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Descartes-Meditations on First Philosophy RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-1 and correction. This revision renders the French edition specially valuable. Where it seems desirable an alternative reading from the French is given in square brackets. Meditations On First Philosophy —Elizabeth S. Haldane TO THE MOST WISE AND ILLUSTRIOUS THE DEAN AND DOCTORS OF THE SACRED René Descartes FACULTY OF THEOLOGY IN PARIS. 1641 The motive which induces me to present to you this Treatise is so Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1996. This file is of the 1911 excellent, and, when you become acquainted with its design, I am edition of The Philosophical Works of Descartes (Cambridge convinced that you will also have so excellent a motive for taking it University Press), translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane. under your protection, that I feel that I cannot do better, in order to render it in some sort acceptable to you, than in a few words to state what I have set myself to do. Prefatory Note To The Meditations. I have always considered that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be demonstrated by The first edition of the Meditations was published in Latin by Michael philosophical rather than theological argument. For although it is quite Soly of Paris “at the Sign of the Phoenix” in 1641 cum Privilegio et enough for us faithful ones to accept by means of faith the fact that the Approbatione Doctorum. The Royal “privilege” was indeed given, but human soul does not perish with the body, and that God exists, it the “approbation” seems to have been of a most indefinite kind. The certainly does not seem possible ever to persuade infidels of any reason of the book being published in France and not in Holland, where religion, indeed, we may almost say, of any moral virtue, unless, to Descartes was living in a charming country house at Endegeest near begin with, we prove these two facts by means of the natural reason. Leiden, was apparently his fear that the Dutch ministers might in some And inasmuch as often in this life greater rewards are offered for vice way lay hold of it. His friend, Pere Mersenne, took charge of its than for virtue, few people would prefer the right to the useful, were publication in Paris and wrote to him about any difficulties that they restrained neither by the fear of God nor the expectation of another occurred in the course of its progress through the press. The second life; and although it is absolutely true that we must believe that there is edition was however published at Amsterdam in 1642 by Louis Elzevir, a God, because we are so taught in the Holy Scriptures, and, on the and this edition was accompanied by the now completed “Objections other hand, that we must believe the Holy Scriptures because they come and Replies.”1 The edition from which the present translation is made is from God (the reason of this is, that, faith being a gift of God, He who the second just mentioned, and is that adopted by MM. Adam and gives the grace to cause us to believe other things can likewise give it to Tannery as the more correct, for reasons that they state in detail in the cause us to believe that He exists), we nevertheless could not place this preface to their edition. The work was translated into French by the argument before infidels, who might accuse us of reasoning in a circle. Duc de Luynes in 1642 and Descartes considered the translation so And, in truth, I have noticed that you, along with all the theologians, did excellent that he had it published some years later. Clerselier, to not only affirm that the existence of God may be proved by the natural complete matters, had the “Objections” also published in French with reason, but also that it may be inferred from the Holy Scriptures, that the “Replies,” and this, like the other, was subject to Descartes’ revision knowledge about Him is much clearer than that which we have of many created things, and, as a matter of fact, is so easy to acquire, that those 1 Published separately. RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-2 who have it not are culpable in their ignorance. This indeed appears make trial of it in the present matter. from the Wisdom of Solomon, chapter xiii., where it is said “How be it Now all that I could accomplish in the matter is contained in this they are not to be excused; for if their understanding was so great that Treatise. Not that I have here drawn together all the different reasons they could discern the world and the creatures, why did they not rather which might be brought forward to serve as proofs of this subject: for find out the Lord thereof?” and in Romans, chapter i., it is said that that never seemed to be necessary excepting when there was no one they are “without excuse”; and again in the same place, by these words single proof that was certain. But I have treated the first and principal “that which may be known of God is manifest in them,” it seems as ones in such a manner that I can venture to bring them forward as very through we were shown that all that which can be known of God may evident and very certain demonstrations. And more than that, I will say be made manifest by means which are not derived from anywhere but that these proofs are such that I do not think that there is any way open from ourselves, and from the simple consideration of the nature of our to the human mind by which it can ever succeed in discovering better. minds. Hence I thought it not beside my purpose to inquire how this is For the importance of the subject, and the glory of God to which all this so, and how God may be more easily and certainly known than the relates, constrain me to speak here somewhat more freely of myself than things of the world. is my habit. Nevertheless, whatever certainty and evidence I find in my And as regards the soul, although many have considered that it is reasons, I cannot persuade myself that all the world is capable of not easy to know its nature, and some have even dared to say that understanding them. Still, just as in Geometry there are many human reasons have convinced us that it would perish with the body, demonstrations that have been left to us by Archimedes, by Apollonius, and that faith alone could believe the contrary, nevertheless, inasmuch by Pappus, and others, which are accepted by everyone as perfectly as the Lateran Council held under Leo X (in the eighth session) certain and evident (because they clearly contain nothing which, condemns these tenets, and as Leo expressly ordains Christian considered by itself, is not very easy to understand, and as all through philosophers to refute their arguments and to employ all their powers in that which follows has an exact connection with, and dependence on making known the truth, I have ventured in this treatise to undertake the that which precedes), nevertheless, because they are somewhat lengthy, same task. and demand a mind wholly devoted tot heir consideration, they are only More than that, I am aware that the principal reason which causes taken in and understood by a very limited number of persons. many impious persons not to desire to believe that there is a God, and Similarly, although I judge that those of which I here make use are that the human soul is distinct from the body, is that they declare that equal to, or even surpass in certainty and evidence, the demonstrations hitherto no one has been able to demonstrate these two facts; and of Geometry, I yet apprehend that they cannot be adequately understood although I am not of their opinion but, on the contrary, hold that the by many, both because they are also a little lengthy and dependent the greater part of the reasons which have been brought forward concerning one on the other, and principally because they demand a mind wholly these two questions by so many great men are, when they are rightly free of prejudices, and one which can be easily detached from the understood, equal to so many demonstrations, and that it is almost affairs of the senses. And, truth to say, there are not so many in the impossible to invent new ones, it is yet in my opinion the case that world who are fitted for metaphysical speculations as there are for those nothing more useful can be accomplished in philosophy than once for of Geometry. And more than that; there is still this difference, that in all to seek with care for the best of these reasons, and to set them forth Geometry, since each one is persuaded that nothing must be advanced in so clear and exact a manner, that it will henceforth be evident to of which there is not a certain demonstration, those who are not entirely everybody that they are veritable demonstrations. And, finally, adepts more frequently err in approving what is false, in order to give inasmuch as it was desired that I should undertake this task by many the impression that they understand it, than in refuting the true. But the who were aware that I had cultivated a certain Method for the case is different in philosophy where everyone believes that all is resolution of difficulties of every kind in the Sciences—a method which problematical, and few give themselves to the search after truth; and the it is true is not novel, since there is nothing more ancient than the truth, greater number, in their desire to acquire a reputation for boldness of but of which they were aware that I had made use successfully enough in other matters of difficulty—I have thought that it was my duty also to 2 RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-3 thought, arrogantly combat the most important of truths2.
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