1980

SetbackofWashingtonTreaty–Rivalrywith–Isolatedover –Syria’sRapprochementwithIraq

Under President Hafez al-Assad, Syria has experienced more than eight years of comparative stability – the longest stretch in its turbulent, modern history since independence in 1946. The signing in Washington in March 1979 of the peace treaty between and – the climax of a protracted rapproche- ment – has had two fundamental and conflicting effects. On the one hand, Syria has become the main focal point of pan-Arab resistance to this treaty. But on the other, the treaty exposed the limitations of Syria’s capacity, in both ex- ternal and internal policies, for solid and constructive rather than diversionary initiatives. With involvement in Lebanon becoming increasingly burdensome, Syria has concerned itself with avoiding direct conflict with Israel; with the im- plementation of the Baghdad resolutions aimed at isolating Egypt politically and economically; and with cautious construction of a union with Iraq after many years of ideological rift. This uncertainty has had its inevitable effect on economic policy-making. Although the sources of aid are now more assured as a result of the Arab summit conference in Baghdad of November 1978, the gov- ernment has been debating whether to reflate after some years of restraint. Within this debate, the possibility of expanding the role of the private sector hasbeenexamined. The build up to the Washington treaty and the conclusion of the treaty itself on 26 March was inevitably a major blow – even though the régime was able to exploit it to some limited extent. Syria, with 26,000 troops bogged down in Leb- anon as the major part of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), was impotent in the face of Israeli actions in Lebanon for fear of being drawn into a fight which it would be bound to lose. Thus the effective removal of Egypt, through the treaty, from the conflict with Israel, left Syria feeling almost desperately exposed to a possible Israeli attack. Furthermore, Syria nurtures no illusions about the de- bilitation of its armed forces by their presence in Lebanon since June 1976. There appeared, too, to have been difficulties with the , the main arms supplier. Deliveries of advanced fighters, including the MiG-23, and ground-to-air missiles were reported at the beginning of 1978. But in November of that year, a visit by Chief of Staff, General Hikmat Shihabi, to Moscow was broken off after a row over future and more sophisticated supplies. President

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:�0.��63/978900439�533_006 1980 53 Assad returned from a visit to Hungary on 2 December, during which he was believed to have enlisted Hungarian help in persuading the Soviet Union to sell Syria the arms it wanted. In January 1979, Defence Minister Mustafa Tlass went to Moscow, and the following month agreement was reported on arms deliver- ies which would include the MiG-25. But none of these developments did any- thingtohelpSyrianconfidenceinthefaceofIsrael.

OppositiontotheEgypt-IsraelPeaceTreaty It would be an error to see Syria’s hostile reaction to the rapprochement be- tween Egypt and Israel as completely negative. In fact, the way Assad re- sponded was deeply characteristic of the man. He is by nature cautious perhaps to the point of sometimes being blinded to political opportunities. He takes de- cisions only after extensive consultations with his senior political, intelligence and military officials as well as with leaders of the ethnic and religious commu- nities. Thus, it was step by step that he moved to the forefront of the Steadfast- ness and Confrontation Front of Syria, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen and the Pal- estine Liberation Organisation (PLO) (Iraq joined fully later), those Arabs most opposed to Egypt’s policies. It was only when it was completely clear that Egypt was going to conclude what appeared to be a bilateral deal that he moved to outright opposition and rejection – but still stopping short of calling, for exam- ple,foranoilembargoagainstthe US. This policy was based on several factors. The first reflected genuine concern, characteristic of the Ba’athist pan-Arab philosophy, at the shattering effects of Sadat’s moves on Arab unity. ‘Sadat has taken Egypt’, he told Newsweek in March 1979, ‘out of the Arab trench and put it in the same trench with Israel’. He went on typically: ‘There is no doubt that the Egyptian régime, by siding with Is- rael, is a new fact, a new reality, but this doesn’t mean that we should accept it.’ The second was the belief that Sadat would be unable to obtain anything substantial beyond the withdrawal of Israel’s forces from Egyptian Sinai. This would have the effect of postponing further the opportunities for the Palestin- ians to form a state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. (Again it is charac- teristic of Syrian caution, and apprehension of Israeli retaliation, that Assad neverpositivelyendorsedthestagingofPalestinianraidsintoIsrael.) Thirdly, the continued occupation by Israel of the Golan Heights – now in its second decade – remained a constant affront to sovereignty, particularly as neither the Camp David Accords nor the Washington treaty made any specific referencetotheseoccupiedareas. Fourthly, Assad’s reaction was a result of the longstanding rivalry between Damascus and Cairo for leadership of the Arab world. The task of rallying first the militant Arab countries and then, at the Baghdad conference at the end of