For a Connecting Progressive Agenda
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For a Connecting Progressive Agenda With Foreword by: Alfred GUSENBAUER Edited by: Ernst STETTER Karl DUFFEK Ania SKRZYPEK INDEX FOR A CONNECTING 122 Europe beyond Maastricht – PROGRESSIVE AGENDA the Role of Inter-State Transfers, Social Protection 6 Introduction and Cultural Homogenization Ernst STETTER, Karl DUFFEK Ronny MAZZOCCHI & Ania SKRZYPEK 154 Europe 2020, EU Governance 12 Daring to Take a Step Forward and Progressive Reform Alfred GUSENBAUER Renaud THILLAYE & FACING SOCIAL Patrick DIAMOND CONTESTATION – A SEARCH 178 Way Forward for European FOR A NEW CONNECTION Welfare Society Ania SKRZYPEK 20 Responding to New Patterns of Social Contestation: MAKING EUROPE WORK – the Politics of Protest A DEMAND FOR QUALITY Management during the Global EMPLOYMENT FOR ALL Economic Crisis David J. BAILEY 214 Towards an Eqalitarian and Effi cient Economic Model 36 From Euroscepticism to Based on Strong Labour Eurorejectonism: Analysing Market Institutions Discontent with Widening Rémi BAZILLIER and Deepening European Integration 236 Whither Flexicurity? Discursive André KROUWEL & Exercises and Empirical Reality Yordan K. KUTIYSKI in European Labour Market Reform 64 Creating Majority Coalitions in Dimitris TSAROUHAS the United States and Europe: is there a Blueprint for the 264 Quality of Justice for a New Progressives Social Europe: Better Access, John HALPIN & Ruy TEIXEIRA More Equality and Better Democracy CREATING EUROPEAN Nadia CARBONI WELFARE – A PROPOSAL OF A TANGIBLE AGENDA FOR ORGANISING FINANCIAL EQUALITY CAPITALISM – A STRIVE FOR ETHICALLY PREVAILING 102 European Union and Inequality ARGUMENT Ignacio URQUIZU 294 The European Union as Peter Pan. Global and Foreign Policy Implications of the Eurozone Crisis Carlo D’IPPOLITI 318 Mediating (Rather than Eluding) Contention of Enhanced democracy in the EU Amandine CRESPY 342 Reinventing Modern European Industrial policy: Beyond the Current EU Legal Framework Matjaz NAHTIGAL 358 Economic Democracy as a Key Element of a Social Europe Pascal ZWICKY EUROPEANISING SOCIAL DEMOCRACY – A NEED FOR AN ORGANIZATIONAL RENEWAL 398 European Elections 2014: A Critical Election for Social Democracy and the European Union Robert LADRECH 410 The Greek debt Crisis and "For a Connecting Progressive PASOK: Lessons for European Agenda" Social Democracy First published in Poland in 2015 Gerassimos MOSCHONAS By FEPS - Foundation for European Progressive Studies 432 PES, Sustainable Development Editors of the "Next Left" book series: and Democracy Dr. E. Stetter, Mag. K. Duffek, Dr. A. Skrzypek Erol KÜLAHCI Designed by: Ofi cyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR 456 Consensus, Coalition and Cover design by: Les Marquisettes www.lesmarquisettes.be Confl ict – possibilities for Copyright ©FEPS – Foundation for European transformation of the European Progressive Studies and RI – Renner Institut. partisan system This book is sold subject to the condition that it Ania SKRZYPEK shall not be by way of trade or otherwise be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without publishers’ prior consent in writing in any form 485 BIOGRAPHIES of binding or cover other than that in what it is published and without a similar condition being 497 FEPS NEXT LEFT imposed on subsequent purchaser. PUBLICATIONS 978-3-85464-041-7 978-83-7545-593-9 This book represents not the collective views of FEPS or RI, but only the opinions of the respective authors. The responsibility of FEPS and RI is limited to approving its publication as worthy of consideration within the global progressive movement. For a Connecting Progressive Agenda Ernst STETTER, Karl DUFFEK & Ania SKRZYPEK 7 For the last six years the terms of the political debates were determined by the crash of 2008. The mainstreaming inputs would remain “crisis-centered”. They would either refer to the causes of the predicament, or to its’ character, or to the prognosis regarding the way forward. These later ones would in general be gloomy varying from “this is the end of an era” to “we are not out of it with the next wave mounting to hit”. Consequently, a strange political consensus seems to have been silently reached among the ‘traditional’ actors regardless of their particular ideological orientations. They would all eventually unite in understanding that the crisis costs remain “unimaginable” and lack of certainty about them profoundly limits the scope of effective exit scenarios. This logic brought historically distant (or event opposing) forces onto the same side of the argument. Even though they would dispute details, in overall the parties of moderate left and right would tend to compromise with one another regarding an eminent need to balance the state budgets and eliminate the erosive debts that had occurred. As said, they may have discussed how this debit had been created – but as a way forward they all would subscribe under ‘cut what is wasteful – and invest in what can gear benefi ts’. This would perfectly fi t with the dominant metaphor that the conservatives successfully imprinted in minds of European societies, namely that the state budget is ruled by the same principle as the household one and hence in times of recession one needs to cut on extravagance. The problem with this approach is that much of what should be consider as a measurement of the social progress in the post-war Europe was classifi ed as such a profl igacy. Despite the fact that it would appear as more than appalling for all fi tting the most classical image of the supporters of social democracy, it is in fact not that diffi cult to understand why the center-left would become a signatory of this new consensus. First of all, it ticked the boxes regarding plausibility criteria. With the scarcity of public resources, it effectively would have seemed the only possibility. Especially since the progressives themselves have been fully aware that the social deal at hand was the product of the earlier generations, had severe defi ciencies in terms of effective delivery and would require a vast modernization anyhow. Of course, subjecting it to the cuts to begin with was not at all ideal or desired reform method, but from pragmatic point of view no other heterogeneous agenda existed on the left at that point – reminding painfully of the last and still unfi nished ideological dispute around the “Third Way”. Secondly, even if the different cuts eventually took a form of a more complex “austerity” agenda and even if the population had contested them across the continent – still they were not appearing as a danger to the preservation of the political system. And that was something that all the traditional political parties would need to see as a priority in the times of such an eminent political earthquake. History may have judged it as possibly cynical, but on the other hand it was much more pragmatic than allowing complete destruction and becoming history itself. In that context, it would appear at the fi rst glance that a new equilibrium got established. The subsequent elections would reaffi rm that, as their overall results would induce a format of “grand coalitions” or “unusual coalitions” to become a prevailing model for governing within the European Member States. Within their scopes parties of the left and right would mutually balance their respective agendas, enabling each other to introduce certain particular elements of their programme into legislation. Embodiments of these have been the initiatives regarding youth guarantee or minimum wage. They may have been claimed as “originally coming from the left”, however unlike the past they would not be then seen as “stolen by the right” but rather “supported jointly” within the European or national governing coalition. Paradoxically therefore, though commentators of the “crisis aftermath” focused on the confi nement of the political debate, the “stagnation” was only illusionary. A certain new dynamics was born on its fringes, showing that in parallel the discrepancy in between what was considered “politically responsible” and what would be “socially demanded” grew. In the fi rst instance that led many into the streets under the banners of the new social mobilizations, but later split the citizens in between those withdrawing from politics altogether and those searching for alternative ways of expressing their opposition to the new majoritarian “governmental” consensus. While the level of trust in public institutions continued to drop and with that also the fi gures showing the support for the “traditional” political parties, the actual turnout stabilized and the new energy fl ew towards anti- systemic, protest, extremist and populist forces. In response, those being part of the “system” showed inclination to pick the strategy of discrediting the later groupings, which in essence made them suffer from a syndrome of a “surrounded fortress”. Within its’ walls it has been impossible so far to fi gure out how to build a set of new bridges that would reach beyond this narrow horizon and would establish new connections between established politics and the contemporary society. The raise in strength of the groups that used to be on the margins of politics was a substantial one and brought in new challenges, especially for the progressives. First of F C P A 9 all, in its context a new radical left emerged and claimed the position of representative of those, who opposed social injustice caused by crisis and subsequent austerity. Unlike in the past, it was not as simple as to denounce them and hope that their appeal would only be a “seasonal one”. To the contrary, particularly the examples from the South of Europe would rather indicate that not only were they there to stay, but also would convince at least a part of the center-left core voters to follow them. This posed a new dilemma for the center-left regarding on how they further imagined their “progressive” alliance and if in its framework they would see the radicals as potential friends or foes. Secondly, these new or newly revamped movements would bring along a new sort of energy.