RussianColonial t E*pAnsionto I9I7

trdited by Michael Rywkin With a foreword by SyedZ. Abedin

Mansell PublishingLimited London and New york :--r l : -.

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British I-ibrarv Cataloguingin PublicationData Russian colonial expansionto 1917.- ('I'he Associationtbr the Studl of the \ationalities (USSR and EastEurope) Inc(rrporittedseries in Issuesstudies: no. -.1) I \{()nr)graphse ries'tlnstitute of \1u'lrm \linoritr At-fairs:no. 1) I \rrr it't L nion-Colclntes-Historr I Rrrrkin. \liehrel IL Series III Series q|! J\.ll ljl -11r1-l\h--(l I\B\ ir

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Foreword. SyedZ. Aberlin.

Preface. Michael Rt,wkin. xi

1. An Overview of the Growth of the RussianE,mpire. 1 Rein Taagepera, 11. Russian Central Colonial Administrat rcn. From the of Kazan to the XIX Centurti, a Survey. Michael Rywkin. 8 111.Russian e"punslon in the Far Norrh. X ro mid_XVI Century. Janet Martin. - 23 17. Muscovy's Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan. 1552-56. The Conquest of rhe Volga: prelttde " to Empire. Henr1,R. Huttenbach. -- 45 7. Muscovy"spenetration of . The Colonizcttion Process1555-1699. Henry R. Htrttenbach. 70 71. Russian Expansion policy and in Ukraine, 164g-179l. An Owline and Analysis. Stephan M. Horak. 103 VII. TIte Crimea under Russian Rule. I7g3 to the Great Reforms. Edward Lazzerini. D3 //11. Ru_ssianExpansion in the caucasus to rg13. Muriet Atkin. 139 IX. The. Mobile Steppe Frontier. The RussianConquest and Colonization of Bashkiria and to 1850. Alton Donnelll,. lg9 X The ..lurkestan, Conquest and Administrarion of 1860-85. David MacKenzie. 20g ( ' .i,t '

\ 1. Rtt:.tlr'. C't-lltrill \sian Ernlirc. lSS5-1917.Setnrctur 235 lJt't kt'r'.

lnclcr 257 Foreword

The of Central Asia were among the first to acceptIslam in the seven centur'e.t.. the first c*enturvof the Hijra. Thereafter. Islamic civilizaiion naa a f,riliia;; ;;;;;*'t" that region. Nameslike .Bokhara and Tashkenteven to this dr) stir luminous memories in thc Muslim hearl Memories?yesl For although theseregions are strll.in a manner ot spcaking, Muslim regjons. the vigor and vitalitl, that characterized their era of Islamic has somehow abated. With a realitv "ffilg"n." too painful to conremplate.the Muslim psyche has found comfort and refuge in the diitant past ancrhas left the present to fend for itself. Not too long ago at the Rabat summit of Muslim hcadsof state a vigorous effort was made to include the Indian A"t.gotion u, un actrveparticipant in the deliberations. The proponentsof the idea arguedthat with a Muslim popularionof 70 miilion (at rhar ri.;), India was entitled to legitimaterepresentation in international Muslim councils. The^Muslim population , of the Soviet Union does not equal that of India. But it is closeto a not inconsrderable50 milrion. And it is growing. Based on current rates of growth. it is estimatedthar by the year 2000. the Sovier Muslii poputation will increasebv over 100percent. Indian by comparison rvill.increase by only 7l percentin rhe sameperioci (19g0_2000). In 1980.one out of every six Sovietcitizens was a Muslim-i; but bv the year 2000. one out of rhree will be a Muslim. i".t* -r.n;; I98t). thg population ratio was one Muslim out of Indians. Since the toml "u"r1 Indian population is estimatedto increase bv 55 percent as compareOto ine total Soviet population growth

vll \lll f()t(,\\'()l(l in India will ()t lr pcrccltt. Lr\ the rear 2(X)0thc Muslim ratio i,rclcarct() one Nluslinltlut of cvcrv sevenlndians' cxception I-urthcrntore.sittcc the creatic'lt.tof Pakistan.u'ith thc of offshore ()t thL'\tittL- rlf Kashrnir in thc northuest and a handful in India is irluntl' in thc InclianOcean. the lvluslimpopulation thc lslamtc tlLrite t[1lusc. Inc]ian territories contiguous to (again' Rcpubiiq of Pakistanare uhollv non-Mr'rsiimterritories Soviet ,,itl thc crccl.rtiot.tof Kashmir) The Nluslim regitlnsof the constituted L'nirrn. rrtt iltc-ct)ntrar\'. constitute todar' (and have of ' lt :incc tl.tctilnth centurvj thc border landsof thc rvorid live south hu: irccn estimatedthat 75 percentof RussianN'luslims to l1rml'v ol thu-Srr-Darra river in regionsthat are contiguous Pakistan e.tahlishecl\luslim lands: Afghanistan' lran' Turkel" rintl ChinescTurkestan C.()n\anguinitr'tlfrace.languageanc.lcultureacrosstheborders to the ir .irlnihct;ntcnough to have causedrepeated headaches I{tl..llrll llllperlum .\ll thcsc facts put tosether mav not amount to a convlnclng ()rganization lirgunlentin fa\or of openingup membe-rshipin the do serve ol thc lslamicConference for the SovietUnion' but the.v that the to unclerscclrethe strange phenclmenon of neglect to these \luslim qclrld as a u'hole has been guilt-vof with respect of lslam in Central Asta' l.rroncercommunities great deal ln Nluslinl polemics of recent times one hears a Nothing al-routthe historic encounter of Islam rvith the West' threat lortms larger in Muslim consciousnessthan the persistent (now represented that thc Muslim rvorld has faced from the West i-rr'.dccadentAmerica..)sincethetwelfthcenturve.o.Thisthreat thus large has been lookecl upon as both political and cultural' of sundry cl.rur'tksof Muslim territorv fcll uncler the control became \\'cstern po\\'ers. and Westernization (or Occidentosis) the order of the dav in Muslim societies' lands N{uchof this. horvever.is norv historv' Almost all Muslim oncc occupiedb-v West European powers have been relinquished' andq'ithgrou.ingconfidencetheMuslimwcrldisnowchallenging the hegemonvof the West over its mind and thought' Terrible's But rvhat about the ? From lvan the to the 1979 triumph over the Muslim of Kazan in 1-552 on invasi,onof Afghanistan. the historv of the Russian onslaught is more' the Muslim worlci is no less long and no iess gor-v'What itstillpersists.UnliketheWestEuropeanthreat.itisnotlikely Foreu.ord ix to fade away'.Besicres. it is not directed at rand onlv-oil fields. warm water outrets.strategic wateru'avs.these are ail grist to the expanding Sovietmi,. but.itschief targetis the Muslinirfi.i, no less. As one observer '.For has recently"noted: the first time""0 since the Prophet's triumphant ."turn to Makkah, Islam has come face to face_with a power determlned to eradicatethe religion as such and to convert Muslims from faith to innaetiiy.. (Gai E,aton.Islom and. the Destinl,of Man. London. f CS-i.p.lil. It is no doubt understandable tt an extent that in the first decadesof its emancipation.the world of Islam *u, p."o...rpi"a with rts own problems of stabilitvand consolidation.But surely thc lime has n()\ come for lt to take a measure of its international Islamic commitments. According to one recent estimate'no fewer than 350 million Musrimsrive as minoritiesin non-Muslim states. This figure constitutesclose to one_third of the total Muslim world population and can be overlookedin any planning of Muslim futures onlv at *Affui^grave peril to the Ummah. The Institute of N{uslim Minoritv since its inception'of in 1976 repeatedly drau,n .has attention ro the gravitv ini, situation' Through its research and pubricationactivities, it has sought to provide accurate and reriabre information about the conditions of life of Mu.srim minority' communrtiesin alr parts of th.e.world. and particularrv of thoie of the Soviet Union and China' To date. the Instituie is the onlv bodv of its kind devoted to this essenrialtask. It is hoped ,'ho, on the basis of the informationthus provided. communitvleaders as well as national and international organizarions uithin the Muslim world and outside it will see the urgency of formulating long ou..Ju" policies for the preservation of the Islamrc identity of these communities and of_ ensuring for them, through practicable means.their civil and religiousrights. The publication of RussianColiniar E-rpansionby the Institute mav be viewed as a step in this samedirection. The book is not, of course.exclusi'elv an accountof Muslim encounterwith the Russians. But as a casual "r,.n student of history,would recognize.the tide of Russian expansionhas principalfy U*" (and continucsto be) at the of Muslim tun,l, una tn. Islamic wav of life. This would"rp.'r. iuffice to erplain (if. indeed an explanation was needed) the interest the lnstitute of Muslim Minority'Affairs hasin sponsorin-e. along*'ith the Associationfor the Stud'of the Nationalities.thi, book fbr pubricarion. "*..li.nt '

t":,,:[||\' hope that Rtr.sslrur Co,tniul Erpansionwill rcceive $iclc disseminationand that rt urll be a forerunnerof other such studies that u'ill hclp to au'aken the Muslim mind to the full naturc and ertent of the Sor"ietthreat to the Muslim world' past anclpresent.

Instituteof Muslim Minority Affairs. London Syed Z. Abedin Director Preface MichaelRywkin

The historyof Russian colonialexpansion is of particularinterest. both from the historical point of view and from its continuing relevanccin our dars. First of all' the Russian Empire is the only one that is still rn cxistence.all other European powers having lost their .otonirf possessionsin the twentiethcentury. True. the RussianEmpire. folltlwin.ethe lqlT Rerolution. undcruent importunr .hung", arcas conquered throughout its historv \\ere gircn various dcgreesof autonomr in accordancewith the statusawarded to them by' (union republics. auronomous republics. autonomous re-eions. national districts). local languag"r;*"* recognized.and vast programs of economic.social. meclical, ancl educational assistance were promoted. lifting most of the formerly colonized peoples to the levels of the m-etropolv.tf this rverethe \\'hole storv we should not be able to speak of a survival of a colonial empire. Unfortunatelr,.socio-economlc correctives havebeen balancedb-v continuousporiticar control. Thus Russian cadres have been maintained in ke1,.power positions and in cclntrolover nati'e cadres. Russiantroops ancrsecuritv fbrccs are as much in charge as during the time of the tsars.Some national .r natronal-rcrigiousgroups are trusted.others distrusted.ail on the basisof their trllesiance to .Some nationalitieshave been punished but rehabilitated. others punrshcd "forsi'cn." but not Nationalismis toreraredat the le'er of nepotism.but rarclv abor.'e:separatism is rie-*'edas treason.on thc other hand. Russian chauvinisrn. cquallv suppressedafter the October Revolution.is being incrcasingll.toierated. passlns for patriotism. Secondlr,.the Russian Empire has been the onlv European

XI \ii I're.luce cnrpire to acquire colonial possessionsnot ilcr()ssthc scas-a claisical colorial pattcrn-but ercrossendless land massesof steppes. forests ancl taigas. a situation ntrt al$aVS lropcrlv recognizeclas equalh colonial.The limits of Russianpenetration uerc either natural obstaclcs(such as thc Pamir N'lountainsor pacilic ocean) or oppositic'rnfrom nations strong enoush ttr resist further Russiat.rpenctration (Turkcl'. China' Japan)' wctrks on tsaristRussian colonial erpansion arc bV no means clf purelv historicalinterest. TheY are inciispensablebackground studiesfor understandingcontemporarv Nlclscou'policies towards non-Russian nationalities conquered during the process ot cxpansion.And Sovictreactions to western historicaluritings on that subjectreflect the currentstandinq ol the givennationalitv in I\loscou'scres. contemporarv Soviethistoriographv has strcssedseveral prtn- of all' the ciples iusiifving Russian colonial erpansion First foreign poliiies of the Rr'rssiuntsiirs ure pictured ris having been alntclit as pcaceful anci bencr,.lcnt as the So'iet oncs. Nert. Russianconquest of nationalgroups still under punishment'such as the Crimean . is prescr.rtcdas ai defcnsive measurc on thc psrt of Russia: that of nzltiollsuhosc entry into the Russiat] crnpire was rather voluntar\'. such as Armenia or Georgiit' is clescribecl.on thc other hancl. in a ntore balalced (if not always trr.rthful)lashion. Finalll . all attemptsbv conquerednationalities to c,ain inclepencler.rcefrom tsarist Russia. $ hile not alu'ays c(.rndctnnccl(as $as cionein the 19-50su'ith the Shamilrevolt). are :lunrccl to krok like social. not national conflicts. Thus the Ba:hkir cightecnth-ccnturvstruggle against Russian landlords rrrrulcl [.re justihed. u'hile Kokand's fight nsllirtst udVancing l{r.r'.irrn;.rrntic: rr otrlcl hc \ccll ncgati\elr in thc eres oI prcscnl- rl.rr\r t\ie t histtrrilrn:. in thc case.f Nluslimpe.ples. *h. e'er sincethe sixteenth cclltur\ harc been the main targetof Russianerpansionism. their !(rn(luc\l is prescntedin the most clistortcd$av' uith Russia placc rrpp..,r-i,.r- 1s carrier9f progrcssand ciyilizertionat the giycn ,,i.,.1ti,.,..,.. \ltrslim states.on thc other hand. arc rnacleto appear It. 1.,rtht.rlckuarcl anci aggressive.lslam as a rcactionan' faith. .inrl \luslirl ma5sesas lrorc'oppressed bl their o\\'n co- riiigirrnltrir's(frtlnl feuclallorcls to merchant:)Ihan bY ct-rnqtrcrirlg i.:LIr.t Rttssiltnarmies. lite clcrcn ctlntributionsrnakine up this volume. $rittcn bv Preface xiii ten authors. each a specialistin his (or her) fielcl.have not been conceived as a collectionof essavson a rclated subject.instead, they' wcre planned as chapters.uith areas to be covered and chronological limits set in advance.The storv of Russiancolonial cxpansion has becn from the outsctthe kev point of this volume. with other matters. hou'e'er important. relegated to second place' Thus internationar relations have been discussedin the light of our key issue.and Russia.su,estrvard drive (a conquest, but not a colonialone in the proper senseof the u,ord) excludeO, exceptfor the Ukraine as part of the southwarddrive. To make thc subject more manageable.u,e also exclucledareas that only temporarilv fell into Russian hands (i.e. Alaska. Manchuria. etc.). and avoidedthe Jetvishissue as outsideof our scope. In our first chapter. . Rein Taageperapresents a short survey of the growth of the Russian Empire. Uottr in comparison to oih". colonial empires and as measured by a yarilsiick of average ycarll expansion. Michael Rvwkin's contributiondeals with the central coronial administration (first in Moscorv. then in st. petersburs) and attempts to trace some political continuitv. patterns of lover_ nancc and long-term administrative trends as thev the acts of colonialadministration. "*"rgJf.orn Janet Martin survevs the first Russian colonial expansion, which started even before the Mongor invasion and ended with the absorption of numerous small Finnish tribes dwelling to the north and northeast of Kievan Rus'. The northward extension of Russian territory ga'e Russia two important advantages;first. a refuge,from the . then a springboardfor later"movement towardsthe Volga and the Urals. Henrv Huttenbach presents Russia.s conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan as ke's to a' further colonial expansion. His second piece follou's Russia'sjump from the Urali to the Pacific Ocean. accomplishedin seventv_fi,",evears (as compared to the hundred and fift'r'ears that it took the Americansto reach thc Pacific from the AppalachianMountains). Both expansions, albeit almost two centuriesapart. were crucialin propcliingthese two countnesto sreat_po$,erstatus at a latcr date. StephanHorak's studv of Russiananncxation of the Ukraine bringsup the problem of primac' amon-qthc Sla'ic nations.The victor in the Polish-Russianstrugglc for the Ukraine. already strengthcncdbv the conquestof Siberia.became the sreat oor".i. xiv Preface turn her With her \r'esternborders secure. Russia was able to the Caucasus' attention to the south- towards the Crimea and colonial with the Cossacksprominent in carrying St' Petersburg's conquests. expansion' Edward Lazzerini depicts the Crimean part of that outpost ln with no Poland to contend with. the last Islamic fell into Europe outside of the Turkish possessionsin the Balkans Muslim Chrisiian hands in the way a few centuries earlier Granada had succumbedto Spanish reconquista' into the Muriel Atkin covers the early Russian thrust of Caucasus. an inevttable consequence of the elimination from protective Tatar power first from Astrakhan and then ih. C.i."u. Russia's role as both the protector of Christian of Muslim Georgians and Armenians ancl once again colonizer lands clearl,vemerges in this chapter' pacification It *'as our originii intention to include the Russian piece failed to of the Caucasus as u'ell. but the requested the mirterialize.leaving Muriel Atkin's chapter alone in covering Russian exPansioninto that area' of the Alton Donnelll' tleals with the gradual absorption to the Kazakh Steppe. a movement that finall;- brought Russia gatesof Central Asia. Russian David MacKenzie follows with the storv of the pacification conquestof the three Central Asian khanatesand the of the of the Turkmen tribes. as rvell as rvith the initial setting Russian colonial administration in that area' of the Finally. Seymour Becker surveYs the consolidation classically Russian colonial empire in Central Asia' the most similar to colonial of all tsarist Russian conquestsand the most cases'two thc caseof the French North African empire' In both Statesweremacleintoprotectoratesandthecentraloneabsorbed cases (Kokand by the Russians.Algeria b1'the French)' In both Muslims' the conquerors were Europeans' the conquered were were and in the two casesthe iustificationsgiven for the conquest quite similar. bv the Our project on Russiancolonial expansion'conceived I'Association (USSR American for the Studl' of the Nationalities with the and EersternEurope)" and dealing to a large extent of the Russtanconquest of Nluslim lands' attracted the attention interest Lonclon Instiiute of Muslim N{inoritv Affairs. This shared distribu- has resultedln a common sponsorship'publication' and Prefuce xv The population Ethnic Composition of the of the Russian Empire (within census borders)

Peoplesbv t719 1911/r7 lan_euaucgroup o,u in 100()s in in 1000s in % Russians 11.127 70.7 76.672 14.6 Ukrainians 2.026 129 31.023 18.I Belorussians 38-j 1."1 6.768 1.0 Poles 11.208 6.5 Lithuanians 1.7s6 Latvians t62 1 t.63-s N{oldar,ians r.216 0.7 Jcws 7.25-l ;1 1 Germans 31 0.2 2..r18 l.+ Tadj iksl 188 0.3 Ossetians: :-)/ 0.1

Armenians t.2 Greeks 261 0.2 Georgians 1.7.+8 1.0 Kabardiansr 103 Cherkesr 0.06 -s9 0.c)3 Chechensl 2,s3 0.1 Peoplesof Da_eestanr 772 0.-5 Finns 16.1 t.0 2.697 t.6 Udmurts .+8 0.3 -535 0.3 Estonians 309 1.9 t.1-5-1 0.6 Mordva r07 0.7 1.lEu 0.7

Tatars' r(rl I u 3.010 1.8 Bashkirsr 172 1.1 1.73-3 1.0 Chuvash 118 1..1 l.121 0.6 Azeri Turksr 1.996 Nogai' r.2 111 0.7 -)/ 0.0-5 Turkmcnr 361 0.2 Kazakhsr 1.698 2.7 r\lrgnlZ 731 0..1 Uzt]eksI 1.96-+ Iakuts 1.2 0.l )27 0.1 Kalmt ks 100 L-l 169 0. I Buriats JE 0.i 279 0.2. Othcrs -301 i.902 2.26

Source: S.l. Bruk. V.NI. ..Etnrcheskii Kabuzan. sostar naseleniia Rossii (1117 1.971gg)"..lorersAalu etnogrufiu. N. 6 (19E()). rMuslims rHalf Notes: ol them arc no\\. \iuslims. xvi Preface tion of this volume. Written by ten authors, each of whom is solely responsible for the content of his/her contribution, the work presents some inevitable problems. from a variety of politic;l views and academicapproaches, to different methods of presentation and style. But despite all the shortcomings and bmissions in the text that our critics might justifiablv uncover, this volume. we hope. will provide basic data and proper perspectiveon a subject too little known, but very much alive: ttre iotonial expansion of the only major world power that still managesto preserve its territorial conquests' a Z -J Z/ = -l =-< -a- Z-l ,3- ;

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'l\t f u\ )os \ot.r'IIl\\trYf u\ An Overview of the Growth of the RussianEmPire

Rein Taagepera

( r tarting from a tinv core. the Principality of Moscow eventuallv is ) d"u.ioo"d into a Russian-dominated empire that now that has called the Soviet Union. It is the third-largest empire empires' ever existed. ranking after the British and the Mongol history' Its combination of size and duration is unique in world slow but since it has outlasted by far the other large empires' Its not unique' relentless growth over five centuries' though -also These comes close to the record of steaclinessof expansion' claimswill be documentedin a later part of this overview' Thisbriefsketchwillnotdescribethemethodsthroughwhich empire expansionwas achicredand maintainedBuilding a large by obviously indicatessuperior ability to organizepeople socially' large more or less ruthlessmeans.'This is not to suggestthat empires are the optimal wav to run the world' On the contrary' of our cmpire-building ma,v prove to be a major foolishness a species. The following iiescription of gron'th does not take stand on whether it was healthv or cancerous' is The growth of Muscovl'-Russiain terms of its dr,v.landarea figure shorvnIn Figure I u'here area is plotted versustime'' This or further indicatcsthe approximatemajor areitsconquered subdued b1''Muscovr'-Russia at various time periods'' 1300 First mentionecl in chronicles in 11'17' Muscot'v after (in of startedto lncorporateother Russianstatcs at a ratc tcrms After souarekilomcters) that increasedas its orvn sizc incrcascd. areas the destruction of Novgorod in 1-178most Great Russtan (Mordvin) and were conquered.and ,o ,n'... some Volga Finnic the Baltic Finnish (Vote. Vepse and Karclian) areas' 81' 1533 some conquest of Great Russian areas \\'as cornpletc' and 2 Rus.siotrColonial Exptut.siott Pcrmian Finnic (Uclnurt-Votvak ancl Komi_Zrrian) and (Nc'nets) Samoved arr-asto the northeastalso *.ere controlled. In 1-5-i2-1-5-56 the collapseof the Tatar khanatesof Kazan and Astrakhan extendedMoscou,'s grip to Turkish (Tatar. Chuvash, Bashkir) and Finnic (N{ari-Cheremis)areas throughout the Volga basin. The or.'erthro'r'of the Khanate of Sibir in r-5gi submittJo to Moscorv Turkish-Tatar and Ugric (N,{ansi-Vogul. Khantr- Ostl'ak) populations in the loq,er basin. Displacementof -Polandfrom norrheasternparts of the Ulraine (1661I came simultaneouslv with further seizure of stretchesof Tatar "'ast a'd Sarnovedl.nds in the presentwestern Siberiau,here the Yenissei became the frontier arouncr 1630. Bv 1690 the Burvat Mongol. Evenki (Tungus) ancl yakut lands coulcl be considercd subdued-nearlv the whole of present_davSiberia, except the Amur region claimedb1, China. I'amchatki, anclthe indomiruhleChukchis to the far norrhea:t. By 1700 Russian area expansion slowecl clorvn for almost a centurv. Thc conquestsof Estonia. northern Latvia. and the Finnish lngermanlandaround the presentLeningraci (i721) were of great strategic and economicimportance. but adcredlittle to the land mass of the norv large empire. lncorporation of Kamchatka and the Chukchi area completed thc conquest of northcastern Siberia.East of the Volga. Russianoggr"rrion *u, kept in check for cenruriesbv Bashkirind Kazakh ,.silience.and hr thc destructionoI l Rursianarmr clfinrasion bv thc Turkmen ll7 171 To the *esr- p,rrand Srreden. and thc crimea heldtheir ground. and Russianconquests in the Ukraine alternatedwith rcverses. It'r1i72 a new wAveof major Russiancxpansion started, as the Russietns poland took from parts of Bclorussia.The Crimean Tatar countr' and thc southernUkraine were annexedin 17g3. The partiti.n porand of in 1793-179-rga'e Russia all of the Ukraine east of Galicia. all of Beloiussia. Lithuania. and southernLatria. Beru'ecn1g0r and rg2g. Finlancr.most of ethnic Pol.nd. Bessarabia. and most of rranscaucasiacame under Russian rule. Bct*een 1gl2 and rg5-r Kazakh resistancewas gracluallv crushed.and Russianpenetration of the Arctic rcsions continuedfrom Siberiato Alaska. The latter part of the nineteenthcenturv sau, thc final slowing_ dou'n .f the Russianimperiarist push. In ig,ig-1g63.china rvi's forced to cede rhc Amur and Ussuri clisrricts.In l g63_1E75 An Oten'iex o.filte Grottth of the RussianEmpire 3 was taken- Sakhalinwas occupled'In 1878Armenia's Kars region ot from Turker'. From i855 to 1885' the three and finallv -iodar"s Kirghizia. ' Tajikistan became Turkmenta-were conquered' Meanu'hile' Alaska untenable and rvas solclto the USA in 1867' extent The Russian Empire had reached practicallv its largest play in the ever bv 188-5.Minor expansionin Pamir (189-i)'power antaeonisms Balkans.ancl gradual infiltration of Manchurialed to rvith Grcat Britain. Austria. China. and finallv Japan' Russtan In retrospect. the vear 1905 marked the end of The expansion.ana tne beginningof the shrinkingclf the empire' geographical urea of the Sor,iet Union has never surpassedthe sizethetsaristempirehaclinlg0.l.SouthernSakhalinandclain-rs Poland' in Manchuria q'ere lost to Japan in 190-5'In 191l-1920 Finiand.Lithuania.Latr'iaan

hr the loeisticequation is the following: grou,th proceedsfirst at a constant percentagerate (like monev in a sarings account at c()nstantrnterest). but later it graduallyslows down as the size approachesan eventualmaximum size.This is the way a bacterial colonv srows in a laboratorv dish with fixed space and food supplr. The loeisticfit shown as a dashedcurve in Figure 1 corresponds to the [ollorvingequatit)n:

l) I A= ol-;(t-1690) I + e

where A is the areain million squarekilometers. ancl t is time in vears A.D. The maximum stable area reached is 22.4 million square kilclmeters(which is the present actual arca). Time of fastest grorvth was around e.o. 1690. During its earlv growth. N1usco'v's land area increasedby' 1.-5%per vear. accordingto this logistic approrimation. A similar erpproximationto the growth of the Roman Empire vields a similar rate of earlv growth: 1.8"2'i,per vear. The earlv Ottoman and US area srowths u'erc much faster:3.2 and 3.6% per vear. respectirelr,.One ma,v wondcr r'l'hetherslow growth leads to a better-buili and hence more durable empire. Figure 2 showsthe Russianarea curve in the companv of those trf sometrther major empiressincc llOU.i Asrn.ntiun".l carlier- the Russian empire is the third-largestever. surpassedin size only by the Mongol and British empires. and trailed bv the Chinesc (Manchu). Spanish. French and Baghdad Nfuslim cmpires.u'ith Rome a distanttwentv-fourth.6 Regarding durahilitr at fuirlr stahlesize. Russiahas not 'er rerrchcdthe ageol :uch malor empiresas the Roman-Bvzantine. Parthian-Sassanid. Lithuanian-polishor ottoman oncs. All these lasted at more than half of their maximum size for .l to 7 centuries. At prcsent Russi. has rcached 2.9 centuries.but o{ coursc its duration is stiil incomplete. NonethcressRussia is alreadvamong the tuentv most durablepolitical entitics through_ out histor\' [r1'this criterion. u,ith the list also including su-ch cnduring ministatcsas the Church State and San Marino. whcn onc takes into .ccount both size ancl ciuratio' of emplres. Russiacomes br far ahcad of the British and Monsol empires (u'hich had a short duration-cf. Fieure 2) and also of tI(;.LT()(H.I {RI]A (;RO!TTH oF soi\tE \l {JoR POST-124ilEItPtRES 6 Rls.rlanColonial Expan.sion thc Roman and Sassanidones (which staved small by present standards).A suitablemeasure of this combined size-cruration cffect is "time the so-called integralof area." i.e. the area under the area curve in Figure 2.7 It is 65 million square_kilometer_ centuries for Russia.while the closest,unn..r_up (British, and post-Mongol Chinese. from Ming to Mao) aie around zl5, follorved bv Rome. Baghdad.Han China. Sassaniclpersia. Sung- Tang China and the at 30 to 20 million ,quur!_ kilometer-centuries. As far as the impact of an empire depends on horv much land it controls for how man),centuries, Muscovv-Russra-USSR already holds the record in world history.While the combinedChinese empires. from Han to Mao, add up to much more. they u..,.p".ut"d bv long breakdown periods comparedwith which Russiantimes of trouble have been negligible. How long is the Russian empire stiil likelv to last'r rhere is some indication that biological and poritical entities that grow slowly tend to last longer. More specificallv.the duration at"half or more of the maximum size tends to be about three times the time it takes g0% to rise from 20 to of maximum size.sTo the extent that this very tentative observationapplies. the Russian empire could be expectedto retain at least haH'of its present area for .l more centuries. since its rise time from 20 to g0% of maximum size was 2.4 centuries and it reached half of its maximum size area around 1690.i.e.. three centuriesaso. While such projections . should not be taken as very precise, they serve to give an idea of horv the slou, but relentlesr'gro*,h of the Russian empire can be expected to affect the stability of the resulting structure. Forms of government of the empi.e haue changedoccasionallv. and mav changeagain. Minor or even not- so-minorchunks of land mav detachthemselves. But the bulk of the Russian empire is rikervto stavtogether long afrer the r9g0s. if the experience of past major empirei can be tik.n u, a suide..j

Notes

1. For a comparison of American and Russian policies towards technologicalll' simple people. see Taascpera. R.. .n. n. Haicheiien (1977). "lf the Na'ajo *ere in the Soiiet Union: u .n-poroiiu. approach to the Russian nirtionalitr.poli*,..- In I. Kamene;;iy.;;.. Narionalisnt nnd I!t,tt,t price.ssis Rigftrs.. rl' ,vorrernization'in thi US.IR.Libraries Unlimited. Littlcton. Colorado. '7 Atr Oten'ietr o.f the Gron'th o-f the Rttislcri Empire "Gronth empires"' G^eneral 2.- From Taaeepera.R. (1968). cunes of Bjorklund: H' Svstems.i:,^f Zf-tZ:. *ith correctionsbased on 9" the d;iil;" onO A. Rohr ( 1970\' Hisroric'ttl Atlus of .Workl' ^Barnes &Noble.Neu.York:.Cherv.A'F.(1()67).AttAtlasofRussian Hammond (1968)' iirrory. Yale Universitl Press.' Ne* York: Kinder' H ' and Htrnrmrtrtd HistortcatArlrls. Mapleri'ood' N'J : and Deutscher w. Hilscmann (196-+). tltt.-Ailas Zur weltgesclilcllte. Taschenluch Verlag. \{unich' ct.fMttio-r Soviet :. g;i..l mainlv on liatz. 2.. ed. (1975). Httndbook (1963)' Russia Nationaliti..r.Fre. Press. Ne$ York: RVukin' N'l .trt Estonian Soviet Central Asic. Collicr Books' Nerr York: and Valgus' en.i.iop"Oi" ( 196E-1976).Ee stiN oLrkogutle Entsuklctpeedrrr' Tallinn. .1. R. TaagePera(1968) Horde' Ottoman S. Sor.J 5n'unpublishedmeasurements The Golden sizc' prior to 1700 and Spanishemprres at times surpassed.Russiain cluttering it.up' Thev ire not sho*'n in Figure 2' in order to avoid empires: svstematicsof 6 R. i"tg.p.;-iiqls). "Si)e and d-!t1tl9n of size." Slrlial ScienceResettrclt 7:108-127' growth-decline Z. R. foug"pera (1978). "Size and duration-of empires: 7: 180-196. curves.-3dOto otto B. C... S0cial scienceResearclt "Size empires: grou'th-declinc S. n. foog.pera (1979). and !uratign.of ...,u.,.-600B'C.to600A.D...SoclalScienceHistory3:115-138... does not meanwhile 9. These projections can apph' if humankind 9nl1 population^and reach a clangerous"*.gu.ii'it"'due to accelerating "Crisis aroun-d2005 technologv &plosion--ci. R' Taagepera (1976)' model"' General a.O.:--A tichnologr'-populatioi interaction "People' resources:an .Si's/ents21:137-13E: inci (tSZSl' skills and Teclmological i;r..r.ii* for rvorld populaiion gror,r'th." "rodel Forecastingand SocialChange 13:13-30' il RussianCentral Colonial Administration From the prrkaz of Kazan to the XU Century, a Survey

Michael Rvwkin

of supervisingthc cenrrarladministration in T1""0^lTss^ charge or non-Kusslannationarities annexed bv the growing-patricianRussiin Empire was traditionalrv entrusted to the empire's councils:to the Boyar Duma until the time of petir the Great. to the StatcSenate thereafter. and to the state Councilfrom 1g10to 1917'\\'hether this can be conccivedas a sign of discrimination aqalnstthe non-Russians whoseaffairs were deemedbeneath thc tsar's dignity to handle. or rather as a sign of benevolence towards the conquered rratiors u'hose Russianadministration was thus made accountable to a kind of jury. insteadof one man. or agaln to the tsar'swish to sharethe rule over the alienswith his countr)"s peers, remains unclear.Accordin-q to Kliuchevskii,in the secondhalf of the se'enteenthcenturv the Bovar Duma was in control of severalprika:.t. (posol'skii. pomestnvi. Razriatlrtvi) as n'ell as of the "coloniar" Kazanskii. and had specifichours set asideto hear their reports.r The fact of accountabilitvto a larger bod1,of peers of the realm mectin-ein chamber to hear the tsar'sorders. administrativere- ports and subjects'compraints must haveprovicred some restraints tr the actionsof stateofficials in chargeof colonialadministration. The Iatter has been traditionall;- organized according to territori.l principles.each coroniat .onqu"ri dealtr.vith separolery, i.rith no attempt at British-stvleoverall adnrinistration'.on..n_ trated in a single "Coroniar office." It is only whcn Russiawas expandingexclusivelv eastward.with rittlesuccess elsewhere, thal suchunity occurred.bv chance.under the umbrellaof the centrar office in charge of Kazan and Siberian tcrritories. namelv the prikttz of the Kazan Court. s I Rtrs.sian( entral Colortitl Adntirtistratiott formerlv a The appearance of a separate prikaz of Siberia' the situation very much desk of the Kazan prikaz. dld not change trvo prikazv-' The because of the close relations between the bl: the fact that togethernessof the two offices was underlined a century after their iitn prit or-\'\\'ere. for at ieast a quarter of sL)metimes.even tormat separatioll.headed bv the same bo1'ur' for a basic unity in assistedby the same dlaks' This provided colonial polic1". southward and SuUsequentiv.rvhen Russia began to expand newly conquered westward. and later into the southeast'each r'l'ith its own central area. at least temporarilr" was provided or later in St' territorial administration located in Moscow' seventeenth centurv Petersburg.Thus when at some point in the Malorussia(Ukraine)' ih"r" eriri.d theprikazt' of Kazan' Siberia' and Lithuania the short-iiveclones of Llfland (Latvia. t660-1666) and even (i.e.. conqueredareas of the Grand Duchy' 1656-1667)' office to unite u Corru.t prikaz. there was no single colonial remaining them under one roof. each prikaz administration Some conquered ,apo.",af,u accountable to the Bovar Duma' tutelage' Thus the nations were placed under most unusual prikaz to the one Kalmyks were moved in 1678from the Moscow when Russtawas of the \ew cl'tetvert'.rIn the nineteenth centur.v' Central Asia' agatn pacif,vingthe Caucasusand expanding into appears was dealt with in a separate manner' It thus "a.t-t'arJu (azan was an accident of that the "colonial office" of the prikaz history not to be rePeatedagain'

Stagesof AbsorPtion of downgrading of the There is in Russianhistorv a clear pattern under the rule of the .onqu.."d lands from being statesbrought Muscovttecrowntobeing*centrallyadministeredcolonialterri. administrativel'v tories. and finalll' to becoiring simple provinces' provinces' This inctistinguishablg from neiglboring Russian of stages of transition is clearlv visible ihrough the succession territories seem to administrative dependence most conquered have passedthrough' tribal units that At flrst the conquered state (we are excluding the jurisdiction of did not reach that level) rvouli remain under of Foreign Affairs)' the Posctl'skiiprikaz (later the Ministrv to Russia in the usual Referred to as a separateunit and linked l() RrrssiturColonial E.rpansion tcudal tradition of having a common monarch.it would retain if not the essence. at least a le-qalform of sovcrei-qnty.At the scc.rrcl stage. a tcrritorial prikaz. bearins the iame of the e.'quercd state(such as the one of Kazan).accountable not only tc) the monarch. but to the peers of the realm (Duma. Senate. (ouncil)" is in charge Finailv. the former stateroses all separate identitv and is treated as an ordinarv Russianprovince and its inhabitants as ethnic or national minorities riving in the Great RussianChristian Orthodox state. Almost all the conquered lancls went throuqh this processof diminishing autonomv: Kazan. Siberia. Georgia. Crimea. even Ukraine. This process. irreversiblein the long run. lasteduntil the end of the tsaristempire in r9r7. Thus whire the trvo sisrer prikazv of Kazan and Siberia toqether rvith the posol,skiishared responsibilitv for Russia's eastern poticy. the dividing line between their respectivejurisdiction in dealing w,ith an irt".n natron was that nati.n's degrce of incrependencefrom Russia. Sincc the prikazt'alwavs actedin the name of the monarch.it is often difficult to scparate the poli*, of the rsar from that of the prikaz. What is clear is that passin-eof jurisdiction from the Posol'skii to a terriroriar prikaz ro, u ,u." si-enof decline in the statusof the nation concerned. Thus the shift "rsardom" of the Kasimor,' in Mcshchera from the jurrsdiction of poso|skii the prikaz to the Kazan prikaz in the 1660s is considered to be the end of the autonomy of the "Klrsimov tsars" (or ..tsarevichs..). althou.s.htheir Oun"r,u,ur- vived until 168r.r whire jurisdiction the of the posoi'skii irikaz meant a recoqnitionof formal soverei-entv.that of a teriitorial prikaz was just an acceptanceof nationar-curturalseparatcness rvithin a framework of residualsovereiqntv During the second staqe.that of resicrualsoverergntv, when the area was provided u,ith a Moscow_ petersbur_e_based or St. -of central territorial administration supervisrngthe on. th. ter.tory itself. there were five reversof administrative control: 1. The council (Boy'ar Duma. Senare.State Council) to which the central territorial administrationremained accountabre; 2. the abor,'e-mentionedadministration itself Qtrikaz. com_ mrttee. commission): 3. the provincial administration (hcaded by a t,oey,oda. namestnik.governor-general. governor). accountableto the centraladministration : RttsslartCentml ColttnialAtlmitistration Il

.1. the cit,vor district a

The Prikaz of Kazan The first among Moscor,v-basedcentral tcrritorial administrations charged with handling a specific newlv acquired posscssion\:ls the prikaz of Kazan. Its origins date to the times of vasilii III (1503-1533).when the Meshchera territorv of Mordva was wrested from Kazan in the i-520s and a N{eshchera court ll RussianColonial Expansion

(.Vesltclterskiidt'or) was ser up in N{osco\\.to take care of the aflairs of the territorv. a part of ll'hich u,asleft under the nominal rulc of its Russianpuppet "Kasimov tsars.".i Thc MeshcheraCourt was initiailv placed under the contror of the Posol'skii prikaz (Foreign office)6. but later combined with the Kazan Court. createdin 15-53.a'ear after the takeover of Kazirnbr Tsar Iran the Terrible. The Kazan Court was orgrrrl\\rl a\c. lr\s\E sesesu\ regrssr\ administrationscreated probablv out of Bovar Duma desksTto managevillages taken over bv the cro*'n in areasannexecl bv the Muscovite stale. lt r.las first knou n as i:bu lold Russian for office) in the 1560s.sometimes as dv,or or dt,orets(a court or a palace). and finallv as the Kazan prikaz.s It rvas already so menti

cmplo'ed in militar'constructions.foreign experts working on its tcrntor\,. and local chieftainsu,ho supportedRussian rule.23 The prikaz of Kazan. like the other regionalones. kept estate qrant documents.processed land grants and settled diiputes.?l The prikuz also took care of numerous casesof runawav serfsand cleserters.In the latter task it cooperateduith the Tain-yi(Secret) prikctz. thc prototvpe of the Russian secretpolice. Followins the ustralpattern of the prikuzl'system. thepriiaz of Kazan actld as a court in adjudicating disputes under irs jurisdiction and in prosecutins local officials for graft. thcft or incompetence.ls While Muslims were absent from the prikaz hierarchy. there \\'as not much racial or religi.us discrimination otherwise. Manv \luslir's servedthe croun on equal termsuirh the Russiansin rtll c-rceptthe hiehestpositions. Some Belorussianscrfs captured polish-Lithuanian tlurrns the war againstthe state,evcn ihoush ( hristian.u'ere sold to both baptizedand Musrim Kazan TatJrs in thc earlv 160tls.r6 After 1-563.and long before Siberia. rhe Kazan lands were places of exile for both domesticenemies and foreign prisonersof n ar. and the prikaz u,as in charge of the techniial side of deportationmatters. Moreover. its headquarterscontarned cells tor the temporar' incarcerationof orfendersuncler its iurisdic- tion-the usual practice in the absence of a cohereni prison svstem. In addition. military orders concerningrroops from the Kazan territorv n'ere channered through the kazan prikaz and, not directly through the Razriad as in Russiaproper. Acceptance of local chieftains coming under the tsar's sovereisntv in neighboring nomadic areas was also handled b' the-prikor. Finally'. the prikaz \\'as supposed to protect the natives from willful land seizuresand extortions b_v-Russian settlers. a task not aluayscarricd ouI sith much diligence.:- The Crown was careful not to ignore the prikaz when dealing with "oriental" matters. For example. grain requisitionedin excessof deliverv quotas uas "borrou'ed" rather than '.taken" from the prikaz: a demand for silk atldressedto the voevoda of Simbirsk bvpassedthe prikaz. but still directed that half of the merchandisebe sentto Kazan.Even the'isit of the persianshah, Abaz, to Moscow in 166.1rvas handleclfor the tsar bv a Kazan prikaz diak. not bv the Foreign Office.rs The prikoz of Kazan insured the economic exploitation of the area by the crown. the officialdom. the orthodox clerqv and the RussianCentral Colonial Administration 15 Russiannobility. It provided law. order. and basic protection for the natives in return for their submissionto Moscow. Neverthe- less,during its existence,and despite the encroachmentsupon its authority by other prikazy, especially by the Razriad-a usual occurrence caused by ill-defined limits of jurisdiction among governmental institutions in pre-Petrine Russia-the prikaz of Kazan managed to maintain a degree of separatenessfor the "Kingdom of Kazan." The prikaz disappeared around 1720. when Peter the Great's reforms of the central government were finally implemented. Its functions were then split among various departments (collegiums)of the new administration. During the 1763Senate reform. Kazan was assignedto a "desk" (.rrol)of the Third Department of the Senate, a pale reminder of its former importance;2ethe Volga basin became simply a part of Russia, administrativelyindistinguishable from the rest of the empire.

Siberian Prikaz

Following the conquestof in the 1580s,the newly acquired territory was entrusted initially to the Posol'skii prikaz (Foreign Office) and to the chetvertnoi prikaz of diak Andrei Shchelkalov.soon afterwardsto the Novgorod chet' of diak lvan Vakhromiev. next to the specialchetvert'(office below the prikaz level) headed by diak Yarfolomei Ivanov (159G1599), and finally. soon afterwards, subordinated to the prikaz of Kazan. For the next thirty-eight years (from 1599 to 1637) Siberia remained under a special department within the prikaz of Kazan.30In 1637. a separateSiberian prikaz was established,at first managedby the officialsin charge of the Kazan prikaz. The importance of the new office reached its summit under the vigorous leadership of the dumnyi diak A.A. Vinius, first appointed in 1695. An enterprising Dutchman's son. Vinius was instrumental in promoting the exploitation of the mineral resources of the Urals. but he finally ended in disgrace. The prikaz itself fell victim to Peter's reforms. Reduced to a provincial office in 1710. it was closed in 1725.But owing to an accumulation of unresolved cases. it was reestablished after Peter's death and survived for another twenty-five years (1730-1755).Afterwards, the area's administrationwas not much different from that of the rest of the country, but its non-Russian population remained under special supervision of the Senate 1t. RrrrilarrColonial Expansion rhroughoutthe 1760s.Thus it was the Senatethat in 1759gave tt pcrmi\sinnto build mosquesin Tatar areas .{lmost a centurvlater. first between1821 and 1838.then again i.crucen 1852and 18611.a specialSiberian committee of the State C'rruncil\\'as entrusted with Siberianaffairs' supervision.But after lr6J it *as total integrationonce again.and this time for good. 'Dtrring its long existence.the Siberianprikaz was in chargeof .rll Siberian affairs. appointing and firing voevodas. governors, ,lrrrArand scoresof lesser officials. exercisingmilitary authority \)\cr troops stationed in the area. collecting iasak laxes from the n()n-Russiansand taxes in kind from the Russians.as well as rupervisingdeportees from Russiaproper. The prikaz was also in chirrse of the so-called "Sable Treasurv" (Sobolinaia kazna), a rnajor source of export revenue for the Russian state. Like the prikaz of Kazan, the Siberianprikaz was accountable Ir) the tsar and to the Boyar Duma. To presentreports to either Lrtthe higher instances.the boyar (or the dumnyi diak) in charge rrf the prikaz would appear flanked by trvo dlaks. Reports were gr-ncrallvprepared by one of the diaks and decisions taken nq tt'rklttt ("upstairs") were usually rendered immediately upon hcanng the report. l-herc rvere four kinds of decreesor orders issuedthroush the lrr ku:" 1. Personal decrees (imennlte ukazy), the tsar's orders addressedto a specificperson. Thev were generally issued after hearing the prikaz presentationof the matter. ). L'kazn,,-egramoty-, general decrees issued in the name of the tsar. often responsesto the prior prikaz presentation. .1. Instructionsor memos (nakazy. nakaznye gramoty) setting policies to be followed and usually addressed to the roeroda(s)in Sibena. 1. Simple orders (gramoty) dealing with particular instances rrndissued by the prikaz itself.'': 1'hc prikaz also issuedlists describingdocuments on file and kept track of correspondencewith other prikaz_v, mostly with the Rtt:riod but also with Land Grants and Foreign Affairs.''l An rr.rmple of such correspondenceis the discussionabout deported ('rrcrrssiansrvith the Malorussianprikaz. 'I'hc prikoz also acted as a disbursingagencv, paying its clerks r.t,,tidiuchie)in Siberia. reimbursing travel expenses,assigning RussianCentral Colonial Administration l7 moneys for deportees. for grain deliveries to Siberia, and for office expenses.3'lA permanent peculiarity of Siberia was the absence of serfdom. a concessionmade by the authorities to attract badly needed settlers to this enormous and often inhospitable land. Details of local administration in Siberia are too numerous to be included in this chapter. By and large its differences from prevailing all-Russian administrative practices gradually decreased.First known as the "Siberian kingdom," another jewel in the Muscovite crown. Siberia was ruled by a voevoda assisted by special clerks from the prikaz and responsibleto the latter. During Peter the Great's gubernia reforms, it was made into a governorship divided into tu'o provinces. After the prikaz disappeared, Siberia was split into more governorships and provinces. was initially reluctant to intro- duce her 1775 reform of territorial administration into Siberia. but it was finally implemented by 1782-1783.rs Under the newly establishedSiberian Committee of the State Council, governor-generalsin charge of several governorships were appointed (1822). Unlike regular governors. they were entrusted with militarv powers over their respective regions, a practical necessitygiven the state of communication at that time. By the last quarter of the century this was still the situation in eastern Siberia and in the maritime provinces, but no longer in western Siberia. already integrated into a standard Russian administrativesystem. By the end of the century these last traces of special treatment disappearedas well.

Malorussian Prikaz

Already prior to the "reunion" of the Ukraine with Muscovy and in reaction to Polish difficulties with the Cossacksunder Polish rule, a specialCossack prikaz was set up in Moscow (161G16a6). a forerunner of the Malorussian prikaz.36 However, the Malorussian (Ukrainian) prikaz failed to develop into a fully fledged central administrative institution empowered to conduct its own affairs over some historical lifespan. Organized sixteen years after the closingof the Cossackprikaz and eight years after Khmelnitsky's oath of allegianceto Russia,it remained indepen- dent from other prikazy only from 1662 to 1687. At that time it was subordinated to the Posol'skli (Foreign Affairs) prikaz, a lr 1?rlrrrlrColonial Expansion

.t.rtc. t)f affairs that lasted until its demise. In 1708 it was rc()rsiinized into a "collegium" and u'as given administrative, rutlicial. financial and polic,v powers over the Ukraine. still rcmaining under Foreign Affairs supervision. Among other nratters,it was also in charge of Russian troops operating in the Ukraine. but Moscow's administrative hold over the area was so.mehowalleviated by the fact that Ukrainian hetmansremained elected (albeit not without Russian influence on the election process)and nominally'still in charge of local self-government. Between 1709 and 1722.Peter the Great's centralizationdrive aftered the situation. matching hetmanswith Moscow-dispatched namestniks (a Russian version of English viceroys), a direct consequenceof Hetman Mazepa'sbetray'al of Moscow in favor of Sweden before the famous battle of Poltava. ltlamestnikswere supposed to exercise joint authoritv with the hetmens in the following fields: maintenanceof peaceernd prevention of treason, supervisionof foreign relations. appointment of higher officials, imposition of sentencesinvolving capital punishment. distribution (or withdrawal) of land grants. Such extended powers restricted the hetmans' authority to lesser matters. At provincial levels, Cossack starshinas(elders) were matched by Russian comman- dants in a similar manner. Finally. by 1722the namestnik-hetman pattern (a forerunner of today's first Partv secretary native, second secretarvRussian) was replaced by appointed hetmans. At Peter's death the Malorussiancollegium was abolished and Ukrainian "freedoms." including elected hetmans, restored (1727\. a state of affairs that lasted under Catherine I and Peter IL However. under E,mpressAnne, it was decided to return to Peter's practicesand during the 173,1vacancy no new hetman was elected. Empress Elisabeth changed this again in 1747. sub- ordinating the hetman to the Malorussian collegium of the Senate, the heir of the old prikaz. Under Catherine II. the last of rhe hetmons was forced to resign and the government of the Ukraine was entrusted to an eight-membercommission.-t7 Then. in t763, the commissionwas reformed into the newlv created SecondDepartment in charge of "governorships under special statute" (na osobom polozhenii), meaning Ukrainian and Baltic areaswith their remnants of local sclf-government.3E ln 1161.the position of hetman was abolishedfor the last time and all local administrativeorqans dealine with the Ukraine as a Rus.sianCetttral Colonial Administration 19 unit eliminatedb1- 1765. In 1775the CossackZaporozhie sech,, the territorial base of cossack autonomv. was abolishecland in lTRl the divisiont-rf rhc Ukraine inro iraditionalr.ojska (resi- ments) was terminated. A vear later. rcgular Russian-stvle gubernias were introduced and provided \\,ith standard Russian administrations.Finaily. in 1783 the Russian poll tax was extended into the Ukrarne. The Malorussian collegium itself lasted a few vears longer, probably to wind up its paperu'ork. and was finally closed in 1786.In 1793.the vear of the seconcipartition of poland. Russian administrative institutions were introduced into the annexed right-bankUkraine as u,ell.The right of Ukrainiansro be judged in accordancewith traditional"Lithuanian codes." still in force in the middle of the centurv and more democratic than Russian ones. was eliminated as u'ell. For a short time during the reign of Paul I some elements of Ukrainian self-government.such as elected judges. were brieflv revived.ie to be terminatecl bv the end of the century.

Georgian Kingdom

The case of Georgia is only marginalll, within the scope of this chapter, Georgia having never been provided with a separateSt. Petersburg-basedadministration. a practice alreadv obsolete at the time of Georgia's incorporation into the Empire. Neverthe- lessthe tsar. having overcome his "extreme disgust . . to accept that kinedom into Russian domain. consideringappropriation of alien land unjusr"+o(1801). provideclGeorgia with a speciallocal administrationunder General rsitsianov. himself a Georgian. but in Russian service. Thus Georgian "expeditions.' replaced the usual Russiandepartments. and Russianpolice chiefs were given Georgian adjuncts. This special status lasted until 1g.10,when regular Russian administration was introduced. But owins to Muslim upheavals in the north callins for closer ties with Christian Georgians. some relief was grantecl: a Russian namestnik of the Caucasusrvas appointed (18aa) and Georgian nobles were again called to assist the new administration. Simultaneouslv,a caucasian Committee of the state council was establishedin St. Petersburg(18;15-1882). Georgia was just one of several territories placed under its jurisdiction. A special Caucasian army was also created (1859) anci the namestnik I /l:r'rrtur('t,lttrial E.tpunsiort :.r,\\tric(l$ith fire departmentsof his own: generaladministra- :r,,n. tinrrncL-s.state propertY. control. and even diplomacy' But :hrL,ughoutthe 1860s and i870s. with the extinction of the \ltr:lirn Shamil revolt. the powers of the namestnik were cr.ttluallr curtailed. first by' withdrawin-qhis diplomatic preroga- ii\e\. thr-n by' introducingthe 187:lall-Russian city reform. In 1:sl thc no longer neededCaucasian committee was disbanded .rntl r vear later the system of namestnikswas abolished. From rh.rttirnc- on. Geclrgia.with the rest of the Caucasus.was treated lrkc an ordinar-vRussian province.

Conclusion Russia'sconstant imperial conflict has been between centralized conformity and the variety and diversit.'-of its ethnically alien ()utl)ing areas. In addition, nationalitiesincorporated into the cr.npircwere not viewed on equal terms. Variances and leeways rrnrntcd to each group reflected such variables as their level of development as perceived by Moscow or St' Petersburg, their numerical importance. and their degree of acquiescenceto Russian rule. Ethnic closenessto the Russians often played a negativerole in the strugglefor specialtreatment, as was the case uith the Ukraine. Until Peter the Great. the primacv of the crown prevailed over that of the empire, and conquered nations were viewed as more "kingdoms" under the same tsar. With the emergence of the conc*eptof Rossilskaia imperiia (all-Russianempire) as opposed to Russkaia(Russian), former "kingdoms" were pulled down to provincial levels and their specific administrative setups aligned with those of the rest of the country. This tendencywas somehow arrestedafter Peter'sdeath, but renewed by catherine the Great. The trend of diminishing local autonomy for newly acquired lands was repeated with each new nineteenth-centuryconquest' but this was only on provincial levels. since no St' Petersburg- based central "colonial" office was ever reestablished'

Notes

1. V.O. Kliuchevskii. Boiarskaia duma drevnei Rlsi. 3rd ed' Moscow, 1902.pp.410ff. 2. N.V. OlUot'stil. Istoriiaprikaznogo stroia Moskovskago gosudarstva ^' " Po s o b i e po te k t s ia, n ;1 :;" ::',:::,:: rT.- ;';"' ": :' 3.V.V. Veliaminov-Zernov. "Izsledovanie o kasimovskikh tsariakh i tsarevichakh." Trudv vo.stochnago otdeleniia imperatorskago arkheologicheskago obshchesrt'a. III (St. petersburs. 1g66). p. 186-t{7 4. Grigorii Kotoshikhin. O Rossiiy' tsarsty,ovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicho. 4th ed. (St. Petersburg.1906). p. 27. ,5.See M. Rvwkin. "Russian Colonial Expansion before Ivan the Dread." The RussianRelierr'. XXXII. n.r..l lJulv 1973).p.293. 6. Veliaminov-Zernov. pp. 27,5316 495. 7. Debol'skii.p. .161. 8. At some point a combined Kazan-Nizhnii-Novgorod section existed in Moscow's Razriad (General Militan Administratronl. 9. Mikhail Grigor'evich Kurdiumor'. "Opi.:anieaktov khraniashchikhsia v arkhivakh imperatorskoi arkheograficheskoikommissii," Letopis' zaniatii imperatorskoi arkheograficlteskoi komntissii za 1906 iod. vypusk 19. p. 165(item 50). t0.A. Zimin, "O slozhenii prikaznoi sisremy na Rusi." Akademiia Nauk. Institut Istorii Dokladv isoobshchemia (Moscow. 195,1). vvpusk 3. p. 175. In the middle of the sixteenth centurv there exis.ted.for e.xample.dv'ortst,of Riazan'. Dmitriev. Tver'. Uglich. as well as rhe dvortst,of Kazan and Nizhnii-Noveorod. Some of them were probablvjust sectionsof rhe Razriad. t1.I.l. Verner. O vremeni iprichinakh obrazovaniia moskovskikh prikazov (Moscow. 1907). p. .13. 12. M.M. Boguslavskii.Perr 1 (Moscow. 19,18).p. 278. l3' N.P. Likhachev, otviet surov'omukritiku, vozrazheniiana retsenziiu D.V. Korsakova o knigie "Razriadnve diaki XVI vlekc" (Moscow, 1890).p. 12. l:1. According to LL Smirnov. Ocherki politicheskoi istorii russkoso gosudarstva 30-50kh gg. XVI veka (Moscow-Leningrad, 195d). pp. 203ff. the newlv appointed dvorerskii shared Ivan's lenient approach toward Kazan Muslims. opposing prince Kurbskii's demands for their annihilation. For a different view see J.I. Fennell !:9 ) Prince Kurbskv's Histor,- of lv'an 1V (Cambridge. 1965). 15. This custom, known as mestnichesr'o.was formallv abolished in 1682. but is known to have survived for vears thereifter. 16. S. Porlir'ev. "spiski voevod i diakor po Kazani i Sviiazhsku. sostavlennye v XVII stoletii." Izt'estiia obshchestva arkheologii, istorii i etnografi. XXVII (Kazan. 1911)l pp. 63ff gives a full lisiof governors of both provinces to the times of peter the Great. 17. Porfir'ev. "Neskol'ko dannvkh o prikaznom upravlenii v Kazani v 1627g.," ibid, p.75ft. 18. Boris Nolde, La formation de l'Empire Russe. Etudes, notes et documents.vol. I (Paris.1962).p.78. 19. A.A. Vvedenskii. Dom Srroganot.tkh r XVI-Wil vekakh (Moscow. 1962).pp. 279ff. 288ff. 20. Akademiia Nauk. Arkheograficheskaia ekspeditsiia. ly, 127. act. 289. :l Rttssirut (olonial E.rpttt.siott 11. Debol'skii.p. 486. 32. Letopis' zaniatii imperatorskoiarkheogralicheskoi kommissii . . . vvpusk21 (1908-1909).p.25. citesthe caseof a poddiachiiolthe Kungurizba in the 1680s. 23. For detailedsources. see N{ichael Rvu'kin. "The prikazof the Kazan Court: First RussianColonial Olhce." CanadiunSlavonic Papers, vol. XVIII. N.3. (Sept.1976). p. 298. 24. A.A. Zimin. Oprichninaltctnu Grozrtogo(Moscow. 196:1)'note o. 380. 2-5.Letopis' zaniatii imperatorskoiarkheograficheskoi kommissii . . . v.vpusk3i. p.217 (31Aug. 170"1)rArkheologicheskaia ekspeditsiia. IV. 209 (12 Sept. 1667)and p.'l{J9(Aug. l6tt3)r"Diela tainogo orikaza." Russkaiaistoricheskaia biblioreka. XXI (St. Petersburs. tloz;, p. :tl:. 26. Russkaiaistoricheskaia biblioteka. XXVII. pp. 92-93. 27. For detailedsources. see Rvu'kin. "The prikaz of Kazan .." o.299.'Russkaia 28. istoricheskaiabiblioteka. XXI. 996. 10f13.1125. 11'16-46. 29. Aleksandr Vitsyn. Kratkii ocherk Ltpravleniiur'' Rossll ot Petra Velikagodo izdaniiaobshcheg,o uchrezhdeniia ministerstva (Kazan. 185-5).o. 67. 30. N.N. Ogloblin. "Obozreniestolbtsov i knig Sibirskagoprikaza (1592-176E)."in Chteniiav imperutorskomobshchestve istorii i dretnosteiros.siiskiklt pri Moskot'skornunit'ersitele. vol. 173(1895). p. 7. 31. A. Gradovskii. V-vssliaiaadrninistrurslin Rossli XVIII st. i general- prokurort'(St.Petersburg. 1866). p. 179. 32. Ogloblin.pp.6_9. 33.Ibid. pp. 21-25.,31-32. 52-5'1. 31. Ibid. p. 65. 35. Vladimir Grigor'ev. ReJormamestnago uprtn'leniia pri EkaterineII' Ilchrezhdeniiao gttberniakh7 noial>ria1775 g St. Petersburg.1910. p.208. 36.Debol'skii.p. 51-5. 37.M. Ftorinski.Rassia. A Histort'and ttn Interpretation(New York, Macmillan.19-55). vol. II, p. 55-5. 38.BSE.vol. 29(A). p. 514 39.Gradovskii.p. 1.1. ,10.Ibid. p. 121. DOMAIN

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Henry R. Huttenbach

I

l\ fuscovv's triumphant annexationand subsequentabsorption IYI of the Volga vallevand its restlessinhabitants in the middle of the sixteenth centur!' were pivotal events in the history of the entire Eurasiancontinent. having far-reaching consequences well beyond those felt directly in the region. The impact of Muscovv's military victories and territorial gains had immediate repercus- sions in the leading capitals throughout Europe and Asia. In grafting onto itself this geopolitically significant river network with its fertile adjacent lands. Muscovy transformed itself into a major power ready to challengesuch large political entities as the dual kingdom of Poland-Lithuania to the west and the far-flung Ottoman Empire on its southwesternffank. What had seemedto the Catholic and Muslim rulers in Krakow and in the porte a distant and relatively unimportant Orthodox power. now. with these unexpectedacquisitions of the strategickhanates of Kazan and Astrakhan. appearedas a viable rival. even as Muscovv was poised to plunge eastwardinto the vast reachesof the continental ocean that is Siberia. For centuries, the Volga had been a frontier separating the sedentary societies that grew up west of the river from the shifting nomadic peoples who roamed the expanse to the east. Again and again. from the earliest times of recorded history, nomadic hordes would sweep across the Volga and disrupt the agricultural life that had taken root norrh of the Black Sea. Even in the early formative stages of Kievan Rus'. its Varangian prlnces recognizedthat securitv along the Dnieper meant control

4) -16 RtLssianColonial Expansion of the Volga basin. It was no grandiose scheme that spurred Svvatoslavto conquer the on the middle Volga and the on the mouth of the river; on the contrary, his daring campaignsduring the 960s were explicitlv designed to close the door to the marauding nomads, to the Pechenegsand to the Polovtsv, the former alreadv dominant along the Black Sea littoral and the latter poised to cross the Don River and to further destabilizethe steppe lands. As subsequenthistory bore out. a primary reason for the fall of Kievan Rus' was the failure of Svvatoslav'ssuccessors to consolidatehis empire between the Dnieper and Volga rivers. Because thev lost their grip on the Volga. the fatal flood of nomads continued to spill across until the entire region fell under the swav of the Mongols in the middle of the thirteenthcentury. Historical memory ran deep in the Orthodox Christian East Slavs: recollections of their former glor1, along the Dnieper cchoed in their poetrv and pravers. Their chronicles were rcverently copied but imaginativelv adorned to give emphasisto hcroic days before the onset of the humiliation at the hands of thc heathen-turned-Muslim.Thel: are replete with recollections of militarv victories and conquests.as u'ell as dreams of eventual rcrlcrnption from the onus of occupation and a recapture of the lancisthat had once been under Slavic and Christian domination. Cicnerations of clerical scribes couched the past in Biblical rnlrserr'. portraying the people of Kievan Rus' with their princes, anti those that fell heir to them. as a chosen people destined for ultirnate triumph. The vears of Mongol tutelage were seen as an rntcrim similar to the exile suffered by the Children of Israel tlurins their exile in Babvlon. A deep faith stirredall the 6lite of thc northern principalities that a miraculous time would come uhcn they too would emerge from political darknessand rebuild thcir destinv between the Dnieper and the Volga. Thus, as f,,litical circumstancesaltered radically during the sixteenth icntur\'. and the fortunes of the clusterof Orthodox principalities ()n thr- upper Volga showed steady improvement vis-d-vis their \ltrnSr)l overlords. historical consciousnesssurfaced again and .rSurr.rto provide Russian princes. especiallvthose of Muscovy, x ith a motif for political action. The reconquestof the Volga was rntrnitelvmore than what it seemedto the observer-the capture ,,t .r river route to the Caspian Sea or a foot into the rich forests ,nrl :teppes to the east: to Muscovv it was nothing lessthan a Muscovy'sConquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, j552-56 47 crusade, a divinely condoned vindication of its historic heritage and a just defeat of those who had usurped its presencealong the '€d entire stretchof the river. { In order to appreciatethe drama (for so it was in the minds of contemporaries)of the strugglefor possessionof the vital Volga valley-with its prelude. climax and d6nouement-one must not only grasp it in its more mundane terms, but also in the emotional fervor of the times. Just as the battle for mastery of the Atlantic Ocean captured the imaginations of western Europeans, so did the contest for control over the strategic riverway give rise to epic visions of a new historic future. The stakeswere high; for, as all the antagonistswere acutely aware, the fate of the Eurasian landmasslay in the balance. Not only was the heir to the Mongol Empire in question but whether or Islam would dominate the central landmassof the globe, and, thereby. profoundlv change the power balance between two universalistrival cultures for the hearts and minds of man.

il

Muscovy's successesin the Volga vallev came in the wake of a complex evolution of political relations with the region to which, originally, all the Russian principalities had been subservient since the imposition of Mongol control in the middle of the thirteenth century. At the outset. Mongol administration estab- lished a western unit of power based in the city of Saray on the lower Volga; Saray, in turn. was assigned administrative responsibility over the Slavic territories to the northwest, an imperial subregionknown as an t/as. It was to Saraythat Russian princes had to travel in order to receive the coveted iarlvk granting them the privilege to collect raxes for the ; ancl it was from Sarav that khans sent forth punitive expeditions into Russian lands whenever the princes failed to acknowledge the overlordship of the khan, militarv campaignsthat tested the true balance of power between the steppeland of the lower ancl middle Volga and the forest region of the upper Volga. In order to avoid depicting Tsar Ivan IV's triumph as a unique event. it is necessaryto place it in the context of two hundred years of complex power shifts that made possible the revolutionary transition to Muscovy's overlordship over the Volga domain of lS RussianColonial Expansion the khans. the once invincibie territory of the . A psychologicaland symbolic turning point during the two- ccntury-long era of Mongol domination took place on 8 Scptember 1380, when Prince Dmitry of the then small principality of Muscovv. in alliance with a handful of other Russianprinces. inflicted a surprise defeat upon Khan Mamay's arml'. sent to reassertthe Mongol authority that he claimed to represent.rThe Russianvictory in 1380,coming in the wake of a previous military success-the battle at the Vozha River in 137S-aroused enormous enthusiasm among the Christian Orthodox forces, who interpreted the victory as an event of religious significance.Whereas the battle of 1378 had been seen in purely secularand local terms. namelv. as just another incident in the chronic competition between Russian princes and one or another Mongol faction in the respective juggling for political advantage,the 1380 campaign had received the blessingof both Metropolitan Kiprian. the administrative senior official, and Abbot Sergei,the head of the prestigiousHoly Trinity Monastery, the spiritual center of Russian Orthodoxy. The latter had sent along with Prince Dmitry two of his monks to give the campaign all the qualities of a crusade. superimposing on the political purpose a religious cause. With the victor,v, therefore, both prince and Church could claim that divine purpose had been served and that they had read recent human events correctly as providential signs that the misfortunes of the subjugated Christians were about to change. The Velikaia Zamiatna (the Great Confusion) plaguing the Mongol Empire since the assassinationof Khan Berdibeg in 1359 had become a signal for Russian national revival and religious independence from a conqueror whose recent turn to Islam had fundamentally altered the morality of Orthodox Russian subservience to Mongol authority. The call to rally around a singleprince. making political unity a religious imperative, was a consequenceof internal developments in the northeasternRussian principalities, in the middle of which was located the city of Moscow. As a result of its geographic position, Moscow became one of the major Russian cities, soon rivaling the traditional capital. Vladimir. and its princes chal- lenged those of Tver for primacy. a political duel that repeatedly took them to Saray to argue their case before the khan for possessionof the yarlik. One of the more astute Muscovite Muscovy's Conquestof Muslim Kazan anrj Astrakhan, 1552_5649 princesto exploit the position of chief tax farmer for the Monsols and thereby enrich his fiefdom was prince Ivan I( jita (1325-1341). Shortly after his accession.Moscow,s presrige was further enhanced by Metropolitan peter's decision rn tJ26 to transfer his see to Moscow, immediatelv making the city the religiouscenter of orthodoxv. No lesssignificant w"as the uuitoing in 1367 of a stone wall around the heart of Moscow. a construction that reflected its wealth and provided it with practically invulnerable defenses against an enemy lacking a_rtillery. Subsequent attacks on the citv never penetrated the Kremlin, thereby denying the invaders uitimate political victory, despite the destruction they wreaked on the population and its properties. The wealth of Moscow's princes. the presenceof the metro_ politanate, the safety of the city. all combined to account for the rise of Muscovy as a formidable nucleus of power, a fact lost neither to other Russian princes nor to the rival successorsof Khan Berdibeg, who tried to play off one against the other, especiallythose of rver and Moscow. while the various khans continued to favor one or another in the hopes of keeping political conditions among their Russiansatellites off-balance. th! real political equation showed itself in 1375 when the militarv predominance of Muscovy forced a reluctant admissionfrom ail the princes that the ruler of Muscovy was indeed a primus inter paresl no matter what the disputing khans dictated. A major force behind this open expressionof unity, however tentativ;ly acknowledged.was the Russian Church. In the previous decades. the Church had undergone both a cultural revival as well as a change of heart with r-espectto its political strategy of survival. Since the early part of the century. religious pioneers had pushed into the wildernessand estabrished monastic centers which brought Christianity to the forest inhabitants. At the same time. the Church produced a spate of religious personalities who. on the one hand. lookei with enthusiasmupon this expansion of the faith. yet, on the other, harbored increasingconcern over the potential dangersof having to tolerate the dictatesof a Muslim overlord. whereas originallyl since the middle of the thirteenth century, ttre Churctr naa counseled caution. discouraging imprudent acts of defiance againstthe Mongols, calculatingthat its survivarhad precedence over political or secularinterests. a century later it began to see 50 RussionColonial Expansiort the advantagesof placing itself under the protection of a single Orthodox monarch backed by the cooperation of the other Russian princes. The rise of Muscovite power. the seeming declining ability of the Golden Horde to exercisethe bidding of the Great Khan. and the ominous rise of Islam as the major cultural force among the Tatars combined to motivate the Orthodox Church to preach a policy of national unity around the prince of Muscov,vagainst what it depicted as the forces of evil. The most eloquent voice in favor of this new approachto further the Christian faith was that of Abbot Sergey Radonezhsky. to whom Prince Dmitr,v had gone for his blessingbefore the battle of Kulikovo in 1380. For his victory. Dmitry was rervarded with the honorific soubriquet Donskoy. in memorl- of the momentous battle on the banks of the River Don. More important. Dmitry won for himself a permanent place in the ranks of those Russian princes u'ho were revered as saints for their immortal deeds.t In the fertile medieval Russian imagination. Dmitry ranked alongside Grand Prince Saint Vladimir (who in the tenth century had brought Christianity to the easternSiavs) and Alexander Nevsky (who in the thirteenth centurv had successfullyfought off the Swedes): in this context. Dmitrv Donskoy was equal to Prince Igor. who in 1185 had saved Kievan Rus' from the Polovtsy Horde. For years. the ringing versesof the twelfth-century epic The Song of lgor had counteractedthe tragic and defeatistverses of the thirteenth-centurvSlovo o pogibeli zemli russkoi (Elegy to the Ruin of the Russian Land). which sadlv commemorated the defeat of the Russians at the hands of the Mongol Horde. Through the years. the calamity had weighed heavily on the Russianps.vche till the victorv at Kulikovo, a hundred and twenty years later, opened up new vistasof hope and self-esteem,a self- respect preached by the Church and now made tangible by the triumph of arms. As a testamentto the quickened Russiansense of rejuvenation. an unknown poet wrote the resoundingverses of the Zadonshchina, a ht'mn of joy for Russian heroism and an impassionedpanegyric to the church militant. Though it would take another century to achieve permanent freedom from the Mongol yoke. the spirit of the Zadonshchina would never again flag despite severalsevere setbacks in the war againstthe powers on the Volga. Eroectationsof their permanentdecline. as it turned out, were Muscovt,'sCortquest o.f ,lluslim Ku:anond Astrakhan,1552_56 ,51 premature.The routing of Mamav's forcesdid not strike at the heart of Tataro-Mongol power. Revival came in the form of Khan Timur. who emerged out of Central Asia as the true heir of such personalitiesas Chingis-Khan.the founder of the Mongol Empire a centurv earlier.Timur. or Tamerlane.was a masterat intrigue and extended his power u'estward via . a general he had won over from the camp of a rival khan. Tokhtamysh steadilvmoved his armv closer to the Volga. forcing Mamay either to declarehis lovaltyor to pick up the gauntletand fight for his claim of the Volga region ruled from Sarav. In preparation. Mamav sought to tame the Russiansand force them to join forceswith him. especiallvthe armiesof Muscovv.Having failed to assert his supremacv in 1380. Mamav had to face Tokhtamysh alone. losing to him the following vear. Whereupon Tokhtamysh lost no time in declaringwar on the Russianprinces and invading their territories in 1382. inflicting a terrible defeat that left Moscow in flamesand the remaining principalitiescowed and fragmented.3With that. Tokhtaml'sh resroredthe primacy of the Golden Horde but regranted the tarlik to prince Dmitrv. a generous gesture that. in the long run. proved fatal. for it acceleratedthe recoverv and eventual primacv of Muscovy as a center of power that would in the end permanentlv overcome the rule of the Golden Horde. Once again the pendulum swung back. this time favoring Muscovv. as political decline broke the Golden Horde asunder. Not surprisinglv. tensions developed between Tokhtamvsh, now khan of the Golden Horde. and his sponsor the Great Khan Timur in Central Asia. For the next ten vears the two waged a bloody war, depletingtheir wealth and sappingtheir strength:by the time Timur manased a definitive defeat of Tokhtamysh in 1395.the future of the empire was predictable.At best. it was a pyrrhic victory; in order to restore his authoritv over the Goliten Horde. Timur literallv had put the re-eionto the torch before he could extract compliance from its local rulers. It so exhausted Timur's militarv capacitv that he was unable ro mount one more campaign against the Russians. who had shown ambiguous loyalty to Tokhtamvsh even after his break with Timur. Timur returned home to Central Asia to recoup but then focused his attention on India till his death. leaving Central Asia, the crossroadsof the trans-Eurasiantrade. in chaos. The repercus- sions of the disruption of trade considerablvweakened rhe once 5l Rttssiurt(olttnial E.rpunsic.tn atflucnt Golden Horde. which dependedon the caravanroutes l.rassingthrough Sarav.The overall economicdecline. matched by continuous internal strife (which included the failure of Tokhtarnvsh to return to power). quickly led to political fragmentation. despite the emergenceof a powerful personality rn Khan Edigev (Idigu). a former associateof Tokhtamysh. ln order to compensatefor the loss of revenue. Khan Edigey raised taxes. prompting after his death in 1'11'1a series of secessionsthat proved to be irreversible. The breakup of the Golden Horde came about. in part owing to Edigey's failure to assert his militar.v superioritv over the Russian principalities in 1-108.a clear sign of the shifting balance of porver. In the 1420s the Nogay Horde announcedits independenceand began to trade clirectlywithout Saray's acting as entrep6t. In 1438 the followed suite.r and in l-l-i9 Khan Geray of the Crimea did likewise with the expresshope of ultimately reconstitutingthe Golden Horde from the Black Sea peninsula. where a lively international trade helped fill his cotfers. Without losing much time, Khan Geray began to interfere in the internal politics of Kazan. where he competed with Muscovite agentsfor control of the khanate. His efforts. however. were thwarted bv two factors: his inability to tame the lower Volga. where an independent pirate-khanate based in Astrakhan preyed on all the shipping through the delta channels:and the fall of Constantinoplein 1;153 to the Osmanli (Ottoman) Turks. The latter quickly imposed their hegemony on the entire Black Sea littoral. ultimately forcing the Edigey dynasty to become a vassalstate of the new Muslim empire on the Bosporus in 1475.5Soon thereafter, in large measure becauseof the political orientation of the Porte, the' redirectedits military power againstPoland rather than againstits steadilygrowing neighbor to the north, the Grand Principality of Muscovy'. In acting as an extension of Ottoman foreign policy. the Crimea dissipatedits energies and forfeited its last opportunity realisticallyto challengeMuscovy for control of the steppe and of the Volga vallev. By the time the Crimea resumed its hostilities against Muscovy in the early sixteenthcentury (again partially prompted by' the sultan), it was too late. There was no viable political unit to reconstitute the Golden Horde other than Muscovv. The rise of Muscovy as a major regional power paralleled the decline and disintegration of the Golden Horde. As the latter Muscovt"sConquest of illuslim Kazanund Astrakhcrn,1552_56 53 broke apart. the former experiencedgreater territorial unification and political centralization.While Kazan remained as the onlv real threat from the east. from the moment of its separationfrom the Golden Horde its real hold o'n'er Muscovv was more crrcumstantialand theoretical than in actual fact. Were it not for the drawn-out civil war in Muscovv during the l4,l0s. the real power balance would have emerged far earlier than towards the close of Vasily II's reign. After setting up a buffer vassal.state under a Kazan prince. the Khanate of Kasimor'. in 1,153.6Grand Prince Vasilv prepared a major campaign to ward off a counterattackfrom Kazan in 1,159.The outcome was so much in Muscovy's favor that in 1,161Kazan sued for peaceand agreedto pay annual tribute as a sign of its vassalageto the Christian power on the upper Volga. The ascendencl, of Muscovy continued in the follou'ing reign rvith even greater intensitv. Ivan III (1462-1505) managed ro bring virtuallv all rhe northeastern Russian principalities under Moscow,s jurisdiction, thereby thoroughly transforming the entire political configuration of the region both to the west and east of Muscov1,. The gathering of the Russian lands and the unitin-eof the Orthodox people automaticallv elevated Muscovv above its two hostile neighbors. Catholic Lithuania and Muslim Kazan. In 1478. Ivan III completed the absorprion of the Republic of Novgorod, whose fur empire reachedas far as the mouth of the Ob' River in -l485. western Siberia. In the Grand Principality of Tver finally submitted to its old rival Muscovy after yearsof flirtation with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In 1489, the lands of Viarka- strategicallysituated north of Kazan-at long last bowed to Ivan after a major show of forceT that resulteJ in their complete annexation, a punitive action taken in part for their refusal to honor the 1459agreement of vassalstatus.s Then. in his last year. in 1503.Ivan integrated half of Rvazan (a principalitv located on the frontier between the forest zone and the open steppe). With each acquisition. Ivan's Muscovy altered the fundamental power relationship with his neighbors. His triumph over Lithuania, a story apart from this chapter. had its positive consequencesin his dealingswith Kazan. for it deprived the khanare of its principal ally. Ivan's primary interest in Kazan was assurancethat Musc

III The victorv of 2 October 1552 unleashedan explosion of joy in Moscow. The young tsar was welcomed as hero and saint. For the populace. the defeat of Kazan provided an opportunity to give expressionto an abundance of pent-up national pride and hope for prosperity: what Ivan III had achievedin 1,180had now been crowned by the 1552 triumph of his grandsonl having attained seniority. Ivan IV promised to carry on his grandfather's great tradition of nation building and seemed to possessthe ability to overcome the centrifugal forces that had brought Muscovy to the verge of civil war during his vouth. The divisivenessof the era of boyar rule. the so-called"Nepravda." seemedover. thanks to the young tsar. The birth of an heir. less than a month after the conquest of Kazan. guaranteed the continuity of the House of Rurik. Little wonder that lvan emerged as a hero. No lesswas he regarded a saint accordingto Muscovite tradition for his successin leading a Christian crusade againsta Muslim state. For the Church. his accomplishmentwas seen as a pious act of obedience to the preachings of Metropolitan Makary. who. like Abbot Sergey of Radonezh, shortly before the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380, had also preached war in terms of its religious obligation and significance.For the metropolitan. the attack upon Kazan was to be an invasion to eradicate Islam and to make room for Christianity. to complete the work of centuries of patient waiting and preparation. The militant church of Muscovy and the expansioniststate were fused in a common mission of historic importance. The work of integratingKazan beganimmediatelv.2r The day after the tsar's victory march into the city. a solemn but jubilant event took place. the dedication of the ground upon which a splendid cathedral would arise. In the company of senior clergy 60 RussianColonial Expansion

u'hcl had traveled with Ivan to Kazan. the young tsar watched as holv water was sprinkled on the former site of a . Where once an Islamic edifice had dominated the proud citv. a multidomed Christian architectural monument would serve as a permanent reminder of the supremacvof that religion. Through- out the city and in its immediate surroundings. plots and large tracts of land were seized to make room for churches and monasteries.Within a decade. monastic communities extended along the banks of the river net$,ork of the former khanate. linking wtth those of Viatka to the north and Kasimov to the u'est. The thousandsof freed Russian captivesprovided congre- gations and labor for the religious communities. though their ranks quickly swelled with waves of converts. Nothing was more pcrsuasive to prompt a change of faith than military power, cspeciallv in an a-qe u'hich believed that armies were the c-rtensionof God's will. The well-publicizedconversion of many hieh-rankingnobles from Kazan did no harm: theseincluded the last khan. Yadigar. whom Metropolitan Makary personally baptized as Simeon. and lvan promoted to one of his senior military commanders. Even as the Church engineeredits revolution of Kazan. so did thc secularauthorities impose their stamp on the former khanate. Takins advantageof the huge expansesof land in comparison to thc more denselvpopulated Muscovite heartland. the occupying forces allocatedgenerous grants of estatesto those who served in the campaign and choseto remain in the neu' territor.v.ln rcturn for continued militarv service. thousandsof lower-ranking men received land grants that. until the recent conquest. would have been impossible for the land-hungry state to allocate. The majority of the men recruited for the 1552 campaign were demobilized and chose to return home. but manv lower-rankine sentry. the sluzhilve liuclt. recognized the opportunity of selfl lgqrandizementand remained in a setting where they would cniov greater statusand advancementas againstthe more frozen :ocial circumstancesprevailing in Muscovv with its attendant crrnservatism.The lure of the frontier. not the wild frontier of the stcppethat drerv the likes of Cossacksbut the frontier of annexcd tcrritories within the borders of the state. offering at once social nrtrbilitvas u'ell as securitv-this was the dvnamicsthat propelled Ihc proccssof Muscovitetakeover. ln the city of Kazan. Ivan left a militarv force to superviscthe Muscovt"sConquest of MuslirnKazan artd Astrakhon, 1552-56 61 {irst stage of the transformation of the conquered region from a Muslim khanate to a Christian province of Muscovv. In chargeof the Muscovite forces u'as the senior voevoda (general) Prince Alexander Gorbatv. In the garrison lvan stationedin Kazan were one thousand five hundred dieti boiarskie.military servitorsfrom impoverished gentrv who profited from the land grants offered them as bait to keep them on a permanent basis in the new territories. They acted too in the capacity of administrators. Besidesthem. Gorbatl- had three thousand streltsl-(musketeers), whose primary function was to guard the city walls in the event of an assaultfrom the severalFinno-Turkic tribes in the surrounding countryside.To pacif-vthe hinterland and to project the power of the new rulers of Kazan beyond the city walls. Prince Gorbaty had a few units of mounted Cossacksat his disposal. cavalry forces that regularlv patrolled past nomadic tribes giving visibilitv to the power of the rictorioustsar. One other initial step was taken to establish the Muscovite presence. Until 1552. Muscovite trade along the Volga had depended on the goodwill of Kazan. Merchants from Muscovv had had only temporarl- rcsidence permits and rvere subject to expulsion whenever the political wind shifted. Their wares could be seized at any time and compensation was unlikely. Now, among the reconstruction plans of the city. there was to bc a special merchants' quarter where Muscovite businessmencould set up permanent quarters and enjo,vthe undisturbed use of the marketplaces. As for Muscovite shipping. the annexation of Kazan removed one major obstacle along the Volga: fluctuating taxes and tolls for the privilege of sailin_ethrough the territories of the khanate. Since the citv lav somewhat removed from the Volga itself, special fortifications were erected along the water- wa,vto protect shipping from marauders.piracv having become a major scourgeof trade once the Golden Horde had disintegratcd. Howcver. a Pax Muscovitica would not come casily to replace the long-eroded Pax Mongolica. Shortly after the defeat of Kazan. severalTatar murzt (princes) from Kazan u'ho managed to escapethc city and ioin the tribes beyond it beganto plan a counterattackb-v'' sowing dissentamong thc nomadic peoplcs. By the winter of 1-552-53.Muscovite spies learned of impending revolts. and in the spring full-scale rebellion broke out on thc east bank of the Volga. Rumors from Moscow suggcstingthat Ivan lacked support for investing more resources into Kazan 62 RussianColonial Expansion

encouraged the anti-Muscovite forces to evict the Christian conquerors.2sWith a victorv of their own they hoped to restore the status quo that had prevailed between Muscovy and Kazan. News of Ivan's illness in March and of his impending death further fueled their hopes that an internal political crisis in Moscow might work in their favor.16Besides. the death of his infant son Dmitry brought on the possibility of a long dynastic crisis that would cripple Muscovite foreign policy.rTBut Ivan did not die and recoveredto resumeMuscovy's thrust into the Volga, whose tranquility had become a sine qua non for all subsequent Muscovite economic and militarv plans. Securing the Volga for its own sake rested on economic consideration. trade with the East: to reach the markets of Persia, India and even China depended on a riverine highway either to the transcontinentalcaravans that headedeastward from the lower Volga or on accessto the Caspian Sea in order to link up with the caravans in northern Persia. The promise of even greater trade as a consequenceof Muscovite control of the river fortuitously presenteditself in the summer of 1553when English merchants accidentally found themselves in Moscow. after suffering a shipwreckotf the White Sea coast.There they learned of the geopolitical advantageof a Muscovv in possessionof the Volga and immediately began negotiationsfor transit rights for Anglo-Persian and Anglo-Central Asian commerce via Muscovy. In order to reap these unexpected benefits (which for Ivan included a vital relationship with a European power, an opportunity to break through the isolation of Muscovy imposed by the Catholic powers in eastern E,urope),Muscovy recognized the need not only to stamp out rebellion around Kazan but to complete the processof subjugation all the way to the mouth of the Volga. Thus. in its quest for domination of the riverway, Muscovy became an actor in that greater global drama-the search for trade routes to the Far East-which had the Atlantic Ocean as its major stage. The Volga campaign of 1552 and the forthcoming one of 1554 had a second reason: as a precondition for attacking either Lithuania or the Crimea. While Muscovy's foreign policy architectswere divided on the priorities of these two goals, they were of one mind with respectto the securingof the easternfront as the basis for any aggressive move either southward or westward since both the Crimea and Lithuania could exploit an Muscovv'sConquest of Muslim Kazanand Astakhan, 1552-56 63 independent Kazan as an ally to open a second front against Muscovv. News of the defeat of Kazan had created great concern. especiallyin the Crimea. where the khan lost no time in sending help to the rebels in order to frustrate Muscovy's ambitions. Once in possessionof the entire Volga. Muscovy would automatically reduce the Crimea to a permanent second- rate power, and assure its subordinate status to the Ottoman Turks, a condition the khanate hoped to terminate as soon as it had gained control of the entire steppelandsstretching from the borders of Poland to the plains inhabited bv the remnants of the Nogays along the River Yaik. To thwart this scheme. Muscovy had to follow up on its victorv in Kazan with an invasion of Astrakhan. Otherwise. the Crimea could always hold hostage Muscovv's future foreign policv ambitions. Using the rebellion of the Cheremis and Votiaks as an excuse to go back to war. Ivan ordered an army capable of going well beyond the goal of pacifying the tribes. The campaignwas clearly a pretext to go further than the territories of these tribes, whose combined strength was really only a nuisance factor. Without external aid they could not possibly recapture Kazan, which Muscovy defendedwith cannonsand muskets.The rebelsquickll' dispersed before the superior Muscovite troops: these included large contingentsof Kazan Tatars, man-vof them recent converts eager to prove their loyalty to the tsar. Opposition crumbled and the armies marched on towards Astrakhan. which fell in the summer of 1554 with barelv anv resistance.t8The victory was almost anticlimactic and seemed to have caused little domestic response, almost as if it were a commonplace event. Yet it acceleratedthe rate of cultural reconstructionthat had begun in 1552. As early as 1553. a stream of Russian peasantsin search for more land entered the western parts of Kazan, a process of spontaneouscolonization that the authorities did not discourage. Whereasthe exodusof peasantsto the Don vallev meant a lossof manpower and revenue from taxes. the population shift into Kazan was seen as a definite advantage,not least as an equalizer in the still predominantlv Muslim region. Besides.thev provided instant agricultural labor for the new monasticcommunities and. overall. lent support to the crash program of Christianizing the . entire region. About the time Astrakhan fell. the metropolitan decided to 61 RussiunColonial Exponsiort

make Kazan a separate administrative unit of the Muscovite Church. A specialsobor (Church council)was convenedwhere, in the presenceof the tsar. the Church hierarchy expressedits agreement that Kazan become an epurkhia (archdiocese)whose jurisdiction would include the wide expanse of the lands of Viatka. The assembledbishops and abbots elected Abbot Guri from Tver to be the first archbishop of the sec of Kazan. With considerable pomp and ceremon\,. Guri was inaugurated on 3 February 15,t5. To help the sicklv but saintiv Guri. the sobor chosea monk. Varsonofi. to accompanvhim. rewarding the latter with the leadershipof the neu Monastcrl of the Transfiguration in Kazan. While the archbishop'sstaff handled mattcrs of finance and Church policf in general.the abbot and his monks took on the formidable task of missionarvu'ork. Together thev receivedinstructions that amountedto making Kazan a springboardfor Orthodox Christianitv.No cxpensewas spared to keep up the momentum of Christianization.Metro- politan Makarv enjoined all his diocese and monasteriesto contributc funds and qrain to back up the Kazan mission. a requestthat amountedto a specialtax. Tsar Ivan reserveda tenth of the revenuescollected br, the state in Kazan for the Church in the newlv established eparkhin and added to his munificence large grantsof land. Not surprisinglv.of all the archdioccsein thc Muscoviteempire. that of Kazan soon becamethe wealthiestand most important. (A half centurv later. it was one of the largest contributors in the campai_enof national liberation in 1612 to cvict the Poles from N{oscorv.) Thc appointmcnt of Prince Piotr Ivanovich Shuiskv as voevotla of Kazan in Mar l-5-5-5brought a hi-ehlv competent man to complementthe u'ork of the Church. ln no othcr region of the Muscovite empire did Church and state work more in tandem and in harmonv than in Kazan. Their cooperationneeds to be seen in the light of ofllcial injunctions to both men made separatclv by' both Tsar Ivan and Metropolitan Makarlr that the neu' r,oelodc and archbishop "take care of their affairs jointl,r-." To mark the occasion of Kazan as a reqional Christian capital. the richlv ornamented cathedral. thc Pokrovskii Sobor. u,as formaliv dedicatedon 1 October. thrce short vears after the captureof the khanate.The nine-chapelstructure and its golden cupolasu,as completed in 15-t7and could be seen from miles a\\a\'. a monument to Muscovv'svictorv and eastwardorientation. Muscot't"sConquest of Muslim Kazanand Astrakhan,1552-56 6-5 In the wake of the invasion of Astrakhan came a flurry of diplomatic activitv emanating from the steppe. The rise of the Muscovite imperium supplementinsthat of the khans persuaded many petty rulers to pav obeisanceto the tsar. For reasonsnot too clear, Khan Yadigar of Sibir praised lvan for his victory and hoped the tsar would accept him as his vassal.Princes as far as the Caucasusasked for the tsar's protection from both the sultan and from one another.r"Evidentlv. Muscovy'smilitary triumphs along the Volga had createda new power balancethroughout the Caspian region and in u'est Siberia. lts irreversibility seemed indisputable.especialll'' through the eyesof the minor khans.who had to risk their political future on being able to _quesswhich of the great powers would endure and u'ith whom to thror','their lot. Judging from their spontaneousturn to Moscou'. thev shared a consensusabout its ctlntinucdsuccess. What had been a relativelv minor militarv engagement.the invasionof Astrakhan. had. in fact. major political implications which enteredinto the calculationsof the peoplcsin theseareas. The invasion had taken place under the camouflage of an intervention to secure the throne of Astrakhan for a pro- Muscovite candidate.For some time. the politics of Astrakhan had been subject to meddling by both the Nogavs to the east and the Crimeansto the west. Bv 15-53.a segmentof the Nogaysand the khan of the Crimea supported an anti-Muscovite candidatc. Had thev succceded.Muscovv's victorv ovcr Kazan would have been seriouslvcompromised. Moscow had no choice but to back up its support for Khan Dervish Ali with a show of force that had to be more than svmbolic but sufficient to ward off any Crimean military'challenge. Once Muscovv had its puppet firmlv establishedin Astrakhan. it realized that it must keep a permanent militarv presenccthere to assure itsclf of his lo1'alty and to prevent his deposal. The mouth of the Volga was a prize Muscovv u,as not about to abandon voluntarilv without a fight. A vear later. in 1555.the Crimea. backedby Turkish troops sent bv the sultan.mounted a counterattack on Astrakhan. but to no avail. Russian troops repulsed the invaders and started the rapid fortification of Astrakhan b.vgarrisoning a permanent force of streltsv-there. The half-anticipated defection of Dervish Ali in the midst of the struggle led the Muscovites to the onlv logical solution to the Astrakhan problem. namelv. to take full control of it without 66 RussianColoniol Erpansiort attempting to keep up the fiction of local autonomy. Faced with the possibilitv of severeretribution. the population of Astrakhan swore its loyalty to lvan. hoping thev would not be punished for Dervish Ali's treachery.In his stead,they receivednot another khan drawn from their midst but a Muscovite voevoda as the tsar's viceroy; in 1556Muscovv formallv annexed Astrakhan and placed the entire Volga River under its direct control, extending the same program of cultural reconstructionto the lower Volga as it had adopted in Kazan. To securethe internal tranquility of the conquered regions. the Muscoviteshit upon a shrewd plan to neutralize the potential troublemakers who might contemplate renewed rebellion. In preparation for the Livonian War, large contingents of Tatar warriors were attached to the Muscovite army assembled in the northrvest. When Ivan launched his campaign for an outlet to the Baltic Sea. he had lighting for him cavalry from the nomadic peoplesof the middie and lower Volga. With the best troops siphoned off no plot would get off the ground. In their place heavilv armed Slavic soldiers. whose loyalty was bevond question. \\'ere stationed in the new territories. It had not taken Muscovv long to apply the ancient imperial principle of divide et impera, a policy whereby a multiethnic domain with the danger of succumbingto centrifugal forcescan be transformedinto a cohesivebody politic with all the diverse parts working at the behest of the central authority. The successfultransfusion of Christianitv into the peoples of the Volga and the rapid imposition of Muscovite governmental institutions made possible the smooth annexation of Kazan and Astrakhan. What the Mongols had failed to do, namely, to acculturate their Russian subjects bv weaning them awav from Christianity. the Muscovitesmanaged in a few decades.There is little evidencc of real resistanceto conversion:the Russianclergy did not come with crossin one hand and sword in the other. They were experienced at bringing their faith to non-Christians and they arrived in Kazan and Astrakhan with the assuranceof ones bearing a superior culture. The artistic renaissanceof Orthodox Muscovv that came to its apogee during the reign of Ivan IV expressedthis self-confidencein visible form. from the peaksof a majestic stone cathedral to the delicate miniatures bordering a small wooden icon. The extent of the integration of the length of the Volga can best be measuredby its early history till the death of Tsar Ivan in 1584. Its defense depended considerablvon the Muscovy"sConquest oJ MuslintKazan and Astraklnn, 1552-56 67 cooperation of the local populations. Provocateurs operated among them. constantl!' trying to destabilize Muscovite rule. Spies of the sultan and friends of Tatar nobles in exile sought to stir up resentmentsthat would prove useful when a counterattack came from out of the Crimea. but no seriousrebellion broke out. Muscovite control of the Volga split the Muslim world in the steppelands. and Muscovite influence into Caucasia via the Kabardian tribes threatened to obstruct the Ottoman Empire's war against the Persian Empire. an epic struggle between the Sunni and Shiite factions of Islam. With the Muscovites able to project their power across the mountains. the war of the rcunification of Islam seemed to be permanently frustrated. It was. therefore. essentialto the Porte to reassertitself at least on the lower Volga. Its 1569campaignrl uas designedto throw the Muscovitesout of Astrakhan. Sultan Selim II and Khan Devlet Girey of the Crimea. each for his own reasons.joined forces that included cannons.ships and a specialcorps of engineersto dig a canal to link the Don to the Volga. The latter scheme was scrapped. but the daring of its vision is testimony to the determination of the Muslims to oust the Christian enemv. The effort is reminiscentof Philip II's expediting the Armada against Elizabeth I. Just as the Spanish fleet was defeated by the elements and human daring. so \\'ere the Turks. the Crimeans and their Nogav allies destroyed by the heat of the desert between the bend of the Don River and Astrakhan and by the tenaciousnessof the Muscovite defenders. Even as lilliputian English ships pricked at the Spanishgallevs. so did small Don Cossackdetachments harass the dejected. retreatingtroops as they made their wav back to Azov. the nearestport. As in 1588. very few survived to tell the stor-v of their defeat in 1569. Astrakhan survived and its people had remained lo.val.Thanks to the arrival of supplies and reinforcements from Kazan. the Muscovite defendersheld out; the Volga had proved a veritable lifeline. As in so many instancesin the next centuries.control of the Volga would determinethe future of Russianhistorr'.rr ln the same decade. the hrst advantagesof the conquest of Kazan manifestedthemselves. Pioneering entrepreneurs in search of fur. salt. and iron found Kazan at the doorstep of vast resources.The Stro-eanovfamily is the most famous of those who recognizedthe commercial potential. and quickly'consolidatedits ties to the court. winning monopoly privilegesto harvest fur and 68 RussianColonial Erpattsiort to mine mineralsfor thc statc in thc Kama River vallev. Sincc 1558.the Stroganovshad eainedpcrmission to colonize,to fortify and 1rl recruit rnilitiasin the name of the tsar. In 1568.Ivan IV gave them permissionto go bevond the Kama and to penetrate the landsof the ChusovaiaRiver. a tributarv of the Ob. the first of the three great rivcrs that flou' through Siberia. Thus, just as the final defense of the Volqa took place against the Turks. another chapter in the histon' of Muscovl"s territorial expansion opened up. the conquestof Siberia. This next episode rested entirelv on the foundation of thc conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan. u'ithout u'hich Nluscovv ll'ould have remained cssentiallva Slar,'ic.Christian. and Europeanstate. As a resultof its victoriesalong the Volea. Muscovvbrokc out of theseconfines and became both a Eurasian bodr politic and multicultural societv.one of u'hosecharacteristics was its pcrrnanentinvolve- ment with the Muslim u'orld lving astrideits southernfrontiers. The repercussionsof that proximity' still reverberate todav and are an integral part of the globai dvnamics of the contemporarv sccne.

Notes

On the battle of Kulikoro seeTroitskaia letopis'(lVloscorv-Leninsrad. l9-50).pp. .119{20. ) On the tu'inning of prince and saint see Nlichael Chernial,skv. Isar and People(London. 1961). 3 Polnoe sobrunie russkiklt letopisei 11. pp. 78 79. (Henceforth: P.SRL.) The date of Kazan's break from the Golden Horde is disputed. It is somctimcssiven as 1-l.l-5.On thc establishmentof the khanate see B. Nolde. La.fortnutiottde l'entpirerursse. r,ol. I (Paris. 1952).pp. 1-13. -5. George Vernadskl'. Russittat the Davn of the .l4odernEra (London. 1e59).p. 68. On the Khanate (or "tsardom" as it is refen'cd to in Russiansources) of Kasimov see \'.V. Veliaminor'-Zernov. Issledovunie o Kusintovskikhtsariakh. Vol. I. (St. Petersburg.1863). Ustiu:ltskii letopi.snri.rlor/ (Mosco* l-eningrad. 19-50).pp. 96-98: Vernadskv op. t'it.. pp. 10{-}-1{)1. George Ye rnadsk''. The .\4ongol.sand Rus.sia(London. 1953). p. 329. 9. Vernadskv.op. cit.. pp. 331-332. 10.The first treat\' $as sisned in April. 1-180.Shornik imperutorskogo istoricheskogoobsltclrcstvu. Vol. -ll. pp. l6-20. In fact. han Ill and his fatherhad not paid anv annualtribute since l'152 though. interestinglr'. the,""had not stopped collecting it. Muscolr"s Conquesto.f lluslim Kazon ontl Astrakhcut, 1552-56 69

Dukhovrtye i dogovornte grotnotv velikiklt i udelnvkh kniazei XIV-XVI lekor' (N{oscou'-Lcninsrad.1950). pp. 197 and 209. 12. The khan. in order to avert a militan confrontation (u'hich he feared he might lose). had tried diplomatic pressure in order to obtain tribute pavments.onlt' to be rebuffed. Kuzanskaiaistoriia (Moscow- Lcninurad.l,l-;l). p. 5:. 13. An attack in i-160had failcd. PSRL 11. p. 113. l.l. Thc basicsource for the ll80 incidentis PSRL 6. pp.225-230. 15. This had to do *'ith the so-called"filioquc" clauseinserted into the Catholic Apostolic Creed and rejected bv the Greek Orthodox. 16. K.V. Bazilevich. Vneshniuia politika russkogo tsentrulizovannogo gosudarstva. vtoraia polovina XV veka (Moscorv. 1952). pp. l-lG166. 17. PSRL E. p. 228. 18. P.SRL12. p. 232. 19. Vernadskr'.Rrrs.sla at tlte Dawn. pp. 71 77. 20. George Vcrnadskv. The Tsartlont o.f ,\4ost'ot+'1517-1682 (London. 1969).Part 1. p.51. 21. For Ivan IV's Kazancampaigns in the late l-i-lOssee P,SRI- 13. pt. 1. pp. 155 176and pt. l. pp. 157 517. 22. With its abolition. I.''anuon the right to make militarv appointments according to merit or anv criterion other than social standing. as dictated bv the rtresnriclrestto tradition b1' rvhich ranks were determined accordins to detiiiled records kept in the so-called Ra:riadttve kriigi (Tablcs of Ranks). uhich chronicled previous rankings. 23. On thc 1-5-52campaien see P"SRL 13. pt. 1. pp. 177 2231 thc definitive monograph on the historv of lluscovr"s defeat of Kazan is Jarosla"lPclenski. Rttssinatttl Ku:art: conquestand imperiul itleologt' ( I138-1560st (T'he Hague. 197-l). 2-1.For a brief survev of this proccss scc Vernadskt. Tlte Tsardont o.f' Most'ott I. pp. 59-63. 25. PSR1-13. pt. 2. p. -s13. 26. PSRL ibid. pp.522--526. 27. PSRL.13.pt. t. p. 232. 28. On Astrakhan see PSRL 13. pt. l. pp. 235 and 27-l-275:S.NI. Solor''er'. Istoriiu Rossli -i dret'rrcisJrikltvrenrctt 6 (N'loscon. i961). 'Akrvoo. -180--lll7. 29. arkheogra.ficheskoiekspedit.ili -1. No. 1-11.pp. 260-261. i0. N.A. Smirnor'. Politika Rossii na Kttvka;e v XVI-XIX vekakh (Moscou. 19-i8).pp. lGl$. 31. Solor"cr'.op. t'ir.. pp.601 606: N.A. Smirnor'.Rossiirr iTurtsiiu v XVFXVII vekakh (Nloscou. 19-16).pp. 10(I-1-59. 32. The strategic benefits xerc first exploited b1 N{uscovvin the ncxt ''Astrakhan reign. Alexandcr Bcnninssenancl \lihnca Bcrindei. et la politique desste ppcs nord pontiques(15E7-1-581J)" in Eutlnristeriort (Essar,sprcsented to Omelijan Pritsak on his Sixtieth Birthdar'). Httrvard Likrainian StudiesVol. 3 (1979). Vil The Crimeaunder RussianRule 1783 to the Great Reforms

Edward Lazzerinr

1n his mid-sixteenth-centuryaccount Of the Russe Common- L wealrh, Giles Fletcher. English ambassadorto the court of Ivan IV, devoted a chapter to Muscovy's troublesome southern and eastern neighbors, particularly the .' From hearsayand the popular misperceptionsof his Russian hosts, he evoked a titillating if dubious vision of Tatar society whose culture as well as political. social,and economic organizationhad all the distinctionsof barbarism and primitiveness.Not only does Fletcher characterize the Tatars as bellicose, savage in their manners, and conniving in their relations with outsiders, but he insiststhat "knowing no arts of peacenor any civil practice" they are enjoined by nature and custom to "take or steal from any strangerwhatsoever they can get." Such ruthlessnessis tempered only by the quaint aboriginal quality of this mythical society: according to Fletcher's version of reality, the Tatar realm knew no permanent buildings or urban centers, no agriculture or coinage, no learning or written law. Not surprisingly, the facts do not bear out Fletcher's second- hand description of Tatar life in the sixteenth century, except insofar as he correctly revealsthe military might of the Crimean Khanate and the ability of its rulers to influence events in much of eastern Europe. Supposedlylacking even the rudiments of a state structure, a codified legal system, and a diversified economy, the Tatars ensconcedalong the northern Black Sea littoral had, on the contrary, achieved a level of social development that equaled or surpassedthat of their neighbors. With a complex, stable political structure, the khanate was able to mobilize significanthuman and material resourcesto sustaina

r23 124 RussianColonial Expansion sophisticated.literate culture lacking in none of the components expected of a contemporary civilized society.2 By the end of the seventeenthcentury. however, the khanate would see its pivotal role in easternEuropean and steppe politics diminished considerably. Changes in the region's geopolitical balance occasioned by the simultaneous enhancement of Muscovv's position and deterioration of the Ottoman Empire's have often been cited as reason enough to explain the rather sudden turn of Crimean fortune. But to this considerationmust be added the certain if poorly documented evidence of internal decline. Of particular significancedomestically was the reduction of financial resources available to the khans, resources tradi- tionally sustained by plunder from vearly raids against the khanate's neighbors. bv captives either sold into slaverv or ransomed. bv tribute money from Poland and Muscovy, and by donations from the Turkish sultan as payment for the khanate's protection of the Ottoman Empire's northern marches. Without these substantial annual revenues. not only did the fragile compromise between the khans and the great Tatar clans collapse,thereby throwing Crimean politics into turmoil, but the end of the slave trade undermined perhaps the most important sector of Crimean economic life, with as yet poorly analyzedbut clearly profound social consequences.Thus. what peter the Great's Russiafaced along its expandingsouthern frontier on the eve of the eighteenth century was the shadow of a once mighty foe, still able to defend its home base. but no lonser the uncontrolled terror stalking the steppes or visiting desiruction deep into the Russian lands. The ability of the khanate to stave off final defeat at Russian hands until 1783 had less to do with real Crimean strengthsthan St. Petersburg'spreoccupation with its own domestic problems and its western neighbors. and the short-term successof Tatar diplomacy. The long series of events that culminated in the loss of Crimean independence still awaits its historian, but the final stages that were played out during the reign of Catherine II (1761-1796)have been amply describedand analyzed recenrly.3 While the complex and fluid relationshipbetween Russiaand the khanate need not detain us here. we ought to note that four invasions of the peninsula bv Russian troops were require

SalientFeatures of Crimean Life under RussianRule AdministrativeOrganization Except for scattered and limited outbursts of anti-Russian military action in the immediate aftermath of Catherine's annexation proclamation. pacification of the Crimea proceeded with exceptionalease. Much of the reason for this can be found in the substantial emigration to the Ottoman Empire of manv who might have otherrviseoffered continued resistance;but also instrumental werc thosc members of the Tatar secular and religious 6lite willing to accommodate themselves to the new order and serve its interests.The quick end to militarv conflict permitted Catherine's agentsto move to$'ard establishmentof a nerv political structure that initiall-'"combined a Russian military administration with a native civil government. The former was responsiblefor maintaining the occupation armv and defending the empire's newly acquired province from external attack and internal rebellion. Entirclv in Russianhands. it was given the further dutv of collecting local taxes. The native civil govern- ment. on the other hand. in a transparcnteffort by Russian authorities to smooth the transition from independentkhanate to Russian province. was staffed largelv bv Tatars with experience in thc administrative affairs of the old regime. In addition to its reliance on native personnel. the civil government follou,ed the organizational pattern established undcr the khan: six regions subdivided into varving numbers of districts. all of whose heads wielded broad judicial and police authoritl'.5 Thrs original compromise between Russian and Tatar political interestswas too generousto last verv long. Within a vear, pressureto integrate the region fullv into the imperial framework 126 RussianColonial Expansion led to the abolition of the peculiar and expedient arrangement only recently devised. In its place was installed a unified system with organs typical of imperial practice elsewhere in the realm and with participation bv native personnelincreasingly restricted. The administrative organization of the region went through a seriesof changesuntil 1802,when the governmentof Alexander I (1801-1825)set its final pre-1917 shape, and in rhe processthe Crimea-bv being merged with other Russian territory and settled by Russian and foreign colonists-and its people lost much of their identity and the last vestigesof their independence.6 DemographicTrends What is most striking about the demographic aspect of our subject is the depletion of the native population and the subsequentrelegation of the Tatars to minority statuswithin their own homeland. While reliable data are unavailablefor the sizeof the Crimea's preannexation population-scholars have generally accepted the unsubsrantiatedtotal of 300,000 proposed in a number of sources-a survey ordered by Baron lgel'strom in 1784 to determine the socio-economiccondition of the region produced an estimate of 150,000Tatar inhabitants.TA little over twenty years later, in 1805-1806.statistics compiled for a special commission created to adjudicate land disputes showed a Tatar population of slightly more rhan 129.000.xAssuming thesefigures to be approximately correct and in the absenceof fertility and mortality rates, which would have to be startling to prove meaningful in this circumstance, massive emigration must account for the apparent population decline.e In fact, contem- porary literary evidence invariably notes the significant level of Tatar flight. mostlv to the Ottoman Empire. and offers estimates ranging as high as 100,000-110.000for this early period. The bulk of those who abandoned their homeland did so following the signingof the Treaty of Jassyin January 1792.which brought to a close the latest Russo-Turkishconflict and dashedTatar hopes of recovering their independence.Anti-Russian propagandaspread by pro-Turkish elements and the economic threat posed by the influx of colonistsfurther contributed to the exodus. During the first half of the nineteenth century the flood of emigrants receded to a steadv trickle sustainedby an economic depression particularlv severe for manv Tatar peasants. The Crimean War. however. set the stage for a second mass exodus The Crimeaunder RussianRule 127 that involved over 181,000people b-v1863.t" Economic distress, fears of acceleratedefforts at Russificationthrough schools and religious institutions, threats of deportation to the Russian interior, and the passageof approximately16,000 Nogai emigrants through the Crimea on their wav to the Ottoman Empire combined to create the panic that resultedin the reduction of the Tatar population by two-thirds. Bv the time the government, which had initiallv facrlitated the request for exit permission. acted to halt the human tide. the Tatars numbered around 100.000out of a total Crimean population of close to twice that figure.1l The non-Tatar component-a clear majority by the mid- 1860s-had gained its demographic prominence as a result not only of Tatar emigration but also of decades of colonization sponsored by the Russian government and private interests. Under the khanate this segmentof the population representedno more than a small minorit,v of Armenians. Georgians, Greeks, and Karaim Jews. who. despite their numbers. played a major role in the economic life of the realm. Under Russian colonial administration such traditional Tatar neighbors as these were supplementedin two ways: {irstly by Serbs.Moldavians. Vlakhs. Bulgarians. Poles. Germans. and manv other foreignersattracted by financial assistance,free land, and extensive privileges: and secondly by Russian and Ukrainian peasantsbrought from other areas of the empire by serf owners who had acquired landhold- ings in the peninsula and needed field hands. While the concept of systematicallysettling large numbers of foreign colonists in Russia dates from the early 1760s and had resulted in the recruitment of 30.000 immigrants for the Volga region by 1775, the Crimea could boast of a similar number of such settlersonly in the i850s. In addition to the slow pace at which foreigners settled in the region. their presencewas always numerically less significantthan that of imperial colonists,who accountedfor over 70,000 inhabitants of the peninsula on the eve of the Crimean War.12Taken together. these colonistssucceeded in acquiring some of the best land that the Crimea possessedand restricting the opportunities that Tatar peasantsmight otherwise have had to sell their labors. The economic crisis that plagued the Tatars during much of the earlv nineteenth century was undoubtedlv aggravatcdby thesetwin developments.'' \)\ }usirnn f.,iorira) }:xpcntion

EconomicDevelopments On 30 October 1793. after follorving a circuitous route that took him from St. Petersburgto Moscow and then dorvn the Volga. a middle-aged academicianrvith a distinguishedreputation arrived in Simferopol to gather material on the Crimca's flora and fauna. topographv. economic eeoeraphr'. and ethnosraphv. Petr ScmenovichPallas. at the requcstof P.A. Zubov. the local chief administrator. took upon himself the additional task of surveying the region's productive strength and assessingits potential for further dcvelopment. In his reports to Zubov and in later publications.Pallas was optimistic about the Crimea's future as a major entrep6t serving Russia's commercial ties with the Mediterranean nations. provided her ports were improved. warehouse facilities expanded. and a more flexible tariff policy initiated. He was equallv hopeful that through investment and proper manasement the natural agricultural rvealth of the region would support thc revival and development of two potentiallv lucrative enterprises:viticulture and sericulture.So convinced was he of the future of Crimean wines. for example. that he prcdicted Russia '"vouldone dav mana_qetcl do without French imports! Much u'ould have to be changed. horvever. before such rewards could be reaped. and much u,ould depend upon state initiativeas well as privatecapital. To begin rvith.he argued.the government ought to auction all state-ou'nedland. selling to anyone who would guaranteethe propertv's use for intensive cultivation and who would take an active interest in improving the vields of his holdings. In addition. the government would have to respond imasinativelJ'and boidly'to the problem of acute labor shortage (and the slothful nature of the Tatar peasant) by inviting foreign colonists to settle the region and encouraging voluntary' migration of hardrvorking imperial subjects skilled in various agrarian pursuits: Russians.Ukrainians, and Poles to work the rich vallevs and -qrow grain or raise livestock: Armenians and Moldavians tc'lestablish vinevards and silkworm plantationsin the hills. Abol'e all. the governmentwould haveto overcomethe most seriousobstacle to economicdevelopment by resolving the divisir.e disputes betrveen Tatars and non-natives ovcr land ownership and between peasantsand landowners over the former's rights and obli-sationsas tenant farmers.rl Tlte Crirneaunder RussianRule 129 Pallas's hopes for the future of the Crimean economy were only partiallv realized. and even then provided much lessbenefit to the native Tatar inhabitantsthan to those Russianand foreign newcomers who managed to acquire sometimes massiveestates or settled in the new port cities of Sevastopoland Balaklava to participate in the expansion of Russia's southern commerce. Developments in the peninsula'srural economv provide a casein point. Owing in large measure to the decision not to introduce serfdom into Tatar society and the widespread labor shortage resulting from emigration. agriculture in the hands of estate owners became increasinglyspecialized and commercialized:bv the 1830s and 1840s larse-scale enterprises devoted to wheat farming, sheepbreeding.and rvine-making,with their promise of generous profits through national and international marketing. had come to dominate the local econom!'.15In the process. however. the Tatar peasantr)'.while legalll''free from the burdens and restrictionsof serfdom. found its traditional rights and access to the land severelvdiminished in the face of pressurefrom large landowners. Taking advantaqe of their socio-political pcwer (bolstered by favorable imperial policies) and greater hnancial resources,as well as the limited defensethat the peasantrvcould muster on its own behalf. the region's nobilitv (including some of its Tatar members) managedover these decadesto purchasestate lands at undervalued prices. to seize peasant holdings when ownership could not be proved. and to raise the labor demands (barshchina)of their peasanttenants beyond the prescribedthree days a week. Particularly onerous was the growing practice of mesiachina,whereby the landowner denied his peasantsany land for their own use and obliged them to work onlv for him.r6 Little wonder that so many Tatars opted to emigrate. although in fairness to the local nobilitv. exploitation of peasantsincreased throughout the empire in the decadesjust prior to the abolition of serfdom, contributing to the pauperization of the class as a whole and its decline in absolute number. Cultural Conditions In 1821the Russiangovernment commissioned two men to lead an cxpedition to the Crimea with the goal of surveyingthe many antiquities scatteredacross the peninsula.Besides identifying the extant monuments of Tatar and pre-Tatar culture. they were ordered to determine which of these ought to be preserved.In a 130 RussianColonial Expansion report later submitted through bureaucraticchannels, the expedi- tion's architectural expert recommended that 41,000 roubles be appropriated from state funds to subvent the task of restoring and maintaining eight structures, including in Kozlov, Eski Sarai, and Feodosiia. Following extensivediscussion at the highest administrative level, the Minister of Internal Affairs informed authorities in Tavricheskaia Guberniia that 10.000 roubles would be allotted. but onlv for antiquities of Greek and Italian origin; Tatar and Turkish monuments. being lessvaluable, would have to relv uoon the beneficenceof local nativesfor their survival.lT In this responseis reflectedan indifference, if not antagonism, toward Tatar culture that probably represents the general attitude of most Russiansduring this period. At its best, such an attitude contributed nothing to the preservation of splendid mosques. caravanserais,public baths. or fountains, let alone cemeteriesor private dwellings; at its worst, it encouragedtheir destruction in the name of progress.However much a Pushkin, for example, might lament the way in which the khan's palace in Bakhchisaraihad been allowed to decay. poetic indignation could do little to prevent such common but tragic acts as the leveling of major Tatar structuresaround Simferopol'sgreat squareto make room for an enlarged parade ground.lx And the deaf ears were not only to be found among top bureaucrats:when the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a circular in 1827 to all provincial governors for information on antiquities in their administrative areas, the responsefrom TavricheskaiaGuberniia was shocking: only two local officials acknowledged any architectural monu- ments at all in their districts. and each counted only one!le Is this to be explainedby some conspiracyof silenceamong the rest, motivated by a consciousdetestation of Tatar culture, or does it better reflect bureaucratic incompetence, avoidance of duty, or ignorance as to what an antiquity was? For that matter, ought we not at least entertain the likelihood that many Russians in the Crimea were unable to judge the value of Tatar architecturalmonuments becausethe latter were consideredto be part of a culture that. however defeated and decadent, still throve and ought to be maintaining those very structuresitself ? And, finally, given the abandonmentof many Tatar buildings as a result of mass emigration, ought we to be surprised by the sometimes cavalier manner in which thev were razed bv local The Crinteaunder RussianRule 131 Russian authorities, especially in urban areas (always more important to local Russian interests) where the need for developmentwas most pressing?Until such time as the recordsof local government are opened to examination. answers to these and other important questionsare likelv to remain eiusive. If the material achievementsof Tatar culture suffered from Russian neglect, disdain, and, at times, brutal onslaught, its spiritual aspectendured more subtle forms of pressurethat were probably no less destructivefor all their apparent harmlessness. From the moment of annexation the Russian government pursued a dual policv regardingthe Islamic religion. It preferred, for instance, to leave all matters of dogma, ritual, and familial concern in the hands of clergy unless requested to intervene in appellate fashion by a disgruntled litigant. Even when the government undertook to regulate (though not determine) Islamic practice, as through the code of 1831 and other nineteenth-centurydecrees. the bases for such regulation were invariably the Sharia (Islamic jurisprudence) and pre-1783 custom. As one commentator observed laconically. in such matters "Kuranic law proved stronger than state law."20 But religion is more than dogma and ritual. Generally it also spawns a body of specialistsor professionalinterpreters (in the case of Islam, rhe ulema) who, becauseof their wisdom. virtue, or other socially valued personal attributes enjoy a position of leadership among the faithful. Desiring to exploit the social authority of the Tatar ulema, and fearful that if left unfettered this authority could be used to promote anti-Russiansentiment, the tsarist government sought to bind the Islamic clergy to state service. Two approaches were taken. On the one hand, Catherine's regime moved quickly in the early postannexation years to court clerical loyalty by issuinga number of decreesthat: (1) granted salariesto all religiouspersonnel: (2) assuredthat the clergy would retain their positions. spiritual authority, and control over religious education and uakrfs (vast landholdings traditionally serving as revenue-producersto support mosques, schoois,and charitable institutions)t (3) exempted uafrfs and the clergy from state taxation and other levies; (4) bestowed upon the clergy the right to operate movable property and on the mufti (officially recognizedas chief cleric) the statusof nobility; and (5) ordered allocation of state funds to finance construction of mosques,schools, and caravanserais.as well as the printing and 132 RtrssianColonial Expansion distribution of the Kur'an. Taken together these measures engendered a patron-client relationship that inevitably fostered clerical subservience and self-imposed censorship as largely unconsciousexpressions of gratitude. On the other hand. the government maneuvered more cautiously but no less effectively to reinforce financial and psychological dependency' and restrict clerical autonomy by insistingthat civil law was indeed paramount u,herethe corporate status of the clergy. the orqanizational principles underlying clerical life and authoritv. the proceduresfor establishingclerical rank. and the performance of certain duties were involved. In this light. for example.we can discernthe purpose behind the creation of an Islamic -eoverningbodl' that ultimately took the form of the Muslim SpiritualAssemblv (179,1). the promulgation of the code of 1831 (rvhich. among other things. defined the responsibilitiesof the clergv.their positions.and the procedures for election to high posts). and the requirement for clergy to maintain registersof births. deaths.and marriagesbeginning in 1834. Such wcll-aimed thrusts in combination with material and psychic rewards u'orked remarkablv well to achieve for the government its goal of clerical subservience.What the latter's effect upon Crimean societv was. horvever. is more difficult to determine. Before the 1880swe know virtuallv nothing about the relationship between the clergv and the faithful to be able to demonstrate that its co-optation had the negative consequences that manv have long presumed and which analogous situations would indicate. Yet if complaints b1"lay and religious reformers of the late nineteenth and earlv twentieth centuriesare a rcliable gauge of more widespread attitudes. then state patronage succeeded in diminishing significantly clerical esteem and authority. Servility and obsequiousnesshad rendered the clergy socially impotent. Educationaland IntellectualTrends During the late 1860s. officials from the Ministries of Public Education and Internal Affairs met with school administrators. teachers,and local notablesthroughout the empire to discussthe state of educationamong non-Russiansubjects and the possibility of expanding instruction bevond current limits. At provincial conferences.in official publications, in the press. and in the "fat TlteCrintea under RussiuttRule 133 journals" that were so important for the disseminationof information beyond St. Petersburg and Moscow. a seemingly endless stream of opinion poured forth for public scrutinv. Concerning education among the Tatars of Tavricheskaia Guberniia. the consensusheld that the sovernment had accom- plishcd little since 1783to foster secularschooling and instruction and that the quality of native Islamic schoolswas inferior at best. Such cclmplaintswere proffered bv Russians knowledgeable of the local situation and echoed bv Tatars concernedrvith the lack of development in the region and their brethren's cultural retardation.ll Education and intellectual life rvithin Crimcan Tatar society had not alwaysbcen so dismal.During the heydavof the khanate a vigorous literate culture was sustained by a generouslv supported network of domestic mektebs (primarv schools) and medresses(advanced theological institutions) that servedwell the limited needsof a traditionalsocietv.r: The intimate association of religion and education. of course. encouragedthe latter's development.as did the Islamicinjunction that bovs shouldstudv between the ages of six and fifteen. Horv this precolonial. religious educational svstem u'as affected by' the imposition of Russianrule. however.defies anall'sis for the present.We might cxpect that the number of schoolswould have dwindled during the earlv nineteenth centurl- as a consequenceof population movement and decline as u,ell as of the rvidespread and worsening economic distress of most Tatars u,ho rcmained behind. The lack of empiricaldata. unfortunatelv.precludes the making of eventhis basicjudement. Nevertheless. the complaints against the narrownessof the curriculum in the lslamic schools and the poor overall qualitv of their instruction are borne out b,v the efforts of native reformers in the 1880s and the following dccades.Likewise the absenceof anv literarv activitvamong thc Tatars before the same period attests to the general cultural decavof thcir stlcietysince annexation. We are on somewhat firmer ground u'hen addressinggovern- ment involvement in the education of Crimean Tatars. but even here information is spotty. often contradictory. and maddcninglv ambiguous.In general. Catherine II's promise to respcct the clergy's traditional control of religious education r.','asmaintained by her successors.Through the mid-nineteenthcenturv. succeed- ing administrationsshowed little interest in either the quantitv or 13.1 RttssianColonial Expansion quality of local Islamic schoolsand did nothing to foster or hinder their functioning. Only in the areas of language instruction and teacherpreparation did the governmentfitfully develop programs and allocate some public funds. Thus. between 1824 and 1854 severalprojects were drawn up to introduce the study of Russian and secular subjectsinto some Islamic schoolswhile establishing a Tatar section within the Simferopol Gymnasium with instruc- tion of and in the . The impediments to full implementation of the various proposals.however. were multiple: chronic underfunding. lack of Tatar texts for classroomuse, and, above all. widespread suspicion among Tatars of the govern- ment's motives for encouragingthe study of Russian.As a result, all but a tinv number of Russifiednatives (primarily from murza. or noble. families) refused to send their children to the few Russian-sponsoredschools or to permit Russian instruction in native institutions. The educational experience of someone like Ismail Bev Gasprinskii(1851-1914), the great Tatar reformer, was thus exceptionalfor its associationwith Russian institutions: first the Simferopol Gymnasium. followed by enrollment in Voronezh and Moscow military academies. Horv exceptional schooling of this kind was for a young Tatar is attested to by figures for the number of enrolleesin and graduatesof the Tatar section of the Simferopol Gvmnasium: only seventy and twenty- five respectivelyfor the period 1827-185,1.23 In the 1860sthe more serious Russian interest in minority education was stimulated by the desire to bring greater numbers from among such people as the Tatars into the mainstream of imperial life. State-sponsorededucation. emphasizinginstruction of and in the Russian languageand involving a more aggressive role for the Russian Orthodox Church, was expected to foster assimilation (sblizhenie) while simultaneously dissipating the political threat that ethnic and religious consciousnessposed ultimately to the territorial integrity of the empire. Consideredby Russian nationalists as a tool for preserving the status quo, education became instead an instrument for the revitalization of local native culture and the creation of a modern native intelligentsiaincreasinglv critical of Russia'sdominant influence in contemporarysocietl . The Crintea under Rlrssiun Rule 13-5

Conclusion In Bakhchisarai, two days after the centennial anniversary of Russia's annexation of the Crimea. Ismail Bey Gasprinskii published the initial number of the first Tatar newspaper. TerctimanlPerevodchik. In a lead article hailing the important event of one hundred years earlier. he noted how "on 8 April 1783, the small khanate, worn out by disorder and bloodshed, was made a part of the greatestempire in the world and. under the patronage of a mighty power. received peace and the protection of just laws . ." Continuing in this euphoric vein, he added: "Celebrating this day . . . the Crimean Muslims cannot fail to recall all of those good deedsfrom which they have already profited for a century."2a Considering the years of frustration he endured before receiving official permission to publish a newspaper, Gasprinskii might be forgiven the fervor of his gratitude. But hyperbole aside,is there any truth to his assessmentof Russia'scontribution to Tatar society? Were the Tatars recipients of Russian beneficenceand sympathy in the years from 1783 to the 1860s? Had they indeed profited from their associationwith the Russian Empire? Not long ago Western intellectualbias buttressedby the unspoken assumptions of modernization theory might have prompted us to respond affirmatively to such questions. While recognizingthat Tatars sufferedfrom Russianpolitical. economic, and social domination. we neverthelesswould have emphasized some presumed long-term benefit of Russian (i.e. Western) influence. With a faith born of the reality of Western political. military, and technological might. we often argued for the universalapplicability of the Western experienceand the value of its acceptanceby other societies.For all who tread the Western path, short-term social dislocation and personal intellectual traumas were small prices to pay for the inevitable rewards of industrialization. social egalitarianism. political democracy, and modern science. More recently this vision of human history has come under sharp attack. Where once Western civilization was proclaimed the ideal againstwhich other civilizationsand cultureswere to be measured. and where once imitation of the West was a conditio sine qua non of the construction of a better societv. no\l' many are much lesssanguine about what the West has to offer the rest 136 RrrssianColoniol E.rpansion

of the world. As a result. answersto questionsof the type posed above no longer come as easilv: nor are the1,'as likely to be positive. If we descend from this philosophical level of cliscourse, however. then the significanceof the khanate's destruction and the incorporation of the peninsula and its people into the tsarist empire is undeniable and clear. Bv the mid-1860s,after barely eighty vears of Russian rule. Crimean Tatar society had been largely integrated into the imperial order. While the peasantshad escapedbeing caught up in the institutional net of serfdom. their autonomy was more apparent than real. especially in view of their economic plight. As for the clergv and remnants of the olcl murza families, both were transformed into estates in keeping with current Russian practice. and both found their social authority diminished by associationwith and dependency upon Russian officialdom. Emasculated and servile. the traditional 6lite could no longer provide independent local leadership. Socially. then. the effect of Russian conquest was substantial and fundamental. The same conclusion.moreover. can be drawn for other aspectsof Tatar life. Demographically. the cost to the Crimea was extraordinary; in some shorter periods, staggering. Economically. the establishmentof a colonial presence,for all its promise, succeeded only in aggrandizing a minority of the Russified native 6lite and its colonial counterpart, and aggravat- ing the difficult conditions under which peasantsusually work. Culturally, Tatar society appears to have become a wasteland unable to sustain even a modicum of intellectual, literary, or artistic activity. While the Russiangovernment was hardly solely responsiblefor the grim condition in which Tatar sociery found itself by the middle of the nineteenrh century, it certainly did little to easethe transformation, which it had a hand in fosterins. of a once vital culture.

Notes

1. For this discussionI have used the edition of Fletcher'swork found in L. Berry and R. Crummey (eds.). Rade and Barbarous Kingdom (Madison: Universitl' of Wisconsin Press. 1968). pp. 191-202. 2. This is one of Alan W. Fisher'smaior argumentsin Crimean Tatars (Stanford: Hoover Institution eresi. TOZSI;.Chapters 3-5. 3. See Alan W. Fisher. The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783(Cambridge: Cambridge University press. 1970). The (rimett untler RussionRule 137

4. On this subject. once again. Alan W. Fisher has added substantially to our knowledge with two studies: "Enlightened Despotism and Islam Under Catherine II." S/clic Review.XXVII. No. 'l (December 1968),pp.5,12-553. and "Sahin Girey. the Reformer Khan. and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea." Jahrbiicher filr Geschichte Osteuropas.XV. No. 3 lSeptember. 1967). pp. 3,11-364. 5. The following provides the basic information concerning the first years of Russian administration of the Crimea: F.F. Lashkov, "statisticheskiiasvedeniia o Krvme, soobshchenviakaimakanami v 1783 godu." Zapiski imperatorskago odesskago obshchestvaistorii i drevnostei. XIV (1886). pp.91-156; A. Fisher. Crimean Tatars, pp. 7G-78. 6. The peninsulawas initiallv combined with territory beyond Perekop to form Tavricheskaia Oblast' (Tavrida Region). ln 1796 Paul I's government decreed the unilication of the oblasl' with Voznesenskaia and EkaterinoslavskaiaGubernii (Provinces) to create the super- orovince of Novorossiiskaia.Finallv a decree of 1802redefined the Crimea as part of the province oi Tavricheskaia. Meanwhile the internal organization of the Crimea had likewise undergone several changes before the number of. uezdv (districts) was set at five in i838: Simferopol'skii. Feodosiiskii. Evpatoriiskii. Perekopskii, and Ialtinskii. 7. F.F. Lashkov. "Statisticheskiiasvedeniia." p. 103. 8. F.F. Lashkov, "Sbornik dokumentov po istorii krvmsko-tatarskago zemlevladeniia," I zvestiia Tavricheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi kommissii, XXVI (1897).pp. 8f15;1. 9. On this subject see: A.I. Markevich, "PereseleniiaKrymskikh tatar v Turtsiiu v sviazi s dvizheniem naseleniia v Krymu," Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR. Otdelenie gumanitarnykh nauk. 7th series (Moscow, 1928), pp. 375+05 and 7th series (Moscow, 1929). pp. 1-16; and M. Pinson, "Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire. 1854-1862.''Gtiney-Dogu Avrupa Arastirmalari Dergisi. | (1972), pp. 37-56. 10. Iu. Ianson. Krym. Ego khlebopashestv'oi khlebnaia torgovlia (St. Petersburg. 1870). p. 8. 11. See Sbornik dokumentov i sratei po t'oprosu ob obrazovanii inorodtsev(St. Petersburg.1869). p. 84. n.. for the range of figures compiled by different official organs. t2. A. Fisher, Crimean Tatars.p.93. lJ. The question of foreign colonization in Russia generally and in the southern part of the empire particularly is treated in: R.P. Bartlett. "Foreign Colonies and Foreign Rural Settlement in the Russian Empire." Modern Ency-clopediaof Russian and Soviet Historv, Xl (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1979), pp. 210-215. and Human Capital: The Settlement of Foreigners in Russict,1762-1801 , Cambridge: Cambridge Universit.v"Press. 1979; also see J.A. Duran. "Catherine II. Potemkin, and Colonization Policy in Southern Russia." The RussianReviev'. XXVIII, No. 1 (January. 1969). pp. 23-36. 138 Russian Colonial Expansion

14. This brief introduction to Pallas'sviews is basedupon E. Druzhinina. "Nachalo nauchnogo izucheniia Kryma." in Voprosl, sotsial'no- ekonomicheskoi istorii i istochnikovedeniia perioda feodalizma v Rossii. Sbornik statei k 77-teriiu A.A. Noiose!'sko-go (Moscow, 1961). pp. 345-350. A. Markevich has written a more thoroush study entitled "Akademik P.S. Pallas. Ego zhizn.' prebvvanie v Krymu i uchenye trudl'," Izvestiia Tat,richeskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi kommissii. XLVII (1912). pp. 167-212. 15. M. Maksimenko. Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v Tavricheskoi subernii nakanttne i posle otmen)) krepostnogopraua (Simferopol'. 1952). pp. 14-21. 16. Ibid., pp.8-25. passim. Despite government establishment of severalcommissions to resolveconflicting claims on landed property in the Crimea. and despitethe favorablejudgement that some tatar peasantseventuallv won after filing suit before these bodies. land ownership remained a sourceof grave socialtension well bevond the era of Great Reforms. The fullest study of this problem prior to 1861 is found in F.F. Lashkov. Istorichesiii ocherk kry,msio-tatarskaso zemlevladeniia(Simferopol'. 1897). Part III. '.Dela 17. This episodeis recountedin A. Steven. arkhiva Tavricheskago gubernskagopravleniia. otnosiashchiiasiado razvskaniia,opisaniii i sokhraneniiapamiatnikov starinyv predelakhTawicheskoi gubernii,.' Izvestiia Tavricheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi kontmissii. XIII (1g91). pp.37-4i. 18. A. Fisher, Crimean Tatars.o.95. 19. A. Steven."Dela arkhiva." pp. -{2J4. 20. L Aleksandrov. "O musul'manskom dukhovenstve i upravlenii dukhovnymi delami musul'man v Krymu posle ego prisoedineniiak Rossii," Izvestiia Tavricheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi kommissii. LI (l9l+).pp.2l8-2Iq. 27. Sbornik dokumentot'. pp. 97-156. 22. See F.F. Lashkov. "Statisticheskiiasvedeniia." pp. 113-115. for statistics compiled by Baron Igel'strom in 1784. The figure for mektebs (26) is clearlv too low in relationship to the number of medresses(23). Note also Fisher's comments concerning Tatar cultural life in Crimean Tatars. pp. 28-36. and in .'Crimean Separatism in the Ottoman Empire." in Nationalism in a Non- National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. ed. by W. Haddad and W. Ochsenwald(Columbus: Ohio State Universitv Press.1977). pp. 57-76. 23. Sbornik dokumentov. o. 90. 1A "Stoletie," Terc[irnanlPerevodchik.No. I (10 April 1883). p. I