The Federal Role in the Federal System, the Dynamics of Growth: an Agenda for American Federalism: Restoring Confidence and Comp

An Agenda for American Federalism: Restoring Confidence and Competence

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERQOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS Washington, D.C. a June 1981

Foreword

TheAdvisory Commission on intergovernrnen- tal Relations (ACIR) was established by Public Law 380, which was passed during the first session of the 86th Congress and approved by the Presi- dent, September 24, 1959. Section 2 of the act sets forth the purpose and specific responsibilities for the Commission: Sec. 2. Because the complexity of modern life intensifies the need in a federal form of government for the fullest cooperation and coordination of activities between the levels of government, and because population growth and scientific developments portend an increasingly complex society in future years, it is essential that an appropriate agency be established to give continuing attention to intergovernmental problems. It is intended that the Commission, in the performance of its duties, will: (1) bring together representatives of the federal, state, and local governments for the consideration of common problems. . . . (5) encourage discussion and study at an early stage of emerging public problems that are likely to require intergovernmental cooperation. (6) recommend, within the framework of the Constitution, the most desirable allocation of governmental functions, responsibilities, and revenues among the several The study, The Federal Role in the Federal Sys- levels of government . . . . tern: The Dynamics of Growth, of which the present volume is one component, is part of the Commis- Pursuant to its statutory responsibilities, the sion's response to this mandate. Staff were di- Commission from time to time has been requested rected to: (a) examine the present role of the feder- by the Congress or the President to examine par- al government in the American federal system; (b) ticular problems impeding the effectiveness of the review theoretical perspectives on American Fed- federal system. The 1976 renewal legislation for eralism, assignment of functions, and govern- General Revenue Sharing, Public Law 94-488, mental growth; and (c) identify historical and polit- mandated in Section 145 that the Commission: ical patterns in the development and expansion of . . . study and evaluate the American fed- national governmental domestic activities. Specif- eral fiscal system in terms of the allocation ically, Commission staff prepared an 11-volume and coordination of public resources series of which seven are case studies of particular among federal, state, and local govern- governmental functions and two examine the ments including, but not limited to, a study broader indicators of federal growth and the condi- and evaluation of: (1) the allocation and co- tion of contemporary federalism. This volume rep- ordination of taxing and spending authori- resents the culmination of the federal role study. It ties between levels of government, includ- contains a synthesis, an analysis, and an assessing a comparison of other federal government of the preceding nine volumes, as well as the ment systems . . . (5) forces likely to af- Commission's recommendations for reforming the fect the nature of the American federal federal system. It was approved by the Commis- system in the short-term and long-term fusion on June 20,1980. ture and possible adjustments to such system, if any, which may be desirable, in Abraham D. Beame light of future developments. Chairman Acknowledgements

This volume was prepared by the governmental offered on one or more of the draft chapters. Spe- structure and functions section of the Commission cifically, the Commission wishes to thank Thomas staff under the general direction of Assistant Di- J. Anton, John Bosley, Michael A. Colella, William rector David B. Walker and Project Manager G. Colman, James Doyle, Robert D. Ebel, Daniel J. David R. Beam. The following staff members were Elazar, Morris P. Fiorina, Erwin Hargrove, responsible for individual chapters: Chapter Lawrence Hush, Judson L. James, Marvin H. I-David B. Walker; Chapter 11-Cynthia Cates Kosters, Everett Carl1 Ladd, John Lordon, James Colella; Chapter 111-David R. Beam; L. Martin, Arthur Naftalin, Richard P. Nathan, Appendix-Bruce D. McDowell with the invaluable Marian Lief Palley, Neal R. Peirce, Gerald M. assistance of Kathleen M. Behringer. Kenneth Pomper, Austin Ranney, Michael D. Reagan, Wil- Ainsworth, Stephanie Becker, Will Meyers, liam S. Rhyne, Randall B. Ripley, John Shirey, Deil Michael Mitchell, Mavis Mann Reeves, Albert J. Wright, and Joseph F. Zimmerman. Richter, and Jane F. Roberts, also of the ACIR The report would not have been possible without staff, provided helpful counsel on one or more the cooperation and assistance of the above per- chapters. Timothy Conlan, who was responsible for sons. Full responsibility for content and accuracy all or part of several other volumes in the study, rests, of course, with the Commission and its staff. provided valuable advice on this, the final, volume. The secretarial services of Kathleen M. Behringer, Evelyn M. Hahn, Lynn C. Schwalje, and Martha A. Wayne F. Anderson Talley were indispensable. Executive Director The Commission gratefully acknowledges the David 6. Walker valuable ideas, review, and comment that others Assistant Director Contents

Chapter 1. American Federalism 1960-80: Contrasts and Continuities ...... Federalismin1960 ...... Federalismin1980 ...... Certain Continuities ...... The Resulting Paradoxes ...... Chapter2. The Dynamics of Growth in Federal Functions: An Analysis of the Case Study Findings ...... Who Makes Government Grow: The Policy Actors ...... Government Growth and the "Inside" Player ...... The Congressional Policy Role...... The Interest Group Policy Role...... The Presidential Policy Role ...... The Bureaucratic Policy Role ...... The Judicial Policy Role ...... Government Growth and the "External" Actor ...... The Role of Public Opinion and Elections ...... The Role of Political Parties ...... The Role of the Press ...... What Makes Government Grow: The Policy Environment ...... Government Growth and Environmental Dislocations ...... Government Growth and Environmental Trends...... Conclusions: A Reassessment of Critical Whos and Whats ...... Chapter3. The Federal Role: Criteria. Ass-sment. and Analyis ..... Contemporary Federalism and the 1ll1;sionof Centralization ..... Five Standards of Assessment ...... NationalPurpose ...... Four Additional Criteria ...... Limitations ...... The National Purpose ...... 38 Theory ...... Assessment ...... CaseStudyFindings ...... National Defense ...... Unemployment ...... The Elimination of Poverty ...... Protection of the Environment ...... Conclusion ...... Equity ...... Theory ...... Assessment ...... Allocation of Funds ...... Allocation Techniques ...... Income Redistribution ...... Externalities ...... CaseStudyFindings ...... State Flexibility ...... Dispersion of Funds...... The Services Strategy ...... Conclusion ...... Economic Efficiency and Administrative Effectiveness ...... Theory ...... Assessment ...... CaseStudyFindings ...... Implementation Issues ...... Increasing Regulation ...... Fragmentation and Consolidation ...... Conclusion ...... Political Accountability ...... Theory ...... Conflicting Traditions ...... The Role of Grants ...... Assessment ...... CaseStudyFindings ...... Policy Initiation ...... Policy Institutionalization ...... Conclusion ...... Summary and Conclusion ...... Chapter 4 . The Federal Role in the Federal System: Analysis of Basic Findings, Key Questions Raised, andRecommendations ...... Findings ...... TheSigns ...... Some Underlying Causes ...... The Crucial "No Change" Area ......

vii Where Stands the System? ...... Summary Commission Findings ...... Recommendations...... Future Scenarios ...... The AClR Strategy ...... Recommendation 1. Decongesting the Federal Grant System .... Recommendation 2. Avoiding Unintended Impacts on State and Local Governments ...... Recommendation 2(A): Fiscal Notes ...... Recommendation 2(B): Temporary Suspension of Crosscutting Policies ...... Recommendation 2(C): Regulatory Impact Analyses ...... Recommendation 3. Strengthening Political Federalism through the Party System ...... Recommendation 4 . Protecting the Autonomy of State and Local Governments in National Policymaking ...... Recommendation 5. Strengthening the Concept of Constitutional Federalism ...... Recommendation 6. Ending the Ambiguities in the Constitutional AmendmentProcess ......

viii The Structure of Social Welfare Benefits for the Pretransfer Poor, 1974 ...... Major Actors and Forces in Policy Development andGrowth ...... Governmental Expenditures from General Funds, Selected Functions, by Level of Government, 1977 ...... Federal Aid Share of State and Local Expenditures for 11 Major Functions ...... Funding of Federal Aid Programs lnvolved in Rough Tradeoff Proposals ...... Number of Federal Aid Programs lnvolved in Rough Tradeoff Proposals ...... Federal Aid Program Clusters Ranked by Amount of Funding, FY 1980 ...... Federal Aid Program Clusters Ranked by Average Funding Perprogram ...... Federal Aid Program Clusters Ranked by Fragmentation Index,FY1980 ...... Annual Cost of Federal Regulations, by Area, 1976...... 473 Federal Grant Programs, Estimated Obligations, Ranked in Descending Order of Dollar Magnitude, FYI980 ...... 473 Federal Grant Programs, Estimated Obligations, Clustered in 29 Groups, FY 1980 ......

1. Four Functional Assignment Criteria...... 2. Selected Federal Programs Dealing with Traditionally Local Problems ...... 3. Estimated Geographic Scope of Benefits for Selected Government Services ...... Charts

1. Administrative Levels Used in Providing Assistance to Program Beneficiaries ...... 2. Strategy for ~econ~estin~the Federal Grant System......

American Federalism 1960-80: Contrasts And Continuities

Over the past 20 years the federal role has become bigger, broader, and deqer-bigger within the federal system, both in the size of its intergovernmental outlays and in the number of grant programs, broader in its program and policy concerns, and the wide range of subnational governments interacting directly with Washington; and deeper in its regulatory thrusts and preemption proclivities. This is the broad summary conclusion that emerges from this 11-volume study and it points to a growing centralization of policymaking. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, this conclusion does not produce a companion generalization that the system's delivery of services is substantially more centralized than it was a generation ago. What is certain is that the current labyrinth of countless intergovernmental relationships-with their multiple vertical, diagonal, curving, and haphazardly horizontal connections-is less functional than that of 1960. The contrasts, then, between the "systems" of 1960 and of 1980 are stark. However, the continuities between them, along with perplexing paradoxes in both, leave us with an open debate as to whether we still have a noncentralized system, but with a general consensus that it does not function well.

FEDERALISM IN 1960 What then were intergovernmental relations like two decades ago? In a sentence, they were comparatively few, narrow, and in many respects not relations of the period. Programmatically, there very deep. To be more specific . . . was a sharing of some functions. Administratively, the officials involved at the different levels were Approximately 132 assistance programs, not adversaries; they were more like allies. Politi- all categorical, were operational, but only cally, the decentralization that existed did result four accounted for three-quarters of the from "independent centers of power" and oper- total grant outlays (highways, aid to the ated "through the chaos of American political pro- aged, aid to dependent children, and em- cesses and political institution^."^ In these ways, ployment security-and in that order of intergovernmental practice conformed to coopera- dollar significance). tive-- . federalism's principles. A heavily federal-state relational pattern At the same time, there was not, as the theory's predominated, with all but 8% of the total exponents proclaimed, a collaboration in "virtually $7.2 billion in federal grants going to state all functions." Few, if any, traditional municipal governments. functions and only about half of the states' respon- In addition to the administrative simplicity sibilities were touched in any way by federal grant suggested above, the dominant programs or other programs. Nor was a division of functions were old in an administrative sense, with among the levels impossible, as they maintained, highways dating back to 1916, employ- since the legislative process of the day reflected a ment security to 1933, and the two welfare capacity to differentiate between most local and programs to 1935. several state functions and what politically was The goals associated with most of the deemed to be of national concern. grant programs were shared and relatively Despite the talk of complexity and conditions, it noncontroversial and a professional net- was a collaborative network based on the shared work of functional cadres up and down the goals of a relatively few, well established programs line helped to maintain the concept of co- (supplemented by the 1956 Highway Act's major operation. addition to that function's intergovernmental rela- The categorical grant mechanism had be- tions in transportation). The 1960 "system" cost come a consensus device, accepted by relatively little in federal grant funds and involved many Democrats and Republicans. relatively simple and unobtrusive administrative relationships. The "marble cake" metaphor was an Federal promotional efforts (subsidies, tax apt one-two differently colored ingredients (fed- credits, loans, loan guarantees, and the eral and state), a few major swirls (the four major like) as well as regulatory efforts (which grant programs), and relatively inexpensive frequently resembled promotional) were preparation. Phrased differently, the system in far more extensive, but this legacy of the 1960 operated in a limited, but successful coop- New Deal and of the post-war period was erative federal fashion, largely because the legacy directed at the private, not the public, sec- of dual federalism-with its intergovernmental tor for the most part (though some separation of functions, finances, and personnel- grants-notably highways-were as much still was an operational fact in so many proearn a matter of the private sector as of public areas. benefit). This paradox existed because political and fiscal Finally, all the polls of the period indicated constraints still served to restrict the role of the a high degree of optimism about the sys- federal government even though the Supreme tem, its political party foundations, and its Court had given it a green light for expansion since future. 1937. A related paradox was that though the role of the national government had enlarged greatly The system in 1960 clearly was a good example during the previous three decades- international- of "cooperative federalism" in action and it is no ly, intergovernmentally, and as regulator of the accident that the theorists of this interpretation economy-no clear or broadly accepted concept of were beginning then to come into their own. After the powers or the proper role of the federal gov- all, the theory they were advancing provided a ernment had emerged-thanks to the pragmatism, pretty good description of the intergovernmental promotionalism, and implicit conservatism of the New Deal. While, on the one hand, power was as- aid is distributed directly to at least 80% of serted and assumed, on the other, it was rejected, the 80,000 subnational governments (some reassigned, or relinquished. Hence, the popularity special districts and a few school districts of the cooperative federalism concept that left being the chief exceptions) with the larger questions relating to federal authority and roles as jurisdictions participating in several pro- pragmatic concerns to be settled incrementally in grams. the political arena. The third equally unrecognized Twenty years ago the states were the prin- paradox in the system of 1960 was the relative sat- cipal, if not almost the sole, providers of isfaction of an overwhelming majority of the popu- fiscal assistance to America's localities; to- lace with the system, its leaders, its political pro- day the federal government has a strong cesses, its past, and its future in the face of the de- secondary role in this respect, providing nial of basic civil and voting rights to millions of directly 21.6% of the intergovernmental minority citizens. funds local governments receive and significant additional amounts indirectly as states "pass through" about a quarter of the federal money they receive. FEDERALISM IN 1980 In 1960 there were only two grant programs in the over $1 billion class; today The American federal system of 1980 and the there are 15. myriad intergovernmental relations subsumed under it stand in stark contrast to the far simpler, Then, the small and narrowly specialized more sharply bound, and more manageable one of programs numbered about 100; today they 1960. The most significant single factor explaining are at the 450 mark. this difference has been a dramatic expansion in Then, income maintenance and social wel- the policymaking role of the federal government in fare programs accounted for 50% of the domestic affairs-a policymaking expansion unac- total aid amount; today they represent companied by any real expansion in its operational 63% of the 1980 figure. activities. The many dimensions of this prolifera- Then, the conditions attached to grants-in- tion in national policymaking and the national gov- aid were program specific with administra- ernment's reliance on state and local governments tive and personnel requirements applied to for implementation purposes, are highlighted by some; today all of these older vertical type some comparisons: conditions remain, save in General Reve- Then, its 130-odd intergovernmental fiscal nue Sharing and a few block grants, and transfer programs amounted to only a lit- they have augmented by at least half a tle over $7 billion which represented less hundred conditions that apply to nearly all than 2% of the gross national product GNP federal grants. and less than 15% of total state-local ex- In 1960 the regulatory role of the federal penditures; today the 500-odd assistance government focused almost wholly on big programs amount to $88 billion and ac- business, labor, agriculture, communica- count for 3.4% of the GNP and 23.2% of tions, transportation, banking, securities, overall state-local outlays. Put differently, and a few areas of health and safety; it now in per capita and constant dollar terms, the includes diverse environmental, health and 1980 figure of $159 was more than safety, consumer protection, and social 3% times its 1960 counterpart. equality areas as well. Two decades ago the states were the prime Then, federal regulation was direct and recipients of all but a miniscule proportion largely private sector oriented; today it is of federal financial assistance; today ap- not only more expansively direct, but also proximately 25% of it flows directly to lo- indirect using grant conditions as means of cal governments, bypassing the states. furthering national social, environmental, Then, almost all federal aid went to 50 egalitarian, and other goals. recipients (the states); at the present time Twenty years ago only a handful of court decisions existed that touched on Con- economic development, public service jobs, gress' conditional spending power; today and employment training aid programs. there are dozens, though the earlier, ex- These programs now offer assistance to es- pansive judicial interpretation still is ad- sentially every region and community of hered to, despite the far more coercive the nation and a host of impacted groups character of many of the recently enacted (youth, minorities, the elderly, women, grant conditions. . veterans, the economically disadvantaged, Finally, in 1960 Congress' regulation of in- and the handicapped), with total federal terstate commerce focused chiefly on the outlays amounting to some $25 billion in means of production and on preventing the FY 1980. rise of serious impediments to our common While, in 1980, the federal government's market; today it extends beyond these con- fiscal role in elementary and secondary ed- cerns to a range of social, environmental, ucation remains small relative to state and and other noneconomic concerns. local expenditures (around 8% of total pub- Such have been some of the major signs of the lic expenditures), over the past 15 years it growth in policymaking at the national level and in has employed a variety of conditions and relying on the states and their localities to imple- inducements to magnify the impact of its ment "national" programs. Each of these changes, modest dollars. Thus, since the mid-1960s, moreover, is reflected in microcosm in one or more most federal elementary and secondary ed- of the seven functional fields probed in the ucation programs have stressed national Commission's case studies. Thus, for example: purposes or objectives in programs designed to aid the economically, physically,

0 In 1960, welfare had not yet "exploded." and educationally disadvantaged; provided Total federal public assistance grants to auxiliary educational and social services; the states were just over $2 billion com- sought to promote new educational skills; pared to 1980 Aid to Families with De- and stimulated educational innovation. In pendent Children (AFDC) and Supplemen- addition, these federal grant programs are tary Security Income (SSI) estimates of conditioned by laws and regulations over $13 billion. Moreover, in 1959, the designed to eliminate racial and sexual first food stamp law since the days of the discrimination and to promote student Great Depression passed Congress. How- rights and the rights of the handicapped. ever, throughout 1960, the Eisenhower Finally, the federal courts have had a pro- Administration failed to implement the found and growing influence on a variety law, and food stamps drifted into program- of state and local educational practices, matic oblivion. From that oblivion, the particularly in cases of court ordered de- food stamp program has grown to be the segregation. largest single U.S. Department of Agricul- Although the federal government has been ture (USDA) budget item. And, far from a involved in higher education almost since program on which no money was spent, on the founding of the Republic, that involve- May 15, 1980, Congress set a $9.5 billion ment took a quantum leap during the two spending ceiling for FY 1980 food stamps decades under discussion. Total federal spending. funding for a variety of higher education The federal role in unemploywmt policy, purposes grew from $1.7 billion in 1960 to circa 1960, was limited to the financial en- around $12 billion in the late 1970s. Of couragement of a highly decentralized sys- even greater importance, however, the tem of state unemployment insurance pro- depth of federal involvement grew tre- grams, coupled to the cautious application mendously during these 20 years. Hence, of Keynesian macro-economic policy. Be- the federal government now increasingly ginning with the passage of the Area Rede- affects higher education through nonfiscal velopwmt Act in 1961, however, Washing- instruments, particularly through a varie- ton has created a vast and tangled array of ty of regulatory conditions ranging from health and safety to affirmative action to and many provide some kind of technical education record keeping. assistance and information, available to In 1960, federal environmental protection those who request it. was known as air and water "pollution 0 Federal aid to libraries in 1960 consisted control"; that "control," according to Con- of approximately $6 million in annual ap- gressional reports, was "primarily the re- propriations aimed at promoting library sponsibility of state and local govern- services in rural areas. Today, such aid in- ments . . ."; and the limited amount of volves appropriations of about $250 million federal "co,ntrolfing" was accomplished and is spread to every portion of the nation through a relatively few grants-in-aid, re- and every type of jurisdiction, including search, and development programs, and a nearly all public libraries, and, through pollution enforcement mechanism which federal education laws, to elementary and applied to interstate waters only. Today, secondary school, college, and university federal "environmental protection" rules libraries. governing federal, state, local, and private activities and products encompass not only While the seeds for some of this growth were the air we breathe and the water we drink, sown in the 1930s, it is difficult, if not impossible, but the solid and hazardous wastes we pro- to view the past two decades as merely an induce, the land we use, the noises we make, evitable, logical extension of the New Deal. The ex- coastal areas which surround us, and the traordinary expansion reflected in the current fed- creatures with whom we share this envi- eral role-along with its sharp points of contrast ronment. From the comparatively paltry with that of 1960 (which, of course, were a kind of amounts expended in 1960, the Council on historical summation of the New Deal and its Environmental Quality estimates that fed- aftermath)-set this era apart from the previous eral regulations governing environmental one. quality and pollution abatement now gen- Unique shifts in the system itself also occurred- erate over $46.7 billion in public and pri- shifts that helped pave the way for this escalation vate expenditures. in federal policy undertakings. The erosion of certain heretofore effective political and fiscal con- 0 In 1960, the entire federal intergovern- straints on federal expansionism (probed in Vol- mental role infire protection activities con- ume 112 and analyzed in Chapter II of this volume) sisted of small-scale cooperative agree- occurred during the past 20 years. The subtle, yet ments between the U.S. Forest Service very real, relationship between this development and state agencies. Today, although spend- and the federal courts' growing assertiveness also ing for intergovernmental fire-related ac- was a product of these years. Moreover, the con- tivities remains a miniscule portion of the trast between the Supreme Court's almost wholly federal budget, the federal role in fire pro- passive adherence to the New Deal Court's inter- tection stands as a perfect paradigm of pretation of the commerce and conditional spend- marbleization. Hence, all federal executive ing powers of Congress-an interpretation that departments (except State and Defense) as amounted to leaving it to the political process to well as at least 11 other federal agencies decide-and in its highly assertive stance vis-a-vis now are involved in fire-related activities rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment that affect state and local governments. became most apparent during these two decades. Moreover, in addition to General Revenue The contrast, of course, was more a matter of dif- Sharing, sometimes used to support fire fering modes of argumentation in differing areas service delivery, 52 grant-in-aid programs of constitutional law, than of differing systemic ef- handled by 24 separate administrative fects of the Court's decisions in these three areas. units are available to subnational jurisdic- Their combined impact on the system, after all, tions. Eight agencies make loans of money was to expand national powers. Finally, the recent or equipment that can be used to improve efforts to balance the budget and other current fire protection. And, five collect data re- signs of fiscal prudence suggest how unusual the lated to fire incidence, injuries, and losses, earlier fiscal behavior of national decisionmakers was. The past 20 years, then, were distinctive management arm in the Presidency, on circulars, ones, with unique behavioral and specific policy de- on budgetary tools, and on reorganization. velopments occurring for which there were few The final main link with 1960 is the continued parallels in the earlier chapters of the lengthy an- federal preference for the conditional grant as the nals of American intergovernmental relations. chief means of achieving intergovernmental fiscal transfers and of interacting programmatically with subnational governments. Despite the much heralded advent of a tripartite aid system in the CERTAIN CONTIN UlTlES 1970s, including General Revenue Sharing as well as block and categorical grants, federal conditions The many paradoxes present in the contempor- are as much a part of national policymakers' think- ary system, however, stem from the similarities as ing today as they were a generation ago, when well as from the differences between the present categorical grants monopolized the aid system. system and that of 1960, though the interaction be- Witness the overwhelming ascendency of categori- tween the two is also a causal factor. But how can cal grants both in number (492) and in dollar pro- there be many similarities when stark contrasts ap- portions (well over 80%) in the aid system and the pear to dominate? kinds of conditions now attached to all block grants Conceptually, at least, the rhetoric of coopera- and to General Revenue Sharing. Not to be over- tive federalism continued through the past two looked in all this is the fact that the massive expan- decades and is as loud today as it was in 1959. Des- sion in federal conditional aid has been the basic pite the real differences in principles and in prac- means by which national policyrnakers have been tice between Nixon's New Federalism, on the one able to keep the federal bureaucracy comparatively hand, and LBJ's Creative Federalism, Congress' small, while still assuming it was running the pro- implicit intergovernmental approach, and Carter's grams. New Partnership, on the other, all talked (or talk) of sharing. All invited collaboration, and all call(ed) for activist government(s). In short, all employed the language of cooperative federalism. Whether THE RESULTING PARADOXES the purpose and practice of any of these recent or current approaches actually conform to the tenets Conceptually, administratively, and procedural- of cooperative federalism is at least debatable, ly, there are clear links to 1960 which, along with though not in the view of Daniel J. Elazar, its the novel "unleashing" developments noted foremost contemporary interpreter. For him, all of earlier, combine to confront us with some perplex- them violate the essential features of the col- ing paradoxes in current intergovernmental rela- laborative theory.3 Yet the rhetoric of cooperative tions: federalism continues unabated, even in the courts. The federal policy role obviously has mush- This is probably because in the present context it roomed massively, even as the size of the serves as an excellent way of avoiding any clear- federal civil service has remained static. cut delineation of the proper federal role, of Most national domestic goals are achieved avoiding responsibility, and of superficially ra- intergovernmentally, while many local tionalizing the status quo. program objectives also are now achieved Current administrative attitudes and approaches intergovernmentally. also bear a close resemblance to those of 1960. Des- pite the extraordinary acceleration in federal pol- . Redistributive political rhetoric has dom- icy activism, the size of its civil bureaucracy is inated many of the efforts to expand the nearly the same as two decades ago. Totally tradi- federal role, but the resulting programs as tional attitudes clearly have dominated the think- many times as not have had a distributive, ing of national policymakers regarding the pre- not a redistributive, effect. sumed dangers of a big federal bureaucracy. Addi- A pattern of direct federal aid to a host of tionally, pretty much the same prescriptions re- separate substate governments has garding how to run that bureaucracy prevail now evolved, even as the interdependence be- as in 1960, with a reliance on a strong executive tween the 50 states and their respective localities has become ever more pro- In different ways, these ten paradoxes above- nounced. and more could be cited-underscore the perplex- While the dominant ethic of the federal ing political, administrative, programmatic, and grant system is still largely the coopera- judicial bases for the overextended role that the tive one, in practice it is cooptive, not coop- national government now occupies in the federal erative, or even antagonistic, federalism system. They also suggest some of the effects-in that increasingly prevails. terms of management, equity, and accountability- that can result from a tendency to intergovern- While the representational efforts of state mentalize nearly everything. More on this will be and local associations of elected officials covered in Chapter III. But above all, they clearly have become ever more aggressive, their indicate that the task of restoring the system to its voices have been diluted among those of earlier cooperative and functioning condition will the thousands of special interests now pop- not be an easy one. Chapter IV addresses this vital ulating the nation's capitol, with the result assignment. that national policymakers have become To sum up, it is not the paradoxes as such, but less sensitive to the jurisdictional and insti- the highly problematic nature as well as the com- tutional status of the subnational govern- bined effects of the contemporary ten paradoxes ments than they were two decades ago. that concern us. The linking of contrasting goals and values, after all, always has been present in The federal bureaucracy has been singled the American political tradition. Liberty and equal- out by the populace, the press, and the poli- ity, individualism and collectivism, majority rule ticians as the major villain in the emer- and minority rights, national unity and diversity- gence of a dysfunctional system, even as these pairs of potentially, if not actually, anti- that same bureaucracy has been subjected thetical values in our 200-year old system clearly to more directives, more curbs, and more reveal a perennial American propensity simultane- constraints by Presidents, Congress, and ously to seek out and to sustain opposites. More- the courts than ever before. over, the apparent intellectual inconsistencies implicit in this behavior have never bothered us very For some time now on the campaign cir- much. The prime reason for this, of course, is cuit, nearly all candidates for election or that-with one notable and bloody exception dur- reelection to national office have run on ing the 1860s-the system with all its ambivalences one or another variety of an anti-washing- worked. And federalism with its rough but real di- ton theme, while in the renewal process for vision of labor was a major part of this success most grant programs the overwhelming story. But signs of dysfunctionality, not function- majority from both parties has voted ality, now are everywhere, as the foregoing probe "aye". of the paradoxes illustrates. Within the parties, reforms directed at The Commission is not so much worried then rendering them more representative and about the inconsistencies, intricacies, or am- presumably more accountable have won bivalences identified in this study, The Federal out; but in the proliferating pressure group Role in the Federal System. It is concerned about area, elitist domination appears to be as how they have combined to produce an interpreta- strong as ever. tion and application of the constitutional principle of federalism wherein the adaptive, absorbing-of- While the federal judiciary has served ambivalences, and workable features of the in- prominently as a "reformer" of state and herited system are in danger. Dysfunctionality has local governments, in a range of cases re- been substituted for functionality, and rigidities lating both to the conditional spending for flexibility. Almost reluctantly, these primary power of Congress and to what is pro- systemic issues have become the Commission's tected under the Fourteenth Amendment, concerns. The recent record, as the following two it has reflected little trust in the revitalized chapters clearly summarize, suggests that it could political processes that it helped to insti- adopt no other approach-in good conscience or in tute. candor. FOOTNOTES The Condition of American Federalimn: Conflicting Theories and Collapsing Constraints (A-78), Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, forthcoming. 'Martin Grodzins, "The American Federal System," A Nation =SeeProfessor Elazar's statement in Advisory Commission on of States, ed. Robert A. Goldwin, Chicago, IL, Rand McNally Intergovernmental Relations, Hearings on the Federal Role in and Company, 1964,p. 22. the Federal System (A-87), Washington, DC, U.S. Government 2Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Printing Office, 1980. Chapter 11

The Dynamics- Of Growth In Federal Functions: An Analysis Of The Case Study Findings

Noom planned the growth of the federal government, and that, perhaps, as much as any other statement, explains why it grew in the way that it did. It was not planned in the sense that probably no woman or man has ever been elected on a plank which promised "more Washington" and few, if any, American political discussions conclude with a clarion call for "bigger government." Moreover, no one was responsible for this "nonplanning" process-in the short-run of history, neither credit nor blame for the shape and scope of the federal government can be attributed to a single individual or group. The many, not the few, have given rise to big government. Hence, in the way of unplanned and unmonitored behemoths, the national government has rambled as much as it has grown; it has drifted even more than it has expanded. In the past several years, the size, continued growth, and apparent incomprehensibility of government have come under increasing criticism. In- deed, growing numbers of people contend that government has become a monster of excessively pervasive and inordinately complex proportions. In this view, the recent proliferation of regulations and programs along with the continuing intergovernmentalization of implementation have created a largely uncontrolled and unaccountable system-a kind of "big brother run amok." In this report, the Commission has studied the almost continual addition to and expansion of the federal government's now myriad functional roles-roles which have become not only "bigger" sponsibility with a self-aggrandizing bureaucracy from the standpoint of expenditures, but "broad- or a headline-grabbing presidency or an insidious er" in their operational inclusiveness, and "deep- network of special interests confuse far more than er" in their intergovernmental intrusiveness. The they enlighten. Thus, while this study does not bulk of the Commission's research focused on a claim to have formulated a model with prophetic series of case studies examining public assistance capabilities, it does present a description of the pol- (both categorical cash programs and food stamps), icy process and an explanation for the growth of unemployment, higher education, elementary and government which, of necessity, is far more com- secondary education, environmental protection, li- plex than much of the existing literature would braries, and fire protection. While these functional suggest.' In the policy arena, after all, there is no areas comprise only a fraction (albeit a substantial one determinative factor-only the constant re- two-fifths) of the federal government's grant out- sponses of a variety of political actors to each other lays, they nonetheless provide insight into a wide and to the forces which define their environment. and representative range of governmental endeavors-from the massive to the relatively minute. Each of these case studies was designed to illus- Government Growth and the trate the overall dynamics of the policy process and "Inside" Player thus to determine which of a variety of political, economic, and social forces "caused" the existing Amid even this complex interplay, certain actors dimensions of the national government. are distinguished by "larger-than-life" roles. By Two broad types of policy producing and policy virtue of proximity alone, the so-called "Washing- shaping variables-policy actors and environmen- ton insider" at least, would be expected to have a tal influences-were examined in the case studies. leading edge in the expansion of the federal gov- For our purposes, the policy actors included both ernment. In this case, "Washington insiders" or traditional institutional entities and external or "inside players" include traditional institutional noninstitutional entities. Hence, Congress, the actors-Congress, the President, the bureaucracy, President, the bureaucracy, the courts, the press, and the Court-as well as interest groups. Indeed, public opinion, elections, political parties, and that we found that some, but not all, of these "insiders" vast and rapidly swelling army of the "actively were among the major forces responsible for gov- concerned," known collectively as interest groups, ernment growth. And, if one actor, inside or out- were all scrutinized for their effect on and contri- side, has been the most consistently responsible, bution to the growth of the federal government. that actor is Congress. Socio-demographic trends and dislocations, such as war and economic aberrations, constituted the en- THE CONGRESSIONAL POLICY ROLE vironmental influences or forces. If, as some claim, government has gone awry, if the "enumerated Inasmuch as ours is a growing government "of powers" of 1789 have become the immeasurable laws and not of men," the statutory expansion of activities of 1980, if the sublime idea has become, the national government obviously hinges upon the to public and officeholder alike, a subliminal institutional Congress. In the realm of gross statis- nightmare, all these actors and forces are-to a tical possibilities, today's floor vote has a 50-50 greater or lesser extent-responsible. chance of becoming tomorrow's public law. Yet, floor votes arguably are of secondary importance to a complex, aull~~blrnas;enlgmatlc, policy process. Rather, it is another side of Congress-the individual as opposed to the institutional-which, WHO MAKES GOVERNMENT GROW: among all the actors and forces contributing to THE POLICY ACTORS government growth, has loomed largest in the sphere of policy initiation. It is the individual mem- The realm of policymaking as revealed in the ber of Congress, being manifested in the role of Commission's case studies is distinguished by its policy entrepreneur, who has had the most pro- complexities and circularities. Explanations of found and constant influence upon the growth of government growth which place almost total re- government. Policy Entrepreneurship: creasingly the case in the absence of constraints, to Government by the Person narrow, parochial concerns-to actions for action's sake. The policy or public entrepreneur, not unlike her or his counterpart in the private sector, assumes Congressional Entrepreneurshi : responsibility for a venture-in this case a particu- Policy Initiation from Grants to aegulations lar project, program, or policy. In assuming such responsibility, the entrepreneur becomes the ven- A longstanding and central unwritten rule of ture's chief advocate and activist. He or she organ- Congress asserts that it is better to be really well- izes support for the venture, manages the venture informed in a very few areas than to feign knowl- through the legislative maze, and assumes the po- edge in many. The road to legislative power is litical risks of being associated with the venture paved with jacks-of-all-trades. So too, there are should it fail. The motives of these entrepreneurs many times when program persistence-a sort of or issues activists, the size and scope of their Congressional combination of loyalty, fortitude, undertakings, and the eventual impact of their pro- and "pestiness"-pays off in terms of statutory re- motional efforts may differ dramatically. Yet, one alization. Among the case studies, the clearest ex- fact is clear. In each of the cases which the Com- ample of such persistence was found in the food mission studied, public entrepreneurship of one stamp program and its champion, Rep. Leonor K. sort or another-Congressional, Presidential, bu- Sullivan (D-MO). reaucratic, special interest-was the predominant Indeed, for Sullivan, the food stamp program factor in policy genesis and maturation. Moreover, was a sort of legislative raison d'etre. Waging an in every case, only Congress played a consistently almost quixotic battle against the steadfastly op- crucial role and in all but one of these program posed Eisenhower Administration, Republican areas, the Congressional role was manifest most members of Congress, hostile committee chair- often not in the form of Congress as an institution men, and rural and southern reticence, Sullivan, but rather in the form of Congress as an indian Agriculture Committee outsider, waited ten vidual-in other words, through Congressional en- years for the opportunity to logroll her bill into trepreneurship. law. Thereafter, the Missouri Congresswoman Because entrepreneurship is a human activity, continued to fight and bargain for favorable provi- variations on the theme are nearly as numerous as sions and against unfriendly amendments. the individuals involved. The Congressional entre- The impetus for Sullivan's uphill entrepreneur- preneur may be a powerful committee or subcom- ship was pervasive malnourishment among her mittee chairperson with ready access to strategic own constituents, residents of a poor district in St. support or she or he may be a struggling freshman Louis. In a similar vein, the stimulus for Sen. Paul with little immediate backing beyond an inexperi- Douglas' (D-IL) sponsorship of the Area Redevelop- enced staff and a far-away constituency. More- ment Act (ARA)-the granddaddy of structural over, entrepreneurs may choose to pursue single unemployment and manpower programs-was the programs, broad regulations, or entire policy "hard-core" unemployment found in southern 11- areas. In addition, entrepreneurship may be a solo linois in the 1950s. In fact, Douglas' six-year pur- undertaking, a joint venture, or a struggle among suit of ARA bore a number of striking similarities incipient supporters each competing for a portion to Sullivan's food stamp quest. of the glory attached to a successful and popular First, his plan was opposed by Eisenhower and a policy or program. And, while the Congressional majority of Congressional Republicans. Second, he entrepreneur is generally the political horse lead- initially encountered southern and rural enmity. ing a cart full of interests, occasionally the cart Third, realization of his proposal awaited the elec- may nudge the horse into a trot, if not a full gallop. tion of a Democratic administration. And, finally, Finally, in pursuing programs, policy entrepre- the path to legislative fruition was strewn with neurs may be reacting to grave national crises or timely compromises and propitious coalition problems with innovative national solutions; to the building. serious problems of local constituents which also Yet a different characterization of the "persis- coincidently happen to be genuine national prob- tent sponsor" was provided by Sen. Warren Mag- lems requiring national mitigation; or, as is in- nuson (D-WA) and his role in the creation and passage of the Fire Prevention and Control Act of One of the clearest examples of Congressional is- 1974. Magnuson, a member of, the Senate since sue activism in the regulatory arena appeared in 1944, possessed neither the "underdog" qualities the case of Title IX of the Education Amendments of Douglas, or especially Sullivan, nor Sullivan's of 1972, which seeks the elimination of sexual dis- near single goal orientation. Nevertheless, Magnu- crimination practices in educational admissions, fa- son did translate an interest in consumerism into cilities, and practices. Authored and championed an intense fire protection advocacy and became the by Rep. Edith Green (D-OR), Title IX resulted from powerful driving force behind a federal role in fire the Oregon Congresswoman's discovery of the ex- prevention and control. istence of sexual bias in many, if not most, institu- As will be illustrated in the following chapter, tions of learning. Enlisting the support of women's totally innovative policies that depart radically groups and sympathetic female Congressional staf- from extant political strategies are seldom made. fers, Green was successful in her endeavor despite A new employment program by any other name- the fact that the bill lacked any interest or support for example, the Manpower Development and from the educational community. I Training Act-is still part of the existing federal While it is not surprising that a female member employment policy. So too, the actors in the policy of Congress would sponsor an antidiscrimination arena-those who mold first generation policies in- amendment, one of the most controversial educa- to second generation programs and third genera- ., tion regulations had a very unusual sponsor in- tion projects-remain fairly constant. And, un- deed, Sen. James Buckley (Conservative-NY). An doubtedly, the most constant actor is the Congres- outstanding case of pure Congressional entrepre- sional entrepreneur. neurship, the Family Educational Rights and Hence, the history of the Morrill Land Grant Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) was adopted in spite College Act is a vivid example of persistent entre- of the fact that it "had not been the subject of Con- preneurship-in the mid-1800s! In 1856, Sen. gressional hearings," and "professional educators Justin Morrill (R-VT) introduced legislation to es- were not involved in drafting the original legisla- tablish at least one national agricultural school. tion nor even aware of its existen~e."~ Encountering strong oppusition rrom soutnern While Congressional entrepreneurs generally Democrats, the Vermont Republican modified his take the lead in policy initiation, they also occasion- legislation the following year to provide land ally function as supporting actors. Such was the grants to the states on behalf of agricultural and case with federal aid to libraries, the impetus for mechanical education. This time opposition issued which was the determined and skillful lobbying of from the White House, and Morrill chose to delay the American Library Association (ALA). Yet, if further action until 1861. Finally, in 1862 Morrill's the ALA was the initiator of the policy process, endurance-aided rather substantially by the no- Congress was the critical sustainer. Rarely taking ticeable physical absence of any southern Congres- the lead, a few members of Congress did respond sional opposition-paid off. The bill passed both to the incessant prodding of the library lobby. houses by large margins. Thus, while Congression- Their rejoinder came in the form of some very al entrepreneurship has vastly accelerated in re- clear, albeit secondary, Congressional entrepre- cent years, it is nonetheless a historically durable neurship. component of the policy process. Since library aid was not a subject that com- Obviously, responding to one's constituency in manded the attention of many legislators, the for- the forms of needed social programs or pork-barrel mation and shaping of policy was left largely to the projects is its own reward and that type of entre- relevant committees and subcommittees, and par- preneurship is probably most common. However, ticularly their chairpersons. Notable in this regard Congressional entrepreneurs bjno means confine were Sen. Lister Hill (D-AL), Chairman of the Sen- themselves to legislative tangibles. Regulation, ate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, who steeped as it often is in lofty goals, symbolic sponsored every bill during the ten-year effort to rhetoric, and instant national press attention, may pass the Library Services Act, and Rep. Edith also present itself as a golden entrepreneurial op- Green, who chaired the House Special Subcommit- portunity. Such regulatory entrepreneurship has tee on Education. been extremely prevalent in federal education Needless to say, on those occasions when Con- policy. gress is goaded into a secondary entrepreneurial role, interest groups are not always the motivating pivotal figure. In order to retain his position as force. Presidents have been known to fan the chief environmental policymaker, he was forced to flames of Congressional activity, as have a few key react to each new actor who entered the process. bureaucrats, intense public opinion, and conspicu- Having watched his proposed "National Air Quali- ous disruptions in the economic and political envi- ty Standards Act" (a series of incremental adjust- ronments. Each of these factors, and others, how- ments to the Air Quality Act of 196Y) eclipsed by ever, will be discussed in subsequent sections. Sen. Henry Jackson's (D-WA) National Environ- mental Policy Act, sweeping Presidential environmental policy statements, brbad proposals by a Policy Escalation and Multientrepreneurship number of members of the House of Representa- In the private marketplace, entrepreneurship is tives, the media-successful Earth Day demonstra- generally thought of as a highly competitive pro- tion sponsored by Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-WI), and cess-as a rule, for every McDonald's there is a an extremely critical Ralph Nader report, Muskie Burger King. In Congress, entrepreneurial compe- was literally forced to come up with something tition manifests itself less often as a "battle be- "bigger and better" or relinquish his leadership tween the cheeseburgers" than as a rivalry among role. His choice was reflected in the Clean Air Act any number of incipient laws, entirely different in of 1970-a radical departure from, rather than in- subject matter, each vying for a place on the cremental addition to, prior environmental legisla- crowded legislative agenda. One person's SALT I1 tion. amendment may well eclipse another's welfare reform bill. Nonetheless, genuine competition over similar or identical issues does occur even on Capi- tol Hill. The most striking example of this sort of Less visible than Presidents, less subject to criti- policy contention was found in the area of environ- cisms of conspiracy than special interests, to deri- mental protection. sion than bureaucrats, or to claims of imperialistic Actually, the first stage of environmental policy- behavior than judges, the Congressional entrepre- making, lasting until approximately 1969, was neur has achieved an entirely undeserved anonymi- dominated by just a few entrepreneurs within Con- ty. Yet, the near universal existence of such policy gress, most notably then Sen. Edmund Muskie (D- activists in the case studies (the above litany des- ME). Thus, Muskie, Chairman of the Senate Sub- cribing only a few of the more notable examples) committee on Air and Water Pollution, was almost belies the notion that Congress acts as a great rub- totally responsible for the development and pas- ber stamp for Presidential, bureaucratic, or in- sage of the air pollution acts of 1965 and 1967, as terest group initiatives. In fact, in most instances, well as for the water pollution acts of 1965 and the opposite would be far closer to the truth. 1966. In the nature of a policy entrepreneur, he massaged and shaped each succeeding piece of leg- Program Growth and the Institutional Congress: islation, slowly enhancing his own role while mak- The Special Case of Welfare ing incremental changes in the policy over which he held sway. Among the cases which the Commission studied, Unlike the first stage, however, the second stage only one lacked any apparent Congressional entre- of the environmental policymaking process, begin- preneurship but even in this case, Congress loomed ning in 1969, involved more than a few Congres- large as the principal policy actor-not in an indi- sional entrepreneurs and supportive interests. As vidual sense but rather in an institutional sense. public interest in the environment intensified and Categorical cash public assistance-Aid to expanded, the number of actors directly involved Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and in the process also expanded. In addition, policy- Supplementary Security Income (SS1)-obviously makers began reacting not only to their own per- does not easily lend itself to the entrepreneurial ceptions of public demands but to the proposals of drive. It would be an odd elected official indeed other policymakers as well. Hence, environmental who wished to proclaim to the world that, "I made policy came to be made in what was essentially an welfare grow." Yet, two major factors have been atmosphere of one-upmanship. responsible for the tremendous long-term growth Inevitably, Sen. Muskie was once again the of cash public assistance: an open-ended appropria- tion based upon federal matching for state spend- Congressional defenders and detractors, and two ing and the institutional Congress. represented the major bases of support for the po- Though incremental and lacking innovation, the litical parties with which they were identified. Congressional welfare role-characterized by Times, however,-as times are wont to do-have benefit increases, formula adjustments, and a changed. If, not so many years ago, the truism as- sometimes near fatalistic response to state spend- serted that "for every broad sector there is an in- ing patterns-has been positive in terms of govern- terest group," today it states that "for every possi- ment growth. However, Congressional control of ble interest there is a group." public assistance is notable not for individual entre- The image of interest groups also has changed. preneurial support nor even for firm group ad- Now, seldom referred to as interest groups, they vocacy but, rather, for its ambivalence. Congress are called, instead, special interests. And, once an "captured" welfare policy-its initiation as part of accepted, albeit not always highly regarded, part the Social Security Act was a clear case of Presi- of a so-called pluralist nation, special interests are dential entrepreneurship-and has retained its now accused of giving rise to nearly all that is mastery of public assistance because aid to the wrong with government, the economy, and a "bal- elderly was a popular program. In the process, it kanized" society. Because special interests are ill- inherited a small program of aid to dependent chil- defined, because they are endowed with a kind of dren-a program which, along with old-age as- collective invisibility, and because they are "al- sistance, was supposed to all but wither away-and ways somebody else," their role in the policy pro- therein lay the seeds of Congressional am- cess has come to be viewed somewhat conspira- bivalence. It is an ambivalence which allows the torially. Hence, last year's hostility toward the collective Congress to deplore the rise of the "wel- "middleman" has become this year's antagonism fare state" while enacting upward formula adjust- toward the "special interest." ments as a means of providing fiscal relief to the Indeed, there is no doubt that special interests states; to decry the "welfare explosion" while re- have blossomed-or, perhaps, more accurately, ex- sisting Presidential pleas for decreased spending; ploded-into a major political force. A recent edi- and to speak often of "welfare reform" but to re- tion of the Congressional Record exhibited an assist real reform. Hence, whatever its liabilities or tonishing 100-page listing of registered Washing- assets, the prime conditioner of the federal role in ton lobbying organizations, including lobbyists for public assistance is the institutional Congress. major businesses, organized labor, and farm groups, but also for (among others) nonprofit citizen and environmental groups, professional associations, research institutes, Indian tribes, ethnic In the creation of policy and the programmatic fraternities, sports leagues, foreign governments, growth of government, the Congressional role- and American municipalities.3 particularly in its entrepreneurial manifestation- Yet, for all their notoriety and numbers, interest has been paramount. Yet, as aesthetically and in- groups have tended to play a secondary-albeit a tellectually compelling as the simple one-variable profoundly significant secondary-role in the pol- answer is, it fails to offer more than a partial ex- icy process. Hence, the importance of such groups planation. Congress may be chief among those who very often lies not in their greatly exaggerated make government grow, but it has been well (often abilities to create or to advocate successfully brand profoundly) supplemented by other policy actors. new policies, but rather in the ability of policies to generate new interest groups. And, once established, a group will inevitably work to sustain the THE INTEREST GROUP POLICY ROLE policy that gave it life. If policy is primarily "created" by Congress, to interest groups-the "off- In simpler times, the term interest group con- spring" of policy-accrues its "care and feeding." jured up a four-fold sectorial image: big business, organized labor, a somewhat amorphous farm The Resultant Interest and movement, and the American Medical Association. Second Generation Policy Growth Each-save the last-had its own cabinet-level department, each could count on a number of strong In the policy process, a common scenario might observe the creation of a program through Con- stitutions and associations largely originated in an- gressional entrepreneurship. In turn, this program swer to the new federal programs of the Great So- or policy might, itself, be said to give birth to a ciety, gaining additional impetus as the financial policy niche-in other words, to form its own small problems of higher education became increasingly space among the vast array of government en- serious during the late 1960s. Hence, far from be- deavors. Because a space by any definition invites ing responsible for most major programs, the occupancy, interested groups (usually program higher education lobby developed, to a consider- beneficiaries) will generally rush to fill it. And, able extent, in response to them. once firmly established in the niche, these "resultant groups" will quite rationally act to per- Opening the Flood Gates: petuate, enlarge, and add on to the policies that Interest Groups and the "Spiral Effect" give them a clear advantage. Since the heightening of federal environmental Closely related to the concept of the "resultant activity in the late 1960s and enactment of the Na- interest" is the notion of a "spiral effect" in public tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969, policymaking. First described in 1962 by political the number of public interest groups concerned economists James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tul- with environmental issues has grown dramatically. lock, the "spiral effect'' is said to occur when Thus, older conservation groups such as the Sierra Club were joined in the battle for antipollution reg- . . . other functional or interest groups, ob- ulations and enforcement by groups such as the serving the success of the first, will now Natural Resources Defense Council, founded in find it profitable to invest resources 1970 in response to NEPA. In turn, such groups (funds) in political organization. The pres- have been instrumental in lobbying for ever more sure group, as such, will rapidly become a stringent laws and in initiating environmental liti- part of the political decision-making pro- gation. cess. Moreover, because of the activities of Though traditionally a fairly powerless govern- such groups, the range and extent of col- ment clientele, welfare recipients acquired the lective action will tend to be increased. As status of an interest group in the mid-1960s more and more groups come to recognize through associations such as the National Welfare the advantages to be secured by special po- Rights Organization (NWRO). Gaining special in- litical dispensation, this organizational terest stature nearly 30 years after the inception of process will continue. The ultimate the federal cash public assistance program, NWRO "equilibrium" will be reached only when and similar groups were themselves the inspira- all groups have become fully ~rganized.~ tional and organizational offshoots of local War on Poverty activities, and thus indirectly of govern- Over time, federal area development aid has pro- mental policy. Relatively short-lived as a potent po- duced just such a spiral effect. Hence, the original litical force, welfare rights groups nonetheless, area development law, the ARA, was regarded as acted frequently in a programmatically expan- "sectional" legislation. Despite its own early sionary capacity, informing poor nonrecipients of demise, the ARA did succeed in creating a demand available services and current recipients of max- for infusion of development funds into increasingly imum rights and benefits under the law. Moreover, more jurisdictions. As a result, by 1979, ARA's in a few cases, the activities of such groups actually successor, the Economic Development Administra- led to local benefit increase^.^ Finally, and perhaps tion (EDA), encompassed fully 84.5% of the na- even more important, these resultant welfare in- tion's population in its 2230 designated areas. terests often played the classic "veto group" role. This substantial accumulation of program consti- This was most evidently the case in NWRO's "Zap tuency was accomplished through a series of liber- FAP" campaign, an ultimately successful effort alizing amendments which, in a little over a aimed at thwarting enactment of the Nixon Family decade, reduced the minimum size of redevelop- Assistance Plan. ment areas from 250,000 to 25,000; redefined the Still another example of the resultant interest status of recipient jurisdictions from "economical- was found in higher education policymaking. The ly distressed communities" to "urban and rural "federal" orientation among higher education in- areas . . . where long-term economic deterioration has occurred or is taking place;" and added pro- and societal development. Surely these interests grams for economic recovery aid in disaster areas, have had a profound impact upon the shape of adjustment assistance for areas experiencing policy and the institutional responses of govern- structural economic dislocations, and emergency ment. Yet, the opposite causal pattern-the effect assistance to areas with unusually high unemploy- of policy and institutions upon the strength and ment rates. EDA, thus, has probably assured its proliferation of special interests-may prove to be survival by responding to nearly every conceivable even more notable, for while in the inception and group claim. development of some programs there has been a clear interest group role, in the birth and matura- The Interest as Instigator tion of most newer special interests there has been a prior governmental policy or program. All of the foregoing, of course, is not to suggest that interest groups never act in a policy initiation THE PRESIDENTIAL POLICY ROLE capacity. Nor, is it always clear just who the actual policy initiator is-the "chicken and egg" analogy If the case studies revealed a surprising amount is often appropriate to the policymaking process. of Congressional activism, they also showed a sur- The so-called "issue network" of committee chairs prising lack of protracted Presidential importance and staffs, affected interests, and bureau and in the ongoing policy process associated with each agency administrators at times obscures legisla- of the functional areas. Part of this "element of tive authorship.6 Hence, in what has been called surprise" stems from the President's automatic the Congressional phase of elementary and second- policy role (after all, somebody's got to sign all ary education policy, lasting from 1870 to around those bills), from his immense visibility (a Congres- 1960, "The actions Congress would be likely to sional entrepreneur may toil for years in order to take . . . were closely tied to what [a variety of] achieve programmatic success with little or no at- groups would accept or reject in any proposed tention from the press, while a single Presidential policy statement will quite often be embossed in By far, the most vivid instance of interest group front page headlines), and from the high expecta- initiative (or special interest policy entrepreneur- tions which surround and, at times, overwhelm the ship) found in the case studies was that of federal modern Presidency. The President's "star" status, aid to libraries and the force behind that aid, the then, may lead to a distortion of his role, at- American Library Association (ALA). While not a tributing to him more interest in or knowledge of a special interest powerhouse, the ALA excelled at a particular issue than he actually possesses. kind of classic coalition building. Naturally, some Needless to say, all of this is not meant to imply of those included in the alliance for library aid were that the President contributes little or nothing to the specialized library organizations such as the the policy process or governmental growth. Quite Association of Research Libraries and the Medical the opposite is true. In fact, at times, and often Library Association. Moreover, not unexpectedly, over the "biggest" issues, no single actor has the education lobby was an invaluable source of ac- loomed larger. tive endorsement and the publishing industry lent at least tacit support. But, ALA's real strength The President as Grand Policy Entrepreneur and the key to its victories was in enlisting group support from organizations whose manifest con- Perhaps the most obvious and certainly the most nection with libraries was tenuous to say the least. dramatic case of Presidential entrepreneurship oc- Thus, the Library Services Act-which aided rural curred in the mid-1930s with the inception, legis- libraries-was supported by farm organizations, lative management, and passage, in 1935, of the and the 1977 renewal of the Library Services and Social Security Act. Truly an omnibus bill, the act Construction Act-which authorized funding for created the current system of nationwide old age urban libraries-was supported by urban groups. insurance, unemployment insurance, three pro- In the years to come, when thoughtful historians grams of categorical cash public assistance, and reflect upon the last two decades, they will un- several programs of social and health services. doubtedly note the rise of special interests as one In practice, the Social Security Act was the pro- of the most significant variables in governmental duct of the Committee on Economic Security. Yet, the committee was Presidentially chosen and while Hence, the success of policies has often turned the members and staff were charged with studying upon very few Presidential words. As half a loaf is and making recommendations on all aspects of eco- sometimes better than no loaf at all, a half-hearted nomic security, their primary concerns reflected or dispassionate Presidential endorsement at those of President Roosevelt. Thus, the lion's share times is better than the whole-hearted enthusiasm of time and effort was spent on the problems of of many. unemployment and old-age insurance. Despite his A notable example of this sort of Presidential overwhelming preoccupation with these facets of promotion is provided in the area of fire protec- economic security, Roosevelt wisely insisted on tion. Early in 1967, President Johnson delivered presenting Congress with an omnibus bill, encom- his Consumer Protection Message to the Congress, passing insurance, public assistance, and social calling on the legislators to "improve our shameful services. Furthermore, despite a number of legisla- record of losses of life and property through fires," tive roadblocks and a certain amount of Congres- and recommending the Fire Safety Act of 1967. The sional "tunnel vision" on the question of old-age appearance of this endorsement in the Presidential assistance, he would accept nothing less from Con- message, enmeshed as it was in a myriad of recom- gress than passage of every portion of his bill. The mendations, did not attract much public attention, success of Roosevelt's "all or nothing" entre- but the fact that the President had spoken did en- preneurial strategy is evident still in the existing courage and give impetus and credibility to those Social Security, unemployment insurance, and working for federal assistance. Furthermore, it as- cash public assistance system. sured consideration of fire legislation by the Con- The other outstanding case study example of the gress. grand policy entrepreneur was found in the person Obviously, in 1967 the concept of federal aid for of Lyndon Johnson and his sponsorship of the War fire protection was not foremost among the many on Poverty effort. Like Roosevelt three decades grave problems facing the President. Nor was it before him, Johnson transmitted to a task force a probably even among the secondary issues to be at- set of specific policy themes-in this instance, tacked on a sunnier day. Yet, whether through the "poverty" rather than "economic security." And, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and like Roosevelt, Johnson excelled at legislative man- Technology or through the possible intercession of agement. In fact, political scientist James L. Sund- Vice President Humphrey, fire protection found its quist has asserted that Johnson's sponsorship of way into the Presidential message and, eventually, the Economic Opportunity Act of 196.4 was "the fire protection aid found its way into the array of most extreme case of legislative initiative by the federal programmatic endeavors. President almost to the exclusion of Con- Though the recipient of somewhat more Presi- gress . . . .lY8 With the proper confluence of per- dential attention than fire protection, federal aid sonal (the Roosevelt and Johnson personalities), to libraries also was endorsed as a lesser part and political (legislative savvy), emotional (intense poli- parcel of a broader policy preoccupation. Hence, in cy interest), and environmental (receptive public, President Kennedy's 1963 special education mes- press, and political climate) elements-and no sage to Congress, he declared that educational op- doubt, the benevolent intercession of the fates- portunity was dependent, among other things, up- the Presidency may be a most powerful entrepre- on "general community educational resources neurial tool. Such a fortuitous confluence, how- [such] as the public library." This endorsement, ever, fails to occur more often than not. along with the placement of aid to libraries amid the other titles of an omnibus education bill, led cir- The President as Dispassionate Promoter cuitously to the passage in 1964 of the Library Ser- vices and ConstructionAct. There is a sense in which the Presidency may act Dispassionate Presidential endorsements are not as an agent of governmental growth not merely be- limited only to the relative minutia among poten- cause of itself, but in spite of itself. The visibility, tial programs. Indeed, something as large as the the expectations, and the centrality of the office Employment Act of 19.46, the single most important may act to overwhelm its occupant, or, at the very step in the governmental "institutionalization" of least, attribute to him more interest in or knowl- Keynesian economic theories, may warrant little edge of a given problem than actually is the case. more than passing Presidential interest. Thus, although Presidential leadership had been the Congressional public assistance system. Heed- an important ingredient in the passage of much of ing the clarion call of social welfare workers, they the New Deal social and economic legislation, this sought to "eliminate" the welfare clientele was not the case with the Err~ploywmtAct. In fact, through social rehabilitative services. The pro- even the lukewarm support initially proffered by grams were largely unsuccessful; the number of Roosevelt was probably due more to Republican clientele grew. ' opponent Thomas E. Dewey's endorsement of full Finally, Presidents Nixon and Carter sought to employment than to any real Presidential commit- reform welfare through federalization, guaranteed ment. Moreover, despite the fact that President uniform incomes, and program consolidation. Thus Truman tried to play a more forceful role, his pro- far, the bulk of cash public assistance (AFDC) has motional effort merely succeeded in securing the proven resistant to all but the most incremental bill's place on the legislative agenda. Thereafter, measures passing for reform. the formation, extent, and passage of the act pro- In aid to both elementary and secondary and ceeded according to Congressional design. higher education, Presidents have tried with notable lack of success to control seemingly inevitable The President as Restrainer program growth and financial expansion. Hence, as early as 1966, President Johnson proposed a If Presidents tend to be enamored of costly, 50% cut in the popular impact aid portion of the large-scale projects such as Social Security and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Far War on Poverty, there is a conflicting Presidential from "winning the battle," Johnson's effort at role which places them squarely in the forefront of "saving" resulted in a continuation of full federal budgetary restraint. The President, guiding and funding for the program, overall Senate education guided by the Office of Management and Budget authorizations amounting to almost $1 billion (OMB), is the country's chief budgeteer and, above his request, and a $700 million increase in whether or not a viable long-run goal, promising to the final legislation. Moreover, this trend contin- balance the nation's budget has long been part of ued under Nixon, when, in 1969, the Administra- the standard candidate lexicon. In addition, Presi- tion's proposed $450 million reduction in the dents attempt to play another sort of restraining education budget was met in Congress with a $1 role: that of restrainer of organizational and pro- billion increase. grammatic bloat. Thus, along with "low costs," the A similar pattern emerged in higher education rhetoric of the Presidency includes "efficiency" under President Nixon. In 1971, the Administra- and "no waste." In both these incrementalist tion submitted to Congress a proposal which re- restraining roles-budgetary and institutional- quired that aid to students be more strictly tar- Presidents generally have been less than suc- geted on the basis of need, and limited total aid cessful. even to these students to $1,400 per year. In addi- Over time, the most lucid example of the impo- tion, more emphasis was to be placed on loans than tence of Presidential restraint or reform efforts is grants, and higher education categoricals were to provided in the welfare area. Of course, the federal be consolidated into a "National Foundation for public assistance role was Presidentially initiated Higher Education." between 1933 and 1935. But, since that time, Needless to say, the proposals were roundly criti- Presidents have attempted in three distinct, refor- cized in Congress from all sides-for their limited mist ways to regain a welfare role. In all three budget, heavy reliance on loans, and inattention to ways, they have been unsuccessful. the needs of hardpressed schools and middleclass First, beginning with the Truman Administra- students. As a result, the bill received little support tion, Presidents have attempted to curb welfare from either side of the aisle in Congress and spending by asking Congress to hold the line on the represented another resounding education defeat federal share of benefikg Congress, in turn, gen- for the Nixon Presidency. erally has responded to such Presidential requests Not so many years ago, little was expected of the by increasing benefits, or the federal share in national government. Of course, our expectations benefits, or both. have changed considerably. Much has come to be Second, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson expected of government. But, if much is expected sought to get a handle on welfare by circumventing of government in general, more than much is expected of its most visible officer, the President. He fied as bureaucratic jurisdictional expansion, this is expected at once to be the purveyor of new pana- type appeared neither frequently nor clearly cean policies and of a tight, no-growth budget; to enough to attribute to any one or several innovate while holding the nation firmly to its tra- bureaucrats or a bureaucracy a conscious effort at ditions; and to provide programmatic latitude power aggregation. while keeping tight reins on the bureaucracy. At times-in fact, at many times-these contradictory The Bureaucracy and Regulatory Law and semicelestial expectations have not been realized in practice. Often, increasingly, and particularly in the realm Hence, while in certain large expansionary ef- of regulatory law, the Congressional tendency has forts Presidents have had notable successes, they been to write and pass broad, symbolic legislation have exhibited an equally notable propensity for devoid of much substantive content. It falls then to failure in their companion restraint role. More- an administrative agency to define the scope and over, any number of assumed Presidential "suc- intent of the law. Such broad delegation of power cesses" have occurred in areas in which the Presi- has been called, by political scientist Theodore J. dent's interest was transitory at best; in which he Lowi, "policy without law," a Congressional tend- played effective lip service to a "winning" pro- ency that "has wrapped public policies in shrouds gram or policy. The Presidential role, then, has of illegitimacy and ineffectiveness."ll And, it is been ambivalent, at times enigmatic, and in its tri- within the realm of such regulatory delegation that ple functional designations of grand entrepreneur, the potential for a bureaucratic effect upon the half-hearted endorser, and largely impotent government growth has been the greatest. restrainer, perhaps overly ambitious. One of the broadest regulatory delegations found in the case studies occurred with the enactment of THE BUREAUCRATIC POLICY ROLE the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. The Council on Environmental Quality Even more than the President, the federal bu- (CEQ) was instructed to develop policies in accord- reaucracy was found in the case studies to have ance with the purposes of NEPA and was charged had a far less substantial role in the growth of gov- with evaluating other federal programs in order to ernment than much of the literature would sug- determine if their activities were contributing to gest.1° As always, however, the standard caveat "the purposes of [the] act:" applies: A less substantial role than expected To declare a national policy which will should not imply no role at all. Obviously, just as encourage productive and enjoyable har- Congress always automatically plays a role mony between man and his environment; through passage, and Presidents through their sig- natory responsibilities, so some segment of the bu- to promote efforts which will prevent or reaucracy must always be charged with carrying eliminate damage to the environment and out the law. Thereafter, the latitude afforded to biosphere and stimulate the health and the bureaucrats in question is often dependent up- welfare of man; to enrich the understand- on the type of law and, even more important, the ing of the ecological systems and natural degree of specificity or latitude in the legislative resources important to the nation; and to language. establish a Council on Environmental Moreover, within the realm of already estab- Quality. l2 lished broad policy areas, bureaucrats may seek to Needless to say, the "purposes" of the act were become advocates for additional (or second genera- so sweeping, philosophical, and symbolic as to tion) programs. Such activity, classified as jurisdic- force the CEQ into the role of legislative inter- tional expansion or empire-building, has tradition- preter prior to developing policies or enforcement ally been the subject of much public administration mechanisms. Under such circumstances, the coun- literature-often to the point where the reader cil cdnceivably could have amassed a tremendous might assume that most bureaucrats are engaged amount of power and jurisdictional latitude. Yet, most of the time in a byzantine atmosphere of the fact that it ultimately chose for itself a relative- power accumulation. Yet, while the case studies ly limited role-leaving the more substantive envi- did include a few examples which might be classi- ronmental tasks to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), created one year later through federal air pollution enforcement procedure had Presidential reorganization-indicates that the po- been discussed throughout much of the 1950s, the tential for bureaucratic power under broad regula- actual realization of even the most benign enforce- tory grants often remains exactly that. ment procedures was successfully resisted until A different characterization of the bureaucracy 1963. Significantly, the bulk of this resistance and its potential under more or less symbolic Con- came from the Public Health Service (PHs), the gressional regulatory enactments is provided in very agency which would have gained jurisdic- the area of higher education and, particularly, Title tionally from the new procedures. IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, prohibit- In 1975, in the welfare field, yet another example ing sex discrimination in educational institutions. of bureaucratic resistance managed to thwart As was clearly the case three years earlier with change. Hence, not at all willing to administer a NEPA, the winning Congressional vote was based new negative income tax, or Income Supplement almost entirely on vague and lofty principles, Plan (ISP) as the proposal was dubbed under the rather than on any understanding of legal implica- Ford Administration, then HEW Secretary Caspar tions. As a result, "Congress made no attempt to Weinberger sought to have the potential new wel- provide a clear and complete definition of what fare system run by the Internal Revenue Service constituted sex discrimination in education,"l3 and (IRS). An indication of Treasury's "willingness" to an ill-experienced and virtually unguided Office of allow agency expansion was duly noted by officials Civil Rights (OCR) was compelled to draft the reg- of the department in their claim that there would ulations, a process that took an arduous three be "nothing but trouble for the department and the years of labor. IRS if the revenue collection agency were to be In July 1975, the final regulations of Title IX assigned the job of running ISP."14 took effect. They were far-reaching and prompted vociferous controversy. Yet, considering their long and difficult development, the regulations cannot The Bureaucracy and Program Initiation be said to have evolved without ample opportunity for oversight. Both the President and Congress In the realm of program initiation, the bureau- could have intervened to reject or alter the regula- cratic role may be described as sporadic and large- tions since the law required unusual Presidential ly secondary. That is, in the cases studied, bureau- and Congressional clearance procedures prior to cratic policy entrepreneurs were relatively infre- implementation. All of this potential oversight, quent actors and generally entered the initiation however, resulted only in very limited revisions. process in a supportive role at the behest of some Hence, in this case, far from searching after a other actor, usually the President. Certainly this power role, the bureaucracy had a substantial occurred in the previously mentioned instances of amount of power thrust upon it. In much, if not Presidential grand policy entrepreneurship, the most, of regulatory delegation, the facts indicate Social Security Act and the War on Poverty effort. much less a mad and calculated bureaucratic In both cases, the President ordered the bu- scramble for unbridled autonomy than a modern reaucracy to create far-reaching legislation based variation on Tammany Hall boss and pundit, upon specific Presidential guidelines. Although in George Washington Plunkitt's guide to political each case the bureaucratic role or effect was pro- survival: "I seen my opportunities [and I passed up found, it was primarily an extension of Presiden- most of 'em]." tial entrepreneurship. In like manner, the Depart- ment of Health, Education, and Welfare's (HEW) The Btmaucracy and Functional Resistance role in the War on Poverty and the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) importance in pushing for As previously noted, the case studies found few food stamp legislation reflected the priorities of (if any) true instances of bureaucratic empire build- Presidents Johnson and Kennedy, respectively. ing. In fact, the instances of bureaucratic re- In fact, in only one program which the Commis- sistance to the accumulation of new and additional sion studied-the rural community fire program- responsibilities were much clearer and more did a segment of the bureaucracy manifestly act as notable. a primary policy entrepreneur. Hence, "empire Thus, although the possibility of some form of building" on the part of the U.S. Forest Service may have been a factor in agency efforts to broad- functional scope 'of government. But, in a much en its activities and some feel that the service larger sense-one often underlying rather than engaged in a "power grab." Equally plausible is specifically stated in the case studies-the Court the theory that the service recognized a need and may send signals to the other branches and levels moved to fill it. Whatever the case, the Forest Ser- of government, interested groups, and the cit- vice clearly acted as the initiator, chief promoter, izenry at large of just what is or what is not legally and prime mover behind the federal role in rural. and even morally and politically acceptable. fire protection. Hence, since the so-called Roosevelt-Court battle In a broad sense, it would appear that the federal in 1937, Congress has been relatively uncon- bureaucracy is doing precisely what it legally and strained in its interpretation of what is "necessary theoretically should be doing and little more. Re- and proper," of what constitutes legitimate spend- sponding to Congressional and Presidential man- ing for the "general welfare," 2nd of what activi- dates, the power of the bureaucracy and its effect ties-intra as well as interstate-are justifiable na- upon government growth are almost entirely de- tional concerns under the interstate commerce pendent upon the latitude provided by legislators clause.16 Moreover, since the early 1920s,17 the and the chief executive. Moreover, the single case Court has consistently given its okay to the ac- study instance of pure bureaucratic entrepreneur- complishment of national purposes through condi- ship may represent less a statement of bureau- tional grants-in-aid. All of these judicial "green cratic behavior per se, than the exception that pro- lights" offered to Congress the legal mechanisms ves the larger rule: In government growth, policy for expanding the federal functional role. entrepreneurship has been the most significant Yet, in spite of the fact that the national govern- factor-in such a large field, there is occasionally ment possessed the legal authority and means for room for everyone. expansion, the prevailing political climate or mood prevented the widespread or all-purpose use of THE JUDICIAL POLICY ROLE them. And, despite the cost and importance of the New Deal programs, the quantity and types of Determining the political impact of the "non- functions that the national government was willing political" branch of government has proven to be to delve into remained relatively small until the no mean feat for any number of astute analysts. 1960s, when a number of factors began to erode The judiciary does not, in a technical or visible the existing political constraints. Having been sense, create or pass laws; it has no tangible means chief in offering the legal mechanisms for expan- of execution or implementation; and though the ac- sion just a few decades before, the Court was also tivity is not unheard of among "actively con- chief among those setting the political mood for ex- cerned" jurists, lobbying by judges is, at most, con- pansion. sidered somewhat unethical and, at least, is seldom Thus, through the mid to late 1950s and continu- noted in legislative histories. Yet, even the most ing and gaining momentum through the 1960s and casual observer may intuit a not unsubstantial judi- 1970s, what has come to be known as "judicial ac- cial role in the expansion of the federal govern- tivism" worked both directly and circuitously to ment, for in its narrowest, most specific sense, the enlarge the number and types of functions that judiciary interprets statutory law, while in its were felt to be legitimate national activities under broadest sense, according to a former Chief Justice Congress' substantial spending and commerce of the Supreme Court, "We are under a Constitu- powers and under the First and Fourteenth tion, but the Constitution is what the judges say it Amendments. Moreover, the judicial philosophy is . . . ."15 pervading one area of Constitutional concern-for example, discrimination-may have the effect of Creatin the Climate for Ex ansion: broadening and deepening federal involvement in a The Ju #~ciary as Political "8 reen Light" discrete statutory function. An excellent case study example of this lies within the realm of ele- The Court may, of course, rule on the legitimacy mentary and secondary education. of narrow statutory language or on the degree to Several factors have been at work in the expan- which implementation matches Congressional in- sion of the Court's-and, thus, the federal govern- tent. In each way it contributes to the shape and ment's-role in education. First, of course, has been the process of Constitutional interpretation. mental Constitutional issues. It is in such areas The Constitution itself is generally vague, requir- that a judicial decision may affect not only the sub- ing the Court to give meaning to such expressions stance of government and society, but create an as "equal protection of the laws." New interpreta- overall mood of expansion (or retrenchment as has tions have expanded the judicial role in education occurred in the past) thereby producing a circular in several ways. Development of the First Amend- chain of activity as described above. However, the ment guarantees has been part of a 20th century work of the Court often departs from the sublime, trend of applying the Bill of Rights to state prac- moving into the more mundane aspects of statu- tices, in contrast to earlier interpretations. In addi- tory interpretation. And, while far less dramatic, tion, the Court has increased its role of defending the Court also has had an expansionary effect in the rights of "discrete and insular minorities" this area. which may be protected in the majoritarian demo- Since 1970, the Court has been forced to rule in- cratic process. creasingly on environmental matters, both in inter- Another engine of judicial expansion has been preting the vague intent of Congress under NEPA the institutional process of Court involvement. and in compelling action under the highly technical This can be seen in the race discrimination cases. terms of the clean air and water acts-a task that Implementation of the Brown18 decision appeared would seem to require the training of an engineer to be a moderate process of "all deliberate speed." rather than that of a lawyer. Such Court interven- Yet, such eminent observers as Archibald Cox tion into the environment has had at least two ex- argue that it entailed a new dimension of judicial pansionary consequences. enforcement.lg Rather than simply prohibiting a In the first place, the court system has provided certain practice, it established "affirmative one more arena in which environmental battles can duties" on the part of the defendant jurisdiction, take place. This has been especially true in increas- since the latter had to institute specific reforms in ing the visibility and, consequently, the power of order to comply with the law. A lack of compliance environmental and conservation interest groups- could produce increasingly detailed instructions on some of which were formed originally for the sole conformity, urged by the plaintiff. An unexpected purpose of bringing litigation. In the second place, degree of judicial involvement in the everyday ad- the federal courts have served to expand further ministration of a school could, and did, thereby, the federal environmental role both by strictly in- evolve from the process of enforcement. terpreting NEPA, and thus, giving meaning to A third factor increasing educational litigation often vague portions of the legislation, and by put- has been the effect of other governmental pro- ting their weight, as the third branch of govern- grams. In other words, judicial activity sets a po- ment, behind the federal environmental effort. litical tone which may act to fan the flames of Con- The Court has been a powerful, if often cir- gressional activity which, in turn, produces more cuitous, instrument of government growth. Over judicial activity. Thus, federal laws such as Title IX time, it has provided Congress with the mecha- and the Ciwil Rights Act (themselves inspired part- nisms for pursuing growth, the climate for enact- ly by judicial civil rights rulings) have required judi- ing growth, and the legal interpretations for imple- cial interpretation. In enlarging requirements to menting growth. Moreover, it has served as an provide bilingual education, the Supreme Court arena for-and sometimes, itself, spawned addi- based its decision upon the Civil Rights Act.20 In tional-interest groups. The "nonpolitical" branch addition, several federal programs have funded of government, then, has been a potent force in de- lawyers engaged in educational litigation. The veloping the political shape of the nation. Civil Rights Act created a staff for its legal enforcement, and the Econmic Opportunity Act and other programs have established grants for legal Government Growth and the assistance services. "External" Actor

The Judiciary and Statutory Interpretation Certain "actorsw-public opinion, elections, political parties, and the press-which have an ef- Historically, the Court has had its most profound fect upon the absolute size, breadth, and depth of and visible impact when ruling on broad and funda- the federal government are endowed with traits which distinguish them from the "inside players" polls, through any number of citizen participation reviewed above. First, they all act indirectly upon devices,21 through direct contact or correspond- the functional scope of government. That is, they ence with elected officials, or, in its most extreme do not legislate, administer, legally sanction, or form short of revolution, through popular demon- lobby for particular policies. Though intrinsically strations. tied to government, they are government out- siders. The Dual Role of Demonstrations: Second, of course, they are less visible in an indi- Expansionary Force and Veto Mechanism vidual sense, and thus, more difficult to personify than the inside player. The roles and rationales of a Most of the case study programs were not the particular Representative, President, Cabinet Sec- stuff of demonstration democracy. Federal aid to retary, Chief Justice, or lobbyist are much easier to libraries could hardly be expected to evoke the analyze than those of Jane Q. Public or John Doe. same emotional response as a war, basic civil Finally, each of these "external" actors, loosely rights, or abortion. Nonetheless, public demonstra- construed, may be alleged to, in some way, mea- tions did have a significant impact on the develop- sure or organize popular desires. This differentiat- ment of two of the policy areas studied. In one ing characteristic is the most significant of all, for case, the demonstration technique was large-scale, a common and certainly enduring complaint as- broad-based, and part of a number of factors which serts that popularly elected officials, particularly resulted in a much larger and more aggressive fed- Representatives and Senators, are not responsive eral role. In the other, the demonstrations were to the people that they claim to represent. Yet, small, segmentally confined, and acted as an effec- even a brief review of the activities of the inside tive veto to a greater federal role. - players, and especially Congress, would seem to in- In the previous discussion of "multientrepre- dicate that they respond often, to everyone, and neurship," it was noted that a number of factors with the energy of one possessed. The very quanti- accounted for the radical departure in the early ty and topical scope of legislation which has 1970s from business-as-usual in environmental emanated from Capitol Hill, at least since the mid- policymaking. Among the most salient was the 1960s, suggests that hyper-responsiveness is the rapid growth of an unusually intense public in- Congressional rule, hypo-responsiveness, the ex- terest in the effects of pollution and the benefits of ception. a clean environment. This interest manifested it- Hence, responsiveness per se is not the problem. self in a number of ways including public opinion Rather, two instrumental questions arise: To what polls, and, to a certain extent, elections. However, is government responding? And, how accountable the most dramatic displays of public sentiment has it been following the initial response? In other were found in a series of popular demonstrations words, have the "people" gotten what they and, in particular, in one occurring on April 22, wanted? The question, "to what is government re- 1970, Earth Day. sponding," will be explored in the following pages. Though no exact figures are available, it has The question of accountability will be pursued in been estimated that participants in Earth Day ac- the following chapter. tivities across the nation numbered in the millions, represented a broad cross-segment of society- THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION though by far, and very significantly, support was AND ELECTIONS greatest among the nation's most politically influential segment, the white middle class-and had a Public opinion is measured in a number of ways. tremendous impact upon federal policymakers. In a representative democracy, of course, elections Such an outpouring of sentiment could hardly be are the traditional orderly, as well as legal/consti- ignored. In fact, elected officials all over the coun- tutional means of expressing popular desires or try joined in the activities, prompting one journal- opinions. Yet, vox populi is not always orderly, not ist to quip that, "So many politicians were on the always willing to express itself only biennially, and stump that Congress closed down. The oratory, not always able to encourage the adoption of dis- one of the wire services observed, was 'as thick as crete policy positions at the ballot box. Hence, pop- smog at rush Though organizers touted ular sentiment may be expressed through opinion Earth Day as a spontaneous grassroots movement, the number of official participants with prepared the bill's legislative route. Though hardly the gen- speeches would seem to belie their claim. And, in- eralized statement of broad support found in the deed, the event was well orchestrated, represent- environmental movement, NWRO's opposition ing yet another of those disturbing (from the an- tactics convinced liberal members of Congress to alyst's point of view) circularities which repeatedly escalate the benefit levels of FAP to the point occur in policymaking. where no conservative (nor even the bill's author, Hence, in large measure, the "spontaneous Richard Nixon) would support it. The result was grassroots" Earth Day movement offers just one stalemate, the eventual withering away of viable more example of Congressional entrepreneurship. support for the bill, and, ultimately, retention of The idea for and planning of Earth Day came not the seemingly static intergovernmental system of from a gasping citizen of Los Angeles or Gary but welfare. from Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-WI), who was joined in his efforts by Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-CA). Letter Writing and the Growth of Moreover, heavy press coverage of ecological dis- The Food Stamp Program asters arose almost simultaneously with the first If there is one political participatory instruction inklings of public interest in the environment, mak- which the American public receives as much as, if ing it difficult to determine which led which. Final- not more than, "vote for the candidate of your ly, enactment of the first of the new style environmental laws, NEPA, occurred five months before choice, but vote," it is, "if you've got a gripe, write Earth Day. Yet, despite these dilemmas of causali- to your Congressman." In recent years, especially, ty, Earth Day itself did most assuredly change the some groups and organizations have become ex- shape of policymaking. Normally, policy is for- tremely sophisticated in inspiring mass letter mulated and then legitimated. However, according writing campaigns in order to "postally" innun- to political scientist, Charles 0. Jones: date Congress. How reflective this sort of letter writing is of public sentiment has never been Whereas we normally think of formula- satisfactorilly gauged. Yet, because of the election's preceding majority-building in the toral facts of life, Congress can ill afford to ignore policy process . . . , in 1970 [in the environ- huge volumes of mail. In one case study, such let- mental field] a majority seemingly awaited ter volume did indeed produce an expanded federal unspecified strong action. Thus, instead of role. a majority having to be established for a While it no doubt seems hard to believe today, policy, a policy had to be constructed for a the food stamp program was floundering in 1968 majority. Much of that occurred within for lack of use. Yet, within a two-year period the Congress as proposals escalated toward program had begun its explosion. Part of the rea- various actors' perceptions of what was son lay in an outpouring of public sentiment necessary to meet public demands.23 through the mails. Like the environment, public opinion regarding food stamps was intrinsically When broad-based, focused, and "loud," demon- linked to.press coverage. However, in this case, its stration democracy can be a powerful instrument manifestation was very different. Thus, following of government growth. a CBS television documentary detailing wide- In precious few instances in recent history has spread hunger and even starvation in the United any group or segment of society acted as a veto to States, the letter writing public demanded a mas- increased federal involvement. However, as noted sive government effort to alleviate nutritional pov- in the section on interest groups, the National Wel- erty. As a result, Congress and the Nixon Adminis- fare Rights Organization (NWRO) staged an effec- tration took steps to liberalize food stamp benefits tive campaign to thwart the federalization (though (on average they doubled), eligibility rules, and it was opposed to the lower benefits and work as- payment scales. pects of the plan rather than federalization as such) of welfare under the Nixon Family Assistance Plan (FAP). Vague Mandates and Amorphous Support: The Role of Public Opinion Polls in Part of NWRO's strategy was based on demon- Government Growth stration. Hence, members of the group staged sit- ins and rallies at a number of strategic points along In the era of Proposition 13, when the public appears to be demanding less government, it has Vague Mandates and Amorphous Sup ort: been noted that "less government" does not The Role of Elections in Government erowth necessarily mean fewer or smaller programs. Rather, "less government" seems to mean, on one Throughout time, elections have been the legiti- , level, a concrete desire for less burdensome taxes, mate means by which support or opposition for and, on another, perhaps more profound level, a governmental activism has been expressed. Of deep-seated American ideological commitment to course, at the most fundamental level, elections the Jeffersonian notion of limited government, or are the source of Congressional entrepreneur- the "negative liberal state." ship-a majority (or, at least, a plurality) of his or Americans, thus, display-and, in fact, have in- her voting constituents put each entrepreneur into creasingly displayed since the New Deal-a strik- office. Yet, for our purposes, the importance of ing ambivalence toward the role of the modern elections lies in their real or perceived outcome as state. That is, we tend to consent to the growth of mandates and their function as an ex post facto government in a discrete programmatic sense, but means of approval. In this capacity, election re- disdain the growth of government in a broad philo- sults may be said to have contributed to the growth sophic sense. Remarking upon this simultaneous of government. attraction toward and repulsion from government Two elections have been extremely important in as early as 1964, public opinion experts Lloyd Free both regards. In 1936 and 1964, the public was per- and Hadley Cantril coneluded that most Americans ceived not only to be providing Presidents Roose- could be described as "operational liberals" and velt and Johnson and the Democratic Congresses "ideological conservatives." Hence, many who with resounding approval of past activist policies continue to identify with the negative liberal state but with "mandates" for additional activism. in the abstract fully support governmental ac- Moreover, three other elections have also been tivism in specific instances.24 Nowhere is this notably significant-two, in 1932 and 1958, as per- American paradox seen more clearly than in public ceived "mandates" and one, in 1934, as an elec- opinion polls. toral ratification of past activity. Hence, whether Not unexpectedly, among the case study ex- or not correct, the way in which past Presidents amples, the most dramatic instance of public opin- and Congresses have perceived election results has ion poll support for strong government activism contributed to broad (as well as narrow) activist was found in the environment. Between 1969 and policies and, consequently, government growth. 1971, according to the Opinion Research Corpora- tion, the environment jumped from being last THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES among a series of problems with which the public was concerned to second among those prob- It is, no doubt, obvious to the reader that in each lem~.~~Moreover, the environment, along with case citcd of public entrepreneurship by elected of- health, was found by the National Opinion Re- ficials, most of the officials in question had one out- search Center in 1973 to be second only to crime standing commonality: they were all Democrats. among federal program areas in which the public And, significantly, in spite of the waning influence felt the federal government was spending "too lit- of political parties, the Democratic Party has long tle."26 The public appeared to be providing the and with much publicity been labeled the party of government with a mandate to move full speed "big spendersv-yet, people continue to elect ahead on environmental matters and, after it had, Democrats. How, then, have the political parties indicating support for that effort and more. and the people (electorate) who sustain them con- In the areas of federal spending for education, tributed to government growth? A cursory tracing unemployment, and even welfare, over time, public of partisan differences over the past half century is opinion polls have offered at least vague support highly instructive. (though very recently such support has been declin- Current conceptions of the two major political ing for welfare).27 Thus, through polls, the public parties-often bordering on the mythological-be- favors a federal program presence. And, though gan, of course, with the party realignment of the often amorphous or highly generalized, such artic- New Deal. Under Roosevelt's leadership, the ulation of support may be viewed as just one more Democratic Party advanced a broad range of inno- "green light" for government growth. vative programs which jointly constituted an enormous transformation in the functions, size, and marizing his philosophy with the remark that: power of the federal government. In addition, "We're in favor of a lot of things, and we're World War 11, under the leadership of a Demo- against mighty few."28 The result appeared to be cratic President and Congress, greatly expanded a definitive statement of electoral support for gov- the national scope of activity. ernment doing "a lot of things;" opposition to its It is impossible to say just how much further this doing "mighty few." Hence, in 1964, the trait of expansionary tendency would have gone if Demo- "operational liberalism," identified by Free and crats had retained Congressional leadership, for Cantril, won out over more traditional values, and they did not and with obvious consequences. The the remaining conservative logjam was broken in post-war agenda outlined in President Roosevelt's Congress. Economic Bill of Rights and in President Truman's The new political strength of the liberal activists Fair Deal did poorly in Congress. Furthermore, in Congress was reflected in the Great Society's Truman's comprehensive health insurance pro- flood of legi~lation.~~This accumulation of proposal withered and died; aid to education was grams constituted a critical expansion of federal roundly defeated; the Tafi-Hartley Act, a serious activities, both in terms of expenditures and regu- setback for organized labor, passed over the Presi- lations. Nor, significantly, did this trend desist dent's veto; and even the historic Employment Act with the Democratic Presidential defeat of 1968. of 1946 only managed to squeak through Congress Instead, major new regulatory programs such as as a mere shell of its former self. environmental protection and occupational health Yet, despite these "no growth" GOP and "con- and safety were passed (admittedly by Democratic servative coalition" successes, the Republican Par- Congresses) and signed during the Nixon-Ford ty had gradually begun to reconcile itself to the years along with massive new spending initiatives New Deal. Hence, in 1940 the Republicans nomin- such as General Revenue Sharing, a major public ated Wendell Willkie who subsequently ran on a employment program, several countercyclical noticeably "New Deal-ish" platform, while in 1944 spending and work programs, and wage-price con- and 1948, candidate Thomas E. Dewey attempted trols. And, older programs-notably, AFDC and a similar reconciliation with national programs of food stamps-grew tremendously. All of this has social reform. In fact, even President Eisenhower, prompted Theodore Lowi to note that: a fiscal conservative, made no attempt to achieve a significant reversal of the New Deal. Rather, the The national state is no longer a partisan Eisenhower Administration focused on a modest matter at all . . . . There is no longer any reappraisal of the federal government's role in do- variation between the two parties in their mestic affairs, while actually supporting incre- willingness to turn to the positive state, to mental growth of federal activities in selected expand it and to use it with vigor, when- areas. Far from proffering a governmental return ever society's problems seem pressing and to 1931, then, the Republican leadership main- whenever governmental action may jeop- tained and supported a kind of New Deal status ardize electoral opportunities.sO quo. In 1960, however, the "status quo" began Hence, while it may indeed be true that initia- undergoing a profound alteration. tives for government growth were the legislative The election of John F. Kennedy placed a liberal offspring of Democratic entrepreneurs, the contin- activist in the White House and though much of his uation of those growth programs and the fur- program was blocked in Congress by an active and therance of growth itself found full support among effective conservative coalition, his tenure paved the "loyal opposition." the way for the major change in political climate which would occur in 1964. Thus, with the nomina- THE ROLE OF THE PRESS tion of Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) in 1964, the Republican Party reversed a 24-year tradition of It has long been a source of analytical confusion selecting only moderate candidates. It endorsed, whether public opinion leads the press or the press instead, an outspokenly (some would say radically) leads public opinion. Certainly, an intrinsic rela- conservative one. In contrast, the Democratic tionship, if not causality, may often be discerned. candidate, President Lyndon Johnson, urged con- And, in at least two case studies that relationship tinuation of an activist federal government, sum- did exist. Thus, press coverage, in the late 1960s, of eco- Thus, the problem of government growth and , logical disasters such as the Cuyahoga River fire the "supermarbleized" way in which that growth and the great Santa Barbara oil spill heightened has occurred may well lie in the perceptions of public environmental consciousness. In turn, legis- those who make policies-in their interpretations lators were forced into a position whereby they had of the "signals" which the public emits. Or, more to proffer some gesture of concern. The result was likely, it may lie in the realm of accountability-in NEPA. Likewise, the media focus on hunger, how policymakers treat or respond to those through the CBS television program, "Hunger in "signals." And, if those are the "problems" of America," and the widely reported study entitled, government growth, we may just as easily assert Hunger USA, prompted an outpouring of public what is not the "problem" of that growth. The opinion which, for its part, led to the expansion of system may be confused and it may be unaccoun- the food stamp program. Hence, to a certain de- table. It is most certainly not, however, under- gree, the press, too, has functioned as just one responsive. more actor contributing to the growth of the federal government. WHAT MAKES GOVERNMENT GROW: THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT

Has the "popular will," then, through the mechanisms which organize it and through which it ex- Policy actors do not operate in a vacuum. presses itself, contributed to the growth of govern- Rather, they are forced, constantly, to respond not ment? The answer, undoubtedly, is "yes." In both only to other actors (the repeated occurrence of 1932 and 1964, the President and Congress pw- which has been detailed above) but to the econom- ceived a particular type of mandate and acted ac- ic, social, international, technological, and demo- cordingly. Whether or not the perception was graphic environments which surround them. Inas- valid, policymakers thought they were responding much as all these elements remain reasonably appropriately. Moreover, despite its designation as stable, policy might be expected to advance at a the party of "big spenders" and government reasonably stable (or incremental) rate. Yet, the growth, the electorate has chosen Democratic Con- outside environment is not always cooperative: gresses for all but four of the past 50 years and has The Soviet Union seldom consults with U.S. policy- opted for five Democrats out of the last seven makers as to its plans for troop movements, nor elected Presidents. Taking political note of these can our own financial experts agree on the state of public preferences, the Republican Party generally the economy even one or two months in advance. has at least sustained and, in recent history, even Thus, occasionally, both large and small instabili- furthered the tendency toward federal govern- ties in the environment must be dealt with, and the mental growth. political responses to certain of these environ- Public opinion, too, as a "polled" and "demon- mental instabilities have been critical in determin- strated" commodity, has expressed its approval of ing the shape and scope of modern government. government growth-operationally, if not ideologi- For our purposes, environmental instabilities in- cally. Generalized dissatisfaction with government cluded both unanticipated trends and abrupt or more often than not fails to evince itself in specific unexpected dislocations. dissatisfaction with individual government program endeavors. And, in the most extreme and Government Growth and visible instance of "public opinion," the broad and Environmental Dislocations vocal middle class concern over environmental deterioration, Congress, as a political body, had little choice but to respond forcefully and immensely. The term dislocations may encompass any num- On still another level, exemplified by food stamps, ber of critical events, from the extremely severe to area development, and fire protection, specific the mildly disturbing, from those which affect the members of Congress responded to constituent society at large to those which affect only certain needs-precisely the function which members of population segments. Those which are, at once, Congress are supposed to perform. both extremely severe and affect the entire society would be expected to have the greatest impact The metamorphosis of "old Dr. New Deal" into upon the "shapers" and, consequently, the shape "Dr. Win-the-War," also went far in expanding of government. Needless to say, in the time frame the federal role. Normally, entry into a war can be of the case studies, the two most notable examples expected to alter significantly the revenue produc- of this sort have been the Great Depression and ing and expenditure patterns of the central gov- World War 11. ernment fighting the war. After the war, the When the first symptom of the Great Depres- theory espouses, such patterns fail to return to sion, the stock market crash of 1929, occurred, the their pre-war levels.32 America's role in World vast majority of the American public conceived of War 11 and its post-war economy bear this out, for the national government as a kind of vague and re- the most important post-war economic decision moved protector of their rights to "life, liberty, was that the increased and expanded tax base gen- and property." Even at that, the popular expecta- erated by the war could not be substantially re- tion was not that Washington would "protect" duced. Instead, resources formerly devoted to de- against "internal" threats to life by a next-door fense were switched to expanded domestic pur- neighbor or "immediate" threats to property by pose~.~~Hence, in large part, the war effort re- untimely economic reversals-if any governments moved from the federal government many previ- were expected to perform those tasks, they were ously existing fiscal constraints. the states and localities. Rather, the general per- From a discrete programmatic perspective, ception of the national government probably was other less profound dislocations-perhaps more that of protector against broad foreign threats to aptly termed "surprises"-have also been instru- those rights. At the dawn of the 1930s, ideological mental in contributing to an increased national and operational perceptions were fairly consistent. presence. The case studies contain two notable ex- True, the electorate rejected conservative Her- amples of such "surprises." bert Hoover in 1932, but, significantly, not so much One of the most dramatic events of the Cold War because he had not enacted large-scale federal pro- era was the 1957 launching of the Soviet satellite, grams. Instead, his defeat occurred because of a Sputnik. Thereafter, it became the common wis- generalized dissatisfaction with his uninspired dom that Americans suffered from a "knowledge leadership in a time of gravest crisis. Moreover, gap9'-that educationally, we had fallen danger- the man whom the public chose to replace Hoover ously behind our arch-enemy. sounded, during the campaign, a more conserva- In Congress and within the Eisenhower Admin- tive, less government activist note than his oppo- istration, such thinking ended a long-standing re- nent, prompting one commentator to remark that, ligious and racial stalemate over federal aid to edu- "Given later developments, the campaign speeches cation. Thus, the legislation that became the Na- often read like a giant misprint, in which Roosevelt tional Defense Education Act (NDEA) was devel- and Hoover speak each other's lines."31 oped almost simultaneously by Sen. Lister Hill (D- Nor could it be alleged that once in office Roose- AL), Rep. Carl Elliot (D-AL), and the Administra- velt initially adopted a strong expansionist philoso- tion. Given the Constitutional and social bugaboos phy-in a sense, the father of New Deal liberalism previously involved in discussions of aid to educa- could only loosely be described as a "New Deal tion, its passage, less than one year after "Sput- liberal." Rather, Roosevelt was a pragmatist, re- nik," was nothing short of phenomenal. And, this sponding pragmatically and intelligently to a pro- Cold War phenomenon gave powerful new impetus found economic dislocation. Hence, the govern- to federal aid to education. ment response to the Depression was a diverse Just a decade after the Sputnik surprise, an- series of massive new federal programs, both other, more immediate and more tragic "surprise" spending and regulatory, aimed at assuring the confronted the United States. In 1967 the public present and future economic security of the indi- and policymakers alike watched horrified as riots vidual as well as the nation. And, more important engulfed entire portions of major cities in the than their absolute programmatic effect upon the flames of frustration and shattered hopes. The im- size of government, these New Deal programs be- pact was profound on many levels. Yet, for our gan changing popular expectations regarding what purposes (and on a much smaller level) the fires re- the national government could and should do for sulting from the riots drew attention to the occupa- its citizens. tional hazards of fire fighting and created an environment in Congress favorable to a federal role in In a few cases, demographic and social trends local fire activities, a role which came to fruition have led to major programmatic growth, though, the following year. again, there appears always to be a substantial lag A final type of dislocation-the discovery of what between changes in the trend lines and political re- might be termed a "segmental dislocation" within sponses to those changes. Such has been the case a period of general normalcy-has also contributed with public assistance, whose open-ended appropri- to the growth of the federal government. The re- ation makes it somewhat more sensitive than other sults of one such dramatic and telling "discovery" programs to social and demographic shifts. Hence, is exemplified by the War on Poverty. Thus, ironically, the 1935 public assistance program was Michael Harrington's The Other America, and designed primarily to aid the aged poor whose pro- John Kenneth Galbraith's The Afluent Society, ductive years had not been covered by old age in- detailed the existence of previously ignored pover- surance. In time, it was felt social insurance would ty in a nation which, on the whole, was more pros- cover almost everyone and aid to the bulk of the perous than ever before. The books apparently had poor, the aged, as well as the Depression unem- an enormous impact on President Kennedy, whose ployed, would all but "wither away." Aid to De- subsequent determination to inaugurate a poverty pendent Children, now Aid to Families with De- program amidst the unprecedented plenty of the pendent Children (AFDC)-one of the largest fed- middle class was launched by his successor. eral aid programs-was designed to benefit a rela- In a similar vein, as noted previously, the dis- tively few destitute widows and was given only the turbing discovery of relatively widespread hunger most cursory attention by President Roosevelt and in the late 1960s-first, by a small group of the 74th Congress. Senators led by Sen. Robert F. Kennedy (D-NY) But poverty changed. Unanticipated, and for a and later, by the press-was instrumental in the long time unnoticed, poverty became urban and expansion of the food stamp program. Moreover, compacted, young and familial, and itself produc- Sen. Douglas' discovery of a pocket of hard-core tive of successive generations of poverty, often be- unemployment in his state was the impetus for the cause of AFDC rules. Furthermore, the arbitrary Area Redevglopment Act and, consequently, for all poverty that was typical of the depression gave succeeding structural unemployment and man- way to (or was finally recognized as) selective power programs. poverty. That is, it disproportionately attacked members of those population segments-Blacks, Hispanics, and women-who were the least likely Government Growth and to find and retain socially insured jobs because of Environmental Trends pervasive discrimination, a lack of education and training, andlor the provisions of AFDC which In a sense, economic, social, technological, eco- made it unwise or even illegal to pursue gainful logical, and demographic trends affect nearly supplementary employment. In addition, the social every policy area. From a broad historical perspec- advances prompted by the civil rights movement tive, big government is both a response to and a fostered a sense of awareness among minorities part of the dilemmas of an advanced, industrial- which made them less reticent to demand as- ized, largely private-enterprise economy. On the sistance often, if subtly, withheld from them in the other hand, a shorter run or more telescopic ap- past because of race or stringent and selectively praisal sometimes finds little evidence of a one-to- applied sexual mores. one correspondence between such trends and gov- Demography also has played a major role in edu- ernmental change. For example, environmental cation policy. The classroom crunch of the 1950s, protection moved to the top of the political agenda occasioned by a vertible army of baby boom tots ar- around 1970, not because pollution was so much riving en masse at unprepared schoolhouse doors, worse-the real "killer smogs"34 occurred in the brought discussion of federal aid to education to 1940s and 1950s-but because of the populariza- the fore of the legislative agenda. Such aid was tion of scientific evidence illustrating the adverse significantly, though belatedly, realized in the Ele- effects of pollution and because there was a grow- mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the ing perception that government could and should rational of which rested upon yet another demo- do something about the problem. graphic variable, the need for assistance to local areas with high concentrations of disadvantaged tate." Moreover, though the Democratic Party students. Moreover, antidiscrimination regulations often initiated growth, the Republican Party has reflecting the growing social importance of women sustained it. and minorities have greatly increased the federal Finally, the environment which surrounds these role both in elementary and secondary education actors has refused to remain stable. Hence, eco- and in higher education. nomic depressions, wars, baby booms, interna- Thus, certain dislocations and the recognition of tional "surprises," segmental aberrations, and sci- certain trend-line instabilities create what might entific achievements have all created a kind of be called a policy ambience. Such environmental policy ambience in which government growth instabilities may be dramatic or subtle, have an im- could take place. mediate impact, or may be discerned only years af- Yet, even such "mass participation" does not ter they have occurred. Yet, whatever their abso- preclude the existence of certain actors who have lute magnitude, in many of the case study pro- been far more readily and consistently responsible grams, the responses of policy actors to such insta- than others for the shape of modern American gov- bilities have been critical in shaping the current ernment. Thus, if there is one "primary causal fac- contours of the federal government. tor" in the growth of government, it has been the hyper-responsiveness to almost every conceivable stimulus-large and small; important and trivial; of national significance and of local interest-of the CONCLUSIONS: modern Congressional entrepreneur. So pervasive A REASSESSMENT OF CRITICAL has been the influence of these Congressional WHOS AND WHATS policy initiators, that theirs was the outstanding and constant presence in all but one of the case To come full circle, no one planned the growth of study program areas. government, but everyone played a part in it. Ac- Obviously, this is not to suggest that Congress complishment of the absolute and relative dimen- should be abolished on the grounds that it has sions of the federal government has been no mere acted as a removed institutional entity plotting spectator sport-no single variable adequately ex- "giantism" in government. On the contrary, as the plains it. Thus, on the one hand, the Presidency has foregoing suggests, quite the opposite is true. Far acted as a vehicle of grand policy entrepreneur- from being isolated from the nation around it, as ship, while on the other (conflicting) hand, it has at- has often been alleged in the past, Congress, seem- tempted, but, significantly, has been impotent in ingly, has been programmatically aware of every stemming the tide of growth. Special, generally re- national, state, and local nuance and minutia. And, sultant, interests, for their part, have acted as far from being a conspiratorial entity, the trend on over-avid program enhancers, working tirelessly Capitol Hill increasingly has been towad Congress to enlarge and add on to beneficial policies in their as an individual rather than toward Congress as an second-generational phase-acting as veto groups institution. In other words, government has grown or counter-lobbies only when program reform is because the individual member of Congress re- suggested. Since the late 1950s, the federal judici- sponds-in part, exactly what he or she is supposed ary has functioned as a constant green light to ex- to be doing. pansion while the bureaucracy has shaped, often Yet, there is a component virtue-responsible- out of the most enigmatic and symbolic legislative ness going hand-in-hand with responsiveness- language, a far-reaching body of regulatory law. which all the "makers" of government (private as Nor, has recent federal government growth re- well as public) should be striving toward. Nor, sulted from some insidious plot on the part of perhaps, is the growth that results from respon- Washington insiders. Through elections and opin- siveness the variable upon which so much animosi- ion polls, the public has proffered its generalized ty should be focused. The "bigness" of govern- tacit approval of the component parts of government, in and of itself, may be less a problem than ment growth. And, occasionally, through demon- the almost unintelligible complexity which results strations and letter writing campaigns, it has from the continual "super-marbleization" of that demanded additional growth, usually after the in- bigness. The extreme intergovernmentalization of tense coverage of a problem by the "fourth es- nearly every well intentioned public endeavor- and not necessarily the size of the endeavor-may, underaccountable, inequitable, inefficient, and in fact, be the policy variable which works to economically unfeasible morass. These issues are transform an overresponsive system into an examined in the following chapter.

FOOTNOTES 16CharlesEvans Hughes as Governor of New York cited in Ed- ward S. Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today, 12th ed., Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1958, p. xv. 'Theories of government growth are reviewed in Chapter 5, 16The most notable exception occurred in National League of Volume I1 of this study. See Advisory Commission on Intergov- Cities v. Usery, 426 US. 833 (1976). ernmental Relations, The Condition of Awm-ican Federalism: 17Massachusetts v. Mellon (Frothingham v. Mellon), 262 U.S. Conflicting Theories and Collapsing Constraints (A-78), 447 (1923). Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, forthcom- I8Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 347 U.S. ing. 483 (1954) 2From "Personal Privacy in an Information Society: The IgArchibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court inAmerican Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission," reprinted Government, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1976, p. in the US. House of Representatives, Hearings before the Sub- 77. committee on Elerrmtary, Secondary, and Vocational Educa- 20Lauv. Nichols, 414 US. 563 (1974). tion of the Committee on Education and Labor on H.R. 15, Part 21Citizen participation devices, such as procedures for public 9: Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 95th comment at the drafting or implementation phase of legislation, Cong., 1st Sess., 1977, pp. 130-31. did not figure heavily in any of the case study programs. 3Congessional Record, Vol. 125, No. 164, 96th Cong., 1st However, for a thorough analysis of citizen participation, see Sess., 1979 pp. H11024-H11124. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), 4Joe R. Feagin, Subordinating the Poor: Welfare and Citizen Participation in the American Federal System (A-73), AwLerican Beliefs, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Washington, DC, US. Government Printing Office, 1980. 1975, p. 81. 22 WmhingtonPost, April 23, 1970, p. A-20. &JamesM. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of 23Charles 0. Jones, Clean Air: The Policies and Politics of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, Pollution Control, Pittsburgh, PA, The University of Pitts- Ann Arbor, MI, The University of Michigan Press, 1965, pp. burgh Press, 1975, p. 176. 287-88. 24Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Tor a discussion of the "issue network," see H. Brinton Americans, New York, NY, Clarion Books, 1968, pp. 32-37. For Milward, "Policy Entrepreneurship and Bureaucratic Demand a fuller description of this phenomenon and( its effects, see Creation," Why Policies Succeed or Fail, eds. Helen M. Ingram Chapter 3, "Government Udocked: Political Constraints on and Dean E. Mann, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, Inc., Federal Growth Since the 1930s," in Vol. I1 of this study. ACIR 1980, p. 261. (A-78). IEugene Eidenberg and Roy Morey, An Act of Congress, 260pinion Research Corporation, May 1969 and May 1971 New York, NY, W.W. Norton & Co., 1969, p. 60. polls, "Public Opinion on Key Domestic Issues," mimeo- 8James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy, Washington, DC, graphed, Princeton, NJ, May 1971, p. 17. Source: John C. The Brookings Institution, 1968, p. 493. Whitaker, Striking a Balance: Environment and Natural Re- 91n fact, a certain amount of Presidential despair over rising sources Policy in the Nixon-Ford Years, Washington, DC, welfare costs was noted as early as 1939 when, in response to a American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, potential increase, President Roosevelt remarked, "Not one 1976, p. 8. nickle more, not one solitary nickle. Once you get off the 50-50 "National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey. matching basis, the sky's the limit, and before you know it, we'll Source: "What the Public Thinks," Resources 57, January- be paying the whole bill." Quoted in Arthur J. Altmeyer, The March 1978, p. 21. Formative Years of Social Security, Madison, WI, The Univer- 271n the two other case studies examined, libraries and fire sity of Wisconsin Press, 1966, p. 112. protection, the question of federal involvement either has never l0In fact, contrary to much popular belief, the federal bureauc- been posed (as in fire protection) or was posed only once and in racy itself has not been a "growth industry." Federal employ- such a way as to make interpretation difficult (as in libraries). ment in both absolute and relative terms has been decreasing. 28Lyndon Johnson, quoted in David Broder, The Party's See "Indicators of Federal Growth," Chapter 2, Volume I of Over, New York, NY, Harper Colophon Books, 1971, p. 45. this study. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela- 29The 89th Congress was the first in this century where an tions, A Crisis of Confidence and Competence (A-77), activist liberal Democratic President did not have to rely on Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, pp. Southern Democratic votes for his programs. 35-105. 30TheodoreLowi, "Europeanization of America: From United "Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, New York, NY, States to United State," Nationalizing Government, Theodore W.W. Norton & Co., 1969, pp. 126-27. Lowi and Alan Stone, eds., Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publica- lZThe National Environmental Policy Act, P.L. 91-90, 83 tions, Inc., 1978, p. 18. Stat. 852, January 1,1970. 31Unnamed New Deal administrator quoted in William E. 13AndrewFishel and Janice Pottker, National Politics and Sex Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, New Discrimination in Education, Lexington, MA, Lexington York, NY, Harper and Row, 1963, p. 11. Books, 1977, p. 132. 32For the basic study of this type, see Alan T. Peacock and 14John J. Iglehart, "HEW Wants Welfare Programs Replaced Jack Wiseman, The Growth ofpublic Expenditure in the United by Negative Income Tax," National Journal Reports, Vol. 6, Kingdom, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1961. No. 42, October 19,1974, p. 1564. 33For a thorough analysis of the breakdown of fiscal constraints on the federal government, see "Financing Federal ness. Greater than usual levels of air pollution coupled with fog Growth: Changing Aspects of Fiscal Constraints," Vol. I1 of hung over London for five days in 1952, reportedly resulting in this study. ACIR (A-78), op cit. almost 4,000 deaths. In 1953, in New York, an inverted air mass S4For example, in 1948, in Donora, PA, a heavy smog was trapped industrial and automotive waste over the city and is alledged to have caused 20 deaths and 1,440 cases of serious ill- believed to have caused as many as 200 deaths. Chapter 111 The Federal Role: Criteria, Assessment, And Analysis

Thebulk of the research presented in this report, and summarized in the two preceding chapters, has documented the vast expansion of the federal role in the American federal system, especially over the past 20 years. These commentaries have been largely descriptive and analytical, rather than evaluative: they explain the "hows" and "whys" of the changes which have occurred, but don't assess their impact and implications. Yet for policymaking purposes, a normative element also is essential. The condition of American federalism cannot be described solely by reference to the amount of funds, the number of programs, and political activities-although an understanding of these is certainly mandatory. What also is necessary is an assessment of performance; that is, how well it works. Unlike the others, this chapter has such a normative, as well as analytical cast.

CONTEMPORARY FEDERALISM AND THE ILLUSION OF CENTRALIZATION

At the most fundamental level, the question is whether the original Constitutional conception of separately constituted governmental levels, each possessed of some degree of sovereign authority, retains any viability ,or relevance at all as the end of the 20th Century approaches. Opinion on this pivotal question is certainly not clear-cut: Some commentators argue the negative side, terming the states themselves "outmoded" in an era of increasing economic and social nationalization. rather new. The past 20 years have seen near-revo- Others believe that the growth of national pro- lutionary changes in the size, scope, and depth of grammatic responsibilities signals the gradual national governmental activities-but largely emergence of a unitary rather than federal govern- through the use of conditional grant-in-aid pro- mental system. grams and within a distinctly federal Constitu- These are not this Commission's views, however. tional, political, and fiscal framework. Given these From its inception, ACIR has believed that the his- dramatic shifts, past assessments have become toric claims for a federal system of representative outdated, and the traditional rationales for federal and democratic government retain their validity, participation in domestic service functions need even in a period of economic centralization and ex- reconsideration. panded public responsibilities-perhaps even more so. It therefore remains fully committed to the FIVE STANDARDS OF maintenance of the vitality and effectiveness of American government at each of its three levels: ASSESSMENT national, state and local. This faith is underscored by the fact that the di- Any such assessment of the current intergovern- rect domestic responsibilities of the national gov- mental system requires some set of standards or ernment still are extremely limited, and are apt to norms against which its performance may be remain so. The passage of time has seen progres- judged. Benchmarks are necessary if sound conclu- sive weakening of the old model of "dual" federal- sions are to be formed. Yet, as the review of feder- ism in functional assignment and a movement alist theory in this report revealed, there is no ulti- toward increasingly intermixed responsibilities- mate standard.' Instead, there are a variety of the "marble cake" pattern, as it is commonly schools of thought-developmend, democratic, termed-but a unitary system has not emerged, rational, administrative-none of which offers operationally, politically, or legally. Although undisputed claims or sure policy guidance on ques- federal programs, budgets, and regulations have tions of functional responsibility. Arguments are grown markedly over the past 20 years, federal advanced for both centralized and decentralized domestic employment-perhaps the best single in- systems by each of these philosophic groups. Fed- dicator of the direct national role-has held almost eralist theory consequently is in a confused and steady. unclear condition. This is the case because, for the most part, the Thus, any assessment must reflect multiple val- federal government has sought to exert its increas- ues from a largely pragmatic standpoint. Perhaps ing influence indirectly, through the carrot-and- this is as it should be, given the American political stick of subsidy and regulation. State and local tradition. Certainly the grant-in-aid itself is pre- governments remain the dominant service provid- eminently a device of pragmatic government, an ers in every domestic field-except social security, instrument of political compromise, rather than of the postal service, money and banking, and certain ideology. Essentially pragmatic judgments have al- regulatory areas-and there is no possibility that ways been at the root of the expanding federal this pattern will be altered significantly in the fore- role. However, the most influential of the seeable future. Indeed, in many areas of important judgments have normally been applied to specific federal activity, even the financial contribution is programs atthe time of their creation. What is re- quite small. Despite the illusion of increasing cen- quired now is a thoroughgoing pragmatic assess- tralization fostered by the array of federal pro- ment of the intergovernmental system in its entire- grams, a formal or even de facto shift to a genuine- ty, in light of conditions current in 1980 and pro- ly unitary model of governance still lies beyond the bably beyond. pale of political discourse or practical considera- Despite the theoretical confusion, various inter- tion. pretations of federalism do suggest a series of What is at issue, then, are not the competing criteria to guide such an assessment. Five-involv- claims of "centralization" and "federalism", but ing national purpose, economic efficiency, fiscal rather the desirability of the present system of inequity, political accountability, and administrative tergovernmental administration and politics. As effectiveness-have been employed by the Com- indicated in Chapter I of this volume, this system is mission in past studies of functional assignment issues. The following sections review the Commis- . . . the interests of our federal system are sion's previously adopted criteria and examine the best served when states retain primary represent role of the national government in the fed- sponsibility for shaping policies dealing eral system on that basis. Each of the criteria is with general property tax relief and intra- described briefly below. state equalization of school finances-two areas that traditionally have been within the exclusive domain of state policy- National Purpose rnaker~.~ The reduction of fiscal disparities among school districts within a state was determined to be a In past studies, the Commission has devised sev- state responsibility. A massive new federal effort eral criteria for assessing the assignment of func- directed toward this policy objective was said to be tions in the American federal system. One of these neither necessary nor de~irable.~ studies, Financing Schools and Property Tax Re- More generally, the Commission argued that fed- lieJ spoke very directly, and in considerable detail, eral intervention into the principal spheres of to the question of national versus state-local re- state-local responsibility should never be under- ~ponsibilities.~The report contrasted both "ac- taken lightly. Intervention was said to be war- tivist" and "traditional" views of the national gov- ranted when there was a head-on conflict between ernment's proper role, coming down squarely on a major federal objective and the policies of most the side of the latter. states that could be resolved only by federal gov- Those inclined to the activist view, the report in- ernment action. This position was very restrictive, dicated, frequently rely upon what can be termed the report noted, but it also was thought neces- the "timely contribution" test; If a proposal might sary: make an effective contribution to the solution of a serious and persistent domestic problem, they . . . in order to check or at least slow down argue, national governmental involvement is war- the steady growth of federal categorical ranted. Even if state or local action might be forth- aid. Simply to allege that a specific cate- coming, the federal government can help to "hurry gorical aid proposal will "promote the gen- history along." eral welfare" does not sufficiently justify In contrast, the traditional federalist position its adoption on the basis of a strong nation- urges that Congress exercise great restraint in al interesL6 helping to solve problems previously regarded as Although the Commission has long supported the the exclusive responsibility of the states. The re- consolidation of closely related or duplicative cate- port noted that: gorical programs and the use of broadly based fis- . . . the traditional federalist is not satis- cal aid, including General Revenue Sharing, the report fied with the vague contention that new also warned that: federal aid programs will "promote the it is not enough for Congress to build general welfare." Rather he subjects the . . . greater flexibility into its present aid sys- proposal to a test that is rigorous enough tem by means of general revenue sharing to screen out all but the most persuasive and the consolidation of narrow categori- plan for new federal initiatives in areas of cal aid programs into broader and more traditional state-local concern . . . The traditional federalist also has a more re- manageable block grants. Congress should also scrutinize closely all demands for the laxed attitude when it comes to the pace of reform. He generally opposes attempts to enactment of new federal categorical aid "hurry history along" by means of federal programs. carrots and sticks.3 The report's general stance was summed up by In formulating its position on public education fi- this strongly phrased warning: nance and property tax relief, the Commission ad- The most significant and positive inference hered strongly to the latter position. Specifically, that can be drawn from the Commission's the Commission concluded that: policy recommendation is this-it is not necessary to buck every problem up to most important in the delivery of a par- Washington for resolution. . . . If states ticular service. l1 are to play a strong role in our federal system, Congress must resist the constant None of the five is necessarily paramount. In- temptation to solve problems that should deed, a strong case could be made for the preemin- be handled at the state le~el.~ ence of each, depending upon one's philosophical commitments. The concept of national purpose is, of course, closely associated with traditional views Four Additional Criteria of American federalism and deeply rooted Jeffer- sonian values of individual initiative and small gov- Although the national purpose criteria speaks ernment. Yet, political accountability may be seen most directly to the question of the proper federal as the very touchstone of a government based upon role, a later and more detailed Commission study the consent of the governed. Equity also can be re- of assignment-of-functions problems at the subna- garded as the fundamental commitment of our tional level identified four other criteria for allo- democratic egalitarianism in the socioeconomic cating servicing responsibilities among state, area- spheres, while "effectiveness and efficiency" stan- wide, and local jurisdiction^.^ These four were: dards appeal to the management norms of Ameri- economic efficiency, can administrative philosphy and the values of a capitalistic society. Each of the five, then, has a fiscal equity, firm foundation in the American political heritage. political accountability, and Each claims its due; none will be displaced. administrative effectiveness. A second problem arises from the multiple activities that are involved in most governmental func- Summary descriptions appear in Figure 1. tions. Any functional area may involve such dis- Each of these four, the report indicated, provides parate activities as regulation, planning, service a general principle that should be weighed in devel- delivery, training, construction, evaluation, and re- oping a balanced and rational assignment-of-func- search. The varied components of a single function tions policy. The Commission called upon each might appropriately be assigned to different levels state to enact legislation which establishes an on- of government.12 going assignment-of-functions policy and process All of these operational difficulties are exacer- and to create a more reasoned and systematic as- bated greatly when the criteria are applied to the signment of functions between and among state, question of national governmental responsibilities. local, and areawide units of government, employ- The federal government actually provides, or has ing these four criteria as general guides.lo been "assigned," very few domestic services. In- stead, the policy issues in most fields revolve around the magnitude and character of fiscal par- LIMITATIONS ticipation. The federal role is one of banker or check writer, rather than service deliverer-and in Under the best of circumstances, the application a great many fields, even the federal financial con- of these criteria is no easy task. Each presents its tribution is comparatively small. own difficulties of definition and measurement; In contrast, as a close reading of Table I indi- more importantly, the criteria are multiple-five in cates, the four secondary assignment criteria- all-without a clear system for ranking them. The which were developed for state-local consideration 1974 report noted that: and application-assume the possibility of a direct . . . assignment criteria complement or servicing responsibility for each of the subnational conflict with one another. Clearly all cri- governments. For the purposes of the original teria cannot be achieved simultaneously in study, all subnational jurisdictions within each of a functional assignment . . . Assignment the 50 systems, including the states themselves, criteria do not unequivocally favor delega- were presumed to have an actual or potential cation of functions to any particular level of pacity for such a role. Intergovernmental fiscal local government. . . . A central problem is transfers were regarded as but one device in this the determination of which criteria are functional assignment scenario, and a relatively Figure 1 FOUR FUNCTIONAL ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA

1. Economic Efficiency: Functions should be assigned (a) to jurisdictions that are large enough to realize economics of scale and small enough not to incur diseconomies of scale, (b) to jurisdictions that are willing to provide alternative service offer- ings at a price range and level of effectiveness acceptable to local citizenry, and (c) to jurisdictions that adopt pricing policies for their functions when appropriate. 2. Equity: Functions should be assigned (a) to jurisdictions that are large enough to encompass the costs and benefits of a function or that are willing to compensate other jurisdictions for the service costs imposed or benefits received by them, (b) to jurisdictions that have adequate fiscal capacity to finance their public service responsibilities in a manner which insures interpersonal and interjurisdictional fiscal equalization, and (c) to jurisdictions that are able to absorb the financial risks involved. 3. Political Accountability: Functions should be assigned (a) to jurisdictions that are controllable by, accessible to, and accountable to their residents and (b) to jurisdictions that maximize the conditions and opportunities for active and productive citizen participation. 4. Administrative Effectiveness: Functions should be assigned to jurisdictions (a) that are responsible for a sufficient number of functions and that can balance competing functional interest, (b) that encompass a logical geographic area for effective performance of a function, (c) that explicitly determine the goals and means of discharging assigned public service responsibilities and that periodically reassess program goals in light of performance standards, (d) that are willing to pursue intergovernmental means of promoting interlocal functional conflict, and (e) that have adequate legal authority and management capability to perform a function.

SOURCE: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Governmental Functions and Processes: Local and Area wide (A-45), Washington, DC, US.Government Printing Office, 1974, p. 99. secondary one at that. Implicit in all this, then, was role creates serious hurdles to those who seek a family of interdependent, yet partially auton- merely to extend the four supplementary criteria omous, general governments possessing the legal, to its activities. The direct assignment of most do- administrative, geographic, and fiscal capacity to mestic functions to the national government lies discharge the services assigned to them. beyond the pale, unless the sustained belief in a When these criteria are applied to the federal small federal bureaucracy-shared by liberals and system as a whole, the highly specialized role of the conservatives alike and more powerfully held now national government is confronted head-on. As a than a generation ago-is discarded. Moreover, the revenue raiser, regulator, resourceful provider of perennial resort to intergovernmental fiscal conditional grants-and rigorously limited direct transfers has facilitated the steady refusal on the provider of services to the citizenry-the federal part of national policymakers to confront the question of whether the function aided could in fact THE NATIONAL PURPOSE legally be performed by the national government at all. These two factors, then-the bureaucratic Theory and Constitutional questions-could make a . shambles of any effort to apply these criteria to the The idea of a "national purpose" or "national ob- federal role. jective" has been a principal historical standard for Still, despite such difficulties, these five criteria the evaluation of proposals for federal aid (and can provide at least some general standards or other federal) programs. It suggests that some rough yardsticks against which the design and op- governmental activities, due to their special signif- eration of the contemporary intergovernmental icance for the nation as a whole, must be entrusted system as a whole may be judged. National pur- to the national government. Yet, it is at the same pose, efficiency, equity, effectiveness, and account- time an essentially conservative standard, because ability remain key values, and a general evaluation it implies that other, less crucial activities should is possible, although precise prescriptions at either be left to the states and localities. the functional or program level are not. The issue involved here is an ancient one. Until The following sections attempt such a general 50 years ago, however, the question was primarily appraisal, drawing upon the findings of the present one of national authority rather than national pur- study and other recent assessments. What they in- pose. For the first century and a half of American dicate is that the present intergovernmental sys- history, it could be said-as James Madison as- tem-and the federal role within it-has been much serted-that the powers delegated to the Congress criticized on each of the five scoreboards. Federal were "few and defined," and "exercised principal- intergovernmental programs are not related to ly on external objects, such as war, peace, negotia- tion and foreign commerce."13 any sort of clearly defined and limited set of major The national purpose concept became a central national purposes. Many intergovernmental pro- concern following the "Constitutional revolution" grams do not strongly further objectives relating to interjurisdictional or interpersonal equity. Prob- of the late 1930s. Although Supreme Court decisions during the New Deal era opened up the law- lems relating to administrative effectiveness and economic efficiency are widespread, and govern- ful realm of federal activity very substantially ment at all levels appears increasingly unaccount- through expansive interpretations of commerce, able to the public it serves. taxing, and spending powers, they did not eliminate all philosophical and political constraints on the This appraisal is considerably more critical than scope of the federal role. Instead, the question of those prepared two or three decades ago. While appropriate national responsibilities became a pri- echoing some earlier warnings, the record sug- mary focus of political debate, frequently involving gests that the performance of the intergovernmen- partisan competition between Democrats and Re- tal system as a whole has not kept pace with the publicans. Rival interpretations of the "national substantial expansion in the size, scope, and depth purpose" succeeded older arguments about the of national responsibilities. meaning of the "general welfare" and "reserved Equally important, the case study findings pre- powers" clauses and the scope of the commerce sented in the previous chapter and elsewhere in power. But, since the 1940s-and up until the pre- this report suggest that the political dynamics .sent day-the Congress and the President, rather which seem to be inherent in the use of the grant- than the courts, generally have been the final ar- in-aid instrument usually work against the full biter. Since 1937, the balance of authority in the achievement of these objectives. These political federal system has been an overtly political bal- factors account for some of the most important ance, not a judicial one. shortcomings of the present intergovernmental Throughout most of this period, the need for system. thorough assessments of proposed federal activi- Each of the following sections draws upon one or ties against a carefully and restrictively conceived more of the seven functional field case studies, as conception of an appropriate national role was in- well as the findings reported in the previous chap- dicated many times. In its 1955 report, the Com- ter, to illustrate general tendencies and common mission on Intergovernmental Relations (Kestn- problems in the process of policy development. baum Commission) stated its view in these terms: A grant should be made or continued only terest in fact was asserted by Washington in essen- for a clearly indicated and presently impor- tially every sphere of state and local activity. tant national objective. This calls for a Admittedly, there are serious conceptual prob- searching and selective test of the justifica- lems relating to the precise interpretation of the tion for national participation. . . . Exis- national purpose concept and to its practical appli- tence of a national interest in an activity is cation in policymaking. The notion is by no means not in itself enough to warrant national easy to define or measure; some regard the task as participation. Related questions are the essentially impossible. This view was expressed relative importance of the national interest succinctly by V. 0. Key, Jr. as early as 1937. and the extent to which it may be served "There is," he declared, "no mystic standard by by state and local action. Consequently, which it may be determined that one activity is af- where the activity is normally the primary fected with a national interest and another is a responsibility of state and local govern- purely local matter."17 He attributed the creation ments, substantial evidence should be re- of grant programs to pragmatic interest group quired that national participation is neces- politics, rather than to any philosophical concep- sary in order to protect or to promote the tion of national needs and priorities. national interest. l4 A dozen years later, a very similar conclusion was reflected in the report of a committee on fed- In its 1974 study, the Commission developed and eral grants in aid of the Council of State Govern- employed a two-part test of "irreconcilable con- ments. The "national interest," the report said: flict" to determine whether federal entry into the traditional domain of state governments could be . . . appears to be a synonym for "general justified on the basis of a strong national govern- welfare," and it is equally hard to define. ment interest. This highly restrictive test required Furthermore, it is a changing concept, and that: there is a zone with regard to which reasonable differences of opinion exist. The a) the problem that precipitated the de- national interest is apparent in such activi- mand for federal intervention stems ties as foreign affairs, national defense, in- from a head-on conflict-a serious un- terstate commerce, patents, and immigra- dercutting of a major federal program tion. At the other extreme, few would con- objective by policies of most states; tend that local police or fire protection in- b) the intergovernmental conflict can be volve a direct national interest. This leaves resolved only by federal government a vast area of activities and services "in action. l5 the middle," where the national interest is far from settled. Assessment The Committee added, however, that: the present "system" of federal grants Despite its crucial philosophical role, few an- . . . alysts believe that the federal grant-in-aid system does little to clarify the meaning of na- has ever reflected a clear conception of appropri- tional interest. There are federal grants ate national objectives or national purposes. For for certain categories of public assistance, many decades, critics have been unable to identify but not for others. There is federal aid for any sort of rationale-except a narrowly political hospital construction, but not for other one-underlying existing federal programs. Fur- types of public buildings. About all that can thermore, the concept seemingly has become less be said for the "national interest" in exist- and less relevant as a guide to federal policy as ing grant programs is that suffkient pres- time has passed. Such keen observers as Samuel H. sure has been' exerted by those interested Beer believe that the paramount problem of the in special activities to accomplish the past decade was not so much that the federal gov- enactment of a great many federal-aid ernment has mown, but that its -growth has been statutes.18 "without " 'unrelated to any overarching By the 1960s, criticism of this kind had become "public philosophy."16 In this period, a national in- commonplace. After examining the range of exist-

39 ing programs, Phillip Monypenny observed at the all. . . . But once the initial law is passed, start of the decade that while: the issue of legitimacy disappears, and, except in those few cases where the Supreme every grant, from the construction of . . . Court later holds the law unconstitutional, wildlife refuges to the piddling expendi- does not reemerge. . . . tures for civil defense, serves some purpose which its defenders regard as proper- Once the "legitimacy barrier" has fallen, ly national, . . . the attributes of matters of political conflict takes a very different national concern are by no means ob- form. New programs need not await the viou~.~~ advent of a crisis or an extraordinary majority, because no program is any longer And Morton Grodzins declared flatly that: "new1'-it is seen, rather, as an extension, . . . the grant programs have been enacted a modification, or enlargement of some- in response to public demands for the pur- thing the government is already doing. pose of meeting public needs. The end re- Congressmen will argue about "how sult is the lack of any over-all system of na- much," or "where," or "what kind," but tional grants. Each program is legislated not about "whether."22 separately; its relation to other programs Over the past two decades, then, national of- is unplanned and unclear, and is certainly ficials have found new problems of federal concern not based on any total picture of national in essentially every activity of state and local gov- purpose.20 ernments, and functional roles have became thoroughly intertwined. The "marble cake" pattern Yet, if the federal grants of the early 1960s em- which Grodzins described in 1966 became-if it had bodied little clear philosophical conception of na- not always been-the most accurate description of tional concerns, they still left most domestic ser- this intermixing of responsibilities. An extraor- vices and activities untouched. By happenstance, dinary degree of "marbleization" has become the rather than design, the old model of "dual federal- overwhelmingly dominant trait of contemporary ism" retained a certain validity. But the vast ex- intergovernmental relations.23 pansion of the federal aid system during the John- The result is that entries in the Congressonal son era complicated matters much more. In the Record and the minutes of a city council meeting 1960s, as James L. Sundquist has commented: have become increasingly similar. As Figure 2 . . . The American federal system entered shows, recent years have seen the adoption of a a new phase. Through a series of dramatic host of new programs affecting many of the most enactments, the Congress asserted the na- traditionally local of governmental activities, and tional interest and authority in a wide proposals in such areas as jail construction, zoos, li- range of governmental functions that until brary operating expenses, and the like have been then had been the province, exclusively or considered by Congress. It seems plain that-as predominantly, of state and local govern- Charles L. Schultze has argued-a great many ments . . . The massive federal interven- such specific-purpose programs: tion in community affairs came in some of . . . probably serve no major national pur- the most sancrosanct of all the traditional pose but simply reflect the substitution of preserves of state and local a~thority.~~ the judgement of federal legislators and Moreover, federal responsibilities expanded steadi- agency officials for that of state and local ly throughout the 1970s. Prior enactments appar- officials about what specific local services ently created precedents for later ones by piercing should be available.24 the "legitimacy barrier" against national involvement. James Q. Wilson has explained that: Case Study Findings . . . until rather recently, the chief issue in any congressional argument over new poli- The Commission's case studies, in tracing the cies was whether it was legitimate for the historical evolution of the federal role in seven federal government to do something at functional fields, suggest how it is that this mesh- cluding serious curtailment of both civil and eco- Figure 2 nomic rights. SELECTED FEDERAL PROGRAMS Even in peacetime, during the nuclear age, de- DEALING WITH TRADITIONALLY fense requirements have been difficult to separate LOCAL PROBLEMS from those of domestic policymaking. A strong na- Arson Control tional defense posture, after all, requires an edu- Meals-on-Wheels cated citizenry, a healthy citizenry, a sound econ- School Security omy, and a good transportation system. These de- Solid Waste Disposal fense concerns have been important and, at times, Rat Control decisive influences in key fields of domestic policy. Bridge Replacement and Rehabilitation Education policy development, reviewed in two Noise Control of the Commission's case studies, provides many Urban Gardening examples. In contrast to defense, state and local Education of Gifted Children control over education is one of the nation's most Home Insulation deeply rooted governmental traditions and, in Urban Park Facilities principle, the two fields might appear to be unre- Snow Removal lated. Yet, time after time, important educational Police Disability Payments measures have been justified in terms of their con- Alcohol Abuse tribution to the nation's strategic posture. Homemaker Services for the Elderly These links date back for more than a century. Bikeways Military considerations were one influence on the Museums adoption of the Morill Act of 1862, which created Runaway Youth the nationwide system of land grant colleges. The Pothole Repair inspiration for the Act arose partly from Civil War- Adolescent Pregnancy related needs for scientists, engineers, and farmers who could produce food for the Army, and recipient colleges were required to offer a program ing of federal-state-local responsibilities has come of military instruction. about. Two major forces appear to be at work. World War 11 also was a watershed in the devel- First, even the universally accepted federal func- opment of federal involvement in higher education. tion of national defense has had implications for a The massive wartime research effort had a major, surprisingly broad range of public services. Sec- lasting impact on the nation's universities. Indeed, ondly, the number of recognized national objec- until 1970 research grants were the principal form tives has expanded substantially since the 1930s, of federal assistance to higher education. and especially during the past 15 years. Efforts to Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, this category of reduce unemployment, alleviate poverty, and im- spending was dominated by defense-related pro- prove the quality of the environment, for example, grams. have greatly increased the range of federal pro- Also important was the GI Bill, formally titled grammatic activity. Both points are discussed Service Man's Readjustment Act of 19.4.4, which was below. enacted to ease the transition to a post-war economy and as partial repayment of the nation's debt its veterans. It was principally an educa- NATIONAL DEFENSE to not tional measure, as evidenced by the failure of Con- National defense is, in Constitutional terms, per- gress to pursue the Zook Commission (1946) pro- haps the preeminent function of the federal gov- posals for direct federal grants to state univer- ernment, and many of the Founders described its sities. Yet the initial educational impact of the leg- role chiefly in these terms. In principle, moreover, islation was enormous. Partly in response to the the distinction between defense and domestic con- flood of new students inundating the nation's cam- cerns appears clear-cut. In practice, on the other puses, new federal programs authorizing loans for hand, mobilization for the conduct of war has dormitory and housing construction, and later for always necessitated direct federal intervention in- dining halls, health care facilities, student unions, to state, local and private affairs, sometimes in- and the like, also were enacted. National defense concerns have had a similar in- Civil defense agencies took a number of steps to fluence upon the evolution of federal policy affect- advance federal participation in fire activities. ing elementary and secondary education. Although They provided substantial financial support for fire it had been impossible to obtain Congressional con- research and also encouraged the formation of a sensus on the need for general federal aid to the national fire research information network by public schools, a few defense-related measures bringing together those with whom they had re- were enacted quite readily, with bipartisan sup- search contracts. With financial support from the port, in the post-war era. Financial assistance to National Board df Fire Underwriters, the Office of areas "impacted" by large federal installations Defense Mobilization initiated a series of fire staff was adopted in 1950 during the Korean War. Even and command schools. These brought together fire conservative opponents of general aid supported professionals at the national and local levels, creat- the measure as a system of payments in lieu of ing mutual understanding and respect and provid- taxes with strong defense overtones. By 1970 it ing a forum for the exchange of views on fire ser- provided funds to school systems in 385 of the 435 vice problems. Congressional districts. Following the Sputnik The Office of Civil Defense (OCD) also drew the crisis, the Congress in 1958 passed the National U.S. Forest Service into its programs. President Defense Education Act (NDEA), a multi-titled sta- Kennedy gave the Forest Service responsibility for tute aimed at enhancing instruction in the "de- rural fire protection in case of enemy attack, while fense-related" fields of mathematics, science, and the OCD was to coordinate and finance the nuclear foreign languages. The Act declared that "the na- fire protection program. Toward that end, the tional interest requires . . . that the federal govern- OCD funded a Forest Service study on fire protec- ment give assistance to education for programs tion needs and resources, which suggested that fire which are important to national defense." NDEA defense readiness be developed through training, was a political and psychological breakthrough special fire analysis of each community, fire plans, which: and protective measures. In addition, the Forest Service undertook the training of firemen in se- . . . asserted, more forcefully than at any lected rural areas in order to build defense capabili- time in nearly a century, a national in- ty. terest in the quality of education that the In short, the early development of a federal role states, communities, and private institu- in two of the traditionally "most local" of govern- tions provide.26 mental functions owed much to the indirect impact By the early 1960s, the federal government had of the "most national." Defense concerns con- assumed an important role in the field of educa- tributed quite directly to the growth of federal pro- tion, in good measure on the basis of defense con- grams in both education and fire protection. Al- siderations. Although the rationale for federal par- though this factor was perhaps not determinative, ticipation was to shift with the passage of time, its impact cannot be ignored, and the "defense these early programs established the federal connection" certainly strengthened the hand of "stake" in the field and eased the passage of later proponents of an expanded federal role in .these legislation. fields. Defense influences have appeared in a number of other areas, including some where they might be UNEMPLOYMENT least expected. One finds significant traces of the military imperative in even such a localistic func- Similar complex interrelationships may be found tion as fire protection. Although federal civil de- between local government services and another fense agencies were involved in fire activities in major national responsibility-the management of the 1950s, collecting fire information and supple- the economy-or, more specifically, unemployment menting in-service training, this role took on new policy. Although the goal of reducing unemploy- importance in the 1960s, particularly in the wake ment has been relatively fixed for more than 40 of the Cuban Missile Crisis. As already established years, the mans have changed radically, with im- organizations with ongoing operations, the fire portant implications for intergovernmental rela- services provided a ready-made vehicle through tionships. Every step has involved increasing ties which civil defense could be promoted. between national and state-local authorities. In general terms, the federal commitment to the nomically disadvantaged groups in the years fol- nation's economic well-being is very long standing. lowing WWII. During the 1950s and 1960s, new Indeed, economic considerations-like those of de- theories of "structural" unemployment arose to fense-played an important role in the decision to account for these unexpected misfortunes and to replace Articles of Confederation with a new sys- suggest how they might be eliminated. The result tem of government. Many Constitutional provi- was the creation of whole new sets of economic de- sions imply some federal responsibility to "man- velopment and employment training (or "manage" the economy: the power to regulate inter- power") programs, beginning initially with the state commerce, to coin money, to issue patents, Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 and the Manpower and so forth. Development and Training Act of 1962. These de- Yet, for many decades, these responsibilities clared that there was a national interest in "the were construed rather narrowly. Even the transi- maintenance of the national economy at a high tion to industrialism in the post-Civil War era pro- level" and the elimination of current and prospec- duced only rather slow changes in traditional gov- tive manpower shortages. ernmental functions-and these related, for the Programs of both of these types have encour- most part, to regulatory issues. Though the econ- aged the creation of important new policy roles for omy went through noticeable periods of boom and state and especially local governments, and the bust, these problems were not of much governmen- concern with unemployment has grown to reach in- tal concern. to an extremely broad range of public service ac- A national commitment to do something about tivities. After all, most governmental services have unemployment and the economic suffering it some potential impact upon the location of jobs causes reaches back only to the period of the Great andlor the employment prospects of individuals. Depression. The recognition that large-scale, invol- This has stimulted the enactment of a large untary unemployment could occur; that it might number of grants-in-aid. also be ameliorated and even prevented; and that The comprehensive program of economic devel- the federal government in Washington had a cru- opment assistance provided by the Appalachian cial role to play in this area, involved a slow but ex- Regional Commission (ARC) to its 13 member tensive "learning process" for professional econo- states offers an illustration. ARC programs in- mists, public officials, and the general public alike. clude aid for such diverse activities as highways, Widespread consensus on these points was not in child development, mine area restoration, water fact attained until the end of the 1960s. pollution control, libraries, health facilities, voca- Many of the Depression programs were tem- tional education, housing, and airports-all tradi- porary, providing emergency work or cash relief. tionally state and local services. Many of these pro- However, federal unemployment policy received grams owe their origin to a process of bureaucratic its permanent foundations from the program of un- entrepreneurship, coupled with the theory that on- employment insurance (UI) adopted in 1935, as ly a multifaceted effort could attract new indus- well as the pathbreaking Employment Act of 1946. tries into played-out mining areas. According to The former encouraged the creation of state pro- James L. Sundquist, the major federal agencies all grams of financial assistance to the unemployed, responded enthusiastically to President Kennedy's while the latter declared it to be Washington's desire to offer additional resources to this de- "continuing policy and responsibilty . . . to pro- pressed area: mote maximum employment, production, and pur- chasing power" through Keynesian techniques. Of The federal officials had a presidential di- the two, only the first involved cooperation be- rective to cooperate, and to each agency tween state and national governments, and-al- that became a directive to justify an expan- though the administration of the UI system has sion of its services wherever it could do so. been criticized frequently-the roles of each level Appalachia was "in" in 1963; a federal were comparatively confined and clear-cut. agency that could not find a way to help Unfortunately, neither unemployment insurance would have had to be singularly lacking in nor macroeconomic policy provided adequate pro- respect for its own importance. tection against persistently high unemployment In every corner of the federal establish- rates in depressed areas and among certain eco- ment, during the summer of 1963, ideas for the Appalachia program began to substantially enlarged by the Carter Administra- grow-usually in the form of regional ad- tion in one of its first official acts. By Spring 1977, denda to agency budgetsz6 a new set of grant programs had been created, with combined outlays totalling some $9.2 billion in As this example shows, a concern with structural FY 1978, nearly 12% of all federal aid. unemployment may, and has justified many new Funds from one or more of these three programs forms of federal aid. Considerations of this kind, could be used for essentially any local government like those involving defense, contributed to the de- activity that provided benefits to the unemployed. velopment of federal fire protection programs. In ARFA funds, like general revenue sharing, were fact, they were the basis for federal intervention nearly unrestricted in their use. CETA offered into rural community fire protection, long consid- temporary public service jobs in fields as diverse as ered one of the most local of all governmental func- park maintenance, libraries, social work and the tions. In the Rural Develqvrnent Act of 1972, Con- arts, while LPW funds built or repaired sewers, gress declared that: streets, schools, parks, hospitals, and a wide range of other facilities. Because of the size and scope of . . . inadequate fire protection and the re- these programs, and the concentration of their sultant threat of substantial losses of life fwnds especially in large cities, some have argued and property is a significant deterrent to that the economic stimulus package constituted the investment of the labor and capital the most significant program of aid to urban areas needed to help revitalize rural America, in American history.28 and that well organized, equipped, and In short, the historical record shows that with trained firefighting forces are needed in every passing decade, the national commitment to many rural areas to encourage and safe- reduce unemployment has encouraged a bigger guard public and private investments in and broader array of federal policy initiatives. the improvement and development of Every state, most local governments, and most areas of rural America where organized functional activities have been affected by the protection against losses from wildfire is ever expanding network of intergovernmental lacking or inadeq~ate.~~ linkages. Although the economic foundations of this assertion were not examined very closely, the measure THE ELIMINATION OF POVERTY was readily accepted by Congress. Given the commitment to rural community development efforts, Like the earlier national commitments to protect the propriety of federal intervention in fire protec- the nation from military threats and to reduce the tion was never seriously debated. economic hardships of unemployment, the newer In the 1970s, continuing national problems of national objectives adopted in more recent years poor economic performance encouraged a further have had ever broadening implications for inter- expansion of federal unemployment aid and cre- governmental relationships. The "War on Pov- ated major new programmatic ties between Wash- erty" begun in the mid-1960s is perhaps the fore- ington and the nation's communities. In particular, most example. Although the Economic Oppor- Congress' and the Carter Administration's "eco- tunity Act of 1964 (EOA) was not the first program nomic stimulus package" gave state and local gov- of aid to the poor, it was the first federal statute to ernment important new responsibilities for stabil- make the elimination of poverty a major national izing the national economy. These responsibilities objective. With its passage, the President and Con- affected a broad range of public service functions. gress declared it to be "the policy of the United The stimulus package included three major pro- States to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the grams: Anti-Recession Fiscal Assistance (ARFA); midst of plenty in this nation" and unleashed an Local Public Works (LPW), and the public employ- entire arsenal of new and expanded federal domes- ment titles of the Comprehensive Employment and tic programs. Training Act (CETA, Titles I1 and VI). Although The formulation of the War on Poverty provides early elements were adopted by Congress over the a classic case study of White House and bureau- opposition of President Ford, this new effort in cratic policy entrepreneurship. As Bibby and Da- countercyclical policy was warmly embraced and vidson observe: "The most significant feature of the Economic Opportunity Act . . . was that it was religion, race, and the threat of federal control 'legislated' almost entirely within the Executive made agreement extremely difficult, despite (ac- Branch and, indeed, virtually without prodding cording to opinion polls) widespread public sup- from Congressional or other 'outside' clien- port. Limited purpose programs of categorical tele~."~~EOA was drawn up by a Presidential aid were adopted-including vocational education task force, and although many of the programs in- (1917), impact aid (1950), and defense education cluded had direct Congressional antecedents, the aid (1958), as well as temporary programs of as- decision to include and tailor these into an omnibus sistance during the Depression and World War bill was purely an executive choice. In response to 11-but proposals for general education assistance pressure from the White House, Congress passed and school construction continued to be defeated. the bill largely intact, despite substantial opposi- The breakthrough occurred in 1965, as a conse- tion from Republicans and southern Democrats. quence of President Johnson's leadership, the one- Once established, the commitment to eliminate sided partisan outcome of the 1964 election, and a poverty had implications for nearly the full range new focus on the disadvantaged student. The Ele- of domestic activities. Individual hardship, it was mentary and Secondary Act of 1965 (ESEA) passed thought, would yield before a multifaced, a well co- as just one part of the broader effort to combat ordinated, comprehensive attack. Reflecting this poverty. "Poverty has many roots," President view, the Office of Economic Opportunity pro- Johnson once declared, "but the taproot is ignor- duced a catalog listing some 250 antipoverty pro- ance." The same skit occurred regarding federal grams administered by 17 different federal depart- aid to colleges and universities. As Gladieux and ments and agencies. It is of course quite true that Wolanin observe, "the logjam in higher education the needs of the poor are numerous: for housing, policy with respect to scholarships was broken by medical care, food, child care, job training, legal latching on to the antipoverty theme of the assistance, education, transportation, social ser- times. "30 vices-even help in paying their spiraling fuel bills. Once the political barriers against federal in- And there also are many distinct groups of disad- volvement were lowered, education aid began' vantaged persons: the elderly, dependent children, a comparatively rapid programmatic expansion. blacks, native Americans, the Spanish-speaking, ESEA established a pattern for these later enact- youths, women, refugees, the handicapped, and ments, with subsequent proposals adopting either more. Together, these needs and clienteles create a concern for the disadvantaged or for educational a new kind of policy matrix, each cell of which innovation. These areas defined a new rationale might potentially be responded to with a federal for federal involvement in education which could benefit program. Since the mid-1960s, many of be adapted to other areas. Congressional entrepre- them have been. nuers, mostly liberals, obtained passage of a rash Some of this diversity was reflected in the Eco- of new education programs. New categories of nomic Opportunity Act itself. Its six, rather loosely federal aid were added to address the needs of dis- related titles created a series of youth employment advantaged students, including the Spanish-speak- programs (Title I), an umbrella program for coming and the handicapped. Others dealt with such munity action (Title 11), three small programs new matters as ethnic, career, and environmental aimed at small business employment and invest- education. By 1979, federal outlays of aid to element in low income urban areas (Title V), and a mentary and secondary education had risen to "domestic peace corps" (Title VI). But many other about $10 billion, divided among approximately 50 legislative enactments during this period also were separate programs. affected. For example, the rationale for national Traces of antipoverty concern left their mark al- aid to schools shifted from defense to educational most everywhere throughout the government, opportunity, an objective with far broader political even in unexpected fields. For example, a number appeal. of library programs were justified as aid to the The effort to enact a bill of general aid to elemen- needy, even though the middle class provides most tary and secondary education dates back to the of the users of the nation's public libraries. Reflect- post-Civil War era. Assistance proposals had fre- ing the spirit of the times, amendments to the Li- quently passed one chamber or the other of Con- brary Services and Construction Act in the 1960s gress, but never both simultaneously. The issues of and 1970s offered special services for the handicapped, the institutionalized, the educationally dis- 1972, both of which established a far larger and advantaged, the elderly, and the non-English more authoritative federal role than either of their speaking. predecessors. Most recently, federal environemntal policy has broadened to include an extensive network of pro- PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT grams affecting such traditionally local activities as noise control, solid waste, and chemicals, in The development of federal environmental policy addition to waste water treatment and air quality. roughly parallels the cases already discussed: the Events have moved rapidly in these spheres. For scope of national concerns has expanded steadily example, although solid waste is clearly among the into an increasing number of state and local ac- most traditionally local of governmental services, tivities. More than the other cases, however, the federal policy in this field escalated from a re- environmental field also illustrates another trend. search and development program to regulation by This is a shift from the techniques of subsidy permit in just 11 years, less than half the time it through grants-in-aid to the use of direct national took for the development of national water quality regulation. standards. Hence, while the evolution of solid National involvement in environmental protec- waste control policy mirrored the evolution of tion began modestly enough with a small program water and air control policy, it reflected the image for research, technical assistance, and loans. But at a greatly accelerated pace. the Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 was signifi- Noise control followed a similar course. Until cant, not because of what it could accomplish, but very recently, it too was considered to be a purely because it was the first federal recognition of state and local problem. City ordinances were water pollution as a national problem. What it did aimed at noise sources such as radios, car horns, was to legitimize federal entrance (no matter how and the like, while state laws regulated industrial inconspicuous) into the realm of water pollution noise levels and automobile muffler systems. Yet a control on the basis of the Constitutional powers to federal role evolved rapidly. The first federal effort tax and spend for the general welfare. (This initial to control excessive noise came in 1968, with a form of involvement was replicated in the field of statute authorizing the Federal Aviation Adminis- air pollution in 1955.) tration to set noise limits for new planes. Then in Between 1948 and 1968, environmental policy 1969, Department of Labor regulations set decibel developed through a pattern of slow, incremental limits for noise in industrial concerns receiving growth. Though outlays increased modestly, the federal contracts. idea that environmental protection was primarily a More extensive controls appeared with the Noise state, not national, function was never really ques- Control Act of 1972. It authorized the establish- tioned during this period. ment of federal noise emission standards for pro- In contrast, the years 1969 to 1972 saw a great ducts distributed in interstate commerce and in- burst of federal environmental legislation, spurred creased research and information activities by the on by political entrepreneurs in Congress, federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). While agencies, and the White House, and backed by an states and localities are to retain primacy in the aroused public. The incremental policy process of field of noise pollution control, no law or regula- previous years was abandoned, as new enactments tions may be enacted which are seen as conflicting were adopted in what was essentially a game of with federal standards. "political one-upmanship." In symbolic terms, at In short, the quest for a "healthful environ- least, the key bill was the National Environmental ment"-like efforts to bolster the nation's de- Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), which assured a newly fenses, reduce unemployment, protect the con- declared "right to a healthful environment." sumer, and eliminate poverty-has spread to em- NEPA also provided for environmental impact re- brace an increasingly wide scope of local govern- views of all federally-funded activities to deter- mental service activities. Municipal decisions on mine whether or not they will have a "significant everything from parking lots to leaf burning, and impact" on environmental quality. Other major industrial development to the city dump, cannot be statutes included the Clean Air Act Amendments of made without regard for federal regulatory and 1970 and the Water Pollution Act Amendments of subsidy programs. And, environmental policy has increasingly become truly national policy, imposed upon state and local governments, rather than developed by them. Equity-usually defined largely in fiscal terms- provides a second criteria frequently applied to the allocation of functions. This standard emphasizes the "fairness" of functional assignments, especial- Conclusion ly from the standpoint of comparatively disadvantaged states, communities, and individuals. According to the national purpose criteria, grants-in-aid should be employed to advance major national objectives in the principal fields of federal Theory concern, with other functional fields being left to state and local governments alone. In practice, Few doubt that equity considerations are very however, most commentators believe that the fed- important, and quite a few analysts believe that eral grant system has never-at any stage of its de- they, in fact, should be paramount. This perspec- velopment-embodied a clear conception of nation- tive lies at the heart of standard economic theories al purpose or priorities. The specific activities of intergovernmental fiscal relations131and the selected for assistance seem to have reflected view is shared by some political scientists and pub- short-term political judgments, rather than careful lic administrators. In his address to ACIR's Na- assessment of basic needs. tional Conference on Federalism in Action in 1975, At the same time, the case study analyses show Alan K. Campbell argued for this priority, contend- that even such long-established federal concerns as ing that: national defense and unemployment provided a foundation for federal entry into a host of state and . . . public sector benefits should be more local activities. The new national objectives recog- directly based on need rather than on what nizedin the 1960s and 1970s have had still more each individual's pocketbook permits him far-reaching implications. Like ripples from stones to acquire. Whether it be education ser- splashed into water, federal influences move ever vices, police protection, sanitation ser- outward, leaving a steadily expanded program- vices, or any other public service, the matic network in their wake. For example, defense amount received of the total available requirements have influenced the evolution of fed- should be related to the need for that ser- eral policies in even such traditionally local fields vice. Such equity should relate to both inas education and fire protection, while unemploy- terpersonal and interjurisdictional distri- ment programs have grown since the Depression bution of the services.32 era to touch upon almost all functional fields. An- Although it has rejected proposals for the creation tipoverty efforts have led to an expanded federal of a system of general-purpose equalizing grants, role in job training, education, social services, four of the five conditions justifying national action health, nutrition, and many other domestic areas. suggested by the Commission on Intergovernmen- A similar pattern can be identified for environ- tal Relations in its 1955 report dealt with what mental protection. Few grant or regulatory pro- could be viewed as equity problems: the adequacy grams do not contribute, either directly or indirect- of fiscal resources, the need for nationwide unifor- ly, to one or more of these objectives. mity, external costs imposed through state inac- While few now contest the necessity for modern tion, and the protection of basic political and civil governments to address each of these social and rights.33 economic problems, their implications for the char- As analyzed in this Commission's 1974 study, the acter of intergovernmental relations also must be equity criterion has two distinct components. recognized. Every declaration of a new national These involve: (a) economic externalities, and (b) objective has spawned a substantial array of grant fiscal equalization. The 1974 study explained that and regulatory programs, leaving few areas of appropriate functions should be assigned to juris- state and local concern untouched. As a result, the dictions: balance of American federalism has been substantially altered. a) that are large enough to encompass the cost and benefits of a function or istered or merely financed by a higher unit. that are willing to compensate other Functions with an exclusive redistributive jurisdictions for the service costs im- character might be both administered and posed or for benefits received by them financed by higher levels while those with [economic externalities] and; lesser elements of redistribution could be that have adequate fiscal capacity to fi- administered locally and at least partially nance their public service responsibili- financed on a regional, state, or national ties and that are willing to implement measures that insure interpersonal and interjurisdictional fiscal equity in the performance of a function [fiscal Assessment equali~ation].~~ Issues of equity are frequently cited in support of Both of these components have direct application federal action. Indeed, perhaps no claim has been to a system of grants-in-aid. The existence of made more frequently for new grants-in-aid than "spillover" costs or externalities is the classic eco- that they will be of benefit to disadvantaged states nomic justification for the creation of a categorical or communities or will increase the income and grant-in-aid program from a central to lower level economic opportunities of the poor. Yet, despite government when wholesale functional transfers this redistributive rhetoric, many critics note that are impractical. The Commission noted that: the federal aid system is not now-and, in fact, never has been-strongly oriented for the achieve- In theory, externalities argue for the ment of fiscal equity for states, localities, or citi- assignment of functions to jurisdictions zens. large enough to contain the costs and bene- Those concerned with equity goals stress a varie- fits of a given service. Where this is not ty of shortcomings. Many commentaries note the possible or feasible, interjurisdictional ar- tendency to disperse federal funds very broadly, rangements are necessary to reduce ser- rather than to target them strongly to the least advice inequities. Public functions affected vantaged states and localities, and point out the by spillovers may require more centralized weaknesses in many grant allocation formulas and financing or administration or both.36 procedures. Many analysts believe that the nation Grants-in-aid also may be employed to redis- has failed to establish an adequate, equitable, or ef- tribute fiscal resources among individuals and gov- ficient system for income redistribution to the ernments, either through direct cash transfers or poor. Finally, experts in public finance contend in kind payments of goods and services. When it is that the present grant-in-aid system does not con- impossible to assign redistributive functions en- form to the dictates of the theory of economic ex- tirely to governments with adequate fiscal capacity ternalities. to perform them at fair cost, . . . a higher level of government might ALLOCATION OF FUNDS construct an intergovernmental transfer From the standpoint of fiscal equity, there are system that permits local governments to serious shortcomings in the design and operation provide equal services at equal rates of tax- of the federal assistance system as a whole. A host ation, thereby redistributing resources of analyses have indicated that the Robin Hood from rich to poor jurisdictions. principle of fiscal redistribution-"take from the Fiscal equalization can be implemented rich, give to the poorw-has always received much most effectively (politically as well as fi- more lip service than actual use in aid distribution. nancially) by a higher level of government. Recent commentators stress that close targeting That government could either administer to fiscal need (or any other sort of hardship mea- directly a redistributive function or finance sure) is achieved in a very few programs. Instead, its provision by a local unit. The degree of federal grant-in-aid dollars are commonly dis- redistribution sought in a function might persed broadly among states and localities, includ- dictate largely whether it should be admin- ing the relatively rich and poor alike. Monypenny was one of the first to highlight the A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study also contrast between the "textbook" justification of has raised serious questions about equity standards federal grants as equalizing measures and the ac- in the allocation of federal funds at the local level. tual operation of the system. In 1960, he pointed In 1975 federal expenditures per capita were out: $1,059 in the nation's poorest counties-29% less than the national average-while the counties with The classic case for the extension of finan- above-average incomes received an above average cial assistance by one government to an- allocation of $1,66L41 Even those programs other is that it provides money for local oriented toward development objectives exhibited governments which need it in order to sup- a similar, though weaker, bias, with counties in the port essential activities at a minimum lev- top national quintile on the income measure receiv- el. This implies a larger measure of sup- ing $256 per capita, and the poorest counties port for some units than for others, de- receiving only $216 per capita.42Differences were pending on the relative ability of units to fi- noted in the treatment of growth and nongrowth nance the programs supported. No major counties, and between those in metropolitan and federal grant is based primarily on an rural areas and in different sections of the nation. equalization factor, and those which do in- Overall, however, the CBO study observed that: clude such a factor do not begin to produce a uniform level of service.37 . . . the spending patterns indentified . . . appear to be relatively weak. While there Monypenny's observation retains its general va- are large differences in federal spending lidity today. Commenting on the existing system, among counties, these discrepancies are Rudolph G. Penner, in a very recent article, stated: only marginally releated to diferences in The grant system as a whole has never local economic cir~umstances.~~ played an important role in equalizing in- Others have reported comparable findings for comes among states. This is not surpris- the overall aid allocation to local governments. G. ing, since income redistribution is not the Ross Stephens and Gerald W. Olson note that more explicit goal of the vast majority of grant direct federal aid is given to local governments in programs.38 states with higher levels of personal income, and These assessments have been confirmed by a that federal agencies provide much more assis- variety of research reports. Correlational data tance than do the states to "relatively inactive" show that, since 1940, there has never been even a units of local government (i.e., those with zero full- moderately strong negative association between a time employee^).^^ Neither finding is consistent state's per capita personal income level and its per with a systematic approach to fiscal redistribution. capita grant receipts.39 More recently, a General Assessments of the targeting of urban-oriented Accounting Office analysis of the distribution of programs are mixed. A recent CBO analysis of the federal aid funds in 1975 observed that, of the five responsiveness of federal grants to the social, eco- states which received the most per capita aid, nomic, and fiscal needs of 45 large cities found that three had above-average income levels. In con- each of the five major programs it analyzed: trast, all of the five states receiving the least per . . . is responsive to one or more dimen- capita aid also were well below average in in- sions of urban need. For some programs come. 40 and some dimensions of need, however, no This inattention to the problem of fiscal equaliza- relationship is apparent between the size tion is a distinctive feature of the American inter- of a city's grant and its level of need. But governmental aid system. Most major western fed- in no instance did a program regularly pro- eral systems have devised a systematic method of vide larger grants to cities with lesser equalizing the overall fiscal resources of their com- need.46 ponent states. For example, the Canadian national government makes equalization payments to seven On the other hand, others stress that federal urban of the ten provinces. It is accepted that these pay- aid is by no means restricted to the most hard- ments go only to the needy provinces, and not to pressed communities. Richard P. Nathan contends those with higher incomes and large tax bases. that it is a "myth" that federal grants are poured into the larger, declining cities while bypassing the . . . states that spend a considerable better-off. Instead, his Brookings Institution re- amount from their own resources for fed- search studies suggest that: erally aided programs tend to receive more than the national average, whatever their the spreading effect has predominated . . . income level. It might be expected that, as in recent years and that targeting is a very a result of the equalization aspects of many recent and modest development that al- grant programs, the poor states would re- ready seems to be losing ground. The ad- ceive the largest per capita federal grants vent of the computer (and "the politics of and rich states the smallest. Matching for- the print-out") plus the "New Federalism" mulas built into several of these pro- of the Nixon-Ford period produced a grams-particularly for the federal match- marked spreading effect in the distribution ing of state public assistance expend- of federal grants. Jurisdictions which had itures-result, however, in relatively high never seen a U.S. Treasury check before federal grants. Thus, the states that began getting them regularly. The pic- ...... receive the largest per capita assistance ture that many of us carry in our minds of grants include some with the highest per massive federal aid bailing out the nation's capita incomes in the country as well as most distressed cities, but with healthier some with the lowest.49 cities resisting Washington's blandish- ments, simply isn't true.46 Much less information is available about the allo- cational principles employed by federal agencies in the distribution of discretionary project grants, ALLOCATION TECHNIQUES However, one recent study has concluded that bur- Some of these shortcomings can be understood eaucrats make some grant awards strategically in by reference to the design of grant allocation for- order to maintain or expand political support for their program. Only in unusual cases are grants al- mulas, which determine the distribution of about located entirely by reference to need criteria. three-quarters of all grant funds. Most federal Hence, according to R. Douglas Arnold, it appears grant allocation formulas emphasize program-spe- that "a substantial proportion of federal funds is cific need factors and such "political fair share" devoted to coalition maintenance rather than to measures as total population and equality among solving the most urgent national problems."60 the states, rather than fiscal equalization. In 1975 The receipt of discretionary grant funds also ap- only about one-sixth of the formula-based categori- pears to be conditioned heavily by the grant-seek- cal grants contained provisions that seemed to be specifically intended to make adjustments for dif- ing activities of state and local governments. ferences in the fiscal capacities of recipient juris- Those with better informed staffs, for example, are dicti0ns.~7Although need-for-service measures are often considerably more successful in obtaining federal aid.S1 This introduces another nonneed employed frequently, many are at best rough prox- ies. Consequently, a number of studies suggest oriented factor into the ultimate allocation of that the "most needy" areas do not actually re- funds. ceive the greatest benefits under many existing programs.-Federal aids for education, health, water pollution control, and housing have been INCOME REDISTRIBUTION found to be weakly associated with objective need Many critics also contend that federal programs indicators.48 have made inadequate progress toward the objec- A second major factor is the open-ended match- tive of achieving a more equal distribution of in- ing arrangement employed in the formulas of some come and life opportunities and the elimination of of the public assistance programs, including Aid to economic deprivation. They point out, for example, Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and that-despite the growth of federal antipoverty Medicaid. Because of their large size, these grants programs and a rising standard of living-the dis- markedly reduce the redistributive character of tribution of family incomes has been largely un- the federal aid system as a whole. One expert has changed since World War 11. For the past 30 years, noted that: the top fifth of families has received somewhat over 40% of the country's net income, while the However, if relative measures of poverty ad- bottom fifth has received between 4% and 6%.52 justed for changes in national income levels- Furthermore, national programs intended to im- rather than fixed income standards-are em- prove the lot of the most seriously disadvantaged ployed, the record is less favorable. On a relative have not been successful in moving the poor into basis, the size of even the post-transfer poverty the economic mainstream. Poverty levels have fal- population has held constant since 1965. Further- len sharply, but only at the price of increased eco- more, no matter what standard is applied, about nomic dependency. Efforts aimed at making the 20% of the population still lives in pretramfer poor better able to support themselves have not poverty, and this proportion has not been declin- been effective. Many of the slums of the 1960s re- ing. That is, the decline in poverty has been pur- main. chased solely by increasing the amount of transfer Of course, all analysts agree that the social pro- payments, rather than through enhancing econom- grams inaugurated or expanded since 1960 have ic opportunity. offered benefits to many who received none in the Although the reasons are not fully understood, past, and have greatly increased payments and im- three programmatic factors seem to have con- proved services to others. An expansion of the wel- tributed to the inability of federal social programs fare rolls, together with new programs for medical to substantially alter the distribution of income. assistance, food stamps, education aid, housing, First, although the level of federal and state in- and job training, have in fact sharply reduced the come maintenance expenditures has risen sharply, incidence of poverty. A thorough review by Robert many of these programs are not restricted to the Plotnick and Timothy Smeeding indicates that, in most needy population groups. Social Security and the 1965-1976 period, the percentage of poor per- unemployment compensation benefits, for exam- sons fell from 10.1 to 6.5% if the receipt of both ple, are paid out regardless of the income level of cash and major in-kind benefits is con~idered.~~In their recipients. As Table I indicates, in 1974, less 1976 these transfer programs reduced the size of than one-third of all social welfare benefits to the the poverty population from 21.1 to just 6.5% of poor came from income-tested programs. the national population. These data do suggest a Secondly, the "target efficiency" of many other major positive impact. social welfare programs is rather low. In a ten-year

Table I THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL WELFARE BENEFITS FOR THE PRETRANSFER POOR, 1974

Percent of Benefits Income- Nonincoms All Tested Tested Program Type Programs Programs Programs

Cash Transfers lnkind Aid Social Sewices Human Resources

TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Percent of All Benefits to Poor 100.0 % 29.9% 70.1 %

SOURCE: Based upon Robert D. Plotnick, "Social Welfare Expenditures: How Much Help for the Poor?" Policy Analysis, 5, Berkeley, CA, Summer 1979, p. 284. summary report prepared by the Institute for Re- EXTEfWALlTlES search on Poverty, Robert H. Haveman noted that: The application of the theory of externalities to the allocation of functions is difficult because the an important characteristic of the so- . . . actual geographic range of benefits for many gov- cial policy developments from 1965 to 1975 ernmental functions is not known. Often only esti- is the inconsistency, inefficiency, and in- mates are available. Despite these problems of equality of the set of welfare and income measurement, however, it appears that the pre- maintenance programs which were either sent grant system does not provide aid only for initiated or expanded during this period. those public services which have an important im- As has been increasingly realized, the pact on individuals living outside the borders of re- structure of this set of programs-some- cipient states or localities. Instead, the federal gov- times generously referred to as an income ernment presently provides at least some assis- maintenance system-has major weak- tance for essentially all major governmental activi- nesses. It is built around specific categor- ties, including those like fire and police protection ies of people; hence some poor families are which, as Figure 3 suggests, appear to have very not aided at all. A number of programs few important benefit spillovers beyond the local have state-determined eligibility require- level of go~ernment.~?This may be justified on ex- ments and benefit levels; hence, equally ternality grounds only if it is claimed that, in a mo- poor families of the same structure may be bile society, most governmental services affect treated quite differently depending on people everywhere. where they live. And, because of the . . At the same time, state and local financial contri- patchwork nature of the programs, there butions to some functions which are very strongly are serious administrative inefficiencies national in their impact remain large indeed. This and equally serious inefficiencies in the is true for education in particular, as well as for aid targeting of benefits on the most needy to low income groups. The federal share of outlays family units. When held up to generally ac- for public educational expenditures has been cepted principles of efficiency and equity, almost constant at a mere 8.5% since the mid- the social policy legacy of the 1965-1975 1960s, while in FY 1976, state and local spending decade does not score for five major public assistance programs was $13.6 billion, or more than one-third of the national total. On externality grounds, the federal fiscal Finally, some critics believe that the emphasis role probablv should be much larger in both fields. upon in-kind services, education, and job training For these reasons, many allay lldve proposea which characterized federal economic opportunity a substantial reassignment of functions among the programs has been misplaced. (In 1974, almost governmental levels. A recent study prepared for 60% of income-conditioned benefits took the form the Twentieth Century Fund which emphasized of inkind aid or social services and human re- equity criteria concluded that "current programs sources programs, rather than cash payments.) for health, education, and income security do not For example, a recent study by Richard H. reflect a rational division of labor between state deLeone for the Carnegie Council on Children and federal governments."68 It called for national stressed the inability of traditional social programs systems of health insurance nd income support and to create an egalitarian society or to greatly im- a reformulation of federal programs for the sup- prove the life-chances of those born into poverty.66 port of education. Similarly, two major studies by Christopher Jencks Secondly, other analysts have concluded that and his associates have concluded that past efforts most existing grants for social programs are not aimed at equalizing the personal characteristics based upon the externalities rationale, and do not (such as education) known to be related to income follow the prescriptions of this theory in their ac- have been relatively ineffective in equalizing eco- tual design. Charles L. Schultze has noted that: nomic well-being. "If we want to redistribute income," Jencks concludes, "the most effective . . . many of these grants are a means by strategy is probably still to redistribute income."66 which the federal government uses state Figure 3 ESTIMATED GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF BENEFITS FOR SELECTED GOVERNMENT SERVICES Sco~eof Benefits - - Service Local Regional National Fire Protection X Police Protection X Water Distribution X City Streets X Public Libraries X X Air and Water Pollution X Water Supply X Sewage and Refuse Disposal X Mass Transit X Arterial Streets and Intercity Highways X Airports X Urban Planning and Renewal X Education Aid to Low Income Groups Communicable Disease Control Research Parks and Recreation

- SOURCE: George F. Break, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United States, Washington, DC, The Brook- ings Institution, 1967, p. 69.

and local governments (or in some cases Some other analysts have even expressed doubt local nonprofit organizations) as agents or that ideas about "externalities" and the "public" 'subcontractors to produce centrally deter- and "private" characteristics of particular eco- mined amounts and kinds of collective nomic goods have much bearing on their actual goods, since, for a number of reasons, prin- provision by government, at any level or by any cipally historical and political, the federal means. Government provides many goods which government itself virtually never delivers have few important public characteristics, and collective goods or servcies at the local neglects others which possess them. In the opinion level. 69 of Lester C. Thurow, the concept of externalities: Hence, he concludes that: . is simply not a convincing explanation . . . the paradigm of grants as price sub- . . sidies to an independent decisionmaking of the provision of most domestic public goods. Once a society gets beyond basic unit designed to change the incentives it faces is not very useful for analyzing most public health meausres and communicable of the existing social grants . . . . In fact, diseases, medical care does not generate the contracting paradigm comes closer to externalities. Death is the most private of the real sit~ation.6~ all activities, and an individual's health has no nonmarket economic effects on the gen- Similar and equally authoritative views are offered eral population. Neighborhood externali- by James A. Maxwell, J. Richard Aronson, and Ed- ties certainly exist in housing, but inter- ward M. Gramlich, none of whom regard the exter- nalizing these externalities does not lead to nalities theory as descriptive of existing grants-in- the types of housing programs that have aid.61 been legislated. The externalities have nothing to do with minimum housing stan- programs were adopted was simply incompatible dards for each family. Similarly, I find the with a high degree of "targeting" or of fiscal arguments that education generates exter- redistribution. Funds tended to be dispersed nalities unconvincing once one gets beyond rather broadly. elementary education (literacy, etc.). Fire Finally, the significant reliance upon in-kind ser- protection is like medical care. Some vices to supplement direct income transfers also limited amount of fire protection and code can be accounted for in political terms. Programs enforcement is necessary to prevent con- meeting specific service needs of the disadvan- flagrations, but beyond this a donor has no taged have been much more popular than have out- more interest in his neighbor's fire protec- right welfare payments. Furthermore, in-kind pro- tion than in his neighbor's fire insur- grams build larger political constituencies than do an~e.~~ cash payment programs, because they provide Political scientist Kenneth A. Shepsle shares benefits to service suppliers and providers, as well Thurow's perspective. He points out that: as to recipients. . . . some externalities are regulated, some STATE FLEXIBILITY are not; some goods with substantial pub- licness are publically produced or fostered, A principal source of fiscal inequities is best some are not; some goods with substantial understood in terms of the historical context in privateness are publically produced or which some of the most important welfare pro- fostered, some are not. . . . The normative grams were adopted. An assumption of state role for positive governmental action in primacy was fundamental to the initial develop- correcting market failures provided for by ment of federal public assistance policy. The rele- some welfare economists has little to do vant provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 with actual governmental decisions to in- left a great deal of discretion in the hands of the tervene or not in market processes.63 states. Reflecting the attitudes of the period, both President Roosevelt and key members of Congress In short, there is reason to doubt that existing believed that public assistance was a state func- grants-in-aid-or present patterns of functional tion, warranting little more than a helping hand roles-can be justified or explained by reference to from Washington. equity theories based on a consideration of eco- To this end, the public assistance programs util- nomic externalities. Most of these writers suggest ized an "open ended matching grant" through that a political, rather than economic, calculus lies which Washington simply reimburses each state at the origin of many public programs. for a portion of its costs. This system, originally applied to AFDC, old age assistance, and aid to the Case Study Findings blind, also was used for aid to the disabled in 1950 and for Medicaid, the program of health assistance Many of the case studies suggest why the federal to the poor created in 1965. (With estimated out- aid system is not oriented strongly toward the lays of $12.7 billion in FY 1980, Medicaid has since achievement of equity objectives and rates rather become the largest single federal grant.) poorly on equity-based criteria. These reasons are Though the system provides very strong protec- preeminently historical and political. A number of tion for "state's rights," there are important defi- the most important programs were adopted in an ciencies in this design from an equity standpoint, era when state policy discretion took political pri- for it permits the extreme interstate variations in ority over economic redistribution. Although po- welfare benefits and caseloads. In fact, differences litical values may have changed in more recent among the states in either their willingness or fi- years, the underlying structure of several of these nancial ability to provide for the poor are actually older programs has not been altered. During the reinforced by federal policy, rather than minimized 1960s and 1970s particularly, many new programs or eliminated. Thus, in 1976 total welfare spending were developed with the stated intent of advancing for each poor resident under five major programs goals relating to fiscal equity. Yet, even in these ranged from as little as $370 in Wyoming to more cases, the political process through which these than $3,000 in Hawaii. While the Northeast states spent about $1,100 in state and local money for should have "no higher initial cost than the present every poor resident, the southern states provided system," this seems clearly unattainable. Congres- less than $200 in benefits. Ye, because federal aid sional Budget Office estimates put the additional depends upon the level of state-local expenditures, cost of Carter's initial reform plan at approximate- federal welfare spending in the Northeast was ly $17.2 billion. Every other proposal advanced has more than double what it was in the been subjected to charges of excessive cost, inade- These deficiencies in open-ended matching quacy, or inequity. grants were readily apparent even in the 1930s. V. Although AFDC (and Medicaid) have been large- 0. Key, Jr., the author of an early book on grants ly impervious to reform, there have been more administration, commented that "if national policy limited successes. The Supplemental Security In- is directed toward a relatively uniform level of ser- come (SSI) program proposed by President Nixon vice over the country, the percentage grant [as he and adopted by Congress in 1972 established the termed it] must be rejected." In 1937, as he first federalized guaranteed income program, pointed out, old age assistance payments ranged though one limited to the aged, blind, and per- from a monthly average of $4.08 in Mississippi to manently disabled. SSI also advanced equalization $31.37 in Calif~rnia.~~ objectives, in that its minimum benefit provisions Yet, despite these early concerns, real and con- resulted in significantly higher payments to half of certed efforts at welfare reform were very late in the states (particularly those in the south), and its coming. The assumption of state flexibility has con- uniform eligibility standards resulted in the qualifi- tinued to hold some attraction, but the highly vari- cation of many more additional recipients than gated welfare system also presents serious obsta- were eligible under state plans. At the same time, cles to its own reform. Even if greater uniformity the flexibility of state systems was by no means is accepted as a desirable goal, any change would eliminated, since the states which had been provid- tend to impose major costs on one or more of the ing above-average relief checks to the aged poor key participants: the national government, some were required to preserve previous benefit levels state governments, or some recipients. Either fed- through a system of state supplements. These fea- eralization would be enormously expensive, or tures introduced substantial administrative com- some set of interests would be harmed. plexities into the system and preserved some of the Rather than reexamine the earlier handiwork, previous inequities. Thus, "the SSI program con- then, over the years Congress and the states have tains neither simple eligibility criteria nor uniform followed a pattern of incremental program en- payment amounts. It was neither historically nor hancement. Congress has been motivated more by politically possible for such a program to be in- a desire to provide some periodic fiscal relief to the stit~ted."~~SSI might therefore be regarded as states than by a concern about equity. Such policy- "the exception that proves the rule." making rationale is not the stuff of fundamental Though not a grant-in-aid, the federal-state un- equity-related alterations. employment insurance (UI) system also exhibits Even Presidents, though despairing of welfare similar deficiencies when judged from an equity inequities and inefficiencies as well as costs, gener- standpoint, and for similar reasons. Also created ally have been reticent to assume-and ultimately by the Social Security Act of 1935, UI leaves most have been unable to complete-the task of reform. of the crucial policy decisions on eligibility and Though the federal welfare role has grown through benefit levels to the 50 states. Hence, as in welfare, eight administrations, only two Presidents-Nixon 50 separate systems exist. and Carter-have openly proposed thorough revi- Again, the political climate of the 1930s explains sions. Neither was successful. this outcome. While many social workers, labor in- Today, however, it is primarily the fear of assum- tellectuals, and reformers favored a European- ing new and massive federal costs-and not a philo- style national system with one set of benefit stan- sophical commitment to state primacy in welfare- dards, many businessmen and their political allies which acts as a constraint on a greater (or total) demanded flexibility, ruling out national uniformi- federal role in the welfare function. Remedying ex- ty. Furthermore, the Supreme Court was expected isting inequities could be a very expensive proposi- to be hostile to any fully nationalized system. tion. Although the Carter Administration initially Hence, although responsible officials within the adopted the goal that a reformed welfare system Roosevelt Administration-including the Presi- dent himself-would have preferred a uniform pro- campaign trip had alerted him to the need. But, to gram administered on a national basis, their sense gain passage of the bill, he needed many allies. of pragmatism led them to propose a strongly de- The major strategem utilized by the ARA's pro- centralized approach. However, rather than an ponents centered on providing aid to rural as well open-ended grant, UI employed the device of a tax as urban areas of underemployment. The initial credit-previously found to be constitutional by the bill, aimed at dealing with areas of industrial de- Supreme Court-to encourage state participation. cline in the north and east, was modified in re- Roosevelt's bill included no benefit standards and sponse to the concerns of members from the south almost no provisions for state compliance. that their poverty areas also required assistance. In basic outline, this system has been retained Hence, a revision provided loans to some 300 until the present day. Unemployment insurance, poverty-stricken rural counties. Subsequently, lie the welfare programs, has proven to be ex- these funds were expanded further. These changes tremely resistant to proposals for the standardiza- were politically decisive, in that they made large tion of benefits through federalization. Recent po- inroads against the "conservative coalition" of Re- litical rhetoric surrounding the issue of "national publicans and southern Democrats which had responsibility" for the unemployed versus "states' thwarted many other social welfare measures. At rights" to determine eligibility and benefit levels the time of the final House vote, the "story was still sounds much like that of the New Deal period. told eloquently by the large map placed by the bill's Despite several Presidential proposals for mini- sponsors in the Speaker lobby, just off the House mum benefit standards, many analysts believe that floor." The map showed Congressmen exactly Congressional acceptance of federalization is very "how many of their districts would be in line for unlikely. In the view of one specialist, "It's 50 federal help. "68 years down the road before we have federal stan- These political pressures for expansion contin- dards. "67 ued to work after the ARA was enacted. Roger H. Davidson, who studied the program in detail, has commented that: DISPERSION OF FUNDS . . . once launched, the Area Redevelop- The widespread dispersion of grant funds- ment Administration was subjected to a variety of pressures for designating a whether formula or project-across much of the large number of communities as 'de- nation, rather than a "targeting" of allocations to pressed areas' eligible for aid. Farm and the most needy jurisdicitons according to redis- labor interests, as well as legislators who tributive criteria, also can be accounted for in po- had voted for the act, viewed the program litical terms. Political support is maximized when as a new form of the traditional pork- bar- funds are scattered widely. Regardless of the rel. As a result, no less than 1,035 stated intent of a program, a Congress responsive countries-one-third of the national total to small geographic constituencies has a strong in- and containing one-sixth of the nation's centive to provide benefits to a large number of population-were eventually declared areas, rather than concentrating them in the few eligible for aid.69 most needy. At times, this strategy has been essential to the passage of controversial new legislation. Although the ARA was short lived, its successor, The adoption of the Area Redevelopment Act the Economic Development Administration (ARA) in 1961 provides a good case study. Six (EDA), has had a similar history. Over time, the years passed between the initial introduction of de- EDA's mission-and its political constituency- pressed areas legislation by Sen. Paul H. Douglas have expanded steadily. A series of amendments (D-IL) and its final signing by President John F. have added several new aid programs and liberal- Kennedy. Douglas garnered the support he needed ized eligibility requirements. By 1974 nearly one- to see his proposal enacted through a lengthy exer- half of the 3,000-odd counties had received some cise in political coalition-building. assistance under the ARA, the EDA, or both. As of Douglas, not surprisingly, was concerned espe- 1979, fully 84.5% of the nation's population lived in cially with providing development aid to a particu- one of the 2,230 areas designated to receive EDA lar area in his own state of Illinois. A reelection funds. This total included 823 areas which did not meet the current eligibility criteria, but still par- ments in lieu of taxes closely related to national ticipated because of a legislative ban on "de-desig- defense. nation" instituted in 1970. In short, a program in- Since their initial passage, the Impact Aid laws itially intended to assist a small number of de- have been popular (but controversial) programs. pressed areas has grown in less than 20 years to The number of eligible districts has risen steadily, encompass most of the nation. from 1,172 in 1950-51, to 3,821 in 1959-60, to over A similar pattern appeared in the creation of a 4,500 by 1970. In the latter year, 385 of the 435 series of multistate economic development com- Congressional districts received some funds. The missions under the Appalachian Regional Develop- program's immense political appeal in Congress ment Act (ARDA) and Title V of the Public Works and among educators has been responsible for this and Economic Development Act (PWEDA), both growth. Yet, the program also has been attacked adopted in 1965. The Appalachian program was by every President from Eisenhower to Carter. All triggered by a request from the Governors of nine have criticized its massive distribution of funds neighboring states for federal help following seri- without reference to need and its loose definition ous flood damage to the Cumberland Valley in of "federal impact." One study found that Impact March 1963. A Presidentially appointed commis- Aid has no fiscal equalizing tendencies-despite its sion drafted a proposal for a continuing, compre- purely economic rationale and often actually hensive attack on Appalachian poverty through the serves as a large subsidy to the more wealthy dis- creation of a joint federal-state regional planning tricts. commission. Aid to the educationally disadvantaged (ESEA The bill was approved promptly by the Senate, Title I), though an antipoverty program, also and the Democratic landslide in November 1964 as- spreads funds very widely. The politics of coalition- sured its ready acceptance by the House. Whether building limited the extent to which equalization the program should be adopted was not a serious could be achieved, in that many liberal Congress- issue; who should benefit was. In the 89th Con- men placed a higher priority on funding for their gress, the focus of attention was not on the Ap- own districts than on the need for a clear fiscal ra- palachian program proper, but rather on how sim- tionale. Under the initial 1965 formula, a school ilar assitance might be offered to the northern district needed only 100 children of 3% of its en- Great Lakes states, the Ozarks, and New England. rollment in poverty to qualify for assistance. Con- In response, the Administration promised that the sequently, 95% of the nation's counties were eligi- PWEDA, then being written, would provide gener- ble. Furthermore, since the formula takes into ac- al authority for the creation of additional regional count the magnitude of state aid to education as commissions. These have grown in both number well as poverty, it provides larger amounts of aid and size in the intervening period. By early 1979, to some of the wealthier states in the north. Coun- nearly the entire coterminous United States was ties with the heaviest concentrations of low income served by one of these organizations. children receive comparatively small grants per The political dynamics surrounding federal aid to child. Despite this, ESEA Title I appears to be elementary and secondary education have been markedly more redistributive than most other edu- quite similar. In this field as well, supposedly redis- cation programs. tributive programs have had only a modest redis- In sum, the political process behind the creation tributive impact on governmental finances. Politi- and allocation of funds in many programs sup- cal considerations have been paramount; equity posedly aimed at fiscal redistribution is surprising- considerations have placed a distant second. ly reminiscent of the old "pork barrel." A The first major program of federal aid to educa- targeting of funds to the most needy areas has tion, Impact Aid, was adopted in 1950 in response been found to be quite incompatible with the to a problem of fiscal equity. Large federal installa- development of a supportive political coalition. tions, such as military bases, place additional students in the public schools without contributing to the local tax base, since federal property is tax ex- THE SERVICES STRATEGY empt. Although proposals for general federal aid The federal government has never embarked up- to schools had been rejected repeatedly by Con- on a large-scale program of out-and-out income re- gress, Impact Aid was accepted as a system of pay- distribution on behalf of the poor as a general group. Furthermore, it is only in very recent years cipients. Under the early Works Progress Adrnin- that such programs have been seriously proposed. istration (WPA), by far the largest of the relief ef- General assistance remains solely a state and local forts, the federal government provided only work responsibility-and few of these programs are very relief, while the states were required to make large. On the other hand, the national government general relief payments to the "unemployables." has adopted a great many programs meeting essen- Although the Social Security Act inaugurated a tial human needs (for food, shelter, medical care, permanent federal role in the welfare field, politi- etc.) and promoting economic opportunity (through cal attention at the time was almost exclusively on education and job training, etc.) while limiting in- the special needs of the elderly, a group regarded come transfers to specially deserving groups (the with special sympathy and whose interests had unemployed, aged, widows, dependent children, found vocal expression with the Townsend Move- disabled, blind, etc.). This might be described as a ment. AFDC was adopted without much discussion "jobs and services" or simply "services strategy," as simply one minor title of an omnibus bill. It, and since various social and human services play an im- the other public assistance titles, were expected to portant role in it. be purely temporary measures, to phase down with The case studies suggest that this "services" economic improvements and the growth of the strategy has a firm political foundation for two rea- more favored programs of social insurance. Legis- sons. First, service-oriented programs have been lators had no idea that this minor program of far more acceptable to both public officials and the "widows' aid" would one day be the backbone of a general public than have direct cash payments. new, permanent, and very large welfare system. Second, service-oriented programs have been sup- The same sort of orientation reappeared during ported by a broader range of interest groups than the 1960s, when national attention focused once cash benefit programs. While cash payments di- again on the problems of the poor. Federal officials rectly aid only their recipients, services programs tried to cut the size of the welfare rolls during the provide some benefits to service suppliers, pro- War on Poverty period, not increase them. It was viders, and those involved in the delivery system at hoped that an improvement in education, area de- all levels of government. These groups often have velopment, employment training, health, and so- played important roles in the creation or expansion cial services would permit the poor to become self- of service-oriented programs. sufficient in the private enterprise economy. "Re- The first point is illustrated by the origins of fed- habilitation, not relief' was a slogan of the Ken- eral social welfare policy, during the New Deal. nedy Administration, while "economic oppor- Jobs, not income redistribution, were the major is- tunity" became the watchword under President sue of the time. Roosevelt's concern with poverty Lyndon Johnson. As was true in the 1930s, poverty tended to be largely particularistic and Depression- was expected to wither away-within a decade, ac- oriented. In other words, while the President, no cording to one federal plan-and, once again, there doubt, was sympathetic to all who suffered from was little overt attempt to redistribute income poverty, his primary concern was with the peculiar from the upper (and middle) income brackets to mass poverty of the Depression. In all New Deal the poor. programs, the primary objective was economic re- The history of the food stamp program illus- covery, and it was expected that once the economy trates both a preference for services over cash pro- was functioning, the need for large-scale relief grams and a certain degree of involvement by ser- would cease. vice suppliers and providers-in this case, farmers Although the federal relief effort became very and the agricultural lobby. extensive, the focus throughout was on getting the Of all human necessities, food is perhaps the unemployed back to work. Public jobs were created most vital. The federal government now operates under the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Public ten separate food-related, need-determined pro- Works Administration, and the Civil Works Ad- grams, at a total estimated cost of $8.8 billion in ministration. While funds under the Federal 1977. One of these programs, Food Stamps, ac- Emergency Relief Act could be used for either "di- counted for 62%of these expenditures. rect relief" or "work relief," federal adminis- Throughout much of their history, the fate of trators showed a definite preference for the latter these nutrition programs has been intertwined as a means for protecting the "self-respect" of re- with questions of agricultural policy. The first food program, authorized by the Potato Control Act of tions, as well as a television documentary aired in 1935, was in fact concerned only marginally with 1968. Among both lawmakers and the general pub- poor relief. Although it permitted the Secretary of lic, the hunger issue evoked a level of sympathy Agriculture to distribute surplus farm products to which public assistance never received. One wel- the Depression poor, its primary aim was not to fare analyst explains the difference: meet the nutritional needs of recipients, but rather to support farm prices. Agriculture was also the Hunger is [viewed as] quantitatively dif- primary concern of the first Food Stamp program, ferent from poverty in that it is assumed which operated from 1939-1943. that food is so crucial to people that they In the 1950s and 1960s, these two interrelated will do their best to get food and avoid objectives became more distinct, and debate over starvation. Therefore, people are clearly the establishment of a permanent Food Stamp pro- desperate and deserving if they can't get gram became a heavily partisan issue. Republican enough food, while poverty is much more opponents argued that Food Stamps was more pro- likely to be seen as a condition which is not perly a welfare than agricultural program and op- necessarily one of extreme destitution, and posed it, in part, on this basis. In general, they which may well be a chosen condition and favored exclusive reliance upon the distribution of thus not one to have met with extensive surplus commodities at the state and local level. sympathy.70 Democratic Food Stamp advocates admitted that the well being of the poor, rather than of farmers, This separate treatment continued into the was their primary concern, and President Johnson 1970s. While rejecting President Nixon's "Family embraced it as "one of our most valuable weapons Assistance Plan" proposals for welfare reform, in the war on poverty." Where AFDC failed to Congress greatly expanded the coverage of and elicit Administration support, Food Stamps suc- federalized the operation of Food Stamps. The ceeded. 1971 amendments authorized the Secretaries of Although the Food Stamp bill had strong back- Agriculture and HEW jointly to establish uniform ing among urban Democrats, it was opposed by a federal standards for participation. These actions nearly unified Republican party, and many rural placed the decision making aspect of the program and southern Democrats as well. Passage seemed squarely in Washington's hands, leaving the par- improbable. But in Spring 1964, an important ticipating states as mere administrative distribu- wheat-cotton bill came before the House. The mea- tors. Finally, the 1973 amendments mandated that sure was crucial to rural representatives and their all counties across the nation offer Food Stamps as constituents, though it was hardly a vote-getter for of July 1974. the urban members. Precious few Agriculture bills These were crucial steps. Food Stamps is now were. Food Stamps, however, was a major excep- the only one of the five major welfare programs tion. which is wholly federally financed. Consequently, By late March, the terms of a trade were becom- interstate spending disparities per recipient are ing obvious, if still only tacit. Urban members were much smaller than those for AFDC, Medicaid, SSI, willing to vote for wheat-cotton if rural members or general assistance. Regardless of their state of would vote for Food Stamps. On this basis, both residence and whether. or not they are are on measures passed the House in April 1964 within a welfare, families qualify for participation if their few hours of each other, thus providing a textbook income (after a series of deductions) is less than a example of successful "logrolling. " nationally determined standard.71 Once established, Food Stamps took on a life of A second result of these actions-and of the its own, separate from agricultural policy, but also 1974-75 recession-was that Food Stamps joined distinct from the other welfare programs. During the welfare explosion. Between the inauguration of the 1960s, political figures who wondered why Richard Nixon and the election of Jimmy Carter, AFDC had grown "too big" were worried about federal outlays grew from $228.8 million to $5.3 why Food Stamps remained, for many years, much billion, while the number of participants rose from "too small." Indeed, the "politics of hunger" es- 3.2 to about 18 million. What is striking is that calated into a major national concern following a most of this growth can be attributed directly to series of well publicized Congressional investiga- federal policy choices. AFDC grew out of control because of its open-ended entitlement features, but given the histories of many federal domestic pro- Food Stamps grew mostly "on purpose." grams as revealed in the case studies. New Deal Although Food Stamps has found political favor welfare programs emphasized state autonomy over as a hunger-oriented rather than purely welfare national standards and have been very difficult to program, the distinction may in fact be extremely reform. Many later grants-in-aid, including some superficial. There is reason to believe that Food which were ostensibly redistributive in intent, have Stamps functions in practice largely as a general scattered funds widely in an attempt to build sup- cash supplement to its recipients. While the pro- portive political coalitions. And, in recent years, gram fills major gaps in the welfare system, cur- there has been a preference for in-kinds benefits rent evidence suggests that it does not have much and social services, rather than direct cash pay- impact on the diets of poor families.72 ments to the poor. Programs of the former type In the case of education, too, there is an impor- generate more interest group support and have tant difference between officially stated objectives much more popular appeal than does "welfare." and actual results. Federal aid to elementary and Regardless of their effectiveness as redistributive secondary schools was justified in 1965 primarily tools. they have a firm political base. on antipoverty grounds. Yet, an historical review These observations cast doubt on conventional suggests that the concern with poverty was mostly political science distinctions between "distribu- adventitious. The adoption of the program culmin- tive" and "redistributive" policies. Despite ated many decades of work by professional edu- redistributive rhetoric, many social welfare pro- cators and individual Congressmen to enact a programs exhibit the same political patterns common gram of general aid to public schools. Rhetorical to old-fashioned "distributive" or "pork-barrel" emphasis upon the benefits of the program for dis- programs. Logrolling, either in its implicit or ex- advantaged children, rather than for school sys- plicit forms, has been the major way of building tems, broke the ancient impasse over the issue of supportive political coalitions for new enactments federal assistance to parochial schools. The bill was and in expanding previously enacted programs. the first to be supported by both of the principal Moreover, the extensive reliance upon intergov- antagonists on the church-state question, NEA ernmental mechanisms in the provision of aid to and the U.S. Catholic Conference. Their agree- the disadvantaged has made redistributive goals ment led directly to its enactment. difficult to achieve. The claims of state autonomy Despite its antipoverty objectives, many critics in administration and policy, as well as the fiscal believe that the program is widely regarded as a de costs of reform, have prevented the development facto general support grant to public schools, and of uniform benefit standards and eligibility provi- both its allocation formula as well as formal imple- sions. Although the federalization of each of the mentation and evaluation studies lend credence to major welfare programs studied-AFDC, SSI, un- these claims. As indiciated above, funds are dis- employment insurance, and Food Stamps-has persed very broadly without much close associa- been proposed, only in the latter instance has it tion to the number of poor students. And, although been fully achieved. the money certainly benefits the school districts Thus, while theory suggests that the redistribu- which receive it, it is not clear that it has much im- tion of fiscal resources based on equity criteria proved the life chances of disadvantaged students. should be a major goal of national policy, political considerations have limited actual achievements. Conclusion Neither the general public, nor political leaders, have steadfastly supported large-scale, well tar- Existing grant-in-aid programs have not been a geted fiscal redistribution measures. As Laurence very effective instrument in achieving national E. Lynn, Jr. has noted, while: equity goals. In general, the grant-in-aid system is not strongly targeted to the least advantaged states or localities, has not substantially altered . . . significant progress has been made in the distribution of income or economic opportuni- reducing poverty, . . . the policy making ty, and has not been consistent with theoretical process that produces it . . . is probably prescriptions based upon externalities criteria. more concerned with how it is reduced These outcomes make sense in political terms, than whether it is reduced.73 ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND grants-in-aid does exist within the federal context. ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECTIVENESS One of the most important arguments for the use of grants-in-aid views them as an alternative to the Theory excessive bureaucratization, inflexibility, insensitivity, and diseconomies of scale that might be as- The concepts of economic efficiency and adminis- sociated with direct national provision of domestic trative effectiveness provide two additional inter- services. Because of America's large population related criteria for assessing the assignment of size and territorial extent, as well as its diveristy, a functions and operation of intergovernmental pro- truly national government would be gargantuan. grams. As described in the Commission's 1974 V.O. Key, Jr. had such thougths in mind when he study: wrote, in 1937, that: . . . the economic efficiency criteria directs . . . the governance of a nation of continen- that functions be allocated to jurisdictions tal proportions is a matter for which no that are able to perform them at a reason- simple blueprint and specifications are able cost and at a level of effectiveness ac- available. The grant system builds on and ceptable to local citizens. This involves (a) utilizes existing institutions to cope with economies of scale, (b) public sector com- national problems. Under it the states are petition, and (c) public sector pricing.74 welded into national machinery of sorts and the establishment of costly, parallel, Administrative effectiveness, on the other hand: direct federal services is made unneces- . . . deals with the technical and legal di- sary. A virtue of no mean importance is mensions of functional assignment. A suc- that the administrators in actual charge of cessful assignment policy must insure ade- operations remain amenable to local con- quate performance. Hence governments trol. In that way the supposed formality, should have the requisite administrative the regularity, and the cold-blooded ef- and legal capabilities to perform assigned ficiency of a national hierarchy are responsibilities. This assignment criterion avoided. 77 has subcomponents concerning appropri- In Morton Grodzins' last work, he also argued ate legal authority and geographic juris- that grants-in-aid (chiefly those of the 50s) helped diction, management capability, and the maximize administrative effectiveness and eco- ' need for assigning functions to general- nomic efficiency. He stated that the grant tech- purpose governments in the context of nique: shared intergovernmental powers.76 . . . made possible the allocation of responsibilities between the levels of government For the reasons described in the introductory according to criteria of administrative and section of this chapter, an item-by-item application fiscal efficiency. These criteria can be of these subcriteria to national-state-local relation- simply stated: the national government ships is conceptually difficult, and will not be at- assumed partial responsibility for tempted here. There is, in fact, no administrative establishing minimum standards of six- theory of federalism, in the sense of a coherent vice, because the national government model of how a federal system should operate from possessed superior fiscal resources and an administrative per~pective.~~While organiza- was concerned with the general welfare of tional decentralization has a comparatively clear residents of all states. The states (and their administrative rationale, federalism itself does political subdivisions) assumed primary not. Moreover, few theorists would attempt to responsibility for administration, because justify the existence of the present 50 states- they were in the better position to inter- varying widely in size, with fured boundaries-or pret and meet local needs. the hodgepodge of local governmental jurisdictions on the basis of any sort of managerial criteria. Still, efficiency and effectiveness are key values, Hence, he concluded, grants "have avoided both and the elements of an administrative theory of overweening centralization and the inadequacy of complete decentralization in large-scale pro- the states] of federally aided activities is gram~."~~ generally better than that of nonaided ac- In the traditional view, then, grants-in-aid offer tivities can hardly be disputed.gl a simple, harmonious mechanism for the pooling of federal and state efforts, with each level con- By 1955, when the Kestenbaum Commission re- tributing to objectives shared by both. Most early viewed the situation, it declared that the intergov- observers described intergovernmental adminis- ernmental grant had "matured" as an instrument tration as "cooperative," "collaborative," and as a of "cooperative government": "partnership" among officials engaged in the Its elements are well established; the ob "sharing" of public service responsibilities. Grod- jectives are defined; apportionment and zins made this quite explicit when he wrote in 1961 matching formulas are laid down; condi- that: tions, minimum standards, and sanctions are prescribed; and provisions are made Federal, state, and local officials are not for administrative supervision. The matur- adversaries. They are colleagues. . . . The ing of the grant as a means of stimulating American system is best conceived as one and shaping particular programs, as dis- government serving one people. 79 tinct from a subsidy device, is reflected not only in increasing legislative attention to A certain degree of federal administrative con- conditions, standards, sanctions, and trol was not regarded as inimical to this partner- methods of supervision, but also in the evo- ship, however, and most regarded it as essential. lution of national administrative machin- George F. Break has commented that: ery and procedures. The conditions at- . . . the grantor government, since it is tached to grants have not remained mere paying for benefits received, is entitled to verbal expressions of national intent; na- ask that its funds be used efficiently and to tional agencies have generally had funds exercise some controls over the grantee's and staff to make them effective.82 operation of all supported programs . . . . In summary, the grant-in-aid program-espe- Since the public benefits to be paid for in cially the specific-purpose categorical grant, with this case accrue jointly to the citizens of its conditions and controls-was traditionally re- two different levels of government, the regarded as a desirable arrangement from the stand- sponsibility for the effective operation of point of both economic efficiency and administra- the programs should also be shared joint- tive effectiveness. It seemingly embodied the best ly.8O of two worlds, combining the virtues of decentralization and centralization through shared responsi- While many of the 19th century land and cash bility. As Grodzins described it, the grant was in grants had few conditions attached to the use of fact "an admirable invention for the promotion of funds, and almost no plan for federal administra- collaborative federalism."83 tive supervision and control, these were developed gradually-and their creation was generally ap- Assessment plauded. Given the low standards which once prevailed in many states, the combined impact of fed- Despite these earlier, generally positive views, eral planning requirements, audits, civil service more contemporary assessments of federal adrnin- standards, and organizational prescriptions was istrative practices-and of the operation of inter- generally judged to be advantageous to the states governmental programs in particular-have gener- themselves, as well as to Washington. The preface ally been very critical. The national government to the first comprehensive study of grant adminis- has lost much of the reputation for good manage- tration published in 1937 indicated that: ment it enjoyed in times past, and most recent studies of intergovernmental management and . . . the evidence is clear that the influence program implementation have identified many of the federal agencies has almost always serious deficiencies. Furthermore, despite re- been on the side of improving administra- peated efforts to simplify and decentralize inter- tive standards. That the administration [by governmental programs through grant consolidation and other reforms, administrative tensions ap- sprawling agencies assigned to him under the ex- pear to have risen and the federal "partnership" of ecutive power is increasingly doubted, while Con- earlier years has largely broken down. gress seems to devote far too little attention to the Press accounts, the statements of public of- oversight of existing programs and too much to the ficials, and the rhetoric of political candidates are creation of more new ones. Few programs seem to now filled with references to federal program fail- be evaluated adequately, and-regardless of the ures, waste, inefficiency, disorganization, red tape, outcome of performance evaluations-very few are and mismanagement, while opinion polls show that ever terminated. While the past 15 years have seen these criticisms are generally accepted by the a host of managerial reforms-including planning- public-at-large. Consequently, opposition to the programming-budgeting, management-by-objec- practice, if not the principle, of "big government" tives, the federal assistance review, the Congres- is rising. The participants in a recent National Sci- sional budget process, departmental reorganiza- ence Foundation workshop observed that tion efforts, zero-base budgeting, and civil service improvements-high levels of efficiency and effec- . . . in stark contrast to the overall in- tiveness have not been achieved. crease in taxes and expenditures for public The origins of these problems are multiple, of services, gross indicators of output in the course, but many appear to be rooted in the pat- areas of educational achievement, crime, terns of politics and policymaking. In the view of upward mobility, drug abuse, unemploy- many contemporary analysts, much federal inef- ment, health, and housing do not show fectiveness and inefficiency is less the consequence marked improvement. This disjunction be- of poor administrative supervision, staffing and or- tween input and output growth would ap- ganization than of shortcomings in the initial legis- pear to be at the root of the so-called popu- lative design. For example, Wholely and his associ- lar "tax revolt. " ates identify poorly defined statutory objectives Surveys indicate that the major syrnp- and a lack of knowledge as to what activities would tom of this tax revolt is the dissatisfaction lead to the remediation of social problems as of people from all walks of life with ineffi- among the key obstacles to effective administra- ciency and waste in government pro- tion.s6 These are policy, not strictly management, grams. People believe that the public sec- concerns. tor could cut revenue and staff by a fifth or Many other expert analysts contend that politi- more without reducing services, and that government could increase services with- cians devote too much attention to the identification of lofty national goals, rather than the consid- out imposing additional taxes.84 eration of the necessary means for achieving them. Despite journalistic and political tendencies Consequently, many federal initiatives seem doom- toward hyperbole, many of these criticisms are ed to be ineffectively administered-or "imple- well founded in the view of governmental experts. mented." This concern dates back to the legislative For example, Joseph S. Wholely and his associates outpouring of the mid-1960s. At the end of the at the Urban Institute-specialists in the evalua- Johnson era, James L. Sundquist observed that: tion of governmental programs-have concluded that the typical federal program is not being man- . . . in the enactment of the new program aged effecti~ely.~~And Alan K. Campbell, the of federal assistance, scant attention was Director of the Office of Personal Management paid to the pattern of federal-state-local re- and a distinguished contributor to the field of pub- lations that was emerging. At every lic administration, has asserted that "a good man- level-in the executive department, in the ager in the federal government finds it tough to White House, in the Congress-the con- manage because he really does not have the tools centration was on the substance of the leg- to do the job." islation; the administrative language was Although much of the management criticism inserted almost incidentally. "We have no centers on the bureaucracy, the reputations of both organizational philosophy, only a program the President and Congress also have been philosophy," one high federal official put tarnished. The ability of a President to guide the it.87 More recent commentators agree. David R. May- . . . despite the mountains of paperwork hew observes that Congress often adopts essen- and legions of federal watchdogs, a state tially "symbolic" legislation, or addresses prob- or local government is less subject to fed- lems which have been poorly analyzed. It-like the eral discipline than is an ordinary federal general public--has a penchant for the "blunt, sim- agency.91 ple action" as a means for solving very complex problems. Hence, "if it is widely believed that Thomas Anton suggests that most federal agencies spending money will 'solve social problems,' then must rely on statements of verbal compliance with Congress will spend money."88 Similarly, Thomas Washington's goals. Thus, "federal knowledge of Anton has suggested that most grant programs what actually happens to federal dollars in lower- "can hardly be said to be 'designed' at all; they are level systems . . . remains a function of what just pa~sed."~gHis research and observation sug- lower-level officials are willing to report-occa- gest that political advocacy, rather than thoughtful sional General Accounting Office (GAO) or scholar- analysis, is the major source of new programs, ly reports excepted."Q2 Richard P. Nathan has with pragmatic political considerations-including stated similar conclusions in blunt terms. Often, he a desire to "do something" by distributing contends, federal agencies "simply do not know" money-outweighing theoretical considerations of what use is being made of federal funds: ends and means. Not only do they lack sophisticated control Implementation analysts have devoted special mechanisms with which to implement attention to the difficulties involved in the execu- grandiose grant plans, they simply do not tion of intergovernmental programs. They note know what is being done. Even if they that administrative links between Washington, its have information about the allocations to field offices, the states, and localities can create major functional areas by recipient juris- very long "chains of command,'' as Chart I illus- dictions under a particular grant program, trates. Hence include many possible points for they are likely to have relatively little in- delay, disagreement, or misunderstanding. Within formation about specific programmatic any one governmental unit, centralized control uses of these funds and even less informa- over budgets, personnel, purchases, and organization about the effects and effectiveness of tion can be used to ensure a certain degree of com- the dollars spent.93 pliance and coordination. However, subnational governments are fully independent administrative Although, as Nathan believes, this lack of fiscal and political units, with their own personnel pro- control helps maintain the openness and localism cedures, budgetary systems, and so forth. Federal of the system, it also can frustrate the achievement control thus is limited to the issuance of program of national objectives. To many other critics, the regulations and guidelines, together with the deci- grant-in-aid strategy is inordinantly complex, sion to offer and the threat to withhold funds. bolsters "buckpassing," and is prone to failure. Comparatively weak fiscal incentives, then, must Hence, Walter Williams suggests that the exten- substitute for a unified administrative hierarchy. sive sharing of responsibility has created a 'most Philip Monypenny was one of the first to describe uneasy partnership" in which "the negative power these special managerial problems associated with of each partner to block or harass is much stronger grant programs. 1n his prescient 1960 article, than the positive power to move in desired direc- noted that: tion~."~~Many implementation experts, including Pressman and Wildavsky, conclude that simple, di- the introduction of federal aid admin- . . . rect programs are usually more effective than com- istration imposes another administrative plicated intergovernmental schemes requiring and legislative layer, and to that extent high levels of cooperation and coordinati~n.~~ dilutes responsibility, slows action, and in- Such implementation difficulties may reduce the creases the necessity of documentati~n.~~ efficiency and effectiveness of any particular grant Yet, as more recent analysts stress, the piling-on program. But two other trends of the past 15 years of regulatory conditions does not give federal have added to intergovernmental administrative agencies real control over state-local actions. Allen complexities. First, implementation problems have Schick comments that: been exacerbated greatly by the rising number of Chart I ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS USED IN PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO PROGRAM BENEFICIARIES

FEDERAL EADQUARTERSI ( OFFICE I

FEDERAL

OFFICES

NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, ETC.)

PROJECT OPERATORS (INDIVIDUALS, CITIES, COUNTIES, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, ETC.) I 1 I I

PROGRAM BENEFICIARIES (INDIVIDUALS, CITIES, BUSINESSES, ETC.) federal assistance programs. Every field of federal with them a variety of "across-the-board" require- involvement is now marked by serious program- ments dealing with such questions as civil rights, matic fragmentation. environmental impact, citizen participation, labor From Washington's standpoint, this prolifera- and procurement standards, and so forth. Second, tion of interrelated aids is disadvantageous be- several major fields have seen an evolution from cause it: relatively unrestricted subsidy programs to much more stringent regulatory enactments. Indeed, in . . . tends to dissipate federal leverage. some areas the shift has been dramatic enough The federal government can exert influ- that grants may be regarded as simply the "sweet- ence over state and local decisionmaking eners" which make coercive regulatory provisions through the device of categorical grants more politically palatable.QgDaniel J. Elazar has when its efforts are concentrated in a rea- commented that, by the late 1970s: sonable number of areas, but by trying to . . . we had reached the point at which the push and pull state and local budget alloca- states were being excluded by federal pre- tions in hundreds of directions at once, the emption from fields that until relatively re- various efforts to some extent neutralize cently were considered their exclusive pre- each other, exhaust the limited capacity of rogative. . . . [W]e have moved to a system local officials to administer complex pro- whereby it is taken as axiomatic that the grams, and generate mountains of unread federal government shall initiate policies reports. . . . The proliferation defeats the and programs, shall determine their char- very purpose of categorical grants. Funds acter, shall delegate their administration are spread too thinly over too many pro- to the states and localities according to grams; control over the use of the funds terms which it alone determines, and shall becomes increasingly difficult to exercise; provide for whatever intervention on the red tape and delays abound.96 part of its administrative agencies as it From the state and local standpoint, the jungle of deems necessary to secure compliance programs poses serious obstacles to the effective- with those terms.loO ness and efficiency of their own management pro- In some cases, these new, much "tougher" and cesses. Hence, as George F. Break has commented more intrusive federal requirements call into ques- recently: "Anyone evaluating the intergovern- tion the traditional legal characterization of the mental grants system as a whole comes inevitably grant as a limited, purely voluntary instrument of to the conclusion that it is badly fragmented and federal-state-local cooperation. Although the pro- needs some major overhauling."97 visions of the Health Planning Act have been up- A second important trend over the past 15 years held by the federal judiciary as appropriate ex- has been the increasing use of the federal regula- an ercise of the Congress' taxing and spending tory "stick" in addition to the "carrot" of subsidy. The administrative requirements attached to (or in powers, one expert notes that the law: some instances supplanting) federal aids have . . . intrudes upon state and local opera- become ever more numerous and exacting. From tions to a greater degree than almost any the state and local standpoint, the burden is in- other grant program. It virtually man- creasingly onerous and intrusive. dates the passage of legislation by state or This pattern first emerged in the mid-1960s. local governments. The consequences of a James L. Sundquist identified a shift during this state's action not to comport with the period from federal programs intended to help Health Planning Act go far beyond simple states accomplish their objectives to ones which termination of assistance under one pro- used states (and their localities) to accomplish ex- gram but go to all health programs within pressly national purposes. These programs re- a state. Withdrawal of federal funds for quired far greater national control over program failure to comply with the HeaWt Planning content and management.98 However, the policy Act would cripple a state's efforts to main- changes of the 1960s were but modest harbingers tain health care assistance for citizens of of things to come. First, all grants-in-aid now carry that state. . . .Io1 Certainly these developments challenge the train intergovernmental programs are partly explica- ditional conception of "partnership" federalism. In ble in political terms. First, because of shortcom- many fields, federal and state-local officials now ings in the policy process at both ends of Pennsyl- view each other more as adversaries than col- vania Avenue, many programs are poorly designed leagues. Tension between elected public officials at from both a policy and administrative standpoint. the subnational level and federal bureaucrats and Second, the case studies suggest that, once federal judges runs especially high. Too often, the spirit of participation in a field is established, there is a cooperation has been replaced by a spirit of mutual "natural" tendency toward increasing regulatory antagonism. lo2 prescriptiveness and increasing programmatic Evidence of rising tension may be found, among fragmentation. Finally, efforts at grant consoli- other places, on judicial docket books. Recent dation clearly run afoul of important-and stra- years have seen an escalating number of lawsuits tegically placed-"vested interests." Each of these by third parties who were denied assistance under points is examined below. a grant, who were denied the benefits of a grant, or were adversely affected by a grant. One survey IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES of federal court cases identified almost 500 dealing with grant law, 80% of them issued since 1975.1°3 The legislative histories included in the Commis- These developments fly in the face of the pro- sion's case studies indicate the political origins of claimed intentions of every occupant of the White many problems of intergovernmental implementa- House in the past decade. Each President has tion. Many federal programs were poorly designed pledged to strengthen and improve relations at the outset from the standpoint of efficiency and among the governmental levels, and each has at- effectiveness. Indeed, it might be said that the po- tempted to simplify and smooth the operation of in- litical process provides considerable incentives to tergovernmental programs through administra- exaggerate potential benefits of new programs tive reforms and grant consolidation. Yet only while minimizing potential costs and ignoring pos- modest progress has been made. sible obstacles to success. Despite a series of key mergers in public health Specific details do differ. Several key programs (1966), employment training (1973), and communi- were rushed to enactment without much consider- ty development (1974), and a few lesser grant ation of operational concerns. In other cases, ef- consolidations, the number of categorical pro- forts to build a supportive political coalition were grams has continued to rise. No consolidation has so difficult that any doubts about probable results encompassed more than a portion of a major func- were suppressed. Finally, on many occasions, pub- tional field, and most areas have experienced a lic policy addressed problems that were poorly ex- significant amount of "recategorization" as the amined or poorly understood. Although the Presi- years have passed. Furthermore, no major new dent and bureaucracy are generally credited with consolidation has been enacted in the past six greater "rationality," expertise, and staff re- years. sources than the Congress, all of these appeared In short, most contemporary assessments of the mythic in some policies initiated in the executive effectiveness and efficiency of grant administra- branch as well. tion differ sharply from those of 25, 20, or even 15 Examples could be drawn from most of the func- years ago. As the quantity of intergovernmental tional fields studied. However, the political histor- activities has risen, their quality has apparently ies of some of the major education programs show declined. Consequently, visions of "partnership" each of these weaknesses. Consider, for instance, and "cooperation" have been replaced by new im- the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the ages of inadequate implementation, growing frag- Ehtary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 mentation, increasing intrusiveness, and new an- (ESEA), a program which has had serious short- tagonisms. comings, according to many of its evaluators and implementation analysts. Case Study Findings Despite the administrative importance of clearly stated objectives, the language of ESEA was in- Case study materials suggest that many of the tentionally ambiguous. Although the bill had been problems of inefficiency and ineffectiveness found developed largely in secret within the executive branch, the Administration took the position . . .[N]one of the powerful elements within that-faults aside-it was one which could pass. In the legislative coalition-the labor unions, the rush to enactment, important issues were left church groups, and the NAACP-had a unexplored out of fear that the delicate political clear picture of the path that would be re- "consensus" would unravel. Few changes were quired for federal officials to proceed from made by Congress. the status quo to the goal enunciated in Ti- The result was a program with serious im- tle VI. plementation problems. Former Commissioner of The minimal debate on the measure within Education Harold Howe has remarked that "I the Congress also reflected the failures of doubt that anyone could have dreamed up a series the contending interest groups involved in of education programs more difficult to administer the lobbying to focus on the administrative but ESEA was not designed with that in . . . imperatives of the title. The Title VI mind."lo4 One legislator remarked: . . . issue [is] an example of a policy area that . . . [W]e had to make the hard choice and took administrative form without a clear face the reality that in 1965 the issue was blueprint for enforcement emerging from not good education policy versus bad. The the legislative process.lo6 question . . was whether there was ever . Enforcement in fact turned out to be exceedingly to be federal aid to the elementary and secondary schools of this nation. The 1965 complex. Unexpectedly, ESEA became a principal Bill, in all candor, does not make much tool in the effort to force desegregation of sense educationally; but it makes a hell of a Southern school systems. To OE's massive task of lot of sense legally, politically, and con- administering a large and complex new law was stitutionally. This was a battle of principle, added simultaneous requirement to execute the not substance, and that is the main reason civil rights provision: I voted for it.lo6 The task facing the Office of Education Consequently, it is not surprising that ESEA has was staggering. It had to induce instant experienced serious operational difficulties, and its desegregation and to end programmatic effectiveness as educational and social policy has discrimination in every school district been questioned by many experts. Aid to the edu- slated for the award of federal aid. . . . cationally disadvantaged has been used by many Compounding the dilemma was the fact school districts as general aid, sometimes in vio- that the Civil Rights Act provided no lation of the letter as well as the spirit of the law. definitions of segregation and discrimina- Although the federal Office of Education (OE) es- tion. . . . [Tlhe sheer volume of work in- tablished eligibility guidelines and criteria for local volved in processing the submissions of projects, their enforcement is left to the states- nearly 5,000 southern and border districts which frequently ignore them. Because state and severely impeded other USOE efforts. . . . local education agencies constitute OE's primary [Tlhat fear that sizeable blocks of fund.s political constituency, it seldom has taken the would not be distributed because the nec- drastic step of cutting off a recipient from grant essary Title VI assurances could not be ne- funds. gotiated and processed in time brought the Other implementation problems for ESEA arose problem to crisis proportions.lo7 because of the requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination A similar disregard for questions of adminis- in any federally assisted program. Originally in- trative efficiency and programmatic effectiveness serted into the bill by the Kennedy Administration may be found in the legislative histories of a for bargaining purposes, this section took on real number of key antipoverty programs of the 1960s. life only after the President's assassination and the Indeed, the theory of "structural unemployment" subsequent Johnsonian "honeymoon" with Con- on which area development and employment train- gress. Its creation was therefore something of an ing programs were based was far more readily ac- accident, and legislative intent on the means of en- cepted by politicians than by academic economists. forcement was never clear: Few researchers found objective evidence that structural unemployment was actually rising in the munities they were intended to assist. Federal de- early 1960s or that major new federal initiatives velopmental grants apparently have not been a were required. Not until ajter the War on Poverty major influence on the location of business and in- was announced did the thesis of the economic dustry in areas of economic decline, or on the na- "structuralists" gain widespread professional ac- tional unemployment rate. ceptance. Congressmen, on the other hand, em- Poor design also figured into the enactment of a braced the idea readily, because it provided them second major employment bill of the Kennedy with a direct, tangible way to come to the assis- years. The Manpower Development and Training tance of their distressed constituents. Its political Act of 1962 (MDTA) was formulated by Congress virtues were manifest, even if its economic ones and the President as "a positive answer to the were not. challenge of technology"-more specifically, to The first federal program to address the problem provide special retraining assistance to adults dis- of structural unemployment was the Area Redevel- placed by automation. Yet, just one year later, ma- opnzent Act of 1961 (ARA). Its sponsor, Sen. Paul jor revisions were necessary. Just as many Douglas (D-IL), was a respected professional econ- economists had argued earlier, technological ob- omist and former professor at the University solescence was found nut to be a leading cause of of Chicago. But Douglas' sponsorship of the ARA unemployment. A high rate of unemployment in appears to have stemmed more from his political the early 1960s had made it difficult for those who than his academic experience. In 1952, he had pub- lost their jobs to find new ones, but as the sluggish lished a book urging governmental frugality, and economy began to improve, much of this problem stating that federal intervention in the economy dissolved. was unwarranted unless the unemployment rate As the general rate of unemployment fell, how- topped 8%. However, the recessions of 1954-58 ever, the problems of youth and minorities stood and a reelection tour of areas with "hard core" un- out in contrast. Both groups experienced unusually employment problems in southern Illinois led him high rates of unemployment and, while the overall to change his view. In 1955, he had his staff pre- rate declined, youth unemployment actually in- pare a "package" bill including eight separate as- creased. MDTA was not equipped to deal ef- sistance programs for depressed areas. fectively with this situation. For example, the law Throughout the six-year debate over the ARA, stipulated that no more than 5% of its training al- partisan rivalries and philosophical disputes fig- lowances could be spent on workers under 21 years ured more centrally than objective assessments of of age, and it focused primarily on vocational the probable impact of a set of rather small new education, whereas many of the unemployed re- federal aid programs. During Congressional cam- quired remedial basic education. paigns of 1956 and 1958, Democratic supporters of Although several amendments retargeted the the ARA bill exaggerated its potential benefits to program-which had, in fact, been judged to be constituents in distressed communities, sometimes somewhat more effective than many others-it had to the embarrassment of the bill's author. Com- difficulty adapting to its new clientele groups. To a petitive pressures also led to an exaggeration of considerable extent, these implementation prob- differences between the Republican and Demo- lems resulted from its peculiar administrative cratic positions on the measures, as proponents structure. For the majority of its tasks, MDTA re- painted the Eisenhower White House as indif- lied upon existing institutions. None of these were ferent to the fate of the needy. Some Republicans noted for their effectiveness, willingness, or capa- responded that their more carefully targeted pro- bility in dealing with the urban poor. Problems of posals would actually have provided more as- poor coordination and administrative complexitiy sistance to the most highly distressed areas, but posed additional difficulties. The relationships the issue proved to be "too technical" to have among the several federal agencies responsible for much influence on the climate of political opinion. carrying out these different program elements- Economic development programs proved to be each with its own clientele and operation pro- very popular politically, and have grown more cedures-became intensely competitive. All of numerous and better funded. Yet, in retrospect, these factors hampered efforts to rapidly establish most evaluations suggest that they have had very a smoothly working and effective program of man- limited impact on the growth of most of the com- power training. A third key statute, the Economic Opportunity enced severe implementation difficulties. As in- Act of 1964 (EOA), launched the War on Poverty dicated in one recent commentary: and ushered in another major stream of employment and training programs. Yet, despite the fan- Even the most sympathetic appraisal of CETA must conclude that its achieve- fare given it, the EOA lacked much in the way of . . . an overall conceptual framework. Its many titles ments have not been in line with its costs. reflected not a choice among programs so much as Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall still vig- a collection of them. Administratively, the poverty orously defends it, and it has improved the program was extraordinarily complex, at both the look of employment statistics by providing federal level and intergovernmentally. Community more than 725,000 public-service jobs. But action required very high degrees of interagency its failures and weaknesses seem ever. cooperation at every level-cooperation that was more striking. It has made no noticeable dent in the number of hard-core unem- seldom forthcoming. Furthermore, many key EOA ployed. It has wasted billions of dollars on employment programs-the Neighborhood Youth ill-defined and hastily executed relief pro- Corps, the Work Experience and Training programs. And the slackness of management gram, and the Job Corps-faced serious implemen- has been an invitation to fraud and tation difficulties, or produced few tangible re- abuse. lo8 sults. As the 1960s drew to a close, it became apparent that federal manpower policy faced an ero- The "fungibility" problem has been a key con- sion of both popular and Congressional support. cern. In particular, it has been extremely difficult Conceptually, administratively, and politically, to prevent local governments from substituting successful governmental intervention had proven CETA funds for local tax revenues and using them far more complicated than had been recognized at to hire municipal or county employees-or even for the outset. political patronage. The fear arose that some hard- In the 1970s, as in the 1960s, federal unemploy- pressed communities were becoming "CETA ad- ment policy has reflected new-and perhaps er- dicts," dependent upon a continuing infusion of roneous-interpretations of the reasons for per- supposedly temporary federal employment funds. sisting unemployment and the efficacy of available And, even in the best of circumstances, local tools for reducing it. Since the first acceptance of governments had a strong incentive to hire the Keynesian doctrines, macroeconomic stimulation best qualified available persons for public employ- of the economy in times of recession has been con- ment slots, rather than the most needy "hard- sidered to be a national, not local, responsibility. core" unemployed. All of these factors produced However, one classic study of state-local fiscal be- conflict and confusion, reducing the program's havior during the Great Depression suggested that effectiveness and its popularity. Indeed, by 1979, state and local governments tended to exacerbate William Kolberg-who helped draft the 1973 economic downturns by cutting their spending and legislation-conceded that CETA had become "a raising taxes. This idea was seized upon first by dirty four-letter word."lOg Congress, and later by President Carter, as a par- Other similar problems of theory, program de- tial rationale for what became a $16.1 billion "eco-. sign, and implementation may be found among the nomic stimulus package" of countercyclical grants- major programs of public assistance to the poor. in-aid. (The package included an expansion of tem- Cost overruns, inefficiency, and red tape in AFDC porary public jobs under Titles I1 and VI of the may be attributed in part to the "open-ended" Comprehensive Ernplqyment and Training Act nature of its basic legislation. Federal outlays are (CETA), as well as a program for local public essentially "uncontrollable," since the national works and special antirecession fiscal assistance.) government is required to match state and local Yet more recent research has cast doubt on the expenditures at a pre-set ratio. Under these cir- "perversity hypothesis.'' In fact, ACIR studies cumstances, neither party to the transaction- suggest that state and local governments actually federal or state-is fully responsible for the results. stimulated the national economy during the Efforts to cut the burgeoning welfare rolls in the 1973-75recession. 1960s experienced serious operational difficulties Moreover, these public employment programs- as a result of legislative errors. In two instances, like the earlier manpower efforts-have experi- ill-designed amendments opened up new "loop- holes" which had precisely the opposite effect. In have much impact on the diets of poor families, 1962 the President and Congress created a com- though it has been justified on this basis. Ac- prehensive program of social services, on the cording to Maurice McDonald, some form of "more theory that these might help welfare mothers move direct intervention to change the nutritional effi- into productive employment and become eco- ciency of low-income households is needed" to ac- nomically self-sufficient. This hope proved er- complish its presumed objectives.l12 roneous. Instead, social service spending rose from Although the most dramatic instances of ineffec- $354 million to a projected $4.7 billion between tiveness and inefficiency may be found in the 1969 and 1973, with no commensurate decline in largest program areas, even smaller initiatives the welfare population. Indeed, research studies may experience similar difficulties. The effec- indicate that the growing federal outlays did not tiveness of the rural community fire protection even increase the volume of social services program, for example, is open to question on two markedly, let alone accomplish their more basic diffetent counts. policy objective. State and local budgeteers simply The program was created as simply one more ti- substituted federal dollars for their own tax funds, tle in the omnibus Rural Development Act of 1972. transferring program costs without improving ser- Congress justified the program as a contribution to vices. Because of loose phrasing and its open- end- the economic revitalization of rural America, con- ed design, the program became, in the words of tending that "inadequate fire protection and the Congressman Wilbur Mills (D-AR), a form of "back resultant threat of substantial losses of life and door revenue sharingv-"the worst loophole that property is a significant deterrent to the invest- had ever been written into the law on the financing ment of . . . labor and capital. . . ."llS Yet, the of Government."l1° legislative record provided no strong foundation The 1967 AFDC amendments, aimed at encour- for this claim. Fire protection never emerged as a aging work by welfare mothers, also opened a loop- major concern in either Presidential or Congres- hole which permitted payments to some mothers sional investigations of rural development needs, earning $8,000 to $12,000 a year, or even more. and no representatives of the fire services testified Committee reports accompanying the work incen- at the extensive hearings held in both the House tive bill provided incorrect information, with the and Senate in 1971 and 1972. Far more attention result that Congress misunderstood the law it was was focused on other rural problems and services. passing. The net effect was that welfare recipients The need for fire protection aid to spur economic were able to deduct a very broad range of "work- growth was not clearly established. related" expenses, including "grooming, transpor- Even as a purely fire protection measure, the tation, and extra food." There was considerable program's effectiveness and efficiency are open to potential for abuse in these provisions. Further- dispute.l14 In fact, it appears unlikely that the pro- more, the new law actually discriminated against gram has had a measurable impact on fire in- nonwelfare working mothers and fathers, despite cidence and fire loss. Moreover, the program's its intent. During the year in which the new rules focus on fire suppression activities could be inap- took effect, the AFDC rolls expanded by 25%- propriate. One study suggests that the dispropor- faster than ever before. While seeking to reduce tionately high levels of fire in small towns may be dependency, Congress had actually increased it. partially explained by lack of fire prevention ac- For similar reasons, the Food Stamp program tivities in these communities. Hence, federal sup- has been plagued by rapid cost increases, as well as port for prevention, rather than suppression, high error rates, delays, and outright fraud. Many might well be the more effective strategy. Finally, of these problems, according to Phillip M. Gregg, general revenue sharing funds, inititally available are created by a system of perverse fiscal incen- in 1972, have been used to establish local fire de- tives in a program that is entirely nationally partments and improve local fire fighting capa- financed but administered by the states. The "food bilities. The need for a separate categorical grant stamp mess," he indicates, "originates in the infor this purpose might well be questioned. tergovernmental arrangement^.""^ As noted pre- In short, the Commission's case studies provide viously, there also is reason to believe that Food many examples of inattention to issues of efficien- Stamps is not very effective as a nutrition pro- cy and effectiveness in intergovernmental policy- gram. Current evidence indicates that it does not making. Many of these problems can be traced to the political environment in which the programs underwent a significant metamorphosis from pro- were created or operate. Poor design, and poor tecting the rights and responsibilities of the states legislative draftmanship, have led to many im- to establishing a national policy. One step behind, a plementation difficulties and disappointing results. similar scenario was occurring in the field of air pollution. INCREASING REGULATION One result of the increasing intrusiveness of There is an old saying: "he who pays the piper federal policy was a drastic deterioration in the calls the tune." The implication is that governmen- quality of national-state relationships. Antag- tal controls necessarily follow governmental sub- onism replaced cooperation. By the mid-1970s, it sidies. Many of the case studies suggest that this could be said that: observation is quite true-if the qualification, "in . . . whereas past policy reflected a sort of the long run," is added. From small beginnings, "cooperative federalism" consisting in federal policy in many fields has become increas- some national but also considerable state ingly prescriptive over time. There is a pattern of authority, that of the present underscores historical evolution from small, limited-purpose "federal" and, as one might expect, is grant programs to much more stringent regula- distinctly uncooperative. Pollution policy is tory arrangements, including detailed administra- national policy, and the states are little tive controls and even the imposition of national more than reluctant minions mandated to policy mandates. do the dirty work-to implement federal In addition, regulatory measures are subject to directives often distasteful at the local implementation difficulties, and problems of poor level.l16 design-including the inadequate specification of objectives and a failure to recognize potential costs Moreover, many environmental regulations as well as benefits-occur here, as well as in grant came under attack as needlessly rigid, excessively programs. If anything, they seem to be unusually expensive, and technologically unrealistic. For in- prone to these shortcomings. stance, the adoption of federal air pollution control Both of these tendencies are very readily ap- policies provides an example of what political parent in the field of environmental protection. scientist Charles 0. Jones terms "speculative Federal involvement in water pollution control be- augmentation, . . . the escalation of proposals gan in 1948 with a small research, technical as- leading to the enactment of law admittedly beyond sistance, and loan program, which-though unim- the immediate capabilities to apply."l16 In enacting portant itself-did legitimize national intervention. the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Congress Still, the federal contribution was small, and all imposed auto emission standards well beyond the early enactments made it clear that the principal capability of the auto industry to produce. It responsibility still rested with the states. legislated a nonexistent technology. Economic and Over time, however, both the amount of federal administrative limits on the effectiveness of new payments and the scope of federal authority in- federal policies were ignored in a game of creased-initially in small, incremental steps, then "political one-upmanship" among a number of in giant leaps. First Congress moved from a pos- policy entrepreneurs. ture of denying federal authorities any enforce- A very similar history of subsidy and regulation ment powers to requiring the enactment of na- may be traced regarding federal aid to higher tional water quality standards in the event that a education, with the crucial shift occurring around state chose not to specify its own clean water 1972. Nineteenth century land grants for higher criteria. In order to rationalize this shift, the education entailed practically no federal regula- federal government moved from timid reliance tions or prescriptions whatever, and changes from upon its power to tax and spend to increasingly this pattern were incremental and cautious. Post broad interpretations of the interstate commerce WWII programs-the GI Bill and research sup- clause. It institutionalized its role as a protector of port-also brought with them very little in the way the nation's waters by raising a small adminis- of federal controls. In the 1960s, the issue of trative section buried within an agency within a federal regulation became more important as department to the status of an independent agen- Washington challenged the segregated state col- cy. Finally, the stated purpose of the legislation lege system in the south, but since so many states had abused their independence, strong federal ac- be withheld unless a school enlarges the tions were accorded ready legitimacy. program the government is particularly in- Slowly, however, further regulatory issues terested in, is to use the threat of cutting began to develop. As the number and complexity of off aid for one purpose in order to accom- programs proliferated, administrative costs and plish another. . . . This is Constitutionally burdens on educational institutions also grew. One objectionable, even in the name of a good report complained of distortion of academic cause such as "affirmative action." lls development, disruption of institutional integrity and the imposition of burdensome, sometimes in- Federal aid to elementary and secondary educa- consistent, administrative regulations. Nonethe- tion also has become increasingly prescriptive and less, these concerns were overshadowed by higher intrusive. The authorizing legislation for the major education's thirst for additional federal funds. aid programs has become longer, more detailed, This changed in the 1970s. As a result of a series and specific, owing to tension among the federal of new regulatory enactments, there was a sharp and state-local program "partners." For example, deterioration in the relationship between colleges the original ESEA totaled 32 pages; the 1978 re- and the nation's capital. Many institutions became newal, some 237 pages. Title I started out with just more concerned about protecting their autonomy nine pages; it now takes up more than 47 pages. than securing additional financial support. Sum- Albert L. Aford comments that: marizing this trend, one commentator noted the: . . . what has happened to Title I, while . . . painful and wrenching change in the more drastic than the effects on most relationship between the American re- other titles, is symptomatic of a trend search university and the federal govern- toward greater specificity in the law as to ment. . . . The great postwar partnership the way programs will be administered at between them turned sour after 1968. The the federal, state, and local levels . . . . relationship between them that has since Detail is explicit not only as to who is eligi- emerged is in part almost adversary.l17 ble for funds and how funds are to be distributed-something Congress does in Critical college spokesmen charge that federal most programs-but also as to the adminis- regulations challenge academic freedom and the trative procedures in planning and in ex- scholarly "merit" system, are costly to administer, pending and monitoring funds, areas and distort academic priorities. Some, including where in the past more leeway was usually former Yale President Kingman Brewster, have accorded the executive branches of federal spoken out sharply against policies which subject and state governments. . . . an entire educational institution to federal This situation appears to be the direct re- regulatory standards if any of its students or pro- sult of growing Congressional distrust and grams receive federal aid. In an address to the Fel- dissatisfaction with the way federal, state, lows of the American Bar Association, Brewster and local officials administer their pro- objected: grams. This came about partially because . . . to the notion that the receipt of a of a widening gap between the legislative federal dollar for some purposes subjects a and executive branches during this decade, private institution to federal regulations but more often because education interest and surveillance in all its activites. . . . groups have been finding it easier to get Thus if we are to receive support for their views expressed in law rather than in regulations. 119 physics, let us say, we must conform to federal policies in the admission of women Congress also has shown itself willing, in some to the Art School, in women's athletic fa- cases, to utilize regulatory powers to impose its cilities, and in the recruitment of women will on the school districts. Under new conditions and minorities, not just in the federally of budgetary constraint, regulations provide supported field but throughout the univer- Washington with a "cheap" way of accomplishing sity. . . . To say . . . that all general educa- its objectives. As Samuel Halperin, a former HEW tional activities of national importance will Assistant Secretary, notes: Congressmen see themselves as having among the decisions rendered by judges of been elected to legislate. Confronted with differing jurisdictions and the wavering a problem and showing that other levels of strategies of the enforcement agencies. government are "defaulting," their strong The direct cost of litigation to school tendency is to pass a law. Ten years ago, districts has been staggering, and preoccu- money was Washington's antidote for a pation with the possibility of legal chal- problem. Now, the new fiscal realities . . . lenge is now a potent influence on almost mean that Congress provides fewer dol- every aspect of school operation.lZ1 lars. Still determined to legislate against All of these trends have been greeted with dis- problems Congress uses sticks instead of taste in many quarters of the education communi- carrots. lZ0 ty. In fiscal terms, Washington clearly remains the A prime example is the Education of All Handi- "junior partner" in the educational enterprise, yet capped Children Act of 1975, which requires par- federal subsidies, controls, and mandates are an ticipating states to provide a free and appropriate ever present aspect of school operations. The education to all handicapped children, and local critic's view has been expressed in these terms by school authorities to prepare an individualized ed- the Illinois Superintendent of Schools: ucational program for each handicapped children . . [Sltate and local taxes together still ac- and local school to authorities prepare an indi- . count for more than 90% of the dollar vidualized educational program for each handi- outlay for public schools in this nation. Yet capped child. It also establishes due process pro- the amount of federal regulation has in- cedures for guaranteeing the educational rights of creased in ways disproportionate to the handicapped students and promotes the "main- amount of federal dollars received. streaming" of handicapped children. These are ex- . . . [Sllowly, inexorably, and incrementally, pensive services-and the federal grant program the federal government is taking over edu- created by the Act covers only about 9% of the cation. Especially since 1965, the country total cost. Faced with Presidential opposition to has moved-almost every year-toward a the huge outlays which full funding would require, national system of education.lZ2 Congress passed the law with much smaller authorizations than were proposed originally. Local officials have since protested against having FRAGMENTATION AND CONSOLIDATION. to meet the fiscal burden imposed upon them, but The proliferation of federal programs in such without success. major fields as education, employment, income Other regulatory standards have been as much of judicial as Congressional origin. Following the maintenance, health, environmental protection, and transportation has been widely docu- momentous decision of Brown v. Board of Educa- tion (1954) and, more particularly, the Civil Rights mented,lZ3and the resulting administrative diffi- Act of 1964, more and more aggrieved individuals culties are well understood. What is less widely and groups have turned to the courts for a remedy. recognized is the sizable number of programs in One expert notes: some of the lesser areas of federal activity, including those in which the overall national effort is It would be impossible to summarize comparatively small. briefly even the highlights of the litigation This point emerged in the Commission's case over the past fifteen years relating to such studies of federal fire protection and library as- major issues as busing of students, teacher sistance programs. All federal executive depart- bargaining rights, student behavior and ments except State and Defense, as well as at least records, school district boundaries, and 11 other agencies, are involved in fire-related ac- state and local finance policy. The general tivities that affect state and local governments. effect has been to constrain the authority The programs include a variety of activities rang- of school administrators to act independ- ing from research to the training of fire personnel. ently with regard to these and a host of In addition to General Revenue Sharing, which is narrower concerns. Their problems have sometimes used to support fire service delivery, 52 been compounded by a lack of consistency other grant-in-aid programs handled by 24 sep- mate administrative units are available to subna- ecutive branch agencies but sometimes from Con- tional jurisdictions. Eight agencies make loans of gressional or interest group sources. The increas- money or equipment that can be used to improve ing use of large, multititled omnibus bills for the fire protection. Five collect data related to fire in- enactment and renewal of programs facilitates an cidence, injuries, and losses, and many provide implicit form of logrolling, and many specific provi- some kind of technical assistance and information sions ride to enactment on the strength of support to those who request it. for the bill as a whole. Program proliferation is the Although most federal programs promote some natural result. national purpose other than the prevention or sup- Once a network of programs is established, both pression of fires, both the U.S. Forest Service and old and new political forces combine to make con- the U.S. Fire Administration are directly consolidation extremely difficult. While the desire to cerned with the actual delivery of fire protection at create new categorical grants is quite strong, the the local level, while the Law Enforcement As- protectionist sentiments surrounding those al- sistance Administration and Department of Trea- ready in existence seem even more intense. sury are playing increasingly important roles in ar- Political "iron triangles" emerge, even where they son prevention and control. did not exist previously, with proponents in the Similarly, although federal aid to libraries is very Congress, interest groups, and bureaucracy work- limited-amounting to some $250 million in FY ing together to preserve "their" programs. These 1980-these funds are divided among eight sep- program specialists have clear advantages in arate major program authorizations. Numerous terms of access, expertise, and intensity of inter- other federal aid programs have funding provi- est-factors which formally make up for their lack sions that can be used by libraries to provide basic of numbers. Because of these political facts of life, services, initiate special projects, or erect new few consolidation proposals are advanced; fewer buildings. The American Library Association has yet are ever enacted; and even these tend to be- identified some 30 library-related programs from come undone with each passing year. which libraries have the potentional to receive Of the seven functional fields reviewed in the some financial support. case studies, only federal unemployment programs The most frequently proposed remedy for this have been subject to a major grant consolidation. sort of functional fragmentation is grant consolida- The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act tion. Potentially, block grants formed by the of 1973 (CETA) merged 17 existing categorical pro- merger of categorical programs could greatly sim- grams into its Title I, creating an important new pllfy administrative duties at all levels of govern- block grant, with funds distributed by formula to ments, increase flexibility, and decentralize de- state and local "prime sponsors." cisionmaking authority. Yet the commission's case CETA was enacted in response to the serious studies and previous reports show the limitations problems of administrative fragmentation in em- of the grant consolidation strategy.12* Successful ployment training programs. Several earlier ef- grant consolidations have been few. Most pro- forts to improve coordination through incremental posals have been simply ignored or badly watered managerial reforms and interagency cooperation down in Congress, while the creation of new cate- had been largely unsuccessful. In 1969, President gorical grant programs has continued apace. Nixon proposed a new consolidated grant which Many of the case studies also suggest the politi- one analyst termed a "happy marriage of tradi- cal rationale for these outcomes. As indicated pre- tional Republican philosophy and expert opinion viously, broad conceptions of the national purpose within the manpower subgovernment." Yet this justify federal assistance in a great many specific (and a similar proposal advanced in 1971) was re- fields, while Congressional entrepreneurship- sisted by those committed to the maintenance of bolstered by an array of highly specialized interest existing programs. Although a spirit of compro- groups-encourages the creation of narrow cate- mise prevailed in 1973, CETA fell far short of the gorical programs, each directed at particular prob- wide-ranging merger that the President had con- lems and constitutencies. Moreover, many major templated initially and that many reformers felt Presidential proposals are simply loose as- was desirable. The consolidation enacted was at semblages of separate legislative initiatives, fre- best a partial one. Title I eliminated very little of quently drawn from the proposals advanced by ex- the historical overlapping and duplication of purpose among employment training programs. departments, 3 independent federal agencies, the CETA's six other substantive titles continued Federal Regional Council, 26 national organiza- some existing programs and created new ones. tions or state agencies, and more than 50 separate Many more manpower programs were beyond the local administering agencies.lZ7It noted that: jurisdiction of the Congressional committees which designed CETA, and hence were not affected by its . . . the number of narrowly defined pro- passage. Even within their area of jurisdictional grams and the manner in which they are competence: scattered across many federal, state, and local agencies raise questions about the overall efficiency of the federally assisted . . . the committees attempted to develop a employment and training effort. Such a mix of block and categorical program piecemeal approach can saturate and authorizations that would strike an accept- blanket an area and still not produce op- able compromise between national and timum results. . . . subnational objectives. . . . The proliferation of programs also By surrounding Title I with a cluster of makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to categoricals aimed at public service evaluate the overall federal effort. Evalua- employment, special target groups, and tions can be made but for practical reasons the Job Corps, a politically viable way was must generally be done on a program-by- developed to assure the manpower subgov- program basis. In fact no one knows ernment that programs that had proven whether the overall results of federal ef- popular in the past, or that called for na- forts are effective in solving employment tional recognition in light of contemporary and training problems.lZ8 conditions, would be kept in place regardless of decategorization and decentraliza- For these reasons, GAO recommended that the Of- tion. Although the containment approach fice of Management and Budget and Congress ex- helped deflect some opposition to man- plore further alternatives for program consolida- power reform, it did not significantly alter tion to reduce the number of separate pro- the fragmented national program struc- gram~.~~~ ture.lZ6 The past record of consolidation attempts in education is even bleaker. Although aid pro- In the period since 1973, Congress has added ponents have always favored general aid to public considerably to this complexity by creating CETA schools, only limited-purpose categorical programs programs for other special purposes or particular were enacted prior to 1965. Thereafter, the focus target groups. These include measures for public on compensatory services for the educationally service employment (1974), youth employment disadvantaged which characterized the Elemen- (1977), the handicapped (1978), and private sector tary and Secondary Education Act: opportunities (1978). A number of additional employment programs also have been established . . . opened up a floodgate of demands that outside the CETA umbrella.126 special needs of other categories of children be met: those from migrant and The result is that, despite the 1973 consolidation, bilingual families, the gifted and the many of the administrative problems associated talented, and the physically and emotional- with excessive fragmentation still remain. A rely handicapped. Over the past fifteen cent General Accounting Office (GAO) report years, the essential structure of ESEA has found some 44 federally assisted employment and been maintained by a series of reenact- training programs operating in the Tidewater, VA area-many with similar goals and serving virtual- ments, but with the addition of categorical grants for several designated clientele and ly the same target populations. GAO identified for stimulating some state and local pro- serious problems in planning, coordinating, and gram initiatives.130 evaluating the effectiveness of this maze of programs, which utilized a variety of delivery Beginning in 1971 the Nixon Administration ad- mechanisms. The 44 programs involved 5 federal vanced a proposal for Education Revenue Sharing (ERS), a block grant combining the 33 major aid- handily defeated by a vote of 79 to 290. to-educational programs in a single $2.6 billion for- Such measures never got that close on the mula grant to states. However, this proposal was Senate side.132 almost totally rejected by Congress and education- A decade of Presidential attempts to consolidate al interest groups. Groups like the audio-visual various library programs also has met with very lit- manufacturers and bilingual aid supporters predic- tle success. The question was first raised by Presi- tably opposed the consolidation of categorical dent Johnson, who asked a temporary national grants in their areas of interest. But even the Na- commission to investigate the problem, and Presi- tional Education Association (NEA), which could dent Nixon made a number of unsuccessful pro- have gained from unrestricted federal aid, opposed posals in this area. Richard P. Nathan explained the ERS, and the Chief State School Officers and the Congressional resistance to the Nixon Admin- National School Boards Association offered only istration's 1969 library grant consolidation pro- lukewarm support. posal in these quantitative terms: "99.99% of the There were several reasons for this. First, many public is not interested in library grant reform. Of opponents feared that the ERS would be used as the 0.01% who are interested, all are librarians and an instrument of budgetary control. Consolidation oppose it." 133 could be politically acceptable only if it carried the A minor success (noted above) was achieved in possibility of more, not less, money. Secondly, 1974, with the consolidation of separate programs some interpreted the Administration's decen- for school libraries, instructional equipment, and tralization rhetoric to mean federal backtracking school counseling into a single broader grant. This on civil rights enforcement. Finally, most Con- compromise measure was supported by the major gressmen resisted losing what control they felt education groups, but several of the smaller inter- they have over existing federal aid. The targeted, ests affected objected on the basis that it combined categorical, innovative approach to federal aid "things" and "people." In 1978 Congress acceded reflected the views of many members that state to this reasoning, and separated the two compon- and local educators have failed in certain areas of ents once again. education. Eliminating categorical aid restrictions, All three of these cases of consolidation attempts they though, would simply reinforce local educa- point toward similar conclusions. Though justified tional priorities which Congress disavowed. chiefly in administrative terms, consolidation pro- Fear of a Presidential veto in 1974 did lead to posals raise major political issues. Possible gains in Congressional initiation of a small consolidation in efficiency and effectiveness are not enough to that year. In a House-Senate compromise, seven counterbalance the political tendency toward categorical programs were merged into one two- specificity. Even a successful grant consolidation, part program. But this was a largely symbolic when achieved, may do little to alter the underly- gesture with little impact on federal involvement ing political dynamics which encourage program in education. And even these minor steps were proliferation. largely dismantled by the 197'8 Education Ad- merits, which created at least 16 new statutory Conclusion authorizations. 131 More recent consolidation proposals also have made little headway. Albert L. Recent assessments of intergovernmental imple- Alford observes that, in 1978, Congress (and espe- mentation, for the most part, have been records of cially its education committees): programmatic problems (and even some outright failures). The grant-in-aid has proven to be a very . . . enunciated clearly that categorical difficult instrument for the execution of national programs are still its first preference. . . . policies, though it is invaluable as an instrument of Although several bills were introduced in national politics. And, in sharp contrast to the the last Congress for varying degrees of traJitiona1 view of grant administration as a consolidation of programs, essentially no "cooperative" endeavor, contemporary analysts consideration was given such measures by suggest that the earlier federal-state-local partffer- the authorizing committees. One such pro- ship has largely broken down. posal, rather drastic in nature, was From the standpoint of economic efficiency and brought up on the House floor. . . . It was administrative effectiveness, the present division of labor among the governmental levels rates poor- however, is directly or obviously associated with ly. Too many programs are ineffectively managed; the question of federal involvement in specific the multiplicity of interrelated programs in each functional areas. Federal programs in general and functional area dissipates federal leverage and grants-in-aid in particular most often have been complicates state-local administration; and the justified on the basis of fiscal or administrative cri- growing prescriptiveness and intrusiveness of fed- teria of the kinds already described, rather than on eral regulatory policies have produced high levels an overtly democratic basis. Furthermore, given of intergovernmental antagonism. Despite efforts the existence of representative institutions at all to simplify the intergovernmental system through governmental levels, there is no strong a priori grant consolidation and policy decentralization, basis for any particular distribution of functions. the number of categorical programs remains ex- As the Commission's 1974 report noted, "Effec- cessive, and actually has continued to rise. tive access and control can produce satisfaction A number of the case studies suggest that many with any given pattern of functional assign- of these deficiencies are political, rather than pure- ment."lS6 ly administrative, in origin. Too often both Con- gress and Executive Branch have failed to consider how their policy objectives were to be accom- CONFLICTING TRADITIONS plished. Many grant and regulation programs have been poorly designed-or not "designed" at all. All Still, ideas about political accountability and too often, political entrepreneurs have rushed cru- functional assignment are by no means wholly un- cial measures to enactment without much consid- related. The advocates of federal action have often eration of operational concerns. Many programs justified their proposals by references to short- have addressed social or economic problems that comings in the political process at the state or local had been poorly analyzed or were poorly under- levels, while opponents have argued on behalf of stood. While administrators inherit this political local discretion and keeping power "close to the legacy, and are blamed for the results, "economy people." These competing views, in turn, reflect a and efficiency" can never be realized in bureau- conflict in American political theory, reaching back cratic practice until they are understood and ap- to the era of the founders. plied in policy formulation. First, it must be recalled that the founders were more concerned about protecting the individual from the abuse of governmental authority than the POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY constructive exercise of public power. Hence, they devised a system based on popular sovereignty but The notion of political accountability provides a geared to curbing the potential excesses of any fifth criterion for assessing the federal role in the temporary political majority. The Constitution federal system, including the assignment of func- they drafted embodied only a limited, represent- tional responsibilities. Though taken up last, it is ative democracy, and it contained many features hardly the least important. On the contrary, many intended to slow action, to cool passions, and to would stress accountability as the bedrock for pro- prevent the accumulation of power. "Federalism," per public policy in a democratic nation. For some, in particular, "was designed as one of a parcel of the "will of the people" should override any other negative devices which inhibit the use of power in philosophic or technocratic concerns. the United States. It was not designed to facilitate that use. "Is6 Within this prevailing conception of the "nega- Theory tive liberal state," however, there were two conflicting views on the most appropriate allocation of The 1974 Commission study described two facets governmental authority. Jeffersonian philosophy of the political accountability criterion: (a) citizen provided one traditional perspective: that the func- ac"cess to and control of governments performing tions of local governments should be maximized, assigned functions, and (b) direct citizen participa- because they are the "closest to the people." Po- tion in the delivery of an assigned service.ls4 Both litical accountability was expected to be strongest of these involve basic democratic values. Neither, at the local, then state, and finally national levels. This view dominated political rhetoric, at least un- majority must, under the Constitution, be til comparatively recent times. taken by a two-thirds vote. Powers are Yet there also is an important opposing tradi- divided, or shared, between the federal tion, founded in Madison's theory of the extended government and the states. To all these republic. In Madison's view, there was a danger Constitutional limitations, Congress has that small societies, because of their greater voluntarily added other elements of re- homogeneity, would be likely to oppress minority straint, by granting to groups and in- interests. In contrast, the greater diversity of a dividuals within each house what can vast "compound republic" could mitigate this amount to a power of veto over the ma- tendency and promote freer, more legitimate gov- jorities of the houses. ernment. Madison said: The "total effect" of these institutional obstacles, Extend the sphere, and you take in a Sundquist concluded: greater variety of parties and interests; can be not just to delay action in the in- you make it less probable that a majority of . . . terest of full and free debate, but to forbid the whole will have a common motive to inaction. To the extent that the American in- vade the rights of other citizens; or if such stitutional system cannot respond to a pop- a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their ular mandate for a change in the general own strength, and to act in unison with course and direction of the government, as each other. . . [I]n the extent and proper translated into specific measures by the . President and his legislative majorities, it structure of the Union, therefore, we be- must be judged defective. .IS8 hold a republican remedy for the diseases . . most incident to republican gov- However, while conceding the inherent conser- ernment.lS7 vatism of the Constitutional framework, most observers in the 1950s and 1960s believed that the na- Debate on this issue has never ended, but there tional government was far more responsive to has been a major shift in its terms. Consistent with many social needs than were the states. Even in the rise of the activist "positive liberal state," 1970, Richard H. Leach concluded that, despite its minority rights have been redefined to include ac- faults: cess to public services, jobs, and income, as well as . . . the national government is nonethe- the protection of basic liberties. But the underlying less at present the most effective partner argument has remained much the same. in the federal system. Both the executive First, until very recent years, the traditional as- and legislative branches of the national sertion that the division of powers in the American government, if marked too by weaknesses, system was a conservative perhaps even reac- are characterized by their ability to per- tionary influence, was seldom questioned. In 1968, form reasonably well and to produce a following a thorough analysis of national policy- close approximation in the end of what the making in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson American people want from them. It is the years, James L. Sundquist commented that: state and local governments in our system . . . the United States is unique among the which more often miss the mark and so are world's democracies in the extent to which most in need of impro~ement.l3~ the institutional system is weighted on the side of restraint regardless of the mandate In particular, critics charged state and local gov- of the people. The Constitution defines ac- ernments with being unresponsive to urban resi- tions that the majority can at no time take. dents, blacks, the poor, and other social and eco- An independent Supreme Court interprets nomic minorites. Legislative malapportionment, and applies the Constitution. An independ- restrictions on black voting in the south, and the ent President and Congress restrain each dominance of many cities by business "power other, through a mutual veto power. The elites" or entrenched political "machines" lent two houses of the legislature likewise re- substance to these claims. Writing in 1966, Grant strain each other. Some decisions of the McConnell reflected Madison's opinion that small constituencies tend to undermine democracy, . . . minority political interests are rather than to promote it: sometimes more effectively served in a The effect of a small constituency is to larger, more heterogeneous jurisdic- enhance the power of local elites, whatever tion. . . . [Slome population groups have their character or sources of power. . . . only exerted effective local political influ- [Tlhe claims that small units ensure ence by recourse to higher levels of gov- democracy are erroneous. . [Dlecen- ernment-this is particularly true of eco- . . nomic and racial minorities.144 tralization to local . . . units does not make for democracy; indeed, in the sense that democratic values center about liberty and THE ROLE OF GRANTS equality, the tendency inherent in small It was once often said that the system of shared units to stratification of power relation- responsibility exemplified by the use of grant-in- ships and to protection of established in- aid programs provides at least a partial reconcilia- formal patterns of domination and subor- tion of these two competing approaches to the ac- dination is most alien to equality.140 countability issue. First, grants certainly increase William Riker concluded his analysis of federal opportunities for citizen participation beyond those systems in 1964 with an even harsher view: "If in present in direct, uniform, national programs. To the United States one approves of southern white the extent that they are voluntary mechanisms of racists, then one shall approve of American cooperative federalism, they permit local residents to select from and tailor national programs to meet federalism. "141 On the other hand, a certain philosophical com- local needs and to become involved in the actual de- mitment to the vitality of local political processes livery of services at the community level. Second, still remained. Even critics regarded the principal the involvement of several levels of government in of decentralization as a sound one. As James L. each program area may actually heighten citizen Sundquist wrote: access and infuence. Morton Grodzins once contended that: . . . decisions on community problems made at the community level are potential- . . . a system of many power centers is well ly better than those made at the national suited to meet the infinite variety of ex- level, because only at the community level pressed needs. It responds quickly (some- can the community be seen whole, only times too quickly) to citizen demand. Be- there can the community programs be in- cause there are many pointsfor decision, terrelated, only there can the systems of citizens and citizen groups have multiple comprehensive planning and program co- opportunities to influence decisionmaking. ordination be established and operated, If a group does not get satisfaction at one and only there can widespread citizen par- place, it can try another. And if the second ticipation be organized and the contribu- is unresponsive, there may exist a third or tions of the citizens blended with those of a fourth.146 professionals in the decisionmaking pro- As Grodzins suggests, the creation of grant pro- C~SS.~~~ grams often has been attributed to the pressures of Both perspectives were reflected in the Commis- interest groups which, for one reason or another, sion's 1974 discussion of accountability and func- found their needs to be inadequately represented tional assignment. First, echoing Jefferson, the re- at the lower levels of government. In this view, port noted that "theoretically and empirically, categorical programs are a reflection of the direct citizen involvement has been most produc- pluralism of American society and its political in- tive in local settings" and that "more direct and stitutions. In 1960 Selma J. Mushkin argued that: concerted political influence may be brought to . . . most federal aid programs . . . origin- bear on smaller, local units of government by the ate in rather specific public needs and are majority of its c~nstituents."~~~But, consistent designed primarily to stimulate states to with the Madisonian argument, the report also in- meet those needs. Pressures for action dicated that: have centered on concerns of the citizen and of the interests groups with which he American federal system. They seemingly recon- associates himself for political action: ciled competing centralist and decentralist ap- clean water, school hot lunches, training proaches to the accountability question, and as- practical nurses, control of cancer, effi- sured that public policy would be a faithful re- cient interstate highways, and scientific flection of the popular will. apparatus in classrooms. 146 In that same year Monypenny built a more formal Assessment theory of grant development around considerations of group strength and access. He explained Few assessments of political accountability in that the growth of grant-in-aid programs lay in the American federal system are positive now. On certain characteristics of the American political the contrary, a crisis of confidence-affecting system. Specifically, he noted that: citizens and public officials alike-is the paramount . . . the population of the United States is political concern of our times. It is now widely divided by loyalties to a thousand different charged that the federal budget, and the federal causes. People look to the complex fabric bureaucracy, as well, have grown "out of control." of government for means to pursue these Despite evidence of continuing immobilism in a few causes, acting at points which are respon- select areas (energy resources, arms control, wel- sive, whatever the formal jurisdiction of fare reform, national health insurance), past char- the officials who respond. Groups within acterizations of American political institutions as the population use their influence in one biased toward inaction seem ludicrous, given the part of the fabric to negate the influence of legislative record of the past decade and a half. their opponents at other points, to impose Hyperkxis-a "pathological condition caused by controls, or to escape them. The popula- an overactive lawmaking glandu-has been diag- tion acts through political parties and out- nosed as the national political disease.148The pro- side of them; it divides in elections for of- liferation of special interest lobbies in Washington, fice, and recombines in pursuit of more facilitated by modern communications, has under- particular goals. It uses the weapons of mined the premises of the Madisonian system.lq9 numbers, or of status, of publicity, or of in- Furthermore, few contemporary analysts believe tensity of organization, of money, or of that the present pattern of intergovernmental re- familial and personal connection, as they lations facilitates popular control. On the contrary, are appropriate. the maze of grant and regulatory programs and multiple levels of responsibility diffuses authority "For such a popualtion," he added: and mitigates against meaningful public participa- . . . the federal grant-in-aid is a made-to- tion at any level. Journalist Neal R. Peirce, a close observer of state and local affairs, has concluded order device for securing unity of action without sacrificing the cohesiveness which that the burgeoning federal role in recent years is necessary for political success. . . has seriously imperiled political accountability and [Plolitically speaking, federal aid programs the power of the ordinary citizen. "American are an outcome of a loose coalition which federalism," he argues, "was grieviously wounded resorts to a mixed federal state program in the 1970s:" because it is not strong enough in in- Despite all the talk of popular participa- dividual states to secure its program, and tion during the decade, the average because it is not united enough to be able citizen's power to affect government, to achieve a wholly federal program through the ballot box in his local com- against the opposition which a specific pro- munity, was severely diminished. More gram would engender.l4I was lost, too: the system's traditional To the exponent of cooperative federalism, view- balance between competing national and ing the intergovernmental system as it appeared state-local interests, and the clear-cut ac- 20-odd years ago, grants-in-aid both contributed to countability of government officials at all and were evidence of the responsiveness of the levels. . . . There has been an unprecedented expansion of federal fund- "pretty much run by a few big interests looking out ing-and federal controls. Power has for themselves" rather than "for the benefit of all shifted from elected officials to the people" has risen steadily from less than one- bureaucrats. State and local governments, fifth of the population in 1958 to more than three- chosen by Congress as delivery agents for quarters in 1978. Over this same period, those be- a mind-blowing variety of programs, have lieving that the government in Washington cannot found their own policy priorities distorted. be regularly trusted to "do what is right" has risen Their responding to local citizen wishes is from 25% of the population to 70%.164 extremely difficult.lsO "Atomization" refers to the increasing division In Washington, commentators from across the of political authority and influence, particularly the political spectrum point to a decline in the per- rapid increase in the number and strength of spe- formance of the major institutions of represent- cial interest lobbies and a concommitant decline in ative government-Congress, the Presidency, and the importance of the overarching political institu- the political parties-as well as in the faith of the tions: the political parties, the Presidency, and the populace in them. Deep-seated trends, they con- Congressional leadership. All of these trends, in tend, have created a "crisis of competence" in the view of concerned observers, spell out a weak- government which may worsen in the 1980s.lS1 ening of American mass democracy and an undercutting of opportunities for effective participation Scores of scholarly studies and informed com- by the average citizen. mentaries confirm that fundamental changes have The term "atomization" has several synonyms. occurred in American politics. Much of this analy- To journalist Robert J. Samuelson, the name of the sis is captured in the three themes of political game is: alienation, atomization, and overload. Rising "alienation" is evidenced in the growing . . . fragmentation. In a word, that is what suspicion with which political leaders are regarded, has happened to American politics in the as well as declining levels of participation at the past 30 years. Had you hibernated from ballot box and allegiance to the major political par- the early 1950s to the end of 1979, you ties. Dramatic changes in the political climate over would have awakened to find that Ameri- the past 20 years have brought the nation to what can electoral politics has changed . . . be- some have described as "the most severe crisis in yond any reasonable stretch of the imagin- civic' morale and trust in our history."lS2 David ation. . . .Is6 Cohen of Common Cause has commented that: Former HEW Secretary Joseph A. Califano, Jr. . . . if de Tocqueville, one of our most pres- warns of the "new world of molecular politics" cient observers, were to return, he would which has arisen in Washington. He comments: be struck by one overriding phenomenon: There are today nearly 300 Congression- Confidence in and respect for our public in- al committees, subcommittees, and select stitutions has tumbled so low that it's ad- committees, each meticulously attended by versely affecting American society. No narrow interest groups that have weight major public or private institution is ex- with Committee and Subcommittee mem- empt from the decline in trust. bers (whose political campaigns depend The loss of confidence comes from the upon private financing) far beyond their heart of the population. There is nothing power in the electorate as a whole. And it radical, fringe, or extreme about it. It is now a truism that, over the past decade, comes from the vast number of voters the power of the Subcommittees in the whose choice is increasingly "none of the Congress has increased, as have the size above." The antigovernment and anti- and influence of Congressianal staff. Washington feeling pervades and runs Political party discipline has been shat- deep.lS3 tered by the rise of special interest politics Social science survey studies provide ample con- in the nation's capital. Washington has be- firmation of these judgments. The proportion of come a city of political molecules, with the general public believing that government is fragmentation of power, and often authority and responsibility, among increasingly have given themselves an "F" for "frustration," narrow, what's-in-it-for-me interest according to one recent commentary.lKsThe days groups and their responsive counterparts when Capitol Hill housed the "world's greatest de- in the Executive and Legislative Branches. liberative body" are gone. Few measures now re- This is a basic-perhaps the basic-fact of ceive more than superficial consideration on the political life in our nation's capital.lS6 floor of Congress or, increasingly, even in its com- Much academic research points in the same di- mittee rooms, where the "real work" is said to be done. Dr. Delphis C. Goldberg, a veteran Congres- rection. A comprehensive scholarly analysis of the sional staffer, describes the changes over the past changes in American politics between the late 1950s and the late 1970s summarized the findings 20 years: of its contributors in this manner: In the early 1960s, when the level of federal aid was $7 billion rather than close to Certain words have appeared again and $85 billion, and the scope of regulatory in- again in the preceding pages: "fragmenta- volvement much more limited, there was tion," "proliferation," "decentralization," ample opportunity in the Congress to dis- "disintegration," "breaking up." The cuss legislative proposals and their impli- ideas of the New Deal are no longer the cations. ideas around which American politics is or- There was far less reason for members to ganized; but no new public philosophy has go to the floor or to their committees and emerged to take their place. Power in Con- vote on the basis of how "the rest of my gress is even more widely dispersed than it delegation is voting, how many people used to be; the conservative coalition is have called me, and the number of tele- much less prominent that it was. The old grams I received." Generally, there was an party machines and bosses have largely extensive discussion of program issues; gone; nothing has replaced them. There this has ceased to be the case. It is not are far more interest and issue groups unusual today to see programs costing than there used to be; the great majority of $100 million and more brought up in the them lack internal cohesion. Within the House under the suspension-of-the-rules federal government in Washington, the old procedure which limits debate to 40 min- "iron triangles" (coalitions of a sort) have. utes but requires a two-thirds vote for pas- given way to much more amorphous issue sage. Nevertheless, if the skids have been networks, to the description of which a greased and the interest groups have done simple Euclidian geometry is no longer appropriate. Even among the electorate, the their lobbying, there is neither the oppor- voting blocs of the 1930s and 1940s have tunity nor the inclination in that brief time been gradually eroded by time; only the to consider even the big issues. Unless the number of programs and their complexity blacks remain. To the words suggestive of disintegration, of breaking up, used so fre- can be reduced, it is inevitable that the quently in this volume, we should clearly future will bring even less carefully con- add "atomization." American politics have sidered legislation, together with ill-defined program purposes and unintended become, to a high degree, atomized.lK7 effects.lK9

"Overload," on the other hand, is apparent in At the same time, the pressures which encourage both the rising number of decisions and the chorus precipitous action in some cases bar any action at of demands which confront national policymakers. all in others. The 96th Congress (1979-80)has been As the sphere of governmental activity has ex- branded the "do nothing Congress" because of its panded, the growing pressures have nearly over- inability to grapple with key issues, and critical whelmed every major institution. members have charged that "We're approaching No one is more aware of-nor more concerned the point where the House of Representatives sim- about-the overload issue than the occupants of ply can't handle its work load."160 these institutions themselves. National legislators The press of ongoing business also has strained the capacity of the major executive branch agen- House have experienced difficulty exercising legis- cies. Former HEW Secretary Joseph Califano has lative, bureaucratic, and popular leadership. The described the pressures on that department-an pressures are overwhelming. To the historian organization which employed 144,256 persons in Henry F. Graff, 1978 (and paid the salaries of an additional 980,000 state, local, and private workers) and has a budget . . . the White House has become the approaching $200 billion: dumping ground of last resort for society's unsolved and unsolvable technological, so- Beyond the size of its budget and the num- cial, and economic issues-most of them so ber of its employees, HEW challenges complex that they would tax the mind of a those who would manage it by the sheer polymath. lt33 complexity-and volatility-of the respon- A recent conference of eminent political scientists sibilities Congress has placed there. It is concluded that: our responsibility to determine whether saccharin is carcinogenic, whether laetrile . . . the President is saddled with exagger- is efficacious, and how dangerous mari- ated public expectations and that what had juana is. We confront tangled social prob- originally been introduced as institutional lems like poverty that do not yield to quick, innovations, including the presentation of technical fixes. We cope with controversial comprehensive legislative programs . . ., is problems that defy simple definition, much now considered routine. less solution, like discrimination on the Just as important, the demands of the basis of race, religion, ethnic origin, sex, Presidency, which is fundamentally a per- handicaps, and. . . age. sonalized institution, overload the office We struggle with deeply troubling ethi- and restrict the flexibility of the occu- cal issues in biomedical research, issues pant.ls4 that would confound a Socrates. We are In summary, few close observers of American dealing with searing social issues like abor- government offer positive assessments of the re- tion, teenage pregnancy, psycho-surgery cent performance of our representative institu- and sterilization. . . . tions and processes. As governmental responsibili- We must deal with problems such as ties have grown, so has the belief that it is but tenu- these in ways that are acceptable to an ar- ously accountable to the public it serves. ray of competing, and often conflicting interests: pharmaceutical companies and Nader public interest groups; business and Case Study Findings labor; rich and poor; black and white; His- panics, Eskimos and Indians; women and Although the Commission's case studies did not handicapped citizens; big computer manu- investigate citizen participation in federal pro- facturers and American Civil Liberties grams at the state or local level, they do illuminate Union privacy lawyers; retired people on the issue of political accountability in Washington. social security and active workers angry Indeed, several characteristics of the political pro- about payroll taxes. cess revealed in the case studies seem to help ac- And, most importantly today, we must count for rising levels of alienation, atomization, deal with these problems in the new world and overload. First, in large part because of the en- of molecular politics.lsl trepreneurial character of policyrnaking, even major policy decisions freuqently are entrusted to The White House, of course, is the point where comparatively small groups of individuals and in. all of the policy and administrative problems come terests. Second-but more importantly- accounta- to rest on a single person. Not surprisingly the bility tends to be even more drastically reduced in Presidency too, appears to be in a "state of de- the later stages of policyrnaking, when programs cline," the salient features of which are "high ex- are renewed, refunded, or revised. Given the pre- pectations amidst an increasingly intractable at- sent scope of federal activity, this embraces most mosphere."ls2 All recent occupants of the White policy most of the time. Much evidence bearing on these propositions was the committee stage, where the "real work" of presented in foregoing sections of this chapter, Congress is usually said to be done. and the role of various political actors in policy-de- The problem of accountability in policy develop- velopment was indicated in Chapter II. A few se- ment is aptly illustrated by the circumstances sur- lected additional cases are presented below. rounding the adoption of the Employment Act of 1946, which must surely be counted as one of the leading legislative achievements of modern times. POLICY INITIATION While World War I1 wiped out the Great Depres- Most of the case studies indicate that, while the sion, the Employment Act was Congress's vow that political game is played in the name of the people, it would never return. Specifically, the Employ- it is not played by the people themselves. Instead, ment Act made a formal legislative commitment to policy development in Washington is, in most in- the use of macroeconomic policy to reduce unem- stances, a highly specialized and entrepreneurial ployment and stabilize the economy. It thus made activity, engaged in only by those with the commit- permanent what all of the experimentation of the ment and resources to do so. New Deal had left only temporary: that the nation- The crucial roles played by one or a few indi- al government has a major responsibility to assure viduals at the policy initiation stage mean that it job opportunities and alleviate economic suffering. often is difficult for the public-at-large to have Though important in itself, the spirit behind the much influence on legislative outcomes, or to hold act also has been the foundation for the creation of any set of actors responsible for the final product. a vast array of community and regional develop- Moreover, important interests and issues have of- ment and job training programs. ten been ignored when policies were first for- Yet, despite its centrality, the Employment Act mulated rested on only a highly generalized political con- According to conventional theories of represent- sensus. Public opinion polls taken at the time sug- ative government, the electoral process, the gested that it was widely accepted that govern- political parties, and the interest group system ment should "do something" to help maintain em- provide channels for communication between the ployment levels. But this general attitude offered governors and the governed, while the legislative little guidance on specifics, and is hard to relate to process is structured to assure that policy proposals the Employment Act in particular or to the political are carefully debated and evaluated. To be effec- wrangling over its most crucial provisions. In- tive, a process of legislative deliberation must as- stead, according to the bill's principal political sure that the representatives obtain accurate infor- historian, Stephen K. Bailey, what was striking mation about the implications of the proposals they was the "lack of sustained, intense, and wide- consider, that they have opportunities to think spread interest" in a measure of great national about that information, and that they discuss with political and economic importance.166 each other the factual, political, and moral implica- Neither did the instruments of political account- tions of each initiative.165 ability-the President, the political parties, or even Yet, the case study findings suggest that each of interest groups-play decisive roles in the enact- these institutions has sometimes failed to play the ment of the full employment bill. Roosevelt was roles ascribed to them very effectively. On the con- almost invisible during its gestation period, and trary, a variety of even very important measures Truman, while providing a modest measure of have been adopted with little public attention, par- leadership, was not a key actor. Democratic and ty involvement, or even a broad range of interest Republican party positions in 1944 did not differ so group participation. Even when public interest was sharply as they had on many New Deal measures. comparatively high, it usually focused mostly on The Republican Presidential candidate Thomas E-: the general aims of the legislation. Many measures Dewey accepted full employment as "a first objec- also have been given cursory attention on the floor tive of national policy," while the Democrats of the Congress, which remains the only point in sought to portray FDR principally as a great war the legislative process at which every citizen's leader. Even the coalition of liberal and labor elected representatives have an opportunity to groups assembled on behalf of the act changed few participate. Even more stiikingly, a number of ma- votes. Opposing conservative organizations were jor enactments received very little consideration at perhaps more influential, but their impact was indirect: Past "educational" campaigns, more than the only successful effort in the dreary history of short-term lobbying, had conditioned the views of welfare reform, and-from a human standpoint- many Congressional members. contributed to a better life for many by raising In truth, a comparatively small number of indi- benefit levels and by increasing the number of reci- , viduals-working within a favorable but extremely pients in many states. "permissive" political environment-must be SSI had its origins in a more modest Nixon Ad- regarded as the real architects of federal full ministration proposal, advanced as a postscript to employment legislation. A few members of Con- the Family Assistance Plan, which would have re- gress and their staff largely determined the out- quired the states (for the first time) to pay certain come of the debate. Senator James E. Murray (D- minimum benefits to the needy aged, the blind, and MT.) provided the "spark of will which trans- the disabled. This measure thus addressed the conformed an idea into a specific legislative pro- cern that these welfare payments were far too low posal"ls7 Other major roles were played by several in some states, and were highly inequitable be- more well placed members of Congress, most of cause of gross variations in benefits levels. whom held leadership positions or key committee The proposal was both warmly embraced and chairmanships, while the final language was ham- drastically liberalized by Congress, with the major mered out by the 12 members of the House-Senate changes made in closed meetings of the House joint conference committee. Ways and Means Committee dominated by two fis- In making their policy decisions, all of these in- cal conservatives, Representatives Wilbur Mills (D- dividuals were guided more by their personal AR) and John W. Byrnes (R-WI), in concert with values and beliefs than by any external political top HEW officials. Their primary motive was the forces. Bailey observed that "the fate of an issue protection of the Social Security system. SSI depends to a shocking extent upon a handful of promised to ensure the needy elderly a minimum men who take special interest in the pending legis- income without raising the regressive payroll tax lation in committee."ls8 He also expressed concern levels and without costly increases in Social Securi- that the legislative process was in fact quite "ir- ty benefits for all, rich and poor alike. responsible" from the standpoint of the general Endorsement of the measure by the Nixon Ad- public. He concluded that "the American voter ministration and a handful of Congressional lead- could not and cannot hold any recognizable group, ers was good enough for most legislators. Few had interest, or individual responsible for the Employ- carefully read the third title of the otherwise con- ment Act of1946."ls9 troversial welfare reform bill, and the floor debate Bailey's critique is readily extended to a host of suggested tht many misunderstood some crucial the other major policy initiatives studied. The provisions. Neither did the measure attract much chain of accountability between the public-at-large public notice-a fact which probably speeded its and the actions of their representatives has often passage. Thus, as Vincent and Vee Burke have been a thin one. Indeed, in a surprising number of obsered: instances, even most members of Congress-let alone the general citizenry-were unaware of the full significance of new undertakings. Regardless When the historical law was enacted, poli- of one's assessment of their desirability, many im- ticians ignored it and most newspapers portant enactments have rested upon a political failed to report it. It is probable that many foundation of accident, rather than intention; of members of Congress who voted for it did neglect, rather than firm commitment. not realize what they had accomplished This may be said, for example, of the creation of . . . . Except for the few persons who had the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program engineered it and for Governors, who an- under the Social Security Act Amendments of 1972. ticipated savings from its federally paid SSI constituted a quiet, nearly unnoticed revolu- floor for the aged, blind, and disabled, few tion in public welfare, dramatically reversing long- knew what was in Title 111 of H.R. standing federal-state-local relationships. Most importantly, it federalized welfare payments to the The regulatory sphere also provides a variety of aged, blind, and disabled by establishing a guaran- similar cases. Indeed, there seems to be something teed minimum income. The measure constituted about the politics of regulatory enactment which mitigates against full and careful deliberation. an ambiguous law, exciting considerable con- Congress often seems to view new regulations as troversy after the fact. Yet, the possibility of judi- one-sided moral issues or opportunities for "posi- cial review of impact statements had never been tion-taking," rather than as major policies with im- discussed prior to NEPA's adoption. portant operational and economic implications. Similar weaknesses appeared in the development While the potential benefits-and beneficiaries-of of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act regulatory measures usually are considered, the of 1974 (FERPA), which requires all educational in- potential costs often seem to be ignored. stitutions receiving federal funds to provide full When they are poorly framed, regulatory enact- student and parental access to educational records, ments can do serious damage to the processes of and also limits the disclosure of such records to accountability by granting excessive discretion to others. Critics believe that the law has had a chill- the bureaucracy, or to the courts. The result can be ing effect on student evaluations and references, endless wrangling and confusion over the charac- and that-because it applies to all university pro- ter of a "legislative intent" which was either never grams, whether federally aided or not-raises im- decided or im~reciselyspecified. portant administrative and perhaps even Constitu- The National Enzrironmental Policy Act of 1969 tional issues. (NEPA)-creating the "environmental impact None of these questions was given much consid- statement" process and established the Council on eration at the time of enactment. FERPA was in- Environmental Quality (CEQ)-was the most troduced on the Senate floor during debate over sweeping environmental law ever adopted by Con- the General Education Provision's Act of 1974. It gress. Yet, the measure attracted little public at- was adopted there and was subsequently retained tention during its formative period, and the news by the House-Senate Conference. FERPA had media offered little coverage. Neither was there been subject to no hearings nor any other major in- much organized lobbying from the interests most put from educators during its drafting and, indeed, likely to be affected. While the proposal did excite very few were aware of it. Intended primarily to considerable conflict, the concerned parties were address problems in elementary and secondary ed- mostly members of Congress, and they were as ucation, higher education was added "as an after- much interested in jurisdictional disputes as fun- thought," apparently on the assumption that the damental issues of national policy. Consequently, problems of elementary and college education are only a few legislators were well informed about the similar and that the same principles should apply to implications of the law they were adopting. Ac- both. This assumption was clearly erroneous. As cording to a Congressional staff aide, "If Congress initially adopted, the bill had major defects and had had appreciated what the law would do, it would to be revised almost immediately. Higher educa- not have passed." 171 tion groups remain very dissatisfied with both the According to its Congressional mandate, the costs imposed and the unusual federal intrusion in- new CEQ was to develop policies in accordance to their administrative procedures. with the purposes of NEPA and to evaluate other Title IX of the Education AmRndmnts of 1972, federal programs in order to determine if their ac- which prohibits sex discrimination in the admis- tivities furthered the objectives of the Act. Had sions, facilities, and practices of educational in- NEPA set specific standards, CEQ would have had stitutions which receive federal funds, had a a difficult enough time defining the scope of its similar legislative history. The provision was chief- policymaking and watchdog functions. But no ly the work of Rep. Edith Green (D-OR) and Sen. guidelines were included in the statement of pur- Birch Bayh (D-IN). They were supported by rela- pose, which was framed in heavily symbolic rather tively few lobbying groups: most women's organi- than operational language. zations were concentrating their attention on In the absence of clear legal criteria, and given ERA, while the education groups thought the ques- the limited coordinating influence of the CEQ it- tion to be one of minor imp0rtance.1~~Its implica- self, the measure has been interpreted and enforc- tions also were not understood by many of the ed largely through the judicial process. In the members who approved its passage: hands of environmental interest groups, NEPA became a potent weapon to be used against projects . . .[W]hen Congress passed Title IX in they opposed. The courts read firm meaning into 1972, it was voting for a general principle of equality; the specific implications of the typically becomes infrequent (and is often ineffec- law were understood by few members of tive). Congress. . . . Congress made no attempt From a policy standpoint, most programs be- to provide a clear and complete definition come self-perpetuating and resistant to termina- of what constituted sex discrimination in tion or large-scale reforms. As documented previ- education. As a result, the real public ously, a seemingly "natural" tendency toward in- debate on the issues involved in creasing fragmentation and regulation-as well as eliminating sex discrimination followed higher funding levels-takes hold. Autonomy rather than proceeded, the passage of the grows, and, "because policy is evermore its own law.173 cause, programs depend less on the external environment than on events inside the sector from Implementation of Title IX has been slow, dif- which they come."174 ficult, and contentious. Due to superficial treat- From the standpoint of political accountability, ment and the symbolic nature of the law, legisla- the consequences are serious, and challenge the ef- tive intent was not clear. The drafting of final reg- fectiveness of representative institutions. Policy- ulations alone took three years. Their publication making becomes an "insider's game," largely in July 1975 prompted vociferous controversy pro- incomprehensible, inaccessible, and unaccountable ducing support as well as heated opposition. to those outside a narrow circle. Results are biased toward the political and programmatic status quo. POLICY INSTiTUTlONALlZATlON Thus, many of the case study findings echo a The enterpreneurial process described in the warning first voiced by the Commission on Inter- preceeding section, and the problems of political governmental Relations in 1955, which coined the accountability which pertain to it, is most typical of phrase "vertical functional autocracy" to describe the development of new program initiatives in the networks of program specialists at all levels of emerging functional areas. Where federal activi- government and their ability to resist the initia- ties are limited, policy entrepreneurs may have tives of elected political generalists and the politi- free rein, once the legitimacy of national involve- cal currents of the times. (Others use the term ment is accepted. In many cases, the result has "iron triangle" to describe these same alliances of been one or more dramatic, precedent-shattering interest groups, Congressional subcommittees, enactments followed by a flurry of lesser, closely- and program administrators). Once established, related legislation. both early and contemporary critics stress, federal At the present time, however, a few domestic programs seem to become isolated from general policy fields remain unexplored. Instead, in almost political direction. Indeed, their enactment helps to every major function, there are a number of exist- create tripartite coalitions of interests which often ing grant or regulatory programs. Once federal in- spur rising outlays and stand as major obstacles to volvement is thoroughly established, a new politi- termination, programmatic consolidation, or major cal process comes to the fore. Policymaking is in- administrative reorganization. stitutionalized, revolving around the funding, re- Substantial evidence for these propositions has newal, refinement, or elaboration of existing ef- been presented in the previous sections of this forts intended to achieve generally accepted na- chapter. Yet, this general tendency may be in- tional objectives. dicated more clearly by examining the policy in- During this "second generation" of policymak- stitutionalization process in selected functional ing, new political patterns emerge. Regardless of areas. the origin of the program in question, power shifts The history of welfare reform efforts over the toward those who are affected most intimately by past decade illustrates many of the peculiarities its day-to-day operations: the Congressional com- and difficulties of second-generation policymaking. mittees which oversee it; the federal bureaucrats Most importantly, it reveals the obstacles which charged with its management; state and local pro- confront Presidents who attempt to displace en- fessionals who received funds and operate it; and, trenched programmatic interests, even with broad frequently, its organized beneficiaries or clientele public support. Both Presidents Nixon (in 1969) groups. Public attention subsides; partisan dif- and Carter (in 1976) sought to reform welfare ferences diminish; and Presidential involvement through federalization, guaranteed uniform incomes, and program consolidation. Neither plan grams. Opponents were concerned that, although was adopted, for the same overt reasons: both FAP offered new aid to many of the poorest of the failed to gain the support of the powerful chairman poor, it provided no additional benefits and had of the Senate Finance Committee, Sen. Russell some disadvantages for AFDC recipients in the Long (D-LA); both were subject to claims of inade- more generous states. quacy on the one hand and over-generosity on the The pattern of strange alliances continued dur- other; both sought to simplify the plethora of vir- ing the Ford Administration, though welfare re- tually unconnected programs which make up the form was more a matter of talk than action. In this "welfare system" and thus, both sought to battle case, the unlikely partners in reform were Rep. entrenched chaos; both required new and perhaps Martha Griffiths (D-MI) and the Secretary of massive federal expenditures; and finally, both ran HEW, Caspar W. Weinberger. Not only did these headlong into elections-elections usually won by two would-be reformers belong to different politi- currying favor, not with the poor, but with the mid- cal parties, but they tended toward opposite ends dle class. of the liberal-conservative spectrum within those Although public assistance policy was a bone of parties-Griffiths being the House sponsor of the contention between Democrats and Republicans most liberal, far-reaching, and expensive national from the New Deal onward, contemporary welfare health insurance plan to that date and Weinberger reform has been a thoroughly bipartisan issue in having previously served as finance director for authorship, support, and resistance. By the end of the conservative Governor of California, Ronald the 1960s, key leaders from across the political Reagan. The proposals also became subject to a spectrum agreed that the administratively com- curious battle between HEW and the Treasury De- plex, increasingly expensive, but often inadequate partment. Unlike classic and expected jurisdic- set of public assistance programs initiated in the tional expansion fights, in this case the two depart- 1930s required an overhaul. The notion of a guar- ments both sought to avoid responsibility for the anteed minimum income was first championed by a program. Thus, while Weinberger proposed that staunchly conservative economist, Milton Fried- the negative income tax system be run by the In- man; was refined and advocated by staffers of ternal Revenue Service, Treasury Department of- President Johnson's Office of Economic Oppor- ficials claimed that there would be "nothing but tunity, and was passed on to President Richard trouble for the department and the IRS" if they Nixon, whose "Family Assistance Plan" generated were assigned the job. considerable public support. This bill passed the In the end, HEW'S plan for a rather straightfor- House of Representatives in April 1970, and was ward "negative income tax" system failed to make expected to flow smoothly through the "more lib- it past the President's desk. Devoid of support, the eral" Senate Finance Committee. Yet, the bill died bill was finally introduced to Congress in 1975 by a with the 91st Congress, in good measure because Democratic Representative from Wisconsin, Rob- of the opposition of a group of liberal Congressmen ert J. Cornell, and died a quiet death. who deemed the guaranteed income level of $2,400 No happier fate greeted the proposal of the to be "too low." Carter Administration. During his Presidential Interest group alignments on welfare reform campaign, Jimmy Carter announced that welfare have been as curious as its partisanship. Surpris- reform would be one of his major domestic goals, ingly, the most vocal opposition to Nixon's Family and in September 1977, he unveiled his plan for Assistance Plan came from groups speaking for "Better Jobs and Income" (BJIA). The proposal the poor themselves. Militant recipients-most bore some striking similarities to those of his two notably, the National Welfare Rights Organization Republican predecessors. Indeed, BJIA was ac- (NWR0)-probably were the most potent single tually a restatement of several previous welfare negative force. Waging a "Zap FAP" campaign, reform and public employment proposals. Further- NWRO not only garnered the support of critical more, it was a restatement which combined their liberal legislators, but, by their very resistance, most comprehensive features. Thus, its cash com- robbed welfare reform of its moral and practical ef- ponent was larger and more inclusive; its jobs com- ficacy and legitimacy. ponent was more pervasive and more intense. The reason for this opposition was rooted in the Politically, the reaction to BJIA was a potpourri: federal-state structure of existing welfare pro- "to each his own" objection. From the outset, it produced advocates, opponents, and a significant comparatively old federal function; the relevant in- collection of interests who seemed not to know terests were "vested" years ago. Still, a process of what they wanted. Although formidable opposition institutionalization may be identified in most other appeared from key legislators, the real nemeses of fields, including some in which the federal role is the program were its half-hearted supporters and much smaller and relatively recent. Examples in- ambivalent commentators. The measure was slow- clude both education and the environment. Over ly nibbled to death by those who were unwilling to time, each has developed its own "policy communi- discard it entirely but were critical of certain com- ty" (or mini-political system) and has proven resis- ponents. tant to external-including Presidential- redirec- Nearly every major group which could be ex- tion. pected to have an interest in welfare policy voiced Although the key programs of federal aid to criticism of some elements of the plan. Thus, some education were not enacted until 1965, federal par- welfare recipients opposed it because the public ticipation in the field was substantially institution- jobs component paid only the minimum wage alized well before then. Indeed, a growing tenden- rather than higher prevailing wage rates; others cy toward federal initiation of new programs is opposed unclear day care provisions and the idea of clearly discernible, and by 1960, government itself requiring mothers of school aged children to work had become a major-perhaps the preeminent- at all; still others described the $4,200 cash grant force in shaping the federal role in education. as "lousy." Organized labor opposed the minimum Of course, the federal role in education did not wage requirement on the grounds that it would develop without considerable external political create a "second-class workforce" and undercut support. Indeed, opinion polls have regularly the wages of other workers. They were joined for a shown that large majorities favor high and rising time by business interests who feared the govern- levels of federal assistance to the nation's schools ment might eventually become the "employer of and colleges. Furthermore, demands from interest first resort." groups have been a primary force in federal in- Rounding out the list of ambivalent commen- volvement in elementary and secondary education tators and sometime opponents were social from the earliest years. This has been especially workers who decried the basic benefit levels and true of NEA and other educational groups. certain portions of the job program; policy re- Still, these demands have always been enhanced search organizations, such as the Institute for Re- by governmental actions, and the continuing pro- search on Poverty, which offered half-hearted en- cess of institutionalization has reinforced group ac- dorsement at best and criticized the jobs compo- cess and influence. A first step was the creation of nent; and professional associations, such as the Na- a federal department for education in 1867. tional Academy of Public Administration, which Though later reduced to bureau status, this agency' warned against federal administration, cashing out worked actively with NEA in the early struggle for food stamps, and the inclusion of SSI. federal aid, and it has provided useful information Little emerged from all the furor. By mid-1978, to aid proponents throughout its history. In- it was clear that the original Carter proposal was a dividual Congressional activists also were long dead issue; while many members of Congress vitally important for their work with education devised alternatives aimed toward more accept- groups on behalf of federal aid. able costs and content, these fared no better. Thus By the 1960s, the process of institutionalization reform floundered in 1977-78, the victim of group had proceeded much further. The Office of Educa- anarchy, the growing "taxpayers revolt," and the tion had grown, and the President and bu- Administration's own poor planning and shifting reaucracy had assumed new policy leadership priorities. Though three major proposals have been roles. This resulted less from any external political introduced into the 96th Congrss (all offshoots of demands than from the unfolding internal agenda 1978 bills), national attention now appears to be of the Great Society itself. Education subcommit- focused elsewhere, and the nroblem of entrenched tees, complete with staff and stable membership, opponents remains. had been established in both chambers of Con- Every policy field is somewhat unique, and wel- gress, and each additional federal aid program was fare reform involves some very special difficulties. accomplished by clientele and beneficiary groups Public assistance is a very large, prominent, and committed to its growth and survival. With the election of President Nixon, the in- educators, including the American Federation of itiative for federal growth shifted out of the White Teachers-the NEA's major rival-as well as the House, but not out of the federal government. Con- AFL-CIO and many other liberal as well as congressional entrepreneurs and bureaucratic officials servative groups. Rather than unifying the educa- have advanced recent federal regulations affecting tional community, the reorganization proposal education. Each has found incentives that make deepend splits among them. such an activist role attractive. On the surface, the primary issues were purely The same pattern of political interaction may be administrative. Many proponents argued that an identified for higher education, although the initia- education department would provide a more ra- tive has long rested with the government. Indeed, tional organization of federal education programs, prior to 1970, the higher education groups were which were scattered among a number of different notorious for their lack of influence. Far from be- agencies and departments, making coordination ing responsible for most major programs, the among them more difficult. Departmental reorgan- higher education associations largely developed in ization by function is, in fact, the traditional response to them. This is true also of some of the remedy of administrative experts for just these groups interested in particular educational issues. sorts of problems. For example, the relationship between women's Yet, lurking below the surface-and sometimes organizations and federal programs and policies erupting over it-were major issues of political ac- has been a symbiotic one, and the emergence of a cess and power, and different approaches to the strong lobby on sex discrimination issues was a by- "institutionalization" question. Both sides agree product of Congressional battles over federal reg- that the new organization might further enhance ulations. the federal role. Many supporters felt that the de- The institutiona1izath-j of educational interests partment would raise the visibility of and Presi- has placed major obstacles in the path of Presiden- dential attention to education, thus increasing the tial policy leadership, and rendered large-scale re- education budget. In their view, the inclusion of forms difficult to contemplate, let alone achieve. education with HEW held down spending because Indeed, in the view of Gary Orfield, fundamental education represents an abnormally large propor- changes in the federal role in elementary and section of the department's "controllable" outlays. ondary education had become essentially impossi- Since the major welfare and health programs ble as early as 1969. Because of: operate on an open-ended entitlement basis, education programs seemed to bear the brunt of down- . . . the mounting strength of local consti- ward budgetary pressures. tuencies that grow up around major grant On the other hand, many opponents viewed fur- programs after several years of operation, ther institutionalization of the federal role in edu- the President had lost his last real oppor- cation as dangerous indeed. Such critics as John E. tunity to fundamentally reshape the basic Sawyer, the President of the Mellon Foundation structure of federal aid. and past President of Williams College, warned of The failures of grant consolidation efforts, as re- the "pressures" that a new department would counted earlier, lend credence to this view. "inevitably" create. "Given the dynamics of gov- Though partially successful, the creation of a na- ernment and the natural ambitions of men," he tional Department of Education (DE) also clearly said: revealed the fragmented coalition of interests . . . one need not be a hardened conser- undergirding current programs and the difficulties vative to anticipate the drift toward cen- of comprehensive change. This issue was brought tralized planning and control that would to the fore when Jimmy Carter voiced approval of follow, or the ways in which this could the DE proposal during his 1976 Presidential cam- undercut the diversity and initiative, the paign. Establishment of a cabinet-rank educational adaptability and responsiveness of the department had long been the goal of NEA, the vigorous, flexible, competitive network of largest organization of professional educators, and private and public institutions, locally gov- Carter's announcement earned him the first NEA erned, which would follow.l76 Presidential endorsement in history. But the proposal also brought the opposition of other Of course, educational interests were not the only ones potentially affected. Indeed, the most vig- during, institutionalized problems and concerns. orous opposition came from various agencies Federal action was generally accepted and, though slated for inclusion, plus their constituencies and views were less intense, public opinion continued Congressoinal defenders. All feared the disruption to support high levels of expenditure. Further- of traditional relationships in the new organiza- more, a new policy system was in place within the tional environment and the subjugation of their structure of government itself. At the federal level own priorities to those of education. Thus, veter- this institutionalization took the forms of an agen- ans opposed the inclusion of the large Veterans cy (EPA), a council (CEQ), and the active consider- Administration (VA) student assistance program ation of environmental impacts by all federal agen- in the department; civil rights groups opposed cies. In addition, five standing Senate committees placing Head Start and civil rights enforcement and eight House committees had assumed some personnel in the department; Indian groups op- responsibility for making environmental policy. posed the addition of Indian education programs to Further, each state had created a permanent agen- the department; many science and higher educa- cy responsible for environmental programs, and tion representatives opposed the addition of Na- there are many local, regional, and substate bodies tional Science Foundation (NSF) programs; and engaged in environmental activities. nutritional groups opposed the inclusion of child As in other fields, the growth of federal environ- nutrition programs in the education department. mental activity has been accompanied by the acti- Moreover, many Congressmen opposed changes vation of an increasing number of organized group because any realignment of agencies would cause a interests. During the early stages of policy devel- realignment in power on Capitol Hill. opment, the bulk of support for a national antipol- As finally approved by Congress in September lution role had come from the "urban lobby" repre- 1979, the DE was a sharply scaled-down version of senting the nation's cities and counties, as well as a Carter's initial 1978 proposal. Rather than bring- few conservation organizations. This situation ing together education-related programs on a gov- changed drastically in the 1970s. Such venerable ernmentwide basis, the new department is com- institutions as the Sierra Club and National posed chiefly of programs formerly housed within Wildlife Federation experienced rapid growth in HEW'S own Education Division, plus the system of membership, and refocused their attention from overseas schools formerly run by the Department forestry and wildlife to the environment in of general. And many more groups, using a variety of In both public assistance and education, federal new issues and tactics, emerged. Some of the policies became institutionalized over a substantial newer groups chose the courts as the arena in historical period. Yet, under extreme conditions, which to wage their struggle. Others have used the process also can proceed very rapidly. Environ- their resources to lobby Congress and provide pub- mental policymaking is an apt illustration. In a lic information, but have not attempted to attract a remarkably short period, the quality of the envi- large membership base. ronment changed from a major focus of mass Hence, if by mid-decade the environment had "demonstration" politics to an ongoing concern of become a secondary concern to the public-at-large, an expanded host of bureaucrats, interest groups, the number of organizations and policy profes- and Congressional committees. sionals for whom it was a principal preoccupation "Earth Dayw-April 22,1970-was the most visi- had increased sharply. All of these new actors ble public expression of concern for the environ- could make their presence known as new budgets ment. It also marked an era of major new initia- were proposed and legislative reauthorizations tives in federal policy. Yet the decline in very in- were required. The nation's frantic commitment tense popular concern was nearly as precipitous as had been replaced by a less emotional, but far more the rise had been explosive. As early as 1971, the enduring, one. most focal of public demands for massive and Toward the end of the decade, environmental radical environmental changes had begun to sub- politics had entered yet another phase. Most im- side, and by the mid-1970s, environmental quality portantly, there was growing awareness of the was no longer the national issue. costs of controlling pollution-costs which had By the time public interest subsided, however, been cavalierly or even deliberately ignored in the environmental quality had joined the ranks of en- heady atmosphere of Earth Day. The energy crisis focused attention on the need for additional domes- These past assessments are belied by the political tic fuel sources and the obstacles which environ- trends of the past two decades. Paralleling the mental policies placed before their development. growth of federal programs has been a rising level Some critics feared that clean air standards, if of political alienation, a growing atomization of strictly applied, would have the effect of halting in- the political process, and increasing overload of the dustrial growth in certain cities and regions. major governmental institutions. Most policy- Others charged that the rising tide of governmen- making has been increasingly entrusted to narrow tal regulations, including environemntal regula- circles of specialists inside and outside govern- tion, was raising the costs of doing business and ment, while the role of representative, ma- was contributing.- to rampant inflation. joritarian bodies-the President, political parties, Yet, the thoroughgoing institutionalization of en- and Congress as a whole-has declined. At few vironmental programs has made the balanced times in the past has government seemed less fully assessment of these competing national objectives accountable to the public than it does now. Some very difficult. A recent GAO report stresses that even believe that these new pressures pose a seri- the fragmentation of responsibility for environ- ous threat to the vitality of American democracy mental issues among an array of Congressional itself. committees does not permit effective considera- The case studies do suggest that popular control tion of tradeoffs between them and other national of and participation in national policymaking has priorities. It also makes it difficult to address been quite limited. Indeed, some of the nation's "multimedia" pollution problems as a whole, i.e., most fundamental domestic legislation was for- the relationship between air, water, and land pollu- mulated by small groups of individuals, and given ti~n.l~~Similarly, the division of responsibility cursory review in the broader legislative and elec- within the Executive Branch makes coordination a toral processes. At best, these statutes reflected a constant and troublesome pr0b1em.l~~ highly generalized political mood, with the consent Despite the existence of variations on the theme, of the governed obtained after, not before, the a similar process of institutionalization can be iden- fact. tified in each of the other fields studied: fire protec- Far more important-because it is now much tion, libraries, and unemployment. In every case, more pervasive-is the character of the political policy control has shifted toward networks of pro- process within established fields of governmental gram specialists in the legislative and executive activity. Once in place, federal programs become branches, as well as organized beneficiary groups. "institutionalized" in specialized networks of This, in combination with the expanded scope of bureaucrats, legislators, and beneficiaries. Many public responsibilities, creates serious obstacles to become self-perpetuating, and opportunities for the exercise of political leadership by the occupants full-scale policy reviews and the effective exercise of the White House, the Congress, or the political of political leadership are limited. parties. Thus, the fragmentation and congestion of intergovernmental programs is now mirrored in the atomization and overload of the political process itself. Each begets the other; the two are mutually Conclusion reinforcing; and both are destructive of the traditional processes intended to ensure political ac- Prior to the mid-1960s, federal grants-in-aid countability. were frequently judged to be excellent instruments of a healthy, peculiarly American brand of political pluralism. From this earlier perspective, intergov- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ernmental programs provided some reconciliation of the representational protection inherent in a In past studies, this Commission has employed "large republic" and the participatory opportuni- five criteria for the analysis of the assignment of ties of a small one. The multiple points of political functions among governmental levels: national access offered by overlapping governmental func- purpose, fiscal equity, economic efficiency, admin- tions seemed to ensure that public policies would istrative effectiveness, and political accountability. accord quite closely to the desires of the citizenry. Although these criteria are difficult to operation- alize, frequently conflict, and are more readily ap- to even the most traditionally local fields. plied to direct operations than to federal assistance Individual programs have been created programs, each does offer a useful and appropriate largely on a hit or miss basis, chiefly reflec- standard for assessing the overall operation of the ting the entrepreneurial activities of intergovernmental system. policymakers and organized interests. Fur- Earlier theory and research generally presented thermore, limited national objectives have positive appraisals on every count. Potentially, at proven difficult to specify in politically least, grant programs were believed to advance meaningful terms. Even such a universally principal national goals, while leaving lesser mat- accepted federal responsibility as defense ters to state-local discretion; to help equalize in- has encouraged the creation of federal pro- comes and service levels among jurisdictions and grams affecting such diverse local ac- individuals, thus benefiting the disadvantaged; to tivities as education and fire protection. provide an efficient and effective means for deliv- The acceptance of new national goals, ering services on a cooperative basis among the especially in the past two decades- levels of government; and to assure the respon- including the reduction of unemployment, siveness of the political system to the needs and the elimination of poverty, and the protec- desires of its citizens. tion of the environment-has resulted in More contemporary commentaries provided in an elaborate network of intergovernmen- recent assessments of intergovernmental adminis- tal programs touching upon essentially tration and politics offer a far less sanguine view. every field of state and local operations. Over the past 20 years, the federal assistance sys- Regarding fiscal equity, the record tem has grown "bigger, broader, and deeper," ex- indicates that federal aid programs have panding dramatically in terms of the number of in- never consistently transferred income to tergovernmental program relationships and ex- the poorest jurisdictions or individuals. penditure levels, the functional range of intergov- Neither do most existing grants accord ernmental activity, and the intrusive character of with the prescriptions of "externality" intergovernmental regulation and control. These theory. Unlike a number of other major new measures have addressed a variety of impor- federal systems, the United States lacks a tant social, economic, and political needs. Yet the systemmatic method for equalizing the fis- net result has been a major transformation in the cal resources of its states. The targeting of balance of American federalism-and, despite resources to the most needy jurisdictions repeated reformist efforts-increasing dissatisfac- has been inconsistent with the coalition- tion with its performance as a whole. While aspira- building process engaged in to secure sup- tions have risen sharply, results have not kept port for legislation; hence, for political pace, and many of the traditional virtues of in- reasons, funds are often dispersed very tergovernmental relationships now seem more broadly. While poverty rates have declined mythical than real. markedly, the open-ended character of the In large part, these critical perspectives can be major public assistance programs allows accounted for by the piecemeal, even haphazard vastly different (and frequently inade- manner in which intergovernmental policies have quate) levels of help to the poor. In-kind been developed, as presented in the Commission's service programs for particular groups seven functional field case studies. Too often, the have been more politically acceptable than political process itself has hampered the realization large-scale income redistribution of the five key vlaues enumerated above. measures. In sum, then, the recent record comes to this: Regarding economic e- and admin- 0 Regarding national purpose, the record in- istrative effectiveness, the record indicates dicates that federal grant-in-aid programs that there are serious obstacles to the suc- have never reflected any consistent or cessful implementation of intergovern- coherent interpretation of national needs. mental programs. Legislators often have At present, the federal government's given insufficient attention to operational assistance or regulatory activities reach in- issues, and many programs are poorly designed to accomplish their objectives. The sistant to major reforms. The process of multiplicity of administrative levels dilutes legislative extension tends to be dominated responsibility, while the fragmentation of by policy specialists in Congress, bureauc- grants dissipates federal leverage and racy, and interest groups, while undercut- taxes the managerial capacities of recipi- ting opportunities for effective leadership ent jurisdictions. Proposals to consolidate by the President or through the political grants to simplify and decentralize admin- parties. istration arouse major political opposition, and few have been adopted. Finally, fed- These altered and sharply conflicting assess- eral policy in most fields has become in- ments are largely explicable in historical terms. creasingly prescriptive and intrusive as When federal involvement was confined principal- time has passed. For all of these reasons, ly to a few major fields; when programs in each of in many areas the spirit of intergovern- these fields were few in number; and when their mental cooperation has been replaced by regulations were limited to matters of good man- rising levels of intergovernmental an- agement practice, the grant-in-aid had much to tagonism. commend it. The deficiencies have become more Kegarding political accountability, the apparent as grant programs have become more record suggests a decline in popular con- pervasive, and essentially every policy field has be- trol through state and local governments come an intergovernmental undertaking. as well as rising levels of political aliena- Politically, the deficiencies reflect a declining tion, an increasing atomization of national philosophical commitment to a balanced federal- political processes, and a growing overload ism, an increasingly pervasive "pork barrel" men- of national decisionmaking institutions. tality inside and outside government, and the The entrepreneurial process through relative ease with which new programs may be which many programs are initiated makes created and older ones may be extended and exit difficult for the general public to have panded. much influence on legislative outcomes or Both reflect the congestion of the intergovern- to fix political responsibility for them. Im- mental system-a system which has become too portant issues and interests often are big, too broad, and too deep for effective operation ignored-perhaps particularly in the enact- or control. Where all responsibilities are shared, no ment of regulatory legislation. Further- one is truly responsible. And, if everyone is respon- more, once programs are adopted, they sible for everything, none can fulfill their obliga- tend to become self-perpetuating and re- tions.

FOOTNOTES l1 Ibid., D. 99. l2 Ibid., b. 17. See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela- l3 The Feederalist 45, New York, New American Library, tions, Condition of American Federalism: Conflicting 1961, pp. 292-93. Theories and Collapsing Constraints (A-78), Washington, l4 Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, A Report to DC. U.S. Government Printing- Office, (forthcoming), the President for Transmittal to the Congress, chapter 1. Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, D. 123. Financino Schools and Propertu Tccz Reliet A State Re- l6 ACIR (A-40), p. 4. sponsibilZg (A-40), ~ashi&on, DC, U.S: Government l6 Samuel H. Beer. "Political Overload and Federalism." Printing Office, January 1973. Polity, ~rnherst,'~~,Fall 1977, pp. 15-16. Ibid., p. 126. l7 V.O. Key, Jr., The Administration of Federal Grants to Ibid., p. 5. States, Chicago, Public Administration Service, 1973, p. Ibid., pp. 4,9. 376. Bid., p. 4. la The Council of State Governments, Federal Grants-in- Ibid. Aid: Report of the Committee on Federal Grants-&-Aid, Ibid., p. 9 Washington, DC, Council of State Governments, 1949, 9 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations pp. 43-44. Governmental Functions and Processes: Local and Area- l9 Phillip Monypenny, "Federal Grants-In-Aid to State wide (A-45), Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Governments: A Political Analysis," National Tw JOUT- Office, 1974. nu1 13, Columbus, OH, March 1960, p. 64. lo Ibid., p. 19. 20 Morton Grodzins, The American System: A New View of Government in the United States, Chicago, Rand McNally, ference on the City in Stress, sponsored by the Center for 1966, p. 64. Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, New 21 James L. Sundquist, Making Federalism Wwk, Brunswick, NJ, March 9,1979, pp. 8,lO. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1969, p. 1. '7 ACIR (A-52), p. 217. 22 James Q. Wilson, "American Politics, Then & Now," Ibid., pp 208-9. Commentary, New York, NY, February 1979, p. 41. Sophie R. Dales, "Federal Grants to State and Local 23 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Governments: A Quarter-Century Review," Social Summary and Concluding Observations (A-62), Security Bulletin 39, Washington, DC, September 1976, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, June p. 31. 1978, p. 65. R. Douglas Arnold, Congress and Bureaucracy: A Theory 24 Charles L. Schultze, "Federal Spending: Past, Present, of Influence, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, and Future," Setting National Priorities: The Next Ten 1979, pp. 207-10. Year eds. Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultze, Washing- 61 See Brett W. Hawkins and Robert M. Stein, "Regional ton, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1976, p. 367. Planning Assistance: Its Distribution to Local Govern- 26 James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, ments and Relationship to Lo4Grant Getting," Journal Kennedy, and Johnson Years, Washington, DC, The of the American ~nstituteof Planners 43, JU~1977, pp. Brookings Institution, 1968, p. 179. 279-88. Sundquist, Politics andPoliy, p. 102. 62 Richard H. deleone, Small Futures: Children, Znegwclity 27 Rural Datelopment Act of 1972, P.L. 92-419, Title IV, Sec- and the Limits of Liberal Reform, New York, NY, Har- tion 401. court Brace Jovanovich, 1979, p. 8. 28 John P. Ross and Susannah r;. Calkins, "The Economic 63 Robert Plotnick and Timothy Smeeding, "Poverty and In- Stimulus Package at Mid-Stream: The Role of State and come Transfers: Past Trends and Future Prospects," Local Governments," Publius 9, Philadelphia, PA, Winter Public Policy 27, Cambridge, MA, Summer 1979, pp. 1979, pp. 45-65. 255-72. 29 John Bibby and Roger Davidson, On Capitol Hill: Studies 64 Robert H. Haveman, ed., A Decah of Federal Antipover- in the Legislative Process, New York, Holt, Rinehart, and ty Programs: Achievements, Failures, and Lessons, New Winston, 1967, p. 220. York, Academic Press, 1977, p. 14. Lawrence E. Gladieux and Thomas R. Wolanin, Congress 66 deleone, pp. 74-76. and the Colleges, Lexington, MA, D.C. Heath, 1976, p. 29. 66 Christopher Jencks, et al, Who Gets Ahead? The Deter- 31 For a leading exposition, see George F. Break, Zn- minants ofEconomic Success inAmerica, New York, NY, tergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United States, Basic Books, 1979, p. 311. See also Christopher Jencks, et Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1967, al, Inequality: A Reassessment ofFamily and Schooling in Chapters I11 and IV. America, New York, NY, Basic Books, 1972. 32 Alan K. Campbell, "Functions in Flux," American Feder- These estimates of externalities are based upon Break, Zn- alism: Toward A More Effective Partnership, Washing- tergovernmatal Fiscal Relations in the United States, ton, DC, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1967, p. 69. Relations, 1975, p. 37. 68 Peter Passel1 and Leonard Ross, State Policies and 33 Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, A Report to Federal Programs: Priorities and Constraints, New the President, pp. 64,110. York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1978, p. 162. 34 ACIR (A-45), p. 7. Charles L. Schultze, "Sorting Out the Social Grant Pro- 36 Ibid., p. 88. grams: An Economist's Criteria," American Economic 36 Ibid., p. 89. Rewiew 64, Menosha, WI, May 1974, p. 183. 37 Monypenny, "Federal Grants-In-Aid to State Govern- Ibid., pp. 182-83. ments," p. 11. 61 See James A. Maxwell and J. Richard Aronson, Finane- Rudolph G. Penner, "Reforming the Grants System," ing State and Local Governments, Washington, DC, The Fiscal Federalism and Grants-in-Aid, eds. Peter Brookings Institution, 3rd ed., 1977, p. 65n, and Edward Mieszkowski and William H. Oakland, Washington, DC, M. Gramlich, "The Role of Economics in the Study of In- The Urban Institute, 1979, p. 114. tergovernmental Relations," paper presented at the 74th 39 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Annual Conference of the American Political Science Categorical Grants: Their Role and Design (A-52), Wash- Association, New York City, August 31,-September 3, ington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, pp. 1978. 216-17. 62 Lester C. Thurow, "Cash Versus In-Kind Transfers," 40 Comptroller General, "Changing Patterns of Federal Aid American Economic Rewiew 64, Menosha, WI, May 1974, to State and Local Governments," PAD-78-15, December p. 191. 20,1977,p. 38. 63 Kenneth A. Shepsle, "The Private Use of the Public In- 41 Congressional Budget Office, Troubled Local Economies terest," Center for the Study of American Business, and the Distrihtion of Federal Dollars, Washington, DC, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, June 1979, p. 4. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 36. 6d Joel Havemann and Linda E. Demkovich, "Making Some 42 Ibid., p. 44. Sense Out of the Welfare 'Mess'," National Journal, 43 Ibid., p. 49. Washington, DC, January 8,1977, p. 44. 44 G. ROSS Stephens and Gerald W. Olson, "The 66 V.O. Key, Jr., The Administration of Federal Grants to Redistributive Function of Federal and State Govern- States, Chicago,-. IL,. Public Administration Service, 1937, ments," University of Maryland, College Park, MD, May pp. 335-39. 15,1980. 64 Joel Havemann and Linda E. Demkovich. "Makina Some 46 Congressional Budget Office, City Need and the Respon- Sense Out of the Welfare 'Mess'," ~&onal ~&rnal, siveness of Federal Grant Programs, Washington, DC, Washington, DC, January 8,1977, p. 44. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 75. V.O. Key, Jr., The Administration of Federal Grants to 46 Richard P. Nathan, "Federal Grants-In-Aid: How Are States, Chicago, IL, Public Administration Service, 1937, They Working in 1979?", paper prepared for the Con- pp. 335-39. Beryl A. Radin, "Can We Learn From Experience? The Edward R. Fried, et al, Setting National Priorities: The Case of SSI," Policy Analysis 2, Berkeley, CA, Fall 1976, 1974 Budget, Washington,DC, The Broolcings Institution, p. 617. 1979, p. 177. Quote from John Palmer in Annette Kronblum, "Job In- g7 George F. Break, "Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations," surance's Growing- Pains," The WashingtonPost, August Setting National Priorities Agenda for the 1980% ed., 14,1977,p. B4. Joseph A. Pechman, Washington, DC, The Brookings In- Roger H. Davidson, Coalition-Building for Depressed stitution, 1980, p. 277. Areas. Inter-University Case Program- #103, Indianapolis, Sundquist, Malcing Federalism Work, pp. 3-5. IN, ~obbs- erri ill, 1966, p. 28. 9@ Helen Ingram, "Policy Implementation Through Bargain- 69 Ibid. ing: The Case of Federal Grants-in-Aid," Public Policy 25, 70 Letter from Kirsten Gronbjerg, Associate Professor of Cambridge, MA, Fall 1977, pp. 506-07. Sociology, Loyola University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, loo Daniel J. Elazar, "Is the Federal System Still There?", in May 1,1979. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, For a comparison of these major programs, see Hearings on the Federd Role (A-87), Washington, DC, Havemann and Demkovich, "Making Some Sense Out of U.S. Government Printing Office, forthcoming. the Welfare 'Mess'," pp. 44-55. lol Thomas J. Madden, "The Law of Federal Grants," paper 7Z Maurice MacDonald, Food, Stamps, and Income prepared for the ACIR Conference on Grant Law, Maintenance, New York, Academic Press, 1977. Washington, DC, December 12,1979, p. 19. 7s Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., "A Decade of Policy loz See Chapter 1, "The Question of Federalism: Key Prob- Developments in the Income Maintenance System," in lems," ACIR (A-77), pp. 3-34. Havemann, "Making Some Sense Out of the Welfare loS Madden, "The Law of Federal Grants," p. 2. 'Mess'," p. 102. Emphasis added. lo4 Quoted in Jerome Murphy, "The Education Bureaucracies 74 ACIR (A-45),p. 82. Implement Novel Policy: The Politics of Title I of ESEA, 76 Ibid., p. 92. 1965-1972,"Policy and Politics in America, ed., Allan P. 76 These issues are discussed in more detail in Volume 11, Sindler, Boston, MA, Little, Brown & Co., 1973, p. 194. Chapter 1, "Theoretical Perspectives on Federalism," in 106 Quoted in Eugene Eidenberg and Roy Morey, An Act of ACIR, A-78. Ccmgress, New York, W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969, p. 7l Key, The Administration of Federal Grants to States, p. 93. Emphasis added. 383. lo8 Beryl Radin, Implementation, Change, and the Federal 78 Grodzins, The American System, pp. 62-63. Bureaucracy, New York, Teachers College Press, 1977, 7B Morton Grodzins, "Centralization and Decentralization in pp. 146,211. the American Federal System," A Nation of States, ed. lo7 Stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, ESEA: The Of Robert A. Goldwin, Chicago, Rand McNally & Company, fice of Education Administers a Law, Syracuse, NY, 1963, p. 23. Syracuse University Press, 1968, pp. 144,148. Break, Zntergovern~talFiscal Relations in the United lo8 Juan Cameron, "How CETA Came to Be A Four-Letter States, pp. 78-79. Word," Fortune, Chicago, IL, April 9,1979, p. 112. Key, The Administration of Federal Grants to States, p. lo@ Ibid., p. 113. xiv. 110 Quoted in Martha Derthick, Uncontrollable Spending for 8z Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, A Report to Social Service Grants, Washington, DC, The Brookings the President, p. 120. Institution, 1975, pp. 3-4. 88 Grodzins, American System, p. 382. Phillip M. Gregg, "Food Stamp Administration and National Science Foundation, Proceedings: Workshops on Reform: The Intergovernmental Perspective From 11- Research About State-Local Fiscal Management: An linois," paper prepared for presentation to the 39th Na- Assessmat for Program Planning, Washington, DC, tional Conference on Public Administration, Phoenix, AZ, Municipal Finance Officers Association, 1979, pp. 2-3. April 9-12,1978, p. 2. 86 Joseph S. Wholely, et al, "Evaluation: When Is It Really 112 MacDonald, Food Stamps, and Income Maintenance, p. Needed?." Evaluation 2, Washington,- DC, 1975, p. 89. 76. 86 Zbid., p. 89. llS Rural Developmat Act of 1972, P.L. 92-419, Title IV, Sec- 87 Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, p. 13. tion 401. David R. Mavhew, Cunaress: The Ekctoral Connection, New Haven, +ale unive;sity Press, 1974, pp. 138-39. 114 The following discussion is based upon Mavis Mann Thomas J. Anton, "Federal Assistance Programs: The Reeves, "Politics, Public Policy, and Intergovernmental Politics of System Transformation," paper prepared for Relations: The Rural Community Fire Protection Pro- the Urban Choice and State Power Conference, Center gram," paper prepared for delivery at the 1979 Annual for International Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, Meeting of the American Political Science Association, June 1-4,1977, p. 37. Washington, DC, August 31-September 3, 1979, pp. 76-81. @O Monypenny, "Federal Grants-In-Aid to State Govern- ments," pp. 12-31. James E. Drier and Edmund Ursin, Pollution and Policy: 91 Allen Schick, "Contemporary Problems in Financial Con- A Case Essay on Calqornia and Federal Experience with trol," Public Administration Review, Washington, DC, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution, 1940-1975, Berkeley, CA, NovemberlDecember 1978, p. 516. University of California Press, 1977, p. 297. 92 Anton, "Federal Assistance Programs," p. 35. ll6 Charles 0. Jomes, Clean Air: The Policies and Politics of 9S Nathan, "Federal Grants-In-Aid," p. 11 Pollution, Pittsburgh, The University of Pittsburgh B4 Walter Williams, The Zmpkmmtation Perspective, Press, 1975, p. 176. Berkeley, CA University of California Press, 1980, p. 44. 117 Steve Muller, "A New American University?," Daedalus 96 Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Zmplemen-- 107, New York, NY, Winter 1979, p. 31. tation, Berkeley, CA., University of California Press, 118 Excerpts from remarks printed in the Congressional 1973, p. 159. Record, March 10,1975, p. S5828. 119 Albert L. Alford, "The Education Amendments of 1978," 14@ Aaron Wildavsky, How To Limit Government Spending, American Education, Washington, DC, March 1979, p. 7. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1980, p. 46. lZ0 Samuel Halperin, "Federal Takeover, State Default, or a Is0 Neal R. Peirce, "The State of American Federalism," Na- Family Problem?," Federalism at the Crossroads:Improv- tional Ciwic Rewiew, New York, NY, January 1980, p. 5. ing Educational Policymaking, ed. Samuel Halperin, 16l James L. Sundquist, "The Crisis of Competence in Washington, DC, Institute for Educational leaders hi^... Government," Setting National Priorities:Agada for the 1976, p.-19. 1980s, ed., Joseph A. Pechman, Washington, DC, The lZ1 Edith K. Mosher, "Intergovernmental Relations in Brookings Institution, 1980, pp. 531-63. Education: The Old and the New." Southem Rewiew of John E. Bebout, "On the Essentiality of Trust in Public Public Administration 3, ~ont~omery,AL, June 1979, I;. Affairs," National Civic Rewiew 68, New York, NY, 52. November 1979, p. 526. lZ2 Joseph Cronin, "The Federal Takeover: Should the Junior David Cohen, "Responsible Managers and Accountable Partner Run the Firm?," in Halperin, ed., "Federal Institutions," The Bureaucrat 7, Alexandria, VA, Winter Takeover, State Default, or a Family Problem?", pp. 2-3. 1978, p. 17. lZs For a listing of programs by function, see Advisory Com- Public Opinion, Washington, DC, OctoberMovember mission on Intergovernmental Relations, A Catalog of 1979, p. 29. Federal Grant-Zn-Aid Programs to State and Local 166 Robert J. Samuelson, "Fragmentation and Uncertainty Governments: Grants Funded FY 1978 (A-72), Litter the Political Landscape," National Journal, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. Washington, DC, October 20.1979, p. 1726. lZ4 For a summary, see Advisory Commission on In- 1D"emarks of Secretary Joseph A. Caliiano, Jr., Depart- tergovernmental Relations, Block Grants: A Comparative ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, before the Analysis (A-60), Washington, DC, U.S. Government Prin- Economic Club of Chicago, Illinois, April 20,1978, pp. 5-6. ting Office, 1977. Anthony King, "The American Polity in the Late 1970s: lZ5 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Building Coalitions in the Sand," The New American The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act: Ear- Political System, ed., Anthony King, Washington, DC, ly Readings From a Hybrid Block Grant (A-58), American Enterprise Institute, 1978, pp. 390-91. Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, lS8 Richard E. Cohen, "A Report Card for Congress-An 'F' p. 56. for Frustration," National Journal, Washington, DC, lZ6 Comptroller General, Federally Assisted Employment August 11,1979, pp. 1326-30. and Training: A Myriad of Programs Should Be '59 Remarks at a "thinker's session" in the ACIR offices, Simplified (HRD-79-11), Washington, DC, General Ac- December 13,1978. counting Office, May 8,1979, pp. 11-12. 160 Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-IN), quoted in Richard E. lZ7 Ibid., p. iii. Cohen, "Tinkeringwith House Rules," National Journul, lZ8 Zbid., D. 39. Washinpton, DC, Aumst 25,1979, D. 1417. lZ9 Zbid.; P. 40. lB1 califan;, pp: 4-5. - Mosher, "Intergovernmental Relations in Education," p. lg2 Joseph Kraft, "Presidency in Decline," The Washington 54. Post. Aumst 12.1979. D. B7. lS1 Alford, "The Education Amendments of 1978," pp. 8-9. 16S ~enb6 ~raff,"~&idents Are Now Mayors," New lS2 Zbid. York Times, July 18,1979, p. A-23. lS3 Richard P. Nathan, "Special Revenue Sharing: Simple, 164 Dom Bonafede, "Not What It Used to Be," National Neat, and Correct," unpublished manuscript, quoted in Journal, Washington, DC, December 15,1979, p. 2111. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, le6 Michael J. Malbin, Unelected Representatives: Congres- Block Grants: A Comparative Analysis (A-60), p. 4. sional Staff and the Future of Representative Govern- lS4 ACIR (A-45), p. 90. mat, New York, Basic Books, 1980, p. 242. lS6 Zbid., p. 91. lee Stephen K. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law: The Story lSe Richard H. Leach, American Federalism, New York, Behind the Employment Act of 1946, New York, Vintage W.W. Norton & Co., 1970, p. 57. Books, 1950, p. 181. lS7 The Federalist #lo, New York, NY, New American lg7 Ibid., p. 41. Library, 1961, p. 83. lB8 Ibid.,1). 100. lS8 Sundquist, Politics andPolicy, pp. 510-11. leg Zbid., P. 237. lS9 Leach, American Federalism, p. 115. 170 Vincent J. and Vee Burke. Nixon's Good Deed: Welfare I4O Grant McConnell, Przvate Power and American ~efokiNew York, ~olumbiaUniversity Press, 1974; pp. Democracy, New York, Vintage Books, 1966, pp. 109, 195-97. The foregoing account also relies heavily on the 114. Burke's analysis. 141 William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, 171 Richard A. Liroff, A National Policy for the Environmen Significance, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1964, p. 155. NEPA and Its Afirmath, Bloomington, IN, Indiana Sundquist, Making Federalism Work,p. 250. Emphasis is University Press, 1976, p. 35. original. 172 Edith K. Mosher, Anne H. Hastings, and Jennings L. ACIR (A-45), pp. 91-92. Wagoner, Jr., Pursuing Equal Educational Opportunity: ld4 Ibid., p. 91. School Politics and the New Activists, New York, ERIC Grodzins, The AmericanSystem, p. 335. Clearinghouse on Urban Education, Columbia University, Selma J. Mushkin, "Barriers to a System of Federal 1979, p. 11. Grants-in-Aid," National TW Journal, Columbus, OH, Andrew Fishel and Janice Pottker, National Politicd and September 1960, p. 199. Sex Discrimination in Education, Lexington, MA, Lex- 141 Monypenny, "Federal Grants-In-Aid to State Govern- ington Books, 1977, p. 132. ments," pp. 14-15. 174 Aaron Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Bayless Manning, "Hyperlexis: Our National Disease," CraB of Policy Analysis, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, & The Congressional Record, March 16, 1978, pp. Co., 1979, p. 62. S3948-3952. Gary Orfield, Congressional Power: Congress and Social Change, New York, NY, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, sional Quarterly, September 29,1979, p. 2112. 1975, p. 136. General Accounting Office, Environmental Protection 176 John E. Sawyer, "Leadership for Today's Colleges," The Zssues Facing the Nation (CED-79-63), Washington, DC, WashingtonPost,December 16,1978, p. A15. U.S.General Accounting Office, March 15,1979, p. 29. IT7 "Education Department Wins Final Approval," Congres- Zbid., p. 31.

The Federal Role In The Federal System: Analysis Of Basic ~indings, Key Questions Raised, And Recommendations

FINDINGS

Inthis study, The Federal Role in the Federal System, the commission has identified dramatic changes in the system that have occurred during the past two decades. These changes, when combined with some key standpat political attitudes and practices, have produced neither a dual nor a cooperative brand of federalism but an increasingly dysfunctional form of federalism. Contempo- rary intergovernmental relations, our research shows, have become more pervasive, more intru- .sive, more unmanageable, more ineffective, more costly, and above all, more unaccountable.

The Signs

The prime symptom of this deepening dysfunc- tionalism is the continuing tendency to "intergovernmentalize" seemingly everything that becomes a public issue-and, increasingly, everything becomes a public issue. Its signs are everywhere, as previous chapters have documented; hence there is no need here to detail the degree to which: The old line between private and public concerns has been obliterated.

0 The very real distinctions between federal and state-local matters of the early 1960s have been lost. State and local budgets have become much 1930s through the 1970s, these mostly Congres- more fiscally dependent on grant revenues. sional entrepreneurs pushed their favorite pro- State and local programs are involved in gram initiatives from conception to enactment- intergovernmental fiscal transfers, condi- sometimes in conjunction with converging broad tions, and court orders. political and historical forces (as in the 1930s and State and local regulatory processes are 1960s) and sometimes not (as in the 1970s). Most circumscribed by federal statutory and always, the resulting greater federal involvement court sanctioned constraints. was in the regulatory or grant assistance areas, not in the national government's direct servicing State and local policies and administrative role. Most always the policy entrepreneur's effort processes have been affected by the Su- was more clearly seen during the frequently preme Court's extraordinary expansion of lengthy battle to achieve initial passage of a mea- what is "absorbed" within the orbit of the sure and less clearly recognized in the adoption of Fourteenth Amendment. key expansionist amendments during subsequent Federal grants-in-aid have been "used" rounds of reauthorizations. While these actors during the 1970s to serve national regula- have always played a role in the system, their num- tory-not promotional, supportive, or addi- ber and output increased significantly beginning in tive-purposes. the mid-1960s and this was directly the result of . State and local governments have been the converging collapse of the older systemic con- "used" to implement wholly national pol- straints that began at the same time. icies. The federal government has been "used" Judicially, the Supreme Court had ceased to be to further what not so long ago would have the "umpire of the federal system," and more ac- been a wholly local or, at best, a state con- curately could be described as either spectator or cern. player. From an intergovernmental perspective, this was and is reflected in its fairly steady adher- The details of these manifestations of incessant in- ence to the New Deal Court's passivity regarding tergovernmentalization are variously chronicled in Congress' seemingly unbridled right to regulate this 11-volumeACIR study. commerce, even for mandating purposes, and Congress' willingness to use it in areas undreamed Some Underlying Causes of before 1960. Only a few decisions of the 20-year period suggest some sensitivity regarding the The underlying reasons for them are highlighted states' police power and only the National League throughout the seven case studies and the two of Cities case suggests an actual judicial willing- background volumes and they are analyzed in some ness to curb the commerce power. depth in the two previous chapters. To recapitulate This absence of an umpiring role is even more briefly, it has been the erosion of certain basic con- dramatically reflected in the federal judiciary's un- straints on national expansion that has nurtured willingness to check Congress' power to spend for these troublesome trends. In the Constitutional the general welfare, even when some of the condi- realm, this actually began in the 1920s, accelerated tions attached to grants in the 1970s have in the late 1930s, and soared in the 1960s and amounted to coercion or arbitrary intrusion into 1970s. With politics, the shedding of the older in- the administrative and decisionmaking processes hibitions began in the 1930s and almost completely of state and local g0vernments.l The Tenth disappeared during the past 15 years. In the public Amendment's basic protection in the grant-in-aid finance area, the real decay of fiscal discipline area, this 58-year-old judicial theory still holds, is started in the 1960s and continued to the present, the presumed capacity of the states and localities with some concern over deficit spending reemerg- to say "no" to a grant. ing as a constraint in the late 1970s. In terms of the The third major manifestation of a nonjudicious key actors in this drama, that distinctive product of approach to federalism is reflected in the activist the open-access, uncohesive, largely unprogram- stance of the Court through its extraordinary ex- matic American political system-the individual pansion of what is subsumed under the Fourteenth policy entrepreneur-held center stage. From the Amendment. This includes not only broad interpretations of the "equal protection" and "due proc- types of interest groups at the national ess" clauses, but also the steady "absorption" level based on social, participatorylcon- within the Amendment of most of the federal Bill sumer, and environmental causes, along- of right^.^ While the Court's commitment to the side the traditional and increasingly frag- protection of individual rights should be ap- mented economic and programmatic groups; plauded, its concomitant failure to assess few, if the increased efforts on the part of state any, of the institutional impacts of its decisions and local governments to lobby Washing- may not. ton, even as their own traditional political strength at the national level was growing Fiscally, the federal government began the weaker-thanks to this growing array of period with a much stronger revenue system than programmatic, social, participatory, and that of the states and the localities. Buttressing the demographic groups that are vertically or- federal fiscal strength in the 1960s were its broad- ganized and usually aligned against them based income tax, the responsiveness of this levy and to the growing insensitivity of their to conditions of growth and inflation, the growing national legislators to their jurisdictional acceptance of deficit spending, the separate sys- worries; tem for financing social insurance, and the ability . the steady erosion in the capacity of the to shift funds from defense to the domestic sector two major parties to "absorb" and "recon- and vice versa as in the case of Vietnam. These cile" all of these interests in primaries and combined to produce the notion in the 1960s that in national conventions; "the resources are there, if only we have the political will to tap them." The myth of the federal cor- the steady deterioration of the capacity of nucopia thus was born. the political branches of the national gov- Soaring federal outlays (especially in the grants ernment to "pacify" this plethora of pres- area), mushrooming deficits, and six tax rate cuts sure groups, especially in a period of osten- during the period 1969-79 all bear witness to the sibly "democratic" and "open access" Con- popularity and credibility of this myth. Only in the gressional "reforms" and of a populist Presi- late 1970s was there a growing recognition that it dency; was and is a myth. 0 the steady decline since the 1960s in the voting differences between Democrats and Politically, the changes in attitudes, in the mode Republicans in the Congress on federal and extent of participation, and in the process it- role and grant-in-aid issues; and self over the past two decades probably have been the slow but clear change in the manner the most dramatic. ~mehcanpolitical history sug- that Congress handles grant and grant-re- gests that the major parties either singly or in com- lated legislation, from a largely partisan bination have provided their own self-serving clus- and ideologically dominated, usually exec- ter of constraints on the expansion of the federal utive- branch-intiated, yet geared to reach- role in the system. Political factors made questions ing a rough consensus process in the of federalism a perennial source of campaign and 1960s-to a functionally oriented, Con- Congressional debate from Washington to Ken- gressionally dominated, cooptive process nedy, and they combined to keep the federal inter- in the 1970~.~ governmental role a comparatively modest one clear through to the mid-1960s. The Constitutional Some explain all this in terms of the Goldwater constraints after all had collapsed by the late candidacy in 1964 and the resultant Johnson land- 1930s, and the fiscal were largely linked to the slide victory and the overwhelming Democratic political. Yet over the past decade and a half, most margins in the 89th Congress. For the first time, of these political curbs have declined. Witness: an activist Democratic President could rely, if need be, solely on northern party members. The product 0 the steady decline in the strength of local by 1968 was over 249 new aid programs and the and territorial interests in the governmen- concomitant piercing of dozens of heretofore im- tal and political processes; pregnable program "legitimacy" barriers. the rapid rise recently of a host of newer The causes of these developments, the Commis- sion finds, are more varied and more complex. Pre- party system that is much less able to perform its eminent among the forces shaping these develop- twin historic missions-of serving as interest ments has been the most complex of all our na- group broker and of building (or preserving) national institutions: Congress. As Table 2 shows, tional consensus. It leads to confusion in official only Congress played a consistently crucial role in role-playing. Presidents act almost as frequently in each of the seven program areas reviewed in the a mayoral or a gubernatorial role as in a national Commission's case studies. The Congressional role Presidential one and Congress plays a municipal was particularly significant in the originating and county council, not to mention the state legis- phase of the policy process, for in the initation of lative role, almost as often as it acts as a national programs, no other actor eclipses the individual deliberative body. It has produced a situation Congressional entrepreneur or issue activist. Our where no level or set of officials is performing the findings belie the notion that Congress acts as a functions it is best suited to perform. All these po- great rubber stamp for Presidential, bureaucratic, litical changes have combined to produce a process or interest group initiatives. In fact, in many in- wherein federalism's basis for functioning-a rough stances the opposite would be far closer to the division of labor among the levels-has been ig- truth. nored and incessant and intrusive intergovernmen- Hence, increasingly over the past 15 years, legis- talization up and down the line has been the inevit- lation encompassing an ever-growing range of able result. domestic concerns has issued forth from Capitol Hill. Because of this hyperresponsiveness, everything reaches the national agenda: there is little or- The Crucial "No Change" Area dering of priorities (the SALT debate rages side by side with debate over federal funds for the repair Even with these drastic changes in the consti- of local potholes and jellyfish control succeeds tutional, fiscal, and political areas, the dysfunc- while welfare reform fails), and there is little time tional traits of contemporary American federalism or capacity for understanding the consequences of would not be as disturbing as they are if continuing legislation. Policy is made in a "pass now, pay elements of "standpatism" also were not present. later" atmosphere. Where then have there been no basic changes? The Other key contributing factors include: (1) the critical cluster of static attitudes and practices in- basic shifts in popular attitudes regarding what is a clude: public issue and the need for an activist governmental role, especially on the part of the federal no basic change in the size of the federal g~vernment;~(2) the progressive narrowing of par- bureaucracy and in the Presidential and tisan differences in Congress on federal role ques- Congressional desires (regardless of party tions (even as the political rhetoric on the cam- or ideological persuasion) to keep it rela- paign trail seems to get even more polemical and tively small, despite an ever mounting punitively anti-Washington); (3) the ease with number of assignments given to it; which almost every interst group in the 1970s can 0 no basic change in relying almost exclu- establish a Washington office and the equal rela- sively on grants-in-aid as the primary in- tive ease with which many of them "get a hearing" strumentality for carrying out the national before Congressional committees and administra- government's prime domestic servicing re- tors; (4) the pulverizing in the 1970s of the already sp~nsibilities;~ heavily pluralistic power structure of Congress- thanks to ostensibly democratic reforms and a 0 no basic change, as the above would sug- soaring rate of retirements; and (5) the emergence gest, in the national government's direct of a lower-profile Presidency, especially in his roles servicing role-from that of 1960 (or of as policy-initiator and program manager. All of 1940, for that matter); these have combined to erode most of the older 0 no basic change in the Congressional and political constraints that kept the bulk of domestic Presidential view that relying on state and governmental issues and programs completely out local governments and administrators of the Washington arena. even for the most "national" of programs What flows from this, of course, is a national is "administratively convenient," less costly, Table 2 MAJOR ACTORS AND FORCES IN POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH

Functional Fields-ACIR Case Studies Elementary and Public Secondary Higher Fire Assistance Education Education Environment Unemployment Libraries Protection Internal Policy Actors Congress x x x x x X X President x X Interest Groups x x X x Bureaucracy x x X Courts x x

External Policy Actors Public Opinion Elections Political Parties Press

Environmental In- fluences Demographic and Social Trends x x x Dislocations (war, depression) x x

'Food stamps only. 'Interest groups were crucial in the creation of the U.S. Fire Administration only. a curb on federal bureaucratic growth, and welfare) are still intergovernmentalized, while the more politically acceptable; most local of matters (potholes, rat control, li- no basic change in the dominance of the old braries, policemen's pensions, jellyfish control, ur- public administration approach to inter. ban parks, aquaculture, and the like) have become governmental program management-that intergovernmentalized. The most major as well as with adequate conditions and sanctions the clearly minor and the most national as well as state and local administrators can be rend- the most local and even private concerns are all ered properly accountable, hence a part of part of what cooperative federalism now encom- a "chain of command" whose pyramidal passes. Yet, in truth, there is too little cooperation peaks are in Washington; and a lot of inevitable conflict. Cooperation after no change in the belief that with the right all rests on shared goals and mutual trust, rare formula or the right administrator (de- commodities in this period of controversial and un- pending on the form of the grant) equity clear program goals, creeping conditionalism, and and "targeting" can be achieved; chronic buckpassing. A rather fanciful form of federalism, then, has no real change in the incapacity of most emerged. Basic policies in most program areas ap- concerned observers to comprehend and to pear to be made in Washington either by the Court criticize effectively this supermarbleized or Congress. Their implementation is achieved system; and through decisions, orders, mandates, conditions, finally, no basic change in the belief of regulations, and the lure of federal subsidies by 12 most state and local officials and their rep- million state and local civil servants. And, in the resentational groups in Washington that end, the fancy becomes caprice because the subna- federal aid is a first-rate way of alleviating tional governments, their elected officials, and bu- their fiscal pressures and that federal aid reaucracies are capable of highly differentiated can be had without federal conditions. responses to all this-in terms of compliance, coop- These continuing attitudes and conditions along eration, participation, and conflict. with their very real policy and political implications Equally fanciful is any notion that the federal aid have complemented growing individual Congres- system as a whole protects the interests of the sional activism, the passivitylactivity dichotomy of needy or equalizes levels of public service. The log- the federal judiciary, the earlier comfortable condi- rolling style-whether explicit or, more often, im- tion of the federal treasury, and the rapid flower- plicit-through which most grant programs are ing of fragmenting interests in "explaining" the adopted frequently precludes any careful "target- critical contemporaiy state of the system. In their ing" of fiscal resources. "What's in it for me?" is own way, these attitudes and practices have per- the watchword for Congressmen (and their folks mitted the erroneous impression that the system back home), for special interest lobbies, and for bu- still functions pretty much as it did in the reaucrats as well. Questions of equity are too often Eisenhower and Kennedy years. But anyone who ignored in the scramble for benefits. If they were a can count the number of state and local bureau- genuine concern, direct federal performance of the crats, of federal programs, of mandates and function at least would be raised as a serious issue, across-the-board conditions attached to federal but the last time this occurred was in the middle grants, and of instances where the federal courts 1930s. Though disguised in the rhetoric of redistri- are actually running certain state and local opera- bution, distributive politics is the hallmark of these tions-knows better. actions. Matters of operational efficiency also are seldom brought into focus, either before or after the fact. Where Stands the System? Potential benefits are usually dramatized; potential costs are frequently ignored. Many In combination, these attitudes along with the intergovernmental programs are poorly designed changed political and earlier economic conditions, to accomplish their stated objectives. On the con- noted above, have led to an overloading of the in- trary, their objectives are seldom specified in tergovernmental system. The most national of con- operationally meaningful terms, sometimes cerns (income maintenance, health insurance, and because they are unachievable. Furthermore, few programs are evaluated once they are in place; basic governmental institutions, is frustrated by consequently, fewer still are modified or the complexity, confusion, cost, and occasional cor- eliminated. ruption of the system. If in a democratic federal Above all, perhaps, no real debate has occurred republic, the citizens-not to mention the key ad- regarding the questionable administrative assurnp- ministrators and prime politicians-are unable to tions on which grants' management rests. Instead, comprehend the most basic aspects of policy for- the federal bureaucracy has been condemned from mulation and implementation other than in terms all sides for its apparent ineptitude and ineffi- of personality appeals, special interests, and rhe- ciency. The political sector-in the executive bran- toric relating to leadership, where stands the ch, Congress, and most of the press-somehow ex- system? If all of the norms relating to a functioning pects a wholly politicized nonsystem of grants and system-again, effectiveness, efficiency, equity, conditions to behave as a rational system that con- accountability, and some operational notion of na- forms or could conform to the traditional principles tional priorities-are too often slighted, the same of public administmtion. Endless efforts have been question arises: Where stands the system? made since 1967 to the present-through legisla- Yet, the system as it has emerged since the mid- tion, management circulars, and even 1960s makes eminent sense in short-range, pres- reorganizations-to render this nonsystem more sure group, and political terms. From this perspec- manageable. Yet, the basic failure of all these ef- tive, it works! It helps elected officials to get forts has not sunk in. The lesson that these experi- reelected; it provides manifold opportunities to in- ences should have taught has not been learned. The dividual members of Congress to play "ombuds- reasons for this lie in the pervasiveness and con- man" and to parlay this role into a political asset; it tinued popularity of three myths: keeps a range of interests somewhat "pacified"; and it leaves the federal bureaucracy as the villain The myth that it makes no difference in the drama. It also conveys the impression of a whether the number of grants be "man- to governmental response and of responsiveness. It aged" is 130 or 500; whether they involve has helped keep the majority party together and merely physical and economic develop- provided valuable lessons on how the minority ment programs or a wide mix, including a might become the majority. But does any of this variety of "soft" social and educational en- make sense for the nation as a whole, or for either deavors; and whether they go merely to its constituent governments or citizens? The Com- states or to practically all but a handful of mission thinks not! subnational governments; The myth that the cutoff-of-cash threat, conditions, and supporting court cases, in Summary Commission Findings some instances, are adequate to control state and local administrators in the same In light of these various findings and our inter- way as if they were all part of one adminis- pretation of them. .6 trative system; and . The myth that the President has ample The Commission concludes that the cur- authority, time, and inclination to focus rent network of intergovernmental rela- steadily on this "no win" proposition, hence tions has become dangerously over- that more "M" in OMB, more government- loaded, to the point that American wide circulars, and more rearranging of in- federalism's most trumpeted traditional terest group-dominated administrative traits-flexibility and workability-are units will somehow do the trick. critically endangered. The Commission further concludes that But where does this leave the electorate? Frus- this threatening condition largely has trated, alienated, often angry! The system has become about as a consequence of a rapid come largely incomprehensible even to those expansion in the overall scope, range of whose job it is to have an overall understanding of specific concerns, and coercive charac- it. No wonder the average citizen, who is skeptical ter of the federal role in the federal sys- of politics and politicians but who still trusts our tem, because of the erosion of various political, judicial, and fiscal factors that already responding" and the "system requires formerly disciplined the national polit- drastic Constitutional change" schools of thought. ical process and of the emergence and The former is based on a reading of recent events growing strength of interest groups- that suggests that the system's hyperresponsive- both public and private. ness in the 1970s to the immediate concerns of a The Commission obviously recognizes plethora of pressure groups also applies to the that while certain governmental activ- long-range basic concerns of the electorate. Advo- ities necessitate an intergovernmental cates of this approach note the emergence recently approach it believes that the almost un- of some elements of fiscal and political constraint. bridled tendency of the part of the na- The early years of the last decade witnessed the tional government and the political proc- disappearance of the "fiscal dividend" that the ess that sustains it to thrust nearly all of prosperity of the 1960s had generated and which the nation's most national domestic con- had helped fuel the expansion of the public sector, cerns, as well as an ever-multiplying num- they note. Growing pressures for budget balancing ber of parochial and even private con- as a means of curbing inflation have arisen, so cerns, into the intergovernmental arena their argument runs, and inflation is now deemed reflects a feeble faith in the problem- the number one public finance and political agenda solving capacity of the various partners item. In addition, they warn, defense outlays are in the federal system. slated to rise and the Social Security system appears to be in need of alternative sources of fund- The Commission believes further that ing, both probably at some cost to domestic pro- this permits the national government to grams. The Carter budgets for FY 1980 and 1981, avoid some of its most basic domestic Congress' recent handling of its own reformed governmental responsibilities, while clut- budget procedures, and talk of revamping the Con- tering up its agenda with issues that more gressional power structure are cited in evidence of properly belong on that of a municipal or a new behavioral pattern. These incrementalists county council, a school board, or a state also warn that no drastic reform proposals are legislature. really necessary and that continuing political Finally, the Commission concludes that pressures will correct the imbalances, ineffi- neither equity (in the sense of giving due ciencies, and ineffectiveness of the present sys- attention to jurisdictions or people in tem-thus rendering it more accountable and sim- need), nor administrative effectiveness, pler to the electorate. In short, the alarmist ap- nor economic efficiency, nor above all proach to interpreting past trends and to prescrib- political, electoral, or administrative ac- ing corrective courses of action is rejected by this countability are furthered by this ten- group and a traditional trust in the innate respon- dency to intergovernmentalize practical- siveness and responsibility of the system is relied ly all domestic questions, nearly all sub- on, instead. national governmental functions, and Opponents of this incremental strategy, and this the bulk of the national government's Commission is among them, counter with the argu- own civil governmental obligations. ment that fiscal retrenchment in domestic program areas need not involve basic intergovernmental program and regulatory reform, but merely RECOMMENDATIONS a cutback or static growth in aid dollars. On the basis of current and projected experience, they Future Scenarios argue, this approach only adds up to as many (if Other than the deeply disturbing prospect of not more) aid programs and probably more condi- more of the same-more aid programs, more for- tions attached thereto, but less money in constant mal conditions and constraints, more buckpassing, dollar terms. From the state and local perspective, and fewer real dollars-at least three basic alterna- as well as that of the system as a whole, they warn, tive reformist strategies confront anyone con- this would be the worst of nearly all possible cerned with the condition of the system. worlds. To accept the "already responsive" thesis, On the two extremes stand the "system is they claim, is to ignore the undiminished dynamics of interest group lobbying and Congress' perennial The AClR Strategy tendency when confronted with fiscal constraints to adopt the "the parity of pain principle." This Six components constitute the Commission's ap- leads to no real assessment of intergovernmental proach to applying this general policy position to programs and regulations, to avoiding the choice the most critical of the challenges confronting the between those grants that make sense from those system. Each rests on a rejection of the incremen- that are nonsense, of separating out those con- talist and full-scale Constitutional revision alter- cerns that are genuinely intergovernmental from natives. those that are patently parochial and political. In- Unlike the former, each represents a less san- stead, budget cuts are distributed on a rough guine view of the various aspects of the system's across-the-board basis among departments and current operations. Unlike the latter approach, the agencies, with few programs suffering extinction. six-both separately and collectively-reflect a due At the other extreme, the Constitutional re- deference to our Constitutional heritage and an formers contend that the political pressures are awareness that programmatic, political, pressure too great, that the system's responsiveness con- group, as well as a few formal Constitutional fac- tinues to be excessive, and that Constitutional tors have brought the system to its present parlous curbs are needed to foster an environment in state. Each then constitutes a separate attack on a which national decisionmakers more easily can say separate contemporary problem in the system. But "No!" The proposed curbs range from the less dra- they combine to form an overall strategy, since matic, like Constitutional limitations on taxing or they basically are interrelated and interdependent. spending and the changing of the terms of House Action on only one of these fronts will not su£fice members (and sometimes of the President) to the then, but a persistent push on all will go far toward most drastic, which involve the instituting of a achieving a decongested, disciplined, ad- quasi-parliamentary system, the redrawing of ministerable, and accountable system-a worthy state boundaries, and a clarification of state goal for a nation soon to celebrate its Constitu- powers. But most in this school argue for the more tional bicentennial. The focal points of this elemental of the Constitutional changes, since they multifaceted strategy are: (1) programmatic, (2) view the present political and governmental procedural, (3) political, (4) public interest group, systems as reciprocals of one another. Only a total and (5) Constitutional. overhaul of the government then will achieve the The first addresses directly the prime problem changes in both that are necessary to promote identified in this study: the overloading of the in- greater political cohesion and accountability, tergovernmental network. Hence, it insists that a greater administrative effectiveness and rationali- determined federal-state-local effort be mounted ty, greater capacity to plan and anticipate-not to decongest the grant system and to disengage in simply endlessly to react; greater recognition of certain program areas. To achieve this, elements the utility of federalism in a transcontinental na- of both centralization and devolution inevitably tion like ours; and above all, a greater understan- come into play in the functional trade-offs called ding among the American electorate of how, why, for here, even as certain major program areas re- and for whom the governmental system operates. main heavily intergovernmentalized. Opponents of this approach, including this Com- The second basic reform proposal moves beyond mission, argue that full-scale Constitutional review the Commission's earlier recommendations (grant is neither feasible nor desirable, that it departs too consolidation, sunset legislation, and income tax drastically from the American tradition and that indexation) for injecting greater discipline and reforms-short of the whole-scale Constitutional managerial sense into the operations of the na- variety-can do the job. If any of the major Consti- tional government. It goes on then to stipulate ad- tutional reform approaches could muster signifi- ditional ways of achieving these goals, including cant strength, they contend, then the existing sys- fiscal notes for federally mandated costs on state tem already would respond without having to and local governments, the temporary suspension tinker with our basic charter, by the President of difficult-to-implement or unim- Between these two policy extremes stands a re- plementable national policy conditions attached to alistic, but relatively radical school of reform think- grant programs, and regulatory impact analyses. ing to which this Commission now adheres. The third plank in this strategy addresses some of the more obvious defects in our major national sponsibility to the system. Its present enfeebled parties: their weak policy development process, state is largely reflective of our collective adher- the reduced role of their elected officials in party ence to a fairly fanciful concept of.federalism, as conclaves, and the proliferation of Presidential pri- was noted earlier. A psychiatrist might deem it maries. Strengthened parties, the Commission be- symptomatic of the schizophrenic state of the col- lieves, are a necessary counterweight to the persis- lective American mind. On the one hand, there is tent, penetrating, and even paralyzing pressures the pretentiousness of the national government of the growing number of interest groups. concerning itself with nearly every variety of pub- The fourth component in this agenda for the lic and even private service, the illusion that its 1980s centers on the public interest groups and in corporal's guard of grant administrators is au- diverse ways seeks to enhance the "public" and the thoritative and able enough to "run" the pro- system-saving roles they sometimes, but more grams, and the delusion that nationally dictated, often, should assume. The overriding purpose here but interest group sustained, crosscutting policy is to dramatize the fact that the national organiza- goals in three dozen or more areas cumulatively tions representing state and local elected officials have neither a fiscal nor an individual program dis- also have an obligation to help decongest and to torting effect. discipline the system and this now involves a bold Counterposed to these unreal dimensions of our defense of their jurisdictional integrity as well as a current national political behavior are the real di- determined effort to address the critical servicing mensions of present intergovernmental relations. assignment question. Cooperative federalism and There is a Presidency that has neither the time nor its many derivatives, in fact, have become cooptive the authority to organize effective intergovern- federalism, and the public interest groups have mental operations. There is a Congress that can paramount responsibility to help reverse this de- neither oversee nor overlook with impunity 500 structive course. conflicting, largely interest-group-conditioned The Commission's strategy for decongesting and categoricals which represent its chief contribution disciplining the system also recognizes the need for to the system. There is a federal judiciary that has a better public and official understanding of what lost its historic stabilizing rudder in its forays into Constitutionalism and federalism mean in theory nearly every aspect of governmental responsibil- and in practice and for a Presidential convocation ities and individual rights. In the past, much of this of key federal, state, and local officials at the judicial endeavor compensated for the intractabil- earliest feasible opportunity to consider ways and ity of the political process and the political bran- means of eliminating or at least curbing the polit- ches in providing adequate answers to pressing so- ically imposed inflexibilities and the other dysfunc- cial questions, but now the issue is whether the ju- tional features of the current intergovernmental diciary is capable of considering the systemic ef- system. Finally, the Commission calls for a com- fects of its decisions, of reconciling conflicting po- plete clarification of the Constitutional amending sitions reflected in the multiple lines of its opin- process and urges a raising of the state initiating ions, and of recognizing that the protection of indi- option to the same level of dignity and legal cer- vidual rights and claims to equal treatment can on- tainty as the familiar Congressional alternative ly be effectively met in a system where conditional possesses. order is certain and continuing. Decongestion, discipline, and greater manage- Finally, the national parties now do little more rial dependability-these are the hallmarks of this than ratify the results of primaries, pacify pressure ACIR strategy. While to some these may appear to groups, and build platforms that neither further be restorationist-going back to the early 1960s or consensus nor propose real policies. When a geo- late 1950s-the Commission views them as essen- metric increase in the number of interest groups tially futuristic, in the sense that the intergovern- coincides with a series of crypto-democratic re- mental relations of the 1980s will have far greater forms in the nation's political institutions, the his- need of them than the far simpler system of 20 toric function of the parties as basic arbiters of years ago. what are really national issues and concerns is What is more, the Commission views these goals bound to collapse. And this has been the case for and our proposed means of achieving them as es- the past dozen years at least. sential to bringing some greater realism and re- When these elements of reality blend with the unreal, the confusion in roles noted earlier almost President to (1) reexamine federal, state, and inevitably results. Moreover, in terms of servicing, local roles in and contributions to the principal the division of labor that every federal system con- functional areas of public policy, including as- templates is lost. Yet, Presidents are not mayors; sessments of the desirability of fully nationaliz- Congressmen are not county commissioners; and ing some functions while reducing, eliminating judges are not state legislators. Presidents have or forestalling federal involvement in others; (2) three basic concerns if they are to survive elec- assess the interrelationships among the full torally and historically: to conduct a decent foreign range of programs in each policy field; and (3) policy, to help maintain an adequate common consider the possible use of instruments other defense, and to help assure the viability of the nathan grants-in-aid to realize national objec- tional economy. Almost the same may be said of tives.' Congress. All else is secondary, tertiary, or unnec- The Commission also reaffirms its earlier rec- essary. ommendation that the federal government as- Clearly, the system now needs decongestion, dis- sume full financial responsibility for the provi- cipline, and a realistic definition of roles more than sion of Aid to Families With Dependent Child- at any other point in our history. The six recom- ren, Medicaid, and General Assi~tance.~ mendations advanced here, the Commission be- The Commission now recommends further lieves, merit special consideration by policymakers that, in addition to the above, the federal gov- at all levels as well as by the public-at-large. Each ernment move toward the assumption of full fi- in its own way addresses an undeniable defect in nancial responsibiltiy for those existing govern- our increasingly dysfunctional system, When com- mental programs which are aimed at meeting bined, they constitute a grand strategy for ending basic human needs for employment security, the era of fanciful federalism and for beginning a housing assistance, medical benefits, and basic new chapter in the 200-year history of American nutrition.* In assuming full financial responsi- intergovernmental relations. And this new one bility, the federal government should take steps could, should, and must be a chapter wherein our to ensure uniform levels of benefits, adjusted system's much admired historic traits of flexibility, for cost of living variations, and consistent na- functionality, and faith in the essential worth of tionwide administration.* * the American proposition are again dominant. At the same time, separately or in conjunction with efforts to implement the above federal proposals, the Commission recommends that the RECOMMENDATION 1 number of remaining federal assistance pro- Decon esting the grams should be reduced very substantially, Federal 8 rant System through termination, phase-out, and consolidation. As recommended by the Commission pre- The Commission concludes that the federal gov- viously, the most likely candidates for consolida- ernment has overused the grant-in-aid mechanism, tion should be those which are or could be made: sometimes giving the state and local governments (a) closely related in terms of the functional area roles in certain programs that could be handled covered; (b) similar or identical with regard to best by the federal government itself, while at their program objectives; and (c) linked to the other times establishing a federal role in programs same type(s) of recipient governmental jurisdic- better left to state and local governments. In these tion~.~The primary candidates for termination cases, the grant mechanism often unnecessarily complicates the administration of the program, *Representatives of HUD and OMB supported Recommenda- confuses political and program accountability, re- tion 1, except for naming specific programs for full federal duces effectiveness, interferes with economic effi- financial responsibility. ciency, and rarely achieves equity goals. Hence . . . **The question of eligibility for benefits under this fully federal program was debated by the Commission at some length. The Commission agreed that coverage should extend beyond The Commission reiterates and strongly reen- those holding citizenship, but perhaps not as far as to encom- dorses its earlier recommendation that the na- pass illegal aliens. Since this issue was highly complex and beyond the scope of the research undertaken by the staff, the tion's excessively intergovernmentalized system Commission did not adopt precise wording on the subject of be corrected by action of the Congress and the eligibility. and phase-out should include: (a) the approx- amount of federal funds and federal personnel imately 420 small federal categorical grant pro- committed. grams which account for only 10% of all grant As a practical matter, the federal government funds; (b) programs in functional fields in which has taken over policy leadership in virtually every federal aid amounts to approximately 10% or functional field in which it offers aid, despite the less of the combined state and local outlays, in- fact that its funding is predominant only in the including federal aid; (c) programs which do not come maintenance and housing fields. General na- embody essential and statutorily clearly stated tional policies on matters such as civil rights, op- national objectives, or which are too small to ad- portunities for the handicapped, and protection of dress significantly the need to which they re- the environment-to cite only a few of the more late; (d) programs, especially small ones, which than 60 such requirements-are attached to most have high administrative costs relative to the grants, along with each grant's own policy require- federal financial contribution; (e) programs ments. Thus even when a grant is small the na- which obtain-or could obtain-most of their tional policy component is large. For example, the funding from state and/or local governments, or federal government provides only about 10% of fees for service, or which could be shifted to the public primary and secondary education funds in private sector. the nation, but has heavy influence over nearly every public school. The prime problem addressed in this recom- Administratively, federal grants too often frus- mendation is the fact that the national government trate effective and efficient public service by state offers state and local governments nearly 500 sep- and local governments. Some are so narrowly arate grant programs. These range in size from drawn that what needs to be done is ineligible for more than a dozen large multibillion dollar pro- funding. Most bear so much red tape as to waste grams to over four dozen small programs of less time and resources which should be spent on pro- than $1million each. (See Appendix Table A-1.) gram objectives. Many are spread so thinly and It is estimated that approximately 63,000 of the targeted so poorly that they do not meet their ob- nation's 80,000 state and local governments re- jectives, or meet them only marginally. cieve one or more such grants. Many states and Political accountability often is confused when large local governments receive so many different program dollars, policymaking, and administration federal grants that they have hired specialists sim- are shared so widely. Under these conditions, no ply to apply for them and keep required records. one is sure exactly who should be held responsible Grantsmanship has become a recognized profes- when the aid program falters. In fact no single sion. Many private consultants make a living at it. body or official can be tagged or expected to rem- Federal grant programs are available for a very edy the difficulty single-handedly. wide range of activities. They encompass such In short, a condition of overload has arisen from: broad fields as agriculture, community and eco- (1) the seemingly endless proliferation of aid pro- nomic development, education, employment and grams into areas wholly national (like social wel- training, fire safety, food and nutrition, health, fare programs) or wholly local or even private, as housing, law enforcement, occupational safety, so- well as into activities that legitimately are of an in- cial services, transportation, and welfare. Many of tergovernmental nature; (2) the expansion of elig- these fields are the traditional provinces of state ibility to reach directly almost all of the categories and local governments. Federal entry has occurred of subnational governmental activity; (3) the ad- primarily in recent decades. Now, the federal gov- vent of more conditions and more national policy ernment is simply into everything. requirements; (4) the mounting difficulty of any Although federal grants are, as a legal matter, level or unit within a level to keep track of, not to voluntarily accepted by state and local govern- mention oversee, the system; and (5) the public's ments, the practical reality is that many jurisdic- growing disenchantment with a system that seems tions must have the federal funds to make ends out of control. meet. This necessity for state and local participa- This overloading of the federal grant system, as tion in the federal aid system has been used by the documented more fully throughout the Commis- government to multiply the effects of its policies sion's series of reports on The Federal Role in the throughout the nation far out of proportion to the Federal SysW, is undeniable. Over the past two decades, particularly, the system has grown almost governments; and (7) the heavily political setting in without limits, adding more programs in more which many of these grants operate. functional areas, more dollars and greater state- Some feel that these difficulties can be corrected local reliance on federal financing, and more fed- by strengthening the processes in Congress and eral policy guidance on top of state and local pol- the executive branch that bear directly on the en- icies. This growth is responsible for the burgeoning actment and reenactment of grant programs and amounts of red tape, along with the substantial regulations. Others focus on the need for a strong, confusion of goals, responsibilities, and account- pervasive, persistent, and popularly as well as ability at both the political and administrative public interest group supported drive for grant levels, noted above. consolidations. A third group argues strongly that Of course, there is much on the positive side as incremental procedures and even grant mergers well. Federal grant programs have created many are inadequate and calls for a dramatic deconges- common efforts to meet the needs of the nation tion of the intergovernmental arena. In this and the diverse jurisdictions within it through the group's view, the functional assignment pattern involvement of the federal, state, and local govern- has become almost totally botched up by the fed- ments-as well as other recipients-working to- eral aid system and some sorting out of programs gether. While the results are imperfect, many and activities is mandatory if any semblance of an national needs are being met this way. These pro- authoritative, sensible system, with the national as grams often provide desperately needed funds to well as state and local governments having some the state and local governments. They also have genuine discretion, is to be resurrected. In effect, the potential of giving state and local governments the Commission adheres to all these positions, and their elected officials a significant voice in de- though it believes that all, not merely one, of these termining how national goals are to be achieved approaches is now necessary. within their jurisdictional boundaries; they can To still other observers, the forces which have help to keep the federal bureaucracy from grow- created the present federal aid system seem irre- ing; they can help to keep program administrators versible. Increasingly, the nation's economy, sense close to the people being served; they can help to of community, and debates on public policy issues maintain at least some degree of political account- have been coalescing at the national level, they ability at the jurisdictional level where services are contend. Airplanes, the national press, television, being delivered; they have in some instances mass marketing, influential books, the ascendancy helped equalize individual and economic opportun- of national interest groups of all types, plus other ities across diverse jurisdictional boundaries technological and social factors, they feel, are uni- throughout the nation; and they can help to en- fying the nation and pushing increasing numbers hance state and local governmental capabilities. of public policy issues to the national level where they receive greater attention. This attention Yet, many of the present federal grant programs comes from the national media, entrepreneurial do not achieve these potentials. The reasons are members of Congress, national interest groups, numerous, including: (1) the existence of too many and the national administration which is backed up separate federal grant programs, often too nar- by a professional and well paid bureaucracy. This rowly drawn, and burdened with excessive paper- array of potential support for national programs, work requirements; (2) vague legislative objectives they point out, often is more effective than that supplemented by overly restrictive federal admin- found at the state or local levels. It is not likely, istrative regulations and judgments; (3) funding then, in the view of these observers, that the grant levels unequal to meeting stated objectives; (4) con- system could be made less pervasive. Perhaps its fusion of roles and responsibilities among program growth may be slowed somewhat, as the new fed- administrative units at the various levels involved; eral fiscal constraints now on the horizon become (5) inadequate management capability at all levels stronger and as the potential range of federal aid to meet the unusually demanding circumstances fields is filled, but actual decreases in the range of and unique styles of intergovernmental adminis- program concerns would not be expected. tration; (6) inadequate allowance for different Middle range reformers, and the Commission modes of administering programs which vary numbers itself among them, are less pessimistic greatly by size, powers, and structures of aided about change. They claim that real opportunities for improving the grant system can be expected in for various reforms of the federal grant system, it the realms of program simplification, consolida- now concludes that even more all-inclusive action tion, and sorting out. These would reduce some of is needed in the 1980s. This recommendation, the administrative burdens now associated with therefore, calls for a reduction in the grant system federal grants, allow greater policy discretion to be overload through federal assumption of full re- exercised by state and local grant recipients, and sponsibility for certain programs along with full strengthen accountability at all levels. devolution of responsibility to state and local gov- While stressing better systemic processes and ernments for other programs. grant consolidations, they feel that more is needed. Before examining this new policy more closely, it The systems' improvement and consolidationist is instructive to review previous ACIR recommen- approaches alone, even with a heavy dose of dations concerning federal grant reforms, as well federal consultation with grant recipients, they as related recommendations from other sources. assert, will not be enough to convert the present As long ago as 1961, ACIR found evidence that va- array of grants into a smoothly functioning, rious federal aid projects in metropolitan areas manageable system of federal aid. They propose, were being approved without proper coordination, therefore, a major reassignment of functions in and that most grant programs, once enacted, were which the federal government would take full not subject to adequate review and modification or responsibility for certain functions now aided (like termination in accordance with current national welfare, medical benefits, and other social in- needs. Based upon these findings, the Commission surance programs), while eliminating the federal recommended the use of metropolitan planning role and aid in a range of petty grants where the agencies to review and comment upon federal aid federal contribution is minor, in those programs applications for a variety of physical facilities where the administrative costs are dispropor- grants in metropolitan areas,1° and the enactment tionately high, andlor in those that are funded at by Congress of a general statute providing for the low levels. Such actions not only would reduce the periodic review of federal grant programs.ll Three scope of the federal aid, but might also substantial- years later, the Commission found that federal aid ly increase the size of the federal budget and bu- to urban areas was still not coordinated, so it reaucracy, as beneficiary payments are brought up adopted another recommendation calling for a to equitable and reasonable levels and as federal unified federal urban development policy and "administration" becomes something more than federal aid coordination procedures in accordance check-writing. At the same time, state and local therewith. l2 bureaucracies could be reduced. Moreover, the ACIR's first comprehensive evaluation of the funds freed up at the state and local levels would be federal grant system occurred in 1967 and pro- available for the range of activities now aided by duced a series of recommendations calling for a re- hundreds of project and small formula grants. On duction of the number of federal grant programs balance, proponents of such functional trade-offs by at least half through the consolidation of narrow believe that the grant system and the nation would categorical grant programs into broader block be well served by such a decongesting strategy. grants (beginning with vocational education and Despite these differing views about what is re- programs for water and sewer facilities), passage alistic and what is necessary, the present overload of a new general support grant for state and local on the grant system is a major concern. ACIR governments without federal strings attached began to recognize some significant difficulties in (what is now known as the General Revenue Shar- the grant system as early as 1961 (shortly after the ing Program), enactment of joint funding simplifi- Commission was created), then focused on them in cation, standardized matching ratios, apportion- a major way in 1967, and returned to them again in ment formulas, and planning requirements, simpli- the latter part of the 1970s. Now, the Commission fied auditing, and coordinated administration of is addressing the grant system's increasing grant programs within the federal establishment.ls overload once again. In two succeeding reports, ACIR recommended ACIR is not alone in addressing this problem, but specific allocations of certain fiscal and functional this is a problem which will not be solved easily, responsibilities among the levels of government. A even with attention from many quarters. While the 1969 report called for the national government to Commission stands by its earlier recommendations assume full financial responsibility for public assistance (including general assistance and Medi- set of recommendations into a fivefold strategy for caid) while the states were called upon to assume improving the present federal aid system through substantially all responsibility for financing educa- simplification, consolidation, sensible conditioning, tion.14 In 1972, the Commission concluded that effective evaluation, and reallocation of roles.19 local property tax relief and equalization of school ACIR is not alone, by any means, in its concern finances among school districts within the states about the burdens which the federal aid system should remain state responsibilities, and that an (and even broader activities of the federal govern- expanded federal role in these areas was neither ment) place upon the nation's federal system of necessary nor desirable.16 government. Then, in 1977-ten years after its first compre- Recent years have been filled with concerns for hensive evaluation of the federal grant system- these burdens expressed by many other quarters. the Commission returned to this broad topic with a For example, legislation was passed in late 1974 new 14-volumestudy. That study reemphasized the (P.L. 95-556) to establish the Commission on Fed- need for reducing the now much larger number of eral Paperwork, and that commission began pub categorical grant programs by at least half by lishing its three dozen reports in mid-1976. The last means of consolidation, and expanded the list of of its reports was issued in October 1977.20In ad. potential mergers from the original two program dition, the Commerce Department issued a Jan* , areas (vocational education and facilities for water uary 1977 report urging regulatory reform;a1 the and sewage) to 24 program areas encompassing Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs work- 170 programs.16 The Commission also reformu- ed throughout 1977 and 1978 and issued a series of lated its earlier periodic review recommendation reports on the same and Herbert Kauf- into support for current sunset proposals, and ad- man at the Brookings Institution published a major dressed several other needs for facilitating and report on the reduction of paperwork in June simplifying the administration of grant programs, 1977.2s Furthermore, the Federal Grant and including the standardization, simplification, and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977 produced a reevaluation of the appropriateness of a growing report from OMB in March 1980 geared toward set of national policy requirements now having streamlining the federal aid system.24 At about general applicability within the federal grant sys- the same time, GAO prepared a report summariz- tem.17 This same study also focused considerable ing nearly a decade of its research on intergovern- attention on, and made several recommendations mental relations and federal aid.26 These reports concerning, the need to enhance general manage- struck many similar themes concerning simplifica- ment capabilities and structures within the federal tion, consultation, and consolidation-building to a government for interprogram and intergovern- crescendo in 1979-80 when Congress began to mental coordination, both at the headquarters focus on the need for administrative and regula- level and in the field. tory reform and when some began to label it "The These recommendations urged, among other Oversight Congres~."~~ things, strengthening and better use of the following mechanisms for such coordination: the execu- While the regulatory reform reports go beyond tive office of the President, the federal regional this discussion of the grant system, they also evi- councils, interprogram grants management offices dence parallel concerns about the burdens and in each major department and agency, interagency overloads resulting in part from excessive inter- agreements, interagency committees, and the A- governmentalization in that sector of activity as 95 federal aid review and comment clearinghouses well. Some of the resulting legislative proposals for at each level of government, including the federal regulatory reform would apply to administrative level.18 Finally, the 1977 study, in its concluding rulemaking in grant programs as well as to the ac- volume, added a recommendation calling for tivities of the independent regulatory commissions "reexamination of federal, state, and local roles in and agencies. and contributions to the principal functional areas Of more direct relevance to the federal aid sys- of public policy, including assessments of the desir- tem are the several hundred recommendations of ability of fully nationalizing soke functions while the Paperwork Commission aimed at reducing the reducing, eliminating or forestalling federal in- amount of paperwork required by federal aid activ- volvement in others . . ." and crystalized the full ities (as well as activities resulting from federal regulations, federal taxes, federal surveys and re- shrinking the government, (2) devolving -federal search, and other sources). To summarize very policy, (3) concentrating authority, and (4) manipu- briefly, the Paperwork Commission urged that top lating pecuniary incentives. Here is what he says policy officials throughout the federal government about them: direct their attention to paperwork problems, us- The first two attribute red tape primari- ing a new "service management" philosophy to ly to the size of the federal government evaluate the various means of achieving public pol- and recommend drastic reductions in icy while minimizing their paperwork impact on federal activities, either by simple the federal government itself, as well as on state withdrawal of many kinds of services and and local governments, businesses, and the public- cessation of many forms of regulation or at-large. It suggested the use of paperwork impact by a transfer of functions to state and local assessments, both when legislative and administra- governments, which are at least smaller tive proposals were being formulated, and at such than their federal counterpart and are said times as existing laws and regulations may be re- by some of their champions to be "closer to viewed under sunset provisions. the people." The third ascribes red tape The goals would be to simplify and consolidate largely to the autonomy of departments federal programs, requirements, and reporting and bureaus in the executive branch and procedures at every opportunity, and to reorganize urges stronger central controls as a way of the government when that would help to reduce offsetting the chaos and confusion pro- paperwork burdens. A "Department of Adminis- duced by the multitude of free-wheeling tration" was recommended to group together a units. The fourth attempts to avoid the ex- wide variety of information-gathering and data tremes by using government authority in a management activities so that the concept of new way-to provide incentives to private "managing information as a resource" could be en- interests to do what the government wants hanced throughout the government. This would instead of employing regulation or gov- entail coordinating federal requests for informa- ernment operation for this end.30 tion, sharing available information, indexing such information for easy reference, using plain En- According to Kaufman, the advocates of these glish, and so on. Finally, public participation was strategies put much more faith in them than is just- called for in this process to help assure that these ified by experience. He believes that the quantity goals would retain the vitality brought by inter- of red tape will continue to grow.31 ested outside parties. Kaufman, then, expects to see no panaceas in reducing red tape. Instead, he believes that there will Following publication of the Paperwork Commis- always be red tape and the best that can be done is sion's reports, and in accordance with the legisla- to keep it "under control and endurable." He ex- tion establishing the commission, OMB established pects moderate relief from the worst abuses to a followup process designed to promote and mon- come through the normal political process, as itor action on the recommendations. OMB has is- "pointed demands for specific actions" develop at sued three semi-annual progress reports, and a particular pressure points. He also sees increased final (fourth) report is due in 1980. The third casework by the members of Congress as a signifi- claimed considerable success in implementing cant means of helping individual constituents deal commission re~ommendations,~~and the Presi- with Washington's complexities, and sees hope dent issued an executive order in November 1979 that the recently established Federal Information to expand and accelerate the paperwork reduction Centers of the General Services Administration effort.28 Nevertheless, GAO has found the pro- (GSA) and other ombudsman-like organizations cess to be less effective than claimed and has called will help citizens to find their way through the fed- for stronger leadership in the executive branch and eral maze. Eventually, he sees the possibility that additional legislation to spur effective foll~w-up.~~ automation may help to reduce red tape by trans- Kaufrnan's report on red tape, like the Paper- ferring and combining records on individuals and work Commission's report, summarizes and as- businesses, rather than requiring such information sesses a broad range of proposals for reducing the to be resubmitted over and over again. But, even burdens of federal activities. These include (1) here, he is not sure, because of the resistance based upon the fears that privacy may be invaded and and local government^.^^ Its three major successes government may become too all-powerful. So, in this regard were enactment of the General Rev- Kaufman sees red tape as something to be chipped enue Sharing (GRS) Program, the Comprehensive away at continuously, with little hope of ever Employment and Training Act, and the Commun- achieving final victory over it. ity Development Block Grant Program. The Comptroller General's 1979 summary of its Though not completely devoid of red tape, the recent reports on intergovernmental policies em- GRS program has considerably less than any other phasized the needs for standardizing and simplify- federal grant program. All states and virtually all ing federal aid administration, improving coordi- general purpose local governments receive funds nation among programs, consolidating programs, under this program without even submitting appli- and using proper types of grants in appropriate sit- cation~.~~These funds are subject to considerably uations. In looking to the future, this report noted fewer federal policy requirements than those the tendencies for increasing numbers of complex which apply to other grants, and carry relatively problems to be laid at the federal government's modest administrative reporting requirements. doorstep, while the short-term forecast for federal The receiving governments also have virtually un- aid indicates a substantial slowing in the growth of limited discretion concerning the purposes for funds. These trends, GAO expects, will "generate which the funds may be spent. Since 1972, when much intergovernmental conflict . . ." as an ex- the program was enacted, it has become the favor- pression of "a functional tension between the in- ite of governors, county officials, and mayors who creasing mutual interdependence among all levels openly state that if federal grants must be cut, of government and the desire of each level to pre- those cuts should be made in other programs.37 serve its own autonomy and political preroga- The block grants created in the fields of employ- tive~."~~ ment and training (1973) and community develop- The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement ment (1974) each consolidated a number of preex- Act of 19r7 (P.L. 95-224) required still another ma- isting categorical programs and thus offered their jor study of issues concerning the management of recipient local governments substantially more dis- federal assistance programs. OMB responded with cretion in the use of funds. While neither program a massive set of working papers in August 1979, is nearly as free of red tape as GRS, both were sig- which it circulated for review and comment,33and nificant improvements over their former cate- a final report in March 1980.34The purpose of this gorical programs in this re~pect.~8 study was to help resolve a broad range of issues Thus, it was demonstrated that the form of fed- relating to the management of federal aid, and to eral grant programs can affect both the amount of help establish a streamlined management system red tape and the degree of policy discretion refor implementing the various types of federal assis- tained by the grant recipients. More traditional tance programs. The final report lists a large num- "procedural" efforts in the Nixon years produced ber of actions being taken by the executive branch reductions in processing time and the size of appli- in this direction and calls upon Congress for addi- cations in some 80 federal aid programs, and tional legislation to spur those efforts. Emphasis is standardization of a wide range of administrative placed upon the consolidation of grant programs requirement^.^^ and reducing the burdens of generally applicable In 1974, the Ford Administration introduced by policy and administrative requirements in the fed- executive order, a requirement for inflation impact eral aid system. statements to accompany Administration program These major studies, cited above, add up to a proposals deemed to have significant economic ef- "conventional wisdom" that chipping away at fects. This requirement was interpreted from the grant reforms little-by-little is the best way to pro- beginning to apply to major regulatory activities, ceed. Indeed, there were various efforts in this di- and led the Council on Wage and Price Stability to rection undertaken during the 1970s. Some were apply benefit-cost analyses to themS4OWhile such "structural," while most were "procedural". analyses have not produced startling changes in Among the former was the policy of the Nixon Ad- the operation of federal regulatory agencies, they ministration's New Federalism of returning some have become useful in appraising the performance of the powers which the federal government had of regulatory agencies, and have spurred these been exercising in domestic programs to the state agencies to acquire the skills of economic analysis and to begin applying such skills in their decision- sued by President Carter in March 1978. This one making processes.41 was an executive order on the topic of regulatory The Carter Administration also actively address- reform (including administrative rulemaking for ed the need to reduce burdens imposed by federal federal aid programs). It requires the agencies to: grants. In July 1977, the President issued a memo- analyze the costs and benefits of major randum to the heads of all departments and proposed regulations and provide good agencies directing them to review all of the plan- reasons if they choose options other ning requirements attached to federal aid pro- than the least expensive; grams, with a view toward eliminating, consolidating, or simpllfylng them wherever possible. OMB ensure that their top officials supervise was assigned the task of coordinating this effort, the regualtion-writing process; and produced a report in October 1977 containing provide increased opportunity for pub- an inventory of the planning requirements for over lic participation in the process; 150 federal programs administered by 16 federal regularly review existing regulations agencies and accounting for more than $60 billion and weed out those that are outdated; in the FY 1976 budget.42 This report also ident- and ified present and potential efforts by federal agen- write their regulations in plain En- cies to respond to the President's objectives. OMB gli~h.~~ has followed up on this effort, at the President's direction, and seems to have settled into a fairly This executive order supersedes and restates long-range process which has begun to produce President Ford's order requiring inflation impact some results. In March 1979, OMB released a pro- statements. On September 15,1979, OMB reportd gress report enumerating improvements in plan- to President Carter that some progress had been ning requirements in the Departments of Agricul- made toward compliance with this new executive ture; Health, Education, and Welfare; Interior; order, but that much still remained to be done. and Justice; as well as the Environmental Protec- In 1979-80, a number of bills were being con- tion Agency and the Appalachian Regional Com- sidered by the 96th Congress which would estab- mission.43 lish processes for sunset review of most federal In September 1977, just two months after the programs (includingfederal aid, federal regulatory planning requirements memorandum, President activities, and others), reform federal regulatory Carter issued another memorandum to the heads and rulemaking activities (which would put a statu- of executive departments and agencies calling for tory basis behind President Carter's executive reductions in federal red tape for state and local order and might go even further), and reform the grant recipients, with particular attention to appli- federal aid system (by encouraging the consolida- cation and reporting requirements, procedures for tion of existing narrow categorical programs into making grant payments, and necessary revisions larger block grants, combining and simpllfymg of regulations. This time, the White House itself, in numerous generally applicable federal aid require- cooperation with ACIR, monitored the results. ments for easier administration and more uniform One year later, the White House reported a compliance, and using other means). number of identifiable achievements and pledged It is clear from these activities that both the Con- continuing efforts along these lines,44 though gress and the executive branch recognize the need ACIR found sufficient evidence of deficiencies to to reduce burdens imposed on others by the federal formally recommend: (1) reissuance of the government, and to make the far-flung federal es- memorandum as a strengthened executive order, tablishment more manageable. This includes re- (2) an improved consultation mechanism for state form of the federal aid system, where some pro- and local government involvement in federal gress is being made. rulemaking, (3) easier certification of compliance Nevertheless, the record also shows very clearly with federal policies in the process of applying for that net increases in the number of grant pro- federal aid, and (4) advance appropriations for grams continue (amounting to about 50 from 1975 federal aid to help ensure adequate program plann- through 1978), and that new policy initiatives con- ing and ~ontinuity.~~ tinue to move the management of grant programs Still another directive of a similar nature was is- into increasingly greater complexities buttressed by multiplying pages of formal rules and regula- for certain other programs to the state and local tions. Grant consolidations have not become a governments or the private sector. large factor. While there have been a few small There are a wide variety of specific "trade-off' ones from time to time, there are still only three packages that would be consistent with the Com- major ones: Partnership for Health initiated in mission's general policy recommendation. Here, 1966, Comprehensive Employment and Training purely for illustrative purposes, we offer a tenta- initiated in 1973, and Housing and Community De- tive proposal based upon the assumption that the velopment initiated in 1974. financing of nationally assumed responsibilities Several major proposals by President Nixon (in would approximately equal the financing responsi- the fields of education, law enforcement, rural de- bilities turned back to the state and local govern- velopment, and tran~portation)~~and by President ments, so that the total revenue needs of the Ford (in the fields of health care, education, and various levels of government remain substantially child nutrition) failed in Congres~.~~Consolidation unchanged. This might well be unrealistic. Our proposals advanced by the Carter Administration primary goal, however, is to unburden the federal (for FY 1981) encompass only four relatively aid system and the political processes that sustain modest sets of programs, two of these are to be ac- it, rather than to alter substantially present rev- complished administratively. The four proposals enue structures. are: (1) legislative consolidation of three experi- The net effect of this decongesting recommenda- mental youth employment programs; (2) legislative tion, along with older recommendations for simpli- consolidation of three vocational rehabilitation fication and consolidation, is depicted schematic- programs, combining them with a previous consoli- ally in Chart 2. The important points highlighted in dation; (3) administrative consolidation of five fish this chart are: and wildlife management programs; and; (4) ad- Terminated or phased out federal aid pro- ministrative consolidation of an unspecified num- grams may cease to exist if they are not as- ber of health planning requirements (including at least 11 state health plans) and some health service sumed by state and local governments. grant programs.49Thus, the grant reform achieve- Some existing federal aid programs might ments actually realized to date have been insuffi- be partially terminated through some form cient to produce a net streamlining of the federal of cutback in their scope. Some of these aid system. The enactment of new programs has cutbacks would be picked up by the state and local governments, while others might outrun the consolidation and oversight- -processes so heavily relied upon in these various efforts. not be. In this recommendation, the Commission Of those federal aid programs retained stresses full national responsibilty for certain pro- completely, most would be consolidated grams combined with devolution to the state and and simplified, while a few might remain local levels or the private sector of responsibilities essentially unchanged. for others. This "trade-off" is advised as a major Table 3 shows census figures for governmental method of decongesting the federal grant system. expenditures in 11 major functions, broken. down At the same time, it is meant neither to detract by their federal and state-local shares. The federal from nor to decrease the effort that must be share of total expenditures is large for the func- mounted to simplify and consolidate the remaining tions of airports (7790), housing and urban renewal grant programs. (88%), natural resources (go%), public welfare The new features of this recommendation are: (1) (67%), and social insurance (9490). In this tabulation, a bolder approach to the federal assumption of cer- public welfare includes medicaid, food stamps, and tain responsibilities (potentially expanding beyond s?cial services as well as the more traditional com- welfare and medicaid to encompass related human ponents of aid to families with dependent children needs for jobs, housing, and basic nutrition); (2) a and general assistance. Broad program areas in serious attempt to establish uniform administra- which the total federal share is small to moderate tion consistent with the national responsibiltiy (in- include education (16.5%), fire protection (less cluding the possibility that this might mean direct than 1110 of I%), highways (2690),health and hos- administration by federal employees in at least pitals (3290),libraries (10.390), and police and cor- some cases); and (3) returning full responsibility rections (10.5%). Chart 2 STRATEGY FOR DECONGESTING THE FEDERAL GRANT SYSTEM

Existing Federal Aid Programs

I ' Programs in Which the Retained Federally Terminated or Scope is Federal Assumed Phased Out Cut Back Aid Programs Programs (partial Programs termination)

Programs Portions of , Programs Assumed Programs Which are by State Assumed by Consolidated and Local State and Local sndlor Governments or Governments or Simplified Private Sector Private Sector i

Programs Portions of Which Programs Programs - Cease Which Retained to Cease to "As Is" Exist Exist

Portions of Aid Programs Retained Table 3 GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURES FROM GENERAL FUNDS, SELECTED FUNCTIONS, BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT, 1977 (millions of dollars)

Total Federal Federal Level of Government Expenditures lntergovernmental as Percent Funds as Percent of of All State- Government State- Functions All Federal Local Expenditures All Local Airports Direct lntergovernmental Education Direct lntergovernmental Fire Protection Direct lntergovernmental Highways Direct lntergovernmental Health and Hospitals Direct lntergovernmental Housing and Urban Renewal Direct lntergovernmental Libraries Direct lntergovernmental Natural Resources Direct lntergovernmental Police and Corrections Direct lntergovernmental Public Welfare Direct lntergovernmental Social Insurance Administration Direct

lnteraovernmentalw ,- -- 39.0 87.2 SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances in 1977-78, and Compendium of Government Finances: 1977Census of Governments, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. Table 4 more pointedly summarizes the intergovernmental aspects of program financing. It shows that the federal aid shares of state and local expenditures aggregate more than 50% in three programs: housing and urban renewal (go%), public welfare (53.2%), and social insurance (87.2%). The federal aid share is moderate in another three programs: airports (44%), highways (25%), and natural resources (38.5%) and it is small in five program areas: education (10.5%),60 fire protection (0.08%), health and hospitals (11%), libraries (7.6%), and police and corrections (3.4%). Thus, based upon the principle that program areas already heavily funded by the federal government should be prime candidates for full federal funding, housing, welfare, and social insurance programs come to the fore. Conversely, those programs with a small federal share appear to be the most likely candidates for termination or phasing out of the federal aid role: namely, education, fire protection, public health and hospitals, libraries, and police and corrections. Programs in the middle range- airports (44%), natural resources (38.5%), and highways (25%)-might remain intergovernmental, or might be separated into federal and state- local portions not involving federal aid. This approach to sorting out the federal and state-local roles for major governmental functions clearly produces only a very rough first cut. The published census data do not allow fine break- downs so that individual federal aid programs can be examined in their full intergovernmental financial context. Moreover, criteria other than financial contributions may be critical to final determin- ations about full federal assumption of responsibilities or devolution to the state and local governments. It should be pointed out, however, that those programs already possessing a large federal share are ones which ultimately assist individuals primarily, rather than state and local governments. They chiefly include income redistribution programs in which equitable treatment is a prime factor, and uniform nationwide benefit levels (adjusted for cost of living variations) would be especially important. Also, considering the high mobility of people and jobs, and the increasingly close linkage between these income redistribution programs and work incentives, it is important that nationwide standards be applied so that individual state and local variations in such programs will not impede mobility. Thus, it is recommended that those programs - which provide for the basic human needs of income dollar benefits to individuals, working toward a security, employment security, housing, medical "whole person," one-stop basis. But, with its em- attention, and basic nutrition be assumed with full phasis on dollar benefits (including food stamps, financial responsibility by the federal government medical reimbursements, and rent payments, as under conditions which provide for consistent na- well as welfare checks), this consolidation almost tionwide administration and uniform levels of certainly would not encompass the social services benefits throughout the nation, adjusted for cost of staffs found in the state and local government and living variations. Some "leveling up" of benefits private agencies. undoubtedly would be necessary in establishing na- Chances for success in trade-offs would be opti- tionwide equity, although the cost of living adjust- mized, some contend, if the aggregate amount of ments would help to offset some of the aggregate funds on both sides are roughly equal and if it is dollar growth in these programs from that source. likely that many of the subnational units will ac- Full federal financing is envisioned to bring bene- tually assume the terminated federal aid pro- fits for all individuals up to an adequate national grams. Those programs already listed for federal standard, and not as a case of federal preemptions assumption are the ones least likely to be assumed which would prohibit state or local governments by the state and local governments because of their from meeting unanticipated needs which might high cost and their controversial nature. On the arise beyond the reach of the uniform national pro- other hand, the fact that the state and local gov- gram. ernments and some private agencies already pro- It is a highly complex matter to determine vide the bulk of the funds for education, fire pro- whether direct administration of these programs tection, health and hospitals, libraries, and police by federal employees would provide the best likeli- and corrections makes it likely that they might pick hood of consistent nationwide administration. The up extra responsibilities in these fields using funds Commission did not have enough information to released by the full federal assumptions. In addi- take a position on this. Greater nationwide consis- tion, with extra funds available, they also might as- tency could be sought by continuing the traditional sume added responsibilities in the fields of natural state and local administration of such programs resources and airports. Both of them could be under stricter administration guidance by the funded to a somewhat larger degree by fees for responsible federal agencies. On the other hand, services collected at the point of use and the need with little state and local money already in these for both is relatively noncontroversial. programs, and this recommendation calling for Based upon this reasoning, Table 5 presents a none, incentives for efficiency by state and local very rough illustrative calculation of the aggregate administrators would be weak. And case studies of national financial implications of certain potential wholly federally paid portions of subnational trade-offs. bureaucracies provide some stark examples of un- While still unbalanced by about $2.5 billion, with responsiveness and inefficiency. At the same time, the federal government picking up the extra under the federal government already has significant this very rough scenario, more precise calculations networks of field offices for most of these pro- than we were able to make undoubtedly could grams. For example, the Social Security Adminis- bring this balance closer. For example, the pub- tration has district and branch offices and a series lished census figures for public welfare include of teleservice centers blanketing the nation. HUD some social services, which would be left in the fed- has a network of 77 area and FHA insuring offices. eral aid system rather than being assumed fully by The U.S. Employment Service is affiliated with the federal government. This would reduce the fed- 2,500 local offices run by the state employment eral side of the ledger by a substantial, though services and employing approximately 111,000 presently indeterminate, amount. On the other workers who are paid mostly with federal funds. hand, it is likely that not all education programs The Farmers Home Administration has a network would be turned back to the state and local govern- of county and multicounty offices involved in hous- ments. Excluded from this devolution might be ing loans and mortgage guarantees. Upon this certain highly specific benefits for special groups base, a consolidated network of federal benefits of- or special purposes (perhaps related to federal fices could be constructed and it would have the mandates) such as the handicapped, especially dis- potential for integrating the whole array of federal advantaged minorities, and the elimination of sex Table 5 FUNDING OF FEDERAL AID PROGRAMS INVOLVED IN ROUGH TRADE OFF PROPOSALS (in millions of dollars)

Federal Assumption of State-Local Assumption of State-Local Costs Present Federal Aid Funding

Public Welfare $17,628 Education Medicaid, Libraries Social Services Fire Protection Food Stamps, Police and etc. Corrections Social lnsurance 226* (criminal justice) (including unemploy- Health and ment insurance and Hospitals workmen's compensation) Natural Resources Housing 730 Airports TOTAL $18,584

--- 15,994 TOTAL Net Federal Extra Cost $ 29590 'These are general fund expenditures. They exclude trust SOURCE: Table 3. fund expenditures supported by payroll taxes.

Table 6 NUMBER OF FEDERAL AID PROGRAMS INVOLVED IN THE ROUGH TRADE- OFF PROPOSALS

Federal Assumptions StatelLocal Assumptions Public Assistance 24 Education including Medicaid 1 Libraries and Food Assistance 14 Fire Protection Social Insurance 2 Police and Corrections Housing 6 Health and Hospitals Natural Resources TOTAL 47 Airports

TOTAL Totals Programs Federally Assummed 47 Programs Developed to the State and Local Governments 185 Grand Total 232

SOURCE: Table 7. Table 7 FEDERAL AID PROGRAM CLUSTERS RANKED BY AMOUNT OF FUNDING. FY 1980 FY 1980 Cluster Number of Cluster Name Funding Rank Programs and Subcluster Detail* (in thousands) Housing Medical (57) Assistance (45) Research Employment and Training Transportation (6) Highways (5) Transit (2) Airports (10) Other Food and Nutrition Public Assistance Education (31) Elementary and Secondary (17) Adult and Higher Education (13) Vocational Education (10) Research (6) Other General Revenue Sharing Environmental Protection (1 7) Water (16) Other Development (9) Community (29) Economic (3) Rural Natural Resources Conservation and Development Vocational Rehabilitation Criminal Justice Economic Opportunity Civil Preparedness Arts and Humanities Occupational Safety and Health Volunteer Services Libraries Energy Fire Protection Miscellaneous - TOTALS $1 16,227,656* * *Subcluster details are numbers of programs in parentheses and FY 1980 funding expressed in thousands of dollars of estimated obligations. "This figure is largerthan the usually cited figureof $88.9 billion for FY 1980 federal grants because it includes aslight- ly broader list of programs. SOURCE: Office of Management and Budget, 1979 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1979; and AClR staff. See AppendixTable A-2 for detailed list of programs in each cluster. discrimination in athletics. Also excluded might be their financial size. It is important to note that only certain educational research activities best spon- ten of the 473 programs fall into the miscellaneous sored at the national level. More precise considera- cluster. All the rest are subsumed, in one way or tions such as these would be essential in developing another, under a broader purpose and related to a workable package of trade-offs. other aid programs. Thus, some might be as likely The Commission also realizes that another requi- candidates for consolidation as for termination. site to viable trade-offs is designing the proposals Still, some undoubtedly could be terminated on the so that the net financial effects on the various basis of making only a minor contribution to the states and localities are not negative. The neces- larger purpose or being obsolete, or of having little sary disaggregated calculations, of course, will be or no positive effects. By the same token, not all of highly complex and delicate, but in today's finan- the miscellaneous programs are likely candidates cial cut-back situation, it will be important to mini- for termination, even though all of them are mize net losses to as many as possible of the juris- small-the largest being only about $57 million. dictions, including the federal government. The For example, among these small miscellaneous states might well assist in balancing needs and re- grants are the Army National Guard, research by sources among their local jurisdictions as the the Food and Drug Administration, and the ap- trade-offs occur. A substantial over-assumption of plied science and research program of the National financial responsibilities at the national level, Science Foundation. which might have been used in earlier years to ease Table 8 lists the program clusters in order of the this decongestion by trade-off proposal, appears to average funding per program within the cluster. be quite unlikely at the present time. Clusters which are roughly equivalent to the feder- The inability to meet this jurisdictional balance al assumption/state-local devolution trade-off illus- criterion was one of the main reasons why the tration are marked by an asterisk in this table, Joint Federal-State Action Committee failed in its since further consideration for termination or con- attempts in the late 1950s to turn some programs solidation would not be needed. In general, the and equivalent revenue sources back to the state smaller the average program size within the re- and local governments. maining clusters, the more likely that consolidation Putting aside these concerns for the moment, would be appropriate. however, Table 6 shows an approximate number of Another way to examine the clusters is to calcu- federal aid programs which could be eliminated by late a program fragmentation index based on a the rough trade-offs proposed in Table 5. The composite of the small funding and large number grand total of 232 programs is nearly one-half of of programs within the clusters. This calculation the total 473 grant programs included in the 1979 (the cluster's percentage of all programs divided edition of the Catalogue of Federal Domestic As- by its percentage of all aid funds) makes it easier to sistance. (These 473 programs, listed by magnitude see which program clusters are less and which are in Appendix Table A-1 and grouped by subject in more fragmented. The values for this index are Appendix Table A-2, are those which currently pro- shown in Table 9. Opportunities for consolidation vide grants, research contracts, or payments to in- and simplification should not be overlooked in any dividuals. The list differs somewhat from ACIR's cluster not previously traded off, but the higher the own list of 498 grants to state and local govern- fragmentation index number for any remaining ments because of several differences in defining cluster, the greater the need is likely to be for con- programs.) As indicated previously, it is likely that solidation or termination of minor grants therein. the scope of programs involved in these trade-offs In evaluating the remaining programs for possi- would be trimmed back somewhat upon more de- ble merger or termination, a great deal more work tailed examination. However, this is the general needs to be done within each cluster. It is impossi- magnitude of trade-offs which might be expected ble in a general study such as this to apply the con- from a faithful application of the Commission's rec- solidation and termination criteria enumerated in ommendation. this recommendation to the broad array of 500-odd Table 7 shows how the 473 federal grant pro- federal aid programs. Not only would this be a very grams cluster together into 22 major categories, large task, but presently available information is and in some cases, into several subcategories. The not adequate to make final decisions concerning major clusters are listed in descending order of some of the issues involved. For example, the cri- Table 8 FEDERAL AID PROGRAM CLUSTERS RANKED BY AVERAGE FUNDING PER PROGRAM

Average Dollar Amount Dollar Amount of Per Program (000) Number of Cluster Cluster Name Programs (000) Mean Median General Revenue Sharing 1 $ 6,863,000 $6,863,000 $6,863,000 Housing* 6 22,606,628 3,767,771 409,200 Highways 6 8,829,143 1,471,524 194,463 Food and Nutrition* 14 1 1,386,968 81 3,355 224,800 Employment and Training 18 13,998,608 777,700 162,740 Community Development 9 4,359,964 484,440 53,000 Public Transit 5 2,344,850 468,970 55,000 Public Assistance* 24 10,686,794 445,283 18,928 Water Pollution Control 17 4,850,013 285,295 8,220 Airports* 2 560,100 280,050 - Medical Assistance 57 15,069,424 264,376 19,000 ALL PROGRAMS 473 $1 16,227,388 Economic Opportunity Education* Vocational Rehabilitation Medical Research Occupational Safety and Health Natural Resources Conservation and Development* Civil Preparedness Criminal Justice* Volunteer Services Miscellaneous Environmental Protection (except water) Economic Development Libraries* Other Transportation Arts and Humanities Rural Development Energy Fire Protection* 'Program clusters roughly equivalent to trade-off proposals. SOURCE: Table 7 and AClR staff compilations. Table 9 FEDERAL AID PROGRAM CLUSTERS RANKED BY FRAGMENTATION INDEX, FY 1980

Percent of FY 1980 Percent of Programs Estimated in Cluster Obligations Fragmentation Cluster Name (A) in Cluster (B) Index** General Revenue Sharing 0.21 % 5.90% 0.04 Housing* 1.26 19.45 0.06 Highways 1.26 7.60 0.17 Food and Nutrition* 2.95 9.80 0.30 31 Employment and Training 3.80 12.04 0.32 !Community Development 1.90 3.75 0.51 5 Public Transit 1.05 2.02 0.52 B Public Assistance* 5.06 9.19 0.55 Water Pollution Control 3.59 4.17 0.86 2L Airports* 0.42 0.48 0.88 Medical Assistance 12.02 12.96 0.93 U3 A ALL PROGRAMS 100.00% 100.00% 1.OO Economic Opportunity 1.05% Education* 16.24 Vocational Rehabilitation 2.95 Medical Research 9.49 Occupational Safety and Health 0.84 Natural Resources Consewation 3 and Development* 4.43 !Civil Preparedness 1.48 5 Criminal Justice* 4.22 h Volunteer Services 1.05 Miscellaneous 2.1 1 Libraries* 1.26 rr Environmental Protection 5 (except water) 3.38 E Economic Development 6.12 Other Transportation 2.1 1 Arts and Humanities 6.33 Rural Development 0.63 Energy 1.90 Fire Protection* 0.63 'Program clusters roughly equivalent to trade-off proposals. "Column A divided by Column B. SOURCE: Table 7and AClR staff compilations teria about high administrative costs relative to effort, the most likely result will be a continuation the federal financial contribution was investigated of growth in the number of narrow categorical by GAO in 1978, and their conclusion was that grant programs, a growing intensity of grant con- "The federal government should but doesn't know ditions and administrative regulations, continued the cost of administering its assistance pro- growth of red tape, and fewer real dollars to work gram~."~~ with as grant funds level off and inflation eats Some consolidations may have the potential for away at appropriated amounts. Detailed federal reducing red tape and increasing the effectiveness prescriptions will continue for such minute local ac- of state and local use of allocated funds within the tivities as school security, urban gardening, pot- program area to the point where a small reduction hole repair, training for use of the metric system, in total funds would be justified-perhaps by 10%. arson control, home insulation, urban parks, meals The National Governors' Association, for example, on wheels, jelly fish control, snow removal, police estimated in 1979 that program consolidations in disability payments, aquaculture, displaced home- the following fields could produce cost savings of makers, rat control, education of gifted children, up to 10%:employment and training, environmen- alcohol abuse, homemaker and residential repair tal protection, community and economic develop- services for the elderly, development of bikeways, ment, education, law enforcement, energy, social aid to museums, runaway youth, art education, and services, and health.52 rural fire protection. And the list will grow and Another approach to the termination of small grow. Only a stirred-up state and local government grant programs for activities which are very likely constitutency can stem this tide. to be picked up by state and local governments From the national vantage point, the strategy would be to balance off this loss of funds to state proposed in this recommendation offers some solid and local governments by an increase in general assurance that the domestic agenda of the Presi- revenue sharing. On the assumption that this dency and Congress would assume more manage- would reduce paperwork and increase efficiency at able proportions-difficult as it assuredly will be. the lower levels, the increase in general revenue Perhaps as important, it would reduce the number sharing might be trimmed by about 10% below the of interest group pressures that have so nearly amount of the terminated categorical grant or immobilized the system and thus would provide grants. some basis for hoping that the national parties Finally, it should be noted that major federal as- would be capable of reasserting their older role of sumptions of programs might be phased in over a "absorbing" and "reconciling" the claims of spe- period of a few years, while major terminations of cial interests. In short, all levels-hence the system federal aid to the state and local governments and the electorate-would benefit by the adoption might be phased out over a similar period of time. of a decisive decongestion strategy. This could help to avoid major disruptions by allowing time for budget realignments and the necessary administrative accomodations. RECOMMENDATION 2 The success of any major trade-offs, consolida- Avoiding Unintended Impacts on tions, and terminations will depend very largely State and Local Governments upon the ability of the state and local governments to reach agreement and band together in support- In this study of the federal role in the federal sys- ing such proposals, and will require close collabora- tem, the Commission has noted the breakdown of a tion among officials at every level. Recommenda- number of constraints which once limited and disci- tion 4 stresses the responsibilities facing state and plined the national role. The erosion of these once local governments and their national associations. viable Constitutional, political, institutional, and, While a variety of systems of intergovernmental until recently, fiscal constraints has contributed to consultation will be necessary, Recommendation 5 the unwieldly and dangerously overloaded condi- calls upon the President to convene a national con- tion of the federal system today. vocation on federalism to formulate an agenda for In the past, the Commission has recommended intergovernmental reform, including trade-off pro- certain basic improvements in the operation of the posals. national government. The Commission recom- If state and local governments fail to make this mendations calling for the consolidation of categorical grant programs,63enactment of "sunset" will otherwise occur. The Commission further legislati~n,~~and indexation of the federal income recommends: (a) that prior to any suspension, tax are,66if anything, more relevant now for their the President ascertain through an assessment rationalizing and disciplining effects than when of the requirement's legislative history and, they were initially advanced and the Commission where needed, through direct contact with the strongly reaffirms its support for them. appropriate Congressional committees that the At the same time, the Commission now con- impending disruptions were not anticipated by cludes that additional major improvements in the Congress; (b) that the suspension of the imple- national legislative and regulatory processes are mentation of any given policy requirement by essential to the development of more effective, ra- the President be limited to no more than 180 tional, and publicly accountable national policies days; (c) that the President immediately notify and to the restoration of a more balanced and func- the appropriate committees of Congress of his tional federalism. action and the reasons for it; and (d) that within 60 days of the suspension, the President present Recommendation2(A): Fiscal Notes to Congress an alternative remedial legislative The Commission finds that .federally mandated proposal. legislation often imposes unanticipated burdens1 and costs upon state and local governments. Hence The Commission recommends that Congress Recommendation 2(C): . . . Regulatory Impact Analyses amend the Congressional Bu&et Act of 1974 to require the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), The Commission finds that federal regulations for every bill or resolution reported in the House often lack adequate prior assessments of the poten- or Senate, to prepare and submit an estimate of tial costs imposed upon state and local govern- the cost which would be incurred by state and lo- ments and the private sector by such regulations. cal governments in carrying out or complying Hence . . . The Commission recommends that the with such bill or resolution.* Congress enact legislation requiring each federal department and agency, including each of the Recommendation 2(B): independent regulatory agencies, to prepare and Temporary Suspension of make public a detailed analysis of projected eco- Crosscutting Policies nomic and noneconomic effects likely to result The Commission finds that the im~lementation from any major new rule it may propose. of crosscutting policies sometimes results in unrea- Increasingly, one of the most abrasive points sonable burdens on and serious disruptions to the of friction in the intergovernmental system is the is- intergovernmental system. Hence . . . The Com- mission recommends that Congress enact legis- sue of costs incurred by one level of government or lation authorizing standby authority to the the private sector as a result of certain actions (or President (acting through the Office of Manage- prohibitions) or procedures mandated by another ment and Budget) to suspend temporarily imple- level of government. Such costs may result from mentation of enacted crosscutting national pol- regulations, mandates, or rules which the states icy requirements when it becomes clear that apply to their localities and businesses or which serious and unanticipated costs or disruptions localities apply to resident businesses. The focus of this recommendation. however. is on those costs which result from federal mandates and regulations aimed at states and localities and at private 'Some individual members of the Commission, notably Mayor indu~tr3~. Tom Bradley, strongly advocate the principle of federal reim- TO put this recommendation in proper context, bursement of state and local costs in carrying out federally some-definitional difficulties first be con- mandated programs, and these proposals were the subject of discussion at the March 1980, and June 1980, meetings. Much, if not the battle federal- However. reimbursement vro~osalsraise a series of complex 1v mandated costs has been waged- in the form of legal, fiscal, and political &su& which have not yet been ex- warfare, highly charged with emotional plored in sufficient detail by the Commission as a whole to ihetoricd provide a basis for its recommendations. The mandating issue claims and and in has been identified as a high-priority area for future study. carried on with the various participants debating quite different issues. This confusion is due in part directly mandated activity is of statutory origin, to varying definitions of terms. based upon the Congressional power to regulate r'or instance, just what is a "mandate"? As de- commerce, the necessary and proper clause, and fined in 1978 by ACIR (applicable to state mandat- the 14th Amendment and, thereafter, upon an ad- ing of local expenditures only), a mandate is: ministrative agency's obligation to promulgate rules and regulations. Direct statutory mandates . . . a legal requirement-constitutional generally deal with civil rights or the environment provision, statutory provision, or adminis- and include, among others, such laws as the Eq.ual trative provision-that a [in this case] local Employment Act of 1972, The Clean Air Amend- government must undertake a specified ac- ments of 1970, and The Safe Drinking Water Act of tivity or provide a service meeting min- 1974.60 imum [in this case] state standard^.^^ Despite the often grand sweep of federal direct The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) takes order mandates, most federal mandates are indi- another approach, defining federal mandates as: rect or what CBO has termed contractual obligations associated with grants-in-aid. While no one . . . formal orders issued by the federal has attempted to count all of the federal indirect government, which is legally the higher mandates, Lovell, et al, have identified 1,036 government and is thus entitled to give federal mandates on local governments as condi- orders under certain circumstances. State tions of aid; in contrast, only 223 were the result of and local governments have little option direct orders.61 but to comply with federal orders.67 Further complicating the mandating issue are Moreover, CBO distinguished the term "man- the different types of mandates, particularly with- dates" from the term "contractual obligations," in the category of indirects. Thus, mandates may which are defined as: be either crosscutting (horizontal) or -program - spe- ciific (vertical). conditional; they come about when . . . Broadly defined, crosscutting national policy state and local governments enter into requirements are those which are generally appli- binding agreements with the federal gov- cable to many or most federal grants. Require- ernment. Most contractual obligations are ments of this sort deal with discrimination, equal associated with federal grant programs.58 access, environmental quality, relocation, prevail- Finally, in a recently completed study of federal ing wages, merit ernplo~rnent,financial ethics, co- and state mandates on local governments by Cath- ordination, planning, citizen participation, and erine Lovel, et al, a mandate is defined as: privacy. Nor is it always easy to distinguish crosscutting . . any responsibility, action, procedure . requirements from those which are program spe- or anything else that is imposed by constitutional, legislative, administrative, execu- cific. For instance, at the most literal definitional tive, or judicial action as a direct order or level, a crosscutting requirement is one arising that is required as a condition of aid.5g from a law "adopted without relation to any particular grant program [but which] appl[ies] to the To add to the confusion, mandates have been grant system on an across-the-board basis."62 A characterized in a variety of ways: at times accord- major example of this sort is Title VI of the Civil ing to the theoretical degree of coerciveness, at Rights Act of 196.4. other times according to source, and at still other Some conditions may not literally be "across-the- times according to the number of jurisdictions or entire-board" but, for all practical purposes, have programs which they effect. the same effect. Such "conditions have become a Hence, a mandate may be a direct order to state general policy by reason of being inserted repeat- andlor local governments. Because most direct edly in individual statutes that authorize a wide order federal mandates are based on judicial inter- range of grant programs."63 A prime example is pretations of the Bill of Rights or 14th Amendment provided by the minimum wage provisions of the (i.e., school desegration, redistricting, criminal jus- Davis-Bacon Act. tice procedures), they fall outside of the scope of Finally, some national policy conditions "only this discussion. However, a significant amount of applly] to single grant programs or closely related groups of programs but elaborate on general pol- advocate a return to times gone by when small chil- For example, Section 16 of the Urban Mass dren were sent unprotected to labor in coal mines Transportation Act of 1964 extends the rights of or when the thoughtless economic activities of a the handicapped and the elderly to federal trans- single robber baron could throw the nation into portation grant programs.66 sudden economic panic. Most believe that those un- A mandate by any other name is a regulation, fortunate enough to live daily with physical and and vice versa. Yet, in recent years, these two mental handicaps should, at the very least, be al- terms have come increasingly to be distinguished, lowed equal access to the most basic facilities and perhaps adding somewhat more to the confusion. functions. Operational efficiency, effectiveness, ac- Hence, in most cases, the term mandate is used to countability, and ethics are long accepted govern- identify an order from one level of government to mental values. another, while the term regulation is employed to Yet, despite the variety of complaints about gov- identify an order from government to the private ernment interference, each of the above mentioned sector. Although the majority of federal direct are objects of federal mandates and regulations. orders are aimed at the private sector, thus giving Hence, through mandates and regulations, the fed- an amount of distinctive validity to the difference eral government seeks to reduce discrimination; in terms, some laws, such as the Clean Air Amend- lessen the causes and effects of pollution; protect ments of 1970, both mandate state actions and reg- the very young; safeguard the earnings, savings, ulate private industry. and investments of the average person from un- A final point of confusion may be mentioned here scrupulous monopolies and cartels, on the one hand in passing, though it will be returned to below. and from imprudent competitive practices, on the With a great many mandates and regulations, even other; help the less fortunate; and disseminate the financial costs are, at best, extremely difficult to newest governmental procedural, operating, and measure; the less tangible noneconomic costs and accounting techniques. In short,the varied inten- benefits, nearly impossible. Certainly, program- tions behind most federal orders are unassailable. matically, jurisdictionally, and industrially dis- The purpose of most mandates is to change the persed social and environmental policies do not behavior of affected state and local governments lend themselves easily to cost analyses or benefit and few can doubt that at least in the past and in a analyses, much less comparable cost-benefit number of areas this was a very laudable objective. analyses. The most obvious example, of course, was provided In this recommendation, a mandate means any by many states that engaged in blatant discrimina- responsibility, action, procedure, or anything else tion against racial minorities. Moreover, mandates that is imposed on state or local governments by accompanying the Social Security Act were aimed Congress or the executive branch as a direct order at the tendency in many states to treat welfare re- or that is required as a condition of aid, whether cipients with less than an even hand. And, for crosscutting or program specific. The term many cities and several states, industry domina- regulation, on the other hand, refers to such impo- tion made enactment of genuine antipollutio~ac- sitions and prohibitions on the private sector and tivities nearly impossible. includes rule making by the independent regula- Likewise, the long history of federal regulation tory agencies. of the private sector can hardly be faulted for its in- In advancing this recommendation, the Commis- tentions. The "birth" of such activities in the late sion has had to grapple with the dilemmas of nineteenth century was prompted only by the most weighing good intentions against their sometimes brazen rate discriminatory and collusive activities wayward and unintended effects. Hence, while it is of interstate carriers, which were virtually un- extremely easy to rail against the various costs of touchable by state law, and by wholesale combina- federal mandates and regulations, it is much less tions in trust which made competition all but im- easy for most people to find fault with their goals possible within many of the nation's major indus- and intentions. Prevelant discrimination in our so- trial sectors. Federal "interference," so-called, ciety based on race, sex, ethnicity, and age is an in- was not merely desirable, it was imperative. tolerable condition. Stagnating pollution of the air, Even the newer and, in many instances, more water, and land is hardly a desirable state of affairs widely criticized mandates and regulations cannot in anyone's eyes. None but the most callous would be disparaged for being born of anything less than the very best intentions. For instance, in terms of costs of both displacement and serious conflict up- its cost and implementing difficulties, perhaps no on states and localities. Simply put, the "cost" of federal mandate has been as widely maligned as displacement is a reduction in a certain amount of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Services Act, freedom of choice. That is, when a particular ac- which prohibits recipients of federal aid from dis- tivity or procedure is mandated, the affected juris- criminating aginst handicapped persons, including diction must sometimes give up doing another, of- de facto discrimination resulting from structural ten preferred, activity. Of course, such costs are barriers. Yet, many handicapped persons are in even more difficult to ascertain than are the fiscal, fact barred from full social participation by the ex- since mandated activities sometimes are preferred istence of such otherwise benign objects as high activities-ones which the mandated-on jurisdic- curbs, building steps and stairways, and inaccessa- tion would perform anyway-and sometimes not. ble vehicles. The costs of Section 504 may indeed In general, however, there is evidence to suggest be weighty, but the intentions and goals underly- that federally mandated activities may have the ef- ing it are certainly of the highest order. fect, in a number of instances, of frustrating state The Commission is convinced that the recent and especially local governments in trying to meet spate of complaints against federal mandates and local preferences. regulations issuing from such diverse sources as Other sorts of costs are those associated with the general public, state and local officials, and pri- conflicts and confusion. For example, OMB has vate industry has little to do with the goals or in- identified 59 crosscutting policy and administra- tentions of those orders. Rather, we believe, it is a tive requirements. Because they are crosscutting, variety of sometimes massive costs which result one could almost anticipate the enormous confu- from many mandates and regulations, the coercive sion that results from their enforcement by all of manner in which they are often applied, and the the different granting agencies. Yet, add to that general lack of regard for each of the above in both complexity, the fact that those 59 horizontal the enactment and implementation phases which requirements are tracked or overseen by 19 have inspired the current discontent. guidance agencies. The combination of these 59 No one knows how high the total fiscal costs of crosscutting requirements, the many more pro- federal mandates run. Even as extensive a study as gram specific requirements, all the assistance that completed by Lovell, et al, does not attempt to agencies, the 19 guidance agencies, and the array measure actual costs. Years of prior expenditures, of recipient jurisdictional idiosyncracies cannot a variety of hidden costs, and the difficulty in- help but add up to sometimes very serious con- volved in even identlfyng mandates have probably flicts. As examples, such conflicts can occur be- made such an after-the-fad task nearly impossible tween: for anyone. Nonetheless, the study does present requirements of a particular assis- some very significant findings about mandated fis- tance program and general federal cal costs and all lead to the conclusion that "the policy or administrative requirements; concern of local government officials about the burden that mandating is placing on their local re- general federal policies themselves; sources is justified."66 multiple agencies' implementation of a 'LIIUS,it rouna mat WYOof all direct-order federal general federal requirement; mandating on local governments was paid for by different assistance program or agen- local general funds-in other words, by local tax- cy requirements; and payers-while 45% of all indirect (or aid-related) federal agencies and recipients.68 mandates were financed by the localities. The problem is even worse for cities than for counties A final problem associated with mandates and since cities pay for 48% of the costs of federal di- their costs is the issue of coercion. That is, when is rect orders and 56% of the costs of conditions of a mandate coercive? Obviously, direct order man- aid.67 dates are, by their very nature, coercive; affected While the fiscal burdens associated with man- jurisdictions have little choice but to comply. But, dates are those most often complained about, other what about the majority of federal mandates, those costs, perhaps equally as heavy, are also linked to which accrue to a jurisdiction as a condition of aid? mandating. Mandates, thus, may be said to impose Though the courts have repeatedly upheld the notion that conditions attached to grants are not As with federal mandates, costs of several types coercive because the receipt of a grant itself is a are the principal complaints against federal regula- voluntary action, grant recipients increasingly are tion of the private sector. And, as is the case with coming to view many grant related mandates as mandates, high fiscal costs are the most often cited being as fully coercive as direct orders. Several ex- for their overburdening effect. amples support this view: Like mandates, assessing the costs of regulations is a difficult and, as yet, far from complete The choice to participate in the federal task. However, unlike mandates, some partial, program may be made by state offi- albeit often widely disparate and controversial, es- cials, but the burden of administering timates do exist. For example, a recent study by the program in accordance with feder- Arthur Andersen and Co. for the Business Round- al regulations falls on local govern- table found that in 1977 alone, 48 major U.S. ments. For example, Aid to Families companies spent $2.6 billion to comply with fed- with Dependent Children (AFDC) is a eral regulations in just six of the many areas of grant program available to the states. federal regulatory endeavor.70 Moreover, the an- Yet, in 18 states, local government nual McGraw-Hill survey of business has estimated agencies are responsible for adminis- that in 1976 the private sector spent $3.2 billion in tering the program. The regulations its efforts to comply with Occupational Safety and guiding local administrators come Health Administration (OSHA) rules alone.T1 And, from their state governments, but may as a final staggering example of fiscal costs associ- have their source in federal regula- ated with regulations, the Council on Environ- tions. mental Quality (CEQ) estimates that in 1978, the Conditions of aid may have changed cost of complying with all existing federal pollution since the decision to participate was control and environmental quality programs was originally made. While participation $26.9 billion, a figure expected to reach $64 billion remains voluntary, state and local offi- by 1987.72 cials may believe that, despite the Some estimates also have been made of the total change in regulations, they have no op- costs of regulation. Table 10, prepared by Robert tion but to continue participation, De Fina, provides a total 1976 estimate of $65.5 since constituents rely on the service billion in regulatory costs for six selected areas. provided. . . . The 1976 amendments The enormous direct costs associated with com- to the Unemployment Insurance (UI) pliance and administrative activities are not the law offer an example. In order for only ones which affect the regulator, the regulated, states to continue to qualify for grants and society. The Senate Committee on Govern- for administration and for employers mental Affairs has identified a number of indirect within the state to continue to receive or unintended cost impacts of regulation. These in- a federal tax credit for UI taxes paid to clude the costs of: the state, coverage must be extended to all public employees. The costs of excessive capital investment; noncompliance are perceived as being excess capacity; so high as to make the change in regu- regulatory constraint and encour- lation seem coercive. agement of peakload pricing: regulatory impediments to techno- Current constraints may stem from logical change; decisions made several years earlier. effects of regulation on competition; For example, in order to receive feder- and al aid for the construction of a high- inflationary effects of regulati~n.~~ way, a state must agree to keep the road up to federal highway safety stan- The ultimate fiscal cost of all regulations, whether dards. Decisions made as long ago as shown on the books of business or government, is 20 years thus constrain the budgetary borne by the American public, both as consumers choices available to present day state and as taxpayers. and local official^.^^ Several other problems, highly related to costs Table 10 ANNUAL COST OF FEDERAL REGULATIONSyBY AREA, 1976 (in millions of dollars)

Administrative Compliance Area Cost Cost Total Consumer Safety and Health $1,516 $ 5,094 $ 6,610 Job Safety and Working Conditions 483 4,015 4,498 Energy and Environment 612 7,760 8,372 Financial Regulation 104 1,118 1,222 Industry Specific 474 26,322 26,796 Paperwork 18,000 18,000 Total $3,189 $62,309 $65,498 'Included in other categories. SOURCE: Robert De Fina, "Public and Private Expenditures for Federal Regulation of Business" Working paper No. 22), St. Louis, MO, Washington University Center for the Study of American Business, 1977, p. 3, as cited in U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Framework for Regulation, Volume VI of Study on Federal Regulation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Washington, DC. US. Government Printing Office, December 1978, p. 68. or actually causing additional costs, also are evi- ing market entry and exit; rate, price, and dent in the current regulatory system. One is the profit structures; and competition; lack of coordination and cost sharing information . specific commodities, products, or ser- among regulatory agencies. This is particularly . . vices through permits, certification, or li- true with regard to the independent regulatory censing requirements; and agencies, whose very independence from executive branch control makes Presidential coordination of . . . the development, administration, and economic policy extremely difficult.74 enforcement of national standards, viola- Aside from independence, the Commission on tions of which could result in civil or Law and the Economy of the American Bar Asso- criminal penalties or which result in ciation (ABA) has noted two additional problems slgnlficant costs.76 which make it extremely difficult for policymakers and administrators to coordinate regulatory activi- All this multiplicity and its accompanying costs, ties and thereafter make balancing choices be- overlaps, and conflicts become especially acute for tween and among conflicting and competing goals. individual sectors of the economy which are them- Thus, ABA also notes the problems generated by selves regulated by multiple federal authorities. the For example, the transportation industry is subject to the rules of (from among others) the Interstate single-mindedness of the regulatory Commerce Commission, the Civil Aeronautics agencies or the failure of one agency to Board, and the Federal Maritime Commission; the consider the competing goals of the auto industry to those of the National Highway other agencies; and Traffic Safety Administration and the Environ- 0 multiplicity of agencies-there are at mental Protection Agency; and the nation's finan- least 16 federal regulatory agencies, cial institutions to the Department of Treasury, each created and governed by its own the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit statute; each with its own goals and re- Insurance Corporation, the Federal Home Loan s~onsibilities.~6 Bank Board, the Federal National Credit Union Administration, the Securities and Exchange Com- CBO has identified a total of 33 federal depart- mission, the Commodities Futures Trading Com- ments and agencies whose activities effect: mission, and the Department of Labor.T7 . . . the operatmg business environment of A final serious problem adding heavily to multi- broad sectors of private enterprise, includ- plicity within the regulatory system was noted by William G. Colman in testimony before the Com- "pass now, pay later" atmosphere which sees the mission: substantial "paying" being done by other than the 8 i passer." Regulatory conflict and overlapping is ful- Hence, the Commission sanctions a more ly as contributory to intergovernmental thoughtful and balanced legislative process and imbalance as the increasing "marbleiza- supports the enactment and implementation of tion" of service delivery and financing, . . . procedures which would allow Congress to weigh For example: well intended policy requirements against the costs Concurrent regulatory jurisdiction of of implementation and to consider the impacts of national and state governments in- its decisions on state and local governments. One creases costs for those regulated which such mechanism is the attachment of "fiscal in turn raises consumer prices. notes," or state and local cost estimates, to every Especially critical is state regulation of reported bill and resolution. Already required by product manufacture and product spe- approximately 33 state legislatures, fiscal notes cifications with respect to goods mov- have proved extremely useful in allowing states to ing in interstate commerce-several assess the costs of their own mandates on local federal regulatory statutes not only governments. permit but encourage states to impose For Congress, such costs could be assessed by equal or higher standards, thus break- CBO, which through the existing authority of the ing up economies of scale involved in Congressional Budget Act of 1974, already submits the mass production for a national estimates of the costs the federal government may market.T8 incur as a result of legislation moving through Con- gress. This "fiscal notes" procedure is gaining bi- This Commission, then, finds that the goals and partisan support in Congress and has been en- intentions which underlie most mandates and regu- dorsed, among others by the National Governors lations are unassailable and that the effects, of Association (NGA), the Council of State Govern- most, though often statistically unmeasurable, ments (CSG), the National League of Cities (NLC), have greatly benefited the nation. They have al- the National Conference of State Legislatures lowed long-deprived minorities to make great (NCSL), the National Association of Counties strides, mitigated the damaging effects of many (NAC), and the United States Conference of pollutants, made financial saving by individuals Mayors (USCM). reasonably safe, and reduced the number of The Commission notes that one of the sources of deaths, accidents, and illnesses occuring in the greatest complexity and confusion in the intergov- workplace and on the highway. ernmental system is the array of crosscutting or The Commission recognizes that there are some horizontal policy requirements. At times, such re- who would do away with all or most mandates and quirements may impose unreasonable burdens on regulations, claiming that the marketplace would and even cause serious disruptions to the system. run more smoothly if left totally to its own devices In the past, the Commission has recommended and that social responsibility cannot be legislated. that certain measures be undertaken to simplify, to Such claims, we are convinced, are neither prac- consolidate where appropriate, to regularize, and tical nor factually well grounded. Rather, a to recognize the costs of such generally applicable number of means, in our view, should be employed req~irements.7~However, we now feel that addi- to make the mandating and regulatory processes tional measures are necessary. While it is hoped more thoughtful, to balance the many benefits with that the enactment of fiscal notes legislation would the burdensome costs, and to bring some degree of enable Congress to become more thoughtful about coordination, information, and modification to the cost burdens of legislation, other disruptive areas of overlap and conflict. consequences may still result from the imple- In the process of creating new legislation, good mentation of crosscutting policies. This would be intentions are often substituted for good laws and particularly true if the requirements of one such little thought generally is given to the costs which policy conflict with another, or if the requirements such legislation may impose on state and local gov- of a crosscutting policy conflict with a particular ernments. As a result, policy is often enacted in a program requirement. Though fiscal notes will allow Congress to antici- tive branch agencies analyze the costs and benefits pate and prevent a number of problems, the Com- of major proposed regulations. mission is convinced that there is a need for some This system, we find, is far from complete, how- mechanism to cope with those not prevented. ever, for it fails to include the crucial participation Hence, we sanction legislation giving the Presi- of the independent regulatory agencies. Hence, dent authority to temporarily suspend implementa- Congressional enactment of legislation requiring tion of potentially disruptive or terribly costly na- such analyses, including the independents, is criti- tional policy requirements. cal to fully understanding and assessing the im- Such Presidential authority could be exercised by pacts of new rules. OMB since assistance policy is one of its basic con- Ideally, the analytical process would involve two cerns and relates to its budget, regulatory reform, steps. First, when a regulation is initially published procurement management, and other activities. for comment, it should be accompanied by a draft Thus, in addition to preventing intergovernmental impact analysis containing a statement of the ne- friction, the proposal would strengthen the man- cessity for and purpose of the proposed action; an agement and oversight capacity of the President. inventory of possible alternative actions for achiev- Any suspension, of course, would require that ing the same objectives; and a preliminary assess- OMB first ascertain legislative intent. That is, did ment of the projected economic and noneconomic or did not Congress intend for or anticipate the dis- impacts of and potential effectiveness of each of ruption? Once intent has been firmly discerned and the alternative means for achieving the stated ob- Congress properly notified, a maximum length of jective. Second, following a period of public com- suspension of 180 days has been suggested. ment, each issued regulation should be accompan- Obviously, such postponement alone would, in ied by a more thorough impact analysis containing many cases, merely delay the inevitable. Hence, detailed assessments of all of the information re- the Commission recommends that a desirable and quired in step one. To avoid delays in meeting necessary next step would be the drafting by the emergency situations, waivers of the analysis re- President, through OMB, of alternative remedial quirement should be permitted. legislation. If such alternative language were pre- In order to assure overall compliance, periodic sented to Congress for its consideration early in review of the analysis process and the analyses of the suspension period, systemic disruptions could individual agencies should be undertaken by CBO be significantly reduced. and thereafter reported to Congress, the public, To insure that the costs of regulations are com- and the agencies. Finally, to avoid extended litiga- mensurate with their benefits, to mitigate against tion disruptive to the analysis process, judicial re- conflicting agency rules, and to provide more ade- view of agency analysis procedures should be pro- quate oversight, the Commission urges that regu- hibited. Of course, the regulations themselves latory impact analyses be prepared by each federal would still be subject to such review. agency and department and that they cover the projected economic and noneconomic effects likely to result from the promulgation of any new rule. RECOMMENDATION 3 Some strides in the direction of regulatory re- Stren thening Political Federalism form have already been made. For example, the T rough the Party System Environmental Protection Agency's controversial a "bubble policy," allows individual manufacturers a The Commission recognizes that the recommen- great deal more latitude and prerogative in con- dations noted above are but a first step in unbur- trolling statiosary source pollution. OSHA, too, dening the intergovernmental system. The prob- has taken steps to broaden its standards and the lems of assigning costs as well as benefits to man- Consumer Product Safety Commission has been dates and regulations are monumental and such di- relying more heavily on voluntary manufacturer lemmas are compounded by the fact that our actions and individualized approaches to meeting knowledge of what constitutes a mandated activity standards. In fact, in limited form, regulatory im- is limited. Hence, we believe that a Commission pact analyses are now required. By Executive priority for the 1980s should be a thorough examin- Order 12044 of March 23, 1978, President Carter ation of the complex realm of mandates and regu- began requiring that, among other actions, execu- lations. Hopefully, such study would result in more thoughtful intergovernmental policymaking and view that, although their development was not an- contribute, to a more balanced and functional fed- ticipated by the founders, strong political parties eral system in the future. have made a vital contribution to American gov- The Commission concludes that the current phil- ernance since the earliest days of the Republic. For osophical and organizational disarray of both ma- that large majority of the population unrepre- jor political parties minimizes their contribution to sented by special interest groups, they always have the appropriate consideration of the size of the been the principal instrument of political participa- public sector and of national-state-local responsi- tion. Indeed, by selecting candidates for office, bilities within it, has weakened the accountability preparing platforms, aggregating diverse inter- of public officeholders at all levels to the citizenry, ests, mounting campaigns, and organizing both the has undermined their capacity to balance interest processes of government and of the "loyal opposi- group pressures, and has undercut the traditional tion," the parties have made mass representative position of states and localities as strong political democracy possible. partners within the American federal system. At the same time, the parties have contributed to Hence. . . the maintenance of a balanced federalism. Always The Commission recommends that the two po- strongest at the precinct, city, or county level, the litical parties and the Congress, or state legisla- "bottom up" organization of the parties ensured tures, as appropriate, adopt measures which that they and their elected national representa- will strengthen the parties as forums for the tives would respond to localized pressures and con- regular consideration of major policy issues by cerns, thus providing a vital counterforce against public officials at all levels of government as centralizing trends in the economic sphere and well as by citizen party members, and which will within government itself. As political alliances pri- enhance the status of the political parties as es- marily composed of state and local candidates, of- sential bonds between the governors and the ficeholders, and activists, the parties also provided governed in a healthy representative democracy. for close communications among policymakers at Specifically, the Commission recommends every level of government. that consideration be given to the following pro- The political parties also have contributed to the posals, among others: (a) midterm party conven- balancing act of federalism by presenting to the tions in both political parties, as well as more voters alternative approaches to certain key public frequent party issue conferences at the state and issues, especially those relating to the proper scope local level; (b) the facilitation of greater partici- of governmental authority and its allocation pation by national, state, and local elected of- among the levels of the federal system. Through- ficeholders in party conventions; (c) the out most of American history, one or the other of strengthening of party leadership in Congress the parties has advocated new national initiatives and the reinvigoration of party caucuses as in- on economic or social issues, while the opposition struments for disciplining members and for the has emphasized "states rights" or political decen- deliberation and voting on proposals relating to tralization. Moreover, at certain times, the parties the budget ceilings provided for in the Congres- (for wholly self-centered reasons) in effect collab- sional budget process; and (d) a reduction in the orated to keep certain issues out of the national po- number, dates, and duration of Presidential pri- litical arena. Together, then, the two parties in the maries and the elimination generally of open and past created a meaningful dialogue on federalism blanket primaries. * both sustaining and redefining it in light of changing conditions and popular preferences. This recommendation is rooted in the Commis- At present, none of these traditional descriptions sion's belief that the major parties' historic roles in remain accurate, for the political parties have vir- making the governance of a vast representative tually ceased to perform any of their major historic democracy possible and making federalism worka- roles. Indeed, a sharp decline in the status and per- ble have been badly eroded of late. It reflects our formance of the parties is perhaps the most striking political change of the past 20 years. Expert commentators note the steady transformation from a two-party system, to a "one-and-a-half" 'HUD and OMB abstained. party system, to something approaching a no-party system as the 1980s begin.80 Though always weak gram has attracted or created a sizeable coalition by European standards, the American political of its beneficiaries and defenders, shattering over- parties have become but pale shadows of even their all political coherence in the process. In this reformer selves, commanding little loyalty any- spect, our findings in many functional fields are where, unable to organize the government, the quite consistent with a recent editorial comment in electorate-or themselves. the Natiml Journal, which noted that: Evidence of this dramatic change may be found . . . the diffusion of power in Washington wherever the public's business is conducted: on the stemmed from the same forces that campaign trail, in the Capitol, and within the brought more power to Washington. The White House. Many candidates for office seeming- acceptance of new responsibilities implied ly regard their partisan membership as embarrass- new constituencies which, following a na- ing or irrelevant-a sentiment shared by an in- tural political logic, demanded their own creasing number of voters. Neither party now pro- representation in the nation's capital: their vides a strong focus for personal political loyalties own subcommittees, their own agencies, or a continuing intellectual forum for the assess- and their own lobbying arms.82 ment of issues. And, it seems no easier to devise and carry out a consistent strategy for addressing The record of the past two decades demonstrates national problems when both branches of the fed- that the political parties are no longer essential to eral government are held by the same party than in the fundamentals of the electoral process. Candi- periods of divided control. Compare, for example, dates continue to appear; federal, state, and local the record of President Ford in this regard with offices have not gone unfilled. Yet, the record also that of President Carter.81 suggests that stronger parties still are necessary Neither do the parties now serve as informal po- for effective governance. Without them, some litical bulwarks of federalism. Because of changes measure of political discipline and sound policy for- in internal rules and procedures, they have become mulation appears more difficult to achieve, given far more centralized-though no better disciplined. the force of special interest pressures. Moreover, candidates for national office now rely The resurrection of the political parties, then, ap- chiefly upon personal followings and campaign pears to be an essential step to the renewal of contributors, as well as the media, in their drive for American federalism and the restoration of compe- election. The old, fairly cohesive coalitions of offi- tence to and confidence in basic governmental pro- cials and party loyalists at the state and local level cesses. It seems unlikely that a more effective allo- are no longer needed and, indeed, barely exist. cation of federal-state-local functional responsibili- Instead, control of the government has come to ties can ever be devised in the absence of stronger, rest with a multitude of specialized "policy com- more responsible political parties. Indeed, it is an munities." Their members include individual legis- open question whether meaningful democratic lative activists, bureaucrats, and the now- government itself can exist without the mediating ubiquitous special interest lobbies, giving rise to influence of political party organizations. the appellation, the "special interest state." As The Commission believes that some strengthen- partisan roles have subsided, these narrow policy ing of the two-party system is an essential pre- cliques have multiplied unrestrained by establish- requisite to the restoration of balance to the ing power bases on Capitol Hill, in the various ex- American federal system. Only strong political ecutive departments, in offices up and down the parties, we feel, could ever effectively counterbal- length of Pennsylvania Avenue and its environs, ance the hodgepodge intergovernmentalizing and and within and around subnational governments. fragmenting tendencies inherent in the present The resulting atomization of the political process "special interest state." A number of interrelated is closely tied with the fragmentation of national reform proposals have been advanced with the aim policy and the overload of governmental institu- of increasing the internal coherence of the political tions. Each reinforces the others. However, the parties while maintaining a measure of organiza- Commission's case studies do suggest that the tional decentralization. These merit full considera- rapid multiplication of interest groups has largely tion. been a conseqwme, rather than the primary cause, Several key measures have been urged in order of programmatic growth. Every additional pro- to provide for greater intra and interparty debate on key issues at all levels of government. Some of annual, conventions or conferences for the clari- these involve changes in party organization and fication and renewal of their platforms. County, procedure. The parties, many reformers contend, town, and city party organizations, too, need to have been negligent in performing a primary policy assume more issue-oriented functions. function: the preparation of a comprehensive party From the implementation standpoint, the Com- platform and, especially, its execution through leg- mission insists that those who will be charged with islative action. The platform-writing process is, of executing the party platform should share in, and course, the major vehicle for party deliberations on contribute, to its drafting. Furthermore, if the in- key issues. Careful assessments show that the two tergovernmental dimensions of domestic policy is- major party platforms do differ in significant ways, sues are to be considered adequately-and essen- thus offering some choice to the voters. The prob tially every domestic policy issue has major inter- lem is less with content than with the fact that the governmental aspects-it is important that na- platforms are too often ignored by party leaders tional and state party conventions provide for full and members. participation by their members holding elective of- A part of the difficulty seems to be that the party fice at the state and local levels. platforms, written at four-year intervals, may Elected officials and top party officials also have quickly become outdated as new problems emerge. much to contribute to the other major convention For this reason, the Commission urges that both activity, that of selecting Presidential candidates. major political parties hold regular midterm na- A process of "peer review" by other politicians, tional conventions, with delegates including both after all, is an excellent means for assessing an in- elected officeholders and rank-and-file members. dividual's leadership record and potential, and is a Such conventions would provide an appropriate useful step in assembling the coalitions necessary forum for the debate of issues, and have as their for effective governance.88 major function the renewal of the party platform. In the past, all of these goals were achieved as a In this way, then, platforms could both be publi- matter of course, since many states reserved dele- cized and revised to be in keeping with changing gate positions for their top elected offibials, includ- needs and priorities. We note that the other ing Governors, Representatives, and Senators. mechanisms which theoretically are intended to However, recent changes in the rules of the Demo- provide overall policy direction for the political cratic party concerning delegate selection have re- parties have proven to be inadequate. The national sulted in a substantial decline in convention partici- committees, which supposedly are responsible for pation by public officials. Traditional descriptions the development of party policy between conven- of the highly decentralized party structure are no tions, meet infrequently and have not been effec- longer accurate. Previously, convention delegates tive decisionmakingbodies. were selected according to rules determined by The Commission recognizes that some experi- each state party and legislature, and the Republi- ence has been gained with this proposal, in that can Party continues to give the states substantial midterm conventions have been held twice by the discretion in these matters. But, in the 1970s, the Democrats, in 1974 and 1978; we also note that national Democratic Party promulgated detailed neither session has measured up to expectations. new standards superior to state party rules and Some have described the conventions as the sites even to state law. Among other things, these rules of intraparty battles, more suited to "blowing off encourage proportional representation of various steam" than serious debates over policy. Yet the demographic (rather than party membership) experiment is by no means over. The Republican groups and require that the delegates' preferences Party has not tested it, and many reformers-in- be a "fair reflection" of the Democratic voters' cluding this Commission-feel that it is equally or preferences. The practice of automatically desig- even more important that the opposition party as- nating public officials as delegates was specifically semble regularly to prepare an alternative ap- barred. Party officials were henceforth required to proach to key issues. compete to be participants in the major undertak- The Commission is convinced that there is a ing of the national party on the same basis as parallel need to interject the more frequent consid- private citizens. eration of key issues at the state and local levels. The end result of these rule changes was that State parties also should hold regular, preferably fewer public officials have attended Democratic conventions. In 1976, for example, fewer than half Other measures are necessary to strengthen the of the party's Governors served as delegates, and parties as deliberative bodies and policy forums less than one-fifth of the Democratic members of within the legislative branch of the national gov- Congress-proportions far below those in many ernment. Here, too, the parties are foundering. prior years. Many officials were unwilling to com- Despite the skills of the current Speaker and Sen- pete for seats, and some of those who did were ate Majority Leader and the two Minority Leaders, aligned with losing Presidential candidates. the Commission notes the absence in Congress of As intended, participation in the convention did both effective institutional leadership and a spirit become broader demographically, including many of constructive follo~ership.~~Party ties-once the more women, nonwhites, and younger persons. best single indicator of voting behavior-have Still, many critics charge that power simply shifted weakened. Today, policymaking responsibility has to new "elites," perhaps even less representative been assumed increasingly by a host of individual than the ones they displaced. Most of the new dele- activists, steadily proliferating subcommittees, gates were the enthusiasts of particular issues and and-most recently-an expanding array of special candidates, rather than party regulars, and their interest (regional, demographic, economic) policy preferences were substantially more "lib- caucuses. Under these circumstances, the national eral" than those of grassroots party members. legislature is responsive to everyone, but respun& Furthermore, they had higher incomes and sub- ble to no one. Action on petty concerns is facili- stantially more education than their predeces- tated, while action on overarching new national sors.a4 The drive for greater representativeness, problems is inhibited, even blocked. then, produced what many critics feel is a less rep- The present fragmentation of authority in Con- resentative result-a not unfamiliar outcome in the gress reflects long-established trends. At the turn annals of American politics. of the century, a tight oligarchy held sway in the The Commission believes that it is essential that Senate, while "Czars" Reed and then Cannon ex- the party conventions provide for much fuller par- ercised close control as Speakers of the House of ticipation by the party leadership. To this end, Representatives. Ever since the "revolt of serious consideration should be given to a recent 1910-11," however, comparable direction of legis- proposal calling for the major state and national of- lative affairs has been impossible. Even the strong- ficeholders and officials of each party to be named est Congressional leaders of more recent times- as unpledged, ex officio delegates to the party con- Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D-TX) ventions. Under this plan, every U.S. Senator, and Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX)-were unable to Representative, Governor, national party chair- exert all that much influence over the committees man and cochairman, state chairman and vice and their chairmen, where real power rested. The chairman, and each member of the national com- proliferation of narrow categorical grant pro- mittee, automatically would participate in conven- grams was directly tied to these changes in Con- tion proceedings, along with other delegates chos- gressional organization and procedure, and also is en through reformed state primaries.86 at the heart of the difficutly of establishing clear- Minor steps in this direction already have been cut, comprehensive national policy g0als.8~ taken by the Democrats in response to criticisms of In the-past decade, efforts to "open up" more the composition of the 1976 convention. For 1980 meaningful participation to the rank and file have the Democrats increased the number of delegates further reduced the influence of committee chair- by 10% to allow for greater participation by men. For a brief period, the party caucus enjoyed a elected party and state officials. These "auto- resurgence of authority, with House Democrats matic" delegates, elected by either a state conven- leading the way. The results were mixed. On the tion or by the other national convention delegates, one hand, some committee chairmen who were out are to be selected from among the party chair and of step with rank-and-file views were deposed, and vice-chair, other members of the Democratic Na- the capacity of individual chairmen to block legisla- tional Committee, the Governor, or the state's tion enjoying broad party support was reduced. Congressional delegation. We regard this change But, at the same time, the caucus's steering and as far too limited in scope. If elected officials are to policy committee largely failed in its efforts to co- play a significant role in party affairs, they must be ordinate policy development in such fields as ener- present in far greater numbers. gy, or to overcome other divisions among overlap ping committees. Indeed, critics note that the at which the role of the caucuses might well be ex- caucus speeded the diffusion of power by encour- panded. After all, the budget resolutions are a key aging the creation of additional subcommittees, determinant of the general thrust of national pol- with many independently staffed and operating icy since they determine overall levels of spending, separately from the parent committees. In their taxation, and debt, and fix expenditures levels in view, the end result was chaos, not order; anarchy, major functional areas. Recent experience sug- rather than participation. gests that the parties can and should contribute Many members and close observers of the Con- much to the redefinition of the federal govern- gress, including this Commission, believe that this ment's financial and programmatic role through further dispersion of authority and responsibility the budget process if they organize themselves for produced by the decline in the power of committee the task. chairmen can only be overcome by a strengthened In the House of Representatives (though not in leadership acting in conjunction with a revitalized the Senate), the Congressional budget process has caucus (conference). The present three-way tug-of- been deeply partisan since its inception, with the war between and among the leaders, the chairmen, Republicans frequently proposing across-the-board and the junior members is a direct result of the os- cuts in the budget resolutions prepared by the ma- tensible reforms initiated in the early seventies, jority Democrats. In 1980, both parties contributed and the unreal expectations of new members arriv- significantly to the national debate on appropriate ing in that period. It has produced a situation that levels of federal spending. Following an unpre- no group is satisfied with, as well as contributing cedented two-week series of budget meetings with to the process of incessant intergovernmentaliza- the White House in early March, Congressional tion. Democrats produced a list of spending cuts as a To correct this condition will require a responsi- modification of the President's initial FY 1981bud- ble and reciprocally supportive relationship be- get, including a reduction of $10 billion in existing tween the leadership and the party members ac- programs and a balanced budget. These actions ting through the caucus (conference). It means a represented a major effort on the part of the party strengthening of the "generalist" instnunentali- leadership group to exert fiscal discipline over the ties of the parties and a concomitant curbing of committees, making them more responsive to both many functional interests-whether they be the the leadership and the wishes of the rank and file. committees and their chairmen, or the subcommit- Shortly thereafter, the House Republican Policy tees and their chairmen. A national deliberative Committee announced its own alternative budget body wherein every member acts as if he or she proposals to substitute for the budget resolution were the "great law-giver" is an assemblage that developed by the House Budget Committee. Com- cannot function coherently. mittee Chairman Bud Shuster (R-PA) described In the past, the procedures, the political institu- the Republican substitute as providing "a balanced tions, and the "folkways" of Congress curbed this budget which is $14 billion smaller than President form of impulsive individualism, but no longer. Carter's original FY 1981 proposal, while provid- Procedures are needed, then, that compel some ing a $32 billion tax cut for the American peo- discipline, as we have noted in the second recom- ple."88 The Committee adopted a statement calling mendation. The older institutional values (appren- upon all House Republicans to support its alterna- ticeship, expertise, and appropriate deference) tive proposals. need to be accorded a more honored place in the Together, these twin actions may well represent informal system of rewards and sanctions. Equally an historic effort to loosen the grip of special inter- important, the party mechanisms should begin to ests on fiscal affairs. They may prove to be at least recognize the challenges that confront them in the beginning steps toward the assertion of more ra- 1980s. tional fiscal priorities and they suggest that the With responsible leadership, we believe, that recommendation advanced here might well be im- party caucuses might again be employed to provide plemented in the near future. more meaningful opportunities for participation on There also are a number of proposed reforms key decisions for the rank-and-file members. For which are intended to strengthen the parties in the example, the votes on budget ceilings provided for performance of their electoral functions. The goal in the Congressional budget process are one point is to reduce the rampant individualism of recent campaigns and to restore the parties to their tradi- dent Carter and Gov. Ronald Reagan by mid- tional role of screening candidates and winning March, well before most state primaries and all of their election. Several specific proposals focus on the state party conventions, and months before the Presidential nomination process. either national convention. In the view of many strong party advocates, a re- The extensive use made of the primary device for duction in the number, dates, and duration of nominating Congressional state, and local candi- Presidential primaries is a crucial step. These have dates has similarly weakened party control over proliferated rapidly over the past decade, with 37 the nomination process without increasing popular (including the District of Columbia) being held in participation. Between 1902, when Wisconsin 1980, compared to just 17 in 1968. Altogether, adopted the first comprehensive statewide primary nearly 80% of the delegates to national party con- system, and 1955, when a limited form was put in ventions are now chosen in primaries, rather than use by Connecticut, primaries swept the entire na- state conventions or caucuses. Elections were tion. At present 36 states require a primary for all scheduled on 17 separate dates between mid-Feb- major party nominations for state offices, as well ruary and early June 1980. as most local posts. Others apply the primaries on- The Commission believes that this overextension ly to selected state posts, or combine state pri- of the primary device has seriously undermined the maries and conventions in varying degrees. deliberative and electoral functions of the national Certain specific forms of political primaries di- political parties. The national conventions now minish the stature of the parties further by allow- have taken on the guise of ratifying rather than de- ing participation by nonmembers, including loyal cisionmaking bodies, while the exhaustive series of supporters of the opposition party. In the tradi- state-by-state contests seems a far better test of tional "closed" primary, which is the dominant the limits of human endurance than of the ability to form, participation is restricted to declared party lead the nation. The necessary "blitz" campaign members. However, "open" primaries, which per- strategy leaves voters with little more than slo- mit any registered voter to declare preferences, gans and the candidates' personalities as a basis are found in about one-third of the states, mostly in for their choice. The process often appears to re- the West and Midwest. Under these circum- ward candidates who are more skilled in avoiding stances, voters may "cross over" and vote for op- issues than in confronting them. position candidates. Two states, Alaska and Wash- Rather than reconciling differences, primary ington, utilize the "blanket" primary, which allows politics also encourages the cultivation of small but voters to cast ballots for both Democratic and Re- intense personal followings, with little attention to publican candidates. Either approach inevitably the acceptability of the party nominees to the elec- weakens party control over the essential nomina- torate as a whole. Yet Presidents lacking wide- tion function. spread support and a clear national mandate may The Commission is mindful that a variety of be expected to have difficulty in leading their par- avenues might be pursued to reduce the number ty, Congress, or the nation. and duration of Presidential primaries. Many con- Even as participatory institutions, primaries tend that the responsibility and the remedy rests have serious shortcomings. While the primary sys- with individual state legislatures. Yet, state action tem is very open, it may well reduce effective popu- appears most unlikely. Since many states have ap- lar participation. Turnout in most Presidential pri- parently adopted the primary system as the easiest maries is very low, averaging about 25% of the vot- way to meet the Democratic Party's age-race- ing-age population in 1976, and not much higher in gender quotas, some believe that only the abolition those held in 1980. Consequently, "victory" often of these quotas would facilitate a return to state goes to candidates who garner support from tiny convention or caucus systems for the selection of fractions of the eligible electorate. Media attention delegates. on the early primaries means that the voters in just Others call for the retention of the primary de- a few states can have a disproportionate voice in vice while replacing the three-dozen state contests choosing the candidates who will represent the en- with a single national or a few regional primaries. tire nation. For example, critics note that in 1980, The former proposal has attracted much popular the Democratic and Republican nominations ap- support, according to the opinion polls. This sys- peared to have been effectively captured by Presi- tem would surely increase both participation levels and the representativeness of results over those of- dures which will strengthen the autonomy of fered by the present collection of primaries, their decisionmaking processes and will protect caucuses, and conventions. Yet, it might further and enhance their authoritativeness as govern- undercut the party organizations by entirely re- ments within the American federal system, To moving the nominating function from their hands. this end, the Commission urges that state gov- Another approach, also requiring Congressional ernments take those actions necessary to assure action, foresees the creation of a shorter series of that all local governments have adequate taxing closed regional primaries. Various proposals sug- authority and/or state financial assistance to gest five or six multistate Presidential primaries perform the services for which they are respon- spaced at regular intervals of two weeks or a sible and to assure that such governments are month. Finally, the primary season might be fore- adequately structured and monitored to assure shortened without reducing the number of elec- proper fiscal management and accountability. tions by the designation of a single "national The Commission further recommends that the primary day" or a series of perhaps four such days, elected officials of the states and their locali- to be selected at state option. ties, both independently and through their re- Under any circumstance, in the Commission's spective national associations in Washington, view, both the "open" and "blanket" primaries give priority to protecting and enhancing the should be abolished for all offices. In 1980, the status of state and local governments within our Democratic Party took a first step in this direction federal system and to decongesting intergovern- by restricting the use of the open primary for dele- mental relationships by (1) participating with gate selection (though not for "beauty contest" ex- appropriate federal officers in identifying inter- pressions of voter preferences). While prior regis- governmental activities that are most appropri- tration is not required, voters must make a "public ate for full federal assumption or full devolution declaration" of their party affiliation at the polling to state or local governments or the private sec- places for primaries. However, a number of states tor as proposed in Recommendation 1; (2) identi- requested and received waivers of this require- fying, through survey techniques, those state ment. Further action is deemed necessary if the and local problem areas in which the need for parties are to reassert control over their nomina- federal financial assistance is of high, moderate, tion processes. and low priority; and (3) establishing jointly on a permanent basis a state-local legal defense organization, with adequate funding, professional RECOMMENDATION 4 staffing, and appropriate assistance from the Protecting the Autonomy of states' attorneys general, to monitor and insti- State and Local Governments in tute legal action opposing "coercive" conditions National Policymaking attached to federal grants and "intrusive" Con- gressional exercise of the commerce power.* The Commission concludes that the states and localities also have contributed, both by acts of omis- Paralleling the shift in governmental authority sion and commission, to the incessant "intergov- toward Washington over the past 20 years has ernmentalizing" of their own processes, programs, been a comparable political shift. This recom- personnel and budgets. Moreover, despite their in- mendation addresses one of the basic problems creased representational efforts in Washington- generated by this development. A once strongly and thanks to the growing strength of vertical decentralized political system has become a more functional and single-issue interest groups-the national as well as an excessively pluralistic one. Commission finds that the sensitivity of national Power has been both centralized and "atomized," policymakers to the role and needs of subnational following lines that are mostly functional, rather governments is less now than it was a generation than sectional or territorial, in character. For this ago, when there were few sustained representational undertakings. Hence . . . *OMB abstained, believing the issue to be primarily of state and local concern. OMB noted with concern, however, that the The Commission recommends that the states legal defense fund might encourage an increase in lawsuits and their localities adopt policies and proce- against the federal government. reason, contemporary authorities often describe ers, inadequate tax systems, a failure to address intergovernmental administrative and political re- adequately the problems of metropolitan areas, lations as a "picket fence," controlled by "vertical and especially the denial of basic civil rights to functional autocracies" concerned with narrow blacks and other minorities, all provided an im- programmatic interests. petus for national action and an undercutting of One of the many consequences of these changes the legitimacy of traditional "states' rights" is that the historic autonomy and independent Con- defenses. While the more recent record shows that stitutional status of the states and their localities the states have made substantial progress in are accorded far less weight in the nation's politi- "modernizing" their executive and legislative cal processes than formerly. In the not-so-distant branches, and in increasing participation in and past, the strongly decentralized system of political the accountability of their own political processes, parties led by state and local officials served as a these reforms unfortunately have not reduced, let principal informal bulwark of federalism.S9 Politi- alone reversed, the drift of influence to the na- cal reality demanded that the interests and con- tion's capital. cerns of state and local governments automatically State and local governments also were not al- be accorded deference at the national level-and together passive bystanders as the federal role such generally was the case through the early changed. Mayors, Governors, and other elected 1960s. and appointed "generalists" have usually actively Now, various specialized constituencies and in- supported expanded federal programs. Some of terest groups have become major sources of cam- the older "public interest groups" representing paign funds, manpower, and votes. For this reason these officials not unnaturally were founded dur- (among others), Congress, the executive branch ing the Depression era to seek federal assistance in and federal courts may rush into areas where they dealing with the national economic crisis. The his- once feared to tread at all. Questions of federalism torical record shows that the policy positions of often are treated as minor matters of legal techni- these organizations far more frequently have fa- cality, rather than high principle, while fields once vored, rather than opposed, the creation, continua- regarded as purely subnational concerns are tion, and expansion of federal aid programs.g0 marked by proliferating aid programs. The condi- These groups now follow national legislative and tions under which federal assistance is offered budgetary events very closely and lobby hard to have become more numerous, more onerous, and maintain the flow of federal funds. Over the past sometimes even more openly coercive than could decade and a half, state and local governments have been imagined possible two decades ago. have "come to Wa~hington."~~Those associations Furthermore, as a host of past Commission which lacked lobbying arms in the capital have cre- studies have indicated, federally aided activities ated them, or relocated there. The number of are often difficult for "generalist" state and local states having their own Washington staffs has officials to monitor and control. And, with the more than doubled in the past ten years, while growing fiscal reliance on outside aid necessarily nearly 100 cities and counties have developed fed- has come some decline in state-local political and eral representatives. Grantsmanship, as well as in- programmatic independence. stitutional protective, communicational, technical A wide range of factors-not one-lie behind assistance, and grant reform efforts on behalf of these political trends, as this study has indicated. their members, is a basic activity for all of these Still, in a number of ways, state and local govern- units. ments themselves contributed to the shifts of Still, the rise of this very sizeable intergovern- power and responsibility to Washington and un- mental lobby is better viewed as a response to ris- dercut their own political position within the feder- ing levels of federal assistance, rather than the al system. root cause of it. The public interest groups, like First of all, the subnational political, institu- many other representational organizations, can be tional, and programmatic weaknesses of states and described accurately as a "resultant interest." The local governments in the 1950s and early 1960s Commission's case studies do not suggest that the created a climate of national opinion in favor of lobbying activities of generalist state and local gov- federal intervention. Malapportionment, outdated ernment officials have been a crucial factor in the state constitutions and local governmental chart- initial federal forays into most of the new functional areas examined. On the other hand, it is aid through reformed administrative procedures clear that state and local governmental organiza- and broad-based grants. Neither the Intergourn- tions do play a significant supportive role in main- mental Cooperation Act of 1968 nor the Uniifomn taining and sometimes expanding programs, re- Relocation Act of 19r0, to cite the most obvious ex- gardless of their origin, and they can make termin- amples, could have been enacted without the ation or the targeting of aid funds more difficult. steady support and active promotional efforts of In this respect, they may be regarded as a central- the public interest groups. Most recently, these or- izing force.92 ganizations have advanced proposals on a broad Now, it seems clear that the public interest agenda of intergovernmental issues, including groups-jointly and individually-must reestablish grant consolidation procedures, crosscutting regu- their distinctive status as representatives of coe- lations, governmental accounting standards, regu- qual levels of the federal system. Because of the latory reform, fiscal notes, fair labor standards, widespread power of special interest groups, the and welfare reform, among others. During the past nation's Governors, state legislators, mayors and decade, public interest groups also have substan- county officials are viewed by some of the national tially expanded their research, training, and ser- counterparts as just another lobby, rather than as vice activities, both independently and through full partners in the business of governing.93 Hence, their jointly owned affiliates: Public Technology, their critics contend that national organizations Inc., the Academy for Contemporary Problems, devote far too much of their effort to "grantsman- the Center for International Urban Liaison, and ship" and lobbying activities, rather than attempt- the National Training and Development Service. ing to find solutions to public problems through Yet, despite these continual pressures, the com- state or local initiative^.^^ bined efforts of state and local governments and At least until recently, the critics charge, these the public interest groups have not stemmed the national associations did not establish clear priori- growth of federal intrusiveness. While the enact- ties for federal aid, either individually or jointly. ment of General Revenue Sharing in 1972 can be Furthermore, traditional jurisdictional rivalries attributed in large part to the persistent lobbying and distrust seem to have risen with the increased of subnational public official^,^^ only modest and flow of federal dollars. For example, local govern- partial successes have been achieved in the area of ments have looked chiefly to Washington, rather grant consolidation and grant simplification, while than the states, for a sympathetic response to their the number of separate categorical programs and problems, while the resulting federal-local pro- associated regulations has continued to grow. grams often have effectively shut the states out of On the judicial front, public interest groups gen- various urban issues. Other competitions are ap- erally have played at best a tertiary role in contest- parent within and between different types of local ing the expanding scope of federal regulations. governments and substate agencies; between ur- Yet, over the past ten (and especially the past five) ban, suburban, and rural jurisdictions, and among years, individual state and local governments in- the nation's geographic sections. All of these con- creasingly have challenged arbitrary, onerous, and flicts have made the protection of vital state and capricious Congressional and federal agency regu- local interests more difficult. lations and decisions in the courts. In general On the other hand, it must be recognized that the terms, this trend reflects a shift from a cooperative public interest groups always have been one of the to a confrontational mode of federalism. More spe- leading proponents for the decentralization, stan- cifically, it is a product of the addition of many dardization, simplification, and deregulation of the complex new regulatory "strings" to grant rela- intergovernmental system. For at least three tionships, the expanding number of grants and decades, state Governors have challenged what grantees, and a new defensiveness produced by fis- they regarded as onerous or unworkable adminis- cal dependency and federal leverage. The conse- trative provisions, and the "categorical grant ex- quence has been a rapid growth in federal grant-in- plosion" of the mid-1960s was met by vociferous aid law. Indeed, more than 80% of all of the court complaints about complexity, confusion, and red cases dealing with grants have been handed down tape from many mayors as well. Ever since that since 1975. A number of other important cases time, state and local governments have been in the have attempted to examine the scope of local forefront of efforts to improve and simplify federal authority under the 10th Amendment in areas not involving grant funds, as with land use zoning. ments and individual jurisdictions, should regard Nearly all of these cases, however, have been the development of solutions to public problems at brought by individual states, cities, counties, spe- the state and community levels as a paramount ob- cial districts, and nonprofit organizations-and not jective. by the public interest groups-with the principal Second, but no less importantly, state and local exceptions thus far being the landmark 1976 deci- governments must reassert their own independ- sion in National League of Cities v. U~ery,~~and ence-in part, by reordering their own lobbying the joint participation of some 1,431 plaintiff state priorities. Such an effort is in fact underway. Espe- and local governments in County of Los Angeks v. cially during the past two years, the public interest Marshall.97 The burden of maintaining state and groups have recognized that simply asking for local rights-as opposed to maintaining the flow of more federal money is not an effective way of ad- federal dollars-has fallen primarily on particular dressing every emerging problem.88Some have at- jurisdictions, even thought the resulting decisions tempted (though with limited success thus far) to have important implications for many. identify those fields in which their members' need In sum, then, while the organizational and repre- for federal assistance is paramount, secondary, or sentational activities of state and local govern- only tertiary. ments over the past 15 years have increased their One strategy employed, and worthy of further capacity to secure federal dollars, their determina- utilization, has been the membership survey. In tion and capacity to ward off federal intrusions 1979 both the National League of Cities (NLC) and have not kept pace. Greater recognition of some the National Governors' Association conducted a spheres of real autonomy for state and local gov- mail questionnaire review of federal assistance is- ernments within a balanced federal system will re- sues. These studies addressed problems in the op- quire dramatic and persistent efforts on the part of eration of intergovernmental programs, and, for state and local governments themselves. the first time, also took initial steps in developing a What, then, should be done in light of the forego- strategy for the "sorting out" of governmental ing political analysis? Although most of the dra- functions. Similarly, at its meetings in 1979 and matic changes in federalism over the past two 1980, the National Conference of State Legisla- decades do bear a "made in Washington" label, the tures (NCSL) took on the task of listing those areas actions and inactions of state and local govern- where federal grant-in-aid programs to state gov- ments have contributed to them. Furthermore, ernments could most appropriately be reduced. state and local governments necessarily must play The Commission is convinced that these efforts, if a vital role in restoring balance to the system and expanded and adequately supported by the mem- improving its overall performance. Many friends, bership and national staffs of all the public interest as well as critics and reformers suggest a number groups, offer promise in improving the balance of of ways in which these governments, and their as- federalism. sociations, could contribute to this objective, and The national government now appears to be with some of these, the Commission concurs. more open to-and, indeed, is actively encourag- First, the Commission believes, it is of para- ing-advice and assistance on these matters. At mount importance that state and local govern- the March 1980 meeting of the NCSL, President ments continue current efforts to put their own Carter indicated his willingness to consult closely houses in order, for only if the states, localities, with state and local government leaders to deter- and metropolitan areas are able to demonstrate an mine which levels of government are best suited effective political, administrative, and fiscal ca- and best equipped to carry out particular func- pacity for self-governance can they expect that tions. "This needs to have a reassessment," he de- Washington will pursue a national policy of respect clared, adding that "I need you to help me with and devolution. Despite the positive record of re- it."g9 Similarly, Congressman Bolling (D-MO) has cent accomplishment, we believe that the public in- sought state and local support for his proposed terest groups could play an even greater role in ca- Commission for More Effective Government. pacity building, in identifymg and evaluating inno- In the judicial area, the Commission is convinced vative policies and administrative practices, and that state and local governments must maintain a increasing the quality of state and local leadership. vigilant posture against coercive federal actions. They, as well as state associations of local govern- The courts remain the final recourse available to state and local governments to challenge the validi- shal others for participation in the legal pro- ty, or even the constitutionality, of federal regula- cess. tions, while the decision in the NLC case could Finally, it might take on the function of insti- mark the beginning of an era of reaffirmation of tuting major suits itself on issues involving state and local rights within the federal system. fundamental principles involving a large num- This potential, however, will be realized only if the ber of jurisdictions. The costs of such litigation states and localities assert themselves skillfully, re- could be allocated equitably among participat- peatedly, forcefully, and cooperatively. ing jurisdictions-perhaps on the basis of a for- While individual jurisdictions have achieved mula reflecting population size, extent of im- some notable successes before the courts, the pre- pact, or other similar factors. sent ad hoc approach to legal questions does not make it easy to challenge federal actions. Too In this regard, the Commission commends the many state and local governments simply lack the creation of a legal advocacy group by the National financial capacity to pursue expensive litigation, Institute of Municipal Law Officers (NIMLO) in sometimes to the highest level, where the costs are November 1979. Composed of several municipal at- likely to run into hundreds of thousands of dollars. torneys, this new group is attempting to screen Virtually none possesses the necessary highly spe- cases brought to its attention, identify those of na- cialized legal expertise for Constitutional tests. tionwide impact, and determine whether NIMLO's Neither is this function an easy one for the public involvement is appropriate. Yet, a more broadly interest groups to assume. While NLC v. Userg re- based effort of this kind remains necessary. mains a signal victory, the effort was initially In summary, the Commission believes that a re- launched somewhat reluctantly, and it was not storation of balance to American federalism and easy to obtain the broad support and funds needed the improvement of intergovernmental relation- to fight the cask all the way to the Supreme Court. ships requires a determined effort on the part of For these reasons, the Commission urges the state and local governments, no less than federal creation of a mutual "legal defense fund" for state officials. The recent actions of individual office- and local governments, following the models em- holders and jurisdictions, and of the public interest ployed so successfully by various civil rights and groups, directed toward these ends are a positive environmental groups. If properly organized, sign and should be maintained, strengthened, and staffed, and financed, such an organization could expanded. help assure that state and local rights and concerns are fully recognized, if not respected, by federal RECOMMENDATION 5 agencies and indeed by the federal judiciary itself. Strengthening the Concept of Such an organization could have several functions: Constitutional Federalism First, it could play a major informational role as a clearinghouse-a source of information on The Commission finds that the present dysfunc- recent and forthcoming decisions. tional pattern of intergovernmental relations is Secondly, it also could help identify those partially a byproduct of a decline among the cit- federal actions which impose the greatest costs izenry and officeholders at all levels in their under- or administrative burden and lend themselves standing of the meaning and practice of Constitu- to litigation. In the NLC case, it took some tional federalism and of the absence of any dra- time before state and local government offi- matic, highly visible effort to address the future of cials recognized the full implications of a com- federalism. plex statute, while the final victory depended upon a clear showing of factual financial dam- Hence, the Commission recommends that edu- age in some 700 pages of reports from affected cators, the media, and public officials at all lev- cities and states. els in this decade of the Constitutional Bicenten- Third, such an organization could help iden- nial stress that the essence of our nearly 200 tlfy the state and local government which is in years of uninterrupted Constitutional develop- the best position to challenge the federal law or ment, not to mention the more than 800 years of regulation, or lower court decision, and mar- Anglo-American experience, is the concept of limited government and that this concept of The Commission is convinced that our historic Constitutionalism above all else involves a sys- concepts of constraints on governmental power tem of regularized constraints on both the gov- and arbitrariness, of formal and informal "rules of ernors and the governed and in the American the game" to which all political participants ad- context a basic constraint is the effective appli- here, of reciprocally responsible relationships be- cation of the federal principle. tween government@) and the electorate, and of a In order to help further this educational goal citizenry that is as mindful of its responsibilities as well as to curb some of the systemic conflicts as of its rights (whether individual or collective, in contemporary federal-state-local relations, whether majority or minority) have been lost sight the Commission further recommends a convoca- of, even though they lie at the heart of America's tion by the President of leaders of Congress, the Constitutional heritage. Neither public officialdom Governors, state legislators, county officials, nor the mass media have duly noted this dark de- the mayors, and the public at the earliest possi- velopment or warned of its potential long-term ble convenient date to address the current mal- damage to the very foundations of our system. functioning of American federalism and to agree Similarly, within the scholarly community, only a upon an agenda for intergovernmental reform in very few individuals-and but a single research in- the 1980s. stitute, the Center for the Study of Federalism at The Commission further recommends that the Temple University, with its journal Publiw-have top priority items on the convocation's agenda thoroughly explored the application of federalist include: (1)a debate on what the term "national principles to the problems of contemporary gov- purpose" now means in a regulatory and pro- ernment. grammatic sense and should mean in a period of Even though the federal principle in the Ameri- fiscal constraint; (2) identification of needed fis- can setting has served as a major constraint-both callfunctional "trade-offs" between and among politically and constitutionally- on governments the traditional levels in light of their actual and at all levels, this too has been largely ignored or potential revenue raising and servicing roles; (3) dismissed as a concern of antiquarians. The rea- a probe of Congress' power to regulate inter- sons for this are many, but this is not the place (1) state commerce and the related questions of its to describe or dissect how the media is organized, use to preempt state and local regulatory au- who it hires, or how it covers public events-other thority and to mandate services and manage- than to note that it generally acts and reports na- ment obligations on subnational governments; tionally as if it were in a unitary system; (2) to diag- and (4) a defining of the parameters of Congress' nose the defects in social studies' teaching in sec- conditional spending power, including its use ondary schools; (3) to bemoan the absence of all but for aiding any and all governmental services, for a few genuinely broad-gauged, "renaissance" regulating, and for mandating. types in the political science, economic, and legal areas at the tertiary educational level; or (4) to In urging this two-part recommendation, the chronicle further the insensitivity, if not the un- Commission focuses first on our Constitutional awareness, of government officials-especially at heritage and its relevance to the mired and murky the national level-to the necessities and advan- pattern of today's myriad intergovernmental rela- tages of Constitutional federalism. The Commis- tionships. At the outset, the Commission addresses sion's call here for a broad educational endeavor to elected and key administrative public officials at inform and illuminate the thinking of the public, its every governmental level as well as the molders governmental officials, and even its educators and shapers of public opinion and of youthful clearly is in order and is especially appropriate in minds-reminding them that the type of Constitu- this decade of the Constitutional Bicentennial. tionalism which we and approximately 25 other na- To those who claim that such a call is the last tions know and practice is the product of a long refuge of the desperate, if not the naive, our re- evolutionary process and that it, and it alone, es- sponse is with the words of Jefferson: ". . . when- tablishes the critical criterion for differentiating ever the people are well informed, they can be between open and closed, free and fettered, genu- trusted with their own government; . . . whenever inely democratic and authoritarian or totalitarian things get so far wrong as to attract their notice, regimes. they may be relied on to set them to rights."loOTO those who deem the issue of Constitutional federal- Critics of this proposal find it impolitic and im- ism as irrelevant to our nation's current basic con- practical. The last thing politicians would concede, cerns, let them ponder the degree to which prac- they argue, is that the system that produced them tically all of domestic American government is now is "badly wounded." The inevitable tendency of caught up in the intergovernmental labyrinth. Let most elected officials to endorse either status quo them also gauge the extent to which our present or moderate incremental approaches to change difficulties stem from our adherence to a crypto- would guarantee not much more than a series of federalist creed which confuses roles, convolutes headlines-starting on page one during the early responsibilities, and recoils from facing admin- days of the convocation and ending up buried in the istrative, programmatic, and regulatory realities. newspaper, possibly close to the obituary column. So, we sanction a widespread educational effort, Moreover, some among the critics see in it too through the media and other public forums, in and much of Canada's regular conferences of the do- outside of the classrooms, and at the annual meet- minion and provincial premiers, but without the ca- ings of every group that seeks to shape the public pacity of these partners in Canada's federalism to agenda-with politicians, judges, and pressure debate authoritatively and to deliver on their group spokesmen not absenting themselves from promises-thanks to their more cohesive parties the dialogue. and parliamentary set-up at both governmental In terms of its possible format, such an effort levels. might begin with a probe of first principles and Yet, the Commission is convinced that a highly with the query: What do the terms "representa- visible and dramatic event is needed to focus the tive," "federal," and "democratic" mean today as mind of the public and its officials on the future of they apply to the American system? It might pro- federalism, and we believe that such a convocation ceed with the question: What principles, in fact, would serve admirably to accomplish these high shape or are reflected in the current governmental purposes. Furthermore, were its agenda to include and political practice? And it might conclude- the four items cited in this recommendation, we hopefully by 1987-with a probe of what in our 200 are convinced that a major first step would have year Constitutional legacy is outdated, what needs been taken to bring down the curtain on the drama to be revised, and what is wholly relevant to our that has been playing steadily as the system's pres- third century of development? Out of this conceiv- entation of "Federalism in Action" for the past ably could come a "New Public Philosophy" to re- decade and a half. place the one that was shattered in the 1960s. An opening debate on what is a "national pur- As a corollary proposal, the Commission recom- pose" in an era of fiscal constraint might well lead mends that the President-whoever he or she may to a rejection or modification of the present politi- be-convene at the earliest convenient time an cal method of defining it, i.e., any purpose that is assemblage of key federal, state, and local officials, embodied in legislation enacted by Congress and as well as lead spokesmen for the public-at-large, signed by the President is deemed a national one. to confront the symptoms of and to come up with It might even produce a hierarchy of concerns: some solutions to the dysfunctional features of the paramount (defense, foreign relations, and the system. Such a convocation would dramatize that economy); primary (post office, internal revenue the era of fanciful federalism is clearly over and service, immigration service, national parks, and that the nation has need for more than increment- other direct services as well as a range of regula- al, politics-as-usualapproaches to the domestic dif- tory activities in communications, transportation, ficulties that will face us in the 1980s. As a noted banking, energy, and like areas); secondary (here national columnist envisages it, such an assem- the array of federal promotional, lesser or concur- blage "meeting over several weeks in the early rent regulatory, and grant programs would come 1980s to hammer out a governmental reform agen- into play along with a range of value judgments da for the decade-might offer the only early op- about these myriad undertakings); tertiary (com- portunity to resuscitate a badly wounded Ameri- prising what is sorted out from the secondary con- can federal systern."lOl At the same time, it would cerns and what is chiefly a state or local respon- avoid the trauma and potential turmoil of the full- sibility, but still warrants a modest federal involve- scale Constitutional convention some have called ment of some kind); and of no real concern for and others actually seek. (programs and activities that have outlived their usefulness, have had counterproductive effects, or in and special needs of federal programs that mix have exerted minimal or no real impact as gauged regulatory and grant components (meat and by their tiny budgets or trivial purposes). Such a poultry inspection, surface mining, etc.); and (3) debate might even lay the groundwork for answer- use of the commerce power to mandate servicing ing authoritatively, at least in some policy areas, or other requirements on subnational govern- what level of government has or should have the ments. That there are limits to this power, none- dominant role. including the federal judges-deny. Yet, their ex- As a close follow-up to this difficult but hopefully act nature in this post-National Leagw of Cities v. defining dialogue, a hard-headed discussion of Usery era is a very open question-one that such a "trade-offs" might well ensue, The earlier probe of convocation might well address and not necessarily federal grant and regulatory efforts almost cer- in wholly legal terms. tainly would have identified key areas which nearly Finally, the-remarkable assertions of federal au- all participants believed should be of primary na- thority under the cloak of Congress' capacity to at- tional importance (perhaps income maintenance tach conditions to grants needs a thorough airing. and health insurance) and this might suggest their Vertical conditions attached to individual pro- national takeover-both financially and, one way grams that require, for example, changes in a or another, administratively. Those programs left state's constitution, or the establishment of a unit or relegated to the "tertiary" or "no concern" within a county government over which the county categories obviously would be candidates for state has no real influence, or a particular pattern of or local pick-up. What is obviously intergovern- headquarters-field relationship within a state de- mental (parts of transportation, energy, and the partment suggest just how far the conditional environment-for example) and what are clear spending power has been pushed. And the three candidates for consolidation also would be high- score horizontal (crosscutting) conditions relating lighted. to a range of national social and environmental In short, this phase of the convocation could pro- goals underscore how federal intergovernmental vide a high-level political forum in which to at- fiscal transfers can be harnessed to regulatory pur- tempt and practically adapt the decongestion poses-purposes whose cumulative effects have yet strategy outlined in our first recommendation. to be assessed thoroughly by anyone. The convoca- And while we are mindful of its political difficult- tion might well examine the kinds of conditions at- ies, we also are mindful that the Presidency, the tached to federal aid that really amount to coer- Congress, and the federal bureaucracy as well as cion. After all, the old and still binding rule that re- the federal fisc cannot function effectively under cipients may avoid the conditions by refusing to today's heavily overloaded system. Moreover, the participate in the grant program has become an public is seeking greater accountability from unrealistic option for many states and localities. elected officials at all levels-a practical impossi- To sum up, this Commission sanctions a Presi- bility in a "super-marbleized system." dential call for a convocation of key leaders from If trade-offs are developed and even if they in- all levels and from the citizenry because the crucial volve a number of program areas, there no doubt issues confronting the system need to be discussed will be plenty left in the intergovernmental realm. and debated in such a dramatically novel, yet delib- Hence, some effort should be made to grapple with erative forum. Who knows, perhaps some decisions that pair of Congressional authorities that impact might be reached on some of them. Politics inevita- so heavily in this area: the commerce and condi- bly would enter into the convocation's proceed- tional spending powers. ings, but given the times, its auspices, and its The Commission is convinced that Congress' weighty agenda, statecraft also might manifest it- power to regulate interstate commerce is a matter self. In any event, this Commission would provide that should not be left solely to a permissive na- any assistance that is appropriate to such an as- tional political process or to the federal judiciary. semblage, were it convened. Hence, the need for its consideration by the convocation. Among the central issues that might be pro- RECOMMENDATION 6 bed are: (1) intentional, unintentional, and unilat- Ending the Ambiguities in the erial federal administrative preemption of the Constitutional Amendment Process states' role in a regulatory area; (2) the ambiguities The Commission believes that the power con- ferred upon the legislatures of two-thirds of the Ervin and many others, feel that Congress has the states to petition for a Congressional call for a power, if not the duty, to remedy this situation by Constitutional convention to draft correcting an ordinary statutory enactment. A few others amendments should be accorded the same degree contend that only a clarifymg Constitutional of dignity, feasibility, and legal clarity as the more amendment will suffice. familiar Congressional initiating option. The Com- For 14 years now, the statutory approach has mission finds the absence of clear guidelines re- dominated what thinking has been given to the garding the unused state initiative approach to need to "reduce to orderly processes the chaos, amending the US. Constitution has been a subtle, and indeed, the anarchy that threatens" were the yet significant factor in the breakdown of con- requisite number of state petitions to be filed. straints at the national level. Hence. . . From 1967 to his retirement in 1974, Sen. Ervin was the focal point of Congressional efforts to es- To end the uncertainties and ambiguities re- tablish an orderly process for utilizing the state-in- garding the alternative state-initiating amenda- itiating option stipulated in Article V. The initial tory process authorized by the U.S. Constitu- Ervin measure was modified in light of a series of tion, the Commission reaffirms its recommenda- hearings and in its present form [S. 3, Sen. Helms tion of February, 1971 which urged "the Con- (R-NC), prime sponsor; H.R. 1664, Rep. L.H. gress at its earliest opportunity" to "enact the Fountain (D-NC); H.R. 500, Rep. Henry Hyde (R- proposed Federal Constitutional- Convention IL) and H.R. 84, Rep. Robert McClory (R-IL)] the Amendment Act" in order "to provide needed bill provides answers to a range of difficult ques- guidelines for a Constitutional convention to tions regarding amending the Constitution by con- consider specific amendments to the U.S. Con- vention. Its basic provisions spec@ that: stitution-should one be invoked by petition from the states." Hence, it recommends early The legislatures of the states may call for passage of the pending version of this legisla- a convention to propose "one or more" tion (S. 3 and H.R. 1664,96th Congress).* amendments to the US. Constitution. This recommendation calls for an explicit inter- Adoption of such resolutions must adhere pretation of the now ambiguous Constitutional to regular state legislative practice, save amending process stipulated in Article V and in a for the fact that gubernatorial approval is way that places the state-initiating alternative on not needed. an even footing with the Congregsional. While the Such applications remain in effect for former has never been used successfully102 and seven years, though rescission may occur the latter has dominated in practice and legal pre- at any time prior to when two-thirds of the cedents, five major efforts (prayer in public legislatures have filed valid petitions. schools, reapportionment, General Revenue Shar- Once the requisite number of applications ing, anti-abortion, and a balanced federal budget) on the same topic has been filed, it is the have been made over the past two decades to util- Constitutional duty of both Houses of Con- ize the state legislative route to petitioning Con- gress to enact a concurrent resolution de- gress to convene a Constitutional convention to tailing the time, place, and specific amend- consider specific amendments to the US. Constitu- ment topics of the convention, which must tion. The current drive for a budget-balancing convene within a year. amendment has come close to receiving the re- State representation would follow the quired number of petitioning states (30, as of May Congressional formula, with two dele- 1980, of the needed 34). Yet, Congress still has vir- gates-at-large elected statewide and one tually "no precedents to guide it in answering the from each Congressional district; compen- myriad questions" in implementing this alterna- sation to the delegates and other conven- tive provision of Article V, as then Sen. Sam Ervin tion costs would be covered in the concur- (D-NC) warned some 13 years ago. Many, like Sen. rent resolution. The Vice President would formally *OMB abstained, noting that the Administration has developed convene the assemblage, and its perma- no policy on this issue. nent officers would be elected subsequently, with voting on this and all other mat- Post, and The New York Times,over to the New ters following the one delegate-one vote Republic. And in February 1971, this Commission formula (not on the one state-one vote sanctioned the objectives of the then pending ver- basis that appeared in the original Ervin sion'of the Ervin bill. bill). The measure's legislative history, however, has A majority of the total number of not been promising. The Senate Judiciary Subcom- delegates may vote to propose an amend- mittee on Separation of Powers first held hearings ment (not two-thirds, as one earlier ver- on the initial bill in October 1967. Following the sion of the Ervin measure called for), but hearings, it was revised in a number of ways. The no amendment may be voted that goes be- changes were incorporated in S. 623 (91st Cong.), yond the subject area stipulated in the con- which Sen. Ervin introduced on January 24,1969. current resolution; the oath that all dele- The subcommittee took favorable action on the bill gates are required to take at the outset on June 13, 1969, and reported it to the full Com- contains the same obligation. mittee on the Judiciary. No final action was taken by the Committee and no companion measure was Any proposed amendment is to be trans- considered by the House Judiciary Committee. mitted to Congress within 30 days after a The measure was reintroduced in the 92nd Con- convention's adjournment. On receipt of a gress. In reporting the measure (S. 215) to the validly proposed amendment, both Houses Senate in 1971, the Judiciary Committee declared are required to adopt a concurrent resolu- that it was the responsibility of Congress "to enact tion of transmittal (which also specifies legislation to make Article V meaningful" and not whether the amendment shall be ratified to make the Constitutional convention "a dead let- by state legislature or conventions) or of ter." The bill passed the Senate later that year, disapproval (if the proposed amendment amid mounting state efforts to obtain General goes beyond its proper subject area or if Revenue Sharing via a call for a Constitutional the convention's procedures were irregu- convention. The House took no action, however. lar). In either case, or even if Congress Two years later the Senate again responded fails to act within the required period of 90 favorably to the proposal (S. 1815), but again the days of continuous session, the proposed House desisted. amendment cannot be pigeonholed. The currently pending bills (S. 3, H.R. 1664, et. Ratification follows the Constitutional al.) are all identical to the 1973 legislation, with the course, that is, by a vote of three-quarters exception of minor technical changes. The of the states, but a seven-year time limit is Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate set for this phase of the process and states Judiciary Committee, chaired by Sen. Birch Bayh may rescind an earlier ratification if the (D-IN), held hearings on S. 3 in November 1979 three-fourths vote still is lacking. and on May 14, 1980. No House action has been This bill clearly is designed to carry out Con- taken on H.R. 1664 and its companion bills. gress' responsibility under the Constitution to en- The reasons for this glacial pace of Congression- act legislation which makes all of Article V mean- al action are not difficult to fathom. Enactment ingful. This means avoiding the creation of road- has been viewed by many as a step that would aid blocks in the way of the convention route, while those who seek to use the state-petitioning route, also avoiding the establishment of procedures that since cries of "a runaway convention" and "the would facilitate the adoption of any particular pro- Constitution would be up for grabs" no longer posed Constitutional change. The steps stipulated would be in the arsenal of rhetorical weapons that in the bill would establish a process which is unam- opponents could employ (and have used previous- biguous regarding those times when Congress' ly). Moreover, the drive for this eminently con- role is ministerial only and regarding the constructive and clarifying proposal has occurred in a straints on a convention. period when the specific state petitioning efforts Those favoring this statutory approach to clari- have been classed by many as conservative in char- fymg Article V have ranged from the late Sen. acter. Not to be overlooked here is the fact that Everett Dirksen (R-IL) and James J. Kilpatrick to these recent efforts in all instances also have been the American Bar Association, The Washington antifederal government, being directed either at the Court (as in the prayer, antireapportionment, any one period (largely liberal or progressive in the and antiabortion drives) or at Congress (as with past and more conservative of late) should not General Revenue Sharing and budget balancing). serve as the basic criterion for considering the Finally, a few of the more legalistically minded op- merits of this measure. It is after all a Constitution ponents have contended that the proposed mea- we are dealing with here-a Constitution that both sure, if enacted, could not achieve its stated pur- empowers and constrains power. And its amend- pose, since a Constitutional convention could not ing process provides alternative ways for launch- be restricted solely to the stated purpose for which ing amendments and for ratifying them, with suit was called. All these factors have combined to per majorities required in all cases. Extraordinary throw doubt on the measure's worth and to delay concurrent majoritarian hurdles are called for, and its passage. the Ervin measure does nothing to diminish their The Commission rejects all of these dilatory tac- height. Two-thirds of the states must petition and tics and arguments. Our position is that the fram- three-quarters are needed to ratify. ers of the Constitution intended that there should Moreover, we are persuaded by the arguments of be two means of initiating Constitutional amend- the American Bar Association and other noted ments. As Madison stated in the 43rd Federalist legal experts that Congress has the power, if not Paper: "It [the Constitution] . . . equally enables the duty, to enact legislation of this type and that the general and the state governments to originate such legislation can set the parameters of conven- the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed tions called to consider a specific amending pro- out by the experience on the one side or on the posal. We also concur with the judgment of the other." The Ervin bill, in our view, is a proper, pro- noted Constitutional authority, Professor C. Her- cedurally sensible, legally adequate, and politically man Pritchett, that "Even the most adamant op- neutral way of filling out the bare bones of the ponents of Constitutional amendment by conven- state legislative alternative provided in Article V tion might well regard such legislation as insur- and of faithfully elaborating on its brief commen- ance against future disaster."10sSo we support the tary in Hamilton's 85th Federalist Paper. measure as being both traditional and timely and The nature of the specific amendatory thrusts of urge its speedy enactment.

FOOTNOTES mary and Concluding Observations, The Intergovernmental Grant System: An Assessment and Proposed Policies (A-62), 'This judicial "passivity" in the commerce and conditional Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, June spknding areas has had the practical affect of accelerating the 1978, p. 78. activism of the federal political branches and in the latter it 8Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State reflects a sustained effort to ignore the very great changes in Aid to Local Government (A-34), Washington, DC, U.S. the grant system since the mid-60s. Government Printing Office, April 1969, p. vi. In 1969, when 2Some slight backing off from the expansionist tendencies of this recommendation was adopted, federal public assistance the Warren Court, it should be noted, can be detected in some aid programs consisted of aid to families with dependent of the procedural due process cases decided by its successes. children (AFDC), old age assistance, aid to the blind, and aid 3Most of this has escaped the notice of even the closest Con- to the permanently and totally disabled. Since then, the last gressional observers, since much of the legislation of the three-the "adult categoriesw-have been federalized into the 1970s appears to be merely a renewal of the legislation supplemental security income (SSI) program. AFDC and launched in the 1960s. Yet, the dramatic shifts, the major Medicaid (medical assistance for the poor and medically in- expansions, the much greater role of narrowly based func- digent) are still federal-state programs, and general tional interests, the lesser role of federal administrators, and assistance remains a state-local program. the greater tendency to insert constraining conditions in gAdvisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Cate- these renewals-make the process of the 1970s a very dif- gorical Grants: Their Role and Design (A-52), Washington, ferent, a less difficult, a more cooptive, and to many, a far DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 298. less constrained one than its predecessor of the last and all 'OAdvisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Gov- earlier decades. When totally new grant or other novel pro- ernmental Structure, Organization, and Planning in Metro- posals come up, however, the older "veto group politics" still politan Areas, House of Representatives Committee Print, emerges. 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Committee on Governmental Opera- 4This continued throughout the period, though the majority tions, Washington, DC, US. Government Printing Office, Ju- now wants the programs at less cost and with less inefficien- ly 1961, p. 49. cies. "Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 6Medicare and the SSI program are the only basic exceptions Periodic Congressional Assessment of Federal Grants-in-Aid to this generalization. to State and Local Governments, Adopted June 15, 1961, $These were adopted at the Commission's March 14, 1980, reprinted as Committee Print, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate meeting. Committee on Governmental Operations, Washington, DC, ?Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Sum- US. Government Printing Office, July 10,1967, p. 13. 12Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Im- s7John Shannon, Assistant Director, U.S. Advisory Commis- pact of Federal Urban Development Programs on Local sion on Intergovernmental Relations, testifying at a Hearing Government Organization and Planning, Committee Print, before the Subcommittee on the City of the Committee on 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., Senate Committee on Government Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Repre- Operations, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Of- sentatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Revenue Sharing With the fice, May 30,1964, p. 37. States, Serial No. 96-14, Washington, DC, U.S. Government 13Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Printing Office, May 3,1979, pp. 57-58. Fiscal Balance inthe American Federal System, Volume I (A- S8Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Block 31), Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, Oc- Grants: A Comparative Analysis (A-601, Washington, DC, tober 1967. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 14ACIR (A-34), p. vi. 39U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Responsive Fed- 16Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, eralism: Report to the President on Federal Assistance Re- Financing Schools and Property TmRelief: A State Respon- wiew, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, sibility (A-40), Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing January 1973. Office, January 1973, pp. 4-9. 4OJames C. Miller I11 and Bruce Yandle, eds., Baefit-Cost 16ACIR(A-52), pp. 298-304. Analyses of Social Regulation: Case Studies from the Council '?Ibid., pp. 305-19. on Wage and Price Stability, Washington, DC, American 1sAdvisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Im- Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979, p. 5. proving Federal Grants Management (A-53), Washington, 411bid., p. lo. DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1977, pp. 42Interagency Task Force on Federal Planning Requirements, 266-287. Preliminary Working Papers: Revieu, of Federal Planning 'BACIR (A-62), p. 78; Requirements, Washington, DC, U.S. Office of Management 2olJ.S. Commission on Federal Pa~erwork.Final Summaru and Budget, October 1977. Report, Washington, DC, U.S. dvernment Printing office, 4SPress Release OMB-47, March 25, 1979, with accompanying October 3,1977. fact sheet and supplement. 21U.S. Department of Commerce, Toward Regulatory Reason- "The White House, Federal Aid Simplijkation: White House ableness, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, Status Report, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing January 13,1977. Office, September 1978. 22U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Frame- 46Federal Assistance Monitering Project, "Streamlining Fed- work for Regulation, Vol. VI of the Study on Federal Regula- eral Assistance Administration," The Final Report to the tion, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., Committee Print, Washington, President, Washington, DC, Advisory Commission on Inter- DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1978. governmental Relations, offset, October 1978, pp. 5-9. 23HerbertKaufman, Red Tape: Its Origins, Uses, and Abuses, 46Timothy B. Clark, "It's Still No Bureaucratic Revolution, But Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1977. Regulatory Reform Has a Foothold," Nationul Journal, W.S. Office of Management and Budget, Managing Federal Washington, DC, September 29,1979, p. 1596 Assistance in the 1980$, Washington, DC, U.S. Government 47ACIR,Special RevenueSharing: An Analysis of the Adminis- Printing Office, March 1980. tration's Grant Consolidation Proposals (M-70), Washington, 26Comptroller General of the United States. Perspectives on DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1971. Intergovernmental Policy and Fiscal Relations (GGD-79-62), 480ffice of Management and Budget, Special Analysis, Budget Washington, DC, U.S. General Accounting Office, June 28, of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1977, Washing- 1979. ton, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1976, pp. 26Ri~hardE. Cohen, "The New Appeal of Congressional Over- 256-57. sight," National Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2, Washington, DC, '9U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United January 13,1979, pp. 44-49. States Govmment, 1981, Special Analysis H, "Federal Aid to W.S. Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork and Red State and Local Governments," Washington, DC, U.S. Gov- Tape: New Perspectives, New Directions, A Report to the ernment Printing Office, January 1980. President and Congress, Washington, DC, US. Government Torlocal school districts alone, this figure is 8.1%. See U.S. Printing Office, September 1979. Bureau of the Census, Finances of School Districts, Volume 28"Federal Paperwork Reduction," Executive Order 12174, 4, Number 1, Governmental Finances, 1977 Census of Gwern- November 30,1979. mts(GC77(4)1), Washington, DC, U.S. Government Print- 29Comptroller General, Program to Follow Up Federal Paper- ingoffice, March 1979, p. 1. work Commission Reeomdations Is In Trouble (GGD- 61The Comptroller General of the United States, The Federal 80-36), Washington, DC, U.S. General Accounting Office, Government Should, But Doesn't Know the Cost of Adminis- March 14,1980. tering Its Assistance Programs (GGD-77-87), Washington, 30Kaufman,Red Tape: Its Origins, Uses, and Abuses, p. 62. DC, U.S. General Accounting Office, February 14,1978. 311bid,pp. 85-86. 62National Governors Association, Review of Grant-In-Aid 32Comptroller General, Perspectives on Intergovernmental Priorities, Washington, DC, September 1979, p. 2. Policy, p. 37. 63ACIR(A-52), p. 303. 33U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Managing Federal 64Ibid., p. 305. Assistance in the 1980s, 12 volumes, Washington, DC,U.S. 66AdvisoryCommission on Intergovernmental Relations, InjZa- Government Printing Office, August, 1979. tion and Federal and State Income Taxes (A-63), Washington, $'U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Managing Federal DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 9. Assistance in the 1980s, Washington, DC, U.S. Government 66Thisdefinition excludes states "restraints." Advisory Com- Printing Office, March 1980. mission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Mandating of 36Ri~hardP. Nathan, The Plot That Failed: Nixon and the Ad- Local erpenditures (A-67), Washington, DC, U.S. Govern- ministrative Presidency, New York, NY, John Wiley and ment Printing Office, July 1978, p. 38. Sons, Inc., 1975. 67Congressional Budget Office, Federal Constraints on State 36By mid-1980, it appears as though the states may lose their and local Governments Actions, Washington, DC, U.S. Gov- funds from this source as a result of federal budget cutting. ernment Printing Office, March 1979, p. 5. SaZbid. 80Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., Where Have All the Voters Gone?: %atherine H. Lovell, et al, Federal and State Mandating on The Fracturing of America's Political Parties, New York, Local Governments: An Exploration of Issues and Impacts, NY, W.W. Norton & Co., 1978. Final Report to the National Science Foundation, Riverside, 81James L. Sundquist, "The Crisis of Competence in Govern- CA, University of California, June 20,1979, p. 32. ment," Setting National Priorities: Agenda for the 1980s, ed. 6oSincethe mid-1930s, Congress has been relatively free from Joseph A. Pechman, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institu- judicial constraints on its actions in this regard. The notable tion, 1980, pp. 542-3. exception, of course, occurred in 1976 with the Court's deci- 82"Payment Deferred: The Inheritance of the New Decade," sion in Natiml League of Cities v. Usery (426 US. 833). National Journal, Washington, DC, January 19,1980, p. 84. That decision invalidated Congressional use of the Commerce %undquist, "The Crisis of Competence in Government," pp. power as applied to the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor 543-4. Standards Act. a4Fora comparison of convention delegates see Austin Ranney, 61Lovell,et al, Federal and State Mandating on Local Govern- "The Political Parties: Reform and Decline," The New ments, p. 56. American Political System, Anthony King, ed., Washington, 'j2ACIR(A-52), p. 234. DC, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 63Zbid. 1978, pp. 213-47. 64Zbid. asEverett Carll Ladd, "A Better Way to Pick Our Presidents," 66Lovell, et al, have produced a very detailed mandate Fortune, Chicago, IL, May 5,1980, pp. 132-142. typology. Briefly, under the general heading of "Re- Vhndquist, "The Crisis of Competence in Government," pp. quirements," they identify the following types of mandates: 548-552. program, program quality, program quantity, and reporting, Tordiscussions, see ACIR(A-52), pp. 55-56 and 61-89. performance, fiscal, personnel, planninglevaluation, record- 88Republican Policy Committee, "House Republican Policy keeping, and residual. Lovell, et al, Federal and State Man- Committee Approves GOP Budget Substitute with Less dating on Local Government, pp. 35-41. Spending and Tax Cut," Washington, DC, U.S. House of Rep- 66Zbid.,p. 168. resentatives, March 31,1980. 67Zbid.,p. 167. Y3ee William Ricker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, 68Exe~utiveOffice of the President, Office of Management and Signi3cance Boston, MA., Little Brown & Co., 1964, pp. 129, Budget, Manacrina Federal Assistance inthe 1980's:A Rmort 1365, and Morton Grodzins, The American System, New to th;! ~ongresHofthe United States Pursuant to the ~e&al York, NY, Rand McNally, 1966, p. 254. Grants and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977, P.L. 95-224, goseeACIR (A-31), pp. 203-13. Washington, DC, Executive Office of the President, March glDonald H. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington: 1980, p. 34. Governors, Mayors, and Intergovernmental Lobbying, New 69Congressional Budget Office, Federal Constraints on State York, NY, The Free Press, 1974. and Local Government Actions, pp. 10-11. 92See Samuel H. Beer, "Political Overload and Federalism," ?OSen. Abraham Ribicoff, "For Effectiveness and Efficiency: Polity 10, Amherst, MA, Fall 1977, p. 10. S. 262," Regulation MaylJune 1979, pp. 17-8. 83RochelleL. Stanfield, "The PIGS: Out of the Sty, Into Lobby- W.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Frame- ing with Style, "National Journal, Washington, DC, August work for Regulation. Vol. IV of Study on Federal Regulation, 14,1976,p. 1134. 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Washington, DC, US. Government @'Zbid.,1139. Printing Office, 1978, p. 38. gsSamuelH. Beer, "The Adoption of General Revenue Sharing: 72Councilon Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality: A Case Study in Public Sector Politics," Public Policy 24, The Tenth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Cambridge, MA, Spring 1976. Quality, Washington, DC, US. Government Printing Office, 96426U.S. 833, SCt 2465 (US. SCt, 1976), 78 LC: 33,390. 1979, pp. 665-66. 73U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Frame- 97-F2nd -DC Cir. March 20, 1980, pet. for cert. pend, no 79-1965 (filed June 14, 1980). See summary at 48 LW work for Regulation, pp. 42-52. 2648. ?'As early as 1937, the so-called Brownlow Committee on Ad- 9aSee Rochelle L. Stanfield, "A New Breed of Mayors With a ministrative Management noted this problem and recommended that the independent regulatory agencies be placed New View of Washington, "National Journal, Washington, under executive branch control. DC, May 26,1979, pp. 866-70. 76Commissionon Law and the Economy, Federal Regulation: g9"National Conference of State Legislatures: Remarks at the Roads to Reform, exposure draft, Washington, DC; American Advisory Conference," March 28, 1980, Weekly Compilation Bar Association, August 1978, pp. 95-96. of Presidential Documents, Washington, DC, U.S. Govern- 76CongressionalBudget Office, "The Number of Federal Em- ment Printing Office March 31,1980. ployees Engaged in Regulatory Activities," Staff Paper lOOThomas Jefferson, Letter to Richard Price, in Thomas Jeffer- presented for the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga- son on Democracy, Saul K. Padover, ed., New York, NY, tion, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. Mentor Books, 1946, p. 88. House of Representatives, August 1976, pp. 1-2, as cited in 1OlNeal Peirce, "A Program for Governmental Reform," San Committee for Economic Development, July 1979, p. 58. FranciscoExaminer, December 5,1979. ??Zbid.,pp. 58-9. lo21nthe first decade of this century, 31 states, or two-thirds of 78WilliamG. Colman, "Reshaping the National Government's the total then, filed petitions for an amendment providing for Role in the Federal System," in Advisory Commission on In- the direct election of US. Senators. Congress took no action tergovernmental Relations, Hearings on the Federal Role in on these petitions, but did advance its own amendment. the Federal System (A-86), Washington, DC, U.S. Govern- lo3C. Herman Pritchett, "Why Risk a Constitutional Conven- ment Printing Office, 1980. tion?," The Center Magazine, Santa Barbara, CA, March 79ACIR(A-52), p. 316. 1980, p. 19. Appendix Tables Appendix Table A-1 473 FEDERAL GRANT PROGRAMS, ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS, RANKED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF DOLLAR MAGNITUDE, FY 1980 (in thousands of dollars)

The 19 largest programs account for 80% of the funding. The 49 largest programs account for 90% of the funding.

FY1980 Estimated Obligations Program (descending Rank Number Title order) Cumulative

Lower Income Housing Assistance-dp Medical Assistance (Medicaid)-fg Highway Research, Planning, and Construction-pg, fg Comprehensive Employment and Training-pg, fg Public Assistance (Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Aid to Disabled)-fg General Revenue Sharing Food Stamps-dp Construction Grants, Wastewater Treatment-pg, coop agreements Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Entitlement Grants-fg 2,753,838 Grants for Educationally Deprived Children-fg 2,625,594 Social Services (Title XX)-fg 2,475,000 School Lunch-sales, exchange 2,123,100 Public Housing-pg, direct loans 2,082,500 Unemployment Insurance-pg, dp 2,034,600 Urban Mass Transportation, Capital 1,400,000 Rural Water and Waste Disposal-pg, guaranteed loans 965,000 CDBG, Small Cities-pg 939,626 Urban Mass Transportation, Operations 850,000 Surplus Food Distribution-sale, exchange 80 % 813,535 Education of Handicapped Children-fg Level 804,000 Youth Employment and Training-pg, fg, contract State Employment Services-fg, services Special Supplemental Food for Women and Children-pg Head Start-pg, services Airport Development-pg, advisory Summer Youth Employment-pg, fg Federal Impact School Aid-fg Vocational Education, Basic Grants to States-fg Rehabilitation Services and Facilities, Basic Grants-fg Job Corps-pg, contract Public Housing, modernization-pg, loans Urban Development Action Grants-pg Community Action-pg Work Incentives-fg State Administration of Food Stamps-fg Outdoor Recreation- pg Child Support Enforcement-fg, services Community Health Centers-pg Law Enforcement, Improvement-pg Heart Disease Research-pg, rc Maternal and Child Health Services-pg, fg Nutrition for the Aging-fg Community Service Employment, Older Americans-pg, rc Cancer Treatment Research- pg, rc School Breakfasts, Grants to States-fg, sale, exchange Aging Assistance to States-fg Child Care, Food-fg, sale, exchange Education, Migrant Children-fg Appalachian Highway Development-pg 90 % Weatherization Assistance for Low Income Persons-pg Level Cancer Cause and Prevention-pg, rc Local Education Imyovement-fg Economic Development, Public Works-pg, direct loan Community Mental Health Center-pg State and Community Highway Safety-fg Disaster Assistance-pg, services Watershed Protection, Flood Prevention-pg, advisory Occupational Safety and Heatlh-pg, services, advisory Bilingual Education-pg, fg, rc Employment for the Disadvantaged-pg Health Maintenance Organizations-pg, direct loans

(pg = project grant, fg = formula grant, dp = direct payment, rc = research contract) FY 1980 Estimated Obligations Program (Descending Rank Number Title Order) Cumulative

Emergency School Aid for Minority Children-pg Drug Abuse Community Service-pg, contract Education for Handicapped Children-fg Family Planning-pg Emergency School Aid for Minorities, Includes Parents-pg Summer Food for Children-fg Youth Employment, Community Conservation-pg, fg Mental Health Research-pg Vocational Rehabilitation for Disabled-fg Vocational Education-fg Diabetics, Endocrinology, and Metabolism Research-pg, rc Youth lncentive Entitlement Pilot-pg Health Resource Planning-pg, contract Agricultural Experiment Stations-fg Cellular and Molecular Disease Research-pg, rc Crippled Children's Services-pg, fg Law Enforcement, Discretionary Grants-pg Cancer Biology Research-pg, rc Public Assistance Training (Title XX)-fg Adult Education- fg Mother and Children Health Research-pg Educational Research and Development-pg, contract Genetics Research-pg, contracts Elementary and Secondary School Minority Aid-pg Employment of Seasonal Farmworkers-pg, fg, contract Microbiology and Infectious Disease Research-pg, rc Water Pollution Control (areawide planning)-pg Wildlife Restoration-fg Air Pollution Control-pg Native American Employment and Training-fg State Student Incentive Grants-fg Coal Miners Respiratory Impairment Clinics-pg, rc Flood Insurance-direct subsidy to individuals Human Reproduction Research-pg, contract Mental Health Clinical and Service Training-pg Blood Diseases and Resources Research-pg, contract Lung Diseases Research-pg, rc State Health Care Survey Certification-pg, fg Neurological Disorders Research-pg, rc Local Rail Service-fg Disease Control-pg Alcoholism Treatment and Rehabilitation-pg, contract Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention-fg Cancer Control Research-pg, rc Economic Opportunity After Preschool, Follow Through-pg, fg, contract lrnmunologic and Allergic Disease Research-pg, rc Applied Science and Research-pg, rc Library Services and Construction-fg Alcohol Abuse-fg Child Welfare Services-fg Upward Bound, Higher Education-pg Construction Management (water pollution control)-fg State Medicaid Fraud Control-fg Handicapped Personnel Preparation-pg Farm Labor Housing-pg, dp Vocational Rehabilitation for Supplementary Security Income Recipients-fg Urban Mass Transit, Technical Studies-pg HUD Project Research and Operation-pg, rc Minority Business Development-pg, contract Civil Rights Technical Assistance for Schools-grants Public Health Services-fg Law Enforcement and Comprehensive Planning-pg, fg Health Financing Research-pg, rc Appalachian Community Development, Supplemental Grant-in-Aid Disadvantaged Children Education Aid-fg State Educational Agency Needs-fg Developmental Disabilities Services-fg Arthritis, Bone, and Skin Disease Research-pg, contract Water Pollution Control (state and interstate)-fg

(pg = project grant, fg = formulagrant, dp = direct payment, rc = research contract) FY 1980 Estimated Obligations Program (Descending Rank Number Title Order) Cumulative

Kidney Diseases, Urology, and Hematology Research-pg, contract Indian Education-fg Digestive Diseases and Nutrition Research- pg, contract Drug Abuse Research-pg, contract Biomedical Research-pg Community Economic Development-pg Consumer and Homemaking Education-fg Historic Preservation-pg Solid and Hazardous Waste Management-pg, fg Surface Coal Mining, Environmental Protection-pg, dp Migrant Health-pg, contracts Aging Research-pg Foster Grandparents-pg Economic Development, Prevent Long-Term Deterioration-pg Section 701 Comprehensive Planning-pg Intergovernmental Personnel, Indian Tribe Governments-pg, fg Emergency Energy Conservation- pg Drug Abuse-fg Medical Facilities Construction-pg Retinal and Choroidal Disease Research-pg Mass Transportation Technology-pg, rc Cancer Detection and Diagnosis Research-pg, rc Education of Children in State Institutions-fg Teacher Corps- pg VISTA-fg Civil Defense Management-pg, rc Physiology and Biomedical Engineering Research-pg Sudden and Severe Economic Dislocation Needs-pg Emergency Medical Services-pg Cooperative Forestry Assistance-pg Marine Research, Education and Training-pg Right to Read-pg Child Nutrition, State Expenses-fg Native American Self-Sufficiency-pg, contract Milk for Children-fg Stroke, Nervous System, and Trauma Research-pg Pharmacology and Toxology Research-pg, rc Public Assistance Training- fg Family Medicine, Graduate Training-pg Rehabilitation Training-pg State Health Planning-pg Aging Services-pg, contract State Public Water System Supervision-pg Fundamental Neurosciences Research-pg, rc Economic Development, Public Works-pg Communicative Disorders Research-pg, rc Agricultural Research-pg Meat and Poultry Inspection-pg Fish Restoration-fg Coastal Energy Impact-fg Rehabilitation Research-pg, rc Coastal Zone Management-pg Arts Promotion, Challenge Grants-pg FDA Research-pg, rc Law Enforcement, Research and Development-pg Health Services, Research and Development-pg, rc General Intern and Pediatric Graduate Education-pg Youth Conservation Corps-pg Arts Promotion, State-pg, fg, services, counseling Public Telecommunications-pg Appalachian Health-pg Laboratory Animal Sciences and Primate Research-pg, rc Retired Senior Volunteer Program-pg Veterans State Nursing Home Care-fg Humanities Promotion, State-pg Environmental Protection Research-pg, coop agreements Emergency Conservation, Farmlands-pg Equipment for School Food Services-fg Nutrition, Education and Training-fg Supplemental and Basic Economic Development Funds for State-pg, direct loans Handicapped Research, Education, and Demonstration-pg Handicapped Research, Early Childhood-pg

-- (pg = project grant, fg = formula grant, dp = direct payment, rc = research contract) FY 1980 Estimated Obligations Program (Descending Rank Number Title Order) Cumulative

Vocational Education, Special Needs-fg Environmentally Caused Disease Research-pg, rc Handicapped Medla-pg, dp Health Careers Opportunity-pg Appalachian, Vocational and Other Education-pg Child Abuse and Neglect, Prevention and Treatment-pg, rc Vision Research, Sensory and Motor-pg, rc Mental Health Research, PrelPost Doctoral-pg Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Enforcement-rc Guidance Counseling, Testing in Elementary and Secondary Schools- fg Youth Conservation Service Corps-pg Economic Development, Planning-pg Water Pollution, Research, Demonstration-pg, coop agreement Aging, Training Workers-pg, contract Summer Youth Recreation-pg Economic Development, Planning Organizations-pg Libraries and Learning Resources-fg Deaf, Blind Centers for Children-pg, contract Talent Search, Postsecondary-pg Construction of Cancer Research Facilities-pg, contract Indian Education-pg Appalachian Access Roads-pg Water Pollution, Lakes Restoration-pg, coop agreement Energy Extension Service-fg Alcohol Research-pg, research contract Mental Health, Children's Services-pg Environmental Disease Research-pg, rc Employment and Training Research-pg, contract Law Enforcement, Technical Assistance-pg Arts Promotion, Music-pg Child welfare, Administration and Research-pg, rc Corneal Diseases Research-pg, rc Urban Rat Control-pg

Appalachian Local Development Planning-pg Crime Prevention-pg Vocational Education Improvement Projects-pg, contract Water Resources University Research, Matching Funds-pg Boating Safety-pg, fg Mental Health Research, Scientist Development-pg Correction, Staff Development-pg, services, training New England, Technical and Planning Assistance-pg, contract Rural Self-Help Housing-pg Rural Area Development Planning-pg Commercial Fisheries Research-fg Health Professions, Financial Distress of Schools-pg Education of Severely Handicapped-pg, contract Child Welfare Services and Training-pg Adoption Practices Improvement-pg, rc Humanities Promotion, Higher Education-pg Humanities Promotion, Program Development-pg Intergovernmental Program, National Science Foundation-pg Criminal Justice Systems Development-pg Drug Abuse, Demonstrations-pg, contract Arts Promotion, Literature-pg Criminal Justice Statistics-pg Veterans State Hospital-fg Radiological Systems Maintenance, Civil Defense-pg, special services Drug Abuse, Education-pg, contract Humanities Promotion, Elementary and Secondary Education-pg Humanities Promotion, Higher Education Development-pg Soil and Water Resource Appraisal and Development-pg, technical information Coastal Plains Supplement to Federal Grants-pg Arts Promotion, Special Projects-pg, training, advisory Upper Great Lakes, Supplement to Federal Grants-pg Alcohol Clinical Service and Training-pg Genetic Disease Testing and Counseling-pg Restorative Materials Research, Dental-pg, rc Humanities Promotion, General Research-pg Civil Defense Readiness-pg Four Corners, Supplement to Federal Grants-pg

(pg = project grant, fg = formula grant, dp = direct payment, rc = research contract) \ FY1980 Estimated Obligations Program (Descending Rank Number Title Order) Cumulative

Education of Gifted Youth-pg, contract Anadromous Fish Conservation-pg Arts Promotion, Architecture-pg National Water Research and Development-pg, contract Four Comers, Energy Crisis-pg Coastal Energy Impact-pg Environmental Education-pg Public Assistance Payments, Research-pg, rc National Historical Publications Records-pg Health, Biomedical Science Research, Minorities-pg, rc Interlibrary Cooperation-fg Law Enforcement Training-pg, contract Community Education-pg, contract Consumer Education-pg, contract Water Resource Planning-fg Alcohol Abuse, Prevention, Demonstration-pg Estuarine Sanctuaries-pg Emergency Medical Services, Training-pg Family Planning, Training-pg, rc Ethnic Heritage Studies-pg Hemophilia Diagnostic Treatment Center-pg Education Information Centers-fg Alcohol and Drug Abuse Education-pg, contract Citizen Education, Cultural-pg. contract Developmental Disabilities, University Affiliated-pg Endangered Species Conservation-pg Juvenile Delinquency, Prevention and Control-pg, contract Resource Conservation and Development-pg, advisory, special services Pain Control and Behavioral Studies-pg, rc Coastal Plains, Technical Development-pg, contract Gas ~ipelirieSafety-fg Sudden Infant Death, lnformation and Counseling-pg Toxic Substances Research-pg, coop agreements New England Transportation-pg Energy Technical, Research, and Development- pg, dp, contract University Year for Action Volunteers-pg Forestry Research-pg Solid Waste Dispoal Research-pg, coop agreements Regional Education for Deaf or Other Handicapped-pg, contract Arts Promotion, Folk Arts-pg Humanities Promotion, Special Projects-pg Upper Great Lakes, Technical Assistance and Planning-pg, contract Humanities Promotion, Higher Education, Pilot Grants-pg Pesticides Control Research-pg, coop agreements Four Corners, Technical and Planning Assistance-pg, contract Coastal Zone Environmental Protection-pg Railroad Safety, State Participation-pg Energy, Consumer Services-pg Civil Defense Readiness-pg Mental Health Hospital Improvement-pg Education, Metric System-pg, contract Bilingual Vocational Training-pg Ozarks, Technical and Planning Assistance-pg, contract Nutrition Education-pg Antipoverty MinieGrant for Volunteer Programs-pg Old West, Supplements to Federal Grants-pg, contract Agricultural Marketing Improvement-pg Statistical Activities in State Education Agencies-pg Toxic Substance Control-pg, coop agreements Alcoholism, Demonstration and Evaluation-pg Youth Development Research (runaway)-pg, rc Rural Development Research-fg Corrections Research-pg, research, advisory, services Drug Abuse Research, Scientist Development-pg State Disaster Preparedness-pg Art Education, Elementary and Secondary Schools-pg Corrections, Technical Assistance-pg, contract Nursing Education Research-pg Humanities Promtion, NEH Youth Projects-pg Water Pollution, Manpower Development-pg, coop agreements Maternal and Child Health Research-pg Foreign Language and Area Studies Research-pg, rc

(pg = project grant, fg = formula grant, dp = direct payment, rc = research contract) Q) bbbbbmobbbbbbb ~~NONNNNNNNNNOOOO~ .-> LCjm~.OmmbmmmmmOmu~mml7OCDmmWWbbbbrrrrm - YV .-FToa-m-wmNo-b..w- Ta-m-cv-a-tomqrm---m-~-qo-e-a-~-- -0 cG~f~~b~~~~r~~O000000000rrrrr W~LOWCD~COCO&~OO-~NNN~rrrrrrrrrrNNNNNNNN NNNNNNNNNNNNNN NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN- dddddddddddddd dddddddddddddddddm a rrrrrrrrrrrrrr rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr 0 rrrrrrrrrrrrrr rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr 0 UZE ooooomoWoooooo oomaNooooooooaooom o Q) oooooaNoooammo oobmmooaooooomooom a~z.,OSz-- o-o-o-omo-aaacOabbbb bbmmmmmmmmmmmbbttm rrrrr eE-2 tf) >..~.g'o 0 'qLl aJ 0 e

Appendix Table A-2 473 FEDERAL GRANT PROGRAMS, ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS, CLUSTERED IN 29 GROUPS, FY 1980 (in thousands of dollars)

1. Housing 11. Public Transit 21. Environmental Protection 2. Medical Assistance 12. Airports (except water) 3. Highways 13. Vocational Rehabilitation 22. Other Transportation 4. Employment and Training 14. Economic Opportunity 23. Libraries 5. Public Assistance 15. Natural Resources Conservation and Development 24. Volunteer Services 6. General Revenue Sharing 16. Criminal Justice 25. Arts and Humanities 7. Food and Nutrition 17. Medical Research 26. Energy 8. Water Pollution Control 18. Economic Development 27. Rural Development 9. Community Development 19. Civil Preparedness 28. Fire Protection 10. Education 20. Occupational Safety and Health 29. Miscellaneous

Program FY 1980 Rank Number Program Name Funding

Federal Aid Cluster #1 - Housing 1 14.1 56 Lower Income Housing Assistance-dp $20,045,328 13 14.146 Public Housing-pg, direct loans 2,082,500 31 14.158 Public Housing, Modernization-pg, loans 409,200 116 10.405 Farm Labor Housing-pg, dp 55,000 264 23.005 Appalachian Housing-pg, direct loans 9,600 316 10.420 Rural Self-Help Housing-pg 5,000 TOTAL $22,606,628 Federal Aid Cluster #2 - Medical Assistance

2 13.71 4 Medical Assistance (Medicaid)-fg 38 13.244 Community Health Centers-pg 41 13.232 Maternal and Child Health Services-pg, fg 54 13.295 Community Mental Health Centers-pg 61 13.256 Health Matntenance Organizations-pg, direct loans 63 13.235 Drug Abuse Community Service-pg, contract Family Planning-pg Health Resource Planning-#, contract Crippled Children's Services-pg, fg Coal Miners' Respiratory Impairment Clinics-pg, rc Mental Health Clinical and Service Training-pg State Health Care Survey Certification-pg, fg Disease Control-pg Alcoholism Treatment and Rehabilitation-pg, contract Alcohol Abuse-fg State Medical Fraud Control-fg Public Health Services-fg Health Financing Research-pg, rc Migrant Health-pg, contracts Drug Abuse-fg Medical Facilities Construction-pg Emergency Medical Services-pg Family Medicine, Graduate Training-pg State Health Planning-pg Health Services, Research and Development-pg, rc Appalachian Health-pg Veterans State Nursing Home Care-fg Health Careers Opportunity-pg Mental Health, Children's Services-pg Nurse Practitioner Training-pg Hypertension Treatment-pg Community Care for Alcoholism, Uniform Act-pg Physician Assistant Training-pg Nursing Scholarships-pg Drug Abuse, Clinical and Service Related-pg, contract State Nursing Home Care for Veterans, Construction-pg. Health Professions, Financial Distress of Schools-pg Drug Abuse, Demonstrations-pg, contracts Veterans State Hospital-fg Drug Abuse, Education-pg, contract Alcohol Clinical Service and Training-pg Genetic Disease Testing and Counceling-pg Alcohol Abuse, Prevention Demonstrations-pg Emergency Medical Services, Training-pg Family Planning, Training-pg, rc

(pg = project grant, fg = formulagrant, dp = direct payment, rc = research contract) Program FY .I980 I Rank umber Program Name Funding Hemophilia Diagnostic Treatment Center-pg $3,000 Alcohol and Drug Abuse Education-pg, contract 3,000 Sudden Infant Death, Information and Counseling-pg 2,802 Mental Health Hospital Improvement-pg 1,900 Alcoholism, Demonstration and Evaluation-pg 1,490 Drug Abuse Research, Scientist Development-pg 1,370 Nursing Education Research-pg 1,101 Maternal and Child Health Research-pg 1,000 Alcohol Research, Scientist Development-pg 986 Home Health Services and Training-pg 804 Mental Health Hospital Staff Development-pg 325 TOTAL $15,069,424 Federal Aid Cluster # 3 - Highways

Highway Research, Planning, and Construction-pg, fg Appalachian Highway Development-pg State and Community Highway Safety-fg Appalachian Access Roads-pg Outdoor Advertising Control-pg Appalachian Special Transportation, Planning, Research, and Development-pg 700 TOTAL $8,829,143

Federal Aid Cluster #4 - Employment and Training

Comprehensive Employment and Training-pg, fg Unemployment Insurance-pg, dp Youth Employment and Training-pg, fg, contract State Employment Services-fg, services Summer Youth Employment-pg, fg Job Corps-pg, contract Work Incentives-fg Community Service Employment, Older Americans-pg, rc Employment for the Disadvantaged-pg Youth Employment, Community Conservation-pg, fg Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot-pg Employment of Seasonal Farmworkers- pg, fg, contract 91 17.234 Native American Employment and Training-fg 78,566 188 10.663 Youth Conservation Corps-pg 24,970 211 30.002 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Enforcement-rc 18,500 213 10.661 Youth Conservation Service Corps-pg 18,000 230 17.233 Employment and Training Research-pg, contract 14,300 252 49.010 Older Persons Opportunities-pg, contract 10,500 TOTAL $13,998,608 Federal Aid Cluster #5 - Public Assistance

Public Assistance (Aid to Families With Dependent Children and Aid to Disabled)-fg $7,056,710 Social Services (Title XX)-fg 2,475,000 Child Support Enforcement-fg, services 333,000 Aging Assistance to States-fg 219,470 Weatherization Assistance for Low Income Persons-pg 198,750 Public Assistance Training (Title XX)-fg 100,825 Child Welfare Services-fg 56,500 Emergency Energy Conservation- pg 40,000 Native American Self-Sufficiency-pg, contract 33,800 Public Assistance Training-fg 31,000 Aging Services-pg, contract 30,000 Child Abuse and Neglect, Prevention and Treatment-pg, rc 18,928 Aging, Training Workers-pg, contract 17,000 Child Welfare, Administration and Research-pg, rc 13,230 Veterans State Domiciliary Care-fg 12,301 Runaway Youth Facilities-pg 11,000 Aging Research-pg, rc 8,500 Senior Companion Program-pg 8,135 Social Services, Research and Demonstration-pg, rc 5,975 Child Welfare Services and Training-pg 5,000 Adoption Practices Improvement-pg, rc 5,000 Public Assistance Payments, Research-pg, rc 3,500 Antipoverty Mini-Grants for Volunteer Programs-pg 1,700 Youth Development Research (runaway)-pg, rc 1,470 TOTAL $10,686,794 Federal Aid Cluster #6 - General Revenue Sharing $6,863,000 6 - General Revenue Sharing TOTAL $6,863,000

(pg = project grant, fg = formula grant, dp = direct payment, rc = research contract) Program FY 1980 Rank Number Program Name Funding

Federal Aid Cluster #7 - Food and Nutrition Food Stamps-dp $6,401,000 School Lunch-sales, exchange 2,123,100 Surplus Food Distribution-sale, exchange 81 3,535 Special Supplemental Food for Women and Children-pg 750,000 State Administration of Food Stamps-fg 362,570 Nutrition for the Aging-fg 254,546 School Breakfasts, Grants to States-fg, sale, exchange 224,800 Child Care, Food-fg, sale, exchange 21 3,000 Summer Food for Children-fg 135,800 Child Nutrition, State Expenses-fg 34,867 Milk for Children-fg 32,000 Equipment for School Food Services-fg 20,000 Nutrition, Education and Training-fg 20,000 Nutrition Education-pg 1,750 TOTAL $11,386,968

Federal Aid Cluster #8 - Water Pollution Control

Construction Grants, Wastewater Treatment-pg, coop grants Rural Water and Waste Disposal-pg, guaranteed loans Water Pollution Control (areawide planning)-pg Managementof Water Pollution Control Construction-fg Water Pollution Control (state and interstate)-fg State Public Water System Supervision-pg Water Pollution Control, Research and Demonstration-pg, coop agreements Water Pollution Control, Lake Restoration-pg, coop agreements Safe Drinking Water Research-pg, coop agreements State Underground Water Source Protection-pg, coop agreements Water Resources Research, Technical Assistance to States-fg Water Resources University Research, Matching Funds-pg National Water Research and Development-pg, contract Water Resources Planning-fg Water Pollution, Manpower Development-pg, coop agreements Water Pollution Control, Training Grants-pg, coop agreements Water Pollution Control, Technical Training-pg, coop agreements TOTAL

Federal Aid Cluster #9 - Community Development

CDBG Entitlement Grants-fg CDBG Small Cities-pg Urban Development Action Grants-pg Flood Insurance-direct subsidy to individuals HUD Project Research and Operation-pg, rc Appalachian Community Development, Supplement Grant-in-Aid-pg, Historic Preservation-pg Section 701 Comprehensive Planning-pg Appalachian Local Development Planning-pg TOTAL

Federal Aid Cluster #10 - Education Elementary Secondary

Grants for Educationally Deprived Children-fg Education of Handicapped Children-fg Head Start-pg, services Federal Impact School Aid-fg Education of Migrant Chilren-fg Local Education Improvement-fg Emergency School Aid for Minority Children-pg Education for Handicapped Children-fg Emergency School Aid for Minorities, Includes Parents-pg Elementary and Secondary School Minority Aid-pg Civil Rights Technical Assistance for Schools-pg Disadvantaged Children Education Aid-fg Development Disabilities Services-fg Indian Education-fg Education of Children in State Institutions-fg Right to Read-pg Guidance Counseling and Testing-fg Indian Education-pg Appalachian Child Development-pg Educational TV for Minorities-pg - (pg = project grant, fg = formula grant, dp = direct payment, rc = research contract) Program FY 1980 Rank Number Program Name Funding

Development Disabilities-pg $5,557 Education of Severely Handicapped-pg, contract 5,000 Humanities Promotion-pg 4,500 Education of Gifted Youth-pg, contract 3,780 Regional Education for Deaf or Other Handicapped-pg, contract 2,400 Art Education-pg 1,250 Handicapped Teacher Recruitment and Inforrnation-pg, contract 1,000 Coastal Plains Education-pg 1,000 Emergency School Aid, Neutral Site Planning-pg 750 Pacific Northwest Educational Development-pg, contract 300 Upper Great Lakes, Education-pg 100 SUBTOTAL $5,897,005

Higher Education

Adult Education-fg $100,000 State Student Incentive Grants-fg 76,750 Upward Bound-pg 56,000 Talent Search, Postsecondary-pg 15,300 Higher Education Land Grants-pg 11,500 Women's Educational Equity-pg, contract 10,000 Higher Education Equipment-pg 7,500 Educational Opportunity Centers-pg 6,300 Adult Indian Education-pg 5,930 Humanities Promotion-pg 5,000 Humanities Promotion, Development-pg 4,400 Humanities Promotion, Pilot Grants-pg 2,000 Education, Metric System-pg, contract 1,840 Fulbright-Hays Educational and Cultural Exchange-pg 920 State Student Financial Aid Administration-fg 600 Higher Education Academic Facilities-fg 500 Fulbright-HaysTraining Grants, Foreign Study-pg, services 289 SUBTOTAL $304,829 Vocational

Vocational Education, Basic Grants to States-fg 71 13.495 Vocational Education-fg Consumer and Homemaking Education-fg Vocational Education, Special Needs-fg 20,000 Appalachian Vocational and Other Education-pg 19,000 Career Education- pg, contract 10,135 Vocational Education, State Advisory Councils-fg 6,073 Educational TV and Radio-pg, contract 6,000 Vocational Education Improvement Projects-pg, contract 5,236 Community Education-pg, contract 3,138 Bilingual Vocational Training-pg 1,820 Bilingual Vocational Instruction-pg 700 Bilingual Instructional Material, Vocational-pg, contract 280 SUBTOTAL $704,227

Research

Bilingual Education-pg, fg, rc $173,600 Educational Research and Development-pg, contract 98,285 State Educational Agency Needs-fg 50,000 Marine Research, Education and Training-pg 35,236 Handicapped Regional Education Resource Centers-pg, contract 9,750 Ethnic ~GitageStudies-pg 3,000 Education Information Centers-fg 3,000 Developmental Disabilities, University Affiliated-pg 3,000 Statistical Activities in State Education Agencies-pg 1,550 Foreign Language and Area Studies Research-pg, rc 1,000 SUBTOTAL $378,421

Other Programs

Teacher Corps-pg $37,500 Teacher Centers, Inservice Training-pg 13,000 Environmental Education-pg 3,500 Consumer Education-pg, contract 3,135 Citizen Education, Cultural-pg, contract 3,000 Telecommunications, Social Services-pg 1,000 SUBTOTAL $61,135 TOTAL (for all education) $7,345,617

(pg = project grant, fg = formula grant, dp = direct payment, rc = research contract)

Minority Business Development-pg, contract Community Economic Development-pg Summer Youth Recreation-pg TOTAL

Federal Aid Cluster #15 - Natural Resources Conservation and Development Outdoor Recreation-pg Watershed Protection, Flood Prevention-pg Agricultural Experiment Stations-fg Wildlife Restoration-fg Cooperative Forestry Assistance-pg Agricultural Research-pg Fish Restoration-fg Coastal Energy Impact-fg Coastal Zone Management-pg Energy Conservation, Farmlands-pg Forestry Research-fg Commercial Fisheries Research-fg Soil and Water Resource Appraisal and Development-pg, technical information Anadromous Fish Conservation-pg Coastal Energy Impact-pg Estuarine Sanctuaries-pg Endangered Species Conservation-pg Resource Conservation and Development-pg, advisory, special services Forestry Research-pg Agricultural Marketing Improvement-pg Marine Mammals-pg TOTAL

Federal Aid Cluster #16 - Criminal Justice

Law Enforcement, Improvement- pg Law Enforcement, Discretionary Grants-pg Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention-fg Law Enforcement and Comprehensive Planning-pg, fg Law Enforcement, Research and Development-pg

(pg = project grant, fg = forrnulagrant, dp = direct payment, rc = research contract) Program FY 1980 Rank Number Program Name Funding

Law Enforcement, Technical Assistance-pg National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention-pg, contract 11,175 Antitrust State Enforcement-pg 10,000 Crime Prevention-pg 5,500 Correction, Staff Development-pg 5,028 Criminal Justice Systems Development-pg 5,000 Criminal Justice Statistics-pg 4,886 Law Enforcement Training-pg, contract 3,300 Juvenile Delinquency, Prevention and Control-pg, contract 3,000 Correction Research-pg, rc 1,404 Correction, Technical Assistance-pg, contract 1,124 Correction, Policy Formulation-pg 662 Organized Crime Prosecutorial Training-pg 259 Law Enforcement Research and Development, Visiting-pg 250 Corrections Clearinghouse-pg 21 0 TOTAL $613,296

Federal Aid Cluster #17 - Medical Research

Heart Disease Research-pg, rc Cancer Treatment Research-pg, rc Cancer Cause and Prevention-pg, rc Mental Health Research-pg Diabetes, Endocrinology, and Metabolism Research-pg, rc Cellular and Molecular Disease Research-pg, rc Cancer Biology Research-pg, rc Mother and Children Health Research-pg Genetics Research-pg, contracts Microbiology and Infectious Disease Research-pg, rc Human Reproduction Research-pg, rc Blood Diseases and Resources Research-pg, rc Lung Diseases Research-pg, rc Neurological Disorders Research-pg, rc Cancer Control Research-pg, rc Immunologic and Allergic Disease Research-pg, rc Arthritis, Bone, and Skin Disease Research-pg, rc 49,374 Kidney Diseases, Urology, and Hematology Research-pg, rc 47,753 Digestive Diseases and Nutrition Research-pg, rc 46,503 Drug Abuse Research-pg, rc 45,536 Biomedical Research-pg 44,840 Aging Research-pg 41,199 Retinal and Choroidal Disease Research-pg 39,466 Cancer Detection and Diagnosis Research-pg, rc 38,118 Physiology and Biomedical Engineering Research-pg 37,019 Stroke, Nervous System, and Trauma Research-pg 31,855 Pharmacology and Toxology Research-pg, rc 31,249 Fundamental Neurosciences Research-pg, rc 29,423 Laboratory Animal Sciences and Primate Research-pg, rc 23,631 Environmentally Caused Disease Research-pg, rc 19,634 Mental Health Research, PrelPost Doctoral-pg 18,691 Construction of Cancer Research Facilities-pg, contract 15,000 Alcoholism Research-pg, rc 14,888 Environmental Disease Research-pg, rc 14,335 Corneal Disease Research-pg, rc 13,015 Glaucoma Research-pg, rc 10,717 Caries Research-pg, rc 9,091 Cataract Research-pg, rc 9,041 Craniofacial Anomalies Research-pg, rc 8,106 Periodontal Diseases Research-pg, rc 7,835 Alcoholism Research Center-pg 7,250 Mental Health Research, Scientist Development-pg 5,171 Restorative Materials Research, Dental-pg, rc 3,952 Health, Biomedical Science Research, Minorities-pg, rc 3,421 Pain Control and Behavioral Studies-pg, rc 2,871 TOTAL $2,506,362

Federal Aid Cluster #18 - Economic Development

Economic Development, Public Works-pg, direct loans Economic Development, Prevent Long-Term Deterioration-pg Sudden and Severe Economic Dislocation Needs-pg Economic Development, Public Works-pg Supplemental and Basic Economic Development Funds for States-pg, direct loans (pg = project grant, fg = formulagrant, dp = direct payment, rc = research contract) Program FY 1980 Rank . Number Program Name Funding

Economic Development, Planning-pg $1 7,700 Economic Development, Planning Organizations-pg 1 6,780 Appalachian Research and Technical Assistance-pg 12,000 Economic Development, Technical Assistance-pg, contract 10,500 Ozarks, Supplement to Federal Grants-pg, contract 8,122 State Economic Development-pg 7,750 Southwest Border Technical and Planning Assistance-pg, contract 6,535 Pacific Northwest Technical Assistance-pg, contract 6,230 Old West, Technical and Planning Assistance-pg, contract 5,855 New England, Technical and Planning Assistance-pg, contract 5,019 Coastal Plains, Supplement to Federal Grants-pg 4,307 Upper Great Lakes, Supplement to Federal Grants-pg 4,100 Four Corners Supplement to Federal Grants-pg 3,861 Coastal Plains, Technical and Planning Assistance-pg, contract 2,843 Upper Great Lakes, Technical and Planning Assistance-pg, contract 2,250 Four Corners, Technical and Planning Assistance-pg, contract 1,970 Ozarks, Technical and Planning Assistance-pg, contract 1,809 Old West, Supplements to Federal Grants-pg, contract 1,650 Economic Development Districts, Operational Assistance-pg 500 Coastal Plains, Health and Nutrition-pg 500 Ozarks, Health and Nutrition-pg 300 Old West, Health and Nutrition-pg 300 Four Corners, Health and Nutrition-pg 150 Upper Great Lakes, Health and Nutrition-pg 50 TOTAL $443,581

Federal Cluster #I9 - Civil Preparedness

Disaster Assistance-pg Civil Defense Management-pg, rc Radiological Systems Maintenance, Civil Defense-pg, special services 4,750 Civil Defense Readiness-pg 3,827 Civil Defense Readiness- pg 1,934 State Disaster Preparedness-pg 1,275 Civil Defense, Staff Training-pg 63 TOTAL $242,549 Federal Aid Cluster #20 - Occupational Safety and Health

Occupational Safety and Health-pg, services, advisory $1 79,520 Occupational Safety and Health, Training-pg 9,400 Occupational Safety and Health, Research-pg 6,400 Mine Health and Safety-pg 6,000 TOTAL $201,320 Federal Aid Cluster #21 - Environmental Protection (except water)

Air Pollution Control-pg $80,000 Solid and Hazardous Waste Management-pg, fg 42,550 Surface Coal Mining, Environmental Protection-pg, dp 41,680 Environmental Protection Research-pg, coop agreements 20,800 Urban Rat Control-pg 13,000 Poison Prevention, Lead-Base Paint-pg 10,250 Appalachian Mine Restoration-pg 9,648 Pesticides Enforcement- pg 9,200 Air Pollution Control Research-pg, coop agreement 7,075 Toxic Substance Research-pg, coop agreement 2,800 Solid Waste Disposal Research-pg, coop agreement 2,500 Pesticides Control Research-pg, coop agreement 2,000 Coastal Zone Environmental Protection-pg 1,955 Toxic Substance Control-pg, coop agreement 1,500 Solid Waste Management Training-pg, contract 675 Quiet Communities Capacity Building-pg, coop agreement 668 TOTAL $246,301 Federal Aid Cluster #22 - Other Transportation

Local Rail Service-fg $67,000 Boating Safety-pg, fg 5,180 Gas Pipeline Safety-fg 2,820 New England Transportation-pg 2,750 Railroad Safety, State Participation-pg $1,940 Ozarks, Transportation-pg 200 Coastal Plains, Transportation-pg 100 Four Corners, Transportation-pg 100 Upper Great Lakes, Transportation-pg 100 Pacific Northwest, Transportation-pg, contract 100 TOTAL $80,290 (pg = project grant, fg = formula grant, dp = direct payment, rc = research contract) Program FY 1980 Rank Number Program Name Funding Federal Aid Cluster #23 - Libraries

Library Services and Construction-fg $56,900 Libraries and Learning Resources-fg 16,200 College Libraries Research-pg 9,975 Interlibrary Cooperation-fg 3,337 Library Research-pg, contract 1,000 Research Libraries-pg 600 TOTAL $88,012

Federal Aid Cluster #24 - Volunteer Services

Foster Grandparents-pg $40,651 VISTA-fg 37,399 Retired Senior Volunteer Program-pg 23,214 University Year for Action Volunteers-pg 2,538 State Volunteer Services-pg 700 TOTAL $104,502 Federal Aid Cluster #25 - Arts and Humanities

Arts Promotion, Challenge Grants-pg Arts Promotion, State-pg, fg, services, counseling Humanities Promotion, State-pg Arts Promotion, Music-pg Arts Promotion, Museums-pg Institute of Museum Services-pg Arts Promotion, Media-pg Humanities Promotion, Media-pg Arts Promotion, Theater-pg Humanities Promotion, Museums, Historical-pg Arts Promotion, Dance-pg Arts Promotion, Expansion Arts-pg Arts Promotion, Visual Arts-pg Humanities Promotion, Research Materials-pg Arts Promotion, Opera and Theater (Musical)-pg Arts Promotion, Education-pg Humanities Promotion, Program Development-pg 5,000 Arts Promotion, Literature-pg 4,900 Arts Promotion, Special Projects-pg, training, advisory 4,300 Humanities Promotion, General Research-pg 3,900 Arts Promotion, Architecture-pg 3,700 Arts Promotion, Folk Arts-pg 2,400 Humanities Promotion, Special Projects-pg 2,250 Humanities Promotion, NEH Youth Projects-pg 1,100 Humanities Promotion, Science, Technology, and Human Values-pg 1,000 Humanities Promotion, Consultant Grants-pg 800 Humanities Promotion, Planning and Assessment-pg 750 Humanities Promotion, Youth Grants-pg 400 Humanities Promotion, Advanced Studies-pg 400 Humanities Promotion, Research Conferences-pg 355 TOTAL $217,355 Federal Aid Cluster #26 - Energy Energy Extension Service-fg $15,000 Four Corners, Energy Crisis-pg 3,503 Energy Technology, Research and Development-pg, dp, contract 2,566 Energy, Consumer Services-pg 1,940 Pacific Northwest, Energy Development-pg, contract 800 New England, Energy Development-pg 500 Ozarks, Energy Development-pg 200 Coastal Plains, Energy Development-pg 100 Upper Great Lakes, Energy Development-pg 100 TOTAL $24,709 Federal Aid Cluster #27 - Rural Development

Industrial Development in Rural Areas-pg $1 0,000 Rural Area Development Planning-pg 5,000 Rural Development Research-fg 1,440 TOTAL $16,440 Federal Aid Cluster #28 - Fire Protection

Fire Prevention Control, Education-pg Fire Incident Reporting-pg Public Education Assistance. Fire Prevention and Control (pg = project grant, fg = formula grant, dp = direct payment, rc = research contract) TOTAL Program FY 1980 Rank Number Program Name Funding

Federal Aid Cluster # 29 - Miscellaneous

Applied Science and Research-pg, rc $57,400 lntergovernmental Personnel, Indian Tribe Governments-pg, fg 40,000 Meat and Poultry Inspection-pg 28,581 FDA Research-pg, rc 26,854 Public Telecommunications-pg 23,705 Army National Guard, Construction-pg 12,000 lntergovernmental Research, National Science Foundation-pg 5,000 National Historic Publications Records-pg 3,500 Archeological Research- rc 790 International Travel in the United States-pg 580 TOTAL $198,410

TOTAL FOR ALL CLUSTERS

(pg = project grant, fg = formula grant, dp = direct payment, rc = research contract)

SOURCE: Office of Management and Budget, 1979 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Of- fice, May 1979, and AClR staff compilations.

COMMISSION MEMBERS

Private Citizens Abraham D. Beame, ACIR Chairman, New York, New York Bill G. King, Alabama Mary Eleanor Wall, Illinois

Members of the United States Senate Lawton Chiles, Florida William V. Roth, Jr., Delaware James R. Sasser, Tennessee

Members of the U.S. House of Representatives Clarence J. Brown, Jr.,Ohio L. H. Fountain, North Carolina Charles B. Ranpel, New York

Officers of the Executive Branch, Federal Government Moon Landrieu, Secretary, Department of Hcusing and Urban Development James T. McIntyre, Director, Office of Management and Budget G. William Miller, Secretary, Department of the Treasury

Governors Bruce Babbitt, Arizona John N. Dalton, Virginia Richard W. Riley, South Carolina Richard A. Snelling, Vermont

Mayors Thomas Bradley, Los Angeles, California Richard E. Carver, Peoria, Illinois Tom Moody, Columbus, Ohio John P. Rousakis, Savannah, Georgia

State Legislative Leaders Fred E. Anderson. President, Colorado State Senate Jason Boe, President, Oregon State Senate Leo McCarthy, Speaker, California Assembly

Elected County Officials William 0.Beach, County Executive, Montgomery County, Tennessee Lynn G. Cutler, ACIR Vice-Chair, Board of Supervisors, Black Hawk County, Iowa Doris W. Dealaman, Freeholder Director, Somerset County, New Jersey