Creating a Textual Public Space: Slogans and Texts from Kong's Author(s): SEBASTIAN VEG Source: The Journal of Asian Studies , AUGUST 2016, Vol. 75, No. 3 (AUGUST 2016), pp. 673-702 Published by: Association for Asian Studies Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44166283

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This content downloaded from 82.146.210.210 on Wed, 17 Feb 2021 08:47:37 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 75, No. 3 (August) 2016: 673-702. © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc., 2016 doi: 10. 1017/S002191 1816000565

Creating a Textual Public Space: Slogans and Texts from 's Umbrella Movement

SEBASTIAN VEG

Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement (September-December 2014) represented a watershed in Hong Kongs political culture and self-understanding. Based on over 1,000 slogans and other textual and visual material documented during the movement , this study provides an overview of claims , which are oriented towards an assertion of agency , articulated at different levels: in a universalistic mode ("democracy"), in relation with a political com- munity (Hong Kong autonomy and decolonization ), and through concrete policy aims. At the same time , slogans mobilize diverse cultural and historical repertoires that attest the hybrid quality of Hong Kong identity and underscore the diversity of sources of political legitimacy. Finally , it will be argued that by establishing a system of contending discours- es within the occupied public spaces , the movement strived to act out a type of discursive democracy. Despite the challenges that this discursive space encountered in interacting with the authorities and the public at large , it represented an unfinished attempt to build a new civic culture among Hong Kongs younger generation.

The tear tear Umbrella gas first gas mobilized first mobilized masses of Movement democracy masses supporters, took placeuntil Decemberof democracy 15, 2014, in Hong Kong supporters, from September until December 28, 2014, 15, when 2014, when the last site was cleared at . Coming at the end of a long process to reform the mechanism for Hong Kongs next chief executive election in 2017, it began in response to a decision issued by the National Peoples Congress Standing Committee (NPC-SC) on August 31, 2014, setting a restrictive legal framework. This decision confirmed the fears that had led to the formation of the group Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) in 2013: initiated by two academics and a Baptist minister, this group advocated and occupation of public space as a last resort against a decision by Beijing disallowing significant universal in Hong Kong. In the event, the occupation of public space took place more spontane- ously, led by two student groups (, which had established its credentials in the Anti-National Education campaign of 2012, and the Hong Kong Federation of Students or HKFS), and began in Admiralty (the site of Hong Kongs Central Government Offices) rather than Central (the business district), before spreading to Causeway Bay and Mongkok. It was fueled by the use of tear gas by the Hong Kong police on September 28, 2014, considered unusual, which mobilized several tens of thousands of people (pos- sibly 100,000 or more at its peak). The government dug in its heels against the movement,

Sebastian Veg ([email protected]) is Professor at the Centre for the Study of Modern and Contemporary , EHESS (School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences).

This content downloaded from 82.146.210.210 on Wed, 17 Feb 2021 08:47:37 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 674 Sebastian Veg which it called "illegal," and encouraged transportation companies to take legal action; court injunctions were eventually used to clear the main occupation areas.1 The Umbrella Movement has defied easy characterizations, sharing aspects of differ- ent movements, as well as encapsulating some of the contradictions of Hong Kong itself. As a territory in which a society that is in some respects post-materialistic is governed by a political system that is not (yet) democratic (Ma 2011), Hong Kong presents an interest- ing theoretical paradox that had implications for the nature of the movement. The argu- ment developed below suggests that, contrary to much of the rhetoric developed in the 1989 democracy movement, for example, in which many participants articulated their role as making personal sacrifices in the name of the future of the Chinese nation, the Umbrella Movement mobilized a great diversity of cultural references, constructing a far more heterogeneous notion of China. These diverse frames nurtured an open debate on the nature of the democratic community itself, in the occupying zones, and more broadly in Hong Kong. In this sense, the movement s particular significance lies in its ability to represent an alternative model to many of the democratic movements that developed in over the twentieth century. The present essay is devoted to a specific aspect that has not yet been studied system- atically: over the seventy-nine-day occupation, the three occupied areas (Causeway Bay, Admiralty, and Mongkok) were colonized not only by artwork,2 but also by textual mate- rial in every size and form. Produced by diverse authors, some of them political groups, some of them unorganized participants, some of them just passersby, what do these texts express? How do they relate to the movement as a whole and help us to characterize it? There has not been much theoretical engagement with movement slogans as such. A chapter devoted to slogans in a classic work on social movements (Stewart, Smith, and Denton 2001, 171-98) proposes a typology based mainly on their "persuasive" function.3 Most discourse analysis on social movements, using the notions of strategic "framing" and discursive "repertoires," focuses either on manifestos and press statements by movement leaders or on how the movement and its claims are portrayed in the media or in subse- quent historiography.4 More recent studies in the field of cultural sociology have revived interest in slogans as speech acts within "performances" that cannot be reduced to stra- tegic framing.5 The present article adopts an interdisciplinary approach, based on a close contextual reading of the texts themselves. In order to consider different aspects of the slogans, the argument is structured following J. L. Austins (1973, 94-108) threefold analysis of speech acts. The first part discusses the illocutionary dimension of the slogans, or their "intended

1For a detailed chronological account of the movement and an initial attempt to characterize it, see Veg (2015). *To view some examples of artwork, music, and slogans, see (2014) and This Is Our Moment (n.d.). For a more theoretical approach, see S. Wong (2015). ^he typology distinguishes three species (spontaneous, sanctioned, and advertising slogans) and five functions (transforming perceptions of reality, altering self-perceptions of protestors, legitimiz- ing the movement, prescribing courses of action, and mobilizing for action). ^his approach is adopted by Sidney Tarrow (2013), who analyzes the use of terms like "boycott," "sabotage," "terror," or "revolution" to characterize social movements. 5For example, Sveta Klimova (2009) argues that texts are mainly created to communicate normative disagreement.

This content downloaded from 82.146.210.210 on Wed, 17 Feb 2021 08:47:37 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Creating a Textual Public Space 675 meaning." The second part looks at the textuality of the slogans themselves (locutionary dimension), paying specific attention to the repertoire of cultural and historical referenc- es they mobilize. Finally, the third section discusses their communicational effect (perluc- tionary dimension) within a communicational framework inspired by Habermass definition of the public sphere. The essay suggests that the movement represented an attempt to articulate a culturally hybrid democratic community, struggling to define deliberation as a political mechanism to regulate both its internal differences and its in- teraction with the broader polity of Hong Kong.

Corpus and Methodology

This study draws on over 1,000 slogans, texts, and other artifacts containing texts, which were photographed during several visits to the three sites of the Umbrella Move- ment between September 28 and December 11, 2014. Visits took place on twenty-one separate days to Admiralty, three separate days to Causeway Bay, and four separate days to Mongkok. The sample is limited to text-based occurrences. However, exploiting this corpus of material raises some significant challenges, in particular quantification. The textual ma- terial can be classified into three main categories: (1) handwritten (unique) posters in various formats ranging from A4 to huge banners; (2) computer-printed or photocopied posters (potentially mass-produced) mainly in A4 or A3 format; and (3) textual parts on graphically designed and color-printed posters, usually in A3 format or above. To these can be added some artifacts or installations with textual components (e.g., the scale model of Lions Rock with the slogan hanging on it). Material that is smaller than A4 format has been mainly excluded, with the exception of a few particularly significant objects. Documenting and exploiting the Post-it notes on which bystanders and partici- pants alike left words of encouragement or random thoughts is a whole separate project, which is currently being carried out by others. It should be noted that the length of the texts varies very significantly. In a classical definition, George Shankel describes a slogan as: "some pointed term, phrase or expres- sion, fittingly worded, which suggests action, loyalty, or which causes people to decide upon and to fight for the realization of some principle or decisive issue." It is thus usually assumed that slogans are "short and snappy" (Shankel 1941, 7; quoted in Stewart et al. 2001, 174). Generally speaking, the survey has been limited to texts of one or two lines. Some exceptions, such as short poems, are included. Anything lengthy (whole pages of text) has been excluded. On the other hand, no material has been excluded on the base of its content or type of speech act. The language is mainly Chinese with some English. Chinese is mainly standard written Chinese, but significant parts of text are in written , which is rarely used in formal settings.6

6In these cases (i.e., when at least one Chinese character in a sentence can be identified as non- standard), Cantonese Romanization (Yale system) is used to transcribe the slogan. These are marked with an asterisk to distinguish from the ones transcribed in Mandarin . When no Chinese appears in parentheses, this means that the original slogan was in English.

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Printed and photocopied materials raise the challenge of duplication. It is impossible to attribute authors and time of production to most texts. Although some slogans or posters contain references to political groups (parties or other groups, like Falungong), most are and undated, making it hard to know whether the time of documen- tation corresponds with the time of production. This also makes it difficult to establish a chronology of the movement. For similar reasons, it is difficult to differentiate between the three locales of Admiralty, Causeway Bay, and Mongkok: many of the slogans were mass-produced and migrated from one venue to another. For these reasons, quantitative analysis is impossible to carry out rigorously, as there are too many biases. Hence, the qualitative approach adopted here has consisted of attempting to maximize diversity in selecting a small number of slogans, and conducting a form of inductive analysis using these reduced samples to attempt a kind of thick description of the movement.

Asserting Agency: A Democratic Community with Varying Perimeters

The slogans and texts produced by the movement may firstly be seen as the expres- sion of claims formulated by participants. In Austin s perspective, the preexisting claims expressed by the movement texts correspond with their semantic content, or "intended meaning." All observers were struck by the extraordinary variety of slogans and claims that they encountered in the protest sites, ranging from local identity and language to en- vironmentalism, gay rights, or anti-capitalism. They are all the harder to classify, as many are saturated with irony or cultural references that all but drown out the literal meaning of the words. It would be easy to dismiss this diversity of claims as the expression of a "post-modern carnival" in which different groups vie for recognition (Taylor 1994), typical of the "new social movements" that appeared in the 1970s. These movements, which opposed both liberal capitalism and repressive communism, distrusted bureauc- racy and affirmed spontaneity, emphasized culture rather than class, and appealed to par- ticipants' identities, are generally seen as having given birth to identity politics.7 Similarly, in Hong Kong, opponents of the Umbrella Movement were quick to dismiss its claims as the expression of an "identity politics" driven by the young generation s growing alien- ation from China (usually conjectured to be fueled by economic difficulties). By contrast, a survey conducted on the protest sites in late October (Cheng and Yuen 2014) showed surprising consistency: using "net percentages" (difference between rating as "important" and "unimportant"), it isolated seven main "reasons" given by participants for their implication: (1) struggle for democracy (87 percent); (2) dissatisfaction with the governments ignoring of demands (68 percent); (3) dissatisfaction with the police s re- sponse (51 percent); (4) identification with the ideal of civil disobedience (46 percent); (5) resistance to the central governments meddling in Hong Kong affairs (33 percent); (6) struggle for a space of discussion for public policy (22 percent); and (7) struggle to improve livelihood (3 percent). This survey - which is quite exhaustive, as interviewees were asked to supplement the available answers with their own - tends to show an over- whelming engagement with democracy, which in its most abstract formulation represents the most widely shared claim, but also, in its more concrete declinations, accounts for

7This description is inspired by Hall (1992, 290).

This content downloaded from 82.146.210.210 on Wed, 17 Feb 2021 08:47:37 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Creating a Textual Public Space 677 reasons 2 to 6. How can these findings be reconciled with the wide spectrum of textual claims? Craig Calhoun criticizes the notion of "new social movements," underlining that "identity politics is not new, or limited to post-materialisť ideologies of stages of devel- opment." Rather, he highlights, "every collective identity is open to both internal subdi- vision and calls for incorporation into some larger category of primary identity" (Calhoun 1994, 23, 27). In a similar perspective, this section argues that the variety of claims doc- umented in the slogans can be understood as expansive or restrictive variations on an un- derlying theme that connects them. It attempts to show that notions of democracy, , or civil disobedience, as they are expressed in the slogans, are under- pinned by an affirmation of moral and political agency, grounded in a community with variable boundaries.

Democracy

Firstly, the term democracy itself was massively quoted in movement texts, with a varying degree of abstraction. One of the iconic slogans was: "Don't forget the original intent: fight for democracy" ( Wuwang chuzhong: zhengqu minzhu As suggested by the ubiquitous notion of "struggle" {zhengqu), many slogans connected democracy to an affirmation of agency: "Democracy is fought for standing up, not begged for kneeling down" ( Minzhu shi zhanqilai zheng, bushi g uixialai qiu de This variation contains a critical allusion to the student leaders of 1989 who famously knelt on the steps of the Great Hall of the People, asking leaders to receive their petition. Other slogans denounce a lack of political participation in Hong Kong (deploring that citizens are "pawns" or "slaves" of the government). Democracy is connected to an un- derstanding of "rights of citizens" or "natural rights" that are being denied by the govern- ment. This rights-awareness was expressed in either Western ("natural," "human" rights) or Chinese references (Menciuss notion of minhen or "people as foundation"). On the one hand, democracy was connected to the framework of the Basic Law and claimed in a minimal, self-limiting manner: "This is not a revolution. We only want universal suf- frage. We only want civil nomination." In other cases, democracy was endorsed for its Utopian, not strictly political, dimen- sion. In a frequently recurring image disseminated by pop culture, democracy is de- scribed as a "flowering": "The flowers of democracy are blooming everywhere" (Minzhu biandi kaihua ÜCÜSÍMTE). Throughout the "occupied" areas, this text suggests, democratic practices of consultation, self-expression, and autonomy are developing. Other slogans connected democracy to a moral imperative, like the following one borrowed from Taiwan s Sunflower Movement: "When dictatorship becomes a fact, rev- olution becomes a duty."8 Civil disobedience, as advocated by OCLP, is in this way jus- tified as the affirmation of a higher form of justice, in the face of an unjust law. Similar slogans, affirming "love," "dignity," or "humanity" ("People driven by dignity will always stay longer than those driven by money")9 implicitly provide a simple moral

8On the Taiwan connection, see, e.g., shanny23 (2014). On the movement, see also Rowen (2015). ^his slogan can also be read as a reply to Chinese state media reports that protesters were paid by "foreign forces."

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Figure 1. Determine our own destiny, flowers blooming everywhere. Photograph by the author.

frame for empirical events, ascribing to the government a set of negative values: violence, the use of force, and money (paying triads and patriotic or other groups to stir up trouble against protesters). The ideals embraced by the protesters are thus translated into a strong contentious claim of the moral high ground. Most importantly, on a moral level, democracy was frequently presented as an asser- tion of agency and individual autonomy: "Masters of our own destiny" ( Mingyun zizhu fàìSÉlì); "Determine our own destiny, flowers blooming everywhere" ( Mingyun zijue , hua kai biandi #31 see figure 1). The idea of "destiny" or "fate" ( mingyun ) is closely linked to the central Chinese state and the traditional moral discourse of the unity of the nation. When the protesters affirm democracy as their "own destiny," they reference a longstanding tension between tradi- tional moral vocabulary and a modern political system, which goes back to May Fourth 1919, when students in Beijing first marched for "science and democracy," affirming the power of human agency ("determine") to change history, of individuals to change po- litical systems. In a context in which Hong Kong s return to China has been portrayed as the expression both of its "rightful" return to the "motherland" and of a "law of history" (linking the traditional moral vocabulary of the unity of the nation with communist anti- colonial historicism), the protesters' call to challenge the laws of destiny implicitly questions the status of Hong Kong. Indeed, there is an interesting nuance between the two slogans: while zizhu (autonomy) arguably remains within the framework of Hong Kong s constitu- tional status, zijue (self-determination), possibly inspired by the much-discussed February 2014 issue of the Hong Kong University student union journal Undergrad ,10 marks a depar- ture from the status quo, foreshadowing Joshua Wongs August 2015 call for a constitutional referendum on Hong Kongs status after 2047 (see J. Wong 2015a, 2015b).

10The title of the issue was " Xianggang minzu. Mingyun zijue" (Hong Kong nation. Determining [our] own destiny); the notion of a "Hong Kong nation" drew some very harsh criticism, including from the chief executive himself, who targeted this issue in his 2015 policy address to LegCo.

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Hong Kong Identity

Much ink has been spilt, especially in the pro-Beijing press, about the connection between the Umbrella Movement and the small group of Hong Kong pro-independence activists, a connection that remains largely unsubstantiated: while many slogans refer to Hong Kong itself and affirm its distinct local identity, almost none call for independence. (One such slogan was documented on-site.) Many do affirm a connection between the cultural community of Hong Kong and the political community of citizens claiming uni- versal suffrage. Echoing Calhoun s critique of the new social movements paradigm and wariness of a reified notion of identity, it should be noted that slogans affirming Hong Kong are hard to divide neatly between an inclusive political notion of democracy and an exclusionary definition of identity. Many proclaim a personal, even intimate connec- tion with the city that is neither directly political, nor culturally exclusive: "Hong Kong I love you" (Xianggang wo ai ni "The most beautiful thing in Hong Kong are its people" (Xianggang zui mei de shi ren In some cases, slogans express "pride" and belonging to a "home," or loyalty (implicitly criticizing politicians for not putting Hong Kongs interests first) but what lies outside the home, or what threatens it, is not defined, or only in vague moral terms: "Protect our home, resist dark forces" (Baowei jiayuan, jujue hei shili "Protect our home from darkness"; "We support Hong Kong" (*Heung Gong , ngohdei chaang » Ocitej# ). In some cases, the expression of cultural identity is indeed exclusive, when Chinese people are designated as others: "Refuse to be Chinese, nothing more than that" (Ju zuo Thongguoren , meiyou dabuliao fëtëWHlÀ » This sense of cultural distance from China was shared by many of the participants in the movement: according to a survey, 81 percent of occupiers identified exclusively as , as opposed to 41 percent in the general population (Cheng and Yuen 2015a). However, at the same time, the expression of local identity presents itself as an affir- mation of agency by a civic community: "Our Hong Kong, let s save it ourselves" (Ziji Xianggang zijijiu Ě EHřčtĚ B$fc); "Hong Kong history, written by Hongkongers" (Xiang- gang lishi you Xianggangren bianxie ĚílčiÁ®^). Borrowed from Taiwans Sun- flower Movement, the first slogan brings together several discursive strands. On one level, it grounds Hong Kong s subjectivity within the city s civic community, rather than within the Chinese nation as a whole. More broadly, it represents an affirmation of the end of a colonial mindset pervasive among Hong Kong elites, in which an ultra-efficient bureaucracy looks to the outside (London, Beijing, Washington) to determine ultimate political goals. It marked a growing awareness that Hongkongers would not be helped by the intervention of foreign powers (while leaders of the previous generation of dem- ocrats, like and , traveled to Washington), but had to organize on their own and take responsibility for their political community. The second slogan points to a similar aspiration to write Hong Kong s "own" history, not its history as a colony that has returned to the motherland to fulfill its "destiny." Consequently, some critiques of China are framed in political terms, when mainland tourists are accused of "colonizing" Hong Kong (tourism has strongly reshaped urban geography over the last decade), some- times using anti-colonial vocabulary ("becoming slaves"). In one drawing, the curtailing or erosion of political freedoms after the handover is denounced as a form of "castration": "Castrated before adoption as a pet" (accompanied

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Figure 2. Castrated before adoption as a pet. Photograph by the author. by a drawing of a cat; see figure 2). The opposite of being a "pet" or a "slave" is an implicit affirmation of agency. Yet the political community in whose name universal suffrage is claimed could be elastic: "I want real universal suffrage. Hongkongers support Hon- gkongers" ( *Ngoh yiujan pousyun, Heung Gong y ahn chaang Heung Gong y ahn MWM » "Umbrella Revolution Hong Kong. Peace for our motherland." While in the first slogan, democracy is linked to the affirmation of Hong Kong as a po- litical community that does not immediately encompass China, the second one, while designating the movement as a "revolution," also refers to an imprecise "motherland" (in English) which may refer to Hong Kong, but also to China. In this sense, the affirma- tion of Hong Kong identity as a central claim of the movement should not be opposed to democracy, but viewed as an expression of the political community claiming democracy. To what extent this community is open or closed to "outsiders" depends on individual slogans, but its central meaning is closely connected to democracy.

Anti-Capitalist and Post-Materialist Claims

A third group of slogans can be summarized as "post-materialist," mainly critiquing crony capitalism, affirming the need to preserve the environment, and supporting alter- native lifestyles (gay pride, vegetarianism, organic farming). Ecological concerns were linked to a more inclusive and democratically accountable decision-making process, as echoed by the establishment of an organic garden in the midst of the Admiralty protest site, with a banner proclaiming: "Organic guerilla garden of plurality. Plentiful garden of organic disobedience" ( Kangming youji fengfu zhi yuan fàfàííôi!£S;£1II); "Freedom has taken root. Peace strengthens it" ( Ziyou yi zhigen , heping zhuozhuang ta Ē ĚELtt® > The first slogan links civil disobedience with cultural plurality and organic farming, which some alternative communities advocated in the aftermath of the Choi Yuen Tsuen incident in 2010 (see also Cheung 2014). Other slogans similarly connect democracy to a more accountable mode of town-planning. The second slogan features a photograph taken on one of the Admiralty flyovers, in which a hole has

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Figure 3. Freedom has taken root. Peace strengthens it. Photograph by the author.

been drilled into the concrete highway to make room for a small cactus to take root in the soil below (see figure 3). Like in the "blooming flower" analogy, political freedom is in- carnated by the image of a plant: by taking over the highways that serve as arteries of Hong Kongs capitalism, and planting flowers on them, the city may develop an ecosystem more conducive to the realization of political freedoms. It points out that democracy is impeded by crony capitalism and the widely shared endorsement of a productivist life- style - an obstacle generated not only in Beijing but within Hong Kong. The occupied zones served as a model: not only was refuse collection ensured, but a complex system of refuse sorting and recycling was organized, in contrast with the SAR government, which has been dragging its feet on the issue for many years, taking the position that recycling should be subcontracted to private companies that can make a profit on it.11 Recyclable materials thus figured prominently in many of the emblematic produc- tions of the occupied areas, like the Umbrella Man statue, made of recycled wood,

nFor this reason, glass, for example, is not recycled in the territory. The initiative of a local green group to find an economically viable model for recycling glass has met only with obstruction from the authorities.

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and the canopy hung between footbridges over "Umbrella Square," made of discarded umbrella tops. Ecological self-organization thus served as a kind of scale-model for the democratic process the occupiers were advocating. The critique of capitalism, productivity, and Hong Kongs economic model based on real estate also featured prominently. Many of the protesters' tents were ironically named in the style of Hong Kongs pretentious real estate developments, such as "Mount Har- court 1" in Admiralty. A series of slogans directly targeted the real estate sector, denounc- ing "government-business collusion" and referencing a famous quote by C. Y. Leung (see Buckley and Bradsher 2014): "HK has too many poor people to allow direct elections (Carry Yourself Leung)."12 The rule of law itself, a mantra in the pan-democrat camp, was questioned as skewed: "Rule of law? Wake up, Hong Kong people. The law? Skewed toward tycoons and finance!" ( "Faatjih P Sing ha, Heung Gong yahn. Faatleuht? Heung fuhouh choihtyuhn kingcheh dik! fèfê? » #*SÀ.ife#? fàïïEWBf£$4W!). These pronouncements establish a clear link between political and economic issues. Con- templating a system that screens out candidates put forward by "poor people" and over- represents vested interests and pro-Beijing crony capitalists, this slogan again calls for an "awakening" that would empower citizens anew. Two significant strands run through the entire range of slogans: democracy, the Hong Kong community that supports it, and the critique of capitalism are all presented as ex- pressions of an affirmation of agency and justified in moral terms. They can simply be seen as different levels of generalization of the same core claim, which is made in a uni- versalistic mode ("democracy"), in relation with a geographical community ("Hong Kong"), or by advancing more concrete policy agendas like opposing the hegemony of corporate productivism.

Performing Cultural Repertoires: An Expressive Movement

In a classic political science approach, social movements are often discussed through the lens of a cost-benefit calculation, against a larger background of the structure of po- litical opportunities. In such a framework of strategic calculation and mobilization, move- ment slogans are generally understood as "frames" or "scripts," that echo a "repertoire" of collective action (Tilly 1978). In an insightful commentary published just after the end of the movement, Law Wing-sang points out that the Umbrella Movement evolved from an "instrumental" model (implicit in the demands made by OCLP) to become an "expres- sive" social movement: while its instrumental demands (citizen nomination of candidates for the chief executive election) had already failed before the movement began (evi- denced by the August 31 NPC-SC decision), the most important aspect was the move- ments "spontaneity" ( zifaxing Ě f$H4) as expressed in the anti-tear gas on September 28 (An Tu 2014). In this perspective, the slogans and other textual materials can be seen not simply as the expression of well-defined claims, but as part of a broader "performance" of the democratic or spontaneous nature of the movement itself.

12In another slogan, the income threshold given by Leung for people who should not be allowed to vote (US$1,800 or 14,000 HK dollars/month or 14K), was ironically described as "protection money" and connected to the famous 14K.

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Similarly, cultural sociology studies social movements as "oppositional performances," in which cultural references or frames are particularly significant in establishing meanings shared with larger groups of society (Johnston 2009, 6). If we consider such texts as speech acts in Austin s perspective, this section deals with their locutionary content, or textuality. In the Chinese context, Jeffrey Wasserstrom and Joseph Esherick use the categories of "ritual" and "theatre" to explain the mobilization of respectively traditional and modern historical repertoires of protest in the 1989 democracy movement. They argue that the three main traits of the movement are its address to the authorities as the implied audi- ence, its public nature as street theatre that invites all citizens to join, and its symbolic self-definition of students within the tradition of selfless martyrs. This performed street theatre, they argue, is ultimately the result of Chinas lack of a structured civil society in 1989 (Esherick and Wasserstrom 1990). Protesters in Hong Kong similarly re- sorted to culturally specific practices of big-character and small-character posters (dazibao and xiaozibao). However, Hong Kong in 2014 had a well-developed civil society, in which the Umbrella Movement was strongly embedded. By contrast with the nationalist martyr imagery in 1989, the hybrid cultural identities performed in the Umbrella Movement reflect Hong Kong s complex position within the Chinese and global context. This section examines the cultural frames mobilized in texts.

Framing China

The Umbrella Movement was sparked by a decision made in Beijing, and it became apparent to many of the participants early on that a satisfactory answer to their claims could only be found if Beijing intervened. At the same time, the Chinese state media were continually castigating the movement as an illegal attempt to overthrow the local and central governments with the help of "foreign forces" (e.g., Guo Ping 2014), and the Chinese government moved decisively to arrest scores of sympathizers in China. It is hence unsurprising that the movement s textual production would implicitly address both the central government and the Chinese population at large, attempting to correct the distorted image painted by state media. Furthermore, in Hong Kong's polit- ical culture, traditional Confucianism, encouraged both under British colonialism and after the handover (Law 2009), plays an important role as a widely shared frame. A group of slogans thus establishes a strong connection with traditional China, using classical references to reaffirm a position of moral superiority and principle:

Both born of the same root [why torment each other so cruelly?] ( Ben shi tonggen sheng [Romance of the three kingdoms]. Choose virtue and persevere (Ze shan gu zhi W #@#0 [Book of Rites]. Virtue is not left to stand alone. He who practices it will have neighbors (De bu gu, bi you ling [Analects]. The people do not fear death, why try to scare them with it? ( Min bu wei si, naihe yi si shen zhi? jJ£A5Etì|;£) [Laozi].

Each of these slogans references a classical text. The first one, which appeared as a rebuke to the Hong Kong police after the use of tear gas, took on a new meaning in

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the context of the rise of localist discourse, alluding to the fact that China and Hong Kong share the same cultural roots. The last slogan uses Laozi to criticize the use of force by the police. The other two use terms like shan or de to refer to the protesters, implicitly marking their claims as morally superior. In these texts, protesters are able to phrase their claims in the vocabulary of traditional political wisdom that enjoys wide acceptance in Hong Kong and China. Many of these explicidy reaffirmed the connection to the Chinese nation (some of them explicitly addressed to "our Chinese compatriots"), defined by Sun Yat-sens both traditional and democratic concept of the "world belongs to all." Traditional popular culture was also referenced in the Guandi shrine that appeared in the Mongkok area (see figure 4). The shrine was supposed to protect protesters from both triads and police because both of these groups worship him.13 Here also, traditional culture, in its local variant, provides a frame that unites the protest- ers and their apparent opponents with the goal of "defending the country and protecting the people" ( hu guo bao min that appeared in the parallel scrolls bearing Guandis full name. Some famous literary quotes also appeared in the occupied zones, most prominent among them two lines respectively by Lu Xun (1881-1936) and Gu Cheng (1956-93):

Although originally there was no path on the ground, as more and more people walked through, it became a path ( Dishang ben meiyou lu, zou de ren duole , bian chengle lu i&LttStâ fé » ' fétôTfé; see figure 5). The black night has given me black eyes, but I use them to search for light (. Heiye geile wo heise de yanjing, wo que yong ta xunzhao guangming see figure 6).

Lu Xun s quote, the last line of his short story "My hometown" ( Guxiang , 1921), refers to the dialectics of hope and despair: although hope may not be visible at first, it can slowly form even in the midst of despair. Gu Cheng's quote, taken from the poem "A genera- tion" (Yi dai ren , 1979), affirms a similar search for moral light in the midst of darkness, and encapsulated the quest of a whole generation to leave behind. Both slogans inscribe the movement within a century-long quest for . A third subgroup of slogans refers more direcdy to the contemporary PRC. In some cases, the occupiers strategically use quotes from CCP leaders (Maos call to support student movements, and another to oppose unelected governments; Xi Zhongxun s en- dorsement of the people s power) to reaffirm their loyalty to the central government and at the same time highlight the CCP s nominal commitment to democracy. Enrolling Mao and Xi Zhongxun (father of ) under their banner, these slogans attempt to confront the CCP with its own contradictions: calling for democracy and universal suf- frage, as well as a critical approach to patriotism before taking power, it then proceeded to do away with elections and demand blind obedience in the name of patriotism. A par- ticularly ironic and graphically striking banner hanging from the footbridge in Admiralty

13Duara (1988, 792) mentions the connection with police and KMT secret societies in passing but does not view it as central to the Guandi myth. However, he does consider that "no god . . . was more identified as a representative of Chinese culture than Guandi" (786). On Guandi in Hong Kong, see Levin (2014).

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Figure 4. Guandi shrine in Mongkok. Photograph by the author.

Figure 5. "Although originally there was no path on the ground, as more and more people walked through, it became a path" (Lu Xun). Photograph by the author.

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Figure 6. "The black night has given me black eyes, but I use them to search for light" (Gu Cheng). Photograph by the author.

demanded the resignation of C. Y. Leung using calligraphy executed in an imitation of Maos style (see figure 7). In other cases, the occupiers affirm their connection with a community of dissent in China. A series of texts explicitly or implicitly connected with Falungong stand out through their direct challenge to the CCP s legitimacy (e.g., "Only without the Commu- nist Party will there be a new China," parodying a famous song). Expressions of support appeared from groups like the Southern Street movement, a well-known rights-defense movement in Guangzhou in 2013-14. In several venues, occupiers drew attention to their supporters in China, with a regularly updated count of arrests: "How many people are still detained [in China] for supporting Occupy Central?" ( Yinwei zhichi zhanzhong, you duoshao ren reng bei qiujin? In another example, Hong Kong s historical role as a safe haven from communism was highlighted, asserting a gen- erational continuity between members of the movement and their parents' generation. Altogether, the cultural references to "greater Chinese" identity are rich and varied. Drawing on different historical frames and political repertoires, the occupiers perform "China" through a mix of classical and modern references, with a strong moral- philosophical bend. Implicitly refusing the definition of patriotism advanced by Beijing, they establish a parallel tradition of Chineseness, which culminates in the strate- gic use of pronouncements by communist leaders to demonstrate their double standards and a direct critique of the CCP s legitimacy.

The World as Audience

While some texts highlight a Chinese connection, other slogans are firmly situated within a cosmopolitan tradition of worldwide protest. For a movement that relied strongly on the presence of the international media to resist skewed reporting by Chinas state organs, cosmopolitan framing had a definite strategic dimension. However, it also corresponds to Hong Kong's status as a hybrid cultural entity, where

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Figure 7. Leung Chun-ying, resign! (left-hand banner). Photograph by the author. identification with cosmopolitan values is now higher than identification as Chinese.14 Multilingual slogans appeared in various locations, with for example a long series of trans- lations in several dozen languages of "Hong Kong democracy" on one of the flyovers leading from Admiralty to Central, underscoring that the Umbrella Movement was part of a more global struggle for democracy.15 Slogans mainly quote pronouncements by worldwide protest leaders or thinkers, and international popular culture. While Gandhi is perhaps the most quoted leader ("First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win"), Aung San Suu Kyi, Nelson Mandela ("Its always impossible until its done"), and Martin Luther King ("Change does not roll in on the wheels of inevitability but comes through contin- uous struggle") all made repeated appearances. Most of the individuals (many of them non-Western) represent moral authorities who fought for seemingly hopeless causes, against colonialism, military dictatorship, apartheid, Nazism (Dietrich Bonhoeffer), or racial discrimination. The slogans are generally abstract, reaffirming agency, and framing the necessary "continuous struggle" as a moral choice between good and evil, vindicated by history. Orwell's famous satire of communism in Animal Farm ("All

14A Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme (HKUPOP) poll shows that, rated on a scale from 1 to 10, identification as "PRC citizens" topped identification as "Global citizens" in 2008-9; however, it has fallen abruptly since 2012, reaching an all-time low at 5.95 in June 2014, against 7.01 for identification as global citizens (HKUPOP 2015). 15 Another example was the " Machine," projecting support messages from social media around the world onto "" at Admiralty.

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animals are equal but some are more equal than others") is used to make a comment on the equality of representation on the proposed Nomination Committee, skewed towards pro-Beijing forces. Finally, a crucial component of the Umbrella Movements international appeal was its performance of international pop culture. While some of it can be read in slogans, these quotations from popular songs were not only written down but also repeatedly per- formed, especially in Admiralty: "Do you hear the people sing?" (Les Misérables); "You may say I'm a dreamer, but Fm not the only one" (John Lennon); and "We don't need no thought control" (Pink Floyd). "Do you hear the people sing" became a core cultural reference of the movement, and was often sung in its Cantonese version ( *Seuih waahn meih goksing "Who has not yet awoken?") at the protest sites. It anchored the movement in a historical series of struggles against tyranny, while its Cantonese lyrics em- phasized the defense of Hong Kong. John Lennon and Pink Floyd refer to the 1960s and 1970s, underscoring the continued appeal among the new generations of a protest culture that their predecessors (among the pan-democratic parties) may have taken part in but did not generally embrace politically.

The Hong Kong Stoiy

The richest and most significant examples of performance can be associated with the expression of local identity. They were targeted both at reinforcing a sense of cultural community among the occupiers and more broadly at appealing to the Hong Kong pop- ulation at large. The Cantonese language was central: to give only one example, an alter- native name for the movement developed through a typical play on words: "Chater Revolution / Umbrella Revolution" ( *Jeda gaakmihng Part of the early occupa- tion took place around and Chater Garden in Central, a name transcribed on street signs as Jeda ; by a particular coincidence^ is also the Cantonese word for "um- brella" (rather than word san ^ or yusan ü^). In addition, this slogan uses "revolution" rather than "movement," further highlighting its trasgressive content. It is not clear, however, that Cantonese slogans are consistently more localist in content, though they may generally be more contentious in tone. The performance of Hong Kong identity referenced the city s popular protest culture. Well-rehearsed song lines from the June Fourth vigil in Victoria Park include the following two, respectively affirming democracy and freedom: "Democracy will return victoriously from battle" ( Minzhu hui zhansheng guilai and "No matter how hard the rain beats down, freedom will still blossom" ( Wulun yu zenme da , Ziyou reng shi hui kaihua » ê ĚfaJlWllTE). The first line is the title of a song composed in 2012 by the band VIIV, and the second is a line from the song "Flower of freedom," which became popular at June Fourth vigils after it was given new lyrics in 1993. Several compositions by the 1980s and 1990s band Beyond, known for its political commitment, were widely sung and referenced in the movement, in particular "Boundless ocean, vast skies" ( Haikuo tiankong 1993), which became one of the anthems of the Umbrella Movement, and "Glorious years" ( Guanghui suiyue JtWfañ » 1990), originally devoted to Nelson Mandela. These references are significant in that the mainstream of the Umbrella Movement was quite critical with respect to the traditional pan-democratic political agenda,

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including the commemoration of June Fourth. They suggest, despite a growing distance from the mainland, that the June Fourth commemorations have become part of Hong Kong identity and as such are not rejected by the younger generation of protesters.16 In a broader sense, Hong Kong pop culture was also performed through references to a number of songs by indie music composers like (strongly implicated in the movement), Fiona Fung, or Eason Chan. A line from a song by Denise Ho titled "Glam- orous" {Yan guang si she originally part of an album released in 2005, which she performed at the Gay Parade during the Umbrella Movement, became widely quoted during the movement, appearing on posters and t-shirts: "Being born in troubled times entails certain responsibilities" (Sheng yu luanshi you zhong zeren ££). It encapsulates the feeling of a generational cohesion among the participants, as well as expressing an analogy between "speaking out" both about gay rights and political rights, as Ho has done. Another indie band, My Little Aiiport, has risen in popularity in parallel with the political critiques of the new generation: lines from the song "Ngau Tau Kok youth" (Niutoujiao qingnian were used to criticize youth apathy. Similar- ly, the song "Stubborn" (Juejiang by Taiwanese rock band Mayday (Wuyuetian) was widely quoted for its line, "Although I may be disappointed I cannot despair" (Jiusuan shiwang bu nengjuewang Most interestingly, several slogans attempted to redefine the political community of Hong Kong by reworking state and government symbols. The British wartime slogan "Keep calm and carry on" (going back to a 1944 propaganda effort, it was recently revived by designers) encapsulating the "British spirit" of stoic resistance, can be seen as an example of colonial heritage that has become part of Hong Kong. Lion s Rock became a symbol of the movement after a group of climbers hung a huge banner on it on October 23, 2014, inscribed with the slogan "I want real universal suffrage." A symbol of the "Hong Kong spirit" of hard work and surviving in adversity, it was popular- ized by the 1970s television series and theme song "Below the " (sung by Can- topop icon ) and referenced in many slogans: "Displaying the Hong Kong spirit under the Lion Rock - real universal suffrage" ( Shizishan xia tixian Xianggang jingshen - zhen puxuan "Hongkongers, undefeatable" (. Xianggangren , da bu si ílčtÁ » "Flowers blooming everywhere under Lions Rock" ( Shizishan xia biandi kaihua ^^lliTliiMTË). As part of the liberal discourse of the value of hard work, Lion Rock may sit uncomfortably with some of the more anti- capitalist pronouncements in the movement, but strongly resonates with the affirmation of identity and political agency. In some examples, Hong Kong identity was expressed by reappropriating political symbols. In one striking graphic creation, the PRC flag was redesigned, replacing the five yellow stars on a red background with five yellow umbrellas (see figure 8). The official name of the PRC and the symbolism of the flag were reinterpreted in the design, which read: "Peoples Village of Occupy Central" ( Zhanzhong renmin gonghecun tà^ÀKÂíott). The explanation below reads: "The red color symbolizes revolution. The big umbrella

16In a survey conducted at the June Fourth vigil in 2015, 88 percent of participants in Victoria Park claimed to be participating "as Hongkongers" (9 percent as "Chinese"; 43 percent as "citizens of the world"). See Cheng and Yuen (2015b). 17Wuyuetian also wrote two songs in support of the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan.

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Figure 8. People s Village of Occupy Central (PRC flag). Photograph by the author.

represents universal suffrage. Four small umbrellas represent the four occupied areas of Admiralty, Causeway Bay, and ." This graphic creation encapsu- lates many of the complexities of Hong Kong identity. Flags are a sensitive symbol in China: no local entities are allowed to have their own flag or emblem, and the Hong Kong SAR flag must, according to the Basic Law, always be flown in a smaller size than and together with the PRC flag. By reinterpreting the PRC flag, the occupiers avoid ag- itating for , but at the same time subvert it thoroughly. The idea of the "nation" is replaced by the notion of a "village," the preferred term by which the occupiers referred to their camp (the term " gonghecuri ' also ironically alludes to the non- democratic nature of the PRC). An ironic commitment to the CCPs early ideals of revo- lution is suggested by the explanation of the red background, and connected with the four "revolutionary sites" in Hong Kong, replacing the four "revolutionary classes" in the orig- inal interpretation of the flag. By using the trivial symbol of the umbrella, and elevating it to ironically integrate it into the national flag, this design in fact subverts the whole notion of the nation-state. Rather than contesting Hong Kong s return to the PRC, it mocks the hollow pomp of national flags in general, proposing instead the organic community of the village. Other variants include a parody of the SAR flag, in which the five petals of the bauhinia are replaced by five black umbrellas on a yellow background. The diversity of cultural repertoires mobilized in the movement represents the com- plexity of identity issues in Hong Kong. Occupiers performed different cultural reper- toires that both strategically played to different audiences and substantially expressed different aspects of a hybrid Hong Kong identity, bringing together traditional Chinese political vocabulary and modern Chinese culture, local and international pop icons, as well as colonial nostalgia and a preference for small, organic communities over large, ag- gressive nation-states. As pointed out by critics, at times the expressive dimension of the movement became overwhelming and drowned out other dimensions, such as the delib- erative one that will be discussed below. Nonetheless, both aspects remain crucial to a full understanding of the movement.

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Speech Acts and Public Space

"Performance" suggests strategic "framing" and a "playful" mode of interaction between an active group of performers and a more passive audience, which ultimately contributes to forming a group culture. There may, however, be another strand to the Umbrella Movement. As E. P. Thompson (1971, 119) famously pointed out, popular pro- tests do not only derive from a strategic calculation but also rely on implicit moral norms around which a community reaches a consensus. Similarly, Paul Lichterman (2012, 214) notes that the mobilization of cultural frames can be part of a process of civic debate: "people use, enact, or rely on cultural forms to solve problems publicly so the forms they are using together in those instances are civic." The moral undercurrent in many of the claims has already been highlighted above. Participants repeatedly expressed a strong commitment to creating spaces for deliberation and making decisions by consen- sus. In this sense, the movements "spontaneism" may be seen as acting out contending public discourses, with as implicit model not only the dramatic stage, but also the delib- erative forum (see, e.g., Delia Porta 2009, 206). Sampson Wong (2015), in his analysis of the artistic production of the Umbrella Movement, moves from an "externalist reading" in which art is essentially a tool for protesters to communicate ideas to the outside, to a communicative framework in which artworks "reflect the desire of the occupiers to speak to other fellow participants of the movement." It should be remembered that the Umbrella Movement - like other "occupy" move- ments - was uniquely structured around the prolonged takeover of urban space, trans- formed into a forum of deliberative democracy. In a recent article, Craig Calhoun (2013) characterizes "occupy" movements by the following traits: (a) claiming the right to public space; (b) demonstrating the ability to maintain spontaneous order; (c) making the assembled group a demonstration of participatory democracy; (d) bringing together a group of like-minded people without a clear political program; and (e) being less a movement than a dramatic performance. The last two points have already been discussed above.18 However, the three first points merit further attention. The Um- brella Movement began with a claim for public space (the storming of "," the public protest space in front of government headquarters that had been closed off); devoted tremendous resources and energy to maintaining spontaneous order (wardens organized security, supply stations provided food and drink, waste disposal and recycling were entirely self-organized); and, most importantly, repeatedly asserted its ideal of par- ticipatory democracy, expressed in the slogan, "Only the masses, no assembly" ( Zhiyou qunzhong , meiyou dahui RÌSI® ' In this perspective, the texts produced and performed in the movement may also reflect an attempt to redraw the boundaries and rules of the public sphere. The exchange of slogans can be viewed as constitutive of a type of "communicative action" that for Hab- ermas (1984, 1:86)

18Chan Kin-man has expressed the similar view that the Umbrella Movement lost its direction but created a Utopian community around the four values of equality, sharing, sus- tainability, and artistic creation. HKU-CEFC Umbrella Movement Round Table, June 17, 2015.

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refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations.... The actors seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement. The central concept of interpretation refers in the first instance to negotiating definitions of the situation which admit of consensus.

Rather than the theatrical performance, referencing and subverting traditional political ritual, which played out on the stage of Tiananmen, it can be argued that the Hong Kong protests emphasized a deliberative exchange, grounded in a well-established tradi- tion of civil society and civil discourse. As one of the student leaders underlined in an in- terview: "Democracy is about debate."19 Habermas s model has been criticized for its lack of attention to conflictuality, in par- ticular to the process by which certain topics may be historically included or excluded from the public sphere (e.g., Fraser 1995, 293). Craig Calhoun (1992, 24) points out that the public sphere became depoliticized and impoverished in the nineteenth century, as critical discussion bowed to cultural consumption, a tendency that the Umbrella Movement also experienced. One way of admitting conflictuality into Habermas s framework is to acknowl- edge a multiplicity of spheres: as Calhoun writes, "Social movements are among the several possible sorts of subsidiary public spheres we might conceptualize if we break with the idea that there must be one public sphere for each state" (37). Slogans can then be seen as the enactment of one of these alternative spheres where public debate takes place. In Austin s typology, this exchange derives from the perlocutionary dimension of the slogans, or their effect on and interaction with an intended audience.

Satire of Official Doublespeak

Caricatures and mocking slogans targeting politicians and members of the Hong Kong establishment, often in Cantonese, were ubiquitous. The main target was the chief executive, C. Y. Leung, and other members of the pro-Beijing camp. Leung was depicted as a CCP member, a wolf (a homophone of his surname), or a corrupt mafioso. One poster portrays him as Lei Feng, the communist model worker from the . Another uses characters homophonous with his English initials to highlight his "warped" thoughts: "Crooked thinking" ( *si waai Sãl). Regina Ip, the former security secretary, was similarly mocked when her name, Ip née Lau (°Yip-Lau ^fij), was glossed as "malignant tumor" ( *yiht lauh IN§). Several slogans mocked govern- ment phrases or catchwords. The one coined in support of the electoral reform package ("Pocket it first"), was reformulated to call for Leungs resignation: "CY resign: pocket it first" ( *lohkjyuh toih sin Others denounced the undermining of the constitu- tional arrangements under the Basic Law and of the motto of the police: "One country, two systems: in name only. Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong: only idle talk" ( Yiguo liangzhi , mingcun shiwang, Gangren zhi Gang , zhide koujiang - UJSrfrJ » » č£A ?oč£ » Kí# Pit); "Candid and upright" ( Guangming leiluo 3t^S$£). While the first asserts that the Basic Law has become meaningless, the second one contrasts the SAR

19Alex Chow, interview with the author, August 10, 2015.

This content downloaded from 82.146.210.210 on Wed, 17 Feb 2021 08:47:37 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Creating a Textual Public Space 693 police s motto with the alleged violence on September 28 (tear gas) and subsequent days (policemen were caught beating protester on October 15), and the alleged police-triad collusion (police allegedly stood by as triad members beat protesters in Mongkok). We may note that, as contributions to a public debate, all these slogans high- light a gap between reality and speech. Interestingly, Chinese president Xi Jinping also became an icon of the satirical cre- ations of the movement. Using a photo taken during flooding in Wuhan, where Xi Jinping appeared with rolled-up trousers and holding an umbrella (in keeping with his "down to earth" image), life-size cardboard figures of him holding a yellow umbrella blossomed throughout Admiralty (see figure 9). In this case, the visual power of the protest signs requires no slogan. On the one hand, this imagery alludes to Xis anti-corruption cam- paign and grassroots image to communicate directly with the supreme leader and denounce corrupt local officials (highlighted in the HKFSs two open letters to the central government on October 11 and November 15), implicitly acknowledging the center s supreme authority over Hong Kong. At the same time, it mocked Xi s undignified appearance, which, in another poster, was unfavorably contrasted with the last British governor , under the slogan "Different tastes" ( Pinwei bu yiyang fâ.; see figure 10). This plays into the idea that British administration was superior, at least in style, to post-handover arrangements. While some of these texts may not exactly suit the framework of civil discussion, they can be seen as conflictual interventions to extend the legitimate area of political debates in the face of the government s denial that the occupiers had a legitimate say in the dis- cussion of public affairs. Critiques of Leungs ties to the Party and real estate promoters (and alleged ties to the mafia) and his preference for "rich people politics" point to this need to extend the public sphere. Similarly, referencing Xi Jinping s populist image, while at the same time mocking it, is also a way of highlighting how far removed the CCP has become from its original ideals.

Public Debate

Many of the movements texts were explicitly designed to appear as interventions into an ongoing discussion, using personal pronouns ("we," "you"). There was an ongoing internal debate on the strategy, goals, and nature of the movement. After the dialogue between the students and the government on October 21, some called to "step up" the action: "Without resistance, how can we have peace? Step up the move- ment!" ( Meiyou kangzheng, na you heping? Xingdong shengji! ? VfW)fr $fc!). Critiques of the "Occupy Trio" (, Chan Kin-man, and Chu Yiu-ming) tar- geted their moderation and their proposed exit strategy of handing themselves in to the police: "Self-surrender yourselves!" (Zishou ni ziji qu! Ē Ě B^!); "Occupy Trio go home, the rest is our business. Umbrella Revolution: self-determination by the masses" ( Sanzi tuichang, shengxia jiushi zanmen de shi le. Yusan geming minzhong zijue One signboard in Mongkok - where slogans were often quite contentious - denounced the "Romantic losers in Admiralty" (Jinzhong de langman shibai zhuyi Critiques of the festive atmosphere in Admiralty, with singing, perform- ing, and art creation, were also aired: "Not a carnival but a protest. We're serious"

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Figure 9. Hong Kong People want universal suffrage. "Raise the umbrella, support it together." Photograph by the author.

Figure 10. Different tastes. Photograph by the author.

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(documented in Admiralty, November 13). The three protest sites were usually consid- ered as representative of different strands of the movement: Causeway Bay more aca- demic and idealistic; Admiralty more middle class, "reasonable," and dominated by HKFS; and Mong Kok more working class, with a stronger presence of anarchists and localists.20 However, it is hard to substantiate these differences using the slogans alone, which appeared to migrate between the three venues. The only notable difference is the larger proportion of slogans dealing with issues of strategy and internal debate in Mongkok. The protestors most critical of traditional democrats often targeted "left plastic" (or "leftist pricks"), which refers to pan-democrats who supported "democratic reunification" and believe their struggle is linked to the fight for democracy in China: "If we don't get rid of leftist pricks, there is no end to Hong Kongs problems" (Zuojiao bu chu , Gang nan bu zhi > čtU^Fit). Many posters criticized the project- ed referendum at Admiralty on October 26, which in the end had to be called off. These contentious claims highlight the growing politicization of Hong Kong society, which used to pride itself on its pragmatic and apolitical stance. Others wanted to stick to the spirit of nonviolence and resisted calling the movement a revolution. They reasserted the value of peaceful resistance: "The dialogue has failed, why be angry? Sit tight and wait for arrest" ( Duihua wujieguo,fenhen you ruhe? Zuo ding deng ren suo ? *£fë^ÀiS); "Retreat? Then we lose forever!" (Che? Jiu hui shu yi shi! ? sfc#$BH1±!). Some proposed alternative strategies, like rotating oc- cupation ("Be water, my friend," an iconic quote from Bruce Lee referring to his unique martial arts style). Many texts highlighted the need for deliberative democracy inside the movement: "Debate our own HK. Umbrella is our common project, let the masses discuss it in common" (Ziji Xianggang , ziji jiang. Yusan gong ye, qunzhong gong yi Ě BlřSĚ Elf ' SéJRâSI). This idea was of course both a strength and a vulnera- bility of the movement, which in the end prevented it from developing a consensual exit strategy, as various groups and individuals tried to leverage their own agenda and failed to develop consensus-building institutions or mechanisms.

Self-Reflexive Texts

An original aspect of the movement was the continual production of self-portrayal, self-description, and self-commentary by its members. September 28 was commemorat- ed as a foundational date almost as soon as it had passed: "We will not forget 9.28" ( 928 women bu hui wangji 928 íMñ^#&lE). Civil society, encompassing both the occupiers and the public at large, was represented in a series of "Mr Men" drawings that appeared around the occupation sites: "Little Mr and Mrs HK People" stood for all the citizens who at one time or another had visited the sites or spoken out against the political reform project (see figure 11). Many self-representations highlighted the generational aspect of the movement. The slogan "If not us, who? If not now, when?" (a quotation from John F. Kennedy) came to refer to the Occupy generation, the "us" fixing an in-group identity and generational sense of belonging. Echoing a ubiquitous subway announce- ment, a drawing states: "Please mind the generation gap" (see figure 12). It shows a

20For a remarkable analysis of some of the micro-politics in Mongkok, see Chen (2014).

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Figure 11. Little Mr and Mrs Hong Kong People. Photograph by the author.

young girl holding a yellow umbrella inside an MTR subway train and an older man stand- ing outside on the platform, presumably hesitating to join her onboard. A group of movement texts can be read as performative redefinitions of space. By renaming the occupied areas, they raise deeper questions about the nature of the occu- pying "community" and the political organization of Hong Kong. Predictably, the "occu- pation" of public space was an ongoing topic of public discussion: "Sorry, the congestion of the roads today is to ensure the smooth circulation of democracy in the future" (. Duibuqi , malu jintian de tanhuan shi weile weilai de minzhu changtong "There will be a short battle because democracy is still in the next platform. Please accept our apologies." Both of these poke fun at the Hong Kong nanny-state for its costly public works and paternalistic discourse justifying them in the name of the common good. They turn around this claim and assure the public

Figure 12. Please mind the generation gap. Photograph by the author.

This content downloaded from 82.146.210.210 on Wed, 17 Feb 2021 08:47:37 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Creating a Textual Public Space 697 that the outcome of democracy is worth enduring some hardship for. However, this argu- ment ultimately failed to convince a large slice of public opinion, which grew increasingly impatient with the inconvenience. A culture of satirizing and redesigning signs developed in the occupied zones. One sign designated an area as a "Temporary Camp of Extraterrestrial forces" ( waixing shili linshi zhuzhaying mocking the chief executives repeated assurance that the movement was due to manipulation by "foreign forces." After the alleged collu- sion between police and triads, a sign pointing to the government building was relabeled "Central Government and Triad Offices" (see figure 13). More seriously, the central space in Admiralty where the stage was installed, under the umbrella canopy, was renamed Umbrella Square (Yusan Guangchang affirming its role as a deliber- ative forum. A large banner appeared at the Western end of the Admiralty occupation zone, close to the PLA building, announcing: "Welcome to the Hong Kong Commune" (see figure 14). Highway signs were rewritten to indicate the "road" to democracy or universal suffrage. One street sign was covered with an inscription pro- claiming the refusal of the NPC Standing Committee decision ("not a road"). These dis- cussions point to a growing, substantive debate about the nature of the Hong Kong polity. On one of the flyovers, a sign with a classical flavor explicitly referred to the "village," the preferred term used by the occupiers to designate their settlement: "Here be the village entrance; good citizens dwell inside" (Ci nai cunkou , nei you liangmin JIŁ7W P ' 1*1 W â S ). It uses traditional political vocabulary to refer to the occupiers as liangmin (good, law-abiding subjects of the emperor). The traditional strand in defining the occu- pying community was also notable in the artwork, a full discussion of which is regrettably beyond the scope of this article. The famous Song dynasty scroll painting Along the River During the Qingming Festival or Qingming shang he tu (Zhang Zheduan, approx. twelfth century) inspired two carefully executed artworks displayed at Admiralty: a scroll-style drawing on several juxtaposed sheets of A3 paper exhibited at the Admiralty MTR station (Exit A), as well as a smaller version with an umbrella by Cuson Lo that

Figure 13. Central government and triad offices. Photo- graph by the author.

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Figure 14. Welcome to the Hong Kong commune. Pho- tograph by the author. circulated widely on the Internet. Both of them titled Along the river under the umbrella (Yusan shang he tu they depict daily life in the "Admiralty village" (see figure 15). They also attest the potential of traditional representations to contribute to the debate about redefining a community in the present.

Figure 15. Along the river, under the umbrella (detail, Admiralty station). Photo- graph by the author.

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These self-representations all redesign the urban space, as other Occupy movements have also done, by highlighting different forms of political organization. Combining the "commune" from the leftist repertoire, the "village" from traditional Chinese represen- tations, and the "square" or "forum" that may be associated with the origins of democracy, these representations all eschew the level of the state and of overly institutionalized pol- itics. They highlight the search for an adequately representative political community (tra- ditional or modern) and the difficulties the movement encountered in creating such a community. Despite the challenges raised by the sheer number and diversity of the slogans doc- umented, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions from the analysis. The claim of democracy, with its declinations ranging from an abstract moral concept of human agency to a norm-based political system in a well-circumscribed community, is central to the movement texts. There is no contradiction between the claims of democracy and most of the assertions of localism, which often take the form of the geographical or cultural affirmation of a civic-based community. The affirmation of agency is situated on both a philosophical and a historical level: while democracy supposes individual agency (hence its moral appeal), Hong Kongs emergence as a democratic political community also entails the affirmation of agency against the legacy of colonization and post-handover recolonization. These claims are more largely framed within different sets of cultural ref- erences, ranging from the traditional Chinese to the cosmopolitan, and encompassing the specific "spirit" of Hong Kong and its own democratic dimension. A composite civic culture emerges from this synthesis, referencing elements of the colonial era, the moral appeal of traditional Chinese philosophy, cosmopolitan pop culture, and defense of human rights in mainland China. The most original part of the movement, inseparable from its highly organized, non- violent, rational principles, is undeniably the reappropriation of public space as an alter- native democratic community. This essay makes the argument that a civil discourse developed in the slogans, which debated the nature of the democratic community itself: the occupying community and more largely the Hong Kong community. This sets the Umbrella Movement apart from many more contentious forms of social move- ments. The deliberative nature of the movement was admittedly sometimes overshad- owed by the dramatic appeal of its performative dimension. As highlighted by one of the student leaders in an interview, it is possible that this civil discourse did not develop strongly or quickly enough to enable new mechanisms of democratic consulta- tion and decision to guide the development of the movement. "We lacked trust within the occupied areas.... There was no possibility to persuade one another through debate.... Democracy is about debate.... We held consultation forums in certain areas, but we [the student leaders] were not on equal status, we were not self-aware enough. Even the [aborted] referendum was still decided by the organizers."21 Some of the slogans indeed attest the insufficiently democratic or civil nature of the deliberative ex- changes among occupiers, which ultimately led to internal division and a disconnect between the occupiers and public opinion at large. However, Alex Chows self-critical as- sessment is surely productive, and we may hence also choose to highlight the importance

21Alex Chow, interview with the author, August 10, 2015.

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of the both radical and civil questioning of the nature of the Hong Kong community that took place in the slogans and artwork, with options ranging from the traditional village to the alternative commune. This long-overdue, self-reflexive questioning of the nature of the Hong Kong polity is probably the movements most important legacy.

Acknowledgments

This article was first presented at the AAS in Asia at Academia Sinica, Taipei, in June 2015. I would particularly like to thank my three copanelists: Edmund Cheng and Samson Yuen offered critical comments, support, and inspiration, while Hung Ho-fung pointed out the significance of the notion of "self-determination."

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