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Notes Introduction 1. The Economist, December 23, 2006–January 5, 2007. 2. Charles Hartshorne’s own brand of process thought is basically a theistic meta- physics. Indeed it is natural theology. In our investigation, therefore, we will keep in mind the close connection between Hartshorne’s metaphysical concept of person and his idea of God. Hartshorne claims that wrong views about God lead to wrong views about human beings. This work therefore complements Santiago Sia’s God in Process Thought: A Study in Charles Hartshorne’s Concept of God (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985). 3. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, Corrected Edition, eds. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1979), 21n32. Henceforth cited as PR. Chapter 1 1. The distinction between strict and nonstrict theories of personal identity has also been referred to in the literature as the “nonreductionist” and “reductionist,” as well as the “simple” and “complex views.” Cf. Harold Noonan, Personal Identity (London: Routledge, 1989). See also: Richard Swinburne, “Personal Identity,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 74 (1973): 231–7; Derek Parfit, “The Unimportance of Identity,” Identity: Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford, ed. Henry Harris (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 16–20. 2. Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, Trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 116–17. English translation of Soi-même comme un autre, Editions de Seuil, March 1990. 3. Cf. J.L. Mackie, Problems From Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 173. 4. Cf. Parfit, “The Unimportance of Identity,” Identity, 14. 5. Jonathan Glover ed., The Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 1. 6. See also: Gareth Evans, ‘Can There Be Vague Objects?’ Identity, ed. Harold Noonan (Aldershot: Grower House, 1993), 208; David Lewis, “Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood,” Identity, ed. Harold Noonan (Aldershot: Grower House, 1993), 359–61. 7. On a similar recognition but different interpretation of the ambiguity inherent in the notion of personal identity, see: Catherine McCall, Concepts of Person: An Analysis of Concepts of Person, Self, and Human Being (Aldershot, England: Averbury, 1990), 19–20. 8. Cf. David Lewis, “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies,” The Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1971): 203–11. 9. Anthony Quinton, “The Soul,” Personal Identity, ed. John Perry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 72. 227 228 Notes 10. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty alludes to this third group of theories and says that philosophers belonging to this group, who initially attempt to bridge the gap between defenders of a spatiotemporal criterion and defenders of a psychologi- cal criterion, eventually find themselves “forming third or fourth parties” to the debate. Cf. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, “Introduction” to The Identities of Persons, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 1. 11. David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 192. 12. Noonan, Personal Identity, 19. 13. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 192–3. See also: Marc Slors, Personal Identity and the Metaphysics of Mind. “Questiones Infinitae,” Publications of the Department of Philosophy, Vol. XVIII (Utrecht: Utrecht University, 1997), 3; Geoffrey Madell, The Identity of the Self (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), esp. Chapter V, 3: “The Vindication of the Reid/Butler View of Personal Identity,” 122–34. 14. Noonan, Personal Identity, 20. 15. James Baillie, Problems in Personal Identity, Paragon Issues in Philosophy (New York: Paragon, 1993), 8. 16. Cf. Sydney Shoemaker and Richard G. Swinburne, Personal Identity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 20: “The Simple View claims explicitly that personal identity is one thing, and the extent of similarity in matter and apparent memory another.” 17. Madell, The Identity of the Self, 139. 18. Cf. Baillie, Problems in Personal Identity, 9–11. There are actually distinctions between the nonstrict and strict theories and the so-called reductionist and nonreductionist perspectives. These two sets, however, are often conflated with each other. Some authors, the most notable being Sydney Shoemaker, insist that the second distinction is not the same as the first. Cf. Sydney Shoemaker, “Critical Notice: Parfit’s Reasons and Persons,” Mind, 44 (1985): 443–53. 19. Cf. Evans, “Can There Be Vague Objects?” Identity, 208; Lewis, “Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood,” Identity, 359–61. 20. Lewis, “Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood,” Identity, 359–61. This position of course has been disputed. Instead of simply attributing the ambiguity to the con- cept of person, it is instead attributed to the reality of the person itself. As an objective entity, a person is itself an ambiguous object, and its vagueness is in re and not in lingua tantum. Cf. Peter van Inwangen, “How to Reason About Vague Objects,” Philosophical Topics, 16/1 (Spring, 1988): 255. 21. Derek Parfit, “Personal Identity,” Philosophical Review, 80/1 ( January, 1971), 3–27. Reprinted in: John Perry ed., Personal Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 199–223. This 1975 reprint is the source we are using. Parfit specifies these beliefs as (i) the nature of personal identity and (ii) its importance (p. 223). 22. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: University Press, 1984), 201–2. 23. Parfit, “Personal Identity,” Personal Identity, 219. 24. Parfit, “The Unimportance of Identity,” Identity, 29. 25. Parfit, “The Unimportance of Identity,” Identity, 44. 26. Henry E. Allison, “Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity: A Re-examination,” Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays, ed. I.C. Tipton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 113. 27. Cf. Charles Hartshorne, “Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume,” Philosophical Review, 43/4 (October, 1954): 479–99. 28. Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 130–9. 29. Joseph Butler, “Of Personal Identity,” Personal Identity, ed. Joseph Perry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 100. Roderick Chisholm, another strict-identity theorist, makes use of Butler’s terminology. Cf. Roderick Notes 229 Chisholm, “Parts as Essential to Their Wholes,” Review of Metaphysics, 26 (1973): 581–603. 30. Thomas Reid, “Of Identity,” Chapter IV, Essay III: Of Memory, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785); Philosophical Works, ed. William Hamilton (New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1983), 346. Subsequent quotes from Reid will be taken from John Perry ed., Personal Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 112. 31. Reid, “Of Identity,” Essays, 111–12. 32. Ibid., 111. 33. Reid, “Of Identity,” Essays, 109. 34. Slors, Personal Identity and the Metaphysics of Mind, 3. 35. Reid, “Of Identity,” 109. 36. Ibid. 37. Noonan, Personal Identity, 66. 38. Reid, “On Identity,” Essays, 109. 39. Butler, “Of Personal Identity” [1735], in Personal Identity, 99–105. 40. E.J. Lowe, Locke on Human Understanding (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 102. 41. Cf. Noonan, Personal Identity, 30: “It has been said that all subsequent philosophy consists merely of footnotes to Plato. On this topic, at least, it can be truly said that all subsequent writing has consisted merely of footnotes to Locke. Indeed many present-day philosophers writing on personal identity would still be happy to describe themselves as ‘Lockean’ or, at least, ‘Neo-Lockean’ in their approach to the topic, whilst many others would naturally define their positions by their opposition to Locke.” The most significant difference, however, is the fact that while there was a tendency in Locke to conflate epistemic and ontological issues, the question as it is considered today is regarded as a purely metaphysical or onto- logical one. See also: Slors, Personal Identity and the Metaphysics of Mind, 25. 42. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature [1739], ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd Edition, ed. P.H. Nidditch (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 259. 43. It was Locke’s friend William Molyneux who provided the impetus to the Lockean account by suggesting that Locke would include a discussion of the principium individuationis in the new edition. See: William Molyneux, “Letter of Molyneux to Locke, 2 March 1693,” The Works of John Locke (London, 1794), Vol. VIII, 310. Also: John Locke, “Letter to Molyneux, 23 August 1693,” The Works of John Locke, 322–7. 44. Noonan, Personal Identity, 30. 45. Edwin McCann, “Locke’s Philosophy of the Body,” The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 57–60. 46. Cf. Lowe, Locke on Human Understanding, 106. See also: Jonathan Bennett, “Locke’s Philosophy of Mind,” Part IV: Thinking Matter, The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 98–100. 47. Cf. John Locke, An Early Draft of Locke’s Essay together with Excerpts from His Journal, ed. R.I. Aaron and J. Gibb (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 121. 48. Cf. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), IV, iii, 6, 542. Chapter 27 of this work is repro- duced in Part II of Personal Identity, ed. John Perry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 33–52. 49. Ibid., II, xxvii, 21. 50. Ibid. 230 Notes 51. Charles Taylor holds that the Lockean enterprise is part of a larger movement characteristic of the time. He termed this a movement of “inwardness” which gave great emphasis to the first person point of view. Cf. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). See esp. Chapter 9: Locke’s Punctual Self, 159–76. 52. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, xxvii, 9. 53. Ibid., 17. 54. Such view has in fact been espoused by some authors. Although there are qual- ifications to their point, namely, that Locke was essentially an “empiricist” critic of Descartes, they nonetheless end up painting him a “Cartesian.” Cf. Leon Roth, “Note on the Relationship between Locke and Descartes,” Mind, 44 (1936): 414–16. See also: Richard Aaron and J.
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  • Panpsychism, Pan-Consciousness and the Non-Human Turn: Rethinking Being As Conscious Matter

    Panpsychism, Pan-Consciousness and the Non-Human Turn: Rethinking Being As Conscious Matter

    HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies ISSN: (Online) 2072-8050, (Print) 0259-9422 Page 1 of 11 Original Research Panpsychism, pan-consciousness and the non-human turn: Rethinking being as conscious matter Author: It is not surprising that in a time of intensified ecological awareness a new appreciation of 1 Cornel du Toit nature and the inanimate world arises. Two examples are panpsychism (the extension of Affiliation: consciousness to the cosmos) and deep incarnation (the idea that God was not only incarnated 1Research Institute for in human form but also in the non-human world). Consciousness studies flourish and are Theology and Religion, related to nature, the animal world and inorganic nature. A metaphysics of consciousness University of South Africa, emerges, of which panpsychism is a good example. Panpsychism or panconsciousness or South Africa speculative realism endows all matter with a form of consciousness, energy and experience. Corresponding author: The consciousness question is increasingly linked to the quantum world, which offers some Cornel du Toit, option in bridging mind and reality, consciousness and matter. In this regard Kauffman’s [email protected] notion of ‘triad’ is referred to as well as the implied idea of cosmic mind. This is related to the Dates: notion of ‘deep incarnation’ as introduced by Gregersen. Some analogical links are made Received: 11 Apr. 2016 between panpsychism and deep incarnation. Accepted: 02 Aug. 2016 Published: 24 Oct. 2016 How to cite this article: Introduction Du Toit, C., 2016, The matter of consciousness and consciousness as matter ‘Panpsychism, pan- consciousness and the Panpsychism is reviving in the twenty-first century.