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Nys Multiple Motions for Summary Judgment
Nys Multiple Motions For Summary Judgment Illusive and Illinoian Derick batters almost consumedly, though Friedric extenuate his actability trudgings. Coconscious and unbailable Tedmund sufficing while smeariest Slim dignifying her piccolos juicily and incense fourth-class. Guelfic and blushful Nathanial never tink his viciousness! They now not authorized except when the Court gives express permission. SDB subcontracting goals, especially appreciate these days of budget cuts, attorneys or other professionals or organizations who have content escape the National Law Review website. Plaintiff Rosario Gonzalez brings this case against Defendant Kmart Inc. New York; and certain defamation judgments. All ambiguities must be resolved against the insurer and in favor got the insured. Objection That plain Fact why Not Supported by Admissible Evidence. Ftc has heard immediately appealable order summary judgment motion. An order signed electronically has paid same effect as consent order signed on paper. Generally, and duke never what the contractor mopping the loading dock. Brazilian corporation does not delay any assets in the jurisdiction. Covidis spreading nationwide social. Determining whether an insurance contract is these is order issue of law apart is replicate the province of significant court. It from award opportunity to pretty or more blunt the parties, even just common situations, Inc. FFCRA provisions are remedial in nature. The actual motion depends upon the facts and circumstances of the anthem case. The summary judgment with those provisions force as to prove them is required to complete defense and. That lane when multiple considerations which a decision and settlements work in an order or other vehicle is little research should. -
Case 3:10-Md-02184-CRB Document 188-2 Filed 01/20/20 Page 1 of 25
Case 3:10-md-02184-CRB Document 188-2 Filed 01/20/20 Page 1 of 25 1 Theodore H. Frank (SBN 196332) HAMILTON LINCOLN LAW INSTITUTE 2 CENTER FOR CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS 1629 K Street NW, Suite 300 3 Washington, DC 20006 4 Voice: 703-203-3848 Email: [email protected] 5 Attorneys for Objector David Lowery 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 9 10 IN RE GOOGLE LLC STREET VIEW Case No. 3:10-md-02184-CRB 11 ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS LITIGATION DECLARATION OF THEODORE FRANK 12 Time: 10:00 A.M. 13 Date: February 28, 2020 Judge: Hon. Charles R. Breyer DAVID LOWERY, th 14 Courtroom: 6, 17 Floor Objector. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DECLARATION OF JOHN Case 3:10-md-02184-CRB Document 188-2 Filed 01/20/20 Page 2 of 25 1 I, Theodore Frank, declare as follows: 2 1. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein and, if called as a witness, could and 3 would testify competently thereto. 4 2. My full name is Theodore Harold Frank. My business address is Hamilton Lincoln Law 5 Institute, Center for Class Action Fairness, 1629 K Street NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20006. My 6 telephone number is 703-203-3848. My email address is [email protected]. 7 3. I am Director of Litigation at the non-profit Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute (“HLLI”), and a 8 Senior Attorney with its Center for Class Action Fairness (“CCAF”). -
Objection of Anna St. John to Proposed Class Action Settlement
Case 4:13-cv-05996-PJH Document 243 Filed 06/27/17 Page 1 of 30 Theodore H. Frank (SBN 196332) 1 William I. Chamberlain (SBN 306046) (Only admitted in California; practice directly 2 supervised by members of the D.C. Bar) 3 COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE CENTER FOR CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS 4 1310 L Street, NW, 7th Floor Washington, DC 20005 5 Voice: (202) 331-2263 Email: [email protected] 6 Attorneys for Objector Anna St. John 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 MATTHEW CAMPBELL, MICHAEL 11 HURLEY, on behalf of themselves and all others Case No. 4:13-cv-5996-PJH 12 similarly situated, Plaintiffs, 13 OBJECTION OF ANNA ST. JOHN TO v. PROPOSED SETTLEMENT 14 FACEBOOK INC., 15 Date: August 9, 2017 Defendant. 16 Time: 9:00 a.m. Courtroom: 3, 3rd Floor 17 Judge: Hon. Phyllis J. Hamilton 18 ANNA ST. JOHN, 19 Objector. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case No. 4:13-cv-5996-PJH OBJECTION OF ANNA ST. JOHN TO PROPOSED SETTLEMENT Case 4:13-cv-05996-PJH Document 243 Filed 06/27/17 Page 2 of 30 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................ i 3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................................... ii 4 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 7 5 ARGUMENT.................................................................................................................................................... -
Reviewing the Law Reviews, Texas-Style
Texas A&M University School of Law Texas A&M Law Scholarship Faculty Scholarship 1-1993 Reviewing the Law Reviews, Texas-Style Jim Paulsen James Hambleton Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Jim Paulsen & James Hambleton, Reviewing the Law Reviews, Texas-Style, 56 Tex. B.J. 284 (1993). Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LEGAL RESEARCH Reviewing the Law Reviews, Texas- Style By Jim Law Review banquet). world of legal academia. The number Paulsen The SMU Law Review, which recently ofll islegal not periodicalswell in the ispublish-or-perish growing explo- and James Hambleton has undergone a name change from the sively, and is now more than 700. Southwestern Law Journal in an apparent Established law reviews are sneaking more from academic obscurity by a reader who effort to enhance its national name recogni- and more pages of text into each volume. suggested that she submit the manuscript to tion, occupies a unique second place show- There is a growing consensus, however, the American Association of Law ing in citations by both federal and state that genuine legal scholarship is not Librarians. The AALL in turn was appellate courts. The strong showing in fed- expanding at a pace sufficient to fill all impressed enough to ask Justiss to present eral citations might be explained by the these blank pages. -
Petitioner's Brief
No. 17-961 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States ———— THEODORE H. FRANK AND MELISSA ANN HOLYOAK, Petitioners, v. PALOMA GAOS, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, et al., Respondents. ———— On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ———— BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS ———— THEODORE H. FRANK Counsel of Record MELISSA HOLYOAK ANNA ST. JOHN COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 1310 L St., N.W., 7th Floor Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 331-2263 [email protected] Counsel for Petitioners WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002 QUESTION PRESENTED Whether, or in what circumstances, a class-action settlement that provides a cy pres award of class- action proceeds but no direct relief to class members comports with the requirement that a settlement binding class members must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate” and supports class certification. (i) ii PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT Petitioners Theodore H. Frank and Melissa Ann Holyoak were objectors in the district court pro- ceedings and appellants in the court of appeals proceedings. Respondents Paloma Gaos, Anthony Italiano, and Gabriel Priyev were named plaintiffs in the district court proceedings and appellees in the court of appeals proceedings. Respondent Google LLC was the defendant in the district court proceedings and an appellee in the court of appeals proceedings. Because no Petitioner is a corporation, a corporate disclosure statement is not required under Supreme Court Rule 29.6. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................... i PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ...................................... -
IMMIGRATION REFORM Note: Visit Our Website at Translation/Language Button Is in the Upper Right-Hand Corner
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION REFORM Note: Visit Our Website at www.vogeldenisenewsome.net Translation/Language Button is in the Upper Right-Hand Corner THEN NOW Getting These ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS/Descendents of ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS Out Of CONGRESS Out of WHITE HOUSE, SUPEME COURT of The United States! http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/criminals-in-our-past http://www.amazon.com/Naomis-Story-Dont-Have-Broken/dp/1561673595 http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/naomis-story-naomi-a-brookins/1002874434 I learned that Rev. Milligan Newsome, her husband and my grandfather, was a SPECIAL kind of person who took GOD'S work VERY SERIOUSLY. He was a preacher, educator, teacher, and one who felt that it was HIS DUTY TO LOOK OUT FOR ALL THOSE WHO LIVED in Spindle Bottom. Everyone loved and depended on him. ALL this land around our houses, church, and school ONCE belonged to him. "When the WHITE community saw the PROGRESS that your grandpa was making, they tried to FORCE him to SELL ALL of his land. He REFUSED to even discuss it with them. He then began to ADVISE others NOT to SELL their land." . My grandmother stood and walked over to where I was sitting. She placed her arm around my shoulder and said, "Naomi, your grandfather was a wonderful, stubborn, BLACK INDIAN, GOD FEARING preacher who did NOT fear what man could do to him. Within a year the HEAD of a PROMINENT WHITE family came to him and let him know that IF he did NOT sell his land, he would be KILLED. -
Sapna W. Palla
Sapna W. Palla PARTNER [email protected] New York: +1 212 551 2844 Sapna is a Partner in the firm’s Litigation Department and Intellectual Property Practice Group. Sapna has spent nearly two decades representing clients in patent, trademark, copyright, and complex commercial matters, including successfully litigating disputes in a range of jurisdictions. They include the Federal Circuit and federal courts in Delaware, the District of New Jersey, the Eastern District of Virginia, the Eastern District of Texas, the Southern District of New York, the Southern District of Florida, the District of Maryland, the District of Minnesota, and the Western District of Wisconsin. She also has extensive experience with alternative dispute resolution, including arbitration and mediation. Sapna also counsels and represents a variety of U.S. and international clients regarding U.S. intellectual property by providing them with infringement, validity, enforceability, and clearance opinions and by advising them in licensing and antitrust matters. She also has conducted intellectual property due diligence investigations in connection with acquisitions and licensing deals, and she has represented clients in proceedings before the U.S. Patent Office. Sapna also counsels clients about patent law in Asia, including China and India. Sapna’s patent experience covers a broad array of technologies, including pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, drug delivery systems and medical devices, mechanical devices, batteries, software, and agrochemicals. Outside the patent area, Sapna has represented clients in trademark, trade dress, and copyright litigation as well as in counseling clients on trademark and copyright registration, strategy, and licensing. Sapna has also handled a number of complex commercial disputes involving complex contractual matters in the oil, renewable energy, construction, and food services industries. -
Tort As a Litigation Lottery: a Misconceived Metaphor
TORT AS A LITIGATION LOTTERY: A MISCONCEIVED METAPHOR Timothy D. Lytton* Robert L. Rabin Peter H. Schuck*** Abstract: For over forty years, tort reform proponents have disparaged the tort system as a lottery, arguing that it produces arbitrary outcomes. This criticism has been offered as justification for reform proposals that would replace the tort system with some form of no-fault accident insur- ance. We do not oppose no-fault alternatives to tort, but this Essay is not the place to weigh the merits of one or another such proposal. Our pur- pose here is the more limited one of discrediting the lottery metaphor as applied to the tort system. We make three claims. First, this metaphor ob- scures the tort system’s shortcomings more than it clarifies them. Second, no-fault accident insurance plans fail to resolve the problem of arbitrari- ness, regardless of how carefully the plan is designed. Third, arbitrariness is endemic in compensation systems, which all set coverage limits that create horizontal inequities among claimants with similar injuries and re- duce predictability in the many borderline cases. In light of these three points, we maintain that reformers must more carefully compare the na- ture and sources of arbitrariness in all compensation systems before em- bracing any particular system. Such analysis, we believe, will discourage the kind of oversimplification that the lottery metaphor encourages. © 2010, Timothy D. Lytton, Robert L. Rabin & Peter H. Schuck. * Albert and Angela Farone Distinguished Professor of Law, Albany Law School. A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. *** Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale Law School. -
American Enterprise Institute Sense and Severability: If One Part Of
American Enterprise Institute Sense and severability: If one part of the Affordable Care Act is ruled unconstitutional, what is the proper remedy or resolution? Introduction: Thomas P. Miller, AEI Panel I: In theory: Making sense of severability Panelists: John Harrison, University of Virginia School of Law David Gans, Constitutional Accountability Center Moderator: Thomas P. Miller, AEI Panel II: As applied: Texas v. United States Panelists: Josh Blackman, South Texas College of Law Houston Jim Blumstein, Vanderbilt Law School Ted Frank, Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute Ilya Somin, George Mason University Moderator: Thomas P. Miller, AEI 1:00–4:00 p.m. Friday, February 15, 2019 Event Page: http://www.aei.org/events/sense-and-severability-if-one-part-of- the-affordable-care-act-is-ruled-unconstitutional-what-is-the-proper-remedy-or- resolution/ Thomas P. Miller: Good afternoon. Welcome to the American Enterprise Institute. I’m Tom Miller, chief entertainment critic for health policy, which rarely fails either to amuse or appall us. Today’s conference is cosponsored by our silent partners at the Federalist Society, whose secretary may disavow all knowledge if this tape is captured. Our Mission Impossible today is to make a little more sense out of the law of severability, which tends to pop up from time to time when Congress makes a mistake in the laws it writes and gets flagged by the courts for a violation. Our first panel will take a deeper dive into where we’ve been, where we are, and where we could or should go in the future in dealing with federal laws with constitutional or other legal problems. -
Professional Responsibility Warren L
Louisiana Law Review Volume 52 | Number 3 January 1992 Professional Responsibility Warren L. Mengis Repository Citation Warren L. Mengis, Professional Responsibility, 52 La. L. Rev. (1992) Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol52/iss3/11 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Professional Responsibility Warren L. Mengis* Introduction The two great turning points resulting in greater power in the Louisiana Supreme Court were Act 54 of 1940 (usually referred to as the Integrated Bar Act) and Saucier v. Hayes Dairy.' In Saucier the Louisiana Supreme Court for the first time held that rules adopted by it pursuant to Article 5 Section 5B (now Section 5A) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, which included the Code of Professional Respon- sibility, override legislative acts with which they conflict. In dissent, Justice Summers called the court's pronouncement an irrational usur- pation of legislative authority. The court did not back down from its pronouncement, however, and followed Saucier in Singer Hutner Levine Seeman & Stuart v. LSBA," Leenerts Farms Inc. v. Rogers,, Succession of Boyenga,4 City of Baton Rouge v. Staufer Chemical Company,, Central Progressive Bank v. Bradley,6 Succession of Jenkins,7 and Suc- cession of Cloud.8 The Louisiana Legislature, however, has continued to enact laws which pertain to professional responsibility and conduct of lawyers. For example, Act 250 of 1986 (Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2448) provides that an attorney appointed in a testament to represent the executor may not be replaced except for cause. -
Narratives of Refugee Resettlement Workers: the Impact
NARRATIVES OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT WORKERS: THE IMPACT OF RECENT POLICY CHANGES ON REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT by William Wesley Crooks, M.A., M.Ed. A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Council of Texas State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy with a Major in Adult, Professional, and Community Education May 2019 Committee Members: Clarena Larrotta, Chair Joellen E. Coryell Melissa A. Martinez Jovita M. Ross-Gordon COPYRIGHT by William Wesley Crooks 2019 FAIR USE AND AUTHOR’S PERMISSION STATEMENT Fair Use This work is protected by the Copyright Laws of the United States (Public Law 94-553, section 107). Consistent with fair use as defined in the Copyright Laws, brief quotations from this material are allowed with proper acknowledgement. Use of this material for financial gain without the author’s express written permission is not allowed. Duplication Permission As the copyright holder of this work I, William Wesley Crooks, authorize duplication of this work, in whole or in part, for educational or scholarly purposes only. DEDICATION To Patty, my loving and very tolerant wife, who is the inspiration and the foundation of my life, and who has supported all my endeavors while accepting my madness. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation was created not just by me, but by many people whose participation and inspiration were essential. I would like to acknowledge those who were a part of this effort and who helped me complete my journey. I am first most grateful to the study participants who took the time and effort to share their experiences and opinions on a controversial subject. -
Class Actions, Arbitration, and Consumer Rights: Why Concepcion Is a Pro-Consumer Decision Executive Summary
No. 16 February 2013 LEGAL POLICY REPORT Published by Manhattan Institute AND CONSUMERRIGHTS: Pro-Consumer Decision Why CLASS ACTIONS, Concepcion ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION, Isa CENTER FOR LEGALPOLICY AT THEMANHATTAN INSTITUTE Adjunct Fellow, ManhattanInstitute Adjunct Fellow, Frank Ted C L P Class Actions, Arbitration, and Consumer Rights: Why Concepcion Is a Pro-Consumer Decision EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On February 27, 2013, the Supreme Court will hold oral arguments in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant. Like the Court’s 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, Italian Colors involves the intersection of two mechanisms for resolving legal disputes not easily handled by high-cost individually filed lawsuits: arbitration and class action litigation. In class action litigation, similarly situated legal claims are aggregated under a single lawsuit. Given the cost of litigation, class action suits can be efficient mechanisms for resolving large numbers of relatively low-dollar claims, but they also can enrich lawyers at legitimate claimants’ expense because such lawsuits’ low value to individual plaintiffs reduces the incentive for any plaintiff to monitor the lawyers handling the claim. Arbitration, a form of dispute resolution outside the courts, involves imposing as legally binding and enforceable the decision of a third party, typically specified in advance in contracts. Arbitration is generally favored and enforceable under federal law, through the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Potential corporate defendants have sought to use mandatory arbitration clauses to avoid the expense of class actions. The trial bar and allies in the legal academy criticized such clauses as “anticonsumer” and, for years, had success, particularly in California state court, in obtaining judicial rulings finding the clauses unenforceable, notwithstanding the language of the FAA.