An Informed International Response to the Coup [USA] Matthew Venker, Nicole Tu-Maung, and Ma Ei Ei [email protected], [email protected], and [email protected] February 4, 2021

On February 1st, 2021 the military () of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar detained members of the civilian government alongside numerous activists, writers, and others who have spoken out against the military. On the pretext of electoral irregularities, the military declared a one-year state of emergency, transferring acting presidential power to the military-backed vice president, , who transferred power to the military’s Senior General . By assuming national authority without the consent of the people of Myanmar, the military government has undermined democratic processes and staged a de facto coup.

The following days and weeks are a critical time for shaping an international response that prioritizes the safety, livelihood, and sovereignty of civilians throughout Myanmar. Calls for foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of Myanmar pose complex considerations for the sovereignty of independent nations and play an undeniable role in the perpetuation of Western imperialism. However, as international focus has already been directed at the coup in Myanmar the global community has already begun creating policies towards Myanmar and its people. In response, this document urges for an informed international response to the coup in Myanmar from our respective countries.

An international response to the coup in Myanmar requires nuance and context if it is to benefit civilians in Myanmar. This document is intended to provide social and historical context to events in Myanmar, and begin charting how international actors can best support the people of Myanmar as they advocate for the rights, dignities, and freedoms denied under military rule.

This document was created by academics in the US with great support from Myanmar-focused academic colleagues in the EU, UK, and Australia - and thus represents an American perspective on possible modes of political engagement. We encourage readers to freely adopt and adapt this document to their own national contexts as the international community develops a response to the coup in Myanmar. We are also maintaining a live version of this document to track developments as they occur and to continuously refine a better international response as the situation evolves. Please feel free to reach out to us to add news, comments, or ideas.

i. What is happening in Myanmar?

● Since November 2020, the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) has been making unsubstantiated claims about voter fraud to protest a massive defeat of the military- aligned Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP). The Union Election Commission refused to investigate these claims. In response, the military began characterizing the newly elected government as illegitimate and threatened to block the meeting of a new parliamentary, which was set to convene a new session on February 1, 2021. ● Early on February 1st, the military detained members of the civilian government alongside numerous activists, writers, and others who have spoken out against the military. On the pretext of electoral irregularities, the military declared a one-year state of emergency, transferring acting presidential power to the military-backed vice president, Myint Swe, who transferred power to the military’s Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. The military has installed military members and loyalists to fill cabinet and ministerial positions throughout the country.

● Following the detention of civilian leaders and activists, the military cut off cellular internet access to large portions of the population in its major cities for several hours on February 1st. Internet access has been alternately restored and cut since.

● The military has deployed troops and armored vehicles on city streets since February 1st, a signal that the military may use violence against large-scale public demonstrations of .

● Since February 1st, the military has been spreading propaganda defending its action as legal and pressuring civilians to recognize the military’s actions as legitimate. Disinformation is being spread through social media, some of which seems designed to provoke violence.

● As of February 4th, the military has successfully pressured telecommunications networks to suspend access to Facebook due to its use in the organization of protest and dissent. ii. Why should US representatives care about what is happening in Myanmar?

● There are over 100,000 members of the Myanmar diaspora residing in the United States. This population includes various ethnic identities such as the Bamar, Karen, Chin, and Rohingya, many of whom arrived in the US as refugees or asylum seekers after experiencing previous tensions with the Myanmar military. These groups are important members of the US population and the US should defend their interests by opposing the Myanmar military.

● Military dictatorship has never dimmed the desire for genuine in Myanmar. Mass civil disobedience campaigns and other forms of domestic opposition to the February 1st coup demonstrate the desire for people within Myanmar to chart their own sovereign future without interference from the military. The political freedoms enjoyed by all people living under democracy obligate us to stand in solidarity with those who have had their sacred electoral rights violated by authoritarian fiat. Despite the setback the coup poses, it is still possible for Myanmar to achieve democracy. In the early stages of this coup it is more critical than ever for the international community to condemn the coup and support those working towards a brighter future for all peoples in Myanmar. iii. What do representatives need to know?

● The Myanmar military has long justified its political role in reference to colonial history and continued threats to national sovereignty from abroad. International response could be used as military propaganda demonstrating the threat foreign countries pose to Myanmar’s national sovereignty. Therefore, it is important that international governments remain engaged with local activists and civilian organizations and reflect the demands of the people of Myanmar.

● An absence of widespread public demonstrations opposing the coup should not be interpreted as acceptance of the coup by civilians. There is a history of violence against civilians by the Myanmar military (such as during the 1988 Uprising) and civilians have warranted fears of bloodshed.

● Military coups occurred in Myanmar in 1962 and 1988. After 1988, Western sanctions imposed on Myanmar contributed to widespread and corruption in the country. Evidently, these blanket sanctions were ineffective in dismantling military power. Blanket economic sanctions should not be seen as an effective foreign policy mechanism. At present, economic sanctions would compound COVID related unemployment and would serve only to harm the most impoverished and vulnerable people.

● The coup represents an illegal course of actions by the Myanmar military: ○ The Myanmar military justifies the coup as a legal act under emergency powers provided in articles 40, 417, and 418 of the 2008 Constitution. These provisions allow for the declaration of a state of emergency when civilian government officials are unable to fulfill their duties. This attempted misuse of constitutional provisions should be denounced as a legal fiction as the arbitrary detention of members of the civil government is the only thing preventing the civilian government from performing its duties. ○ Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution preserved a political role for the Myanmar military. The shortcomings of this protection have proven to be disastrous for the nation’s transition to democracy. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the February 1 coup was illegal even by the provisions of this constitution.

● One of the detained civilian leaders, State Counsellor , was previously condemned by the international community for her involvement in the genocide of the Rohingya and violent attacks on other ethnic minorities. A demand for her release is not mutually exclusive of continued condemnation for her involvement in abuses. However, her continued imprisonment may further empower the military to enact violently against ethnic minorities. iv. What are possibilities for an informed international response? ● International response should highlight and uplift local actors opposing the coup to demonstrate that the coup itself has violated the sovereign will of the people.

● The United States and other foreign governments should use internet resources to research, communicate with, and understand the demands of activist and civil society organizations (CSOs), including and especially ethnic minorities. It is critical for the US and other foreign governments to support the essential work of CSOs by extending flexible funding that will allow these organizations to support the people of Myanmar regardless of their registration status or location, including organizations that operate essential crossborder services for peoples displaced by war, violence, or other crises. ○ Communication and coordination with local CSOs will be especially important as these organizations play a critical role in support and service delivery including the provision of aid to those most at-risk. Local CSOs are on the front line of crisis response and are often uniquely positioned to reach otherwise inaccessible communities. The coup will add a great burden to the work these CSOs have while simultaneously eroding the bases of their financial support and leaving them vulnerable to violence, harassment, or intimidation by the military.

● The needs and safety of ethnic minorities, such as the Rohingya, Karen, Kachin, Chin, Shan, and other vulnerable groups both in and outside Myanmar need to be considered in weighing any international actions.

● Punitive actions, such as sanctions should target individual actors, such as military leaders, rather than civilians. Targeted, rather than blanket economic sanctions are more likely to disempower the military. Targeted responses can include the following: ○ Pressure to foreign banks to bar the Myanmar military. Singapore and Hong Kong provide important banking and other financial services for Myanmar’s military leaders. ○ Selectively apply economic pressure to companies that work with the Myanmar military. A list of companies that currently work with the Myanmar military is available from the Burma Campaign UK: https://burmacampaign.org.uk/take- action/dirty-list/. Additional information is available from Justice for Myanmar: https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/who-profits-from-a-coup-the-power- and-greed-of-senior-general-min-aung-hlaing

● The international community should not exclusively focus on Aung San Suu Kyi or the National League of Democracy. It is important to pay attention to other domestic democratic actors, including Civil Society Organizations, writers, activists, and journalists. Many people within Myanmar are already standing up in opposition to the coup. They should be supported, uplifted, and protected.

● Technology is important for communication and providing access to information for civilians. Yet, it also creates an opportunity for the military to spread misinformation and target civilians in opposition. Therefore the US should take action to protect civilians and disempower military leaders with the following: ○ Urge Facebook to closely monitor military leaders using its platform. ○ Support telecommunications companies, such as Telenor, to push back against any unlawful attempts of restriction.

● International actions against the Myanmar military should be concerted and multilateral. Effort should be taken to ensure support from the regional powers that have the greatest connections to and investment in the country. ○ A global arms embargo is critical; all foreign nations should suspend joint-military training exercises and other forms of military-military connection. ○ Regional ASEAN powers should be pressured or otherwise engaged in developing support in opposition to the coup. ○ The close military-military relationship between Thailand and Myanmar is an important source of support for the Myanmar military. Thailand should be engaged in opposition to the coup. ○ Support from China, Russia, and Thailand insulates Myanmar’s military from condemnation and economic threats issued from the US, EU, or Australia. International actions will be strongest if they are taken in concert. Support from other ASEAN nations is critical. China, Russia, and Thailand, too, may hesitate to endorse interference with domestic affairs, but may privately refuse to support the coup party if it is costly. v. What do elected representatives need to do?

● Elected officials should pressure the federal government to shape an international response that reflects the demands of civil society actors, prioritizes the safety and livelihood of the people of Myanmar, and protects ethnic minority interests.

● The international community should focus on and support the domestic opposition to the coup. Elected representatives should foster this effort.

● International observers and elected officials should pay attention to the following civilian movements, including: ○ Myanmar medical workers have spearheaded a national civil disobedience movement, pledging to stop working unless the military returns control to the civilian government. This movement has garnered strong support on social media with many people posting that they stand in solidarity with the civil disobedience movement. These voices should be highlighted. They should also be protected against retaliation from the military. ○ In response to social media movements, on February 2nd the military announced that it will take action against those that violate the law. This should be condemned and actions should be taken to prevent Myanmar military from using technology like Facebook to target domestic opposition. ○ Many minority groups, including civil society organizations like the Karen Women’s Organization, ceasefire signatory organizations like the Karen National Union and the Restoration Council of Shan State, as well as many ethnic political parties have condemned the coup. These voices demonstrate the breadth of domestic opposition to military rule. They should be highlighted and uplifted. ○ The Myanmar military will likely try to shut down communications systems, including wifi, mobile internet data, or other systems. People in Myanmar use many international technologies to communicate. The international community should do what it can to protect communications infrastructure while preventing the Myanmar military from utilizing these systems to target opposition. ○ Sponsor efforts to provide civilians with access to opensource projects or communications technologies that don’t rely on the internet such as Signal, Briar, and Bridgefy.

● Elected representatives should engage their constituents from the Myanmar diaspora. People with connections to Myanmar, such as refugees, asylum seekers, and international students may need support at this time. They may also be a good source of information for the evolving needs of ordinary people within Myanmar as the situation develops.

● Unfounded attacks on the integrity of US elections from individuals within the US government risks rendering US opposition to the Myanmar military’s coup hypocritical. All American representatives must denounce all false and unsubstantiated claims that widespread election fraud occurred in the US. All American representatives must reiterate support for robust voter rights protections and the importance of free and fair elections at home and abroad.