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• NON-RUSSIAN VIEWS ON CURRENT RUSSIAN POLITICS UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (22), 2020 1

BOARD OF ADVISERS

Dr. Dimitar Bechev (Bulgaria, Director of the European Policy Institute) Issue 4 (22), 2020 Dr. Iulian Chifu Analysis and Early Warning Center) (Romania, Director of the Conflict Russia Amb., Dr. Sergiy Korsunsky (Ukraine, Ambassador Non-Russian View on Extraordinary and Plenipotentionary Current Russian Politics of Ukraine to Japan)

Editors Dr. Igor Koval (Ukraine, Odesa City Council) Dr. Hanna Shelest Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko Marcel Röthig (Germany, Director of the Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine) Publisher: Published by NGO “Promotion of Intercultural James Nixey (United Kingdom, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, Cooperation” (Ukraine), Centre of International the Royal Institute of International Affairs)

of the Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Studies (Ukraine), with the financial support (Slovakia, Ambassador Foundation in Ukraine and the Black Sea Trust Dr. Róbert Ondrejcsák Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Slovak for Regional Cooperation - a Project of the Republic to the United Kingdom of Great Britain German Marshall Fund of the United States. and Northern Ireland)

UA: Ukraine Analytica Amb., Dr. Oleg Shamshur (Ukraine, former analytical journal in English on International is the first Ukrainian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Relations, Politics and Economics. The journal of Ukraine to France) is aimed for experts, , academics, students interested in the international Dr. Stephan De Spiegeleire (The Netherlands, relations and Ukraine in particular. Director Defence Transformation at The Hague Center for Strategic Studies) Contacts: website: http://ukraine-analytica.org/ Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (Ukraine, e-mail: [email protected] Head of the Parliamentary Committee Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ on European Integration) ukraineanalytica : https://twitter.com/UA_Analytica Dr. Dimitris Triantaphyllou (Greece, Director of the Center for International and European Studies, The views and opinions expressed in Kadir Has University (Turkey)) articles are those of the authors and do not Dr. Asle Toje (Norway, Research Director at the Analytica, its editors, Board of Advisors or Norwegian Nobel Institute) necessarily reflect the position of UA: Ukraine donors.

ISSN 2518-7481

500 copies UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (22), 2020 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

RUSSIAN DOCTRINE INHERITS SOVIET TRADITIONS OF COORDINATED USE OF DIFFERENT INSTRUMENTS Interview with Dr. Oleksandr Lytvynenko, Director of the National Institute for Strategic Studies...... 3

RUSSIA`S STRATEGY TOWARDS POST-SOVIET STATES AS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW DOCTRINE OF LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY (PUTIN DOCTRINE) Ihor Lossovskyi ...... 8

VICTIMISATION OF THE “CRIMEAN SYNDROME” Sergii Glebov...... 18

RUSSIA AND THE DILEMMA OF SEPARATIST TERRITORIES Emil Avdaliani...... 28

INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY ARSENAL: TARGETING RELATIONS BETWEEN AND UKRAINE Volodymyr Solovian and Michał Marek...... 36

INSTRUMENTS OF RUSSIAN HYBRID ACTIONS AGAINST BRITISH AND AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES Oleksandr Kraiev...... 45

CURRENT RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARD THE MENA REGION Mykola Zamikula ...... 51

2 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (22), 2020 INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY ARSENAL: TARGETING RELATIONS BETWEEN POLAND AND UKRAINE

Volodymyr Solovian Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmaments Studies, Ukraine Michał Marek Jagiellonian University, Poland

Information security has become a strategically important aspect of international relations. Rapid development of information and communications technologies increases its importance. This paper focuses on the analysis of Russia’s capabilities to achieve its foreign policy goals through methods of negative informational impact. Attempts to undermine the information security of Poland and Ukraine and to provoke tensions between the two countries are taken as an example.

Introduction media platforms. For instance, the non- Information operations are an important Russia invests significantly in its foreign tool in the Kremlin’s foreign policy arsenal. inprofit 2020. organisation The funding TV-Novosti, amount allocatedwhich owns for public opinion worldwide. State intelligence theRT, wasAll-Russia subsidised State with Television USD 369.7 and millionRadio services,Russia is fake systematically accounts on trying social to networks, influence Broadcasting Company (VGTRK), Russian state-funded media, and bot farms, the so-called “troll factories”, are all involved space, was USD 327.4 million in 20201. in global information warfare that brings officialdom’s mouthpiece in the post-Soviet uncertainty and unpredictability and almost Russia’s information activities aimed blurs the line between peace and war. The at foreign audiences were detected as a pillars of Russia’s international information threat by Western societies not so long operations are multilingual information ago. Particular concerns were caused resources, such as the TV channel Russia by the Kremlin’s manipulative practices Today (RT) and news agency Sputnik, as well during previous US and French presidential as local alternative media – niche right-wing sites specialising in conspiracy theories and as well as the 2017 Catalan independence anti-European, anti-American, and anti- referendum.elections (in From 2016 the and Kremlin’s 2017, respectively), perspective, liberal content. the result of information operations abroad

1 Records at Budget’s Expense (Рекорды за счёт бюджета), “Secret Mag”, 20 April 2020

[https://secretmag.ru/news/rekordy-za-schyot-byudzheta-telekanal-russia-today-potratil-22-3-mlrd-rublei-za-god.htm]. UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (22), 2020

36 turned out to be rather questionable. portrays its information policy as a response The Russian government did not receive to provocative actions of “Western hostile expected dividends in the diplomatic forces”. The framework of this narrative was laid out in the Information Security behaviour has forced Western governments Doctrine of the Russian Federation (adopted tofield. take On a closer the contrary, look at information Russia’s provocative security issues. A number of initiatives aimed at Russia appears as an object of destructive raising awareness of citizens and debunking in December 2016). In the document, fake news were launched in response. states that carry out hostile policy toward Russia,information and influence terrorist of externalorganisations. forces – However, in reality, we see the opposite picture, in which Russia continues to invade Russia’s information activities the information space of other states. aimed at foreign audiences «were detected as a threat by Russia’s Information Toolkit in Western societies not so long ago. Poland and Ukraine Particular concerns were caused by the Kremlin’s manipulative One of the key priorities of the Kremlin’s practices during previous US and policy in the region is to freeze Ukraine’s French presidential elections Euro-Atlantic integration and slow down its cooperation with the EU. An obvious way to achieve this goal by means of a non-military toolkit is to provoke new and deepen existing misunderstandings in Ukraine’s has become especially relevant on the eve relations with its Western neighbours. ofCountering the 2020 RussianUS presidential social media election. influence How Poland also has a special place in the Russian Facebook, for instance, developed anti-Western rhetoric. In the framework of a partnershipsdid the platforms with a handlebipartisan the network challenge? of pro-Russian information paradigm, Poland fact-checkers, added prominent labels to is portrayed at the forefront of US political disputed stories, and changed the News and energy interests in Central and Eastern Feed algorithm to favour posts from friends Europe. Therefore, even partial success of over links from publishers2. Other social Russia’s attempts to discredit Warsaw’s networking giants (YouTube, Twitter) policies in the military-political sphere in the also restricted access to manipulative eyes of neighbouring societies may weaken publications of about 20 Russian media (RIA the ability to reach consensus within the EU Novosti, RT, Sputnik, Russia 1, etc.).3 and NATO, undermining the foundations of the Eastern Partnership policy. For the domestic consumer, Russian propaganda constructs an image of Russia as Given the language barrier and cultural a “besieged fortress”. Therefore, the Kremlin differences, the structure and methodology

2 Labeling State-Controlled Media on Facebook, “Facebook”, June 2020

3 Social Networks Limiting State Media Proposed to Be Blocked in Russia (В России предложили блокировать [https://about.fb.com/news/2020/06/labeling-state-controlled-media/]. соцсети, ограничивающие государственные СМИ)

, “BBC”, 19 November 2020 [https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-54999609]. UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (22), 2020 37 of Russian information activities and impact Polish-language portals with controversial and radical content (on the verge of Therefore, the tools of Russia’s information conspiracy theories), fan pages, and groups in Ukraine and Poland differ significantly. operating on Facebook or YouTube channels.

influence in Poland and Ukraine should be information space through Russian portals Polanddefined. thatRussia have also Polish attempts language to influence versions the (e.g., Polish the portal that primarily affects the population Moscow has relatively limited possibilities of the Baltic states, Rubaltic.ru).

information activities. There are no TV news channelsof influencing linked to Polish the Kremlin society in throughPoland, and there are no key information portals Russia is looking for ways to actively lobbying Russian disinformation influence Polish society by using messages. Polish society does not use «Polish-language portals with Russian-language television channels or controversial and radical content internet portals due to the low percentage (on the verge of conspiracy theories), of people speaking Russian. The English- fan pages, and groups operating language channel RT, which is available on Facebook or YouTube channels via satellite platforms, is also extremely unpopular – the Poles who have access to English-language channels are much more likely to choose Western sources. Due to The Russian side also uses pro-Russian or the small percentage of people who know national-radical organisations to lobby for its Russian, the Telegram platform, which is messages and to organise demonstrations or actively used by Russians for disinformation social actions that build desired narratives and propaganda activities, is also not gaining and messages. These organisations popularity in Poland. Russian platforms correspondingly have their own websites such as Vkontakte (VK) or Odnoklassniki and fan pages that popularise the messages (OK) are not recognised as the leading ones, close to the Russian propaganda or introduce translations of Russian propaganda articles the number of users. However, it is likely into the Polish infosphere. thatwhich the makes level it of difficult popularity to obtain is in data line about with YouTube plays a major role in the process of using social networking platforms used spreading messages of Russian propaganda VKthe in European 2020)4 . trendWe can (0.58% also ofassume Europeans that in the Polish information space. It is on this the main group using Russian platforms platform that recordings of, among others, are Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians a few pro-Russian or anti-Ukrainian actions (including economic migrants) living in are placed, as well as recordings that openly Poland, who are increasing the proportion serve Russian disinformation purposes (e.g., of VK and OK users. arguing against the presence of US troops in Poland or arousing hatred toward Ukrainian Under such circumstances, Russia is looking migrants).

for ways to influence Polish society by using

4 Ranking 2020

, “Najpopularniejsze portale społecznościowe”, 01 November 2020 [https://lepiej-widoczni.pl/najpopularniejsze-portale-spolecznosciowe-ranking-2020/]. UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (22), 2020

38 There is a noticeable tendency that the Polish and Russian television remains one of the language version of the Sputnik portal sets the agenda of disinformation content, which of respondents. Russian TV channels are is popularised by alternative portals. It is mostmajor often sources watched of information by respondents for almost over 6% 50 also noticeable that some of the alternative years of age living in the eastern regions of portals are publishing articles clearly Ukraine (about a quarter of respondents in imitating Russian-language publications that have appeared on key information noting that the motivation is quite different: portals of the Russian Federation. Polish toDonetsk receive and news Zaporizhia from Russia,regions). to It learn is worth an alternative portals draw not only on topics alternative point of view on the events in and narratives but also on phrases directly Ukraine, to receive news in Russian . from Russian portals, which are actively 6 used for propaganda.

Ukraine The Russian side also uses pro-Russian or national- Russia had expanded its presence in the «radical organisations to information environment of Ukraine almost lobby for its messages and to without hindrance until 2014. The key organise demonstrations or social actions that build desired was television, one of the main sources of narratives and messages newsresource for Ukrainians. of Russia’s During information the occupation influence of Crimea and armed intervention in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the Russian propaganda machine was aimed at A real challenge in the context of information undermining the foundations of Ukrainian security of the state is the penetration statehood. It is not surprising that the of Russian narratives through the media Ukrainian authorities “turned off the tap” of Russian state-sponsored television: Broadcasting of most Russian channels givennetwork to Victorof local Medvedchuk, agents of Russian widely influence known has been banned since the spring of 2014. in Ukraine.Ukraine Аas special Putin’s role crony. in this Noalgorithm wonder is Medvedchuk is recognised as the main and special forces, as well as Russian cultural Moreover, films glorifying Russian military indirectly acquired three news channels – Ukraine, were also banned. As of today, the Kremlin voice in Ukraine. In 2018-19, he Nationalfigures supporting Council of Russia’sUkraine policyfor Television toward Russian propaganda received a “residence and Radio Broadcasting has restricted the permit”,NewsOne, which 112 Ukraine,complicates and the ZIK. state’s Thus, response to pro-Russian “information channels, the vast majority of which are of sabotage” on screen. Russianbroadcasting origin of5. more than 90 foreign TV However, the effectiveness of these media citizens continue to use Russian media, although TV channels from Medvedchuk’s According to a survey, 17% of Ukrainian resources is quite insignificant. First,

5 Ukraine Banned Three Russian Channels – State Rada (В Україні заборонили три російські канали – Нацрада), “Radio Svoboda”, 27 February 2020

17% of Ukrainians Use Russian Media – Poll (Російськими ЗМІ користуються 17% українців – опитування), [https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-nacrada-rosijski-kanaly/30458438.html]. 6 “Interfax”, 16 October 2020 [https://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/general/695544.html]. UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (22), 2020

39 political orbit hold leading positions among Ukrainian news channels, the share of their many as a covert attempt to draw public audience on national air varies within only attentionin Russia to back Telegram in 2018 channels were perceivedas sources byof information and give the appearance of the of TV channels usually sounds in tune with state’s non-involvement in their activities. the1-2%. main Secondly, narratives although of Russian the editorial propaganda, policy Indeed, it may seem suspicious that political Telegram channels began to expand in the party line (“The Opposition Platform for Ukrainian segment of Telegram network Life”)it is determinedand its electoral in the interests. first place Preference by the is given to the topics of Russian propaganda Moreover, behind the activities of a number that strengthen the party’s position. ofon Telegram the eve ofchannels the 2019 stood election representatives campaign. of the inner circle of Ukrainian fugitive ex- president hiding in Russia.

A real challenge in the context million users of the communication platform of information security of inHowever, Ukraine it as is of worth mid-2020, noting Telegram that despite channels 5.6 «the state is the penetration that cover political topics are less popular, of Russian narratives through the media network of local agents of increasing within the year. Russian influence in Ukraine but the popularity has been significantly The political situation in Belarus is a clear example of helplessness of a rigid administrative hierarchy when it faces a Social networks remain the main source horizontal social communication network. of news for Ukrainians. Therefore, an Hence, the threat of possible Russian important step in enhancing Ukraine’s information resilience and data privacy was by means of Telegram is overestimated in taken in May 2017, when Russian social someinfluence aspects. on information It is unlikely security that the of KremlinUkraine networks VK and OK, as well as Mail.Ru, will choose a “Telegram Revolution” scenario Yandex services, and a number of other to destabilise Ukraine because it may turn Russian internet resources, were banned for out to be a shot in its own foot: The use of three years. (Recently, President Volodymyr Telegram as a communication platform for coordinating protests in Belarus and years. Probably, a similar decision will be Ukraine will become a clear example of an madeZelensky in 2023). extended As a the result, ban thefor anothernumber threeof VK instrument of civil disobedience in the eyes of the society in Russia. Given the popularity of the messenger among Russians (the OKvisitors audience dropped decreased more than threefold five times7. (down number of Telegram users in the Russian to 10% of all Ukrainian internet users), while Federation has exceeded 30 million ), the Lately, the fears of Telegram as a new “Trojan Kremlin may eventually run into trouble8 on the domestic political front, especially have spread among the expert community on the eve of the State Duma elections in inhorse” Ukraine. of Thus, Russian attempts information to block Telegram influence September 2021.

7 Three Years without Vkontakte (Три года без “Вконтакте”)

, “e-Pravda”, 14 November 2019 Number of Telegram Users in Russia Increased to 30mln (Число пользователей Telegram из России возросло до 30 [https://www.epravda.com.ua/rus/publications/2019/11/14/653664/]. млн человек) 8 , “Kod.ru”, 04 June 2020 [https://kod.ru/telegram-30-mln-users-from-russia/]. 40 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (22), 2020 Ukrainian Labour Migrants – frequency of attacks on Ukrainian migrants, Another Horror Story from Russian remind about earlier beatings, and refresh Propaganda Poles and Ukrainians. In the broader aspect, the issue of Ukrainian the plots concerning fights between the economic migrants is related to the spread In Ukraine, pro-Russian media gladly of messages about the threat that Ukrainians pose to Polish workers (overtaking jobs). Ukrainians and the Poles. This creates a These messages were expanded to include hypertrophiedreplicate news impressionabout conflicts of an between atmosphere the the plots of banditism and alcoholism, of hatred that seems to prevail between the which are supposed to be characteristic Poles and Ukrainian migrants. Additionally, features of Ukrainian migrants. The Russian media often use derogatory messages popularised by portals involved language relative to migrant workers from in the distribution of content similar to Ukraine, calling them “Gastarbeiters”. Russian propaganda tried to arouse fear and dissatisfaction among the Poles with the Ukrainian labour migration is used by the presence of Ukrainians. Russian propaganda to construct an image

of human resources of Ukraine. At the sameof official time, Warsaw Warsaw as aallegedly selfish “exploiter”cultivates The Russian government uses the “national memory” policy as incites hostility and violence between the «a trouble-proof tool for political Ukrainians“russophobic” and sentiments Russians. andThus, artificially Russian mobilisation. The war against both media sometimes portray Ukrainian internal and external “falsifiers of migrants in Poland as “bearers of nationalist true history” is an inexhaustible ideology” and its propagators. resource for maintaining ratings of the national leader and All Quiet on the Historical Front enhancing state mythology The Russian government uses the “national memory” policy as a trouble-proof tool for political mobilisation. The war against These narratives were combined with an attempt to spark social rebellion against the history” is an inexhaustible resource for Polish government that opened the country maintainingboth internal ratings and external of the national “falsifiers leader of trueand to “wild hordes of bandits”. The messages enhancing state mythology. Practices of this indicated above were, over time, developed kind are characteristic of many states that with current plots – for example, the threat build their pantheons of heroes and adjust posed to the society of becoming infected their national history in accordance with the political situation. Usually, such agenda does a country that is completely unable to cope not coincide with the historical vision of other with COVID-19the pandemic. by Ukrainians In the picture coming created from countries. Therefore, the battle over memory by the mentioned media centres, Ukrainians became a source of pestilence, banditry – after year. Not surprisingly, the aggressive and a source of social tensions. In order to tonebecomes of the more Kremlin’s aggressive national and memory fierce policy year emphasise the level of social anger of the is projected onto its foreign policy. This trend, Poles against the Ukrainians, the outlets of course, determines the agenda of Poland– connected with Russia broadcast the Russia relations at the current stage.

UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (22), 2020 41 The global coronavirus pandemic has important anniversaries in the history of temporarily overshadowed wars on the Poland,The period Ukraine, of 2019-2020 and Russia saw (in a numberparticular of edges of national memory. However, one of the recent events that served to refresh these Ribbentrop Pact, centennial anniversary of narratives was the visit of President Duda the Polish-Soviet 80th anniversary War and of its theculmination Molotov- – of Poland to Ukraine. Media centres have the Battle of Warsaw). Perhaps the harshest been permanently engaged in popularising historical controversy between Poland and Russian propaganda, focusing on the motive Russia arose over the 75th anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi concentration camp Auschwitz. Ukraine’s ambassador to Poland, of the “Bandera greeting” (“Sława Ukrajini”), Andrii Deshchytsia, noted the following: waswhich, shouted on the out first by daythe president of the visit, of Poland during “Vladimir Putin and his entourage launched accordingthe official to welcome Ukrainian at protocol. Mariyinsky Palace, a large-scale propaganda campaign accusing Poland of anti-Semitism and responsibility Competing Economies for the outbreak of World War II. The reaction of the Ukrainian side to these false In the picture of the world created by reproaches must be unequivocal: we are Russian propaganda for Ukrainian audience, in solidarity with Poland” . It should be Poland appears as Ukraine’s competitor in emphasised that these statements9 became the European market. In this vein, Russian the leitmotif of the Ukrainian president’s media reacted to the news about the plans participation in commemoration events in Poland. revision of the Ukraine– Associationof official Kyiv Agreement to start (in negotiations 2021). Ukrainian on the Minister of Economic Development, Trade Warsaw over history did not prevent Russian and Agriculture Igor Petrashko stated propagandaHowever, a from fierce exploiting confrontation its favourite with that Ukraine counts on “Poland’s friendly topic: Ukrainian nationalists. Russian media support in this important issue”11. gladly picked up critical statements by the ambassadors of Israel and Poland regarding At the same time, Russian media spread the honouring of the Ukrainian Insurgent the thesis that the Association Agreement Army (UPA) in early January 2020. The response of the Ukrainian Ministry of Union”, so Ukraine should not expect real Foreign Affairs was interpreted as evidence supportbenefits Warsawfrom the “as Polish well asside the12 . EuropeanAnother of glorifying “Nazi collaborators”10. almost similar argument is as follows: Polish

Deshchytsia on Russia’s Information Attacks (Дещиця - про інформатаки Росії), “UkrInform”, 02 January 2020

9 [https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-polytics/2848593-desica-pro-informataki-rosii-polsa-ne-musit-nicogo- 10 “Condemn Once and For All”: Will Israeli and Polish Ambassadors’ Call to Reject Heroization of Bandera Influence poasnuvati.html]. Kyiv? («Раз и навсегда осудить»: повлияет ли на Киев призыв послов Израиля и Польши отказаться от героизации Бандеры), “RT”, 03 January 2020

11 Revision of the Association Agreement: Ukraine Looks Forward to the Start of Negotiations with the EU in 2021 [https://russian.rt.com/ussr/article/704449-posly-izrail-polsha-bandera]. (Перегляд Угоди про асоціацію: Україна розраховує на початок переговорів з ЄС у 2021 році), “UkrInform”,

09 September 2020 [https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-economy/3096013-pereglad-ugodi-pro-asociaciu-ukraina-rozrahovue-na- 12 Revision of Partnership: Why Kyiv Intends to Change EU Association Agreement (Пересмотр сотрудничества: pocatok-peregovoriv-z-es-u-2021-roci.html]. почему Киев намерен изменить Соглашение об ассоциации с ЕС), “RT”, 10 September 2020

[https://russian.rt.com/ussr/article/782045-ukraina-soglashenie-associaciya-es-peregovory-2021]. 42 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (22), 2020 entrepreneurs, and hence the government, government (stimulating dissatisfaction with are not interested in strengthening the government’s actions, taking away part Ukrainian economy due to the fear of an of the electorate and directing it toward parties of a more radical/right-wing nature). According to this narrative, bad (including Also,outflow Russian of labour media migrants. are trying to spread anti-Russian) actions of the Polish Ministry scepticism concerning cooperation of Foreign Affairs allegedly lead to the full between Ukraine and Poland in the energy international isolation of Poland. Poland is sector. The Kremlin’s irritation due to the to be isolated by the EU and Russia (after J. consolidated position of Kyiv and Warsaw Biden’s victory, there were also reports of over Nord Stream 2 can be easily seen in impending isolation from the US). Poland is Russia’s attempts to generate mistrust. therefore to be condemned to relations with Moscow attempts to discredit Poland in Ukraine and Lithuania, which are presented terms of energy supplies to Ukraine: This is evidenced by a number of publications that negative image of Ukraine is being used critically assess the prospects of a trilateral toas create weak anda negative insignificant image countries.of the current The agreement on the need to strengthen energy government and other parties that allegedly security in the region, which was signed seek to be subordinate to the US or Germany (EU). At the same time, a subliminal message Energy Rick Perry, Secretary of the National is being built, according to which only Securityon August and 31, Defence 2019, byCouncil US Secretaryof Ukraine of normalised relations with Russia will allow Oleksandr Danilyuk, and Polish Government Poland to strengthen its position in the world. Plenipotentiary for Strategic Energy Infrastructure Piotr Naimsky (according to Conclusions the agreement, Poland will supply Ukraine with six billion cubic metres of natural gas Deterioration of relations between Kyiv and in 2021)13. for Moscow. Thus, Ukraine and Poland are Moreover, Kremlin-controlled media bothWarsaw in the generates focus of a Russia’s number propaganda. of benefits produce a negative information background Russian information warfare is aimed at for the agreements with the Polish company undermining solidarity between the two PGNiG over the search for gas deposits in states, eroding regional cooperation, and western Ukraine. The main narrative sounds elevating cross-border tensions. like this: Poland tries to become a regional gas hub through the sale of US gas to Ukraine. The activities of outlets controlled by the According to the interpretation of Russian Kremlin or the activity of alternative portals propagandists, this violates Kyiv’s main permanently involved in spreading Russian interest in energy, which is to buy Russian narratives promote a negative image of gas directly from Russia14. Ukraine and Ukrainians, aiming to block the possibility of closer cooperation between Russian propaganda processes a lot of Warsaw and Kyiv. The actions of the Russian messages that strike at the image of the Polish propagandists serve to limit the support

13 Ukraine, Poland, and US Will Sign a Memorandum on Gas Supply (Україна, Польща і США підпишуть меморандум про постачання газу), “EuroIntegration”, 30 August 2020

14 Poland Will Look for Gas in Ukraine and Will Take It (Польша поищет газ на Украине и заберет его себе), “Lenta.ru”, [https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2019/08/30/7100236/].

09 December 2020 [https://lenta.ru/news/2019/12/09/pgnig/]. UA: Ukraine Analytica · 4 (22), 2020 43 of the Poles for political forces advocating Kremlin on the basis of short and simple cooperation with Ukraine, whether in analyses/explanations. diplomatic, military, or economic space.

Our analysis indicates the following key Volodymyr Solovian, PhD student, Taras areas of Russian disinformation activities: Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Faculty of manipulations in the sphere of collective Philosophy. Head of foreign policy projects at the memory, constructing a negative image of Centre for Army, Conversion, and Disarmaments Ukrainian labour migration to Poland, and Studies (CACDS), Kyiv, Ukraine. Author of undermining energy cooperation. publications on the topic of security sector reform in Ukraine and information resilience. In the face of such actions on the part of the Russian side, the response of Poland and Michał Marek, PhD student, Faculty of Ukraine lies in the sphere of education. The International and Political Studies, Jagiellonian goal is to reach out to the citizens with a University, Krakow, Poland. The author’s clear message (accessible analyses), which interests: the issue of socio-political and cultural would continuously reveal the mechanisms processes taking place in contemporary Ukraine, and goals of Russian disinformation. An the subject of propaganda and disinformation as effective tool seems to be the popularisation part of the Russian hybrid warfare. Author of the of social networking platforms that would monograph “Operation Ukraine: Disinformation tell the citizens of Ukraine and Poland Campaigns, Narratives, Methods of Operation of (supported by examples of disinformation Russian Propaganda Centres against Ukraine in content – including screens of Russian the Period 2013-2019”. articles) about the tools and goals of the

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