Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura1

Biswajit Ghosh

This paper examines the genesis, growth and continuance of ethnicity and insurgency in , a much-troubled state in North-East . It is argued that the problems of ethnicity and insurgency in Tripura have much to do with modern politico-economic processes than with mere ethnic group identities. It is suggested that ethnicity is neither static nor a pre-determined object, but a situational construct. Though based on some real life experience of deprivation, it is other- wise manipulated and mobilised for personal/group-interest and is sustained by political rivalries and state actions.

There has been a rising trend of ethnic movement and unrest, communal riots, secessionist movements and insurgent activities in India over the last few decades. These phenomena have gained new intensity and momentum, leaving a substantial impression on the structure and processes of contemporary Indian society. The question of ethnicity or identity is, however, not a typical feature of the ‘tradition’-bound societies of the East. On the contrary, minorities and nationalities of both the ‘capitalist’ and ‘socialist’ worlds have often fought on ethnic lines. It has, therefore, been argued that modernisation does not necessarily de-ethnicise cultural communities; it may crystallise ethnic consciousness (Sharma 1990:33). The spread of modernity has, however, affected ethnicity in different ways in different types of societies. Studies on ethnic identity formation in India have time and again showed that contested ethnic categories or boundaries are not ‘natural’, ‘given’ or trans-historical. They are situational, being created and recreated by the social, economic and political processes generated in the complexities of modern life. This paper analyses the role of such ‘secular’ factors in the evocation and nourishment of ethnicity. The case of Tripura, a much- troubled state in North-East India, offers an excellent opportunity to understand the importance of modern processes and institutions, including the role of the

SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 52 (2), September 2003 222 Sociological Bulletin Biswajit Ghosh is Reader in Sociology at the University of Burdwan. state and political parties in the genesis, growth and continuance of ethnic tensions and conflict in the state. In writing this paper, I have drawn substantial inferences from several primary and secondary sources of data, including confidential records and reports, and supplemented them with my personal experience and some interviews of the surrendered rebels, tribal leaders and politicians during 1999- 2000.

Conceptual Clarification

At the outset, it is necessary to clarify the concepts of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic groups’, as they are used in a confusing way to describe a variety of collectivities. The most common attribute, suggested so far, of an ethnic group or category is cultural commonality, differentiating one group from another. The objective markers for such commonality may be cultural attributes, singly or in combination. Also, socially relevant psychological characteristics are important. There is, however, difference of opinion about the acceptance of the ‘biological’ criterion of descent as binding in the definition of an ethnic group/category. The primordialist approach to ethnicity and ethnic identities considers common descent as the more important factor, for primordial loyalties can be activated more easily. However, it has been argued that mere membership of an ethnic group does not transform a social category into a ‘subjectively self-conscious ethnic community’ (Brass 1991:19). Ethnic group membership based on biological attributes - like descent or kinship, cultural attributes - like language, religion or values, and territorial attributes - like region or locality, are generally (though not always) ascribed. Persons born into these categories constitute, in theory, the potential for the formation of an ethnic identity group. Nevertheless, a statistical aggregate of some people born into an ethnic category, without certain ‘consciousness of kind’, may find it difficult to actualise such potentialities (Mukherji 1994:23). In other words, the biological, cultural or territorial attributes of an ethnic category/group may remain dormant unless otherwise evoked by a psychological unity or ‘consciousness of kind’. In order for an ethnic group to transform itself into a subjectively self-conscious ethnic community, the use of subjective, symbolic or emblematic aspect(s) of any culture is critical, so as to create internal cohesion and differentiate itself from other groups. Brass (1991:19), therefore, observes that ‘ethnic is to ethnic category, as class Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura 223 consciousness is to class’. The phenomenon of ethnicity is the expressive aspect of ethnic group identities. It involves consolidation, mobilisation and the setting as well as attainment of goals. The situational, subjectivist or instrumental approach to ethnicity, in sharp contrast to the primordialist one, therefore, does not treat ‘ethnicity’ as synonymous to the concept of ethnic group. If we are to believe that ethnicity has its own logic and that it will naturally evolve into ethnic politics, then it may not make much sense studying this aspect at all. Ethnicity, being a complex process involving psychological, historical, economic and, above all, political factors may, however, appear to be methodologically ‘unsound’. Yet, as Phadnis (1989:241-42) argues, ethnicity, though being a ‘portmanteau concept’, conveys a certain distinct image. Of all the images the term ethnicity exudes, the most powerful is the portrayal of the ethnic ‘outsider’. When a group of people uses any or many aspect(s) of culture to create internal cohesion (we/insider) and differentiate themselves from other group(s) (they/outsider), the self-ascribed awareness of distinctiveness and belongingness becomes crucial. Development of this subjective self- consciousness takes place through the process of assimilation, acculturation, interaction, competition and conflict. Ethnicity, thus, can be defined as the formation of consciousness of identity (real or supposed) in terms of one or more socio-cultural symbols that emerge from the perceived or real experience of domination/subjugation of a group(s) or community by another. Ethnicity transcends the known boundaries of state, religion, sect, and class. It is both an ‘ideology’ and a ‘device’ that can be created and recreated in contemporary society. It should, however, be noted that ethnic identities may persist even when such groups are inherently not consistent or homogeneous. For instance, the categories like Hindus, Muslims, tribes, , Madrasis, and the like, do subsume very strong socio-cultural differences, though these are often used to constitute a boundary. Such labelling often plays a major role in the creation of ‘we’ as against ‘they’. In reality, there are constant changes in the integration or disintegration of such a group. From a historical point of view, Oommen (1997:135) has identified five major phases in the transformation of political authority structures and the concomitant variations in the nature of social movements. There is a need to identify the different phases of each social movement to understand its nature.

Growth of Tribal Movements in Tripura

224 Sociological Bulletin The tribes of Tripura, like other North-Eastern tribes, have a long tradi- tion of protest and insurgency. The hilly terrain, international border, and the geographical concentration of the tribes and the tribal culture provided an easy base for the ‘hit and run’ policy followed in inter-tribal warfare. The Rajmala (surviving history of the Tripura dynasty) bears testimony to several such encounters in ancient times (K.C. Sinha 1896; Sen 1926-31). There were several risings and rebellions against the policies of the Princely administration, particularly against the oppression of tax collectors, sardars and bureaucrats. The most conspicuous among them were the Kuki revolt (1826-60) against feudal exploitation, the Jamatia revolt (1863) against coolie labour, and the Reang rebellion (1939-45) against exploitation and torture by tribal headman as well as unequal taxation system introduced by Maharaja Bir Bikram Manikya. The Reang rebellion took place at a time when the tribes faced a chronic food shortage problem. During the late 1930s and the 1940s, the state also witnessed the for- mation of several socio-political organisations like Jana Mongal Samiti (hereafter JMS), Jana Shiskya Samiti (hereafter JSS), Tripura Proja Mondal (hereafter TPM) and Tripura Rajya Gana Mukti Parishad (here- after TRGMP). JMS was formed in 1936, mainly by a group of based Bengali professionals, to achieve the objective of ‘full responsible government’ under the aegis of the monarch. The founder of Tripura Communism, Biren Dutta, held a very important position within JMS, and a strong Communist influence was evident in its socio-economic and political programmes (Bhattacharyya 1990a:2211). JSS, formed in 1945 under the initiative of a few educated tribal youths, mostly Tripuris, sought to launch a mass literacy campaign for the tribes. Some other problems of the tribes like poverty, shifting cultivation and superstitions also attracted the attention of the JSS leadership. The Tripura Communists supported the JSS movement, and such interaction was helpful in spreading their support base among the tribes. Consequently, when TPM, a political platform for the Communists and liberals, was formed in 1946, it received the support of JSS leadership. The aim of TPM was again the attainment of a ‘full responsible government’, and the two forces standing against such realisation were the medieval feudal regime and the foreign (Bengali) bureaucracy, which almost dominated the princely administration by then. TPM, however, had made it clear that the removal of Bengali ministers and bureaucrats would not mean the removal of Bengalis from Tripura. TPM was an umbrella organisation of many diverse forces and interests, Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura 225 and it remained largely non-communal in nature in spite of the royal efforts to divide its leadership on communal lines. As TPM failed to achieve its veiled objective within the constitutional framework, its Communist leadership decided to go for an armed struggle under the aegis of TRGMP. TRGMP was formed in May 1948 to resist the severe police and military oppression. A large number of tribal youth and peasants joined TRGMP after tribal chiefs expressed their support to the movement. The following were the main demands of TRGMP: (a) a government by popular vote, (b) end of Dewani rule, (c) abolition of taitung (a system by which villagers were compelled to carry luggage, etc., of the officials, (d) abolition of all kinds of taxes, (e) land reform, including giving lands to the tribal Jhumias, (f) end of police atrocities and end to detention without trial, and (g) release of political prisoners. An incident of police firing in October 1948, due to a spontaneous peasant revolt against the oppressive money lenders as well as a reaction to the food shortage prevailing in the state, marked the beginning of armed struggle by TRGMP (Bhowmik 1996:97-98). The TRGMP leadership had observed that two major trends of opinion were discernible among the tribes in the state. The first was the tremendous discontent with Dewani rule and police atrocities and the second was a surge of anti-Bengali sentiments, which was disturbing them. The Communist leadership became much worried after the forma- tion of the first parochial organisation named Sengkrak by the royalist pretender Durjoy Kishore Debbarman. Sengkrak spearheaded the Bangal Kheda (oust Bengalis) movement in 1949 and opposed any merger of Tripura with India. At that juncture, TRGMP decided to organise a massive campaign against such a communal move. With all the important Bengali Communist leaders of the state in jail, it must go down to the credit of the tribal leadership of the Mukti Parishad to resist the sectarian politics and restore the tradition of inter-communal solidarity at mass level. The success of TRGMP to create a responsible, non-communal, parallel government in the hills of Tripura between 1949 and 1951 had also attracted tribal groups other than Tripuris to its fold. The fact, however, remains that tribal movements and armed struggles in Tripura did not generate any strong ethnic divide between the native tribes and the immigrant Bengalis in spite of the growth of ‘Tripuri ’. To the Tripura Communists, the ‘tribal question’ was more a question of social, economic and political development of the natives whom the tribal rulers had exploited for centuries. Tripura Communism, in spite of its close link with tribal nationalism, skilfully 226 Sociological Bulletin avoided any conflict on communal lines. The Bengali and the tribal Communist leaders jointly tried to build a tradition of ‘nationalism’, which was secular, democratic, and development oriented. Not surprisingly, the Communists and their allies could secure more than 60 percent of the votes polled in the first General Elections (1952), capturing 27 out of 30 Territorial Assembly constituencies. The problem of ethnicity is, therefore, a later day development that betrays the tradition of plurality and communal harmony developed so carefully by the Tripura Communists.

Tribe-Non-Tribe Interaction in Tripura

Tripura was a tribal princely state for more than 1,300 years before its accession to the union of India in October 1949. The state remained al- most ‘independent’ in spite of its inclusion into the British Indian territory since the late 18th century. The tribes constituted the dominant population of the state in the Pre-independence Hill Tipperah, and the immigrant Bengalis from the neighbouring East Pakistan (now ) outnumbered them since mid-1940. Unlike the tribes of the other North-Eastern states, excepting those in Manipur, most Tripura tribes during the rule of Rajas came in close contact with Bengalis. As a result, the social formations of some Tripura tribes have undergone significant changes. The tribes of Tripura, divided into 19 major groups, show more cul- tural similarity than differences. The Tripuris are the largest tribe (nearly 57% of the tribal population) followed by Reang (14.39%), Jamatia (7.62%), Chakma (5.96%), Halam (4.96%), Mog (3.12%) and others (nearly 8%). The major tribal groups of Tripura, namely, Tripuri, Reang, Jamatia and Noatia, practice almost the same religion, customs and language (Bhadra 1996:167). More than 85 percent of the Tripura tribes speak and nearly 85 percent of them are still Hindu. Maharajas of Tripura, who were Tripuris, attempted to sanskritise a section of the tribes by according them the status of Tripur Kshatriya, an upper caste of the Hindu society. The Hindu identity of the Tripuris and some other tribes (Jamatia, Noatia) also led them to engage Brahmin priests on certain social occasions and worship Hindu gods and goddesses. The process of assimilation has also affected their food habits, dress patterns and marital relations. The Tripuri kings’ love for and culture was evident from the beginning of 15th century. Bengali became the official language of the state from the 18th century, and many administrative and legal structures of colonial Bengal Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura 227 were incorporated in the state from the mid-19th century. As the shifting cultivation or jhum method practised by the tribes was primitive and less productive, the rulers also looked forward to the Bengali peasants, mostly Muslims, to introduce settled cultivation and to raise the volume of revenues for the rulers. The Tripura rulers’ experience as Zamindars of Chakla Roshnabad and some areas of Noakhali and Sylhet districts of undivided neighbouring Bengal had made them aware of the need for agricultural development (Ganguly 1999:7). Moreover, the tribal monarchs also looked towards the educated Bengali middle class to run the state administration. Due to such encouragement by the royal family, Tripura received many Bengali migrants even before 1947. Following partition of the country, a large number of displaced Bengalis came to Tripura for rehabilitation. The process of sanskritisation of the tribes and their subsequent assimilation under the royal patronage helped in developing a tradition of tribe-non-tribe unity in Tripura from the mid-14th century. The Communists’ penetration into the tribal dynamics further strengthened this tradition of communal harmony and a kind of nationalism. Not surprisingly, the growth of ‘tribalism’ in Tripura during the 1930s and 1940s did not take a sectarian turn; it instead targeted the politics and actions of the royal administration and feudal lords. The Communist influence also explains the way Tripura tribes have avoided, till recently, any inter-tribal clash or anti-India feelings, which so often characterise tribal movements in the North-East.

Growth of Ethnicity and Extremism in Tripura

The present state of ethnicity and extremism in Tripura is a recent phenomenon; the state did not witness any major outbreak of communal riots or killings before 1980. Historically, however, the birth of ethno- nationalism in Tripura can be traced back to the mid-1960s, when the Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (hereafter TUJS) was formed to fight for the tribal cause. The birth of TUJS, though formed through an all-party convention in June 1967, signifies the growth of second-generation leadership among the tribes who are young, educated, and mostly Christian. During the 1960s and 1970s the number of such educated tribals increased rapidly in the state: the tribal literacy rate went up from 10.10 percent in 1961 to 15.03 percent in 1971, 23.07 percent in 1981, and 40.37 percent in 1991. The rise in tribal literacy was also accompanied by the emergence of a new middle-class leadership which had the opportunity to study in the schools, colleges and universities of 228 Sociological Bulletin Shillong, Guwahati and Imphal and share the experience of other tribal friends from the North-East. The story of tribal movements and insurgency in Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur and Assam inspired them to launch similar movements. TUJS was formed by the youth, who received moral and tactical support from other the North-East insurgents. The spread of Christianity in Tripura, started officially from November 1938, left a deep imprint on the minds of the youth (Bhattacharjee 1994:71). The Christian missionaries, through education and medical care of the tribes, stressed a sense of distinctiveness and separateness among them. During 1971-81, the Christian population grew by a spectacular 59.29 percent, whereas the total state population grew by 31.88 percent. It has been reported that the Tripura Baptist Christian Union (hereafter TBCU) played an active role in the formation of TUJS and maintained strong links with its leadership. In a communication addressed to its superior body at Shillong, TBCU expressed satisfaction over its church members’ involvement in political activities. This communication men- tions some insurgents as prominent members of the church in politics. Investigating the June 1980 violence, the Dinesh Singh Committee also reported that Tripura insurgents have maintained close links with other North-Eastern insurgent groups like the Mizo National Front or United Liberation Army who are committed to Christianity. The process of de- sanskritisation through conversion, initiated by the TUJS leadership, later became the focal point of several insurgent activities. Issues like the use of Kokborok in daily life and the use of Roman (instead of Bengali) script for Kokborok, worshipping only tribal gods and goddesses, wearing Ria-Pachra (traditional Tripuri dress) (instead of sari), utilising the services of tribal (instead of Brahmin) priests and so on, initiated a process of social change that was quite unheard of in the past. The brand of politics initiated, for the first time, by TUJS in Tripura, and later taken up by other tribal groups, did not match with the Communist Party of India (Marxist)’s (hereafter CPI(M)) efforts to forge communal unity. While TUJS was particularly critical of the role played by the Communists in the past to fight for the cause of the tribes, the Congress emerged as the ‘party of the uprooted refugees’ who had crossed over to Tripura in large number after partition. The Communists felt the compulsion of electoral politics for the first time after the 1962 Territorial Council Polls, in which they lost to the Congress due to ‘demographic imbalance’. In the aftermath of the 1967 election, in which the CPI(M) lost its position, even in the tribal constituencies, the Communists had to concentrate on the Bengali vote bank without giving Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura 229 up the demands for tribal autonomy. Political campaigns by the Congress in those elections clearly brought back the ethnic issues. The rise of TUJS, therefore, also coincides with the electoral victory of the Congress harping on a pro-Bengali line of campaign as well as the failure of CPI(M) to support the ‘foreigner’ issue. Communists’ resistance to the policies and actions of the Congress government during the 1960s remained almost feeble with most of their leaders in jail during or after the 1962 India-China . The formation of TUJS also saw a rise in anti-Bengali activities in different parts of the state. TUJS initially demanded (a) the creation of an autonomous district council for the tribes under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, (b) the restoration of tribal lands from the non- tribals which were illegally transferred, (c) the recognition of Kokborok language, and (d) the adoption of Roman script. Their movement gained momentum when the Congress government in Tripura reduced the tribal reserve by 300 sq miles in 1968, declared Bengali as the official language, and evicted tribal peasants from Dambur valley for dam construction. The Congress, which had earlier alienated the tribals by identifying itself as a party of uprooted refugees, took several anti-tribal decisions during the 1960s and 1970s, leading to tribal militancy. For instance, the then Congress governments allowed the Bengali refugees to settle down in the tribal reserve land created by the Maharaja to protect the interest of the tribes. It was these refugees, living in at least 30 colonies, who ensured the victory of Congress candidates even in the tribal reserve seats in the 1967 election. These governments took very little interest in filling reserved job vacancies, in solving the problems of landless Jhumias and indebted tribes, or in spending the money meant for tribal development (Roy 1985: 84-86; Bhowmik 1996:123). The politics of tribalism initiated by TUJS, however, failed to produce any spectacular electoral result except to offer openings to counter-communal organisations like Aamra Bangalee. In the 1970 Assembly and 1971 Parliamentary elections, it faired very badly, losing all the seats it contested. In the 1977 Assembly elections also it received only 6.06 percent of the total votes polled, as the Left’s influence over the common tribal masses could not be decimated. The TUJS’s lack of popularity among the tribes forced it to reformulate its ‘soft’ policy on ‘foreigner issue’ and encourage the youth to look for extra- parliamentary courses of action. Thus, a voluntary organisation called Tripur Sena was formed in early 1970 and, under the leadership of Bijoy Kr Hrankhawl, it took arms training in the Mizo National Front camps in the (Roy 1985:81). During 1973-75, Tripur Sena 230 Sociological Bulletin was engaged in several insurgent activities in certain pockets of mixed and refugee habitation, which led to some counter campaign and activities by Aamra Bangalee. The birth of a new phase of ethnic extremism during the early 1970s was later rejuvenated by Tripura National Volunteer (hereafter TNV), formed in February 1978 by the Tripur Sena members to unleash a reign of terror and ethnic violence in the state during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The rest of the story of ethnicity and insurgency in Tripura is about fragmentation and proliferation of several rebel outfits.

Factors Influencing Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura

An analysis of the nature of ethnicity and insurgency in Tripura would reveal that such processes are influenced by some necessary conditions and supplemented by other sufficient conditions. Ethnicity cannot easily be evoked if only necessary conditions prevail. The presence of sufficient conditions induces qualitative change in the nature of group mobilisation. The necessary conditions include several socio-economic factors like demographic compulsions, cultural deprivation, poverty, land alienation and eviction, unemployment and underdevelopment, etc. The sufficient conditions include an acute sense of discrimination among the group members, emergence of a strong elite leadership, political competition and manipulation, state policies and actions and easy accessibility to external support. Let me first look into the necessary conditions. As mentioned earlier, the changes in the demographic profile of Tripura, due to incessant influx of refugees, have aggravated sufferings of the poor tribes. The tribal natives, who constituted a dominant 64 percent of the total population in 1874, formed a reduced component of the population in successive Census enumerations: 52 percent in 1931, 37 percent in 1951, 28.44 percent in 1981 (the figure went down also due to non- enumeration after the 1980 riot), 29.59 percent in 1991 (excluding Chakma refugees), and 26.74 percent in 2001 (provisional). Between 1947 and 1971, more than 600,000 refugees entered the state. Although these refugees have contributed to the economic development of Tripura in many ways, the marginalisation of the tribal peasants and elite has created a psychological trauma of being reduced to a minority in ‘tribal state’. Due to such a demographic imbalance, the density of population in the state has increased from 17 per sq km in 1901 to 304 per sq km in 2001. The numerical domination of the Bengalis in Tripura has gradually Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura 231 translated into their cultural, economic and political domination with a corresponding pressure on the tribes for survival. The first impact of the refugee influx into Tripura was the opening of the state’s forest interiors for the settlement of refugees. As these immigrants were mostly cultivators, such rehabilitation has led to a greater pressure on the jhum land in the hills and a fall in per-acre productivity due to the increase in the jhum cycle. This has also resulted in a large-scale alienation of tribal lands to Bengali peasants and a growing incidence of indebtedness among the tribes. As the non-tribal economy went on growing in the plains, the interaction between the tribes and the non-tribes led to an unequal exchange. The marginalisation and deprivation of the tribes in the economic field gradually led to a situation where the sanskritised tribes experienced the cultural arrogance of the majority. The Bengali dominated administration encouraged the spread of Bengali language and culture, the Bengali medium of instruction in schools and colleges. The problem of economic marginalisation of the tribes due to indeb- tedness, poverty, alienation and eviction from land became a focal point of tribal mobilisation during the 1960s and 1970s. As the area of reserved forest in the state increased from 15.59 sq miles in 1908 to 1160.85 sq miles in 1942-43 (one-fourth of the territory of the state), there was a sharp fall in the total area available for shifting cultivation (Bhattacharyya 1990b:48-49). Along with this the state-sponsored agricultural modernisation, started by the Maharajas themselves, prohibited the tribals from engaging in shifting cultivation. So, they had to switch over either to settled cultivation, in which the scope for participation of women is less, or to cultivate the same jhum land for years. There were large-scale evictions of tribals from the lands and forests due to government-sponsored development schemes like the Dumbur Nagar Hydroelectric Project, rubber plantation, etc. All these had put the jhum cultivators into a vicious circle of poverty, indebtedness and dependency (on the Bengali moneylenders). Today nearly 40 percent of the tribals depend on shifting cultivation, and in the allotment of surplus land they did not receive the officially proclaimed priority (Amitava Sinha 1996:56). Even those who have taken to settled cultivation did not gain much from agricultural modernisation, as many of them had by then lost most of their fertile flat lands to the immigrants. The tribals with less-developed skills, thus, failed to compete on equal terms with the Bengalis. The emergence of class-based agrarian structure in Tripura has impoverished most of the tribals. Thus, the 232 Sociological Bulletin work participation (main) rate of tribes has come down from 51.51 percent in 1961 to 32.03 percent in 1991. In contrast, there is some increase in the number of tribal agricultural labourers in the state during the same period: While one could hardly notice tribals working as agricultural labourers even 20 years back, in 1991 they constituted nearly 10 percent of the tribal population. Tripura has a very high rate of rural households living below the poverty line (73.58%), and there is no gainsaying that tribals form a substantial proportion of these households (Narayan 1997:9). It is under such circumstances that moneylenders and businessmen have thrived in the hills and captured the tribal lands. A survey in north Tripura’s Kanchanpur block in 1968 showed that 80 percent of the tribal land had been seized by non-tribals using fraudulent and unscrupulous means (Mukherjee and Singh 1982). Another survey in Mohanpur block found 36.5 percent of the tribals in the area to be victims of land aliena- tion and 81 percent to be indebted to moneylenders (Government of Tripura 1974). Other surveys and reports too, show that tribals generally borrow money at an exorbitant rate of interest with an understanding that they will repay the loan at the time of harvest. But, they end up passing the loan amount and the interest thereon to the next generation. When the state government declared transfer of tribal land as illegal after 1 January 1968, it received 1,989 applications from tribals, involving 18,840.22 acres of land, for restoration of alienated land. Up to December 1994, of the 26,952 applications, involving 23,240.16 acres of land, only 9,264 cases were found valid by the Revenue Court and restoration was ordered in only 7,000 cases, involving 5,813.95 acres of land (Government of Tripura 1999). This was obviously disappointing to the tribals who failed to produce valid documents. It should, however, be kept in mind that economic inequality and exploitation do not always follow an ethnic line. The peasant, non- industrial economy of Tripura could not do much even for the refugees. It would be unfair, therefore, to suggest that only the Bengalis have exploited the tribals in Tripura. Rather, a distinct dualism has developed among the tribals too, under the influence of the terrain of the state, its history and economy (Amitava Sinha 1996:127). There are rich tribal cultivators, businessmen, professionals and bureaucrats in the state who have benefited most out of the policy of protection and development followed in the state (Ganguly 1999:7). Along with the foregoing problems, the educated tribal youth, living mainly in urban areas, have faced the problems of unemployment and under-employment. As on 31 December 1997, there were 283,044 appli- Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura 233 cants on the live registers of the employment exchanges in the state, including 38,258 registrants belonging to the Scheduled Tribes. According to a rough estimate, out of 150,000 state government employees in 1998, tribals numbered only 24,503 (16.33%), making a short fall of nearly 20,000 (Tripura 1999:6). Considering the fact that tribal women equally participate with their male counterparts in economic activities, the percentage of non-working population among the tribals in Tripura is extremely high (58.75% in 1981). The representation of tribals in government departments, however, increased during the 1980s when the Left Front ministry took steps to fill the reserved vacancies. However, due to the non-availability of candidates among the tribes, upper rank (Class I, II and even III) posts reserved for them remain vacant. This is due to the high dropout rate in classes IX-X (86.72 % in 2000-2001) among the tribals. In the police department too, the tribals were hardly represented some 20 years back, making them less confident about the impartiality of the law-enforcing authority. However, as on 22 April 2002, 25.08 percent of the posts in the Home Department were occupied by the tribals (Government of Tripura 2002b). Along with the factors of deprivation and marginalisation mentioned so far, tribes have been protesting against the pro-Bengali path of deve- lopment followed in the state since the 1930s. Even today, nearly half the state’s area is inaccessible due to poor road networks. The health situation of the hilly tribes is so miserable that 50 percent of deaths in those areas are attributed to nutritional deficiency. The Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reform Act, passed in 1960, was not implemented to initiate tribal development. On the contrary, different audit reports clearly show that the money meant for reclamation of land or irrigation facility for the tribes, including implementation of the integrated tribal development projects, were not spent during the tenure of Congress governments (Roy 1985:84-86). The location of schools and colleges in the mostly Bengali dominated areas did not help the tribals. It was only after the introduction of tuition-fee-free education, a mid-day meal programme, Kokborok as the medium of instruction, and opening of schools in rural and hilly areas, during the late 1970s and the 1980s, that enrolment of tribal students showed an increase.2 The foregoing necessary conditions laid the base for the growth and nourishment of ethnicity in Tripura. The sufficient conditions, developing mainly from the 1960s, resulted in the outburst of its expression. It was mentioned earlier that the first phase of ethnicity in Tripura started with the birth of TUJS. The TUJS leadership was 234 Sociological Bulletin opposed to the policies of both the Congress, favouring Bengalis, and the CPI(M), opposing any kind of ethnic movement. Although the Communists’ demands then were similar to those of the TUJS, the young elites were more radical in their ‘tribalism’. The TUJS leadership had an acute sense of discrimination, as many of its hard-core members had, in fact, lost their land. Moreover, they hardly shared the tradition of unity forged during the last 30 years. The re-tribalisation process started by TUJS made a new beginning in the cultural . Under such pressure, the CPI(M)’s tribal forum had to change its name from Tripura Rajya Gana Mukti Parishad to Upajati Gana Mukti Parishad. It became clear later that TUJS was fighting CPI(M) in the hills to enlarge its own mass base. However, as TUJS and, later, TNV, could not muster the electoral support of the tribes, they were seen joining hands with their arch-rival Congress to defeat the Left Front in the state. The issue of the use or misuse of ethnicity should also be extended to include the activities of those who try to manipulate the group identity to join the elite. The case of Bijoy Kr Hrankhawl, who led TNV, can be cited as an example. When Hrankhawl was persuaded by Nripen Chakraborty to lead a constructive political overground life and granted a loan by the Gramin Bank towards his economic rehabilitation, he left TNV without realising a single demand that his outfit had raised. Hrankhawl’s loyalty to ‘tribalism’ was again found fluid when he signed a ‘deal’ with the union government and helped the Congress to come back to power in 1988 (Economic and Political Weekly 1988: 1171). The politics of economism and pragmatism has dominated the ques- tion of ethnicity and insurgency in Tripura. Had it not been the case, TUJS would have supported the actions of the two Left Front govern- ments during 1977-87. It was during these years that the pro-tribal steps like the formation of the Autonomous District Council, recognition of Kokborok, filling of vacant reserved posts, opening of schools and medical centres in the hills, restoration of alienated tribal land, initiation of community development programmes and cooperatives in the rural and interior areas for landless tribes and artisans, decentralising power to local people through panchayats, etc. were taken, and the Left had shown a definite intention to improve the conditions of alienated tribes. However, contrary to common expectations, TUJS and TNV perpetuated a typical anti-Left posture and aligned with the Congress, which was a pro-Bengali party, to come back to power in 1988. It has since then been revealed that TNV, which was willing to surrender much before the 1988 elections on some political terms (like the dissolution of the Left Front government) with the Central Government, was asked to wait for Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura 235 an appropriate moment (Ibid.). The subsequent declaration of the whole state as a ‘disturbed area’, due to the killings of non-tribals by the terrorists, raised doubts about the political game plan of the Congress, TUJS and TNV to dislodge the CPI(M) government. Ethnic violence and the escalation of terrorist activities on the eve of any election continued subsequently too. Terrorist outfits like National Liberation Front of Tripura (hereafter NLFT) were seen asking tribes to vote for a particular political party or even rig elections for them (The Statesman 2000:4). It is noteworthy that the memorandum of settlement signed by TNV in the 1988 tripartite accord evaded many issues, espe- cially the question of alienated land, it had raised during insurgency. Later also the Tripura ultras have followed a double standard by declaring a ‘Sovereign People’s Republic of Tripura’ to be their avowed goal and, subsequently compromising on some economic concessions and political gains. It may be argued that the politics of ethnicity and insurgency in Tripura smack of a pragmatic end in which ideology is merely a means. Terrorism in the state has earned the status of an ‘industry’, as in other North-Eastern States. Between January 1980 and June 2000, while nearly 7,000 tribal insurgents have surrendered to the authorities, 28 new tribal insurgent groups have emerged. Terrorism has, therefore, provided a new route for unemployed youth or dropouts to a decent income. It has been reported by some surrendered terrorists or those kept in captivity that rebel outfits often provide a monthly salary to their recruits and hire non-tribal Muslim youth from Bangladesh for specific assignments (Debnath 2001:103; Dainik Sambad 2000:1). It also appears from the statements of several surrendered terrorists that terrorism provides scope for an adventurous life as well as a kind of ‘achieved status’ in a society that did not provide them enough opportunities for material success. It is, therefore, not surprising that the huge sum, estimated to be around five million rupees a year, generated through rebel activities, has often become an issue within the groups. Breakaway rebel groups, like the Army of Tripura Peoples’ Liberation Organisation led by Binanda Jamatia, Tripura Peoples’ Liberation Organisation led by Chuni Koloi, Tripura Resurrection Army led by Dhananjay Reang and many others, were formed in protest over the leadership issue. The All Tripura Tiger Force (hereafter ATTF) has three splinter units following different courses of action. Infighting among the rebel outfits has, in fact, caused more deaths than in encounters with the police! It is a contradiction that terrorists fighting for the same demands or issues are opposed to each other’s effort to control a particular territory. 236 Sociological Bulletin Common people in Tripura, including the tribals, believe that such infighting and the fragmentation of rebel outfits have much to do with their economic and political interests than mere ethnic issues. Tribals are killed or abducted by the rebels. There have also been incidents of rape and molestation of tribal girls. Out of a total of 1,242 people killed by the insurgents between 1993 and 2000, 426 (34%) were tribals (Debnath 2001:246). Of late, the issue of forceful conversion to Christianity by NLFT has led to inter-tribal clashes, and the minor tribal groups like Jamatia, Reang, Chakma, Noatia, and Ochai are opposing such a move. Tribalism in Tripura has, therefore, gone beyond the parameters of ‘tribal’ identity and introduced a new logic for ethnic rivalry. It appears that the fragmentation of ethnic loyalty in Tripura is a fallout of the politics of compromise and pragmatism followed by the tribal elite. Also, the way the major outfits like ATTF or NLFT have targeted their political enemies, makes their political connections clear. It is due to such connections that terrorists openly declare their intention to surrender when a ‘friendly’ government is in power. Thus, the political connection of the ultras has provided legitimacy to the growth and development of ethnicity and insurgency in Tripura. The recent formation of Indigenous People’s Front of Tripura (hereafter IPFT), an anti-Left political platform of four hill-based parties, and its alignment with the Congress, has again brought back the politics of convenience in the state. It is difficult to explain how such an alliance would adjust with parochial demands that IPFT has made. There are many tribals who think that ethnicity and insurgency cannot help the poor tribes. Similarly, there are many Bengalis who sympathise with the genuine grievances of these tribes. Poor tribals do not always turn to insurgency to solve their problems. There are few takers for the insurgents’ line of action even in the hills. In the 2002 Assembly election, tribals did not vote for the insurgents or their candidates. It is due to political competition and monetary gains that militancy has become a common platform for some. Had there been a collective initiative by contending political groups, solution to the problem of ethnicity and insurgency could have been found by now. Another substantive condition for the rise and sustenance of ethnicity in Tripura is state policy and action. It was noted earlier that policies and actions of the Tripura Kings before the independence and those of the Congress governments during the 1960s and 1970s had disenchanted the tribals. In a society that had developed a tradition of protest for basic human rights, such anti-tribal actions did not go unnoticed. With the growing anti-state sentiment, ethno-nationalism Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura 237 took its birth. While state action or inaction has contributed to the growth of ethnicity, an untimely and delayed state response has legitimised its sustenance. The basic socio-economic problems of the natives of Tripura should have received early and proper attention of the state administration. However, the successive Congress governments in the state have impeded these issues for long, and the Congress, with its strong base among the Bengali refugees, has ethnicised these issues for partisan ends. This appears to have been the general policy of the Congress in the 1970s (Manor 1983). Political bitterness created among the tribes after independence could not be managed by the Communists in the face of a rise of new leadership, which has already been discussed. When the Left Front government came to power in 1978, it did not prefer the suppression of ethnicity through military action, as tribal ethnicity in Tripura cannot easily be crushed. Therefore, a political solution to the problem of ethnicity and insurgency along with overall development of the tribes was thought to be a better long-term option. However, the political formula of compromise and accommodation too, could not contain insurgency in the state. The policy of several state governments to patronise the surrendered rebels became counterproductive with ever more tribal youth, who have no means to succeed in the normal competitive system, joining the fray. Whenever a rebel surrenders, he receives rehabilitation gifts like cash, loan and job. Such ‘pragmatism’ partly explains why the Tripura ultras do not often clash with the security forces and instead target the civilians. As Bhowmik (1996:241) observes, most of the surrendered members of the Tripura National Liberation Front, which was formed just after the TNV accord, ‘were only trying to get the same kind of rehabilitation benefit that TNV personnel received’. The formation of several other rebel outfits was also influenced by the fact that surrendered ultras did not receive any proper rehabilitation benefit. State government statistics show that only 2,211 (35%) of the 6,314 surrendered rebels have so far received different types of benefits, and among them 2,057 are the members of either TNV (436) or ATTF (1,621). Financial constraints of the state government have come in the way of such rehabilitation. The uncertainty of proper rehabilitation has, no doubt, contributed to poor arms surrender by the rebels. Thus, it appears that the political formula of compromise and accommodation (or even its failure) has provided impetus to the rise and growth of ethnicity and insurgency in Tripura. The Tripura case seems to exemplify the failure of the politics of ‘Consociational Democracy’. 238 Sociological Bulletin Finally, the involvement of foreign or outside agents has been instrumental in aggravating the insider-outsider problem in Tripura. The role of Christian missionaries in providing tacit support and network for ethno-nationalism in the state was discussed earlier. Though there is no direct relationship between Christianity and ethnicity in Tripura, evidence shows that one can hardly brush aside this factor: It is a well- documented fact that terrorism has flourished in places where Christians dominate. It is also not a mere coincidence that tribal rebels did not attack a single church or priests who stay in the extremist prone interior belts. But the United Bengali Liberation Front or the Jamatia and Reang revolters of NLFT have targeted the Christian institutions and priests. It has also been observed that tribal rebels frequently visit churches and utilise such places for organisational networking (Debnath 2001:66-67). One may argue that, as conversion to Christianity had provided an alternative route to most of the insurgent leadership or tribal elite in a Hindu dominated society, the church became the rallying point for tribal ethnicity in Tripura. Consequently, there has been a phenomenal increase in the number of schools run by the Christian missionaries, whereas the government schools remain mostly closed in the hills. There is also evidence to argue that Tripura ultras work under a common umbrella with foreign support. It is widely known that Chitta- gong Hill Tracts provide hiding places and training bases to all North- Eastern insurgent groups. It has also been reported that these insurgents often receive help from the Islamic fundamentalists or foreign govern- ments as and when India’s relation with these governments is sour. Even when a ‘friendly’ government came to power in Bangladesh, there seemed to be very little impact of such change on terrorist activities. Tripura’s hilly terrain and long stretch of border with Bangladesh are a serious constraint on restricting insurgency. Without foreign support, ethnicity and insurgency in Tripura would not have gone out of control.

Conclusion

Ethnicity and insurgency in Tripura are, therefore, not simply a product of socio-economic, cultural or ideological issues of the tribes. The social, cultural, demographic and economic marginalisation of the tribes provided the base for tribal ethnicity in Tripura. However, only when such necessary conditions were supplemented by other sufficient conditions, could ethnic identity find its language of expression. The problem of ethnicity in Tripura, hence, depends much on modern factors like the emergence of a strong elite leadership, a strong sense of Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura 239 perceived discrimination, political competition and manipulation, government policies and actions, easy accessibility to foreign support, and geographical location. In other words, socio-cultural identities of an ethnic group are important, but not sufficient, for the evocation of ethnicity. The role of these substantive factors in ethnic politics also brings into focus the flexible and changing character of the insider vs. outsider conflict in Tripura. We may identify five different phases of the ethnic movement in Tripura. In the first phase, of tribalism and cultural protest, which began with the formation of TUJS, the basic social and economic problems of the tribal people were raised, but received no response from the state. The TUJS leadership sought to revive the traditional cultural symbols and practices of the tribes to de-sanskritise them from the Hindu or, more particularly, the Bengali cultural tradition. However, the TUJS failed to penetrate the strong Communist base in the hills, nor could it muster the support of the urban, sanskritised tribal elites who had benefited most from the protective discrimination policy followed by the government. The isolation of TUJS from the tribals at large inspired some of its leaders to initiate the second phase, of underground militancy and arms struggle, from the late 1970s. The tradition of protest and insurgency among the tribes, the success of other North-East insurgents, and the hilly terrain and the international border have made such a shift more feasible than the uncertain democratic route. The formation of rebel outfits like TNV or counter-ethnic organisations like the Aamra Bangalee, and subsequent ethnic clashes and devastating communal riots, characterise this violent stage. The tribal militants, however, appeared to be less interested in the plight of ordinary tribals who suffered the most due to those ethnic clashes. Even the formulation and execution of a clear-cut state policy of tribal development during the early 1980s could not appease the ‘new tribal elite’, while it generated suspicions among the Bengali refugees. The third phase, of compromise and divisions, began with the sur- render of TNV in 1988 and continued with the formation of politically opposed rebel outfits like NLFT and ATTF. This phase introduced, for the first time, clashes among the tribals themselves on political lines. All the major political parties in the hills were seen supporting one or the other insurgent group. The TNV’s compromise for rehabilitation benefits also ushered in a new era in tribal politics. The fourth phase, of surrender politics, started from the middle of 1993, with the Left Front government wooing the rebels to surrender 240 Sociological Bulletin and rehabilitate themselves in the mainstream. It is in this stage that many tribal insurgents, along with their overground supporters (nearly 4,000), surrendered to the authorities. However, as the melting pot could not absorb all the aspiring groups or sub-groups, successive formation of several rebel outfits created an environment of mistrust and rivalry among the tribes. The fifth and latest phase of tribal movement in Tripura began with the political unity of anti-Left tribal groups or parties during the late 1990s. This ‘unity’ was apparently masterminded by NLFT which again brought back the cultural issues like the use of Kokborok in daily life, forceful conversion of tribals to Christianity, and boycott of traditional institutions and practices. The hitherto political domination of the Left in the hills was seriously challenged by this political combination (that is, IPFT). However, being an umbrella organisation of some small and discrete groups, IPFT has its own limitations. Most important, it has to depend on the gun power of NLFT for its survival. There is also opposi- tion from non-Tripuri, non-Christian sections of the tribals who have of late challenged the ‘cultural package’ of NLFT. It appears that the politi- cal and cultural divisions of tribals, which initially disappeared under the migrant threat, have resurfaced. The tribal ethnicity in Tripura has, therefore, failed to take the shape of a mass socio-cultural movement of 19 different tribes; instead, it took recourse to extremism. Once gun power replaces normal political processes in the hills, parties or groups, irrespective of their affiliation, fall prey to it. There is, thus, no direct relationship between ethnicity and insurgency, and the latter occurs only when the former fails in its objective to arouse mass consciousness. It can also be deduced from the phase-wise differences of the tribal movement that a boundary never remains a quiescent entity. The politics of ethnicity and insurgency in Tripura has led to the brewing of several complications beyond the parameters of mere ‘tribal- ism’. The worst sufferers of the nearly three-decade long ethnic unrest in the state are the tribals themselves. In the insurgency affected areas, most of the government-aided schools with mid-day meal facility are closed, cooperatives and banks opened to help the tribal artisans and peasants do not run, business and work activities have slackened, health centres do not function, and no state-sponsored development programme is operative. This has adversely affected the poor, landless tribals and peasants who depend heavily on government welfare services. On the contrary, infighting and political rivalries between the tribal elite and insurgents have proved costly for them. For the Bengali Ethnicity and Insurgency in Tripura 241 refugees too, life is full of tension and horror. Yet, in the heart of Agartala city, tribal and non-tribal people live peacefully. Even today those in favour of a peaceful resolution of the tribal problems outnumber the opportunists. It is a paradox that tribal ethno-nationalism in Tripura has drawn inspiration from political rivalries of mainstream parties and allowed the personal, group or religious interests of the elite to dominate the general question of tribal development. The highly mobile and cross-cutting loyalty structure of modern competitive societies has drawn ethnicity out of its socio-cultural context and given it a new lease of life. Consequently, the tribal elite and insurgents have often made friendship with their arch-enemies and opposed those who fight for the same cause. The Tripura case, thus, vindicates that ethnicity or insurgency is more a means to an end, than an end in itself. Being a device to push zealously ahead towards secular gains, the ideology of ethnicity is a manifestation of modern instrumental rationality. Ethnicity, then, is neither static nor a pre-determined object, but a situational construct. Though based on some real life experience of deprivation, it is otherwise manipulated and mobilised for personal/group interests and sustained by political rivalries and state actions. This study also shows that movements seeking separate identity or distinctiveness are neither parochial nor opposed to modernity. Had that been the case, concern for ‘power’ and ‘politics’ would not have remained the axial point of tribalism in Tripura. As change and mutability are endemic to ethnic identities, they seem fluid, situationally contingent, perpetual and negotiable. Hence, it would be untenable to view ethnic movements as necessarily constituting a threat to the state. It may be argued that the attempt to produce fixed categories like ‘tribal’ or ‘Bengali’ represents a strategy of power, one that is often involved in preserving a hegemonic representation of the category. In reality, however, the boundary of a particular category is both constructed through and challenged by other social identities. This makes occasional intersection of both social categories and identities possible. The process of boundary formation, thus, rests on both discursive and structural conditions. We, therefore, cannot conceive of a ‘unified’ society with one culture, one history. Contested boundaries and multiple identities will dominate the passage of time and space in the contemporary world.

Notes

242 Sociological Bulletin 1. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the XXVI All India Sociological Conference, University of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram, 29-31 December 2000. I am thankful to the anonymous referee for her/his comments and suggestions. 2. During 2001-02, the enrolment of Scheduled Tribe students was 32.50 percent at the primary stage and 20.41 percent at the secondary stage (Government of Tripura 2002a). Appendix: List of Abbreviations

ATTF : All Tripura Tiger Force CPI(M) : Communist Party of India (Marxist) IPFT : Indigenous Peoples’ Front of Tripura JMS : Jana Mongal Samiti JSS : Jana Shiskya Samiti NLFT : National Liberation Front of Tripura TBCU : Tripura Baptist Christian Union TNV : Tripura National Volunteer TPM : Tripura Proja Mondal TRGMP : Tripura Rajya Gana Mukti Parishad TUJS : Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti

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