Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental— Derrida, Phenomenology, and “The Breath in Intentional Animation Which Transforms the Body of the Word into Flesh”

Husserl’s realization that “absence is a phenomenon and must be given its due” made his philosophy and the phenomenological movement that inherits and transforms his thought positively unique in the history of philosophy. Attending to absence and presence, Husserl’s phenomenology provided alternatives to the problems of modern philosophy and access to the things themselves, the evidence characteristic of subjectivity and time, the way phenomena give themselves or appear, and so on. 1 We have encountered many diff erent dimensions of absence in Husserl’s devel- opment of genuine phenomenological immanence as it emerged with his maturing account of intentionality and absolute time-constituting consciousness. In tracing the development of phenomenology in light of the problem of time, we’ve also encountered increasingly meta- phenomenological refl ections on subjectivity, time, and intentionality and perhaps the reifi cation of absence. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, in their respective later works, focus less on analyzing and describing how things and subjectivity manifest themselves and more on absence variously understood as the condition for the possibility of phenomenality and intentionality. One might say that Husserl’s observations about that for which we have no names left

© Th e Editor(s) (if applicable) and Th e Author(s) 2016 175 M.R. Kelly, Phenomenology and the Problem of Time, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-31447-5 176 Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... ajar a door that was kicked wide open by Heidegger’s account of transcen- dence and the clearing—an opening through which (among many oth- ers) stepped Merleau-Ponty with his negative phenomenology (akin to negative theology) and its notions of latent-intentionality and a past that never was present. Th e phenomenologists considered in Part II of this work are merely representative of a growing (and still thriving) tendency among phenomenologists to “identify” something of which we cannot speak or which does not appear or cannot be brought to appearance—for example, the open, the es gibt, the past that never was present, the time- being or wild being to which we are blind, the other, the face, the trace, the voice that keeps silent, auto-aff ection, life, and so on—as somehow the “fi nal ground” of all appearance, all awareness, all intentionality. 2 Such a radical absence about which we can say nothing more—the ulti- mate grounds proposed by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty—marks less an absence in the sense Husserl understands it and more a claim regarding that which never can be given in intuition as an object or articulated without distorting it. It is seemingly the case that this absolute time- constituting consciousness was not interpreted as absolute insofar as it was either blended with otherness or itself grounded in something more original than the phenomenological origin. Still, such “fi nal” grounds are meant to serve as the condition for the possibility of any and all awareness (whatsoever that is and as it is given in intuition). If one wished to resist the speculation that Husserl’s identifi cation of absolute time-constituting consciousness, as that for which we have no names, set that trajectory in motion, it does not help that Husserl in Ideas I contrasts absolute consciousness (the subject’s absolute being) to the relative being of the world, while in Cartesian Meditations he revives the Leibnizian notion of a monad as a way to explain absolute subjectivity (SP 12, 68, 84 note). 3 One could see why some might say—as Derrida does—that Husserl’s writings on time-consciousness perhaps initiated the “metaphysical back- slide” he criticized in the relation between self and time in Heidegger’s Kantbuch . But in Derrida’s case it was not a backslide but the growth of the germ of phenomenology. Capitalizing on Heidegger’s and Merleau- Ponty’s critiques of Husserl’s phenomenology, Derrida will most directly confront the movement of temporalization as that which will “torment and contest from the inside” phenomenology’s self grounding as Husserl Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... 177 developed it; the movement of temporalization will “contradict” claims to absolute consciousness and mark the “very power and the very limit of the phenomenological reduction” (SP 6, 74). What interests me in closing this work is not the cogency of Derrida’s critique of Husserl’s account of absolute time-constituting conscious- ness. Th e scholarship on this issue is vast, approached from various posi- tions, and largely in agreement that Derrida misreads Husserl’s theory of absolute time-constituting consciousness. 4 Rather, I’m interested in how Derrida’s phenomenological critique of the voice and its auto-aff ection follows the insights opened by Heidegger’s Kantbuch and develops the implications of the latter’s insight into the claim that “this movement of diff erence … produces a subject” or that “the self of the living present is primordially a trace” (SP 78, 82, 85). Derrida attributes this insight about auto-aff ection directly to Heidegger:

Now, as soon as we take into account the movement of temporalization, such as it is already in Phenomenology of Internal Time-consciousness, it is indeed necessary to use the concept of pure auto-aff ection, the concept Heidegger uses … in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics precisely in regard to time. (SP 83)

Heidegger uses this insight precisely in regard to time and time’s aff ecting of itself that fi rst makes the mind into a mind or makes all transcendence, which is diff erent from but constitutive of intentionality, possible. Th is movement, which Derrida will unpack in his phenomenology of the voice, is the germ of phenomenology that either consumes it from within or blooms into phenomenological theology. In the case of the former, phenomenology’s quest for certainty is unrealizable. In the case of the latter, we might fi nd an unexpected apodicticity of absence. While Derrida endorses the former implication and neither Derrida nor Husserl advances (or perhaps even supports) the latter implication, I shall close with the hypothesis that Derrida’s disclosure of the trace or dif- férance as constitutive of presence and all intentionality reveals an apodic- ticity of absence that foreshadows phenomenological theology. Starting with Heidegger, we already have seen that phenomenology must “speak” the “unnamable” (SP 77, 15). Th is claim of Derrida’s alludes to Husserl’s 178 Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... conclusion regarding absolute consciousness (SP 84 note). Insofar as the trace will “produce” this subject, this unnamable alludes to the unnam- able, the unnameable life, Yahweh, the pure “I am” that cannot be named and yet who’s breath is my breath and that by which my “breath in inten- tional animation transforms the body of the word into fl esh, makes of the Korper a Leib ” (SP 15–6)—insofar as the unnameable is the trace and the trace produces consciousness and His breath is our breath. Again, the claim is not that Derrida endorses this claim but that his critique sees in Husserl’s phenomenology the germ of phenomenological theology such as it is found in the work of Michel Henry, Jean-Luc Marion, and others. I’m not claiming that Derrida promotes or should be grouped with this “theological turn.” Rather, on the grounds that Derrida fi nds that rather traditional notions of life or spirit or breath always guided Husserl’s thought (thereby, of course, contradicting phenomenology, as Dominque Janicaud charges phenomenological theology), Derrida’s account of Husserl’s phenomenology can be seen to give license to the kind of phenomenological theology Janicaud denies. Let me try to put the suggestion with which I shall close diff er- ently. Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence presses Husserl’s thought as representative of the tendency in all Western philosophy— which we have seen in Descartes’ view of the “atemporal” cogito and Kant’s atemporal transcendental unity of apperception—to establish clarity and certainty by thinking (1) that what gives itself or appears is only that which gives itself or appears to a subject and (2) that such a subject appears to itself (or is self-given) in the pure (atomistic, dis- crete) now or present. Derrida’s 1967 Speech and Phenomena presents a more sustained and precise critique of Husserl in light of the problem of time and (or for) phenomenology than that off ered by Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty. While Speech and Phenomena seeks in its own way a transcendental condition, 5 its refl ection on time and auto-aff ection as a critique of Husserl enables us to see the trajectory of phenomenol- ogy through Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty and into phenomenological theology, as each moves increasingly toward an absence that is meant, despite its ineff ability, to serve as a foundation or “fi nal” ground—a transcendence constituting immanence. Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... 179

Derrida’s Speech and Phenomena critique of Husserl’s account of abso- lute consciousness, regardless of whether or not one thinks it is a fair reading of Husserl, leaves us with a view of mythic or monistic imma- nence as the destiny of phenomenology in the guise of the enigma of life in the living-present rethought as the “ultratranscendental concept of life,” of trace, diff érance , supplement, and so on (SP 14–5). As such, Speech and Phenomena seems a “natural” fi t for this phenomenological trajectory toward reifying absence precisely because it suggests that this just is the destiny of phenomenology. By pushing Husserl’s notion of the living- present to what he takes as its ultimate—albeit implicit— ground in the “ultratranscendental concept of life,” Derrida’s Speech and Phenomena off ers a critique of Husserl’s notion of the absolute conscious- ness that provides a view of mythic or monistic immanence not as an alternative to what is often (mis)taken to be Husserl’s view of imma- nence but as the inner logic or destiny of his phenomenology of inter- nal time-consciousness. And he accomplishes this task not by off ering meta- phenomenological refl ections designed to ground phenomenology but by off ering a phenomenology of the voice designed to deconstruct phenomenology. Derrida’s phenomenology of this ultratranscendental concept of life thus produces either a eulogy for phenomenology or a note about its future as phenomenological theology because the germ of that movement is contained in Husserl’s (deconstructed) thought.

Setting the Stage: “A Truism Which Has Never Occupied the Forefront of the Phenomenological Stage”

Fitting right into this narrative, it would seem, is Derrida’s Speech and Phenomena . Th e opening or “introduction” to this intense meditation on Husserl’s phenomenology signaled the key to his deconstruction of phe- nomenology, which really cannot rest with (or succeed on the grounds of) his recognizable critique of Husserl’s theory of meaning and signs. Th e really crippling critique of phenomenology aims at its most diffi cult and important problem, namely, time or time’s auto-aff ection. In order 180 Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... to undermine phenomenology’s achievement of—pretention to—cer- tainty and the establishment of a rigorous “science,” Derrida notes:

Th e ultimate form of ideality, the ideality of ideality, … is the living present , the self-presence of transcendental life. … Let us note … in order to here specify our intention, that phenomenology seems to us tormented, if not contested from within, by its own descriptions of the movement of tempo- ralization. (SP 6)

Th e ideality of ideality will be the pure form of expression (total clarity of meaning without intimation and cause for concern of misunderstanding that Husserl claims is found) in soliloquy, the immaterial mental life priv- ileged over the excluded body. And under the infl uence of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, 6 especially their readings of, and alternatives to, Husserl’s accounts of subjectivity, temporality, and intentionality, Derrida sees the opening for a direct attack on phenomenology rather than a concession of a few shortcomings in Husserl’s phenomenology that could be rectifi ed without undermining the essentials of Husserlian phenomenology. Th e real question concerning the torment brought to Husserl’s phe- nomenology by the movement of temporalization needs to attend to— that is, what is in question is—that which simulates presence, that is, the voice “phenomenologically taken” or the transcendental concept of life, the enigma or mystery of the unnamable “trace.” Life, for Derrida, “precedes the reduction because it is the unity from which the reduction makes its division into transcendental life and empirical life. Life for Derrida is the voice that hears itself,” as Lawlor notes. 7 As Derrida is more explicit about such tensions in Husserl’s phenomenology, we shall con- sider his notion of diff érance and the trace—the ultratranscendental—that has a “constituting value” for the “historical destiny” of phenomenology (SP 6). 8 Derrida sees that these phenomenologists after Husserl realize what is implicit in his account of absolute time-constituting conscious- ness, namely, that we must “speak” the “unnameable” (a play, again, on Husserl’s ultimate conclusion regarding absolute subjectivity and perhaps on God as Yahweh or the unnamable breath that animates life). To start with an account of how Derrida gets to this ultratranscen- dental conception of life, consider these functional equivalents in Speech Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... 181 and Phenomena . Derrida invokes Heidegger’s Kantbuch in order to show that the movement of temporalization with its “nonpresence or nonself- belonging” infects Husserl’s view of absolute time-constituting conscious- ness or auto- or self-aff ection such that the latter is never pure or never given in a pure now instant (SP 7). Self- or auto-aff ection, in turn, infects the voice, which is both a special and “unique kind” of auto- aff ection and “consciousness” (SP 78, 80). Th e movement of temporalization, according to Derrida and which I shall try to explain below in “Derrida’s Phenomenology of the Voice and Time as a Problem for Phenomenology: “A Pure Interiority of Speech … Radically Contradicted by ‘Time’ Itself”, thus infects consciousness such that consciousness is never pure or given in a pure now instant. Th e supposedly purely given consciousness of self as self that was supposedly found in soliloquy, in the phenomenological voice, is only “apparently” so given—only a “simulated” presence. As is well known, the issue at stake is the metaphysics of presence and, more precisely, Husserl’s phenomenological account of absolute con- sciousness (or the living present) as something like the culmination of the metaphysics of presence. Th e critique of the metaphysics of presence is a twofold critique: it targets the view (1) that consciousness “secures” the clear and present intuition of the given object—or “the proximity of what is set forth as an object of intuition”—and (2) of consciousness’s given- ness to itself in the pure now instant—or “the possibility of self-presence of the present in the living present” (SP 9). Derrida’s deconstruction wants to show that philosophies in search of total clarity and absolute certainty based on binaries (such as presence/absence, same/other, imma- nence/transcendence, certainty/dubitability) undermine themselves. Th is metaphysics of presence cast in epistemological terms is the desire to fi nd a secure foundation for all knowledge whether it’s Platonic forms, the Cartesian cogito , the Kantian transcendentals and limits on reason, or Husserl’s essential distinctions between expression and indication or absolute consciousness and the correlative world. 9 After the modern turn to the subject, the metaphysics of presence denotes the commitment to a view of consciousness’s self-givenness in the pure now as the condition for the appearance of any object whatsoever such that (1) depends on (2) or (2) founds (1). 182 Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology...

Th e metaphysics of presence thus pejoratively denotes “the proximity of the temporal present which gives the clear and present intuition of the object its form” (SP 9). We see sketched here Derrida’s entire critique of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl grounds the ideality of meaning in the perfect presence of self to self (speaking to understanding) as found in soliloquy. Th is version of the self absent the world will become the self after the reduction, and the principle of all principles will link meaning to the givenness of things in intuition, in person, to the self given to itself in immediate intuition as the pure now. Having determined evidence in this way, according to Derrida, the principle of all principles and thus the very method of phenomenology depends on accounting for the full, clear, and certain presence of self to self at each very moment. After noting his intention concerning the central problem plaguing Husserl’s phenomenology—namely, that time itself or the movement of temporalization will torment and contest these Husserlian essential dis- tinctions or exclusions rooted in the bias of the metaphysics of presence (SP 7)—Derrida’s “Introduction” more precisely applies the critique of metaphysics of presence to Husserl’s thought. He starts by noting that Husserl secures the pure givenness of the living-present through the tran- scendental reduction or epoché (which he refers to interchangeably and synonymously). Th e reduction, it is said, opens up a living present in a way that splits life between (the) transcendental-living or life and (the) empirical-living or life of consciousness. Th e issue, strictly speaking, is whether or not (the) transcendental (life of) consciousness as the condi- tion for the possibility of all givenness can be said to be given in the pure now, the instant, or the present as the instant, or pure presence. Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence as he applies it to Husserl’s phe- nomenology holds that (the) transcendental (life of) consciousness must be so given but that it is not—cannot be—so given; hence, the crucial failing of (Husserl’s) phenomenology, the torment manifesting its “inse- curity” (SP 67, 82). But the two lives question isn’t really the (or what is in the) question. In fact, Derrida will really only “question” the voice. Th e force he exerted on other pressure points on the body of Husserl’s work do not elicit a (or the desired) confession. We can say that Derrida’s real “question,” or that what Derrida really fi nds in question, concerns the voice because Derrida himself notes that the matter in question here Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... 183 concerns life and “living is … the name of that which precedes the reduc- tion and fi nally escapes all the divisions which the latter gives rise to … and requires another name” (SP 14–5). Other (now familiar) underdeter- mined names for life or living will arise— diff érance or the trace or the “ultratranscendental conception of life”—and serve as that which consti- tutes subjectivity (SP 15). Th ese names must be underdetermined names that really are not names because Derrida’s deconstruction seeks to avoid names insofar as names depend on binaries, which entail hierarchies and reinforce the bias of the metaphysics of presence. As the trace or diff erence will constitute consciousness and conscious- ness is the voice, the real matter of Derrida’s critique of phenomenology in Speech and Phenomena is “that consciousness owes its privileged status … to the possibility of a living vocal medium” (SP 15). Th is is, stated otherwise, the view that consciousness is given to itself in pure presence and full of meaning without space for error, which depends upon the sanctity and security of soliloquy, the voice that hears itself speak, absent the world. It is:

not in the sonorous substance or in the physical voice, in the body of the speech of the world that he [Husserl] will recognize an original affi nity with logos … but in the voice phenomenologically taken, speech in its transcendental fl esh, in the breath, the intentional animation that trans- forms the body of the word into fl esh, makes Körper a Leib , a geistige Leiblichkeit . Th e phenomenological voice would be the spiritual fl esh that continues to speak to itself and be present. (SP 16)

Derrida wagers that Husserl’s phenomenology builds the privilege of presence as consciousness upon a faulty foundation, upon “the virtue or excellence of the voice” (SP 16)—upon that which, as excellence implies, surpasses or is “distinguished from,” as towering above, and transcends and is ab-solute. Derrida equivocates productively and provocatively in anticipating his account of the virtue or excellence of the voice phenomenologically taken, the voice that hears itself or “continues to speak and be present to itself” even “in the absences of the world”: this voice is the voice of solilo- quy, absent of the world in its own way, or the phenomenological voice 184 Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... left after—that is, as the remainder of—the transcendental reduction. Taking a cue from Heidegger’s concern that Husserl never asked about the being of consciousness, Derrida notes with more focus that “Husserl in the end never asked what it [the voice as that to which consciousness owes its privileged status] was” (SP 15). Th e source of this privilege of the living vocal medium is, on Derrida’s reading, Husserl’s account of soliloquy as evidence of the essential distinction between expressive signs and indicative signs—the ideality of ideality. If we ask what it is and if we start from the ultratranscendental conception of life, that enigma, then “in determining ‘living’ in this way, we come to designate the origin of the insecurity of [Husserl’s] discourse … the point where it can no longer assure its possibility and rigor” (SP 15). And that will mean, according to Derrida, that the voice always will be entangled or intertwined with the empirical, the other, the unclear, the insecure, and so on, the voice itself will be shown to be constituted by some other name, some unnameable.

Derrida on Husserl on Signs: “A Transcendent Dignity … only Apparent”

Nearing the climax of Speech and Phenomena Derrida writes, “the ele- ment of expression … must protect, respect, and restore the presence of sense, both as the object’s being before us, open to view, and as a proximity to self in interiority” (SP 75). A close reading of this text and Husserl’s Logical Investigations reveals that Husserl protects the presence of sense in the object’s being before us (immanence) by distinguishing between expressive signs and indicative signs. As is well known, the discussion of soliloquy will protect, respect, and perhaps restore (if that’s necessary on your reading of Derrida and Husserl) the presence and certainty of sense but it, in turn, faces two central problems, as Derrida will interpret mat- ters: it will have diffi culties protecting the presence and certainty of sense as a proximity to self in interiority and it will have diffi culty protecting the self’s personal certainty from a mixture with uncertain anonymity. In understanding the two dimensions of the critique of presence, espe- cially in the context of Husserl’s theory of signs, it is helpful to simplify Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... 185 matters by remembering that Husserl and Derrida think of signs diff er- ently. Derrida sees signs primarily as related to other signs rather than, as in Aristotle, related to thoughts. Following the structuralists, Derrida holds that a sign gets its meaning only from its relationship with other signs in a kind of network of signifi cation. But in Aristotle signs get their meaning by standing for, or referring to, ideas that are derived from the activity of sense or the agent-intellect. Whatever diff erences exist between Aristotle and Husserl on the matter, the latter follows the former in thinking that a closer relationship exists between sign and reality than structuralism and Derrida will grant. In Husserl’s discussion of signs, he distinguishes between indications and expression. Indications, such as bodily movements (facial expres- sions) or footprints in the sand or vehicle horns have no essential mean- ing. For example, if I see a young person staggering across campus, it may (well) be the case that he’s intoxicated or (likely) that he’s being playful or (unlikely) that he’s experiencing some trauma (such as dehydration or being chased by bees); footprints in the sand (a natural indicative sign) may (well) mean a person passed by this place earlier, or (perhaps) two people passed with one giving the other a piggyback ride, or (unlikely) a shoe-wearing circus bear traversed the place earlier; and a honking horn (an artifi cial indicative sign) might mean that someone’s pestering me, or alerting me, or greeting me (and I can’t really tell until I see who it is, and it’s always fun when it’s someone we know pestering us before we knew it was them behind the horn). In short, there’s no essentially communicated meaning for the perceiver to understand; there’s a gap between what is meant and what is (to be) understood. Expressions, on the other hand, largely minimize and in some circum- stances overcome this gap. Expressions have meaning tied to them or right in them with minimal possibility for misunderstanding. Th is is the case at least insofar as I know what I mean and want to say. To me, my words are an “immediate” and “unifi ed” expression of my thought and mean- ing; from my listener’s perspective—and this is something Husserl grants and Derrida emphasizes—my communicative expression remains close to an indication. When you hear me as I speak to you, my words intimate to you my thoughts or meaning or intention or what I want to say. For 186 Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... example, when discussing a person’s provocative research in the context of whether it justifi es excluding them from teaching ethics courses, one debater who disagrees with the work of the researcher in question says, “Her research is irrelevant”; or, consider my claim that Derrida exposes the germ of phenomenology in Husserl’s thought; or, simple misunder- standings off ered by the speaker who says that something is hot when he means its spicy. In such examples, the essential link between expres- sion and meaning that supposedly marks an essential distinction between expression and indication is broken. My intent is intimated in my spoken word. But the possibility for misunderstanding remains. Expression and indication seem entangled. According to Derrida, “here we come to the core of indication: indication takes place whenever the sense-giving act, the animating intention, the living spirituality of the meaning-intention is not fully present” (SP 39/41). It is tempting to think that Derrida advances the conclusion that indi- cation pollutes expression. He does not make this claim at this point. He realizes that Husserl does not think this entanglement threatens “the essential distinction” between the expressive sign and the indicative sign because he realizes that, as Bernet notes, it “does not change anything about the fact that, to the one who speaks and hears his own voice, the latter remains a pure expression of his meaning.” 10 Derrida at this point grants the move to soliloquy as an approach to saving the essential dis- tinction between indicative and expressive signs by fi nding an exception to the problem of intimation. As John Sallis notes in his exposition of Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl’s theory of signs, this tension within communicative expression motivates the turn to soliloquy as a way to protect and restore the presence of sense in the object before us: “in order to maintain the integrity of expression, its essential distinctness from indication, it is imperative that Husserl demonstrate that speech in soli- tary mental life is free from intimation.” 11 Soliloquy provides an interesting exception to this problem of intima- tion that would collapse the distinction between expression and indica- tion. Indications are useless in soliloquy as the pure mode of expression where meaning and expressive sign coincide at least in the speaker’s or thinker’s experience. Derrida, quotes Husserl in full this way: “in mono- Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... 187 logue words can perform no function of indicating the existence of psy- chic acts, since such indications there would be quite useless. For the acts in question are themselves experienced by us at the very moment [ im selben Augenblick ]” (SP 54). 12 Two very diff erent readers of Husserl and Derrida’s reading of Husserl assess this discussion quite similarly. Sallis remarks that Derrida takes Husserl’s turn to soliloquy as placing “the essence of language on the side of the spiritual, enclosing it in the citadel of Geist , securing it from intrusion from without.” 13 Bernet reminds the reader that Derrida concerns himself with Husserl’s “spiritualization and idealization of [language] … a fi gure of the return to pure consciousness … the same fascination for a consciousness which is totally present to itself”—immanence. 14 More than just spiritualizing language, the pres- ence of self-presence seems at stake—the moment itself sequestered from all exteriority, contingency, transdence, and so on. Derrida ends his account of “soliloquy” and essential meaning by noting his speculative worry about this “the very moment.” Th is signals Derrida’s concession that soliloquy as a form of self-understanding is independent of the world, a form of absolutely, certain, pure meaning—immanence —opposed to the relative, ambiguous, impure meaning of all other signs— transcendence. Nevertheless, he will press on the point where he believes the diff erence on which the distinction rests is no diff erence at all. Polemicizing Husserl’s turn to soliloquy, Derrida presents it as a turn to the self as it remains in pure proximity or presence to itself—the privilege of presence as consciousness owed to a vocal medium as that which hears itself speak at that very moment (SP 15). Here, we have that question that has never occupied center stage in phenomenology—the privilege of the voice. As Bernet notes, while Husserl is not here in Logical Investigations talk- ing about transcendental subjectivity (indeed, Husserl famously couldn’t fi nd such a subject in 1900/01) this move to soliloquy takes us to the heart of the discussion of time in phenomenology and Derrida’s critique of phenomenology:

Even if the thought which directs expression is not yet transcendental con- sciousness, nevertheless it displays the same fascination for a consciousness which is totally present to itself. It follows that if a pure expression would 188 Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology...

turn out to be impossible from the fact of the impossibility of a pure and immediate presence of speaking subject to itself, this would also aff ect … the distinction between expression and indication and something revealing a diffi culty that aff ects the phenomenological project in its entirety. 15

As the rub regarding Husserl’s supposed insecurity over the force of his move to soliloquy now comes down to Husserl’s insistence on the nature of these signs and the essential distinction being preserved in the moment, Derrida cannot proceed by remaining within this terrain of signs. He turns his focus to the matter of what is indisputable, that is, that Husserl (1) privileges expression over indication and (2) distinguishes these signs by the proximity of expression to intentional consciousness as it is lived- through at the very moment. 16 According to Derrida’s reading of Husserl, “self-presence must be produced in the individual unity of a temporal present,” which claim we again shall see in Derrida’s phenomenology of the voice that perceives sensible phonemes as it speaks (SP 60). If the presence of sense (of the proximity to self in interiority) is to be protected, respected, restored, guaranteed; if establishing this protec- tion falls upon subjective or conscious life’s “unity” of words and thought (meanings) in its interiority at the very moment; then Derrida’s interpreta- tion and/or the cogency of Husserl’s rigorous science rests on the question of temporality. Surely this depends on how one understands Husserl’s understanding of the “temporal present.” 17 But of all that which will be at stake in Derrida’s phenomenological account of the experience of the voice that hears itself in the absence of the world (soliloquy or absolute consciousness after the reduction) the matter does not stand on Derrida’s criticism of Husserl’s account of absolute time-constituting conscious- ness. As I understand this essay of Derrida’s, I suspect we can see his own hesitation about his reading of Husserl’s account of time-consciousness. It’s not the question of time that really fells Husserl’s phenomenology. Th e rather selective reading that this otherwise quite sensitive reader pro- vides suggests this confession. Th e question of speech or voice does this work because the question of speech will place Husserl’s phenomenology and all phenomenology in a dilemma, while the question of time will only reveal the germ of phenomenological theology. For all its apparent intricacies, Derrida’s critique of Husserl on absolute time-constituting Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... 189 consciousness does not touch Husserl’s phenomenology. It is based too heavily on misreadings. Derrida wants to show why the “transcendent dignity” of the phenom- enological voice “seems” secure (insofar as it “seems capable of dispensing with this exteriority within interiority” or transcendence within immanence) and yet why the voice only “simulates the conservation of presence” or why “its transcendence is only apparent” (SP 79, 15, 77). Again, Derrida closes his “Introduction” by stating the centrality and goal of his phenomenologi- cal account of the voice:

Husserl will radicalize the necessary privilege of the phone , and exploit all of its resources with the greatest critical refi nement. For it is not in the sono- rous substance or in the physical voice, in the body of speech in the word, that he will recognize an original affi nity with the logos in general, but in the voice phenomenologically taken, speech in its transcendental fl esh, in the breath, the intentional animation that transforms the body of the world into fl esh, makes of Körper a Leib , a geistige Leiblichkeit. Th e phenomenological voice would be this spiritual fl esh that continues to speak and be present to itself— to hear itself—in the absence of the world. (SP 15)

Th e critique of the voice takes us to the implication of the writing on time insofar as they necessitate—makes incumbent upon us (SP 83)— the notion of auto-aff ection and reveals a self given to itself only insofar as it is taken away from itself—a self dependent on a source other than itself, an unnameable trace that produces subjectivity, that gives subjec- tivity its breath (SP 82, 85).

Derrida’s Phenomenology of the Voice and Time as a Problem for Phenomenology: “A Pure Interiority of Speech … Radically Contradicted by ‘Time’ Itself”

In asking and answering the question of the privilege of presence as the question concerning that to which consciousness owes its privileged sta- tus, Derrida turns to the voice or “the being which is present to itself in the form of universality, as consciousness; the voice is consciousness” 190 Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology...

(SP 79–80). We are interested in Derrida’s capitalizing on the phenom- enological critiques of Husserl’s accounts of absolute time-constituting consciousness. Derrida will “question the phenomenological value of the voice” and expose its transcendent value as only “apparent.” Th e voice will only “simulate the conservation of presence,” will only be staged or will be a production of another sort, if you will, insofar as presence in the now is but a “dress rehearsal” for absence (SP 77, 15, 85). 18 As I understand this questioning—this inquisition—the voice is what is at stake because only it appears to provide apodictic evidence of conscious- ness’s privileged appearance to itself in the pure now that thus grounds or founds the meaning of the experience and an object given in intuition (immanence over transcendence). We’ve mentioned Derrida’s questionable explanation for why the voice would keep silent, namely, if it truly were purely present in the primordial impression, the punctual now instant. But those critiques of Husserl’s account of absolute time-constituting consciousness as rooted in the now as primal impression do not succeed. Derrida’s more persuasive critique concerns how the voice can hear itself but only at the expense of Husserl’s aspirations to certainty and universal- ity, only at the expense of the voice’s pure immanence. It seems, then, that the force of the critique of the apparent transcendence of the voice will rest on showing that the now in which the voice hears itself is itself “contami- nated” or “infected” or “tormented” by a diff erence from within . To accomplish this, Derrida embarks on fulfi lling his promise to “come back to” that problematic that enabled him to “specify [his] inten- tion,” namely, the “enigma of the concept of life” and “the movement of temporalization” that will “designate the origin of the insecurity of the [phenomenological] discourse … where it can no longer assure its pos- sibility and rigor within the nuance” (SP 6, 82, 15). Th at is, to show that the transcendence of the voice is only apparent because it is “tormented,” “contaminated,” or “infected” from within, Derrida brings to the fore an insight about phenomenology’s foundation already seen by Heidegger in his Kantbuch but from which Heidegger’s Kantbuch shrunk away. Th e idea is that the “movement of temporalization” (SP 6, 83) will “radi- cally contradict” the phenomenological pretention to pure self-presence or “absolute subjectivity” because a look at the voice, which is supposed Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... 191 to establish pure presence in the sense of the self’s self-givenness in the pure now in soliloquy—at that very moment—reveals a “diffi culty of the system or a contradiction proper to it” (SP 15). Th e entire discourse—the entire deconstruction of phenomenology—ranges around the voice and what the experience of the voice reveals about “time’s” auto-aff ection— the movement of temporalization, the enigma of the ultratranscendental conception of life—that fi rst turns the mind into a mind—to recall the phrase Heidegger used in his monistic immanence. Th e voice “apparently” sanctions the essential distinction between expression and indication because it has a “transcendent dignity,” a character whereby it overcomes the gap between the signifi er and the signifi ed. Th e voice phenomenologically given in soliloquy does away with that gap: “the ‘apparent transcendence’ of the voice … results from the fact that the signifi ed … is immediately present in the act of expression.” Such purity of givenness and “transcendent dignity” Husserl achieves through the phenomenological reduction, which “transforms the worldly opacity of its body into pure diapaneity” (SP 77). Th is radical translucence of the voice phenomenologically taken reminds us that the voice phenomenologically taken is not the “sonorous substance” (SP 15). In soliloquy understood as that silent, interior communication this seems obvious. In the talking to myself that is thinking without speaking, there’s an immediate meaning and understanding in the expression. In soliloquy, the signifi er (word thought) and signifi ed (thought meant) come together in a pure aff ec- tion of self by self. All other forms of auto-aff ection are clearly merely “apparent” insofar as they require that we go beyond the mode of pure presence that sanctioned the essential distinction between expression and indication. Viewing oneself in a mirror requires an objectifi ca- tion of oneself, a distance between myself as perceiver and the image of myself perceived; hence there is no pure auto- aff ection in such an encounter with oneself. In the case of my left hand touching my right hand or vice versa “the same thing happens” (SP 79). Th e voice “shows” itself or manifests itself such that it “seems” to need no such appeal to the outside. It is an auto-aff ection of an absolutely unique kind (SP 78). 192 Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology...

Derrida seems to locate the voice phenomenologically taken in the conscious awareness of myself that accompanies my speech as speaker- speaking, which he refers to as monologue:

When I speak, it belongs to the phenomenological essence of this opera- tion that I hear myself at the same time that I speak. Th e signifi er, animated by my breath and by my meaning intention … is in absolute proximity to me. Th e living act, the life-giving act, the Lebendigkeit , which animates the body of the signifi er and transforms it into a meaningful expression, the soul of language, seems not to separate itself from itself, from its own self- presence. … It is implied in the very structure of speech that the speaker hears himself: Both that he perceives the sensible form of the phonemes and that he understands his own expressive intention. (SP 77–8)

It is unclear from Derrida’s account of the voice phenomenologically taken whether or not he is speaking at this point about how the self appears to itself in colloquy or monologue or soliloquy. It is also unclear whether Derrida’s phenomenology of the voice ever mentions soliloquy; so far as I can tell it does not. 19 He refers to the act in which we fi nd con- sciousness’s privileged status in the voice as “monologue.” Whether in soliloquy, monologue, or colloquy, it seems questionable phenomenologically to say the speaker hears himself in the sense that he “perceives the sensible phonemes” even if in all of these acts he “under- stands his own expressive intention” or what he meant to say. If we take Derrida’s description of the voice that hears itself as its speaks as an act of soliloquy in self-refl ection, the self “perceives” itself as refl ected and in refl ecting understands his expressive intention, but it does not perceive the sensible form of the phonemes because they are not. If we take his description of the self that hears itself as an act of monologue in the mode of speaking aloud to oneself in self-refl ection before no one, then the description of soliloquy just given holds and we add to it the sensible phonemes, but we do not say that this self “perceives” the words it speaks or the sensible phonemes because it lives through these words in speak- ing and understands its own expressive intentions as it non-objectively hears itself. If the monologue happens to be a monologue in which the speaker speaks aloud before another, then the instance of monologue just Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... 193 described holds except that the self does not “perceive” itself or the words it speaks even as it non-objectively hears itself. And if we take Derrida’s description of the voice that hears itself as it speaks as an instance of col- loquy, which his description would not seem to preclude, then in collo- quy—as with a certain instance of monologue—I do not perceive myself in the way that I perceive the other to whom I speak, I do not perceive my words or sensible phonemes, though I understand my expressive inten- tion and hear myself non-objectively. In any of these various ways we can interpret the acts that fi t the phe- nomenological description of the voice Derrida provides. I surely am aware of myself in soliloquy, speaking to another, or speaking before another, but I’m objectively aware of (perceive) only the audience to whom I am speaking in colloquy or monologue. And I only hear myself in the non-objective way that I am aware of (hearing) myself as speaker- speaking and I understand my expressive intention. I certainly don’t lis- ten to myself or “perceive” the sensible form of phonemes that I’m living through. If these distinctions capture phenomenological diff erences between the various manners of self-givenness in monologue and soliloquy, we could say that Derrida’s argument does not touch the latter (upon which Husserl establishes the essential distinction between expression and indi- cation). Moreover, we could say that it is not really the question of mono- logue or soliloquy that is at stake but the very moment itself in which (across which) monologue or soliloquy supposedly occurs. To propose a phenomenology of the voice meant to expose its apparent transcendence by reintroducing the very problems of communicative expression, which we’ve already seen do not touch the very problem of the tie between what I say and what I mean or intend, seems to founder. So Derrida’s critique of the voice or account of monologue must really be about, as noted above, the self’s self-awareness as it accompanies all its directedness to the world, “the self-presence of the animating act in the transparent spirituality of what it animates, this inwardness of life,” which makes “the operation of hearing oneself speak … an auto-aff ection of a unique kind” because it is an auto-aff ection that apparently never needs to go outside itself to have an intuition of itself in the now (SP 78). Th e phrase “at the same time” clearly alludes back to the im selben Augenblick ; whether 194 Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... soliloquy, monologue, or colloquy the issue concerns the movements of temporalization or the place of the ultratranscendental conception of life in consciousness, in the voice. So let us grant that Derrida is talking about Husserl’s view of the self’s non-objective self-presence or self-givenness. We still cannot follow Derrida’s claim that the self that “hears” itself in this non-objectifying mode of intentionality cannot hear itself “at the same time” because the instant of that time is contaminated by the retentional moment that reproduces the just past now. Th e scholarship has shown the feebleness of Derrida’s move. Derrida presupposes that Husserl views the now and primal impression as a punctual instant and retention as recollection. Th e now phase in that moment or intentional act is not reducible to the pri- mal impression according to Husserl’s view; retention does not “follow” the primal impression as if they were pieces in a process, for they are dis- tinguishable but inseparable moments of the living present on Husserl’s mature view of absolute time-constituting consciousness. Derrida either does not see or will refuse the development in Husserl’s thought on time-consciousness, which abandons the schema-apprehension model of intentionality that trapped the moments of time’s fl ow in the now. 20 Th e claim that the voice that hears itself speak “perceives the sensible form of the phonemes” betrays Derrida’s commitment to this mistaken view (and poor phenomenology) of the voice or absolute consciousness. Phonemes are those discrete units of sound in a word that distinguish one word from the other. To say that we perceive the sensible form of phonemes means that I would perceive at the very moment the discrete sounds c , a , r , t , of the words, “car,” “cart.” Such an account misrepresents both one’s experience of speaking/hearing oneself speak and the expe- rience of hearing another speak. Th ese individual sounds are precisely not what is perceived when we hear another speak them or when we speak or think them. We live through the sounds and perceive the word. Such is the work of the animating act as Husserl would understand it according to the living-present as opposed to Derrida’s view of the primal impression tied to the now understood itself as a discrete instant. Derrida seems to misrepresent the animating act insofar as his phenomenology of a voice that perceives sensible forms of phomenes and understands, that is, hears, perceives himself along with each sensible phoneme. Th is would Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... 195 be a voice or consciousness trapped in each now or a view of a succession of consciousnesses that would not yet be a consciousness of succession. Derrida’s critique of phenomenology has little to do with his problem- atizing of Husserl’s account of absolute time-constituting consciousness although it has much to do with the problem of time. He has always had to show how a now itself—and so consciousness given to itself in that now—is never a pure now. It has always been about Husserl’s presupposi- tion of the pure inwardness of life, a presupposition that prioritizes spirit over matter—immanence over transcendence—in a falsifying binary that is a hierarchy that refl ects and reinforces the (bias) of the metaphysics of presence. Th e privilege of consciousness as the excellence or virtue of the voice is the privilege of spirit in its pure, full self-givenness:

My words are “alive” because they seem not to leave me: not to fall outside, me, outside my breath. … In … the phenomena of speech, the phenome- nological voice gives itself out in this manner … Th is self-presence of the animating act in the transparent spirituality of what it animates, this inwardness of life with itself, which has always made us say that speech is alive, supposes, then, that the speaking subject hears himself in the present. (SP 76, 78)

Since the close to the “Introduction” to Voice and Phenomena , Derrida’s attempt to deconstruct Husserl’s thought and so phenomenology really has been riding on the view that Husserl is committed to the claim that

the word is a body that means something only if an actual intention ani- mates it and makes it pass from the state of inert sonority ( Korper) to that of an animated body ( Leib ). Th e body proper to words expresses something only if it is animated sinnbelebt by an act of meaning (bedeuten ) which transforms it into a spiritual fl esh (geistige Leiblichkeit). But only the geistige Leiblichkeit is independent and primordial. (SP 81)

Th e idea has always been to show that the inwardness requires the outer and that the meaning giving act and its “now” as primordial impression are not primordial. Th e most compelling argument Derrida provides against the voice (consciousness) is to show that the pure inwardness of life depends on an 196 Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... outer. He does this by stating that the voice or consciousness is forced to speak according to a linguistic code that precedes its utterances and expres- sions. Language proceeds consciousness and consciousness or the voice’s privilege is “only apparent” in the very sense that conscious only appears anterior to language. 21 Derrida places the chip of deconstruction under the skin of phenomenology. He applies his most general insight to the phenomenological voice—soliloquy as pure expression—by reminding us that there is no pure presence of thought to itself because all thought is mediated by language. As such, language will be too precise to capture all of my meaning—even when thinking to myself. Moreover, the language by which I refer to myself puts me at a distance from myself (even when thinking to myself), for when the voice thinks (itself to) itself (even pre- refl ectively and non-objectively) it must “detour through anonymity,” as Bernet nicely puts it. 22 Here is diff erence, the inevitable diff érance . In Derrida’s words, “when the word I appears, the ideality of its Bedeutung … puts us in what Husserl describes as an abnormal situation—just as if I were written by someone else” (SP 96). Th e self thus comes from the other, presence from absences, consciousness from language immanence from transcendence, and the nameable from the unnameable. Th is argument against the purity of expression and the privilege of con- sciousness in the voice seems more compelling because it is, at least, more accessible. It not only helps us see the argument against self-presence according to the now, it also is the very structure of the argument of the movement of temporalization against the notion of a pure now in which we would fi nd consciousness’s (the voice’s) pure self-presence. It’s impor- tant to take both arguments together despite their identical structure, for while there is no consciousness without language, the latter needs the former to animate it. More to the point, the full deconstruction of the voice requires the deconstruction of the now on which the privilege of consciousness in the excellence of the voice rests. Th e spiritual life of absolute consciousness, the inwardness of life, must be shown not to be itself primordial or self-constituting but constituted by—founded upon—a more primordial movement of temporalization, life: “the movement of diff érance is not something that happens to a tran- scendental subject; it produces a subject” (SP 82). Th e notion of auto- aff ection is “incumbent upon us” as soon as we make the move to time Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... 197 because time itself is auto-aff ection: “this we know is what Heidegger does in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics precisely when he is concerned with the subject of time” (SP 83). Derrida thus tries to show less that the now or source point or primal impression described on Husserl’s own account is contaminated by retention and more that the primal impres- sion is infected from within because the primal impression is that out of which “the movement of temporalization is produced” (SP 83). Derrida will push Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, deconstruct it such that the movement of temporalization as the movement of diff érance “is not something that happens to a transcendental subject; it produces a transcendental subject” or fi rst makes the mind into a mind (SP 82). Heidegger realized that the now of time was pure auto-aff ection, a pure spontaneity. On Derrida’s deconstructive reading:

Th e process by which the living now produced by spontaneous generation must, in order to be a now and to be retained in another now, aff ect itself without recourse to anything empirical but with a new primordial actuality in which it would become a non-now, a past now—the process is indeed pure auto-aff ection in which the same is the same only in being aff ected by the other, only by becoming the other of the same. (SP 85)

Th is means to say that the present only is the present by virtue of becom- ing the past and thus that the supposed origin cannot be an origin with- out some more primordial. For example, there is no father without the son, or as Descombes puts its, “the fi rst is not the fi rst if there is not a second to follow it”. Th is is the process by which the now “in order to be a now” requires (or must aff ect itself with) “a new primordial actuality.” It is by virtue of this second or new primordial now “in which it [the fi rst now] would become a non-now, a past now.” And it is this non-now or past now that in becoming the past now becomes the origin that it would not have been without the new, present now (the second now or “new primordial actuality”). Th is is what it means, too, to say that the primal impression or source point or now is already auto-aff ection as the movement of temporalization because the primal impression is aff ected by nothing other than itself; this is what it means to say that “the living present springs forth from out of its nonidentity with itself” (SP 85). 198 Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology...

Th is is what it means to say that the second is more primordial than the fi rst or that “we cannot say that the self of the living present ‘primordially is’” because “being-primordial must be thought on the basis of the trace, and not the reverse” (SP 85). Th e movement of temporalization is pure diff erence, pure diff er- entiation without separation. Th at may sound like Husserl’s reminder that the living present is a tripartite structure of distinguishable but inseparable moments. But the claim is more radical because Derrida, following Heidegger, is talking about “time itself” and not absolute time- constituting consciousness (SP 86). In a diff erent sense, the movement of temporalization is an absolute-time that constitutes consciousness. For Derrida, if the fi rst time were the only time there would both be no time and no origin. Th e movement of diff érance , then, is the movement of time, auto-aff ection, and the voice, which means there is no purity in the now but always a blending of now-with-not-now and this in turn means no pure self-presence. Th is diff ers greatly from Husserl who talks of a structure of consciousness that enables the now to pass and yet be retained (withheld, as Nicolas de Warren nicely puts it). Derrida seems to propose at least the coexistence of the now and the not now. But how would that relation play out? As an auto-aff ection that produces nothing, if the trace is the present sign of an absent in the sense that the fi rst time that became fi rst-time only by virtue of the emergence of the second-time, then in the second- now is the trace of the fi rst now. We cannot think here in terms of fi rst and second but must think in terms of old-now and new-now, for the second now can be second by virtue of its being a fi rst alone and does not need there to be a third to be second. Th e movement of time, then, just is this absolute trace of old-now in new-now. But since without the trace we would have no movement, no diff erence and no time at all, we must posit an absolute trace as that which constitutes this constituting. Hence, Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Husserl’s phenomenology arrives at the level of “a past that never was present” but constitutes all presents in a way analogous to how language is anterior to and constitutes consciousness (which in turn will disclose or animate language): “being primordial must be though on the basis of the trace, and not the reverse” because without the trace there would be nothing for the present to pass Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... 199 into or nothing by which the present could become the present of time and hence no diff érance . Th e trace is the supplement and the supple- ment is the trace—two sides of the same coin that is diff érance . While “the theme of a pure inwardness of speech … is radically contradicted by ‘time’ itself,” the apodictic absence of its auto-aff ection seems to have done the deed (SP 86).What has been at stake throughout has been the supposedly “purely temporal nature of the ‘expressive’ process … of a pure inwardness of speech” (SP 86). Th is is why the reduction reveals its limits in its power. It takes us to an absence apodictically secured in insecurity, an absolutely not-given that makes all givenness possible, an absence that has a “constituting value” for presence (SP 6). Concerning the status of this trace that infects and contaminates from within, we must say that it ontologically comes before the primordial impression if it is to constitute the primordial, if it is to produce a sub- ject or constitute the self presence of the living present. Life is the unity before the divisions created by the reduction. Indeed, the trace must be to some extent wholly other to or outside of the living present because it is not an attribute of it (SP 85). Th is movement of diff erence or trace is the primordial supplement (SP 87). And it is here that the theological under- tones of an unnameable, ultratranscendental conception of life resound:

if the world needs the supplement of a soul, the soul, which is in the world, needs this supplementary nothing which is the transcendental and without which no world would appear. But … we must … refrain from … substan- tializing this … or making it be … some thing or some moment of the world. Th is would be to extinguish the light at its source (SP 13).

Th e transcendental subject needs a supplement that it receives in the trace that constitutes it as a subject; the transcendental subject receives its breath from the unnameable that “one cannot attempt to deconstruct,” life “as self-relationship whether or not it takes place in the form of con- sciousness,” “the light at the source” (SP 77, 14, 13). Th e point to which Derrida’s phenomenology of the voice takes us— the inner logic or destiny of phenomenology—implies that the voice is “the breath, the intentional animation that … makes of the Körper a Leib … this spiritual fl esh that continues to speak and be present to itself … 200 Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... in the absence of the world” (SP 15). If the trace as a retentional trace is tied or appended to the primordial impression and constitutive of the lat- ter, might we not see in Derrida’s thought of such a supplement Marion’s notion of saturation or excess? If the trace is ontologically prior as the unity of life that makes possible subject and object, self and world, might we not see the immediacy of life that Henry will relegate to the primordial impression after dispensing with the bias of (or, he should say, against) ontological monism? What is clear, in any event, is that Derrida’s asser- tions about this absence that he sees latent in Husserl’s thought are apo- dictic assertions about this absence. Derrida’s ultratranscendental is life, in its unity, before the split of transcendental and empirical ego, a ‘material’ phenomenology. Th e supplementary nothing that is life as the ultratran- scendental is a no-thing or that which cannot be named. Across all the monikers given it by Derrida, this unnameable life must be unnameable because it resists all the opposites that would come with giving it a name. Such a life would be a self-relation of the kind that would have no divi- sions within it and would not exist at a distance from itself since it lacks opposites. Such a life in its unity refl ects a monism, a monistic imma- nence, “the light at the source” that makes possible all appearance but does not itself appear. As a movement of diff erence, nevertheless, it would constitute diff erence, the realm of phenomenality, the world made pos- sible by, but that would diff er and distract us from, the ‘truth’.

Reprisal

Th e trajectory of my account to this point might (justifi ably) lead one to expect a presentation of Derrida’s deconstruction of phenomenology as the culmination of a narrative on the “loss” or “end” of phenomenology. Th e previous chapters have, after all, presented accounts of how the prob- lem of time in phenomenology became a problem for phenomenology. And I’ve tested the same hypothesis (which I repeat now in its most sche- matic formulation) against Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s thought: (1) later phenomenologists took Husserl’s view of absolute time-constituting consciousness as a refl ection of the shortcomings of Husserl’s view of immanence and intentionality that contributed to his failure to access Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... 201 the things themselves in accordance with the principle of all principles; (2) each thinker presents an alternative view of the ground of intention- ality—all awareness, both subject and object—that refl ects an absolute- time constituting consciousness (or consciousness constituted by time) that created more problems than it solved—or turned the problem of time into a problem for phenomenology. Unlike Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty who challenge Husserl’s success in returning to the things themselves or adhering to his own method and principle of all principles, Len Lawlor notes that this 1967 introduc- tion to the problem of the sign in Husserl’s phenomenology serves up a “super-phenomenological critique” because it doesn’t just hold Husserl to methodological principles such as the principle of all principles but “refers us to an experience.” 23 Th is experience is the voice. In turning to this experience, Derrida relies upon the insight of Heidegger’s 1929 Kantbuch rethinking of time and self-aff ection (SP 83). Th e reference to Heidegger’s Kantbuch account of temporality and auto-aff ection occurs just when Derrida makes good on the promise from his “Introduction” to expose and reject the priority of presence that takes the form of con- sciousness’s “privileged status (about which Husserl in the end never asked what it was )” and “which has never occupied the forefront of the phenomenological stage” (SP 15–6). Indeed, Derrida invokes Heidegger’s 1929 Kantbuch account—of the very matter of time’s self-aff ection that Merleau-Ponty too cited in his 1945 account of the subject as time— in order to raise a question phenomenology has never raised, that is, to question the truism of the presumption of the privilege of consciousness based on the excellence of the voice. 24 Stemming from Heidegger’s 1929 notion of time as that which aff ects itself and turns the mind into a mind, a critical narrative and theoretical arch can be traced in these major (critical) interpretations of Husserl and their distinctive attempts to rethink immanence, intention- ality, and time-consciousness (in order) to return to the things them- selves or question the methodology that purports to do so. I’ve claimed that Heidegger’s view of time as pure self-aff ection and transcendence, which he stipulates is wholly diff erent from but nevertheless (or thus) grounds intentionality, has a “constituting value” for inten- tionality (all awareness and appearance of both subject and object) 202 Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology...

(SP6). If Heidegger moves away from a conception of subjectivity as a non-temporal temporalizing toward a temporalized conception of time that constitutes subjectivity, I have proposed that Heidegger’s Kantbuch rethinking of time, intentionality, and subjectivity put Merleau-Ponty on the way to his 1960 Ursprungsklärung that amounted to an account of the time-being or wild being and latent-intentionality unanchored from any conception of subjectivity and indeed constitutive of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty, recall, thus admitted that such a view of latent-inten- tionality and a past that constitutes consciousness (rather than the other way around)—a “past that adheres to the present” as “the model of … openness upon being” or an absolute-time constituting consciousness— is “not compatible with phenomenology” (VI 191, 184, 244). As with Merleau-Ponty, Derrida radicalizes the self by radicalizing time and the present. As they search for the ground of all intentionality that is not itself identical with intentionality, these phenomenologists moved away from absolute consciousness and intentionality to transcendence, to the truly transcendental, and to the “ultratranscendental conception of life” (SP15). But, unlike Merleau- Ponty who proposes such radicalizing in the name of following phenomenology but ends up incompatible with it, Derrida radicalizes subjectivity and time precisely to deconstruct phenomenology. 25 Yet, in posing the question that phenomenology before him had not—a question that had “never occupied the forefront of the phenomenologi- cal stage” (SP15)—Derrida’s critique of Husserl’s account of the privileged status of consciousness brought him to an apodictically given absence com- patible with phenomenology-though not, perhaps, the phenomenology Husserl envisioned. Or, perhaps we could say of what Derrida has said of the trace—Life, the ultra-transcendental prior to the reduction, intention- ality, and the subject-object dichotomy—what we have seen Deleuze say of immanence, a life, that it does not refer to an object or belong to a subject?

Notes

1. R. Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 45, 22. Among Husserl’s and phenomenolo- gy’s many contributions to philosophy, it comes as no surprise that Sokolowski identifi es the “explicit and systematic” analysis of absence and presence as its most “original.” Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology... 203

2. While phenomenology isn’t bound in its methodology by Kant’s worries about the excesses of speculative reason, phenomenology does ask that its proponents be able to identify the experience to which they are pointing. See D. Zahavi, Self-awareness and Alterity A Phenomenological Investigation (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999), pp. 50–1. 3. T. Seebohm, “Th e Apodicticity of Absence,” in W. McKenna and J.C. Evans (eds), Derrida and Husserl (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995): 185–200, p. 186. 4. For a selection of such rejections, see N. Alexander, “Th e Hollow Deconstruction of Time,” in W. McKenna and J.C. Evans (eds), Derrida and Phenomenology (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995): 121– 50; J. Brough, “Husserl and the Deconstruction of Time,” Review of Metaphysics , 46(3) (1993): 503–36; R. Bernet, “Derrida and His Master’s Voice,” in W. McKenna and J.C. Evans (eds), Derrida and Phenomenology (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995): 1–21; N. de Warren, Husserl and the Promise of Time (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); B. Hopkins, Th e Philosophy of Husserl (London: Acumen, 2010); L. Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl: Th e Basic Problem of Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003); T. Seebhom, “Th e Apodicticity of Absence”; D. Zahavi, Self-awareness and Alterity . 5. L. Lawlor, “Jacques Derrida,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , (2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/derrida/ . 6. On these infl uences, see Rudolf Bernet’s “Husserl’s Early Time- Analysis in Historical Context,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology , 40(2) (2009): 117–54; and F. Dastur, “Finitude and Repetition in Husserl and Derrida,” Southern Journal of Philosophy , 32(1) (1994): 113–30, p. 119. 7. L. Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl , p. 174. 8. Ibid., p. 168. 9. G. Gutting, Twentieth Century French Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 293–5. 10. R. Bernet, “Derrida and his Master’s Voice,” p. 7. 11. J. Sallis, Double Truth (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), p. 10. 12. Ibid., p. 13: “to talk about indication in relation to soliloquy has no mean- ing because in this case the words and meaning are lived by the subject in the same instant making in this way any representation by the subject through the mediation of indications ‘useless’.” 13. J. Sallis, Double Truth (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), p. 9. 14. R. Bernet, “Derrida and his Master’s Voice,” pp. 10–11. 204 Conclusion: The Ultratranscendental—Derrida, Phenomenology...

15. Ibid. 16. Ibid., p. 9. 17. As Bernet summarizes: “if Derrida considers pure expression to be impos- sible, it is up to him … to disprove … that an ‘instantaneous’ presence of the present exists … and … that the subject is present to itself and there is no need of an appeal to an indicative representation through which it would come to inform itself about itself” (ibid., p. 14). 18. V. Descombes, Modern French Philosophy , trans. L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 14. 19. See B. Hopkins, Th e Philosophy of Husserl , pp. 258 ff . 20. N. Alexander, “Th e Hollow Deconstruction of Time,” p. 134. 21. V. Descombes, Modern French Philosophy , p. 146. 22. R. Bernet, “Derrida and His Master’s Voice,” p. 18. 23. L. Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl , p. 174. 24. Th e importance of the place of the reference to Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics has been identifi ed (but not as a central focus) by other authors: Sallis, Double Truth, p. 17; Dastur, “Finitude and Repetition in Husserl and Derrida,” p. 119. Confi rmation of this, too, is provided by Len Lawlor in his extensive and extremely helpful notes to Derrida’s Voice and Phenomena (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2011), p. 104. 25. R. Bernet, “Husserl’s Early Time-analysis in Historical Context,” p. 149. Index

A See also Self-aff ection; Absence, xxxiii–xxxiv, 53, 55, 57, 73, Trace, the 88, 91–2, 124, 149, 177–81, 183, 192, 198 apodicticity of 197, B 201–2, 204 Barbaras, Renaud , 166, 171, 173 Absolute-Consciousness , 61, 81–6, Bernet, Rudolf , 71, 93, 104, 188–90, 93–5, 105, 107–8, 114, 198, 206 128, 131–3, 140, 148–53, Blattner, William , 28–9 161, 163, 166, 178–81, Body , 5, 43, 139, 142, 180, 182, 183, 190, 196, 198, 204 . 185, 191, 197 See also Intentionality, Breathe , 180, 182, 191, 201–2 double-; Intentionality, Brough, John , xxvii, 48, 65, 71, non-objectifying-; Living- 79–80, 83, 90–1, 96, Present; Momentary-phase 104, 173 of consciousness; Pre- refl ective self-awareness Aristotle , xxi–xxii, 112, 187 C Auto-aff ection , 179, 183, 191, 193, Carbone, Mauro , 159, 172, 173 195–6, 198–9, 200–1, 203 . Carr, David , 29–30

© Th e Editor(s) (if applicable) and Th e Author(s) 2016 205 M.R. Kelly, Phenomenology and the Problem of Time, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-31447-5 206 Index

Clearing, the , 105–6, 117–21, Heidegger’s critique of , xxxvi– 123–4, 127, 130–1, 141–2, xxxvii, 109–10 155, 168, 178 . See also Husserl’s critique of , xxv–xxvii, Heidegger, self-critique; xxxii, xlvi, 23–4, 34, 45–7 Immanence, monistic; Descombes, Vincent , 199 Intentionality, latent-; de Warren, Nicolas , xxii, 91, 93, 96, Intentionality, Merleau- 98, 200 Ponty’s view of; D i ff erence (diff er a nce) , 179, 181–2, Temporality; time-being; 185, 198–200 . See also Transcendence Trace, the; Unnameable, the Cobb-Stevens, Richard , 57 Doubt , xxiii, xxxi–xxxii, xxxix, xlv, Cogito , xxii–xxiii, xxxix, 180, 183 xlvi, 7, 46–7, 122 Consciousness . See Absolute- Drummond, John , 29–30, 63 consciousness; cogito; Pre-refl ective self-awareness; Voice, the; Transcendental E unity of apperception Evidence (Evidenz ) , xlvi, 33, 47, Consciousness of succession , 16, 19, 51–60, 170–1, 184, 192 . 20, 22, 29, 68–9, 75–6, See also Absence, 79–81, 89–93, 107, 147–8, apodicticity of 196–7 adequate/inadequate , xlvi, 54–5, Crowell, Steven , 52, 57 57–60 apodictic(ticity) , 60, 192

D Dasein , vii, xxxix, xliii, 104–6, G 108–16, 120, 123, 127, God , xxii, xiv, xlv, 8, 12, 13, 125, 129–31, 136 132, 182 Dastur, Francois , 130 Deconstruction , 183–5, 198–200 Deleuze, Gilles , xlv, xlvi, 103, 160, H 131, 165, 167 Heidegger, Martin, passim Derrida, Jacques , vii–x, xliii, 105, critique of Husserl , xxxiv-xl, 24, 133, 141, 173, 177–204 32–3, 41–2, 44–5, 48–9, Descartes, Rene , ix, xx, xxii, xxv, 58–61, 108–10, 112–13, xxvii, xxi, xxxii, xl, 5–12, 121–3, 164 14, 20, 23–4, 34, 46, 50, self-critique , 116–17, 121–3, 58, 125, 126, 143, 144, 180 128–30 Index 207

Henry, Michel , 103, 180, 202 synonym for consciousness , Hume, David , 8, 18, 28, 62 ix, xix–xx, xxv, xxxv, xxxvii, Husserl, Edmund, passim xxxix–xl, xliii, 35, 53, 62–3 and time-consciousness , xxvii, 146 (see also I Absolute consciousness; Ideality of ideality , 182, 186 Immanence, genuine Immanence phenomenological; Living- in classical philosophy , xxi, xxiii present; Momentary- phase genuine phenomenological , of consciousness) xxvii–xxxv, xxxvii–xxxviii, vertical immanence , xxi, xxiii, 42 xl–xliv, 32, 51–61, 65–9, (see also Immanence in 79–83, 86, 140, 143, classical philosophy) 146–7, 150–1, 158, 171 Ineinander , 165–6, 169, 170 horizontal , xxii-xxiii Intentionality, passim in modern philosophy , xxii– act-intentionality , 4, 6–8, 20–3, xxiv, xxv–xxvii, xxxiii, xxxix, 32, 57–8 66 categorial- , 143, 158–9 monistic , xxiii–xiv, xl (see also co-intentionality , xxxiii, Spinoza, Baruch) 53, 55 in Derrida , 180–1, 202 double- , 87–93, 115 in Heidegger , 106, 129–33, empty-/fulfi lled-intentionality, 151 xxxiii–xxxiv, 53–6 in Merleau-Ponty , 141, 151, ( see also Evidence) 165, 171 fungierende -(operative-) , 4, 6, 8–9, mythic(al) , xxiv, xxxvii, 14–15, 11, 20, 22–4, 32, 48, 58, 24, 141, 165, 171, 181 88–9, 95, 139, 142–50, psychological (real) , xxv, xxxvii, 153–62, 174 10, 14–15, 42–3, 46–7, Heidegger’s view of , 48–51, 77, 80, 146, 158, 108–13, 117–19, 159, 164 ( see also 120, 122–4 Immanence in modern care-structure , 111–12, 116, philosophy) 120, 126–7 reel , xxvi–xxvii, xxxvii, 42–3, latent- , 105, 156–171, 48–52, 77, 80, 146, 158, 178, 204 159, 164 ( see also Merleau-Ponty’s view of , 139–40, Immanence in modern 142–71 philosophy) non-intentional- , 14, 23 208 Index

Intentionality (cont. ) reel / irreel 36–42, 49, 52–5, non-objectifying , 13–14, 23, 58, 79–80, 82, 90–2 61, 66, 81, 83, 86, 88–9, tri-partite , 82, 89–90, 95, 107, 95, 104, 109, 115, 143, 123, 158, 163, 200 145–8, 153, 155, 158, 164, Intuition , xxxiii–xxxiv, 12–13, 15–21, 195–6 ( see also Absolute 31, 35, 55, 85, 123–5, 178, consciousness; 183–4, 192, 195 Consciousness of succession; Immanence, genuine phenomenological; K Intentionality, double-; Kant, Immanuel , ix, xx, xxiv–xxv, Pre-refl ective xxxvii–xxxviii, xl, xliv, 4–5, self-awareness) 10–23, 27, 34, 58, 67–71, operative , 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 20, 23, 75–6, 78–81, 107, 109, 24, 32, 58, 89, 95, 98n22, 180, 183, 205 140–62, 164, 174n26 Heidegger’s view of , 123–8 schema-apprehension model of , Husserl’s view of , 20–5, 34, 75–6 40, 60–1, 71–4, 76–82, Merleau-Ponty’s view of , 4, 25, 86–8, 97, 161–4, 166, 167, 144–5, 148, 157–8, 160, 196 ( see also Momentary- 161 phase of consciousness; Time-consciousness, Husserl’s immature view) L structure of (see also Absolute Landgrebe, Ludwig , xxxvi consciousness; Language , 198–9 Consciousness of succession; Lawlor, Leonard , xliii, 137, 173, Intentionality, act-; 182, 203 Intentionality, double-; Licht 119 Living-present; Momentary- Lichtung. See Clearing, the phase of consciousness; Life , 103, 110–12, 121, 146–8, 150, Pre-refl ective self-awareness; 152, 154, 158, 160–1, 164, Retention; Temporality; 170, 178, 180–2, 184–6, Trace, the; Transcendence as 192–3, 195–9, 201–2, 204 founding intentionality) ambiguous- , 146–7, 150, 152 act-quality/act-matter , of consciousness , xxvi, xxviii, 34–40, 42 50–1, 60, 82–4, 86–8, 90, founding/founded , 68, 70, 92, 107, 133–4, 148–9, 87, 95 160, 184–5, 190 Index 209

Living present , 82–95, 107, 115–16, P 131, 133, 136, 140, 149, Past . See also Intentionality, latent-; 181, 184, 196, 200–1 Time-being; trace, the Locke, John , 9–10, 26 constitutes consciousness , 140–1, 199–202 mythic , 141, 157, 170 M that never was present , Manes , 118 157, 166–7, 178, 204 Marion, Jean-Luc , 103, 180, 202 Perception of a temporal object , McMullin, Irene , 113–14 17, 68, 74–7, 82, 87–8, 91, Memory , xxx, xxxiii–xxxiv, 22, 36, 107 . See also Retention 53, 55, 74–80, 82, 85–7, diff erent from imagination , 88–90, 95, 98, 107, 149 . 20–1, 75, 82 See also Perception of a diff erent from memory , 21–3, temporal object; 75, 77–8, 82, 85–8 Representation; Retention Phenomenological examples Mensch, James , 97–8 of hearing an echo , 91–2 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice , ix–x, xliii– of hearing a sentence , 70–1, xliv, 4–5, 11, 25, 32, 58, 89, 74, 88 103, 105, 126, 132, 139–71, of hearing a word , 72–5, 77, 91–2 177, 178, 180, 182, 202–4 of soliloquy , 193–5 Metaphysics of Presence , 183–5, 197 of subjective and objective time , Momentary-phase of consciousness , 68–9 71–8, 84–5, 162 . See also of the voice , 194–5, 196–7 Intentionality schema- Phenomenology as rigorous science , apprehension model; xxxv, xxxvii–xxxviii, 34, Time-consciousness, in 44, 112, 122, 190 Husserl’s immature account Phenomenology, passim Morrison, R.P. , 122, 129 Phenomenological reduction , xxx-xxxii, xxxix, 3, 23, 34, 43–8, 51 . See also Time- N consciousness; bracketing Negative philosophy , 166, 168 of natural attitude Noema , 163–4 Derrida’s view of , 182, 184–6, 201 Heidegger’s view of , 32, 110 O Merleau-Ponty’s view of , Open, the . See Clearing, the 32, 141–50 210 Index

Phenomenological Th eology, 168–9, 196, 199, 202 . 103, 179–81, 190, 201 See also Absolute Plato , xxi, 118, 183 consciousness; Poltinus , xxi, 170 Intentionality, double; Pre-refl ective self-awareness , 80–1, Intentionality, non- 93, 112, 145–8, 153, 158, objectifying-; Living- 164–5, 198 . See also Dasein; present; Time-consciousness, Immanence; genuine Husserl’s self-critique; phenomenological; Time-consciousness, in Intentionality; double-; Husserl’s mature view Intentionality, diff erent from memory , 82, 95 non-objectifying and double-intentionality , 81–3 Presence , xxxiii–xxxiv, 53, 55, 57, and primary-memory , 82, 95 73, 88, 92, 118, 121, 123–4, 130, 133, 140, 152, 159, 163, 168, 179, 182–6, S 188–98, 200, 201, 203, 206 Sallis, John , 188–9, 205 non-presence , 173, 183 Seebohm, Th omas , 205 Primary Memory , 72–4, 76–7, 86–9, Self-aff ection , xliii–xliv, 105, 164–5 . 104 . See also Momentary- See also Immanence, phase of consciousness; monistic Retention; Retention, Heidegger’s account , diff erent from memory xliii, 105–6, 126–32 Principle of all principles , xlviii, 109, Derrida’s use of Heidegger’s 117–19, 184, 202–3 account, xliii, 105, 133, Problem of appearances , xxxviii, 4, 5, 178–9, 182–3, 192–3, 43, 104 198–9, 203–4 Protention , 89–90, 95, 107, 123 Merleau-Ponty’s use of Heidegger’s account , xliii, 106, 126, 132, 140–1, 150, R 154, 156, 170, 203–4 Recollection , 22, 196 Self-awareness . See Absolute Representation , 8, 13–14, 21–2, 23, consciousness; Pre-refl ective 29, 35, 53, 54, 69, 79, 82, self-awareness 88, 205 Self-givenness . See Absolute Retention , 73–4, 82, 85–92, 94–5, consciousness; Auto- 98–9, 107, 114, 123, 133, aff ection; Pre-refl ective 149–50, 154, 158–60, 166, self-awareness; Self-aff ection Index 211

Sensations , 36–40 Time Signs 186–7 Clock/Calendar , 93, 108, 115 expressive , 187–8 in idealism , 144–5, 147 intimation in , 187–8 Inauthentic/authentic , 115 indicative , 187–8 mythical time , 141, 151, 157 Derrida’s critique of Husserl’s in realism, 144–5, 147 theory , 181–2, time-being , 139–40, 141, 152–3, 188–91, 192–3 155, 157 (see also Sokolowski, Robert , xxvii, 47, 84, 24 Ineinander; Intentionality, Soliloquy , 182, 185, 186, 188–90 . latent-; Time-consciousness, See also Voice, the in Merleau-Ponty’s Spinoza, Baruch , xxi, 106, 133, 166, 1959–1961 account) 168, 170 vertical-being , 157, 161, 163, Subjectivity, Transcendental . 165, 170 See Absolute consciousness; wild-being , 140, 161, 163, Dasein; Immanence, 165, 169 genuine phenomenological; Time-consciousness, Living-present; Time- phenomenology of consciousness, in Husserl’s bracketing of natural attitude in mature view; Trace, the; Heidegger , 115 Transcendental unity of Husserl , 67–9, 92–3 apperception; Voice, the Merleau-Ponty , 147 Derrida’s critique of Husserl , 179, 181–4, 189–91, 192, 196–7 T Heidegger’s 1925–1927 account , Temporality/Temporalizing , 108–16 viii, xxxix, xl–xli, xlvi, Heidegger’s 1929 account , 10, 83, 92–3, 97, 105–8, 121–30 112–16, 120, 122–3, 126, Husserl’s immature account , 128–30, 132–3, 135–6, 69–82 144, 149, 151, 153–5, 158, Husserl’s self-critique of , 76–81 171, 178–9, 182–3, 190, Husserl’s mature account , 81–96 192–3, 195–6, 198–200, Heidegger’s critique of Husserl , 203–4 65–6, 81–2, 95–6, 103–6, Th ings-themselves , viii, ix, xix, xxxi, 112–13, 202–3 xxxvi, xxxvii–xxxviii, xxxix, Heidegger’s relation to Husserl , 6, 24, 34–5, 40, 47, 52, 105, 109, 113–16 112, 116–20, 202–3 Kant’s account , 16–19 212 Index

Time-consciousness (cont. ) Unnameable, the , 179–80, 182, Husserl’s critique of , 19–24, 185, 191, 201 70–2, 77–9 Ursprung , 146, 150, 155, 161, Heidegger’s relation to , 123–7 165–7, 168 . See also Merleau-Ponty’s 1945 account, Intentionality, latent-; 139, 141, 144–6, 160 Intentionality, operative-; Merleau-Ponty’s 1959–1961 Transcendence as founding account, 140–1, 156–71 intentionality; Truly Merleau-Ponty’s critique of transcendental, the Husserl , 150, 152–6, 158, Ursprungsklärung , 141, 146, 160–4, 167, 202–3 157, 166 Merleau-Ponty’s relation to Husserl , 145, 148–9, 161 Non-temporal temporalizing , V 90–3, 107–8 Voice, the 179, 182–3, 184–6, Trace, the , xliii, 179, 182, 191, 189–92, 203 . See also 200–1, 203–4 Living present; Soliloquy Transcendence as founding intentionality , 122–3, 126–8, 130, 145, 150, 152, W 165, 178, 180, 204 . Wittgenstein, Ludwig , 54 See also Clearing, the; Wood, David , 133, 155 Intentionality, latent-; World , viii, xxvii–xxviii, xxxi–xxxii, time-being; trace, the; 46–50, 58–9, 109–12, Truly transcendental, the; 114, 116, 142–4, 184–5, Ultra-transcendental, the; 190, 193, 195, 201–2 Ursprung annihilation of , xxix–xxxi, Transcendental unity of 43–5, 53 apperception, the , 19, 22–3, 80, 180 Truly transcendental, the , 139, 141, Y 144–7, 150, 156, 168, 204 Yahweh , 180, 182

U Z Ultra-transcendental, the , 181, 182, Zahavi, Dan , xlvii, 10–11, 26, 69, 185–6, 196, 201, 204 88, 98, 124, 131, 136