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The Costs of Politics and Reform The Year of “Little Trims”

Sergio Rizzo and Gian Antonio Stella

Albo signanda lapillo. If historians were to choose a special day to mark the end of Italy’s “Second Republic,” it would be Sunday, 28 October 2012. On that morning, newspapers announced that , sentenced to four years of incarceration for fiscal fraud, had summoned reporters and those loyal to him to fire shots at everyone: Mario Monti, the judges, ’s chancellor, , and even the former French president, Nicolas Sarkozy. That evening, journalist Milena Gabanelli’s television program Report destroyed the “hero” who had destroyed the First Republic, the leader of the IdV, Antonio Di Pietro. Reporter Paolo Bracalini revealed that Di Pietro was responsible for “[d]ozens of purchased properties from 2002 on, donations used to buy homes, renovations with party funds, ambiguities between ‘IdV the party’ and ‘IdV the family organization’” and that Di Pietro had “managed the party’s treasury and approved its budgets for years.”1 While Gabanelli went on television, regional polls were closing in Sicily. These events sanctioned the fall of the two popular “idols” who had emerged triumphant from the 1992–1993 period and, at the same time, account for the explosion of the Five Star Movement (M5S) founded by the new electoral idol, . Certainly, to conclude today that 28 October 2012 was the death of Berlusconism (as well as Di Pietrism) and at the same time the

Italian Politics: Technocrats in Office 28 (2013): 59–77 © Berghahn Books doi:10.3167/ip.2013.280104 60 Sergio Rizzo and Gian Antonio Stella

consecration of Grillism requires a lot of hindsight. This is because, after offering Monti the prime ministership of the “moderates” to no avail, the Cavaliere (the Knight)2 would have returned dramatically to the scene after a couple of months for the sixth time—this time with a new adversary. Apart from the left of and Nichi Vendola, Berlusconi now aimed poisonous blows at the former presi- dent of Bocconi, whom he had supported for a year in the Parliament: “His government is responsible for recent disasters. He has not done anything but bring back taxes and the IMU [municipal property tax].”3 These words kick-started a venomous electoral campaign right from the start. Yet the campaign was silent on content. At the outset, we examine the argument most discussed in the last five years, which contributed in no small amount to the Grillo phenomenon,4 that is, the costs to a political class accused of not listening to the demands of its citizens and incapable of self-induced reform. There was indeed an embarrassing lack of political response to what took place in 2012. True, explosive scandals over revelations about the improper use of public party funds—even while the current Great Depression imposed incredibly difficult sacrifices on the popu- lace and brought the weakest and most vulnerable groups to their knees—forced even the most hostile to take action, amid a thousand inconsistencies, such that it was no longer possible for to pull their belts any tighter without signals that relief was on the horizon. But here lay the problem with these signals in 2012: they were impro- vised, disorganized, and incoherent. In the remainder of the chapter, we shall consider five points: the expenditure cuts by the constitutional bodies in the first section, the (predictable) failure of every attempt to reduce the number of MPs in the second, the attempt to reduce public funding of political parties in the third, the “anarchy” of regional expenditure under the pretext of autonomy in the fourth, and the promises about the abolition of provincial government (and the inability to decide on this) in the fifth.

Obtorto Collo, the Cuts

In the budget for Italian institutions, only one item, until now at least, has always emerged untouched: the funding for the two chambers of Parliament. Even in the most acute years of financial crisis, such as in 2009 when the GDP decreased over 5 percent, the annual funding for the lower and upper houses—the Montecitorio (the Chamber of Depu- ties) and the Palazzo Madama (the Senate)—remained anchored to the astronomical total of one and a half billion euros: 1,519,760,500 euros, The Costs of Politics and Reform 61 to be precise. Every year, when it was time to approve this budget, reductions were announced without any real, concrete results. Con- sider that on 6 October 2011, amid a full financial storm and while Fitch (after Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s) was downgrading the sovereign debt, Montecitorio insisted in a letter to the Treasury that fund requests should remain unchanged until 2014.5 This situation was no longer sustainable under the pressure of the international community and of public opinion. Starting in 2012, the Senate therefore reduced its funding figure to 21.6 million euros, “being satisfied with” a state check of 505,360,500 euros, which should decrease further to 494,223,000 euros in 2014. The Chamber’s endow- ment is to be reduced from 992.8 to 943.2 million euros starting in 2013. The officers at Montecitorio spoke “of a decision of exceptional scope that the Chamber of Deputies has not undertaken for 50 years.”6 This automatic praise is also an own goal: how could they have contin- ued to ask for more funding if the state has been static since the 1990s? Can a savings scheme of 82.3 million euros a year be considered a lot? The sacrifice (a reduction of 5.4 percent, overall) is modest compared to other items in public spending. For example, between 2001 and 2012, the budget for Montecitorio has grown 32.6 percent and that of the Senate 44.7 percent, while, in contrast, public funds for culture have been cut in half: from 0.39 percent to 0.19 percent of GDP. Certainly, the cuts of 5 percent and 10 percent in salaries, pensions, and annuities higher than 90,000 euros were counted up until 2013 and will be in effect for the rest of the year. This amounts to 26 million euros for the Chamber and nearly 17 million euros for the Senate, not taking into consideration the judgment of the High Court that declared some reductions in the salaries of civil servants employed by the two chambers to be illegal. Nonetheless, taking all of this into account, Montecitorio’s spending should fall only 2.1 percent with respect to 2011: from 1,049,299,520 euros to 1,027,173,354 euros. This mirrors the 2 percent decline of the GDP estimated by the National Institute of Statistics. The cuts resulted from “little trims” here and there that did not spare the congressmen and -women, who have been ironing out 10 percent of the allowances since 1 February 2012. Only about 580 tons of paper (920.6 kilos per MP in Montecitorio), which continues to be used in large quantities, was disposed of by the Chamber in 2011, as opposed to 845 in 2007. However, it would have been impossible to reach these reductions (heralded as “epochal”) had it not been for the termination of the rental contract for four buildings (privately owned by property developer Sergio Scarpellini) that housed the offices of MPs. The expenditure for the Senate dropped as well in net terms: -6.17 percent, or nearly 35 million euros. Yet this prima facie miracle has its 62 Sergio Rizzo and Gian Antonio Stella

own explanation. The abolition of a single item—a final compensation scheme for the lump sum given to staff at the end of service—is worth more than 12 million euros. Then we find 6 million euros for the sena- tors. Still others come from the reduction of the grand total of salaries and wages for employees of the Senate: from 138.5 to 131.9 million euros. And here we come to our point. A 4.8 percent drop in spending corresponds to a reduction of 8.1 percent of staff over a year and a half (from 978 to 898 on the payroll between 31 December 2010 and 1 July 2012). This means that the average salary (gross) is still growing, reaching 146,960 euros per year, compared with 137,525 in 2010. The same goes for the Chamber of Deputies, where employees con- tinue to diminish in number, yet salaries continue to grow. The payroll for Montecitorio accounts for a hefty 229.3 million euros—300,000 more than in 2011—even if the number of employees has decreased from 1,933 in 2003 to 1,566. The average pay in 2003, the equivalent of 146,439 euros annually, had not gone above 94,712 euros.7 Thus, in the space of one decade, salaries and wages have risen 60.8 percent in the Chamber, with a real growth of more than 35 percent. This makes sense of the abyss between these expenditures and the cost of other Parliaments across Europe. The foundation Itali- adecide (chaired by Luciano Violante) compared Italian figures for the Chamber of Deputies with those of other lower houses: the German Bundestag, the French National Assembly, and the British House of Commons.8 Even without considering pension costs, which are not included in the budgets of other Parliaments, the Italian expenditures are in another league. Compared to the 724 million euros of spending attributed to Montecitorio in 2010, the Bundestag stops at 576, the National Assembly at 473, and the House of Commons at 498. The House of Commons has 650 members of Parliament and a number of employees similar to those in the Chamber. Their average salary, how- ever, does not reach 40,000 euros per year—over 100,000 euros less than the salary of those in the Italian Chamber. This does not include spending on pensions. The Italian Senate moved from 97.1 million euros in 2011 to 106.8 million euros in 2012. In the Chamber, the spending grew from 209.7 to 216 million euros—a 3 percent increase. This further demonstrates the fact that the most important issues that have to do with spending cannot be easily resolved in Italy. There is yet another problem arising out of the Italian “perfect bicameral” parliamentary system: it was not corrected in the 16th Leg- islature. As there were not any cuts (or only marginal ones at most) to the spending on employees, another peculiarity of the system became more evident. In contrast to other European countries, the entitle- ments of the elected (reimbursements and other incidentals included) The Costs of Politics and Reform 63 are accredited directly to individual accounts, thus becoming dispos- able income to be used with absolute discretion. If we then add the weight of certain questionable investments, the picture is complete. As an example, the Santa Maria property in Aquiro, administered by the Senate, signed rental contracts (to host 45 senators’ offices in 2003) with the Istituti di Santa Maria in Aquiro for 36 years at a price of 426,839 euros per year for the first 18 years and 853,678 euros for the next 18—over 23 million euros in total. This is valued at 512,000 euros in fees per room plus the costs of renovations (26 million euros, i.e., 8,387 euros per square meter), which took eight years to complete and were entirely at the expense of the State. This was all done even though the Senate did not own the properties that it paid to have renovated. Regarding the MPs, things could be even worse, given the circum- stances. Starting on 1 January 2012, the old life annuity was replaced with another that is calculated using the contribution method. For all members of Parliament, this annuity is given regardless of the start of their terms and not before age 70, with at least five years of paid service. This is a major difference from before, and it would be wrong to ignore it: it has been calculated that future treatments will be down- sized to roughly half the amount with respect to now. And yet, how many ordinary people, who must wait 67 years before retiring, would not sign it? For the rest, the damage (for the beneficiaries, of course) has been limited. The alignment to the European average introduced in 2011 dur- ing the budgetary correction by then Minister Giulio Tremonti vanished. After “careful analysis,” the Parliament theorized that Italian MPs cost less than their European colleagues.9 Despite this, on 30 January 2012, the office of the president of the Chamber announced an allowance cut of 1,300 euros gross a month. This was immediately trumpeted to the media. But this was just a bait-and-switch: inside the payroll, nothing changed.10 Instead, something changed for the parliamentary groups in the Chamber: budgets would be made public and submit- ted to be verified by an external controller. As for the Senate, the wall remains impenetrable, even if it will not hold for much longer. For the question of transparency can no longer be postponed and must cover all constitutional bodies. The general secretary of the presidency of the Republic, Donato Marra, wrote that “the forecast for the 2013 budget and the three-year period of 2013–2015 will be made public, together with any account- ing document.”11 Recall, however, that we have waited for this change since the summer of 2007, when a special commission for reform of internal budgets terminated its work. Up to now, there have only been 64 Sergio Rizzo and Gian Antonio Stella

“briefing notes.” The Quirinal’s briefing note of 12 February 2012 stated that, contrary to the Chamber and the Senate, the funds for the presi- dent’s headquarters (228 million euros for the year) would remain unchanged for 2013: “The total planned expenditure” of this year will remain “essentially unchanged compared to the 2011 budget.”12

And the Reduction of the Number of MPs?

The then president of the Chamber of Deputies, Gianfranco Fini, admit- ted defeat: “The true cost of politics is in the excessive number of MPs: 945 of them are a mammoth apparatus. Many times I requested a reduction of the number, but decisions are made by a majority. For me, it is a great regret. This is yet another of the promises not kept by the legislature.”13 This has been a theme for decades. “We are arguing about the number of MPs at the moment,” wrote Giulio Andreotti in 1986. He noted: “It is impressive that the same amount of work is done by 323 senators at Palazzo Madama as by 630 MPs at Montecitorio.”14 A quarter of a century later, despite a reform agreed to verbally by all major parties, the story remains the same: combining this reform with something else that one of the parties objects to makes the reduction of MPs unacceptable. On paper, cutting the number of MPs was easy. An agreement was reached, even with discomfort: 508 deputies instead of 630 and 254 senators instead of 315. But when it was time to carry on with a decision, the proposal was trimmed by the dual executives of the People of Freedom (PdL) and the Northern League (LN) and disliked by the left. And everything hit a dead end. There are those who believe that streamlining that “mammoth apparatus” would have been inapplicable in any case without modifi- cations to the electoral law. This was the same argument used in 1990 by ’s Christian Democrats (DC) and ’s (PSI) to veto the cut of 130 deputies and 65 sena- tors, as provided for by a draft from Leopoldo Elia. The reduction, they said, would have penalized minority parties. Today, the problem is bigger still. While the positions available for the Italian-style spoils system were still growing in the 1990s, they are decreasing today: there are fewer posts for nepotism, fewer regional councilors, fewer boards of directors run by relatives, friends, and those expelled from the system. This is all without considering the eruption en masse of the Five Star Movement in Parliament in 2013. In any case, the current electoral law has not been changed, although the Senate’s Com- mission for Constitutional Affairs has committed “to the examination of 46 bills, as well as 24 popular petitions,” since 22 December 2008.15 The Costs of Politics and Reform 65

Who knows, then, how many party secretaries spent the most tur- bulent weeks after the scandals repeatedly asking themselves if it was really worth pressing on with another reform, that is, the regulation of political parties. The implementation of Article 49 of the Constitu- tion has been on hold for 65 years.16 During the life of this Parliament, it was the subject of the recommendations put forward by an expert hired by Monti’s government, . Six decades have appar- ently not been enough time to define the legal status of the parties.

Too Much Money: The Drug of the Parties

There is too much money in politics—to the point of not knowing what to do with it. The former treasurer of the Margherita, Luigi Lusi, was expelled from the party after a scandal in the winter of 2011–2012. He had been “responsible for illicit operations that involved roughly 22 mil- lion euros,”17 giving out “hundreds of checks of small denominations” for a total of 869,793 euros and transfers of funds to Canada and then back into Italy under a tax pardon. The former treasurer of the LN, Fran- cesco Belsito, was thrown out of his party in the spring of 2012 when it was revealed that he had invested electoral reimbursements in Tanzania, Cyprus, and Norway, buying diamonds and gold ingots. Meanwhile, the cash was apparently used for “the family,” meaning the children of the LN’s leader, Umberto Bossi. In a country of “amoral familism,” as described by E. C. Banfield,18 and of parties that identify themselves with individuals, it was probably inevitable that the leaders’ family rela- tions would come to play a key role in Italian political parties. Even the management of the monies is often regulated by personal dynamics. The fact is that for too long political parties have swallowed public money, thanks to so-called inflated electoral refunds provided by a hypocritical flat-rate mechanism. This deception has revived, in a largely abnormal way, the old system of public funding that was born in 1974 after the oil tax evasion scandal. This system should have ended in 1993 after a referendum to repeal contributions to parlia- mentary groups. Promoted by the Radical Party (PR), the measure was approved by 34.5 million Italians (90.3 percent of votes cast).19 Yet these contributions survived anyway. The flow of money was never interrupted: from 1974 to 2010, the par- ties’ banks received the equivalent of 5.556 billion euros.20 Starting from just 2001, Forza Italia, the National Alliance (AN), and the PdL pock- eted 749.5 million euros in state funds; the Left Democrats (DS), the Margherita, and the (PD), 580 million euros; the LN, almost 135 million euros; the IdV, 76.2 million euros; and of 66 Sergio Rizzo and Gian Antonio Stella

the Center (UdC), just less than 120 million euros.21 This was an amount of money that allowed the accumulation of substantial reserves, stocks, and financial cushions. At the end of 2011, Di Pietro’s party had a sur- plus of an additional 35 million euros, while the UdC received another 18.6 million euros. Even though the Margherita has been defunct since 2008, there is still an amount of 19 million euros in its current accounts. These large amounts of money sometimes had the effect of sending party spending through the roof. A case in point is Forza Italia. Born from nothing, and despite having received rich public contributions, the party accrued very heavy losses. As if all this were not enough, the river of money overflowed with contributions from wealthy external donors. For example, funds destined for the party’s newspapers amounted to 850,851,746 euros from 1990 to 2009. At times, the party’s money ended up paying for questionable publishing endeavors and was subjected to judicial investigations, such as with Avanti, a daily newspaper owned by the unscrupulous businessman Valter Lavitola, who devoured 21 million euros.22 This is all without taking into account contributions to groups in the Chamber and the Senate and to regional councils. This is too much money, distributed without little real control or transparency. To understand the cases of Lusi and Belsito, one must recognize a pathology that dates back to the fight against Fascism, when the parties were illegal, as was funding them. Since the post-war period, when the (PCI) received dollars from the Soviet Union23 and the DC received dollars from the US, the situation has not changed. Nothing regarding transparency and controls came from Law No. 195/1974 or from rules enacted after the Tangentopoli (Bribesville) scandal of the 1990s, which further worsened things, causing the opac- ity of political parties’ accounting systems to take root even more deeply. It is worth pointing out that if there had not been the explosive scandals involving the Margherita and the LN to raise the public’s level of indignation, the Parliament probably would not have passed Law No. 96 on 6 July 2012 to reduce “refunds” and introduce new rules to monitor the parties’ budgets. Thus, today 62 statements of political parties receiving public funding in 2011 must be certified by an exter- nal auditor, a practice that was adopted voluntarily among the mass parties only by the PD (whose secretary was ) in 2008 and was designed by the then treasurer, Mauro Agostini. In addition, pressured by angry citizens, the parties (with great pains to their trea- suries) were forced to renounce portions of electoral refunds in July 2012 and donate them to areas affected by the earthquake in Emilia- Romagna and Lombardy. This was a decision that threw into turmoil those who had already spent the money, something that was antici- pated by the banks. For example, the PdL had transferred the needed The Costs of Politics and Reform 67 funds in 2009–2012 to “a banking institution”; as a result, Berlusconi’s party had to return about 20 million euros. So-called reimbursements for election expenditures of political parties reach the level of 4 euros for every citizen registered on the Montecitorio’s electoral lists (one euro each for any vote cast for the Chamber, Senate, regional elections, and European elections). The system has brought the total of “reimbursements” to over 200 million euros annually, even though the ceiling was set at 91 million euros. To compensate, a German system was introduced that provides a public contribution of 50 cents for every euro of private individual funding within a ceiling of 10,000 euros. Tax relief for political contributions was allowed at 19 percent up to a limit of 103,000 euros. This is shock- ingly more favorable than contributions to charities, where the ceiling is 50 times lower. Now tax relief for political contributions is set at 26 percent. However, the law reduced the limit to 10,000 euros—yet only for individuals, not for companies. And the controls on party finances? They are entrusted to a com- mission of three accountants, one Court of Appeals judge, and one councilor of state, who will act as chair. This is a real eyesore: in Italy, the general rule is that the Court of Auditors carries out the controls of public expenditure (a category that conceptually includes the public funding of parties). Why should parties be excluded from the general rule, as suggested by Amato, Monti’s special adviser on this matter?

The Regions: “Little States of Plenty”

Speaking of politicians in the regions, Carlo Taormina stated: “They are all equal, all one race. Fiorito, rather less than more. They use money to buy themselves cars, to pay for prostitutes. If they condemn one, they must condemn the entirety of Italian politics, because whatever hap- pens in Latium [referring to the regional assembly] will happen in all the other regions.”24 Taormina is the lawyer for the so-called Batman of Anagni, Franco Fiorito, who was the leader of the PdL in Latium. On 30 April 1993, Fiorito was dutifully in front of the Raphael Hotel, throw- ing coins at the then leader of the PSI, Craxi, who had been accused of fraudulent use of party funds.25 Fiorito stands accused of using public money deposited in the party’s accounts for personal purposes, such as luxury cars, extravagant parties, vacations, and his foreign accounts. And he was not the only one. Expenditures by politicians for dinners of ostrich and champagne, photography books, cocktails, and even cos- tume parties were “inflated” by millions of euros.26 Scandals did not even spare the IdV: its leader, Vicenzo Maruccio, was handcuffed for the 68 Sergio Rizzo and Gian Antonio Stella alleged appropriation of nearly 700,000 euros from the party coffers. It was discovered that the elected members of Latium’s regional assembly, benefiting from resolutions of the office of the president (of the region) approved by all, left and right (the elected members of the PR being the only exception), had 14 million euros a year to spend, without any over- sight. For a country like Italy in the autumn of 2012, when workers were struggling, this was a shock. Renata Polverini’s regional government dis- solved, and investigations by the regional revenue finance police began. Meanwhile, even the governor of the Lombardy region, Roberto Formigoni, was forced to resign. This happened in a regional council where 62 elected regional councilors out of 80 were under inves- tigation. The Monti government presented a constitutional reform project aimed at tightening the rules. First of all, the new rules intro- duced preventative controls on regional activities. But afterward, as soon as Fiorito disappeared from the limelight, the new rules encoun- tered extremely strong resistance to the point of having to be watered down—especially the preventative controls. It is useless to wonder why, since controls and transparency will not only put the “Batmen” of the system in crisis, but the entire system as well. “With Deliberation No. 53 of the Office of the Regional Presidency dated 20 June 2012, we acknowledge to former regional councilor [name omitted] the total and permanent inability to work.”27 The three lines dedicated to granting a disability annuity totaling 7,490.33 euros a month demonstrate in more than one way that the regions are, as described by Italia Oggi,28 “little republics of plenty” that believe in their sovereignty and in being free from every control. In fact, the omis- sion in the text above covered the identity of Alberto Sarra, the under- secretary to the chairmanship of Governor Giuseppe Scopelliti. The undersecretary was so active and dynamic that, after being afflicted by a “hemorrhagic shock,” he recovered well enough to report on an additional 150 ANSA (the most prestigious news agency in Italy) news items: meeting the presidents of mountain communities, presid- ing over a conference for public services, inaugurating new roads. As stated by Roberto Formigoni, the president of the region of Lombardy: “To practice politics, one has to have the body of a beast.” Therefore, the omission was not out of respect for privacy, but rather to hide the contradiction between a disability pension and the superactivity of one who was, theoretically, “totally disabled.” That a public institution like a region can distribute money to law- yers or various professionals—covering their names with “omitted”— seems incredible. And yet the Official Gazette of Calabria is full of such things. This desire to hide their spending from citizens exists not only in the deep South: during those same weeks, elected members of The Costs of Politics and Reform 69 the Trentino assembly decided to refuse rules for the transparency of refunds. For example, the local PD leader, Luca Zeni, stated: “[T]here exists a sphere of discretion and confidentiality in political activity that according to us must be preserved.”29 This is an argument that no one would dare support in Anglo-Saxon countries. The fact is, explains Stelio Mangiameli, director of the institute for the study of federal and regional systems of the Italian National Research Council (CNR), that after having “canceled the old regional control committees, all powers were transferred to the Court of Audi- tors, regionalized by virtue of the new structure. The central govern- ment and the Court of Auditors should have begun supervising in 1998 how regions were going to activate internal controls. As far as we know, nothing like this ever happened.” Worse still, “when the state tried to speak out, demanding a 10 percent cut on the allowance for the members of the regional assembly of Campania in 2006, the higher court intervened with a ruling, Judgment No. 157/2007, which stated: ‘State law can prescribe criteria and objectives (e.g., the containment of public spending). Yet it cannot tell the regions how to achieve these objectives.’”30 According to an analysis of regional budgets conducted by the Italian Handicraft Association (CGIA Mestre), the result is that the regions have increased spending by 89 million euros a year during the first decade of the century. About half of this (49.1 million euros) went into health policy expenditure. Inflation in that period reached 23.9 percent, yet spending grew by three times: 74.6 percent. To trace the path to this insanity would require hundreds of pages. But it is worthwhile to provide at least a glimpse because, in the long run, Monti found himself in 2012 with disastrous regional budgets. “For three years, from 2003 to 2005, the ASL [the Health Policy Depart- ment] of Latium did not bother to calculate the budget. They wrote down expenses in a notebook and communicated this information verbally to the chief accountant of the region,” explained Mariano Maugeri and Giuseppe Oddo in Il Sole 24 Ore.31 This of course does not cover the money given to parties without controls. “Eight hundred million euros. This was the final figure in 2011 for the regional funding of institutional bodies,” Il Sole 24 Ore further denounced.32 Then there is the proliferation of additional benefits to those in the assembly: “Of 1,111 posts in the regional assemblies, a good 862 (77.5 percent) offer something additional to whoever occupies them.”33 Thanks to various “refund” mechanisms, allowances and perqui- sites vary. But no one seems to get more than the president of a Sicil- ian parliamentary commission who lives about 100 kilometers from Palermo: this person earns 17,476 euros net per month. This is in contrast to the 13,823 (gross) earned by the secretary-general of the 70 Sergio Rizzo and Gian Antonio Stella

United Nations (UN), Ban Ki-moon. Looking at the ratio per inhabit- ants, one elected member of the regional assembly costs one and a half cents a year for every citizen of Lombardy or Emilia-Romagna, 5.2 cents for every citizen of Calabrese, 16.5 cents for every citizen of Lucania, and 38 cents for every citizen of . This number goes all the way up to 57.4 cents for Valle d’Aosta. Controls? Zero. It is enough to remember the case of Silvestro Ladu, one of the 21 former elected Sardinian regional officers under inves- tigation for having used group funds for their own purposes. Ladu was asked: “Excuse me, how was the 139,000 euros withdrawn from the ATM machines spent? Was the ‘body shop work and mounting of parking sensors’ on all your family cars for institutional purposes?” Ladu replied: “Sometimes I took away the Punto and the Golf from my family members for official use by the group.” “In what sense was the spending of 553 euros on body shop work and mounting parking sensors for institutional purposes?” “For the same reasons I brought up before. Parking sensors are very useful for parking.”34

The Provinces? Get Rid of Them All—but, Better Yet, None of Them

“The argument is of great interest but warrants further reflection.”35 This is what Senator Cesare Salvi stated in 19 October 1993, explaining why the Democratic Party of the Left (PdS) asked Augusto Barbera to withdraw an amendment that proposed abolishing the provinces, which was being considered by the Bicameral Commission chaired by Nilde Iotti. Since then, two decades have passed—the time taken, according to Herodotus, to construct the Pyramid of Khufu. When he thinks about it, Barbera laughs. In a 2001 interview, he explains that “the suppres- sion of the provinces was [already] decided within the Constitutional Assembly of 1946–1948, by the Commission of Seventy-Five [the 75 members nominated by the Assembly to draft the Italian Constitution]. But when the text passed to the Assembly for examination, it was resuscitated. In the 1970s, when regional order was put into effect, the leader of the Italian Republican Party [PRI], Ugo La Malfa, announced yet again the abolition of the provinces to eliminate the duplication of bureaucracy and spending. Enrico Berlinguer, the secretary of the Ital- ian Communist Party of the time, the PCI, agreed. But, they reasoned, it was worth waiting for the consolidation of the regions. Instead, the provinces materialized in Decree No. 616 in 1977, with full national backing, dismantling the municipal districts created by the regions. Ber- linguer and La Malfa were either convinced or acquiescent.”36 The Costs of Politics and Reform 71

With this, the provinces, instead of disappearing, continued to grow to 110 in number. There were gradual additions of, shall we say, eccentricities such as Ogliastra with its co-capitals of Tortoli (10,947 inhabitants) and Lanusei (5,655 souls). Then there was Barletta- Andria-Trani, the famous province created from 10 municipalities, three of which (but why not the other seven?) became capitals. The right and the left competed for years to “sell” to the voters the idea of abolishing the provinces. With the exception of the LN, every party agreed to this objective. Berlusconi, we understand, dur- ing a chat on the Corriere della Sera website in the election campaign of 2008, told Ines di Forte dei Marmi, “I don’t talk about the prov- inces because we need to get rid of them.”37 “They are useless enti- ties,” agreed Renato Brunetta (PdL). “We support the abolition of the provinces and mountain communities,” guaranteed Di Pietro’s IdV, announcing a law with popular support. Rocco Buttiglione spoke on behalf of the centrist UdC party: “We are renewing the call to save money, beginning with the abolition of the provinces.” Meanwhile, on the Circolo Fuoriluogo website, Bersani (PD) stated that it was neces- sary “to de-constitutionalize the provinces and entrust the regions with the identification of intermediate bodies between regions and the most useful communities in every territory.” In short, everyone was more or less united. But the fact is that on 5 July 2011, those entities that supplied 40 presidential seats to the PD, 36 to the PdL, 13 to the LN, 5 to the UdC, 2 to the Movement for Autonomy (MpA) and the Margherita and that a century ago were called by the mayor of , Emilio Caldara, “good only for asylums and roads,”38 were newly saved. This time the Chamber of Deputies rejected the IdV proposal to abolish the provinces. As Andrea Giuricin recalls in the volume The Abolition of the Provinces, edited by Silvio Boccalatte,39 these controversial local enti- ties “involve spending nearly 16 billion euros a year. This figure can be considered not high if it is compared with the GDP, because it amounts to about 1 percent; but if we compare it with total pub- lic spending, it approaches 3 percent.” A communication from the Union of Italian Provinces (UPI) on 21 July 2011 gave this figure: “The provinces represent only 1 to 1.5 percent of public spending for the entire state.” But it stated that the so-called provincial caste weighs on the public purse less than other political classes: “The cost of elected provincial officials is equal to 5.5 percent of the total, in contrast to 20.3 percent of officials in Parliament, 44.2 percent of those in the regions, and 30 percent of those in city councils.” This false theme, according to Barbera, “depends on skills. It’s about how to put together apples and pears.” 72 Sergio Rizzo and Gian Antonio Stella

The truth is that the political class had to concede something to public opinion. It was then decided to make the cut in 2011. Even the LN was forced to make the best of bad luck. “The Costs of Politics: Epochal Cuts” shot across the first page of La Padania, with an inner- page headline: “The ‘Caste’ Struck to the Heart.” Roberto Calderoli (LN) explained that “50,000 seats were cut: provinces, seats, and sala- ries of the regional councilors, and municipalities with under 1,000 inhabitants.”40 The facts demonstrated that this was pure propaganda, and the hot potatoes ended up on Monti’s table. Putting himself to work, it became clear that any merging would be impossible without touching the barbed wire of rivalries, parochialism, and rancor that had accumulated for centuries. For example, at Siena’s stadium, when there is a game with Fiorentina, the black-and-white shirted fans of Siena stretch out a banner saying “We were at Montaperti too,”41 recall- ing after centuries the battle as told by a chronicle from Siena with horrifying words: “They prayed to Saint Zenobius in vain for help. We butchered them like a butcher slaughters animals on Good Friday.” Barbera concludes that, in the end, “it is an impossible task to put together territories that are divided by ancient hostilities. First the Parliament and then Monti’s government have to go for the wiser road of abolishing all provinces.”42 But this road was abandoned early on in favor of returning to groupings based on two parameters: a 350,000 inhabitants floor and 2,500 square kilometers. One revi- sion, however, would stay untouched: provincial councilors would no longer be elected directly by citizens but instead by bodies appointed by the municipalities. Reactions after the television appearance of ministers Anna Maria Cancellieri and Filippo Patroni Griffi on 31 October 2012 with the map of the new provincial bodies, in any case, demonstrated that the “modest amount” of change would not resolve the problem. Contro- versies, fights, and revolts by local administrators threatening to cut off heating in the schools were the result, from Tuscany to Puglia, from Venice to Calabria. In Matera, on the Day of the Dead, people were encouraged to post a notice of mourning: “The province of Matera was sentenced to death. This announcement is from its children, grand- children, active citizens, leaders, and provincial presidents—all of whom played a role during the privileged existence of the province.” The idea of “sentencing to death” a territory because the admin- istrative-political institution called “province” disappears is ridicu- lous. But is there a problem with establishing a level of government between the municipality and the region? Obviously. The problem is resolvable, however, by a division of labor. We should convert the functions of provinces to de-centered functions of the regions. The Costs of Politics and Reform 73

Is change impossible? Not necessarily. As explained by Gianfranco Fabi in the preface to the essays edited by Boccalatte that we have already cited: “If the objective is to reduce public spending, the instru- ments needed to reach this in a rational manner are a division of labor and a simplifying of the centers of costs.” The provinces “are probably somewhere between these entities, [and their] abolition … would help not only to lower public spending but also to facilitate the recovery of a trusting relationship between the citizens and their politicians.” This change would address “the token honor and allowance that the [provincial] councilors, aldermen, and presidents believe that they are entitled to, inasmuch as each one of them is a cost center and a multi- plier of initiatives, an activist dedicated to consolidating consensus to guarantee a safe re-election.”43 Certainly, the spread of protests against the mergers at the beginning of November in 2012 demonstrated the risk that the whole project would end up on a dead-end track—exactly like all the other times. The most dazzling contradiction would reveal itself to be the overlap between the merged provinces of Perugia and Terni, Potenza and Matera, and Campobasso and Isernia, lying like individual peas in regional pods in Umbria, Basilicata, and Molise. If the objective of a reform of this kind is simplification, most critics ask, what would be the success in speeding up bureaucratic processes? Both the regions and the provinces would question the wisdom of representing the same territory with the same boundaries, the same citizens, and the same problems. There are two options. Either the provinces are indispensible, and whoever thinks so at this point must have the courage to leave them as they are. Or (as we believe) they are useless and should be sup- pressed, with the creation of some metropolitan cities to take over regionally decentralized offices and carry on with the division of labor. A difficult choice? Only if it is to explain to Padovans and Trevisans that one of their cities is more important than the other. The problem is that this option is no longer viable. The decree to merge the prov- inces was definitely gone on 21 December 2012 with the resignation of Monti’s government.

Conclusions: How Will Things Turn Out? Transparency and Listening

The year that could have (and should have) been of change was instead the year of “little trims,” thanks to all the scandals. In con- clusion, we return to the same point: namely, the incapacity to self- reform on the part of a system semi-paralyzed by 20 years of fierce 74 Sergio Rizzo and Gian Antonio Stella

conflict, vetoes, phobias, distrust, and the selfishness of “professional politicians” scared by the idea of having to return to their previous jobs, if they had one. This semi-paralysis makes everything more dif- ficult, even for true reformers, who are not lacking. For example, one can point to the triumph of Grillo for inspiring someone like Paolo Flores D’Arcais, not because he believes in the governing ability of M5S, but because “only with a blank slate from the center-left can forces for ‘justice and liberty’ grow.’”44 Whether we like it or not, this theme encompasses purifying, Hegelian war. But is this truly the only possible result? Perhaps the hope is that, if they are finally afraid of the prospect that popular anger might have a political outlet measurable in votes, even the politicians most hostile to reform will stop defending indefinitely the excesses of a system based on party politics that is too costly and greedy, as if this system coincides with democracy. It is as though there is some kind of equivalence: the more costly, the more democratic; the less costly, the less democratic. A few examples? “The least costly politics were produced by Mussolini: fewer MPs, less democracy. The rest: small talk and demagogy,” said right-winger Gianfranco Rotondi (PdL) sarcastically.45 “The ‘Caste’? It’s a term that appeared in the lexicon of the terrorist group Red Brigades. We should remember certain things,”46 judged Massimo D’Alema (PD), drawing an infamous comparison between paramilitary assassins and those who ask why the Chamber of Deputies today must spend 41 times more in rents than 30 years ago. The need for change is also recognized by President Napolitano: to save serious politics, we must eradicate the evil. The starting points are no more than two. First, there must be absolute transparency for every act, because only in this way can citizens exercise the first among their rights: to know how their money is spent. Second, the democratic debate must not start and finish only “inside” the “pal- ace.” If the Italian Parliament had not refused for years just to look at the laws proposed by Grillo’s movement, which collected seven times more signatures than required by Article 71 of the Constitution, today things would not be so complicated for the parties, whose response is to accuse a comedian of being a demagogue who wants to go beyond the Constitution.

— Translated by Holly C. Naylor The Costs of Politics and Reform 75

Sergio Rizzo is a columnist and correspondent of the daily newspaper Corriere della Sera.

Gian Antonio Stella is a columnist and correspondent of the daily newspaper Corriere della Sera.

Notes

1. P. Bracalini, “Altro scandalo IdV e il partito dice basta al dittatore Di Pietro,” Il Giornale, 30 October 2010. 2. This is how Berlusconi is frequently referred to by the Italian media, due to his honorary title (Cavaliere del Lavoro). 3. Interview with Berlusconi on Studio Aperto, 22 December 2012. 4. See the chapter by Rinaldo Vignati on Grillo and his movement in this volume. 5. S. Rizzo and G. A. Stella, “La Camera ci ripensa: I tagli?” Scherzavamo, Corriere della Sera, 25 October 2012. 6. Chamber of Deputies, Progetto di bilancio per l’anno finanziario 2012, Doc. VIII, No. 10, Rome, 2011. 7. Chamber of Deputies, Conto consuntivo dell’anno finanziario 2003, Doc. VIII, No. 7, Rome, 2011. 8. Italiadecide, Rapporto sui costi della politica per la Camera dei deputati, Rome, 2011. 9. “The comparative data relative to the costs sustained by the parliamen- tary members, as already noted, demonstrate that the total cost of one Italian deputy is in line with, if not lower than, the cost sustained by parliamentary members in the main European countries. As for the Parlia- ment’s allowances, it was noted that although gross allowances received by Italian Parliament members exceeds those of other countries, the net amount received, equal to around 5,000 euros, after numerous reduc- tions, can be considered mostly in line with other countries.” This report was approved by the office of the president of the Chamber of Deputies on 30 January 2012. 10. “[I]t should be considered that approval of the new pension scheme for Parliament members involves the application of diverse fiscal schemes. In fact, while the contributions were the tax basis of parliamentary allow- ances, the application of the current fiscal scheme for pension contribu- tions involves a deduction from the income of the same contributions. The resulting consequences for tax relief on parliamentary allowances make appropriate the gross amount of the allowances to the point that the net amount remains unchanged.” This report was approved by the office of the President of the Chamber of Deputies on 30 January 2012. 76 Sergio Rizzo and Gian Antonio Stella

11. D. Marra and F. Bechis, “Gli 11 milioni che il Colle non vede: Lettera,” Libero, 1 March 2012. 12. Quirinal, Nota illustrativa del Bilancio di previsione per il 2012 dell’am­ ministrazione della Presidenza della Repubblica, Rome, 12 February 2012. 13. “Riforme. Fini: Non mantenuta promessa taglio numero parlamentari,” TM News, http://www.tmnews.it, 19 September 2012. 14. G. Andreotti, “Bloc-notes,” L’Europeo, 20 December 1986. 15. Servizio studi del Senato: Ufficio ricerche sulle questioni istituzionali, sulla giustizia e sulla cultura, Dossier No. 393, Rome, October 2012. 16. Article 49 of the Constitution, which came into force on 1 January 1948, reads: “All citizens have the right to freely join in [political] parties to compete in national politics in a democratic way.” 17. “Bilancio 2011 della Margherita,” supplement to the Gazzetta Ufficiale, 23 October 2012. 18. E. C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1958). 19. E. Pizzimenti and P. Ignazi, “Finanziamento pubblico e mutamenti orga- nizzativi nei partiti italiani,” Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, no. 2 (2011): 199–236. 20. G. A. Stella and S. Rizzo, Licenziare i Padreterni (Milan: Rizzoli, 2011). 21. P. Bracalini, Partiti S.p.A. (: Ponte alle Grazie, 2012). 22. E. Veltri and F. Paola, I soldi dei partiti (Venice: Marsilio, 2012). 23. F. Gori and S. Pons, Dagli archivi di Mosca: L’Urss, il Cominform e il Pci (1943–1951). Annali VII della Fondazione Gramsci (Rome: Carocci 1998). 24. From the Radio 24 broadcast La Zanzara of 12 September 2012. 25. On 30 April 1993, in a well-known episode of recent Italian history, Craxi was greeted by a salvo of coins thrown by a crowd of protesters waiting for him outside the Raphael Hotel, his residence in Rome. A few hours earlier, the Chamber of Deputies had denied the authorization to bring Craxi to trial on charges of corruption. See P. Buttafuoco, “La rovina della destra tra i porci senza ali,” La Repubblica, 27 September 2012. 26. S. Rizzo and E. Menicucci, Batman & Co. (Rome: Corriere della Sera, 2012). 27. Official bulletin of the region of Calabria, 15 September 2012. 28. G. Di Santo, “Regioni onnipotenti, è un disastro,” ItaliaOggi, 25 Septem- ber 2012. 29. L. M. Patruno, “Lunelli: ‘Maggior trasparenza, ma niente eccessi,’” L’Adige, 27 September 2012. 30. M. Maugeri and G. Oddo, “Venti Stati nello Stato senza controlli e sanzioni,” Il Sole 24 Ore, 3 February 2012. 31. Ibid. 32. G. Trovati, “Dalle Regioni 830 milioni ai politici,” Il Sole 24 Ore, 18 Febru- ary 2012. 33. G. Trovati, “Dalla Valle d’Aosta alla Sicilia nelle regioni la spesa è record,” Il Sole 24 Ore, 25 September 2012. 34. S. Rizzo and G. A. Stella, “‘A’” come ‘Arredamento,’ il Dizionario degli Sprechii,” Corriere della Sera, 23 September 2012. 35. ANSA, 19 October 1993. The Costs of Politics and Reform 77

36. Interview in F. Cangini Barbera, “Perché non aboliamo le province?” Il Giorno, 6 August 2001. 37. S. Rizzo and G. A. Stella, La Deriva (Milan: Rizzoli, 2008). 38. C. Tognoli, participating in a debate titled “Abolire le province per arginare il localismo, ridurre la spesa pubblica, ripensare lo Stato federale, aprire una fase costituente,” Milan, 30 November 2006. 39. A. Giuricin, “Il costo delle province,” in L’abolizione delle province, ed. S. Boccalatte (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2008), 73–107. 40. P. Bassi, “La ‘Casta’ colpita al cuore. Calderoli: Tagliate 50.000 poltrone,” La Padania, 14 August 2011. 41. Motaperti was the scene of a battle fought in the year 1260 between Siena and Florence troops. 42. A. Barbera, “Le politiche istituzionali: Tra Buñuel e Ghobadi (e Grillo),” Quaderni Istituzionali, no. 4 (2012): 857–860. 43. G. Fabi, “Prefazione,” in Boccalatte, L’abolizione delle province, 5–9. 44. P. Flore D’Arcais, “Matteo Renzi è pessimo quindi lo voterò,” Il Fatto Quoti­diano, 28 October 2012. 45. G. A. Stella, “I veri nemici della politica,” Corriere della Sera, 12 October 2012. 46. B. Gravagnuolo, “D’Alema: La Casta? È un copyright Br,” L’Unità, 26 November 2011.