bilize the Yemeni economy. dle East Report Online, January 13, 2006.

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States, Salih was told that Yemen was attempt was soon eclipsed by a more Within days of releasing the first issue of being suspended from a U.S. government professional attack in July 2007 when a Sada al-Malahim in January 2008, al-Qa`ida program, the Millennium Challenge suicide bomber struck a convoy of Spanish in Yemen attacked a convoy of tourists Account. The suspension shocked Salih, tourists in Mar’ib. This attack followed on in Hadramawt on January 18, killing two who was under the impression that he was the heels of two al-Qa`ida statements, both Belgians and two Yemeni drivers. The going to be rewarded for Yemen’s help in of which were essentially a call to arms by attack seemed to fit a pattern that al- the war against al-Qa`ida. Instead, he was al-Qa`ida in Yemen’s new commander, Qa`ida had developed in June and July hurt by the loss of $20 million in aid. The Nasir al-Wahayshi.7 He has worked hard following day, his anger was compounded to rebuild and reorganize al-Qa`ida in “Al-Qa`ida in Yemen has when the World Bank told him that it was Yemen and has been careful to apply the cutting its aid from $420 million to $280 lessons he learned from the organization’s learned from watching the million. Both of the cuts were attributed early failures to his current task. fighting in Iraq that it can to rampant corruption within the Yemeni government. The 2008 Campaign thrive in an unstable and One of al-Wahayshi’s major chaotic environment.” American claims of corruption were on accomplishments was the publication the mark. Yemen is plagued by “double- of the online journal Sada al-Malahim in dippers,” employees who draw two or January 2008. The first issue features more government salaries, as well as an interview with a Saudi fighter, Abu 2007 of conducting an attack on the heels by “shadow employees,” workers who Hammam al-Qahtani, who explains his of a public statement.10 Little more than a exist only on paper but still receive rationale for remaining in Arabia instead month later, on February 24, a previously paychecks. Nevertheless, it is important of traveling to Iraq. “This choice was unknown group calling itself The Soldier’s for U.S. policymakers to understand made for two reasons,” he said in the Brigade of Yemen released a one-page that Washington cannot have everything interview. “The first is a legal reason.” He statement on al-Ikhlas claiming credit it wants in Yemen. The United States then proceeded to quote a Qur’anic verse for the attack on the Belgian convoy, as must decide whether it wants a partner and a hadith that command Muslims to well as the March 2007 assassination of in the war against al-Qa`ida, or whether “expel the unbelievers from the Arabian Ali Mahmud al-Qasaylah, the July 2007 it wants a country that is attempting Peninsula.” His second reason is a military attack on Spanish tourists in Mar’ib and to meet democratic benchmarks. No one. Remaining in Yemen, he explained, two attacks on military checkpoints in matter the goal, the starting point has will allow him to strike at oil supplies Hadramawt in November 2007.11 Initially, to be a stable Yemen. Withdrawing aid in Arabia that aid the West in its wars there were thoughts among intelligence from Yemen, whatever the reason, only in Iraq and Afghanistan.8 The journal officers in Yemen that this group was a makes stabilizing the country that much was quite clearly an opening salvo in a fiction that existed only on the internet more difficult. Already the government propaganda war. It was aimed at a broad and was trying to steal credit from al- does not have firm control over the audience, with small features on some of Wahayshi’s group. More recent evidence, hinterlands, which is why the recent the classical figures of the jihadist world however, indicates that this is not the attacks in Mar’ib and Hadramawt are not including Sayyid Qutb, `Umar `Abd al- case. that surprising. The more worrying trend Rahman, and the Saudi fighter known as is the two attacks on the U.S. Embassy Khattab.9 On March 29, for example, the same and the Haddah housing complex in user, Jund al-Iman, posted a 13-minute Sana`a. Al-Qa`ida in Yemen has learned February 2006 escape, see Gregory D. Johnsen, “Track- video on al-Ikhlas that included the last from watching the fighting in Iraq that ing Yemen’s 23 Escaped Jihadis – Part 1,” Terrorism will and testament of a suicide bomber it can thrive in an unstable and chaotic Monitor 5:18 (2007) and Gregory D. Johnsen, “Tracking who identified himself as Abu al-Miqdad environment. Yemen’s ever increasing Yemen’s 23 Escaped Jihadis – Part 2,” Terrorism Monitor al-Sana`ani. The footage on the video slide toward instability only provides al- 5:19 (2007). Also see “Al-Ghad Publishes the Names and Qa`ida with more operative freedom. Information about the Escapees” (Arabic), al-Ghad, June Suwaylim. 25, 2007. 10 For more, see Gregory D. Johnsen, “Attacks on Oil are Mistakes of policy and vigilance could 7 Al-Wahayshi was introduced as the new head of al- a First Priority for al-Qaeda in Yemen,” Terrorism Focus be concealed when al-Qa`ida was largely Qa`ida in Yemen by Abu Hurayra al-Sana`ani, the kunya 5:5 (2008). dormant in the country. That dynamic of Qasim al-Raymi. Both men were among the 23 escap- 11 “Statement 1,” The Soldier’s Brigade of Yemen, Feb- changed, however, with the February ees. For more on the events of July 2007 and al-Wa- ruary 24, 2008. The full name of the group is: The al- 2006 prison break. Within months, al- hayshi’s background, see “Al-Wahayshi the Leader of Qa`ida Organization of Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula: Qa`ida was once again a security threat al-Qa`ida in Yemen” (Arabic), al-Wasat, June 27, 2007; The Soldier’s Brigade of Yemen. There are a handful of in the country, attempting what would Gregory D. Johnsen and Brian O’Neill, “Yemen Attack mistakes and typos throughout the four statements that ultimately be failed suicide attacks Reveals Struggles Among al-Qaeda’s Ranks,” Terrorism this group has released, all of which have posted on al- on oil and gas facilities in Mar’ib and Focus 4:22 (2007); Gregory D. Johnsen, “Al-Qaeda in Ye- Ikhlas by a user identified as Jund al-Iman (Soldier of 6 Hadramawt. This early and haphazard men Reorganizes under Nasir al-Wahayshi,” Terrorism Faith). For example, in the first statement the group said Focus 5:11 (2008). that al-Qasaylah was assassinated in April 2007, but he 6 For more on the aftermath of this attack, the trial of 8 “An Interview with One of the Wanted Men – Part 1” was actually killed in March 2007. Other mistakes are which is still ongoing, see Robert F. Worth, “Wanted by (Arabic), Sada al-Malahim #1, January 2008, p. 8. mainly limited to typos and misspellings in Arabic. For the F.B.I., but Walking out of a Yemeni Hearing,” New 9 Khattab was poisoned by Russian forces in Chechnya more on al-Qasaylah, see Gregory D. Johnsen, “Is al-Qae- York Times, March 1, 2008. For more background on the in 2002. His real name was Samir Salih Abdullah al- da in Yemen Regrouping?” Terrorism Focus 4:15 (2007).

3 april 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 5 indicated that al-Sana`ani was the bomber soldiers in Mukalla and the attack on the Qa`ida, there has also not been a visceral who carried out the July 2007 attack on the U.S. Embassy. The statement expressed public backlash to the deaths of Yemenis Spanish tourists in Mar’ib. Al-Sana`ani, regret at the injuries to the schoolgirls during this campaign such as what has whose real name was Abdu Muhammad and asked God for their quick recovery. It helped to derail other campaigns like the Said al-Ruhayqah, clearly states on the went on to say, however, that “previously one in Saudi Arabia in 2003. video that he is carrying out the attack for we have warned Muslims about not getting The Soldier’s Brigade of Yemen.12 There is too close to government and foreign For the United States, the stability of also the fact that Sada al-Malahim, which is offices.”16 A little more than a week later, Yemen is the first and most important being directed by al-Wahayshi, neglected The Soldier’s Brigade of Yemen put out step in winning the second phase of to deny that The Soldier’s Brigade of the war against al-Qa`ida in Yemen. Yemen was speaking for it in its second “The more successful and Unfortunately, this will not be easy to issue, which was released on March 13. secure. Washington must be realistic Al-Qa`ida in Yemen’s information officer, vocal the group is, the more about what is and is not possible in Sayf Muhammad, did put out a statement recruits who want to join.” Yemen. It must decide on clear, realistic denying that a January interview between policy goals and accurately articulate the local Yemeni paper al-Wasat and these to the Yemeni government. The an individual claiming to be al-Qa`ida previous carrot-and-stick approach is in Yemen’s information officer was its third statement claiming that it had not a sustainable policy. Washington legitimate.13 “We say that we are the al- attacked a French oil pipeline on March 27 will have to put more money, not less, Qa`ida organization of jihad in the South of and a Chinese oil field on March 29.17 The into the country if it wants to prevent full the Arabian Peninsula and that the callers Yemeni government acknowledged that collapse. Simply throwing money at the are ignorant of the situation and have no there had been a pipeline explosion, but problem and clearly articulating policy relationship with the group.”14 While it is denied that it was a terrorist attack.18 Al- goals, however, will not be enough to far from clear whether the same people Qa`ida in Yemen followed these attacks stabilize Yemen. Washington will also are putting out both Sada al-Malahim and up with its most recent strikes on two have to work in concert with its allies, the statements of The Soldier’s Brigade military checkpoints in Hadramawt and particularly Saudi Arabia, which has of Yemen, it appears that they are either a mortar attack on a housing compound much more influence in Yemen than does united under al-Wahayshi’s leadership or for foreigners in the Haddah district the United States. None of these steps at least working in concert. of Sana`a. In the statement, the group will be easy, but failure to carry out any reiterated its claim that it would not rest of them will almost certainly result in The second issue of Sada al-Malahim is until the last unbeliever had been driven the continued instability of the country, both smoother and more authoritative from the Arabian Peninsula.19 which will in turn allow al-Qa`ida in of tone than its earlier version. Just like Yemen more strategic freedom. the first issue of the journal, the second Securing the Future was followed almost immediately by an This campaign is likely to get stronger Al-Qa`ida in Yemen has already shown attention-grabbing attack. On March 18, before it gets weaker for two reasons. that it can rise from the ashes of defeat the U.S. Embassy in Sana`a was the target First, al-Qa`ida in Yemen has effectively stronger and better organized than it ever of three mortars that fell short of the exploited U.S. and Yemeni negligence was originally. The United States and embassy, killing one guard and injuring a to carefully lay the groundwork for Yemen have yet to prove that they can number of girls at a neighboring school.15 a successful campaign by linking its adapt as quickly and as ably as al-Qa`ida Almost immediately, The Soldier’s Brigade rhetoric to action. Tied to this is the fact has done, but both must be flexible if they of Yemen released a statement claiming that it has slowly increased the number hope to win the second phase of the war credit for a March 1 clash with government and focus of its attacks, which appears against al-Qa`ida in Yemen and prevent to have increased recruiting. The more future incarnations. 12 Al-Ruhayqah was from the Musayk neighborhood successful and vocal the group is, the of Sana`a, which would fit with his kunya of Abu al- more recruits who want to join. Second, Gregory D. Johnsen is the author of the Miqdad al-Sana`ani. Furthermore, the age of the man al-Qa`ida in Yemen will continue to forthcoming monograph Reforming Yemen: on the video seems to match with al-Ruhayqah, who was benefit from the lack of stability in Foreign Aid and the Push for Democracy 21-years-old. Yemen. Not only is government attention (Foreign Policy Centre). He has written for 13 Al-Wasat has since lost its license for domestic po- directed elsewhere, but so is the attention a variety of publications, including The litical reasons that have nothing to do with al-Qa`ida, in of the population at large. This means that American Interest, The Christian Science another mistaken move by the Yemeni government as it while the government is unable to devote Monitor and The Boston Globe. Mr. Johnsen feels threatened. its finite resources toward combating al- has also consulted for various organizations 14 “Statement of Denial” (Arabic), Sada al-Malahim #2, on security and political issues in Yemen and March 2008, p. 8. It should also be noted that in the 16 “Statement 2,” The Soldier’s Brigade of Yemen, March the Gulf. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate second issue of Sada al-Malahim, al-Qa`ida in Yemen 21, 2008. in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton changed its name to: “Al-Qa`ida Organization of Jihad 17 “Statement 3,” The Soldier’s Brigade of Yemen, March University. in the South of the Arabian Peninsula.” The group is re- 30, 2008. ferred to as al-Qa`ida in Yemen throughout this article 18 “Yemen Says Pipeline Explosion not Terror,” UPI, for the sake of continuity and brevity. April 1, 2008. 15 “Families and Teachers Concerned Post Attack,” Ye- 19 “Statement 4,” The Soldier’s Brigade of Yemen, April men Times, March 19, 2008. 7, 2008.

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The LIFG’s Current Role in to secure their release in return for more widely. Interestingly, however, relinquishing violence.1 Abu Laith did not announce that the the Global Jihad LIFG was joining with al-Qa`ida in the As a result, Abu Laith was never Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Rather, Abu By Alison Pargeter considered to be part of the LIFG Laith made it clear that while the LIFG leadership but rather represented a was ready to fight alongside his Algerian with increasing numbers of suicide remnant faction comprising a handful brothers, the LIFG was now part of al- attacks in Algeria, the uncovering of of Libyans who had fled Afghanistan Qa`ida and not AQIM. This, however, is militant cells in Morocco and the recent following the U.S. attacks in November hardly surprising given that there have kidnappings of two Austrian tourists 2001 and who had scattered into Iran and long been antagonisms between Libyan in Tunisia, North Africa appears to the border areas with Pakistan. That is not and Algerian militants born out of a be once again becoming a hotspot of disastrous experience in the 1990s when Islamist militancy. Although the Islamist members of the Algerian Armed Islamic movement in Libya was deemed to have “The demise of the LIFG Group (GIA) killed a number of the LIFG’s been all but eliminated by the Mu`ammar does not, however, mean best fighters after they had gone to fight Qadhafi regime at the end of the 1990s, in the Algerian jihad. Indeed, in spite of concerns are now mounting that this North that support for militancy the shared al-Qa`ida badge, it seems that African state will not be able to escape the inside Libya has subsided.” even Abu Laith was unable to transcend new wave of violence and militancy that such nationalistic concerns. is blighting the region. These fears were further compounded in November 2007 Abu Laith’s attempt to take over the LIFG when al-Qa`ida ideologue Ayman al- to say that this faction had been completely and bring it under the al-Qa`ida banner Zawahiri and Libyan militant Abu Laith disregarded by the LIFG, as when the was short lived. He was killed, along with al-Libi announced that the Libyan Islamic negotiations with the regime began the the LIFG’s representative in Iran, in an Fighting Group (LIFG) was joining al- leadership sent an emissary to consult attack by U.S. forces in North Waziristan Qa`ida. It appeared that this movement, with those factions outside.2 Nevertheless, at the end of January 2008. His death known for its nationalism and its fierce Libyan militants in Afghanistan and probably marks the final nail in the coffin independence, as well as its rejection of Pakistan who were still fully caught for this moribund organization. Indeed, Usama bin Ladin, had at last joined the up in the world of jihad did not take it appears to have given fresh impetus to al-Qa`ida network, linking Libya into kindly to the idea that their brothers the LIFG’s negotiations with the regime, what many observers have described as were contemplating compromising with as it was reported in February 2008 that al-Qa`ida’s North African front. the “Pharaoh Qadhafi.” In fact, they were in spite of some resistance from within so outraged that in 2007 they issued the Libyan security services a number Examining the al-Qa`ida-LIFG Relationship a statement in the name of the LIFG of LIFG prisoners were to be released, As with most things Libyan, however, condemning the Qadhafi regime and reportedly under the direct instructions of this new relationship with al-Qa`ida was denying reports that any negotiations Qadhafi.4 The regime is clearly supremely not quite what it seemed. First, Abu Laith were taking place, a development that confident that it has finally neutralized al-Libi was considered by many to have reportedly angered the LIFG leadership this troublesome movement. On April moved away from the LIFG and to have in prison who considered themselves as 9, for example, 90 LIFG prisoners were started working closely with Bin Ladin the only ones with the authority to speak released on the condition that they and al-Qa`ida many years ago. Second, on the group’s behalf.3 abandon political activities and strive for the LIFG is a movement that was largely the building and the future of the nation. eliminated inside Libya at the end of the Abu Laith’s November 2007 1990s with most of its members being announcement, therefore, appears The Role of Libyan Jihadists killed, arrested or forced to flee, and as to have been an attempt to snatch the The demise of the LIFG does not, however, such has existed since that time primarily leadership of the LIFG for himself and mean that support for militancy inside as a movement in exile. Moreover, the to try to scupper the continuation of Libya has subsided. In fact, it would movement has been delivered further negotiations between the true LIFG appear that if anything there is a renewed blows in recent years as prominent LIFG leadership and the regime. It also seems surge of Islamist sentiment among some members have been arrested abroad and to have been a rather desperate attempt of Libya’s youth, particularly in the in some cases handed back to Tripoli as to bring back some credibility to the disaffected eastern regions that have part of the war on terrorism. Third, and group and to the Libyan militant scene long been the bastion of resistance to the perhaps most importantly, the leadership regime. Much of this sentiment appears of the LIFG, comprising the group’s amir 1 “The LIFG Between Fragmentation and Joining al- to be being channeled into support for `Abdullah Sadiq, his deputy Shaykh Abu Qa`ida” (Arabic), www.almoslim.net, November 14, the Iraqi jihad, with a steady stream of Hazim, spiritual leader Abu al-Mundhir 2007. Libyans making their way to join the al-Sa`idi and two other shaykhs—Muftah 2 Camile Tawille, “Al-Muqatila Wants its Leaders in struggle there. Indeed, as the Sinjar al-Dawadi and `Abd al-Wahhab Qa’id, Afghanistan and Iran...to Take Part in its Dialogue with Records show, Libyans are seemingly who are incarcerated in the Abu Slim the Libyan Security Services” (Arabic), al-Hayat, January making up a disproportionately large prison on the outskirts of Tripoli—have 28, 2007. been engaged in negotiations with the 3 Personal interview, former Libyan LIFG member, Lon- 4 “The Decision of the Releases was Issued by Qadhafi regime for at least the past year to try don, 2007. Personally” (Arabic), Libya al-Youm, March 4, 2008.

5 april 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 5 number of the foreign fighters who have (Arabism), nationalism and humanity.”8 misunderstand the nature of the region joined the Iraqi jihad.5 Although there are With the regime putting out these kinds and the huge cultural differences that exist many different motives and reasons that of messages, it is not surprising that not only between North African states might push a young man to give his life for young Libyans might find it acceptable to but also among their Islamist movements. such a cause—including Arab nationalism fight in Iraq. Although it may be true that militants or sectarianism—the Islamist dimension from North Africa have been willing is clearly present. Aside from the Libyan volunteers in Iraq, to train or work together, this does not there also appears to be a growth of other necessarily mean that national priorities It would, however, be wrong to assume, militant activism in the east of the country. do not still override transnational ones. as some commentators have done, that Although in the current climate there are Indeed, in the recent Sulayman case in these recruits found their way to Iraq many rumors coming out of Libya related to Tunisia, in which militants clashed with through LIFG or AQIM networks. Given stories of weapons stashes being uncovered the regime in December 2007, leaving 12 the difficulty of any organized groups or cars containing explosives being found, it dead and a further 30 arrested, the group being able to operate inside Libya, as well would seem that a number of incidents have allegedly chose to call themselves Jund taken place. The most notable occurred in Assad bin al-Furat, after the Tunisian “Aside from the Libyan June 2007 when three young militants blew scholar and fighter who led a Muslim themselves up in a house in Derna, seemingly army against Sicily in 827, seemingly volunteers in Iraq, there to evade capture by the security services, reflecting the essentially Tunisian nature also appears to be a growth something that was confirmed by Sayf al- of their movement.10 Islam in an interview he gave with the BBC.9 of other militant activism As in the rest of North Africa, it is clear that Similarly in Algeria, while one faction in the east of the country.” the underlying causes that are provoking of the Salafist Group for Preaching and radicalism have not disappeared. Combat (GSPC) may have chosen to work under the al-Qa`ida banner, it is There are many factors that would explain noticeable that other factions within the as the weakness of these organizations, it the perpetuation of militant ideology in same organization have rejected such an is more likely that such volunteers went Libya, particularly in the troubled east association and are splitting away from through loose networks tied into a number that has long been kept purposefully the AQIM group. Moreover, while those of preachers or mosques, particularly in underdeveloped as a form of punishment militants in Morocco may well appear to the eastern cities of Derna and Benghazi.6 for its rebellious nature, a rebellion that in be buying into the AQIM brand, there Such flows have also been facilitated by fact pre-dates the Qadhafi era and is related is no real evidence to suggest that there the regime’s apparent willingness to turn to longstanding tribal rivalries. Indeed, are real or extensive operational ties a blind eye to such activism. Moreover, although Libya is enjoying its rehabilitation between these young jihadists and al- although not confirmed, a number of in the international community and oil Qa`ida. That is not to say that AQIM does Iraqi officials have accused the Libyan money is flowing back into the hands of not exist, but rather that in the North regime of supporting and facilitating the the regime, large swathes of the population African context the synergies should Iraqi jihad, including Colonel Jubayr still suffer from acute socio-economic not be overplayed. Each of the militant Rashid Naif from Anbar Province who, grievances including a lack of public service groups or currents operating there retain in January 2008, accused Qadhafi’s provision, unemployment, poor state wages their own national characteristics and son, Sayf al-Islam, of supporting foreign and a society that operates on the basis although international concerns clearly fighters.7 The regime also continues to of patronage networks and corruption. cannot be ignored, these individuals are display a somewhat ambiguous discourse Combined with a real sense of social largely acting in response to specific local on the Iraqi resistance. In February, for injustice, this, as well as the conservative conditions that essentially have remained example, a key member of the Libyan nature of the east and the longstanding unchanged since the 1980s and 1990s and regime, Ahmad Ibrahim, told the website antagonisms that have blighted the area, has that prompted the first major wave of IslamOnline.net that “whoever fights only served to fuel support for ideological Islamic radicalism in the region. In this the occupation in Iraq are resistors” and alternatives to what is in fact itself a highly respect, Libya is no exception. that the willingness of the Awakening ideological regime. Councils to fight against al-Qa`ida was kufr Alison Pargeter is a Senior Research Associate (heretical) because “whoever co-operates Jihadist Movement Remains Divided at the Centre of International Studies at the with the American occupation is a kafir Whether these disaffected youth aspire University of Cambridge. She works on security (heathen) in Islam and a kafir in al-Rubah to be part of a truly globalized Islamist issues in North Africa with a particular focus on movement or are even aware of al-Qa`ida Libya and also on issues related to political Islam 5 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign in the Islamic Maghreb is another matter. in the Middle East and Europe. She has recently Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (West The rush by commentators to assert completed a major study of the Muslim Brotherhood Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2008). that the LIFG had joined AQIM is to and is now working on a project on radicalization 6 As the Sinjar Records show, almost all of the Libyan in North Africa. volunteers came from the highly conservative eastern ar- 8 Ahmad Ibrahim, “Libya Didn’t Bend Before the West eas, with a particularly high concentration coming from but Behaved in a Clever Manner” (Arabic), IslamOnline. Derna. net, February 12, 2005. 7 “Gaddafi Son Linked to Blasts in Iraq,” The Australian, 9 See the BBC interview with Sayf al-Islam, August 2, 10 Personal interviews, Tunisian lawyers defending January 28, 2008. 2007. those arrested in the Sulayman case, February 2008.

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Al-Qa`ida’s Finances: The means that al-Qa`ida and affiliated use of cell phones as vehicles to transfer groups use to raise, move and store payment, to the transfer and storage of Evidence of Organizational funds present an ever moving target, funds via online entities such as Cash-U Decline? as the methods of financiers and cells or E-Gold. evolve in response to counter-measures. By Matthew Levitt There are, however, some discernable The case of the July 7, 2005 London trends in al-Qa`ida financing. Usama bin subway bombers offers a perfect example speaking before congress in February, Ladin’s personal wealth has not been a of a locally-funded cell. British authorities Director of National Intelligence (DNI) factor since the mid-1990s, and terrorists concluded that the attacks—which were Michael McConnell commented that are increasingly raising funds through estimated to have cost less than £8,000— during the previous 12-18 months the criminal activity and moving money via were self-financed. Investigators found intelligence community noticed that cash couriers. The abuse of charities “no evidence of external sources of “al Qaeda has had difficulty in raising to raise and move funds continues income” and stressed that the group funds and sustaining themselves.”1 to be a preferred terrorist tactic, and raised the necessary funds “by methods In early April, Undersecretary of the major individual donors and organized that would be very difficult to identify Treasury Stuart Levey echoed the DNI’s facilitation networks remain critical as related to terrorism or other serious assessment, adding that the government’s sources of al-Qa`ida funds. criminality.” One cell member provided efforts to combat terrorist financing “are the majority of the funds, defaulting on a more integrated than ever before” and The Local Jihadists £10,000 personal loan and overdrawing have enabled the government to disrupt or In part, the terrorist threat persists on his multiple bank accounts.7 In deter some sources of al-Qa`ida financing because the internet provides a cheap, contrast, Dhiren Barot, a terrorist and make “significant progress mapping fast, efficient and relatively secure means operative eventually sentenced to 30 terrorist networks.”2 A Philippine of communication, effectively creating a years in prison on charges of conspiracy military official, for example, recently conveyor belt for self-radicalized foot to murder, reached out to senior al-Qa`ida disclosed that lack of funding was a major soldiers who connect and communicate leaders abroad seeking some £60,000 for factor hindering the al-Qa`ida-linked with like-minded jihadists through a bombing plot he concocted involving Abu Sayyaf terrorist group from carrying chat rooms and online message boards. limousines packed with explosives.8 out major attacks, the last of which was These budding, local terrorist cells conducted in 2005.3 There is no question, however, that “Despite being short on terrorist cells are increasingly exposing Despite being short on cash, however, al- themselves to potential law enforcement Qa`ida and like-minded global jihadist cash, however, al-Qa`ida scrutiny by engaging in criminal activities terrorist groups still pose an acute threat. and like-minded global to raise funds. In some cases, acts of petty Authorities have foiled recent terrorist crime—such as welfare fraud—raise plots in Germany, the United Kingdom jihadist terrorist groups limited amounts of money for small and Spain; counter-terrorism officials in still pose an acute threat.” operations. In others, brazen crimes France neutralized seven operational cells raise significant sums. In France, one in the past year and officials there stress cell netted about €1 million when a cell that France remains “at the top of the list” member whose job was to restock ATMs of al-Qa`ida targets;4 and the director of are increasingly self-funded through simulated robberies on several machines. the National Counter-Terrorism Center the proceeds of criminal activity, use In another case in France, a cell blew a recently warned that “the al Qaeda threat of personal funds, or government hole in the wall of a cash distribution still looms large.”5 welfare benefits. Some of these cells center and would have walked away with have connections to al-Qa`ida’s senior €4 million had the hole not been too small 9 1 “Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Hearing of leadership but are independently for them to enter. the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and locally funded; others operate on February 7, 2008, pp. 16-18. their own in “leaderless” communities Tried and True Finance Methods 2 “Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intel- with only virtual connections to al- Even with the proliferation of local ligence Stuart Levey Testimony Before the Senate Com- Qa`ida. Today, however, some plots and self-led terrorist cells, traditional mittee on Finance,” U.S. Department of Treasury, April are still funded by al-Qa`ida’s leaders methods of terrorist financing—such as 1, 2008. See also Dennis M. Lormel, “Combating Ter- based along the Pakistan-Afghanistan the abuse of charities, individual major rorist Financing at the Agency and Interagency Levels,” border. In some cases, terrorists are donors and organized facilitation and CTC Sentinel 1:4 (2008). suspected of using the internet to financial support networks—remain a 3 “Official: Leadership, Funding Problems Hamper At- obtain logistical and financial support mainstay of al-Qa`ida financing. 6 tacks by al-Qaida-linked Group,” Associated Press, for their operations. This is part of a April 3, 2008. broader shift toward the utilization of 4 Personal interview, French security and intelligence technology in global commerce, from the 7 Terrorist Financing, Financial Action Task Force, Feb- officials, March 25, 2008. ruary 29, 2008, p. 14. 5 “Looming Challenges in the War on Terror,” Remarks 6 “Declassified Key Judgments of the National - Intel 8 Personal interview, UK counter-terrorism official, Presented to The Washington Institute by Michael Leit- ligence Estimate ‘Trends in Global Terrorism: Implica- March 6, 2008. er, Acting Director, National Counter-Terrorism Center tions for the United States’ Dated April 2006,” Office of 9 Personal interviews, French intelligence officials, (NCTC), February 13, 2008. the Director of National Intelligence. March 25, 2008.

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Charities Islamiyah.16 In January 2007, Treasury passports for foreign terrorists, provided According to the Financial Action Task designated Farhad and Junaid Dockrat, passports, weapons, guides, safe houses Force (FATF), “the misuse of non- two South African al-Qa`ida financiers. and allowances to foreign terrorists profit organizations for the financing of Farhad funded al-Qa`ida and the Taliban in Syria and those preparing to cross terrorism is coming to be recognized as a through an al-Qa`ida charity on the UN the border into Iraq.” Indeed, Badran crucial weak point in the global struggle 1267 committee’s terrorism list, and reportedly received several hundred to stop such funding at its source.”10 thousand dollars from his cousin, another While Treasury reports that many of member of the Abu Ghadiyah financial the charities al-Qa`ida has relied on in “The reverse directional and logistical facilitation network, with the past as a source of funds have been flow of funds appears to which he supported insurgent activity disrupted or deterred from continuing targeting the U.S. military and facilitated such activity,11 the department has also support the assessment the travel of AQI foreign fighters.19 noted that charities serving as fronts for that the al-Qa`ida terrorist groups often open up under new Senior Leaders Low on Funds? names soon after they are shut down.12 leadership is increasingly Despite these various means of raising According to the Justice Department, unable to fund itself.” funds, recent cases suggest that the al- intelligence indicates that terrorists Qa`ida senior leadership is lacking funds. continue to use charities as sources of In Bahrain, for example, a five-member both financial and logistical support.13 cell was convicted in January for terrorist British officials concur. According to a Junaid raised $120,000 for then-al- activities, including receiving explosives joint UK Treasury/Home Office report, Qa`ida operations chief Hamza Rabi’a.17 and weapons training, engaging in a “significant proportion” of terrorist In January, the United Nations listed terrorism overseas and terrorism finance investigations in the United three Kuwaitis—Hamid al-Ali, Jaber al- financing targeting “friendly countries.” Kingdom during 2006 included analysis Jalamah and Mubarak al-Bathali—as According to Bahraini investigators, of links to charities. The report found that al-Qa`ida financiers. Designated a year several of the cell members traveled from “the risk of exploitation of charities is a earlier by the U.S. Treasury Department, Bahrain to training camps in Afghanistan significant aspect of the terrorist finance the three actively recruited and financed via Iran. One of the individuals who threat.”14 al-Qa`ida activities, including the group’s returned to Bahrain was successfully activities in Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan prosecuted after acknowledging that Individual Major Donors and Pakistan.18 he had traveled to Afghanistan to fight Speaking in the Gulf, Treasury coalition forces. Cell members also twice Undersecretary Levey noted that “terrorist Organized Support Networks delivered funds to al-Qa`ida operatives organizations and al Qaeda raise money In the period following 9/11, multiple in Afghanistan, according to Bahraini in the Gulf by going to individual donors support networks were identified, in officials. The funds appear to have and through charities.”15 This was evident Europe in particular, that supplied been self-generated, totaled only a few in 2006, when Treasury designated as a logistical and financial support to thousand dollars, and were sent not from terrorist financier Abd al-Hamid al-Mujil, the September 11 plot. The tactic of al-Qa`ida’s leadership to a terrorist cell executive director of the Eastern Province positioning organized networks of abroad, but from a budding terrorist cell office of the International Islamic Relief facilitators in key locations continues to al-Qa`ida leaders in Afghanistan.20 Organization (IIRO), described by fellow to be employed by al-Qa`ida today, jihadists as the “million dollar man” for especially in providing support for al- The reverse directional flow of funds his support of Islamic militant groups. Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI). In February, the appears to support the assessment that According to declassified information Treasury Department designated four the al-Qa`ida leadership is increasingly underpinning his designation, al-Mujil members of a key terrorist facilitation unable to fund itself. Indeed, anecdotal boasted a long history of financing al- and finance network operating out of evidence that has come to light Qa`ida and its Southeast Asian affiliates, Syria for supporting AQI. Treasury sporadically during the past few years the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah reported that the “Abu Ghadiyah” suggests that the al-Qa`ida leadership network, named for its leader Badran has been impecunious for some time. In 10 Terrorist Financing, Financial Action Task Force, Feb- Turki Hishan al-Mazidih (known as his July 2005 letter to Abu Mus`ab al- ruary 29, 2008, p. 11. Abu Ghadiyah), controls the flow of Zarqawi, Ayman al-Zawahiri humbly 11 “Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intel- much of the money, weapons, personnel asked the leader of al-Qa`ida in Iraq if he ligence Stuart Levey Testimony Before the Senate Com- and other material through Syria into could spare “a payment of approximately mittee on Finance,” U.S. Department of Treasury, April Iraq for AQI. According to the Treasury one hundred thousand” because “many 1, 2008. Department, the network “obtained false of the lines have been cut off.” Similarly, 12 David R. Sands, “Iran Uses Fronts to Evade US Sanc- in May 2007, al-Qa`ida leader in tions,” Washington Times, June 13, 2007. 16 “Treasury Designates Director, Branches of Char- 13 Glenn R. Simpson, “Islamic Charities Draw More ity Bankrolling Al Qaida Network,” U.S. Department of 19 “Treasury Designates Members of Abu Ghadiyah’s Scrutiny,” Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2008. Treasury, August 3, 2006. Network Facilitates Flow of Terrorists, Weapons, and 14 The Financial Challenge to Crime and Terrorism, HM 17 “Treasury Targets Al Qaida Facilitators in South Af- Money from Syria to al Qaida in Iraq,” U.S. Department Treasury, February 28, 2007, p. 52. rica,” U.S. Department of Treasury, January 26, 2007. of Treasury, February 28, 2008. 15 “Millions of Dollars May Fund Terrorism,” Gulf Daily 18 “Treasury Designations Target Terrorist Facilitators,” 20 Personal interviews together with Michael Jacobson, News, February 27, 2008. U.S. Department of Treasury, December 7, 2006. Bahraini law enforcement officials, January 30, 2008.

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Afghanistan Shaykh Sa`id Mustafa Financial Indicators of a Changing al-Qa`ida? have been written today. What remains Abu’l-Yazid highlighted the group’s When it comes to financing al-Qa`ida and to be seen is whether the al-Qa`ida senior desperate need for funds: its affiliated components of the global leadership’s lack of funds degrades the jihadist movement, much has changed core group’s power to control activities As for the needs of the jihad in even as much has stayed the same. For and direct operations. Without the power Afghanistan, the first of them is instance, a recently declassified August of the purse, would local terrorist cells still financial. The mujahidin of the 1993 report, “The Wandering Mujahidin: need the al-Qa`ida core as much as that Taliban number in the thousands, Armed and Dangerous,” written by the core would need these cells? Part of what but they lack funds. And there State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence drew the Salafist Group for Preaching and are hundreds wishing to carry out and Research (INR), described several Combat in Algeria into the al-Qa`ida fold, martyrdom-seeking operations, according to intelligence analysts, was the but they can’t find the funds to “What remains to be seen financial dividend of such a relationship.25 equip themselves. So funding is the Should this trend continue, it could lead to mainstay of jihad. They also need is whether the al-Qa`ida the further degeneration of the al-Qa`ida personnel from their Arab brothers senior leadership’s lack of core and the devolution of al-Qa`ida’s and their brothers from other organized global insurgency into a more countries in all spheres: military, funds degrades the core localized—and controllable—terrorist scientific, informational and group’s power to control threat. Toward that end, and in light of otherwise...And here we would like recent successes disrupting and deterring to point out that those who perform activities and direct al-Qa`ida’s finances, constricting the jihad with their wealth should be operations.” terrorist operating environment—with an certain to only send the funds to eye toward al-Qa`ida’s financial streams those responsible for finances and in particular—should remain a strategic no other party, as to do otherwise priority. leads to disunity and differences in trends that remain issues of serious the ranks of the mujahidin.21 concern today, including some of the same Dr. Matthew Levitt is a senior fellow at The streams of financial support that continue Washington Institute for Near East Policy, In a recent case in Saudi Arabia, a to finance today’s militant Islamist where he directs the Institute’s Stein Program taped message from Ayman al-Zawahiri groups. To the present-day reader, who on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. Dr. distributed via cell phones asked for would digest this 1993 report with an eye Levitt is a professorial lecturer in strategic “donations for hundreds of the families toward the conflict in Iraq, perhaps the studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of captives and martyrs in Pakistan most disturbing analytical judgment is of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and Afghanistan.” Saudi authorities the following: and an adjunct fellow at the Combating subsequently arrested some 56 Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point. From individuals suspected of belonging to al- The war-era network of state 2005 to early 2007, Dr. Levitt served as the Qa`ida who were using the recording to sponsors and private patrons Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence raise funds.22 which continues to support the and Analysis at the U.S. Department of the mujahidin has no rigid structure Treasury. Dr. Levitt has also served as an Investigations in Europe and Asia offer and no clearly defined command FBI intelligence analyst providing tactical other examples of local cells raising center, but receives guidance from and strategic analytical support to counter- funds for themselves as well as sending several popular Islamic leaders and terrorism operations. His latest books include funds to Pakistan. In Spain, for example, financial support from charitable Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism authorities see Pakistani jihadists Islamic organizations and wealthy in the Service of Jihad (Yale University involved in petty crime through which individuals. Key figures who have Press, 2006) and Negotiating Under Fire: they not only finance their activities in emerged as the mentors of the Preserving Peace Talks in the Face of Spain, but also send millions of dollars mujahidin provide one another with Terror Attacks (Rowman & Littlefield, back home, some of which is suspected the contacts and conduits needed forthcoming August 2008). of financing extremist groups there.23 In to keep the militant groups they Singapore, a “self-radicalized” cell leader support in business. collected contributions from fellow cell members with the intent of sending the The network circa 1993 was not an exact money as a donation to support violent parallel to today’s combination of al- causes abroad.24 Qa`ida operatives (a smaller, but no less committed cadre) and like-minded 21 Evan Kohlmann, “Al Qaida Leader in Afghanistan followers of a virtually-networked, Begs for Cash Donations,” Counterterrorism Blog, May leaderless jihad. Yet, the 1993 warning 25, 2007, available at www.counterterrorismblog.org. of an unstructured network of jihadists 22 “Saudi Says Arrests Qaeda Suspects Planning At- moving from their current area of tacks,” Reuters, March 3, 2008. operations to other battlefronts could 23 Elaine Sciolino, “Terror Threat From Pakistan Said to Expand,” New York Times, February 10, 2008. Front (MILF) Detention and Restriction Order Cases,” 25 Personal interviews, Mideast intelligence analysts, 24 “Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Moro Islamic Liberation Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, January 28, 2008. July 9, 2007.

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The UK’s Experience in the July 7 bombings and blamed British Rafiq admitted that he was unprepared foreign policy, the Israeli-Palestinian for the hostility—or effectiveness—of Counter-Radicalization conflict and “Islamophobia” for the these Islamist attacks: attacks.1 They recommended that the By James Brandon government tackle Islamic extremism by The Islamists are highly-organized, altering foreign policy and increasing the motivated and well-funded. The in late april, a new British Muslim group teaching of Islam in schools. Haras Rafiq, relationships they’ve made with called the Quilliam Foundation, named a Sufi member of the consultations, said people in government over the last th after Abdullah Quilliam, a 19 century of the meetings: “It was as if they had 20 years are very strong. Anyone British convert to Islam, will be launched decided what their findings were before who wants to go into this space with the specific aim of tackling “Islamic they had begun; people were just going needs to be thick-skinned; you extremism” in the United Kingdom. Being through the motions.”2 have to realize that people will lie composed entirely of former members of about you; they will do anything to Hizb al-Tahrir (HT, often spelled Hizb Sufi Muslim Council discredit you. Above all, the attacks ut-Tahrir), the global group that wants As a direct result of witnessing the are personal—that’s the way these to re-create the caliphate and which has Islamists dominate the Preventing guys like it. acted as a “conveyor belt” for several Extremism Together consultations, Haras British jihadists, the Quilliam Foundation Rafiq established his own group called In spite of this, Rafiq was able to gain represents a significant departure from the Sufi Muslim Council (SMC). It was access to senior members of government, conventional counter-radicalization efforts. launched on July 19, 2006 at an event including Tony Blair, the then-prime If successful, it may become an important attended by Hazel Blears, the minister minister, and urged them to re-think the model for tackling Salafi-jihadi ideologies for Communities and Local Government.3 government’s deepening dependence in Western Europe and in the United Rafiq said that he set up the SMC because on groups such as the MCB. Despite States. he was frustrated that government efforts such successes at a policy-making level, however, the abuse directed at Rafiq— The group’s launch reflects the mixed including death threats—gradually results of previous British counter- “In many cases, the most deterred others from speaking on behalf of radicalization efforts that have been outspoken and influential the group, creating the impression that, in dominated by conflict between Salafist the words of one Muslim blogger, the SMC Islamists and their secular Sufi rivals. of these critics were former was “an outfit whose membership could These groups disagree substantially extremists.” probably fit on one piece of furniture.”5 over the causes of Islamic extremism. On the whole, Islamist groups blame Freelance Counter-Terrorism Efforts British foreign policy, Islamophobia Although the SMC became widely and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to tackle extremism had been repeatedly discredited among many British for radicalizing young Muslims; Sufi hijacked by Islamists and was angry that Muslims, by mid-2006 the group had groups acknowledge that these are their attempts to make political Islam broken the Islamists’ stranglehold over contributing factors, but blame extreme synonymous with the Islamic religion government policy and emboldened Salafist ideologies for transforming these were damaging the faith as a whole. Rafiq Muslim secularists. In many cases, grievances into a literal casus belli. hoped the SMC would tackle Islamist the most outspoken and influential of influence over government policy and, these critics were former extremists. “Preventing Extremism Together” through grassroots work, give young In mid-2006, Shiraz Maher, a former One of the earliest government attempts Muslims a strong secular Sufi identity mid-ranking member of HT, became the to encourage Muslims to tackle Islamic that would inoculate them against Salafi- first to denounce his former ideology, radicalism were the “Preventing jihadi thought. From its inception, writing newspaper articles and fronting Extremism Together” consultations. however, the SMC suffered damaging television documentaries explaining Held soon after the July 7, 2005 London attacks by established Muslim groups how the ideas of HT and other Islamists bombings, the consultations brought that accused it of being unrepresentative, lead to terrorism. Inevitably, he was together prominent Muslims and asked having “neo-con” links and supporting attacked by HT and also received death them to investigate the causes of the government anti-terrorism policies.4 threats. Similarly, in the summer of 2007, bombings and suggest ways to prevent Ed Husain, a local leader of HT in East future attacks. The discussions were 1 Preventing Extremism Together: Working Group Report London during the 1990s, published a dominated by members of the Muslim August-October 2005, available at www.communities. book, The Islamist, about his experiences, Council of Britain (MCB), an umbrella gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/152164. providing not only an insider’s view of group of Muslim organizations mainly 2 Personal interview, Haras Rafiq, London, February HT, but also describing Jamaat-i-Islami’s run by supporters of Jamaat-i-Islami 2008. attempts to monopolize Islamic practice (JI), the South Asian equivalent of the 3 “Launch of the Sufi Muslim Council,” Department of Muslim Brotherhood, who packed the Communities and Local Government, July 19, 2006, of the Muslim Public Affairs Committee UK (MPACUK) consultations with fellow Islamists. As available at www.communities.gov.uk/speeches/corpo- on February 8, 2006, available at www.mpacuk.org/ a result, the consultations’ conclusions, rate/sufi-muslim-council. content/view/2816/35/. published in October 2005, denied that 4 For an example of such criticism, see the article “Fi“Fi-- 5 “Hunt Down the Sufis?” Indigo Jones Blog, December Salafist ideologies played any role in nally Exposed! The Sufi Muslim Council” on the website 17, 2007.

10 april 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 5 in London’s heavily Muslim East End. Others also felt emboldened to stand If people of both sides of the Although Husain—like Maher and Rafiq— up to pro-jihadist organizations. For equation are saying Islam is the came under assault from Islamist groups example, Musa Abu Bakr Admani, the problem, then we can point to the that sought to intimidate and discredit Muslim chaplain of London Metropolitan biggest theologians who are around him, his bestselling book circumvented University, a former stronghold of groups today who are saying that Islam can the Islamists to explain to the British such as HT, independently took action and is adapting to these problems. public how Islamist teachings can lead to to challenge student extremists. Admani From a policy perspective, it is key violence. has said that he took action himself after to say that Islam isn’t the problem. the government ignored his request for If you say that Islam is the problem Others also renounced their former assistance.8 By early 2008, his efforts had then you’re basically saying that 1.5 views. Hassan Butt, a former al- begun to succeed; on March 11, members billion people are the problem.11 Muhajiroun member who helped British of the campus’ Islamic Society complained jihadists join the Taliban during 2001- on the radical website islambase.co.uk Unlike the SMC, the Quilliam Foundation 2002, renounced his former views and that they were no longer able to invite will launch without government backing. claimed to have begun de-radicalizing extremist preachers to their events Instead, its launch will be attended by former jihadists in Manchester.6 As because of Admani’s influence.9 a range of prominent Muslim leaders, including Ali Goma, the mufti of Egypt. “The Quilliam Foundation Quilliam Foundation According to Nawaz, “In the Muslim The Quilliam Foundation is expected to community, it’s important to have is expected to pose the pose the biggest threat to radical Islamists theologians with us if we’re going to biggest threat to radical thus far when it launches on April 22. Islamists thus far when it Funded by Muslim donors, it is entirely “The most committed composed of former HT members who opponents of extremism launches on April 22.” have renounced their former beliefs. Its director is Majid Nawaz, formerly one are often former radicals of HT’s most prominent members who gained celebrity status within the group who are best able to a result, he was reportedly stabbed after being jailed for three years in Egypt explain the attractions by other al-Muhajiroun members. He before being released in early 2007. In now plans to co-publish a book on his addition, the group’s deputy director is and implications of radical experiences later this summer. Others Ed Husain, while Usama Hasan sits on the Islam.” include Usama Hasan, a Salafist imam group’s advisory council. Also involved in East London, who denounced Muslim is Rashid Ali, a former director of HT’s “pacifists” in 2001 and had joined the secret command structure who wrote and Afghan mujahidin to fight the country’s edited many of the group’s publications. make progress.” In this respect, as in communist government in 1990. Now, “To refute or criticize Islamism as an others, the group aims to learn from the however, Hasan has become a prominent ideology, it’s important to have people mistakes of previous groups, keeping its opponent of Salafi-jihadi ideologies— who have been involved in it,” Nawaz distance from the government, working using his jihadist past to win credibility explained. “People on both sides of within the Muslim community and using with his congregation, while continuing to spectrum still don’t understand what the “extremist” background of the group’s identify himself as a Wahhabi. Hasan does Islamism is about. We can understand members to earn vital credibility among not argue merely that jihadist attacks on and explain this ideology because we were young British Muslims. the United Kingdom are only undesirable training people in it.”10 at present; instead, he challenges the Conclusion theology behind such violence. For Once operational, Nawaz said that It is too early to judge the ultimate success instance, he has challenged the use of Quilliam will argue that Islamism is “the of British counter-radicalization efforts. It kafir(heathen), calling the term intrinsically biggest form of extremism” and also “put is clear, however, that Muslim secularists derogatory, and says that Islam prohibits out ideas regarding how to counter the are increasingly successful in finding the killing of all and any non-combatants, Islamist narrative.” While Islamist groups ways to challenge jihadist ideologies. The arguing that theological justifications for often aim to defend political Islam from Quilliam Foundation itself illustrates attacks against Israeli citizens inevitably criticism, Nawaz says Quilliam aims to several important lessons of the British open the door to similar attacks in protect Islam itself from being associated experience in combating extremism: Western countries. “Others argue that with violence and refute arguments that this terrorism is just counter-productive; Islam itself is the source of terrorism: - The most committed opponents of I’m arguing that it’s wrong and immoral extremism are often former radicals who and evil,” he said.7 are best able to explain the attractions 8 “Islamic Radicalisation,” BBC Radio 4, November 14, and implications of radical Islam. 2006. - Radical Islam’s most ardent opponents 6 Ed Husain, “If Words Could Kill Me,” New Statesman, 9 Post entitled “Speakers needed!!!!!!” islambase.co.uk, are often pious Muslims who are motivated June 14, 2007. March 11, 2008. by a desire to protect Islam from being 7 Personal interview, Usama Hasan, London, December 10 ���������������������������������������������������� Personal interview, �������������������������������Majid Nawaz��������������������, London, March 20, 28, 2007. 2008. 11 ������Ibid.

11 april 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 5 associated with violence and hatred. AQIM’s Expanding While the source of the violence was a - While Islamists regularly work closely national political event, the campaign with the government without losing Internationalist Agenda waged by the GIA through much of the influence in Muslim communities, 1990s took on an international element. reformists are often more successful By Andrew Black Algerian groups, such as the GIA, if they keep their distance from conducted various types of operations government. in late july 2007, Algerian press outlets abroad, ranging from procurement reported on the defection of a former to plotting and conducting attacks, Nevertheless, many challenges remain. member of al-Qa`ida in the Islamic especially within Europe. Throughout Hundreds of mosques and Islamic schools Maghreb (AQIM). This individual, named the conflict and despite incorporating a around the country are run by highly Abdelkader Ben Messoud, alias Abu number of veteran Afghan mujahidin, the conservative members of the Deobandi Daoud, was a former senior member of rhetoric and operational orientation of and Salafist traditions, while Islamist the group’s wing operating in the Sahara, the movement largely remained focused groups frequently enjoy levels of foreign and the account he related to journalists on effecting change in the Algerian polity. funding that their secularist and Sufi depicted an organization riven by After 2001, however, elements within 1 rivals cannot match. Furthermore, many disputes about the group’s new direction. the Algerian jihadist movement began politicians—particularly on the left—are According to Abu Daoud, one of the key to exhibit signs of a shift toward a more willing to support Islamists in return sources of dissent within AQIM’s ranks international orientation, manifesting in for their support in elections. Despite was over the decision by the group’s amir, professions of allegiance to Usama bin this, it is clear that increasing numbers Abdelmalek Droukdel, alias Abu Mus`ab Ladin and the al-Qa`ida leadership.3 of secular Muslims are stepping forward `Abd al-Wadud, to merge with al-Qa`ida to question jihadist ideologies regardless in September 2006 and thus redirect the This shifting dynamic was accentuated of the personal risk. One important group’s focus from a nationalist to an in September 2006 when Ayman al- outcome of this is that Islamists no longer internationalist agenda. Zawahiri announced the official merger monopolize the interpretation of Islam between al-Qa`ida and the Algerian and can no longer portray their version of The proceeding seeks to determine the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat Islam as more genuine than others. Haras balance AQIM has found between these (GSPC). While this event and the group’s Rafiq said, “A few years ago the Islamists two competing views. To do this, the subsequent renaming to al-Qa`ida in the were able to say that their’s was the article presents the findings from two Islamic Maghreb indicated al-Qa`ida’s only version of Islam and no one would studies: a quantitative content analysis of growing interest in North Africa, it also contradict them; I don’t think that’s the group’s statements, and a data analysis pointed to the GSPC’s shifting focus away any longer the case.” In other words, of attacks by the group. The article will from nationalist ambitions toward a more counter-radicalization efforts are not only proceed by providing a brief synopsis of internationalist agenda. What remained tackling terrorism, but are also aiding the AQIM, its legacy and the merger with to be determined was the balance the development of a more pluralistic, tolerant al-Qa`ida. Following this, the essay will GSPC’s and later AQIM’s leaders would and, indeed, recognizably “Western” outline the methodology and present the strike between these competing views. version of Islam. findings from each study. Finally, context and a threat assessment will be provided Content Analysis James Brandon is a senior research fellow setting the findings against the current For the current study, 33 statements at the Centre for Social Cohesion in London. environment in North Africa. issued by the GSPC and AQIM from He is a former journalist who has reported March 2005 through March 2008 were on Islamic movements in Europe, the Middle An Evolving Movement reviewed and coded for content. The East and Africa for a wide variety of print The Islamist opposition to the current statements were collected from the and broadcast media. He has an MA in Algerian government, of which AQIM is Open Source Center (OSC) and the Site Middle Eastern Studies from the School of only a recent manifestation, has its roots Institute, and each statement was coded Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). in the late 1980s and early 1990s when for specific references to either national the Islamist movement, led by the Islamic or international terms. Examples of Salvation Front (FIS), was poised to win national terms include references to the majority vote in the 1991 general Algeria’s government, security services elections. Rather than accept a ruling and any other terms that indicate a desire Islamist party, the Algerian military to change the national polity or which nullified the elections in January 1992, respect national borders. This view touching off a period of hostilities, aligns with the nationalist ambitions of initially led by the Armed Islamic groups such as the GIA and the GSPC. Group (GIA), that has endured almost References to foreign governments and 2 uninterrupted. people were coded individually and in the aggregate are considered to fall within an internationalist perspective, a perspective 1 Geoff Porter, “Splits Revealed Inside Al-Qaeda in the which roughly comports with the vision Islamic Maghreb,” Terrorism Monitor 5:17 (2007). 2 Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield Algeria 1988-2002 (New 3 “Algerian Group Backs al-Qaeda,” Jane’s Intelligence York: Verso, 2003). Digest, October 23, 2003.

12 april 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 5 of al-Qa`ida and the global jihadist indicates an overall process of realigning by the group targets an international movement. Important components of the organization’s objectives to comport asset. Examples of such attacks include this view are a focus on attacking the “far with al-Qa`ida’s own views. the December 2007 bombing of the UN enemy,” while rejecting the Westphalian building in Algiers, and the February state model and national borders. 400 2008 kidnapping of two Austrian tourists Algeria 350 in Tunisia. All Foreigners The analysis also relied upon two key 300 70 assumptions. First, it is assumed that West & Israel 250 Nationalist statements issued by the group, especially 60 Internationalist 200 its key leadership, are indicative of the 50 Undetermined 150 overall emphasis placed on key strategic 40 issues; the frequency of terms used is 100 30 assumed to correspond to the group’s 50 20 priorities and in total would indicate 0 whether the group leans more toward Pre Merger Post Merger Post Sept. 2007 10 a nationalist or an internationalist 0 Figure 1. This figure depicts how AQIM’s rhetoric has evolved Pre Merger Post Merger Since Sept. 1, 2007 campaign. When compiled, the data from March 2005 through March 2008. The bar represents the should portray the evolution of the number of references made to each variable. Figure 2. This figure depicts the number of successful group’s priorities and be informative as attacks by the GSPC and AQIM from January 2006 through to AQIM’s future direction. The second Data Analysis March 2008. assumption underlying the analysis is To provide the findings from the content that Abu Mus`ab `Abd al-Wadud has analysis with context, a data analysis was Implications of the Data remained the amir of the organization since conducted of attacks by both the GSPC and Both the content and data analyses before March 2005 and that he speaks AQIM from 2006 through March 2008. demonstrate the escalating emphasis for the majority of the group’s members. The methodology employed for the data on internationalist targets, and in the Significant doubt has been cast on this analysis was similar to that of the content aggregate confirm the notion that AQIM assumption in recent months, as several analysis. A dataset of 96 attacks by both is moving closer into alignment with al- reports from the Algerian media have the GSPC and AQIM was compiled from Qa`ida’s worldview. The implications of suggested that al-Wadud was deposed in the U.S. National Counter-Terrorism the findings in this article are significant 2007.4 These reports, however, appear to Center’s Worldwide Incidents Tracking for the other North African countries be misleading since al-Wadud continued System (WITS). The coding principals as well. Countries such as Tunisia and to be featured on AQIM’s website through employed were the same as in the content Mauritania, upon which AQIM has December 2007 and on videos released in analysis. The dataset was increased to a focused in the past, are likely to become spring 2008.5 total of 107 with the inclusion of events increasingly popular targets. In Tunisia, from 2008 by the author. It must be noted AQIM has devoted attention specifically The findings from the content analysis that one inherent drawback to using the to the tourism industry, which is an represent a group that, while still WITS data is that it largely omits failed important element of that country’s predominately focused on Algeria, is and disrupted plots, such as the December economy. This point was made salient nonetheless shifting its focus from a 2006 plot in Tunis, Tunisia. Rather, these most recently in the ongoing hostage nationalist to an internationalist agenda, data portray only those attacks which crisis involving two Austrian tourists. as illustrated in Figure 1. The most were both successfully executed and In Mauritania, it appears to be not only dramatic shift can be seen in the group’s reported in the media. tourism but also that country’s diplomatic identification of the West and Israel. relations with Israel that draw AQIM’s Prior to the September 2006 merger with The results of the data analysis similarly ire. Two months prior to the February al-Qa`ida, AQIM makes specific mention portray a group that is shifting its 2008 attack on the Israeli Embassy in to Algeria just under five times more targeting preferences from nationalist to Nouakchott, AQIM released a statement than Israel and Western countries. In the internationalist personnel and assets, as claiming an attack on the Mauritanian period following the merger, that figure illustrated in Figure 2. Of the 33 events military: “This operation has come at a is cut almost in half, and since September which occurred prior to the GSPC’s merger time during which the sky of our beloved 2007 the ratio of references to Algeria with al-Qa`ida, 29 targeted national Nouakchott is still polluted with the versus the West and Israel stands at just assets against just one international fluttering of the Israeli flag” and while two to one, a 48% reduction since before asset.6 Since the September 2006 merger, the Mauritanian government continues to the merger. This is a dramatic strategic however, this ratio of nationalist to support the “Crusaders” militarily and by shift for the organization as a whole and internationalist attacks reduces to seven hosting the Dakar Rally.7 to one. Since September 2007, the same

4 “Algerian-based al-Qa’idah Leader said Deposed; Re- month in which Ayman al-Zawahiri called Additionally, aside from the growing gional ‘Emirs’ Replaced,” Liberte, September 18, 2007; for the expulsion of Western influence threat to Western interests in North “Al-Qa’idah in Maghreb Algerian Leader ‘Replaced,’” El from the Maghreb, the trend accelerated Africa, AQIM’s statements indicate Khabar, October 3, 2007. to the point that now one in three attacks 5 AQIM’s website qmagreb.org was removed following 7 OSC, “Al-Qa’ida in Lands of Islamic Maghreb Claims the December 2007 attacks in Algiers; “Lovers of the 6 Four events were coded as “not applicable,” as they ‘New Victories’ in Algeria, Mauritania,” January 1, Houris,” AQIM martyrdom video, March 27, 2008. were against former GSPC members and their families. 2008.

13 april 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 5 an intention, though not necessarily Nanomanagement: or voluntarily transformed in their a capability, to strike within Europe, organizational structure from traditional a point which has been echoed by A Challenge to Those hierarchies to networks, or “networks of numerous European security officials.8 Combating Terrorism networks.”2 Where terrorists can readily The EU’s counter-terrorism coordinator, adopt network structures, for traditional Gilles de Kerchove, noted recently that By Major Tommy Sowers, U.S. Army hierarchical professional militaries Europe faces a “real threat” from “the “the challenge will be to discover how rallying to al-Qaeda of groups like the in 1998, as part of my officer training, to combine hierarchical and networked Salifist Group for Preaching and Combat I recall watching a short promotional designs to increase their agility and (GSPC) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting video about the future of my profession. flexibility for field operations.”3 Group.”9 Thus, while AQIM continues to The video starred a rotund colonel sitting Decentralization to widely dispersed maintain a strong commitment to effecting in a command post of the future. The units, delegation of tasks once controlled change within Algeria, the growing colonel shouted out orders as he literally in the center, empowerment of the most internationalist rhetoric and shifting armchaired a distant battle, watching it junior levels of an organization and targeting preferences indicate that the unfold on video monitors. The explosion of encouraging initiative are all hallmarks group is in the process of realigning its an enemy vehicle formed the triumphant of both network structure and counter- priorities to be in accordance with al- conclusion. I remember thinking the actor insurgency strategy, yet anathema to Qa`ida’s strategy of targeting the “far in particular was comical, and the lesson what occurred in the Baghdad command enemy,” and therefore presents a greater somewhat confusing, wedged as it was center. threat to the West. between lessons promoting junior officer leadership and initiative. Yet, in the The term micromanagement has long Conclusion summer of 2006 in Baghdad’s command been used to describe a supervisor that This article has set out the findings of a center, I found myself watching the same closely monitors and controls the actions quantitative content analysis of GSPC scenario unfold in real time. I watched as of his immediate subordinate. Today, we and AQIM rhetoric between March a general barked orders, surrounded by see nanomanagement, or the ability of a 2005 and March 2008. In addition and plasma screens, using Unmanned Aerial supervisor to closely monitor and control to provide context, a data analysis of the Vehicle (UAV) feeds to vector in air and the actions of all subordinates throughout group’s attacks was presented. In sum, ground forces on a target 20 miles away. an organization. This raises three critical the analyses show the group’s rhetoric With a staff of dozens at his side, he gave questions. Where did nanomanagement has focused proportionally more on commands as specific as “Follow that originate? Why is it done? What are its the international arena than have second truck” and “Tell them, it is the costs? its successful attacks. Nonetheless, house in the center of the compound,” the trends in both analyses show while continually asking his legal officer, Military Origins of Nanomanagement: that since the September 2006 merger “Do you see hostile intent?” The general Combating Networks with Networks with al-Qa`ida and despite reportedly authorized, coordinated, executed and The military’s efforts to respond to deep internal dissent, the group has managed an operation foreseen eight networked enemies fall under the moniker progressively shifted to a stronger focus years earlier. of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW). on an internationalist agenda. This NCW seeks information superiority, transition has altered security in North Information has always been valuable enabled by IT, and “generates increased Africa and may have implications for the in war. The difference today is in combat power by networking sensors, West as well. the dramatic reduction of its cost. decision-makers, and shooters to achieve Information Technology (IT) employed shared awareness, increased speed of Andrew Black is the Managing Director of on the modern battlefield (e-mail, UAV command, high tempo of operations, Black Watch Global, an intelligence and risk feeds, video conferencing, GPS, vehicle greater lethality, increased survivability, management consultancy providing insight trackers, sensors) enables the highest and a degree of self-synchronization.”4 and analysis on emerging threats for public levels of an organization to directly Moreover, “no less than the embodiment and private sector clients. Mr. Black has influence and monitor the very lowest of DoD transformation,” NCW provides worked extensively in counter-terrorism and levels of an organization at increasing much of the explanation behind the homeland security as a specialist on Middle speeds and decreasing costs. extensive adoption of networking tools, Eastern and African security affairs and UAVs and sensors employed in the has spoken at several industry and counter- Much has been written about al-Qa`ida’s contemporary military arsenal.5 terrorism conferences. use of modern IT and the subsequent 1 power it draws from this medium. 2 Gabriel Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Inter- More than utilizing IT, many terrorist net (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2004). organizations have either been forced 3 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Information, 8 “German Spy Chief Warns of Al-Qaida’s Growing Power, and Grand Strategy: In Athena’s Camp—Section Strength in North Africa,” Der Spiegel, March 25, 2008; 1 Bruce Hoffman, “Countering Terrorist Use of the Web 1,” in David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla eds., In Athena’s “New EU Counterterrorism Coordinator says al-Qa’idah as a Weapon,” CTC Sentinel 1:1 (2008). See also Evan F. Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa is Main Threat to Europe,” De Standaard, November 6, Kohlmann, “Al-Qa`ida’s ‘Myspace’: Terrorist Recruit- Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), p. 5. 2007. ment on the Internet,” CTC Sentinel 1:2 (2008) and Ga- 4 The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare (Wash- 9 “EU Faces ‘Real Threat’ From North Africa: Anti-Ter- briel Weimann, “Al-Qa`ida’s Extensive Use of the Inter- ington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2005), pp. 3-4. ror Tsar,” AFP, April 7, 2008. net,” CTC Sentinel 1:2 (2008). 5 “Network Centric Warfare,” Department of Defense

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Early advocates of NCW recognized that senior leaders can nanomanage a former will find ways of making the the potential hazards of the military distant action, when everyone rushes to decision for the latter.”15 Actions must be rapidly adopting IT, including “increased the sounds of the guns, who is planning, visible, traceable, quantified, known and potential for information overload, second who is thinking, who is directing what ultimately defensible. guessing, micromanagement, stifling will occur when those guns go silent? of initiatives and distraction.”6 Where Occam’s razor might explain a third information once was in short supply, a Why Nanomanagement? and most troubling cause for persistent torrent of data now deluges and potentially With these costs, why nanomanage? monitoring by distant superiors—they paralyzes, and “inserting new technology There are three explanations. Some claim can, so they do. In professions, especially into old systems and organizations may that uncertainty conditions the level of in the military, senior officers rise through create new inefficiencies, even as some monitoring. Wilson argues that when the ranks. Now at the pinnacle of their current activities become more efficient effort and outcomes are clear, authority careers, the tasks of generals shift toward or effective.”7 Decision-makers must now can be pushed to the front line. Yet when tasks of budget, management, external process an abundance of information and fighting networks, few pitched battles are relations, long-term planning and also decide “when to stop collecting and fought, front lines formed or penetrated, administration. In short, as professionals waiting for information and when to take or progress of winning hearts and minds rise in organizations, they do less work action.”8 easily measured. In these uncertain that forms the heart of the profession. environments, “more discretionary The issue of inefficiencies from monitoring authority in an agency is pushed upward The ability to nanomanage now allows persists in varied forms of literature— to the top.”10 these senior officers a choice—work on principal-agent theory, delegation theory, the budget and watch endless PowerPoint management theory and transaction In the past, perfect information was slides, or fire a Hellfire missile and watch costs. The common view throughout is limited by time, distance and technology, the action on a plasma. When taking that monitoring comes at a cost both to leading Clausewitz to state, “In war action defines the profession, where the everything is uncertain.”11 Through this warrior ethos is inculcated, technology fog of war, commanders have peered, now allows those distanced to drift into “Nanomanagement leading Van Creveld to argue that “from the fight. Indeed, with the industrial threatens the essential Plato to NATO, the history of command in revolution, complexity, distance and scale war consists essentially of an endless quest forced generals to retreat from the front quality of professional for certainty” about the environment, lines. Today, however, the information organizations—trust.” enemy and “last but definitely not least, revolution allows them to stride back to certainty about the state, intentions, and the virtual front. activities of one’s own forces.”12 From these thoughts, nanomanagement can be Nanomanagement and Professions: the monitored and the monitor. For the seen as just another in a long line of efforts A Question of Trust monitored, time spent quantifying efforts, to dissipate the fog of war. A UAV feed or While the above costs and justifications writing situation reports or reporting hourly reports can easily be justified in may impact any organization, to higher command is time spent off providing at least the patina of certainty. nanomanagement threatens the essential delegated tasks. Furthermore, persistent quality of professional organizations— monitoring reduces the risks taken by Another explanation sees monitoring trust. Wilson summarizes the differences subordinates, reducing their discretion as less a response to uncertainty, but between a bureaucratized and a and pushing up many decisions once motivated by liability and accountability professionalized workforce in terms of made at their level. For the monitor, time and a natural result of an “accountability the monitoring of their work, or how processing the deluge of information, or culture”13 and “the audit explosion.”14 much they are trusted. Where the former waiting for a more accurate and timely With increasing levels of scrutiny, both is highly supervised, the latter focuses on report, comes at a cost. For Leonard, by superiors and persistent media, “If restrictive hiring but once hired leaves “Truth on the battlefield costs time, lives the administrator is going to get into the professionals to their methods.16 More and supplies. Ignorance is free.”9 Now trouble for what an operator does, the trust equals less monitoring and less costs, a fundamental benefit of training, Report to Congress, July 27, 2001. 252. recruiting and investing in professionals 17 6 David S. Alberts, Information Age Transformation: Get- 10 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government as opposed to bureaucrats. ting to a 21st Century Military, Information Age Transforma- Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, tion Series (Washington, D.C.: DoD Command and Con- 2000), p. 133. trol Research Program, 2002), p. 9. 11 Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Eliot Howard and Pe- 7 Norman C. Davis, “An Information-Based Revolution ter Paret, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 15 Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and in Military Affairs,” in David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla Press, 1976), p. 156. Why They Do It, p. 133. eds., In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Infor- 12 Martin L. Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, 16 Ibid., p. 149. mation Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), p. 81. MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 264. 17 Jeffrey H. Dyer and Wujin Chu, “The Role of Trust- 8 Alberts, Information Age Transformation: Getting to a 13 Onora O’Neill, A Question of Trust (Cambridge: Cam- worthiness in Reducing Transaction Costs and Improv- 21st Century Military, p. 57. bridge University Press, 2002). ing Performance: Empirical Evidence from the United 9 Robert R. Leonard, Principles of War for the Information 14 Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification States, Japan, and Korea,” Organizational Science 14:1 Age (New York: Ballantine Publishing Group, 1998), p. (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). (2003).

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Furthermore, professionals are trusted After Action Report: Sunni citizens against his men.1 to use qualitative judgment as opposed to quantitative assessment.18 The subjective Politics 101 for Small Units I cannot take credit for the visit or any is the purview of the professional. The in Counter-Insurgency progress that was made since the idea was rise of IT-enabled monitoring, and the the council’s, not my own. Yet between insistence on quantifying both efforts and By Major Jeremy Gwinn, U.S. Army the Iraqi security forces on one side, outputs can be seen as an encroachment and the shaykhs and the neighborhood on professional judgment. How does the key role that politics play in one quantify and report the shaykh’s counter-insurgency finally became “As posited by the bulk tone, or how a neighborhood feels? For clear to me in the spring of 2006, as my professions, O’Neill sees the impact of soldiers and I escorted a delegation of of classic insurgency constant monitoring and accounting of Ghazaliyya’s Sunni clerics onto a mini- literature, political actions as severe, “distorting the proper aims of bus, compliments of the Iraqi National professional practice (original emphasis) and Police. My rifle company’s area of engagement is critical in indeed as damaging professional pride operations in western Baghdad had seen this kind of war.” and integrity.”19 When a senior leader its share of turmoil during the previous nanomanages a distant battle, or demands months. Home to a mixed population of ever more accurate and by definition Sunni and Shi`a Muslims, the Ghazaliyya quantified reports, they take back the neighborhood was hit hard by sectarian council on the other, I became the only autonomy so central to professional violence following the February bombing person willing to initiate dialogue. That work. of Samarra’s Askariyya Shrine. My day, I saw the value of months of work battalion, 1-87 Infantry of 1-10 Mountain with the local council and eventually the Conclusion Division, was recalled within days to quell shaykhs, a duty I had initially considered Nanomanagement—to overcome uncertainty, the chaos after having handed over the a mere distraction. as a response to increasing accountability, area to Iraqi forces the previous December. or simply because it provides an escape Now, struggling to find an Iraqi solution As posited by the bulk of classic insurgency from the mundane—brings with it costs to Ghazaliyya’s security ills, my company literature, political engagement is critical to any organization. For professional was in the midst of a gradual transition in this kind of war. This truth holds not organizations, nanomanagement threatens to the National Police force. The largely only at the national level, but locally trust, the sine qua non of what it means to be Shi`a police were perceived as illegitimate as well. My experience with Iraqi local a professional. When fighting networks, among the area’s Sunni population, which politics is limited to 2005 and 2006 adoption of networking technology is was being terrorized by vengeful Shi`a within western Baghdad. Political not enough. This must be concomitant militias. Reports abounded of abuse at systems outside urban areas function with organizational change focusing the hands of the National Police, whom differently, and clearly the advent of on empowerment and delegation, not many viewed as simply a de facto wing of the Sons of Iraq and similar groups has centralization and monitoring. In the Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. brought a markedly new dynamic to the contemporary fight, the challenge will be environment. Yet, the small unit COIN learning the right lessons from the rotund On that spring morning, the shaykhs, practitioner should continue to find colonel. several members of Ghazaliyya’s relevance in the following lessons when neighborhood advisory council and taken in context and adapted to his/her Major Tommy Sowers is an instructor of I made our way to the police brigade unique situation. American Politics, Policy and Strategy in headquarters across town to visit the West Point’s Department of Social Sciences. commander and tour the detention Realistic Expectations He has served two tours in Iraq as a Special facility. The day’s visit did not cause What should a small unit leader expect Forces officer. Commissioned through ROTC, an outbreak of peace throughout to achieve through the local political he holds a BA in Public Policy from Duke Ghazaliyya, but was a small step organization in his AO? At the platoon, University and an MSc in Public Policy toward improved police performance company and even battalion level, from the London School of Economics. He is and dialogue with local leaders. The host-nation political goals often seem currently researching his Ph.D. dissertation religious shaykhs, with whom I met distant—beyond our ability to influence. through LSE, “Nanomanagement: Technology, regularly, significantly toned down their At our level, the neighborhood advisory Trust and the Death of Professions.” He vitriol toward the police force. Instead of councils may appear to be ineffective, can be reached directly at Thomas.Sowers@ pronouncing that “the police must leave dysfunctional or even criminal, which in usma.edu. Ghazaliyya at once,” the shaykhs’ message some cases is accurate on all three counts. changed to “this is what the police must Nonetheless, by accepting the cultural do to gain our acceptance.” Without a differences and establishing realistic doubt, the police colonel understood expectations, small unit leaders can the tremendous influence wielded by make important gains for their counter- the shaykhs and, seeing the validity in 18 Gary A. Klein, The Power of Intuition: How to Use Your many of their complaints, the need to 1 While some readers may view this as legitimizing at- Gut Feelings to Make Better Decisions at Work (New York: professionalize his force or continue to tacks against ISF as a negotiating tool, a pragmatic coun- Currency/Doubleday, 2004). fuel the violent backlash of Ghazaliyya’s ter-insurgency approach must acknowledge the leverage 19 O’Neill, A Question of Trust, p. 50. of such influential actors.

16 april 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 5 insurgency effort, particularly in the areas broader communications plan, IO themes only updating the council on U.S.-funded of governance, Information Operations are blunt, ineffective tools. Moreover, projects, but eventually broadened this to (IO) and intelligence. local leaders do not want to be lectured include combat operations. by the newest Westerner to appear in Governance their neighborhood. Official IO themes Week after week, I appeared at council In addition to representing the U.S. should underpin our communications meetings and was predictably greeted by military, leaders should take the advisor and be tailored to the local situation, but one or two weeping mothers, wondering role with the local council. In the conduct certainly not constitute the extent of small why my soldiers had detained their sons. of Civil Affairs projects, we often saw unit IO. Equally important is countering The weekly scenes were arranged and council members make requests without insurgent IO. officiated by the council chairman, who a willingness to do any legwork to created a deliberate spectacle to showcase make them happen. In cases like these, At one meeting, several days after my our supposed injustice. I tried my best we learned that the council’s active soldiers discovered a weapons cache to justify our actions, but, in this forum, cooperation should be a requirement, attached to a mosque, a council member was not positioned for success. After except in emergency situations or those angrily accused my men of desecrating several months, I tried a new approach. carrying an unacceptable physical risk it. In truth, my men uncovered the My company, with several Iraqi Army to the council members. In doing so, the cache outside the wall, prompting our platoons, was conducting multiple raids council takes ownership of the project and involving five or six houses at night, is forced to function as an organization. My with the objective of detaining about unit’s policy eventually required that all “Without adjustment 10 targeted individuals. Before the project requests must move through Iraqi for local context and operation began, I envisioned the line- channels. In practice, this meant the local up of insurgents’ mothers at the council council could no longer make requests integration into a broader meeting several days later, so I decided to to the U.S. representative. Instead, communications plan, be proactive. In the early morning hours they sent project requests through the immediately following the operation, after district advisory council, which could IO themes are blunt, ensuring there were no remaining OPSEC then draw on U.S. resources. While this ineffective tools.” constraints, I placed a cell phone call to slowed the start of a project, it exercised the council chairman. To my amazement, and strengthened the Iraqi organization he already knew about our operation and at multiple levels and was the preferred was glad to talk. I briefed him on each technique for most projects. sister Iraqi unit to search inside, where detainee, telling him why he was detained they discovered additional contraband and his likely timeline through the Iraqi Another way small unit leaders can aid weapons. U.S. soldiers never entered the justice system. At our next meeting, there governance is by improving the internal mosque’s walls. When confronted with were no weeping mothers. Instead, the decision-making process. Early in my the truth, which I pointed out could be chairman, empowered with information, unit’s tour, the council decided they could backed up by video, the agitated council dealt with the families individually and no longer tolerate the incompetence and members backed down and admitted without a scene. corruptness of the chairman who had, that perhaps their second-hand report among a host of other transgressions, was wrong. My error in this case was not We often heard complaints about the local stolen the new furniture from the council involving the council leadership sooner, Iraqi police during council meetings. My building for use in his own home. Not even engaging them while the operation initial course of action was to take note wanting to offend him, they waited until was still in progress. I generally heard of the grievances that seemed valid and the chairman missed a meeting to vent the same themes from the council as later confront the police chief. I soon their frustrations on me. The council from ordinary citizens on the street, and saw this procedure as a wasted effort, members indicated indirectly that they therefore regarded the council as a reliable so I convinced the police chief to attend wanted to replace him, but they wanted it indicator of public sentiment. When a council meeting, opening a line of to be my decision. I informed the council combined with the religious shaykhs, I communication that had not previously that I would not make such a decision and believe the group’s ability to influence the existed. When the National Police came recommended they vote on the matter. population was significant. to town, this same procedure evolved This seemingly obvious solution took the into a formal weekly security meeting council by surprise, but they voted and Small unit leaders should consider using a between the National Police brigade the chairman was dismissed. The same counter-insurgent’s version of a customer commander, the local council and several scene was repeated several more times on service approach when working with the religious shaykhs. The Iraqi colonel lesser matters, and again, a nudge toward council. As far as OPSEC and common typically received a tongue-lashing at making a decision was needed to stop sense will allow, it is our responsibility to these meetings, but began establishing otherwise endless debate. keep local leaders informed of our units’ goodwill by making noticeable changes activities, sending the message that we in police procedure, such as improving Information Operations respect their institutions and want them to the treatment of women at checkpoints. Merely rehashing talking points from a be in charge. This comes not from a sense of Perhaps most importantly, the shaykhs note card is certainly a missed opportunity friendship, but recognition of the group’s acknowledged these improvements. for meaningful IO. Without adjustment influencing power and the imperative to for local context and integration into a strengthen the institution. We began by

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Intelligence an attempted double assassination, when they realize it is not bearing fruit. Small units will not typically glean a successful assassination and a groundbreaking intelligence from kidnapping ending in assassination. For Allegiances the local council, but they can gather a council of approximately 10 members, Counter-insurgents should not assume valuable information that contributes this represented a 40% attack rate. All that council members are solely loyal to the overall intelligence picture. Being of the attacks, except for the kidnapping, to their constituents, nor should they aware of the internal divisions present in took place in the vicinity of the council assume that loyalties are divided neatly the council, I was usually skeptical when building. Following the kidnapping/ by religious sect. Expect that most one of the members made an accusation assassination, the council essentially council members are affiliated with against another. I regarded one member, broke down for several weeks out of fear. political parties, which may have loose however, as particularly reliable, and We eventually resumed meeting in a more connections to militia groups or insurgent took seriously his confidential report secure part of the city, but only later organizations.2 In my experience, council about another member’s son who he moved back into Ghazaliyya at my urging. members view themselves as politicians believed was conducting attacks for the In order to better secure the council first, avoiding direct involvement with Mahdi Army. A visit to the son’s home the militia or insurgent activity. Nonetheless, next day by one of my platoons turned up “The general lesson they often have knowledge of illicit a supply of hand grenades and eventually activity, but will not, of course, freely revealed that the son’s place of work was for small unit leaders share this information. Every situation is a major hub of Mahdi Army activity. is that religion will be different, but confrontation on the issue or posing an “us or them” ultimatum Following the Askariyya Shrine bombing intertwined with politics, will generally not end in the counter- and the subsequent spike in sectarian and a comprehensive insurgent’s favor. At a minimum, we violence, the Sunni shaykhs looked to should be keenly aware of possible outside the U.S. military for security assistance. political approach requires allegiances among council members and As a result of relationships built through recognition of this fact.” attempt to leverage their influence with the local council, several of the shaykhs these external groups. began calling me frequently with reports of Mahdi Army activity. One mosque Religious Influence in particular was the target of frequent and boost the members’ confidence, my As indicated earlier, the religious shaykhs drive-by shootings, so the shaykh called company significantly reinforced the came to play a major role in our work me directly via cell phone when he physical defenses of the council building, with the Ghazaliyya council. I quickly spotted suspicious activity on the street including concrete barriers and firing learned that shaykhs from the local Sunni outside. As a result, my patrols more platforms for the small Iraqi guard force. mosques were major influencers with the effectively disrupted the shooters and I also issued the members handguns and chairman behind the scenes. The clerics reduced the attacks on the mosque. As weapons cards for personal protection. and I eventually commenced regular always, counter-insurgents need to be meetings, which several council members wary of traps disguised as tips. Still, Internal Conflicts also attended. The shaykhs never attended I found that tips given by people we As mentioned earlier, internal conflicts actual council meetings, but did attend knew were much higher quality than were a persistent issue. Prior to my the security meetings held with the police. anonymous tips because the informant’s first council meeting, the chairman Despite my best efforts, I was unable to reputation was on the line. In the case of furtively waved me into his office and convince the Shi`a clerics to participate. political or religious leaders, we are not proceeded to accuse more than half of I recognize that intentionally bringing only accessing the observations of one the other council members of insurgent clerics into political activities may have its person, but a deep network of contacts. activity. Later, I found that some of the downside, not least of all the appearance Caution is still necessary, however, as accusations contained a hint of truth, of favoritism from only having the Sunni the tendency for vendettas and rivalries but overall this was just a clumsy sect represented. In this situation, among prominent leaders is also higher, attempt to put me in his camp and however, I determined the benefit of and they may attempt to lead counter- alienate the other members. Week having Sunni shaykhs interface with the insurgents astray for these purposes. after week, the accusations and counter- Shi`a-dominated police force outweighed accusations became a regular occurrence, any appearance of one-sidedness. The Additional Considerations as various members attempted to pull general lesson for small unit leaders is that In addition to establishing realistic goals me aside before meetings or call my religion will be intertwined with politics, for their work with the local council, small cell phone late at night. I cannot offer and a comprehensive political approach unit leaders should bear in mind several an easy solution to this problem, other requires recognition of this fact. other factors. than attempting to filter out the bad information and demonstrating that you The Council as a Target will not be manipulated for the sake of 2 From my observations, militia or insurgent groups Depending on the local threat situation, personal rivalries. As work with the with which council members may be involved are usu- and other factors such as demographics, council progresses, counter-insurgents ally of the “local resistance” variety, many of which have some council members will likely be will gradually learn the appropriate level since been co-opted through the CLC/SOI programs, as targets of the insurgency. During my unit’s of trust to afford each member, and the opposed to irreconcilable terrorist organizations such as tour, the Ghazaliyya council experienced amount of finger-pointing will decline al-Qa`ida and its affiliates. This distinction is critical.

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The Initial Testing Period Recent Highlights in approximately 20 others, near Wana in Counter-insurgent leaders could ideally South Waziristan Agency after his home operate in the same area with the same Terrorist Activity was destroyed by a series of missiles. local leaders for the duration of the According to Pakistani intelligence conflict. Unfortunately, with the nature March 15, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A officials, another home was also destroyed of “the long war,” we rotate frequently, suicide car bomber targeted a NATO-led during the attack. It is suspected that and local leaders will see a fresh Western convoy near the town of Khost in Khost an unmanned aerial drone, or other U.S. face approximately each year. With this, Province. Two civilians were killed and a aircraft, executed the attacks. – AP, March there is a tendency to initially “try out” NATO soldier wounded. – Reuters, March 16; New York Times, March 17 the new commander, testing his limits 15; Voice of America, March 15 of generosity, tolerance and naiveté. My March 16, 2008 (NORTH AFRICA): Al- only recommendation is to expect this March 15, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): After Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb, which is and set an appropriately firm tone from a series of Taliban attacks on mobile holding two Austrian tourists hostage, the outset. A high quality relief-in-place phone infrastructure, a phone company extended a deadline for their demands will also mitigate problems. official announced that at least one of the to be met in exchange for the hostages’ country’s four cell phone companies would release. – Reuters, March 16 Conclusion heed a Taliban demand to cease operations Work with host-nation political at night. The Taliban demanded the action March 16, 2008 (IRAQ): The U.S. organizations is among the most on February 25, stating that coalition military announced that al-Qa`ida in frustrating and least rewarding activities forces track Taliban movement through Iraq is increasingly using suicide vests of counter-insurgents. Particularly at the cell phone signals. – Reuters, March 15 to conduct attacks. According to a U.S. local level, clear measures of success are military spokesman, “There has been an elusive; we must simply be satisfied with March 15, 2008 (GERMANY): According increase over time in the use of suicide small steps. While it is impossible to say to German newspapers, a suicide vest bombers. Late in 2007 there were with certainty, I am highly confident that bomber who killed two U.S. soldiers in about eight or 10 a month; in the month my company’s work with the Ghazaliyya Afghanistan’s Khost Province on March of February, there were 18. There is an council significantly contributed to 3 may have been a 28-year-old German- increase...We are also seeing that average the local counter-insurgency effort. born Turk. The reports were based on a Al-Qaeda fighters are wearing suicide Perhaps the benefit to combat operations claim of responsibility from the Islamic vests and before they are captured they was minimal, but along other lines Jihad Union. – Spiegel Online, March 15 are often blowing themselves up.” – AFP, of operation—such as IO, essential March 16 services and governance—the impact was March 15, 2008 (THAILAND): A car bomb significant. We will always need to kill or exploded at a car park adjacent to the CS March 17, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): capture certain individuals, but a sole focus Pattani Hotel in Pattani Province, killing Afghan authorities apprehended Taliban on these activities is generally counter- at least one person and injuring more commander Maulvi Dastagir in Herat productive. Small unit leaders, particularly than 10. The luxury hotel is often used by Province. Dastagir was identified as company commanders, can deal the government officials. – AFP, March 15 a commander in neighboring Badghis harshest blows to an insurgency by not only Province. – Pajhwok Afghan News, March 17 conducting direct action and securing the March 15, 2008 (THAILAND): A man populace, but also by dedicated and astute was killed after two bombs exploded March 17, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Four political engagement. prematurely in his vehicle in Yala NATO soldiers were killed after their Province. It is suspected that the man was convoy was hit by a suicide car bomber in Major Jeremy Gwinn commanded B Company planning to conduct an attack. – Reuters, Helmand Province. – AFP, March 16 st th st 1 Battalion 87 Infantry Regiment of the 1 March 15 BCT 10th Mountain Division from February March 17, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 2004 to May 2006, including tours in March 15, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani According to NATO, approximately 12 Afghanistan and Iraq. He is currently militant commander Faqir Muhammad insurgents were killed in an airstrike in attending graduate school at the University offered his government a cease-fire if Helmand Province. – AP, March 18 of North Carolina and will serve as an it refrained from supporting President economics instructor at the United States Pervez Musharraf. – Dawn, March 16 March 17, 2008 (IRAQ): More than 40 Military Academy. Major Gwinn wishes to people were killed in Karbala Province acknowledge the valuable contributions of March 15, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Four after a female suicide bomber targeted Major James P. Work, who provided current American FBI personnel were wounded Shi`a worshippers. – AP, March 17 insight on the topic and the area of operations after militants bombed a restaurant at discussed. which they were eating in Islamabad. In March 17, 2008 (PAKISTAN): At least addition to the wounded FBI personnel, two police officers were killed after a one Turkish aid worker was killed in the suicide bomber detonated his explosives attack. – AP, March 16 at a police compound in Swat District in the North-West Frontier Province. – AP, March 16, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A suspected March 17 militant leader, known by the single name of Noorullah, was killed, along with

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March 18, 2008 (UNITED STATES): wrong and twisted. They made the wrong join al-Qa`ida in Iraq since “the nearest The U.S. State Department announced decision in 2006 when they backed the field of jihad today to support our people that the Somali group al-Shabab has Ethiopian invasion and they are wrong in Palestine is the Iraqi field.” According been added to its list of designated to designate part of the resistance as to the Associated Press, “There was no terrorist organizations. According to the terrorists.” – AP, March 19 indication how recently the recording statement, “Al-Shabaab is a violent and was made, or if it was an unreleased part brutal extremist group with a number March 19, 2008 (FRANCE): The seven of the audio posted late Wednesday on an of individuals affiliated with Al-Qaeda. men of the “19th arrondissement” cell extremist Web site that has carried al- Many of its senior leaders are believed to went on trial in Paris and are charged Qaida statements in the past.” – AP, March have trained and fought with Al-Qaeda in with recruiting French men on behalf of 20 Afghanistan.” The decision to designate al-Qa`ida and sending them to fight in the group, the statement reads, was made Iraq. Authorities believe that the men March 20, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): The on February 29. – AFP, March 18 managed to send 10 fighters to Iraq, three UN Security Council agreed to extend the of whom may have died there. The cell mandate of its mission in Afghanistan— March 18, 2008 (UNITED STATES): The members were arrested in 2005, and they known as UNAMA—until March 2009. U.S. State Department advised Americans now face up to 10 years in prison if found The mission will also “strengthen to avoid travel to southern Thailand. guilty. – AP, March 19 the cooperation with” the NATO-led The announcement came after a series International Security Assistance Force of attacks in the country’s southern March 19, 2008 (IRAQ): Iraqi security “at all levels and throughout the country.” provinces, including a March 15 car forces apprehended Ahmad Muhammad – AFP, March 20 bomb at the CS Pattani Hotel in Pattani Taha in Ba`quba in Diyala Province. Taha Province, a hotel that is frequented by was identified as an al-Qa`ida member March 20, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Five foreigners. – AP, March 18 who confessed to killing 20 people. – UPI, soldiers were killed after a suicide car March 19 bomber drove his explosives-laden March 18, 2008 (YEMEN): Bomb blasts vehicle into the gates of the primary army struck a girls’ school near the U.S. March 19, 2008 (IRAQ): A female suicide base in South Waziristan Agency. – Daily Embassy in Sana`a, killing a schoolgirl bomber detonated her explosives in Balad Times, March 21 and a policeman. U.S. officials believe that Ruz of Diyala Province, killing four the mortars were directed at the embassy, people. The bomber apparently targeted a March 20, 2008 (SOMALIA): Al- but hit the school by mistake. – AFP, March police patrol. – Voice of America, March 19 Shabab leader Shaykh Muktar Robow, 19 responding further to the U.S. decision to March 19, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide car designate al-Shabab on its list of terrorist March 19, 2008 (THAILAND): Security bomber targeted an Iraqi army building organizations, told reporters that “we forces killed two suspected insurgents in Mosul, Ninawa Province, injuring 14 were not terrorists. But now we’ve been in Raman district of Yala Province. people. – AP, March 19 designated…we have been forced to seek Authorities allege that one of the men was out and unite with any Muslims on the list a core leader of the Runda Kumpulan Kecil March 19, 2008 (GLOBAL): A new audio against the United States.” – Reuters, March militant group. – Bangkok Post, March 19 recording with the purported voice of 21 Usama bin Ladin appeared on jihadist March 19, 2008 (SOMALIA): In response internet websites. In the recording, Bin March 21, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Golab to a March 18 decision by the U.S. State Ladin threatened the European Union for Mangal, the new governor of Helmand Department to place al-Shabab on the U.S. publishing editorial cartoons mocking the Province, told reporters that he wished list of designated terrorist organizations, Prophet Muhammad. “Your publications to negotiate with “second- and third-tier” al-Shabab spokesman Shaykh Muktar of these drawings—part of a new crusade Taliban militants in order to stabilize the Robow told reporters, “We are happy that in which the Pope of the Vatican had a region. He also stressed, however, that the U.S. put us on its list of terrorists, significant role—is a confirmation from the invitation does not extend to “foreign- a name given to pure Muslims who you that the war continues,” Bin Ladin affiliated,” top-tier militants. – RFE/RL, are strong and clear in their religious said. He warns the EU that it is “testing March 21 position.” Robow claimed that the U.S. Muslims” by publishing the cartoons, and government is against al-Shabab because that “the answer will be what you shall March 21, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Two it is “fighting against Ethiopia, a Christian see and not what you hear.” – Reuters, coalition soldiers were killed after a nation that had invaded our country.” March 20 roadside bomb destroyed their vehicle – AP, March 19 near Kandahar city in Kandahar Province. March 20, 2008 (GLOBAL): Al-Jazira – AFP, March 23 March 19, 2008 (SOMALIA): Shaykh broadcast audio excerpts from a speech Hassan Dahir Aweys, a top leader in the attributed to Usama bin Ladin, in which March 21, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani Council of Islamic Courts, denied that al- he denounced Israel-Palestine peace authorities shut down three FM radio Shabab is linked to terrorists such as al- negotiations and stated that “Palestine stations in the Swat Valley. The stations Qa`ida and insisted that the fighters “are cannot be retaken by negotiations and were shut down after they broadcast a part of the coalition for the re-liberation dialogue, but with fire and iron.” Bin Ladin speech by a pro-Taliban cleric, Maulana of Somalia.” According to Aweys, “The also said, however, that mujahidin who Fazlullah. – Voice of America, March 21 U.S. policy toward Somalia is always cannot fight against Israel should instead

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March 21, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): March 23, 2008 (YEMEN): Yemen God—assault, seeking martyrdom and Philippine Marines killed a suspected Abu extradited to Saudi Arabia four Saudi paradise.” Similar to a recent statement Sayyaf Group fighter in Barangay Pansol militants suspected of being al-Qa`ida by Usama bin Ladin, in the tape Zawahiri in Patikul, Sulu Province. – Philippine Daily operatives. – AFP, March 28 focuses on the need to retaliate for Israeli Inquirer, March 23 attacks in the Gaza Strip. – AP, March 24 March 23, 2008 (SINGAPORE): March 21, 2008 (YEMEN): The Jund al- Singaporean authorities announced March 24, 2008 (THAILAND): Police Yaman Brigades, or The Soldier’s Brigade that they arrested a member of Jemaah arrested a suspect in the March 15 bomb of Yemen, which is linked to al-Qa`ida, Islamiyah in February who they attack on the CS Pattani Hotel. The claimed responsibility for the March allege trained with Muslim fighters in suspect was identified as Muden Sameng, 18 mortar attack on the U.S. Embassy. Afghanistan. The suspect was identified and he was arrested in Pattani Province’s The attack failed to hit the embassy and as Rijal Yadri Jumari, and it is believed Panare district. It is alleged that Muden is instead struck an adjacent girls’ school. that he trained at an al-Qa`ida camp in a member of the Runda Kumpulan Kecil According to the claim of responsibility, Kandahar in 2000 where he learned militant group. – Thai News Agency, March which was posted on the internet, “one of explosives, surveillance, weapons 24 the mortars missed its target and fell in a handling and other guerrilla warfare school close to the embassy. We pray to techniques. It is also alleged that he March 24, 2008 (THAILAND): Exiled God to speed the girl students’ recovery.” met Usama bin Ladin on more than one Pattani United Liberation Organization – Asharq al-Awsat, March 25 occasion. – AP, March 23 leader Lukman B. Lima told the Associated Press that “peace talks cannot be held March 22, 2008 (IRAQ): U.S. military March 23, 2008 (IRAQ): At least 13 Iraqi [with Thailand’s new government] under spokesman Rear Admiral Greg Smith told soldiers were killed after a suicide car the conditions of war, military aggression reporters that in the past year authorities bomber targeted a military base in Mosul, and occupation.” – AP, March 24 had killed and apprehended 39 al-Qa`ida Ninawa Province. Soldiers attempted to members charged with producing and stop the vehicle with weapons fire, yet the March 24, 2008 (NORTH AFRICA): spreading propaganda materials in Iraq. suicide bomber’s vehicle was equipped Press reports quoted a new statement As a result, al-Qa`ida’s propaganda with bullet-proof glass. – AP, March 23 by al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb in activities have been degraded. According which they provide a new deadline for to Smith, “We think the vast majority of March 23, 2008 (IRAQ): The U.S. their demands to be met in exchange for this media network has been degraded at military announced that it has disrupted the release of two Austrian hostages. The this point.” – Reuters, March 22 a “suicide bombing network” in Diyala terrorist group was quoted as saying, “It is Province, with 12 terrorists killed in the an additional extension of two weeks that March 22, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): raid. According to the statement, six will expire on Sunday, April 6, 2008, at Afghan and NATO air and ground detained men had their bodies shaved in midnight.” After that date, “we will have operations in Dihrawud district of preparation for their suicide operations. exhausted what we could bear. Let Austria, Uruzgan Province resulted in the deaths - Australian Broadcasting Corporation, March 23 Tunisia and Algeria be responsible for of “dozens of terrorists,” according to the the lives of the kidnapped.” The group Afghan Defense Ministry. The estimate of March 23, 2008 (PAKISTAN): has demanded the release of imprisoned the number of militants killed surpassed Approximately 65 people were injured militants, and Austrian media sources 40. – AFP, March 23 after Islamic militants used an IED to blow have reported that the group is also up a series of fuel tankers in Landikotal demanding five million euros in ransom. March 22, 2008 (YEMEN): Yemen’s in Khyber Agency of the Federally – AFP, March 24 al-Thawra newspaper, citing a security Administered Tribal Areas. The tankers official, said that al-Qa`ida operative were supplying fuel for U.S. and NATO March 25, 2008 (ISRAEL): Israeli forces Hamza al-Dhayany was behind the March forces in Afghanistan, and a total of 36 arrested Hamas operative Umar Jabar, 18 bomb attack against a girls’ school near were destroyed. – AFP, March 23 who is wanted for planning the 2002 the U.S. Embassy in Sana`a. According to Passover suicide bombing in Netanya the official, “Dhayany launched rockets March 23, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): that left 30 Israelis dead and more than that were mounted on a car toward the International and Afghan forces killed 12 140 wounded. Jabar was apprehended in school.” The United States believes that Taliban-linked fighters in Chora district of a West Bank village. – CNN, March 26 the attack targeted the U.S. Embassy. Uruzgan Province. – Australian Broadcasting – AFP, March 22 Corporation, March 25 March 26, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A Danish soldier was killed during a March 23, 2008 (YEMEN): Yemen’s March 24, 2008 (GLOBAL): A new firefight with Taliban fighters in Helmand Interior Ministry denied March 22 press statement by al-Qa`ida operative Ayman Province. – AFP, March 27 reports that al-Qa`ida was behind the al-Zawahiri appeared on Islamist websites March 18 bomb attack against a girls’ in which he calls on Muslims to “strike the March 26, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A car school near the U.S. Embassy in Sana`a. interests of the Jews, the Americans, and bomb exploded at a farmers’ market in The March 22 press report was published all those who participated in the attack Helmand Province, killing eight civilians. in the state-run al-Thawra newspaper. on Muslims. Monitor the targets, collect The bomb was detonated remotely. – AFP, – Saba, March 23 money, prepare the equipment, plan with March 26; AP, March 26 precision, and then—while relying on

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March 26, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): The FBI The offer, directed at Islamist militants on Dutch forces in Afghanistan were in began a six-month counter-intelligence inside the country, was welcomed by one retaliation for Dutch MP Geert Wilders’ training program in the southern of the major militant groups, Tehrik- film Fitna, which is highly critical of Philippines to assist Philippine police and i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). According Islam. The film was released on March military forces in their efforts against the to TTP spokesman Maulvi Omar, “We 27. The post alleges that the retaliatory Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah. welcome the announcement by the federal attacks took place on March 30; the Dutch – AFP, March 26 government to hold talks with Taliban Defense Ministry stated that two separate Tehrik to improve law and order situation attacks on March 30 wounded five Dutch March 26, 2008 (SOMALIA): Al-Shabab in the country.” Omar added, however, soldiers. – Reuters, April 1 fighters briefly took control of the that “the government should immediately strategic town of Jowhar, which lies 55 say goodbye to pro-U.S. policies because April 1, 2008 (ALGERIA): Algerian miles north of Mogadishu. According to there is no good in them for the government newspapers reported that authorities the Washington Post, al-Shabab has in the and the people of Pakistan.” – AFP, March recently foiled a plot by al-Qa`ida in the past month “briefly asserted control of 30 Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to assassinate at least six towns in southern Somalia.” the country’s prime minister, Abdelaziz - Washington Post, March 27 March 30, 2008 (GLOBAL): CIA Director Belkhadem. According to reports, AQIM Michael Hayden told reporters that al- operatives planned to assassinate the March 27, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A Qa`ida is training operatives in Pakistan’s prime minister when he was vacationing new internet posting by the Taliban tribal areas who “look Western” and at his holiday home in Marsa bin Mahdi, warns of the start of a spring offensive “would be able to come into this country which is in Tlemcen Province. – AKI, April against government and international [the United States] without attracting 1 troops in Afghanistan. The posting was the attention others might.” Speaking of authored by Mullah Bradar Akhund, and Pakistan’s tribal areas and the border April 1, 2008 (TURKEY): Turkish police says, “Our aim in these operations is to region with Afghanistan, he said, “If there detained 45 suspected al-Qa`ida-linked give the enemy an admonishing lesson is another terrorist attack, it will originate individuals in various locations in through conclusive and painful strikes there.” – Bloomberg, March 30 Istanbul. – Reuters, April 1 that he does not anticipate, until he knows and is compelled to end the occupation of March 30, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): April 1, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): A Afghanistan and withdraw until the last Two British Marines were killed after an Department of Education executive was soldier leaves.” – Reuters, March 27 explosion destroyed their vehicle while kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf Group in they were on patrol near Kajaki Dam in Maimbung. Reportedly a ransom is being March 29, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Helmand Province. – AP, April 1 demanded for his release. – Philippine Daily Taliban militants bombed a power station Inquirer, April 1 in Girishk district of Helmand Province, March 31, 2008 (UNITED STATES): The which resulted in the deaths of two people. U.S. military charged a Guantanamo Bay April 1, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): The U.S. – Reuters, March 29 detainee with involvement in the 1998 Embassy warned American citizens to U.S. Embassy bombing in Tanzania. The avoid travel to the Zamboanga City area March 29, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Tanzanian suspect, identified as Ahmad since “extremist elements may be planning Afghan and international troops killed Kalfan Ghailani, was apprehended in July to kidnap Americans or other foreigners eight Taliban fighters in Zabul Province. 2004 and transferred to Guantanamo in at hotels or other public places.” U.S. – AFP, March 30 2006. He could face the death penalty. counter-terrorism troops are based in – AP, March 31 Zamboanga and on the nearby Jolo Island. March 29, 2008 (PAKISTAN): The first – AP, April 1 of six joint U.S., Afghan and Pakistani March 31, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): military intelligence centers on the Taliban commander Mullah Naqibullah, April 1, 2008 (UNITED STATES): Afghan-Pakistan border was opened. who has escaped from prison in FBI Director Robert Mueller told a The purpose of the centers is to limit the Afghanistan on two separate occasions, congressional hearing that al-Qa`ida ability of militants to move and conduct was apprehended by Afghan police after a is attempting to recruit Westerners so operations in the region. According to U.S. gun battle which left three militants dead that its operatives can have valid North Brigadier General Joe Votel, “The macro and two policemen injured. The incident American and European passports, view is to disrupt insurgents from going occurred in Helmand Province. – AP, April allowing them to enter the United States back and forth, going into Afghanistan 1 without arousing as much suspicion. and back into Pakistan, too. This is not – AFP, April 6 going to instantly stop the infiltration April 1, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Two problem, but it’s a good step forward.” police officers were killed after a suicide April 1, 2008 (SOMALIA): Al-Shabab – AP, March 29 car bomber attacked a police compound fighters allegedly took control of the in the town of Zaranj in Nimroz Province. central Somali town of Buulo Burte, and March 29, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani – AP, April 1 in the process killed an estimated 22 Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani told his government soldiers, according to witness country’s lawmakers that “we are ready April 1, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): accounts. - CNN, April 4 to talk to all those people who give up According to a posting on Islamist arms and are ready to embrace peace.” websites, two recent Taliban attacks

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April 2, 2008 (SOMALIA): Al-Shabab (ASG) has been weakened by leadership April 5-6, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Police fighters withdrew their forces from and funding problems, in addition to and military forces killed a top Abu Sayyaf the town of Buulo Burte in advance of a having to counter continuous U.S.-backed Group (ASG) leader in Sulu Province. convoy of Ethiopian reinforcements. The attacks on their fighters. According to The leader, Sam Andal, was identified fighters had taken control of the town on Sabban, “They [ASG] haven’t been able to as a logistics and liaison officer for ASG. April 1. - CNN, April 4 come up with a single, influential leader – GMANews.TV, April 6; Sun Star, April 7 who can unite the different factions.” April 2, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): The Abu – AP, April 3 April 6, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): NATO Sayyaf Group released a Department of and Afghan forces killed 10 Taliban Education official who they had kidnapped April 4, 2008 (SOMALIA): According to militants in Uruzgan Province. The men the previous day. It is believed that a Somalia’s Shabelle Media Network, al- were killed after they engaged a joint ransom was paid by the official’s family in Shabab fighters took control of Biyo Ade NATO-Afghan patrol in Charchino exchange for his release. – Philippine Daily village, which is north of Mogadishu. district, a hotbed of Taliban activity. Inquirer, April 2 - CNN, April 4 – Reuters, April 7

April 2, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber April 4, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A new April 6, 2008 (IRAQ): Coalition forces killed at least five people at a checkpoint video of Taliban commander Jalal al-Din apprehended 22 suspected al-Qa`ida in the Addayah area near Mosul, Ninawa Haqqani was sent to news organizations. fighters in central and northern Iraq. Province. – AP, April 3 According to the Associated Press, – UPI, April 6 Haqqani appeared in the video for “the April 2, 2008 (MAURITANIA): Sidi Ould first time after seven years in hiding.” April 6, 2008 (YEMEN): Three rockets Sidna, an al-Qa`ida-linked man accused of – ABC News, April 7 were fired at a residential housing killing four French tourists in December complex for Westerners in Sana`a. The 2007, escaped from a Mauritanian April 4, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): complex houses foreign U.S. and Arab courthouse. – AP, April 3 France offered to send 700 more troops oil workers. Initial reports showed no to Afghanistan to combat the Taliban casualties, and it is believed that the Jund April 3, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani insurgency in the east. According to al-Yaman Brigades, an al-Qa`ida-linked authorities arrested four Turkish reports, the troops will allow the United group, were likely responsible for the nationals who are suspected of being tied States to reinforce the current troops in attack. – AFP, April 7 to al-Qa`ida. The men were traveling on a southern Afghanistan. – Bloomberg, April 4 bus from Quetta to Peshawar when they April 7, 2008 (SOMALIA): A roadside were arrested. Frontier Corps personnel April 4, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A bomb exploded in central Somalia, killing who made the arrest found explosives, suicide bomber killed two policemen and six people. – Dow Jones Newswires, April 7 sub-machine gun ammunition, a laptop, a civilian in Lashkar Gah of Helmand jihadist books and other materials. Province. It is believed that the attack April 7, 2008 (YEMEN): Authorities – Dawn, April 4 was in retaliation for the March 31 arrest arrested seven suspects in connection of Mullah Naqibullah; one of the dead with the April 6 attack on a residential April 3, 2008 (GLOBAL): A new audiotape policemen was the commander responsible housing complex for Westerners in began circulating on Islamist websites for Naqibullah’s arrest. – Reuters, April 4 Sana`a. An official said that some of the in which al-Qa`ida second-in-command suspects had links to al-Qa`ida. The Jund Ayman al-Zawahiri makes efforts to April 4, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A al-Yaman Brigades, which is believed deny that his movement kills civilians. Canadian soldier in NATO was killed connected to al-Qa`ida, took credit for Zawahiri was responding to a question after his vehicle hit a roadside bomb in the attack, stating that they fired three posed by an individual on an Islamist Kandahar Province. – AFP, April 5 mortar shells at the compound as an act of website, in which the questioner asked revenge for last year’s killing of Taliban about al-Qa`ida attacks that have killed April 4, 2008 (IRAQ): Approximately 15 military commander Mullah Dadullah. civilians in Muslim states such as Iraq, people were killed after a suicide bomber – AP, April 7 Algeria and Morocco. Zawahiri explained targeted a funeral for a policeman in al- that the deaths of innocents are caused Sadiyah in Diyala Province. – AFP, April 4; April 7, 2008 (NORTH AFRICA): Al- by “unintentional error” and because AP, April 4 Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb released the enemy uses innocents as “human a new statement in which it warned shields.” Zawahiri also mentioned the April 5, 2008 (IRAQ): At least four people that it will not be responsible for the December 2007 attack by al-Qa`ida in the were killed after a bomb exploded on a fate of the two Austrian tourists the Islamic Maghreb against a United Nations minibus in Baghdad. – AP, April 5 group abducted in Tunisia in February. building, saying that the “United Nations AQIM’s deadline for its demands to be is an enemy of Islam and Muslims.” April 5, 2008 (SOMALIA): A group of met passed on April 6. According to the Finally, Zawahiri said that Usama bin militants used a public transportation statement, “Austria has shown disregard Ladin is “healthy and well.” – CNN, April 3 bus to execute a surprise attack on and carelessness regarding its citizens, government police at a checkpoint in despite the flexibility of the mujahidin in April 3, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Philippine Mogadishu’s Hodan district, which their legitimate demands. Now, after the Brigadier General Juancho Sabban told resulted in the deaths of two police new preconditions of the mujahidin, it reporters that the Abu Sayyaf Group officers. - Garowe Online, April 5 [Austria] is responsible first and foremost

23 april 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 5 for the lives and the fate of the abducted.” known as Yasser Igasan, was trained in April 10, 2008 (THAILAND): Thai Army – AP, April 7 the Middle East and was allegedly sought Rangers killed two suspected members because of his connections with financiers of the Runda Kumpulan Kecil insurgent April 7, 2008 (MAURITANIA): Security in the Middle East. The police report group in Rueso district of Narathiwat forces attacked a group of gunmen further stated that the ASG “continues Province. – Bangkok Post, April 11 suspected of having links to al-Qa`ida to operate without a central leadership.” and of being involved in the December - AP, April 8 April 10, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Security 2007 killings of four French tourists in forces took control of the village Imam Mauritania. At least one of the men was April 8, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Six people Dheri in the Swat Valley, which is a killed by security forces, but the fate of were kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf Group stronghold of pro-Taliban cleric Maulana the other militants is not clear. – AP, April in Sulu Province. – GMANews.TV, April 10 Fazlullah. Authorities have now set up a 8; Reuters, April 9 checkpoint in the village. – AP, April 10 April 9, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Abu April 7, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban Sayyaf Group militants released six April 10, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A fighters killed two police officers after hostages after ransoms were reportedly suicide car bomber attempted to attack a attacking their checkpoint in Shindand paid by the victims’ families. The six were NATO convoy in Kandahar, yet missed his district of Herat Province. – AP, April 8 abducted from Sulu Province on April 8. target and instead killed eight civilians. – AHN, April 10; GMANews.TV, April 10 - AP, April 11; Los Angeles Times, April 11 April 7, 2008 (THAILAND): Suspected insurgents destroyed four power relay April 9, 2008 (PAKISTAN): U.S. counter- April 11, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): The Abu lines and a cell phone transmitter in terrorism officials told reporters that an Sayyaf Group freed Jolo businesswoman Narathiwat Province. A total of five al-Qa`ida bombmaker, Abu al-`Ubayda Maria Rosalie Lao, who was abducted in bombs were used, and it is believed al-Masri, died in Pakistan several months January. According to the Sulu governor, that wristwatches were the trigger ago due to natural causes, possibly from the ASG released Lao in order to better mechanisms. – The Nation, April 8 hepatitis. According to Fox News, “Al- evade Philippine Marines who were avidly Masri is credited with recruiting, training pursuing the kidnapping group. Other April 8, 2008 (SOMALIA): A suicide and directing the suicide bombers reports, however, say that a negotiator, car bomber rammed his vehicle into an involved in the July 2005 London hired by Lao’s family, was responsible for African Union military position, killing [bombings], and officials also believe the release. - Philippine Daily Inquirer, April one civilian. The target was a base housing he played a role in the liquid explosives 11 primarily Burundian peacekeepers. The bomb plot to blow up transatlantic flights al-Shabab militant group claimed credit bound for the U.S. and Canada in the April 11, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): for the attack. – AFP, April 8 summer of 2006.” – Fox News, April 9 Coalition forces killed 24 Taliban militants in airstrikes in Zabul Province. - AP, April April 8, 2008 (LIBYA): Libya released April 9, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): A 12 from jail 90 members of the Libyan Islamic UK appeals court blocked the deportation Fighting Group. Authorities claim that all of Jordanian al-Qa`ida-linked cleric Abu April 12, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban of those released had renounced violence. Qatada, along with two Libyans, because militants killed four policemen working to – AP, April 9 the suspects would possibly be tortured eradicate the opium harvest in Kandahar once out of British custody. – The Guardian, Province. - Australian Broadcasting Corporation, April 8, 2008 (THAILAND): The Pattani April 10 April 14 United Liberation Organization (PULO) posted a statement on its website saying April 10, 2008 (UNITED STATES): April 12, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): that the group is “fully committed to Suspected al-Qa`ida conspirator Ibrahim A suicide bomber targeted a road finding a peaceful resolution of the Ahmad Mahmud al-Qusi, who is currently construction crew in Nimroz Province, conflict” in southern Thailand. There are being held at Guantanamo Bay, told a U.S. killing two Indian engineers and an a number of other groups involved in the military court that “Usama bin Ladin has Afghan driver. - AP, April 12 southern Thailand insurgency, and it is succeeded in a great way in attacking you not clear whether they support PULO’s militarily and economically…The whole April 12, 2008 (TUNISIA): A court in new statement. – AP, April 9 world has a headache from your [United Tunisia jailed 19 men for up to eight years States] hypocrisy.” The Sudanese al-Qusi for “having links with al-Qa`ida [in the April 8, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban is accused of being a bodyguard, a driver Islamic Maghreb] and setting up a jihadist militants ambushed a group of road and logistics operative for Bin Ladin from cell.” The men were arrested in late 2006. construction workers in Zabul Province, 1996-2001. – Reuters, April 10 - Reuters, April 13 killing 18 of their guards. – UPI, April 9 April 10, 2008 (MAURITANIA): Authorities April 13, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): A mortar April 8, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): According arrested Maarouf Ould Hadib, who they allege round placed under a car exploded in the to a confidential police report provided to was in charge of the al-Qa`ida-linked group parking lot of a Roman Catholic cathedral the Associated Press, a Filipino militant that killed four French tourists in December in Zamboanga City in the southern who was considered a prime candidate 2007. The suspect was apprehended after Philippines. Fifteen minutes after the to lead the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) police found him disguised as a woman in a explosion, another mortar detonated “declined the emirship.” The militant, taxi. – AP, April 10 outside a bank in downtown Zamboanga.

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Neither incident resulted in injuries. leave the army and the police...and the CTC Sentinel Staff Authorities suspect that either the Abu Awakening Councils, on the basis that all Sayyaf Group or Jemaah Islamiyah was arms...be directed at the Crusaders and Editor-in-Chief responsible for the attacks. - AP, April 13 those who support them,” he said. - AP, Erich Marquardt April 15 Senior Editor, CTC April 14, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban militants killed 11 policemen at April 15, 2008 (IRAQ): A car bomb Editorial Board a checkpoint in Arghandab district of detonated in Ba`quba, Diyala Province, Jarret Brachman, Ph.D. Kandahar Province. During the pre-dawn killing at least 38 people. The bomb Director of Research, CTC attack, a number of the men were killed in exploded outside a restaurant frequented their sleep. - AP, April 14; New York Times, by people visiting government offices. Brian Fishman April 15 - BBC News, April 15 Senior Associate, CTC April 14, 2008 (SOMALIA): Militants April 15, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber Assaf Moghadam, Ph.D. threw a grenade into a movie theater in blew himself up in a restaurant in Ramadi, Senior Research Fellow, CTC Marka, killing four people. There were no Anbar Province, killing at least 13 people. immediate claims of responsibility, but it - BBC News, April 15; AFP, April 15 James Forest, Ph.D. is likely that Islamist militants conducted Director of Terrorism Studies, CTC the attack. - AFP, April 14 * * *

LTC(P) Joseph Felter, Ph.D. April 14, 2008 (SOMALIA): Al-Shabab The Combating Terrorism Center would like Director, CTC militants killed two Kenyan and two to express its gratitude to Mr. Ralph Adams British teachers in the central Somali (USMA Class of 1965) for his generous and COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. town of Beledweyne. The British teachers unwaivering support of the CTC’s activities, Deputy Department Head were dual British-Somali nationals. including the Sentinel. If you are interested in Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Al-Shabab spokesman Shaykh Muktar learning more about the Combating Terrorism Robow claimed that “our fighters did not Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu. COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. intentionally kill the teachers, but what Department Head we know is that their guards targeted Department of Social Sciences (West Point) fire at our forces and they returned fire, therefore maybe they were caught in the GEN(R) John P. Abizaid crossfire.” - AP, April 14 Distinguished Chair, CTC April 15, 2008 (INDONESIA): Indonesian Contact authorities announced that two Jemaah Combating Terrorism Center Islamiyah operatives who were arrested U.S. Military Academy in Malaysia several weeks ago are now 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall in their custody. Malaysian authorities West Point, NY 10996 discovered the men after a routine raid Phone: (202) 425-8578 on illegal immigrants. The suspects Email: [email protected] were identified as Dr. Agus Purwanto Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ and Abdur Rohim. According to CNN, “Terrorism expert Sidney Jones says * For Press Inquiries: (202) 425-8578 Abdur Rohim is believed to have replaced Zarkasih as Jemaah Islamiyah leader, support after Zarkasih’s arrest last year.” - CNN, The Combating Terrorism Center would April 15 like to express its gratitude to its financial supporters, for without their support and April 15, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): shared vision of the Center products like the A roadside bomb killed two Afghan CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you policemen in Kandahar Province’s Spin are interested in learning more about how Boldak district. - Voice of America, April 15 to support the Combating Terrorism Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu/ April 15, 2008 (IRAQ): A new audiotape support/ or call Wayne Richardson at West by Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, the head Point’s Association of Graduates at 845- of the Islamic State of Iraq, appeared 446-1553. on Islamist internet forums, in which he called on Sunnis to unite against the The views expressed in this report are those of “Crusader” enemy. “The scholars of the the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, faith and the honorable shaykhs of the the Department of the Army, or any other agency tribes are charged with calling and urging of the U.S. Government. the children of the Sunni shaykhdoms to

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