commentary In this context it is crucial to analyse Shrinking Political Space for and understand the electoral downslide of the JMM and to fathom the causes respon- the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha sible for the party’s shrinking political space in Jharkhand. This article traces the roots of the JMM, its emergence as a social Sanjay Kumar, Praveen Rai movement, entry into formal politics, its performance in electoral competitions An inability to command support he May 2009 Lok Sabha elections and the reasons for its failure to occupy from varied sections of the in Jharkhand witnessed a further the centre stage of politics in the state. It is electorate, a fragmentation of Tdecline in the political fortunes broadly divided into five sections: the first of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) in provides the roots of JMM in Jharkhand support among the adivasis and the state. The JMM managed to win only movement that began as a sub-national youth disenchantment have two Lok Sabha seats, half of what it won movement for the formation of a separate together contributed to the in the last Lok Sabha elections in 2004 state based on the issue of tribal distinc- decline of the Jharkhand Mukti losing about 5% of its vote share in the tiveness. It also traces the emergence of state. The electoral downslide of JMM the JMM as a social reform movement Morcha in Jharkhand. This is that started during the assembly elec- between 1970 and 1983 when its focus despite years of mobilisation by tions in 2005 could not be arrested re- shifted to political education for ending the organisation for the cause sulting in yet another setback for the all forms of prevailing exploitations and of a separate state and greater party in the Lok Sabha elections in 2009. toward demand for autonomy of the region This is a crucial period in the JMM’s his- based on militant tactics and direct action. political representation for the tory of electoral politics and can be The second section details the birth of marginalised people. descri­bed as turning of a full circle in its JMM as a political party in 1984 and its political journey that started in the move- entry into formal politics. The JMM asser­ ment for a separate Jhar­khand state after ted the Jharkhandi identity as the basis of India’s independence. electoral competition and spearheaded The JMM’s roots can be traced to the the movement for creation of a separate movement for a separate Jharkhand state state of Jharkhand. The third section as- for the tribal region in the 1950s. The sesses the electoral participation and per- movement witnessed an ideological shift formance of JMM in state assembly and in the 1960s and 1970s with demands for Lok Sabha elections. It also tries to ana- regional autonomy and development in lyse the popular choice of political parties the tribal region. The JMM was formally and leaders and the role played by the launched as a political party in 1984 and JMM in creation of a separate state based entered into electoral politics, but it soon on public opinion. The fourth section tries split into two political parties, JMM to assess the support base of JMM in (Soren) and JMM (Marandi). As a result of Jharkhand and shift in political loyalties splintering in the Jharkhand movement a of voters based on time series data. And large number of parties existed during the the fifth section tries to qualitatively ana- 1980s based on Jharkhandi identity in the lyse the reasons for the failure of JMM in state. The 1990s saw the beginning of the asserting Jhar­khandi identity and in hold- era of coalition politics, which also marked ing centre stage in state politics. the revival for the JMM (Soren). During the 1990 assembly elections, JMM (Soren) 1 1970-83: Demand for polled a little more than 3% votes. The Tribal Autonomy JMM (Soren) witnessed a similar electoral The roots of JMM can be traced to the years performance during the 1995 and 2000 between 1950 and 1970 when the Jharkhand assembly elections. Over the last five movement began with the formation of deca­des, in its long journey the JMM had Jharkhand Party (JHP) in 1950 demanding various political ups and down, shift in creation of a separate state. JHP was the Sanjay Kumar ([email protected]) is with the allian­ces, merger and splits, government first political party in south Bihar to unite the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, formations culminating in the fall of Shibu tribals and non-tribals under the regional New Delhi and Praveen Rai (praveenrai@ Soren’s government in Jharkhand in “Jharkhandi” identity representing all the lokniti.org) is with the Lokniti programme, January 2009 and the Lok Sabha election inhabitants in the tribal areas of south Bihar. CSDS, New Delhi. debacle recently. The results of the first general elections in

24 august 15, 2009 vol xliv no 33 EPW Economic & Political Weekly commentary 1952 showed the JHP at the peak of its and the MCOR, the Jharkhand movement public meetings, propaganda, sit-ins, and popularity when it was able to secure large- was successful in drawing the support of size- demonstrations. Once again it faced se- scale tribal as well as non-tribal support able sections of the tribal and non-tribal vere repression by state agencies (Prakash (Prakash 2001). After the first general elec- population in the region (Prakash 2001). 2001). A combination of integrationist and tion in 1952, the JHP esta­blished itself as JMM launched a series of reform move- repressive measures was adopted to quell the dominant political party in south Bihar ments in the region: first, an anti-liquor the tide of the Jharkhand movement dur- and submitted a memorandum with the campaign which was seen as the main ing this phase (Rekhi 1988). States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) cause of rural indebtedness and selling The beginning of the 1980s saw the demanding the creation of a new state on of land in the region; second, the JMM emergence of cracks in the Jharkhand the basis of economic, socio-political and launched literacy programmes and opened Alli­ance that had earlier put forward cultural uniqueness of the region. schools; third, the JMM began to implement ambi­tious programmes for forging unity The SRC did not take cultural distinc- credit institutions in rural areas by estab- between the peasant and workers to widen tiveness of the region into consideration lishing “grain banks”; fourth, the JMM re- the social base of the movement. The and the claim of the Jharkhandis for a vived the old tribal tradition of people’s overtly Marxist phase of the movement separate state was not accepted due to the courts and finally in the agrarian areas the thus practically ended with the electoral multiplicity of tribal languages in south JMM resorted to direct action campaigns alliance between the JMM and the Cong­ress Bihar. The failure of the JHP in convincing to recover alienated land in the region. As in the 1980 elections and a formal split be- the SRC reduced its popularity and support a result there were large-scale clashes and tween the leftist and Jharkhandi political base in the region. As result of this the JHP violence during the harvest sessions of groups followed soon (Prakash 2001). merged with the Indian National Congress 1974-75. This period thus witnessed wide- (INC) in 1963. The merger of JHP with the spread violence and anarchy (Singh 1977). 2 Demand for a Separate State Congress encouraged more factionalism The JMM and the MCOR formed the The cracks that developed in the Jhar­ than consensus (Jha 1972). Factionalism was Jharkhand Alliance between the workers khandi movement by the early 1980s lead the single most important factor in the under­ and peasants based on a leftist ideology by to further splits and splintering. Shibu mining of popular support for the Jharkhandi redefining “Jharkhandi” as anyone who Soren launched the JMM as a new political political parties and shifting of electoral worked and “diku” as anyone who exploi­ party based on separate identity with the support to the Congress, the Communist ted others. The effort was to unite all adoption of a new constitution on 6 April Party of India (CPI) and Hul Jharkhandi Jharkhandis against the dikus to ensure the 1984 (Dhar 1984). The constitution of the parties (Vidyarthi and Sahay 1976). The creation of a separate state of Jharkhand. party envisaged the role of the JMM as the period from 1970 to 1980 is marked by the The mass following that the JMM had man- leader in the all-round fight to drive out presence of a large number of political aged to generate led to its becoming more the dikus from the region. The relation- parties in this region. The period also wit- assertive (Devalle 1992). The railway strike ship between the tribals and non-tribals in nessed the beginning of leftist politics in of 1974 and the nationalisation of coal- Jharkhand were again redefined concep- this region especially in the industrial towns mines in this region further galvanised tually, which was essential if the JMM was and cities. This resulted in a significant ide- the leftist radical phase of the Jharkhand to participate in electoral politics. The ological shift in the politics in the region movement. The state administration used changes in the demographic profile of the and the focus shifted from the demand for repressive measures on the trade unions, region had made the tribals a numerical a separate state to autonomy for tribals. leftist politicians and the Naxalites to sup- minority, so the electoral support of only The focus of the Jharkhand movement press the movement. The Jharkhand move- the tribals was not sufficient to secure centred on industrial and agrarian re- ment was undermined during the period enough votes for the JMM (Prakash 2001). forms, ending the exploitation of the trib- of Emergency from 1975 to 1977, in keep- The participation of the JMM in elector- als and granting land rights relegating the ing with the suppression of almost all non- al politics and alliance with INC led to an demand for a separate state of Jharkhand Congress political activity during this pe- end in political cooperation with the MCOR. to the backbench. Political activity now riod (Das 1975). Thus, the militant meth- The Jharkhand movement again became centred on securing more opportunities for ods adopted by the JMM in the 1970s led to confused and directionless. The Jharkhand the tribals in terms of seats in educational the decline and waning of the movement. Alliance split into the pro-right JMM led by institutions and jobs in industrial enter­ After the end of Emergency in 1976-77, Shibu Soren, and the pro-communist prises, as also restoration of land alie­nated attempts were made to revive political MCOR led by B B Mahto and A K Roy. Later from them (Prakash 2001). An alliance was acti­vity in the Jharkhand region. In this there was further spilt in JMM into two stuck between social reform organisation phase, the surviving leaders of the Jhar­ factions, one led by Soren and the other by “Shivaji Samaj” (for restoration of land to khand movement formed a united front Marandi. Shibu Soren emerged as the people of Kurmi caste) with the Santhal and focused on mass mobilisation to pur- undisputed mass leader in the region population of the region under the name of sue the political goal of a separate state of maintaining a close alliance with the JMM. The Marxist Co-ordination Committee Jharkhand for ending the economic ex- Congress(I), becoming the symbol of ar- (MCOR), a leftist outfit, also supported the ploitation of the people in the area. It re- ticulation of the aspirations of the masses JMM. Thus under the leadership of the JMM sorted to processions, blockades, gheraos, in Jharkhand (Prakash 2001).

Economic & Political Weekly EPW august 15, 2009 vol xliv no 33 25 commentary During the mid-1980s, once again, the in the southern region of then undivided to form the first government in the newly Jharkhandi leaders realised the necessity Bihar had shared a general sense of dis- created state of Jharkhand. of joint action if meaningful political pres- crimination and neglect from the political Elections to the first state assembly in ence was to be maintained. Consequently, leadership that ruled the state after India’s Jharkhand took place only after the BJP in 1987, political parties JMM (Soren), JMM independence. Political leaders from the completed its five years of rule in the state (Marandi) and a host of smaller organi­ north and central Bihar region largely dom- in early 2005. Since JMM led by Shibu sations came together and formed the inated the ruling elites in undivided Bihar. Soren, had fought a long battle for the cre- Jharkhand Co-ordination Committee Political leaders from the tribal regions ation of this new state, it was expected (JCC) to lead a unified agitation for realis- were under-represented and were relegat- that, with large support of the people in ing the dream of a separate province of ed to the periphery of the ruling class. The the state, JMM along with allies would per- Jharkhand (Prakash 2001). The JMM fac- state of Jharkhand was created in the year form well in the first battle for the ballot in tions led by Marandi and Soren played 2000, but the people of Jharkhand got the the state. Just six months earlier, in the marginal roles in Parliament and the state opportunity to elect its own state assembly Lok Sabha elections held in the year 2004, legislature in the 1990s. It extended sup- after five years of its creation in 2005. Since the JMM along with its allies the Congress, port to the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RjD) gov- assembly elections for the undivided Bihar RJD and the CPI had fared very well, win- ernment in Bihar in 1997-98. This move was held barely six months before the divi- ning 13 out of the 14 Lok Sabha seats in the was rewarded by the RJD that adopted a sion of Bihar into two states of Jharkhand new state, raising expectations for electoral resolution recommending to the Central and Bihar it was agreed that members success in the ensuing assembly elections. government the creation of a separate state elected to the legislative assembly from the But contrary to popular expectations, the of Jharkhand. Finally the state of Jharkhand constituencies now under the new state of JMM contested the 2005 assembly elections came into being in November 2000. Jharkhand would be treated as members of in alliance with Congress and performed the new state assembly and the party hav- badly managing to win only 17 assembly 3 Participation in Formal Politics ing the majority would form the next gov- seats and polled 14.3% votes (Table 1, p 27). The creation of Jharkhand as a separate ernment. Since the Bharatiya Janata Party The JMM along with the Congress man- state in the year 2000 filled new hopes (BJP) had won the largest number of as- aged to win 26 out of the 81 assembly seats among the people in the new state. People sembly seats from this region, it managed in the state falling short by 15 seats in

26 august 15, 2009 vol xliv no 33 EPW Economic & Political Weekly commentary forming the next government. The results state. But the electoral performance indi- of BJP-JD(U) combine which swept the indicated that even after the formation of cates that the support base of the party does elections. Second the breaking of ranks the new Jharkhand state, the JMM was not not seem to be broad- based, as the party from the RJD-LJP alliance proved decisive the first choice party in the state. Despite could never mobilise more than 25% votes for JMM’s poor performance in this election. the JMM’s performance in this election, at state level electoral­ competitions. Third the lack of a perfect and united alli- Shibu Soren remained the most popular In contrast to state electoral competi- ance between JMM and Congress with both choice for chief minister in the state.1 tions, JMM’s performance at the national parties having a not so friendly contest in The main factor that was responsible level in Lok Sabha elections since its par- three seats cost them dear during the elec- for the poor performance of JMM and its ticipation in 1991 general elections have tions. And finally, equally crucial was the ally Congress in the assembly elections been better in terms of percentage of seats declining popularity ratings of Shibu held in 2005 was intensive electoral parti­ won. The best performance of JMM was in Soren and JMM as he lost the Tamar as- cipation and fragmentation of votes. Simi- Lok Sabha elections in 1991, where JMM sembly constituency by-elections held four lar to trends in Uttaranchal and Chhattis- in alliance with the Janata Dal contested months ago indicating the party was on garh, the upsurge in participation in the elections and managed to win six out the downward curve in the state resulting Jharkhand had been accompanied by a of the 13 Lok Sabha seats in the state. JMM in yet another electoral reversal in the state. fragmentation of the party political space did not do well in the general elections with a large proportion of votes going to held in 1996, 1998 and 1999 when it con- 4 Lack of Broad-Based Support smaller political formations (Yadav and tested the polls alone. But alliances with The rise of regional parties in India can be Kumar 2005). Second there was also the the secular parties in the state during traced to the late 1960s when many new lack of unity and cohe­rence in the secular general elections has generally favoured parties were formed based on regional alliance forged between JMM and the Con- its electoral fortunes and it always does distinctiveness, culture and political mo- gress during the elections.2 On the other well in alliance with other parties. In the bilisation based on caste/community iden- hand, their main rivals BJP and Janata Dal Lok Sabha elections held in 2004, JMM tities with state-specific agendas. The rise (United) that had fought the Lok Sabha along with its allies, the Congress, RJD elections in 2004 separately and suffered and the CPI, was able to achieve an almost Table 1: Electoral Performance of JMM in Assembly Elections (1952-2005) reverses formed an alliance in this elec- clean sweep, winning 13 out of the 14 Lok Undivided Bihar Divided Bihar tion and also fared quite well in transfer- Sabha seats in Jharkhand, ending the Year Contested Won Votes (%) Votes (%) ring their votes to each other. Third the long domination of the BJP in the state. 1985 57 9 1.8 10.0 negative image of JMM created by infight- The JMM-led alliance established a lead in 1990 82 19 3.1 15.4 ing and nepotism within the party led to 62 out of 81 assembly constituencies in 1995 63 10 2.3 9.0 poor selection of candidates that may have the state. 2000 85 12 3.5 15.9 also proved detrimental and acted as a The recently concluded Lok Sabha elec- 2005 49 17 - 14.3 Source: CSDS data unit. spoiler to the party’s fortunes. And finally tions witnessed further downslide and the “late swing” against the JMM-Congress shrinking of electoral space of JMM in the Table 2: Electoral Performance of JMM in Lok Sabha alli­ance during the election dealt an state. It could manage to win only two Lok Elections (1991-2009) impor­tant blow on the fortunes of both Sabha seats losing around 5% vote share Year of Election Seats Won (%) Votes Polled (%) the parties in this election.3 in the state. The tally of seats won is half of 1991 6 21.4 1996 1 12.2 A look at Table 2 reveals that in electoral what it won in the last Lok Sabha elections 1998 0 10.4 competitions held for state assembly elec- in 2004. This raises the question as to why 1999 0 9.5 tions, the JMM since its inception could did JMM fare so poorly in Lok Sabha elec- 2004 4 16.3 never poll more than 15% of the valid votes tions in 2009 when the party had such a 2009 2 11.7 polled. The best performance of JMM in spectacular victory in 2004? Was it due to Jharkhand has a total of 13 Lok Sabha seats. During the 1991 Lok Sabha elections, JMM contested the election in alliance number of assembly constituencies won factionalism and nepotism within the party with Janata Dal. JMM contested the 2004 Lok Sabha elections was in the 1990 assembly elections when it or was it due to the incorrect choice of alli- in alliance with Congress, RJD and CPI. In 2009 Lok Sabha elections JMM contested in alliance with Congress with contested in 82 seats and managed to win ances? Or were there other important fac- friendly contest in three seats. The JMM contested the 1996 and 1999 Lok Sabha elections alone. 19 seats and polled 15% votes. Even in as- tors that were detrimental in its poor per- Source: CSDS Data Unit. sembly constituencies contested by JMM formance in the Lok Sabha elections? the percentage of votes polled by the party The main factor that was responsible Table 3: JMM Gets the Main Credit for Formation of State of Jharkhand (in %) could never cross more than 24%. The high- for poor performance of JMM and its ally JMM BJP Congress Other Parties est best vote share of JMM was in the first Congress in Lok Sabha election was the All respondents 41 37 16 6 assembly elections held after the formation multi-polar contest among the five poli­ JMM voters 90 5 4 1 of new state in 2005, when it contested in tical formations: the Congress-JMM alli- BJP voters 18 79 2 1 49 assembly seats and polled 24% votes. ance, the BJP-JD(U) alliance, Jharkhand Congress voters 36 9 53 2 During the 2005 elections it was felt in Vikas Morcha, the RJD-Lok Jansakthi Voters of other parties 39 26 8 27 many quarters that JMM has a sizeable sup- Party alliance and the Left leading to frag- Table is statistically significant @ p value < .001. Source: Prabhat Khabar, Jharkhand Assembly Election Study, port base in the newly formed Jharkhand mentation of votes. This worked in favour Pre-poll-2005, weighted data set.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW august 15, 2009 vol xliv no 33 27 commentary of regional parties led to changes in power of the national parties in this demand, Table 4: JMM Popular among Adivasis and Muslims Only (in %) equations in state politics as these parties though positive was not as vociferous. The Caste-Community Lok Sabha Assembly Lok Sabha representing sectional interests were able survey findings (Table 3, p 27) vindicate Election 2004 Election 2005 Election 2009 to carve a niche for themselves. In some the popular sentiment to some extent as All 16 14 12 states, regional parties are perceived by more than four out of 10 voters in Upper caste 7 1 2 voters to serve their interests better in Jharkhand gave JMM the main credit for Other Backward Classes (OBC) 13 5 1 comparison to the national parties and the formation of the new state. But a slight- Dalit 19 21 13 therefore in those instances, regional par- ly less number of voters also gave BJP the Adivasi 25 31 30 ties are seen to be a natural choice for the credit for the creation of the new state. Muslims 22 9 32 electorate. As a result, regional parties Thus, the credit for the formation of a new Source: Post-poll surveys conducted by Centre for the Study of came to hold centre stage in many states state was split between JMM and BJP and Developing Societies after assembly elections 2005 and Lok Sabha elections 2004 and 2009. of India and created alternative political it seems that JMM failed to politically pos- space for themselves. The reasons for the ture itself as the main inheritor of Table 5: JMM Losing Support Base among Youth (in %) rise of regional parties can be attributed Jharkhand movement that led to the crea- Lok Sabha Assembly Lok Sabha to the federal structure of government en- tion of the new state. Though an over- Election 2004 Election 2005 Election 2009 All 16 14 12 visaged by the Indian Constitution that whelming majority of the traditional sup- Young (below 25 years) 20 10 13 provides political space for national level porters of JMM gave it the main credit for Old (56 years or more) 14 20 12 parties and state parties to compete with the formation of Jharkhand, a sizeable Men 18 14 11 each other. Another important factor that section of supporters of BJP, Congress and Women 14 15 13 led to the rise of regional parties was part- supporters of other political parties also Rural 16 17 12 ly a natural development and partly a re- felt that JMM played a crucial role in the Urban 16 2 11 action to over-centralisation by Congress formation of the new state. Source: Post-poll surveys conducted by Centre for the Study of Developing Societies after assembly elections 2005 and Lok government in the 1970s and 1980s lead- Thus, one of the reasons for poor per- Sabha elections 2004 and 2009. ing to federalisation of the polity and for- formance of JMM in state electoral compe- mation of new regional and state-based tition and its failure to hold centre stage surveys conducted for last few elections parties (Hasan 2004). of state politics can be explained in its would better explain the failure of JMM JMM also emerged as a regional party in inabi­lity to project itself as the party with evidence to occupy the centre stage Jharkhand but its electoral history shows which spearheaded the movement for the of state politics in Jharkhand. that it has failed to occupy the centre stage creation of the new state and reap elec- The party’s support base in the state in state politics by getting the majority toral benefits out of it. An analysis of the does not seem to be broad (Table 4). It support of the electorate. Regional parties support base of the party based on quan- appears narrow and localised with regard to such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam titative data gathered by CSDS post-poll location, gender, age groups and caste (DMK), the JD(U) and the Samajwadi Party (SP) have received majority support of the voters in their states and have formed state governments on their own. However JMM got a fragmented verdict in the state assembly elections held in 2005 and needed the support of other parties and independ- ents to form the government. As a result the government led by JMM in the state al- ways remained a fragile coalition with po- litical pulls and pressures. This raises the question that unlike other regional parties THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT NETWORK IS ACCEPTING in different states why did JMM fail to APPLICATIONS FOR THE 2009 GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AWARDS hold centre stage in state politics and in AND MEDALS COMPETITION. THE COMPETITION OFFERS receiving majority support from the people MONETARY AWARDS AND TRAVEL EXPENSES. OPEN ONLY TO in Jharkhand. Before probing this ques- RESEARCHERS AND ORGANIZATIONS FROM THE DEVELOPING tion it would be relevant to find out as to AND TRANSITION WORLD. SUBMISSIONS ACCEPTED FOR NEW what extent people in Jharkhand bestow RESEARCH PROPOSALS, COMPLETED RESEARCH PAPERS AND the main credit for the formation of a PROPOSALS FOR SCALING-UP DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. ALL separate state to JMM and other political SOCIAL SCIENTISTS ARE ENCOURAGED TO APPLY. parties in the state. FURTHER DETAILS ON OUR WEBSITE: There was a popular sentiment in http://www.gdnet.org/~2009awards Jharkhand that JMM played a crucial role in the formation of the new state and voice

28 august 15, 2009 vol xliv no 33 EPW Economic & Political Weekly commentary communities. JMM had since its beginning also commanded 2% more support among Asked whom they favoured as chief minister, 23% of the respondents backed Shibu Soren. Soren carried on the struggles against the exploi- female voters than male voters in Lok enjoyed much higher support among adivasis tation of the adivasis by the dikus. Though Sabha elections 2009. The decline in male compared to other contenders, all from the adivasi community, with his popularity cutting across the JMM united both the tribals and non- voters by seven percentage points in 2009 communities, particularly Muslims and dalits. tribals under its banner in the struggle general elections as compared with the Babulal Marandi lead Shibu Soren in support from the upper castes, the Mahatos, and the Other for creation of a separate state, JMM has last Lok Sabha elections offset the JMM’s Backward Classes. always been seen as a party of the tribals. overall voteshare. 2 Yogendra Yadav and Sanjay Kumar, “Not Alliance Arithmetic Alone”, The Hindu, 7 March 2005, Adivasis constitute 26% of the population The population of youth in Jharkhand Opinion page. The anti-BJP forces moved from and are numeri­cally the largest group in is more than 30% and a good share of sup- unity to disunity during this period in more than one way. First, the alliance shed partners such as the state. If we look at Table 5 (p 28) we port from the youth is crucial for any poli­ the RJD and Left parties on the assumption that see that JMM has a sizeable support tical party to perform well in elections. they were dispensable. It did this at a time when the BJP was learning a lesson about the indispen- among the adivasi voters, but the support Among voters below 25 years of age, sability of smaller allies. A post facto analysis sug- is sectional and frag­mented into other around 20% supported the JMM during the gests that if the Congress, the JMM and the RJD had forged a perfect pre-poll alliance, one that parties. Only about one-third of adivasis last Lok Sabha elections in 2004 that avoided all conflict, its combined vote share was voted for the JMM during the Lok Sabha dropped steeply to 13% in this election. enough to win 44 seats. Second, the truncated Congress-JMM alliance was far from perfect. It elections in 2009. The adivasi votes are Thus, the JMM had a significant loss of was marred by many not-so- ‘friendly’ contests. fragmented between the JMM, the Con- support among the numerically strong All the votes gained by the two parties did not add up as votes for the alliance. Third, the two gress and the BJP. The JMM has stronger young voters in the state by around seven allies were very poor in transferring their votes support base among the Santhals and the percentage points. In the last five years, a to each other. The BJP-JD(U) fared much better on this count. It is difficult to estimate the precise Oraons, while amongst the Munda tribes; sizeable number of young voters seem to effect of all these three follies on the part of the JMM-Congress. But there is no doubt that BJP has a stronger support base as com- have been disillusioned by the kind of better alliance making would have put the UPA pared to the JMM. As a comparison the poli­tics played by JMM and have moved in a less embarrassing situation that it finds itself JMM comman­ded only about 30% of the away from the party. The strong erosion of in today. 3 Yogendra Yadav and Sanjay Kumar, “Not Alliance tribal votes in Jharkhand in 2009 in con- youth voters from JMM that formed the Arithmetic Alone”, The Hindu, 7 March 2005, Opinion page. A “late swing” against the Con- trast to the 77% of the dalit votes by the major support base of the party along with gress-JMM may have also dealt a significant blow Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and 73% of the its failure to polarise overwhelming tribal to the combine. The polling took place in three phases over three weeks. The 24 constituencies Yadav vote by the SP in the 2007 assembly support in its favour might have played a that went to the polls in the first phase actually elections in Uttar Pradesh. crucial role in spoiling the party’s fortunes saw a five-percentage point swing in favour of the Congress-JMM compared with its share in the Lok Among upper castes and Other Back- in Lok Sabha elections in 2009. Sabha election. The BJP-JD(U) suffered a loss of ward Classes (OBCs), the JMM commanded 20 percentage points in this phase. By the second 5 Conclusions phase of the election, the downward slide for the very minuscule support. JMM had around Congress and JMM had begun. The combine lost 13% votes among the dalits and about 32% In a state with sizeable adivasi population, 15 percentage points in the second phase and as much as 22 points in the third. It seems that the among the Muslims but this aggregate is and especially after the successful crea- adverse image created by infighting and nepotism not enough in combination with the par- tion of the new state, it was expected that, within the JMM may have caused the steep decline in Congress-JMM fortunes. ty’s core tribal support to lend the party the JMM will occupy a central position in the centre stage of Jharkhand’s politics. In Jharkhand’s politics, but the party seems References contrast, the assembly election results in to be far away from that dream. Its sup- Das, Arvind N (1975): “Struggle of Workers and Tribal Uttar Pradesh in 2007 showed that the nu- port base still remains much below the re- Peasants in Chhotanagpur”, Economic & Political clei of the overwhelming dalit base along quired threshold for it to occupy a primal Weekly, 10 (9). Dhar, Hiranmay (1984): “Split in Jharkhand Move- with the incre­ased votes share among the position in the state’s politics. The JMM’s ment”, Economic & Political Weekly, 24 (27). upper castes, peasant OBCs and Muslims appeal is concentrated among certain sec- Devalle, Susana B C (1992): Discourses of Ethnicity: formed the critical mass required in bring- tions but it needs to stitch a larger social Culture and Protest in Jharkhand (New Delhi: Sage). Hasan, Zoya (2004): “New Power Centres”, Frontline, ing BSP to power in the state. In essence, coalition of different caste communities. Vol 21, Issue 8, Cover Story. there is an absence of a larger aggregate of The Lok Sabha election results clearly in- Jha, Shashishekar (1972): Political Elite in Bihar (Bombay: Vora Publications). social support for the JMM in Jharkhand dicate that the party is currently on the Prakash, Amit (2001): Jharkhand Politics of Develop- in comparison to a party like the BSP in downslide and heading towards decline. ment and Identity (New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited). Uttar Pradesh, thereby preventing the Shibu Soren, once a “tall leader” and a Rekhi, U S (1988): Jharkhand Movement in Bihar (New JMM from occupying a more central role symbol of Jharkhandi movement in the Delhi: Numes Publications). Singh, K S (1977): “From Ethnicity to Regionalism: A in Jharkhand’s politics. state has lost his stature because of incon- Case Study of Tribal Politics and Movement in The party has a marginally higher sup- sistent politics and personal follies. Chhotanagpur, 1970-75” in S C Mulick (ed.), Dissent, Protest and Reform in Indian Civilisation port among the rural voters as compared (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study). with those living in towns and cities. How- Notes Vidyarthi, L P and K N Sahay (1976): The Dynamics of ever the party lost 5% support in Lok Sabha 1 Yogendra Yadav and Sanjay Kumar, “Soren Pre- Tribal Leadership in Bihar: Research Projecton ferred as Chief Minister”, The Hindu, 7 March Changing Leadership in a Tribal Society 1967-71 elections this time among voters in rural 2005, National page. Despite the JMM’s low key (Allahabad: Kitab Mahal). areas, but gained 7 percentage points performance Shibu Soren remained the popular Yadav, Yogendra and Sanjay Kumar (2005): “Not choice for chief minister as the post-poll survey Alliance Arithmetic Alone”, The Hindu, 7 March, support among the urban voters. The JMM conducted in Jharkhand by the CSDS revealed. Opinion page.

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