United States Department of Forest Service History Series Agriculture Forest Service The Wilderness FS-410 Movement and the National Forests: 1980-1984 United States Department of Forest Service History Series Agriculture Forest Service The Wilderness FS-410 Movement and the National Forests: 1980-1984

by Dennis M. Roth Chief Historian Public Affairs Office USDA, Forest Service Washington, D.C.

August 1988 Chapter I: To Lease and/or Release

The Forest Service's second major In August 1979 former Congress- inventory of National Forest road- man Lloyd Meads (D-WA), one of less areas in 1977 and 1978, known the architects of this strategy, ex- as RARE II, was valuable to envi- plained its rationale in a speech to ronmentalists because it gave them a members of Western States Legisla- comprehensive list of potential wil- tive Forestry lhsk Force: derness areas, some of which they previously had not known about. Now comprehensive legislation ties Although at first skeptical about the wilderness in 38 states together so inventory; the timber industry also that the guy from North Carolina- came to see some hidden benefits in who traded his vote on the study.' During the era from Alaska wilderness is going to have 1964 to 1978, when individual wil- to be voting on wilderness in his derness bills were being passed, the own district at the same time he is gradual accumulation of acreage in voting to lock-up forty percent of the Wilderness System was barely the forest in Alaska if you put it all perceptible to many in the Congress in one package, and he is going to and certainly to most of the public. think about that, RARE I!, however, proposed to de- cide the fate of 62 million acres of During the previous 15 years the roadless land, or nearly one-third of industry had seen what it considered the entire National Forest System. to be a complete erosion of reason- able standards for wilderness desig- The passage of individual wilderness nation. Organizations such as the bills and even the controversial Oregon Wilderness Coalition were statewide Alaska Lands Act, which championing the idea that wilder- was covered extensively by the na- ness should not be surrounded by a tional media, had demonstrated to special aura but should be seen pri- the timber industry that congres- marily as a way of preventing mis- sional representatives were often management by the Forest Service willing to vote for wilderness areas and the timber industry.3 Although if these areas were not in their own the Forest Service had recommended States or districts. Wilderness had that 36 miffion acres in the RARE enough public support so that repre- II inventory be released from fur- sentatives could vote for wilderness ther wilderness consideration, the bills in relative safety, knowing they industry feared that much of this would receive little criticism as long land would eventually end up in the as the bill did not affect their con- Wilderness System if the wilderness stituents. In the eyes of the timber issue continued to be resolved on a industry, wilderness had become a piecemeal basis. In early 1981 the "cheap" environmental vote. It had Forestry Affairs Industry Newsletter to be made dearer by spreading the gave its view of the history of the risks to more representatives. This wilderness movement. meant promoting the idea of na- tional legislation that would simul- Since passage of the '64 Act, taneously decide the fate of all wilderness criteria have been roadless areas in National stretched wide enough to in- Forests. clude any cutover, burned over

1 plot without a ferris wheel or could now hope to convince more parking lot. If John Muir could people that wilderness designation see the land in East Texas re- impeded efforts at attaining low- cently demanded for wilderness cost housing and energy indepen- he'd die again dence.

.. Advocates demand wilder- Western Democratic politicians, ness not for scenic attributes, such as Senators Frank Church unique ecological offtrings, or (D-ID) and Warren Magnuson other intrinsic merits listed in (D-WA), had been good friends of the '64 Act. They want it simplythe wilderness movement. But their because it's there. As a corpora- association with the Carter Admin- tion won't limit profits thinking its shareholders won't settle for istration's foreign and domestic poli- less, so preservation groups cies and a renewed western rebel- don't bridle their ambitions. liousness over the way the Federal The limit is what you can get. Government managed public land Preservation has become an end placed them in political jeopardy. in itself; largely divorced from They were no longer in a position to national needs . strongly support wilderness preser- vation. By 1979 the timber industry and other commodity interests appeared In 1979 Congressman ibm Foley to be in a good position to push (D-WA), chairman of the House national legislation. The Iranian Agriculture Committee, who was Revolution and subsequent cutoff of also a western Democrat under Iranian oil to the United States strong attack from conservative op- demonstrated again America's vu!- ponents, introduced a bill that gave nerability to foreign energy suppli- Congress time limits in which to ers. For the first time, national designate RARE II wilderness areas. opinion poils showed that Ameri- After the expiration of these peri- cans ranked energy above environ- ods, the lands would be "released" mental quality in their scale of and would revert to management values.5 The Carter Administration under regular National Forest proce- had created a new cabinet-level de- dures. In 1980 his bill was altered to partment, the Department of En- allow for the immediate designation ergy, in order to deal with the so- of the 12 million acres that the For- called energy crisis. During the last phase of RARE II, the Department est Service had recommended for had successfully advocated that less wilderness. Neither of these bills land be recommended for wilderness stated that the Forest Service could because wilderness designation never again recommend land for would lock up potential oil and gas wilderness designation and thus did supplies in the Overthrust Belt of not tiireaten environmentalists as the Rocky Mountains and other much as later bills would but they areas.6 Double-digit inflation and opposed them because they were the rapid acceleration in the cost of afraid that the public and the Con- housing prompted the Carter Ad- gress would assume that the wilder- ministration to direct the Forest Ser- ness issue had been totally settled. vice to deviate from its policy of not Perhaps just as importantly, they harvesting more timber annually feared that their grassroots organi- than could be grown in a year (the zations would be destroyed or at sustained-yield even flow policy) so least seriously demoralized if RARE that the cost of building materials II wilderness areas were designated could be brought down. Industry without their participation.7

2 Congressman Foley negotiated with ronmental organizations had wanted the environmentalists. He agreed to avoid any kind of release lan- not to oppose the Sierra Club's guage and had urged the State of method of "releasing" roadless California not to sue because they land. Because of his position as feared a legislative "backlash" Chairman of the House Agriculture which might result in the Forest Ser- Committee, which could assert ju- vice being forever forbidden to risdiction over wilderness bills, his study released land for wilderness agreement on this issue was impor- designation (permanent release) or tant to the environmentalists.8 forbidden to study it for several de- cades (long-term release).9 If the In 1979 the State of California, over Forest Service could never again objections from the national envi- study released land, wilderness ac- ronmental organizations, sued the tivists would effectively be prevented Federal Government to prevent the from working with National Forest development of 48 roadless areas Supervisors. that had been recommended for nonwilderness classification in Congressmen Burton, Johnson, and RARE II. Judge Lawrence Karlton John Seiberling (D-OH), Chairman enjoined the development of these of the House Public Lands Subcom- lands on grounds that RARE II had mittee, attempted to negotiate these not provided site-specific impact issues but quickly decided to con- data on the 48 areas as was required vene a larger meeting to see if they by the National Environmental Pol- could reach a compromise among icy Act. representatives of industry, environ- mental groups, and the Forest Ser- At the same time as Judge Karlton vice. After two meetings this group was reaching his decision, Demo- agreed on statutory language which cratic Congressman "Bizz" Johnson would ensure sufficiency (protection from northern California, an ally of against RARE II lawsuits) and the timber industry, and Phil Burtonwhich would release land examined (Democrat) from San Francisco, the but not designated as wilderness for environmentalists' most powerful one cycle (10 to 15 years) of the friend in Congress, were sponsoring planning process required by the California wilderness bills. The suc- National Forest Management Act of cess of the State of California's law- 1976.10 This was eventually called suit, however, meant that decisions "soft" release. Congressman Seiber- to develop California roadless land ling believed this agreement would could be legally challenged (as well be kept by the timber industry be- as land in other States if local envi- cause its representative, Dick ronmentalists used the California Barnes, a counsel for an industry precedent) unless these decisions association set up to deal with were removed from the jurisdiction RARE II, had participated in the of the courts. Thus began the negotiations. Barnes maintains that search for "sufficiency" language, he had said he would take this the objective of which was to insu- agreement back to the industry for late wilderness legislation from their approval "just as a labor nego- court challenges. Sufficiency lan- tiator takes an agreement back to guage was soon linked to industry's the union membership." At a meet- desire for release language which ing in July 1980 of the industry's would fix a time period during Public Land Withdrawal Committee which the Forest Service could man- Barnes told the industry leaders that age land studied but not designated he had gotten as good a compro- as wilderness under regular National mise as could have been expected Forest Procedures. At first the envi- under the circumstances. Neverthe-

3 less, the Committee disapproved of provement over the 1980 Foley bill the agreement because the release since it did not create any wilder- period was not long enough. Barnes ness but merely imposed deadlines returned to Washington and on Congress after which all Forest attempted to reopen negotiations Service roadless lands would be for- but was rebuffed.'1 Senator Haya- ever off limits to wilderness recom- kawa's (R-CA) opposition killed the mendation by the agency. If bill in the Senate, but its release lan- enacted, some argued it would have guage was added to the Colorado amended the 1976 National Forest and New Mexico Wilderness Acts, Management Act, which required as well as the Alaska Lands Act, all the Forest Service to reevaluate its of which passed at the end of 1980. lands every 10 to 15 years for all its ("Soft" release, "California" re- multiple uses, including wilderness. lease, and "Colorado" release be- During the next 3 years wilderness came interchangeable terms.) The supporters in Congress, such as fact that no senators or representa- Congressman Seiberling, argued tives had objected to the "soft" re- against amending the act on lease formula as these bills moved grounds that it should not be al- through Congress convinced Con- tered until it had more time to prove gressman Seiberling that the timber its usefulness.'5 The timber industry industry had accepted it, despite countered that Congress was always Barnes' attempted re-negotiation.'2 amending laws and that the National Forest Management Act Whether the industry had agreed to 16 Of the formula or had only temporarily was not special. course, Con- avoided opposing it while an envi- gress would always have the right to ronmentally oriented administration create more wilderness, but both the was in power, they decided they timber industry and environmental- could get a better deal on release ists knew it would be reluctant to do after the 1980 election. Andy so without some kind of recommen- Wiessner, Seiberling's Counsel on dation from the Forest Service. the Public Lands Subcommittee, Steve Forrester, a reporter and close believes the industry had broken its follower of the wilderness move- agreement but concedes it was ment in the Pacific Northwest, de- "their right under our political sys- scribed the optimistic mood of the tem to do so." 13 timber industry during the early days of the Reagan administration: In February 1981 Senator Hayakawa introduced a bill co-sponsored by If you had asked the timber Senator James McClure (R-ID), the lobbyists who crowded into the new Chairman of the Energy Com- Senate Energy Committee hear- mittee and Senator Jesse Helms ing room in February 1981 to (R-NC), new Chairman of the Agri- make predictions about what culture Committee. According to the legislation would be enacted Twin Falls [Idaho] Times News "a during the next four years of dissident faction within the National the Reagan administration, it's a Forest Products Association that sure bet they would not have had not been happy with Foley's or predicted enactment of Oregon Burton's approaches was able to get and Washington state wilderness its way on release language." 14 bills. With Senator James Mc- Buoyed by the victory of Ronald Clure, R-Idah4 running the Reagan, the timber industry decided Energy Committee, Ronald Rea- to push more aggressively for per- gan in the White House and manent release. From its standpoint, John Crowell at the Forest Ser- the Hayakawa bill was a great mi- vice, the timber lobby was in

4 heaven and wilderness was the was a member of both the Agricul- farthest thing from their ture and Energy Committees. When minds.'7 he was in the House, Melcher had been a leader in drafting the Na- The Senate Public Lands Subcom- tional Forest Management Act. It mittee of the Energy Committee was hoped his interest in that legis- scheduled its first hearings on the lation would prevent him from sup- Hayakawa bill during a Senate re- porting permanent release. If he cess. The environmentalists feared were to ally himself with the spon- this was the beginning of a legisla- sors of the Hayakawa bill (which he tive "freight train" that would never did), the environmentalists sweep through the Republican Sen- feared his influence in both commit- ate and then overcome opposition in tees might tip the balance against the Democratic House, as was hap- them. At the same time, the envi- pening with the administration's tax ronmentalists were attempting to and budget bills. Senator Dale gather support from several Sena- Bumpers (D-AR), former chairman tors, especially Republicans, so that of the Public Lands Subcommittee, they could "throw sand in the was out of Washington during the gears" of the bill. Thus, even if it hearings and regretted not having passed the Senate, enough doubt been able to attend. He requested would have been created about the and was granted a new hearing, value of the bill to increase the pos- which Tim Mahoney of the Sierra sibility of its defeat in the House. Club says was the Club's first "foot Four years later a staff member of in the door" in its fight against the the Senate Energy Committee re- Hayakawa bill.'8 At this hearing vealed to Tim Mahoney that enough Rupert Cutler, National Audubon questions had been raised at the vice president, former Assistant Sec- hearings to doom the chances of the retary of Agriculture and "father" bill getting out of committee. This of RARE II, predicted that the was not clear to the environmental- Hayakawa bill would simply "gum ists at that time and Mahoney spec- up the legislative machinery" and ulates hindsight may have helped that RARE II wilderness legislation the staff member reach this conclu- would be completed by the end of sion. In any case, the environmen- 1984. ' talists lobbied against the bill as if it posed a serious threat. They were The environmentalists worked with aware that the bill had not been ad- Senator Walter Huddleston (D-KY) equately drafted and that it con- of the Agriculture Committee who mined many apparent contradic- secured an agreement from Senator tions, but they were reluctant to Helms that there would be adequate stress these problems for fear of be- notice before the committee held its coming trapped in an effort to im- hearings on the bill.20 (The Agricul- prove its technical coherence. Their ture Committee never held these goal was to defeat completely the hearings.) These delaying actions idea of pennanent or long-term re- prevented the bill from quickly pass- lease and not to make it more com- ing out of committee and going to patible with other forestry the Senate floor where the environ- legislation.2' mentalists feared it had a good chance of being passed. Within a few months of the Senate hearing it became clear that the The environmentalists wanted very Hayakawa bill would not bask in much to obtain at least the neutral- the legislative glow of the "Reagan ity of Senator John Melcher of Honeynioon' despite support from Montana, the only Democrat who the administration, important Sena-

5 tors, and industry. The Eugene Reg- ous to anyone by now that the ister Guard in the important timber- Hayakawa bill isn't going any- producing region of western Oregon where,' says an aide to (James] described the stalemate that existed Weaver [Democratic Congress- at the end of 1981. An editorial man from Eugene], 'But indus- pointed out a problem supporters of try is trapped by its own the Hayakawa bill found difficult to rhetoric. '22 overcomei.e., even if the timber industry had not reneged on the At the end of 1981 Senators Mc- 1980 "soft" release agreements, Clure and Melcher proposed a com- many people believed it had. promise that would have been simi- lar to the second Foley bill of 1980, The timber industry took a risk although with slightly fewer acres to earlier this year when it backed be immediately designated as wilder- out of a compromise made at ness. The Sierra Club was encour- the end of the 96th Congress aged that permanent release had and moved to support a new been eliminated from the proposal, bill sponsored by S.f. but both the Club and The Wilder- Hayakawa, ness Society continued to oppose any kind of national wilderness bill. Within one month after Haya- They also objected to some features kawa's bill was given hearings of the proposal that they felt would last April by the Senate Energy amend the National Forest Manage- Committee, it was clear to most ment Act and establish unreasonable observers that Chairman James deadlines on wilderness study areas. McClure, R-Idaho, didn't have A Wilderness Society staff member the votes to move the legisla- observed that "McClure and Mel- tion. cher have tried. They can go back to the timber industry now and say The last seven months have we tried our hardest. Eventually, we been fraught with rumors that hope the whole release idea will just McClure was trying to achieve blow away." 23 compromise and consensus to make the bill palatable. But The release idea did not blow away, nothing seems to have occurred, but in the Wyoming bill introduced and McClure's committee is no in early 1982 it mutated into what closer to resolving the release was a slightly less threatening form language issue, hence the wil- for the environmentalistsso-called derness issue "time certain release" that would have prevented the Forest Service Still, there is no evidence that from recommending any released industry is willing to compro- land for wilderness in a land man- mise. 'There is no softening in agement plan made before the year the industry,' says Gene Berg- 2000. Because most hoffen of the National Forest "second-generation" land manage- Products Association. 'We are ment plans would be revised in the no more willing to compromise late 1990's, year 2000 release meant now than we were when the bill that effectively land would remain was introduced.' released until the first plans of the 21st century were written or some- Industry has acted as though time between 2010 and 2015. Many release language were almost a environmentalists saw this as tanta- theological question on which mount to very long term release.M there can be no deviance, no compromise. 'It must be obvi- These facts contained a potential

6 hazard for the environmentalists. authority to grant leases and patents Release was an issue not readily un- for mining on all public land he derstandable by the general public influenced the outcome of the wil- or even by many wilderness activ- derness debate. Because he enjoyed ists. In 1984 Steve Forrester reported ideological combat and strongly be- with only slight exaggeration that lieved in the development of natural only three people really understood resources, he revived the wilderness releasePeter Coppelman of The debate and gave the wilderness orga- Wilderness Society, Andy Wiessner nizations issues with which to of Congressman Seiberling's staff, arouse the public. and Bill Brizee of the Department of Agriculture.25 Many Sierra Club The 1964 Wilderness Act contained members did not follow the intrica- one provision the environmentalists cies of the release debate but merely had accepted only as the last and accepted on blind faith what their hardest compromise needed to pass leadership told them. But this was the actan extension of the public not true of the Oregon Wilderness mining laws in wilderness areas until Coalition and some other environ- December 31, 1983. But, although mentalists, who felt they had little mining companies technically had stake in the release problem. the right to explore and lease miner- als in wilderness areas, they had not The Coalition was becoming done so because of strict Forest Ser- increasingly estranged from the Si- vice regulations, negative public erra Club and The Wilderness Soci- opinion, and the costs of exploring ety, which placed resolution of the in remote areas where prospects release question ahead of the pas- were unknown. Consequently, sage of any single State wilderness for several years the Federal Govern- bill.26 Many legislators also did not ment had imposed a moratorium understand what to the environmen- on the processing of claims. Accord- talists were fme points of principle ing to Howard Banta, the Forest and would have been willing to set- Services chief minerals expert: tie for a compromise somewhere between permanent national release Industry saw the handwriting with no wilderness designation and on the wall. They were simply "soft" release in statewide bills. The not going to be allowedeven environmentalists had important though the law permitted it legislative allies, who thoroughly from the standpoint of public understood their position on release. opinion to really explore. And But even this support might have there was very little certainty of been inadequate in the face of a being able to develop anything public becoming impatient over they would find. As a conse- what seemed to be pettifogging dif- quence ...there was very little exploration done in statu- ferences and the timber industry's 27 argument that the environmentalists' tory wilderness intransigence on release was threat- ening timber supplies and jobs. As the mining deadline approached, the mining companies began to real- The release question and wilderness ize they would forever be excluded might have become boring issues from wilderness areas unless they unable to hold public attention if managed to establish claims before James 0. Watt had not become the the end of 1983 or got Congress to Secretary of the Interior. Watt did extend the deadline. Bills to extend not have any direct responsibility forthe mining deadline for 10 or 20 managing National Forest Wilder- years were introduced but never ness but through his Department's stood a good chance of passage.

7 Thus, the companies had to rely on oppose him although they suspected establishing claims by convincing he would be their strongest oppo- the Government and the public that nent. A small-scale mutiny within they had a legitimate right to enter the Club's Washington Office re- wilderness areas. They mounted a sulted in a reversal of the tentative campaign to get the Federal Govern- decision to acquiesce and the Club ment to lift its moratorium. began actively to oppose Watt's nomination. Even though that at- James Watt, before he became Sec- tempt received little overt political retary of the Interior, headed the support, it put the Club into a more Mountain States Legal Foundation, assertive mood and brought it out which had been patterned after the of the defeatist mentality produced so-called public interest environmen-by the initial conclusion that Presi- tal law firms. Although Mountain dent Reagan had won decisively and States was organized like these other should be allowed to appoint groups, its founder, Joseph Coors, whomever he wanted. A similar the conservative owner of the Coors fight to block the appointment Brewery in Golden, CO, had just of John Crowell as Assistant Agri- the opposite purpose in mind. His culture Secretary for Natural foundation was set up to combat Resources, overseeing the Forest Serv- what he believed to be excessive gov- ice, improved the environmentalists' ernmental environmental regulations morale still further. The environ- hampering industrial growth.28 mentalists argued that Crowd's former position as chief counsel for In 1980 Mountain States sued the Louisiana Pacific, the largest buyer Federal Government on grounds the of Federal timber, created a possible Forest Service was illegally holding conflict of interest. up two mineral leases. The district judge ordered the Secretary of the Crowell, who was from Portland, Interior to report the withdrawal of OR, had the support of his Senator, the lands to Congress within 20 days Republican Mark Hatfield. Crowell or cease withholding them and to assured Congress that he would not promulgate rules relating to the have a conflict of interest. Neverthe- bases on which oil and gas applica- less, the enviromnentalists had cre- tions could be rejected, approved, ated enough doubt to convince 25 or suspended. Mountain States saw Senators to vote against his the decision as a vindication of its confirmation.3° position. The environmentalists, however, chose to interpret it only Soon after becoming Secretary of as an order to the Government to the Interior, Watt began some activ- decide either for or against the ist policies, such as leasing oil sites claims.29 Watt's role in the lawsuit off the California coast, that pro- made it almost inevitable that he voked strong controversy. When the would become directly involved in issue of mineral leasing in wilder- the wilderness leasing issue when he ness came up, however, Watt became Secretary of the Interior. claimed with some justification that he was merely doing what the law The election of Ronald Reagan required of him. His environmental brought the morale of the Sierra opponents, on the other hand, be- Club's leadership, which had been lieved that Watt could have followed slipping ever since the energy crisis the example of previous Secretaries of 1979, to its lowest ebb. When and found legal and administrative James Watt was nominated for Sec- ways to stop leasing if he had retary of the Interior, the top leader-wanted to. The Sierra Club had ob- ship of the Club was reluctant to mined a high-level Interior Depart-

8 ment memorandum stating that one picked the best. If only they can of the Department's goals was "to explore there, they can explore open wilderness areas." This docu- everywhere.3' ment was given to the press as evi- dence of Watt's active support for Tom Coston, the Regional Forester mineral leasing in wilderness. Secre- in Missoula, denied the permit re- tary Watt denied that he had per- quest because the company had sonally directed the Department to committed a technical error by not open wilderness areas. applying under the proper mineral leasing laws. The agency's Washing- The first test for mineral leasing in ton Office directed the Regional wilderness came in the Bob Mar- Forester to reach a decision based shall Wilderness in western Mon- on the appropriate laws. Coston tana, located in the geological for- again denied the permit on grounds mation known as the Overthrust that seismic testing would disturb delicate grizzly bear habitat and Belt, which geologists believed con- otherwise damage the ecological mined substantial supplies of oil integrity of the Bob.32 But these and gas. This 1.5-million-acre com- administrative decisions were not plex (including two contiguous wil- enough to protect the area because dernesses) was named after one of they were subject to further appeal. the founders of the modern wilder- ness movement and was often called At first, the national wilderness or- the "flagship of the Forest Service ganizations were unsure of how to wilderness fleet." deal with this situation and reacted passively to the events unfolding in A Denver-based energy company Montana. Congressman Pat Wil- had applied for a permit to conduct liams (D-MT) took the initiative seismic tests using explosive charges and began to work with Andy in "the Bob:' as it was called for Wiessner of the Public Lands Sub- short. Because of its exalted stature, committee to find some way to the Bob permit request at once as- withdraw the Bob Marshall Wilder- sumed symbolic importance and ness from the possibility of seismic aroused intense emotion among the testing and mineral leasing. They many ardent wilderness supporters believed they had found at least a in western Montana who organized stopgap measure in an obscure sec- the Bob Marshall Wilderness Alli- tion of the Federal Land Policy ance to stop "the bombing of the Management Act (FLPMA) of Bob." If a company could get a 1976, which was the "organic act" permit to work in the Bob, one of for the Bureau of Land Manage- the most beloved of National Forest ment in the Department of the Inte- wilderness areas, then it could prob- rior. This provision permitted the ably get permits in many other ar- Interior Committee to withdraw eas. The Missoulian newspaper in land from commercial activities if a Missoula, MT, portentously editori- public emergency existed.33 It had alized: only been used once before to pro- tect the town of Ventura, CA, from Many defenders of the Bob all the possibility of well contamination along have suspected that the from uranium mining on nearby Denver Firm's controversial pro-Federal land. As the newspapers posal is less motivated by a de- later reported, this was certainly a sire to find oil or gas than it is novel interpretation and stretched to test whether energy explora- the concept of the separation of tion in wilderness will be toler- powers to the limit. Republicans on ated. By picking the Bob, they the Interior Committee asserted that

9 it would be unconstitutional to use construction of a water project in it in this case because all of the ad- his district and through the back ministrative remedies had not yet door had made it known that he been exhausted. Interior Chairman would cooperate with Mountain Morris Udall (D-AZ) admitted it States and Pacific Legal Founda- was a novel use of FLPMA but tion, which had joined the suit. The charged it was the price Secretary Justice Department, which had an- Watt had to pay for his "confronta- nounced it would not defend the tional administration." Interior Committee against the suit, released Committee lawyers were also dubi- a letter from Pacific Legal Founda- ous about its legality but the Demo- tion stating that they "were crats on the Committee, faced with informed that the filing of this law- no quick alternative and strong pub- suit was received with favor by the lic pressure "to save the Bob" de- involved officials of the executive cided to use it anyway.34 Tim Maho- branch." No evidence was actually ney has described this first round in produced that showed Watt had the congressional attempt to prevent conspired with Pacific Legal Foun- oil and gas leasing in wilderness. dation but the incident served to heighten the controversy surround- We wanted the Committee to ing his administration.36 The Bill- pass a resolution withdrawing ings (MT) Gazette noted the convo- the Bob from mineral leasing luted turn the case had taken: but not mining because the hard-rock miners are very The court case has become a toughto try to cut the Mining curiosity. Watt is the defendant, Congress away, which we did defending an action he with some success, and just opposed. He closed the Bob work on the petroleum guys, Marshall on the order of the who, although very rich, had a House Interior Committee after lot of irons in the fire. We had making it clear that he wanted a real dog-fight in the Interior to increase mineral exploration Committee. It was vicious and in wilderness areas. long and there was a united Re- publican opposition to it. We Attacking Watt in the suit are had to work real hard to line up the Pacific States Legal Founda- all the Democrats. Udall tion and Watt's old Mountain worked hard to line up some of States Legal Foundation. Both the softer Democrats [the final are generally supporters of vote was 23 to 18]. We got it Watt's policies and consider through and it was immediately Watt a champion of their own challenged in court by Moun- beliefs. tain States Legal Foundation, Watt's old outfit... We had Siding with Watt in the case are temporarily saved the 'Bob' but his avowed enemies, including not much else." the Sierra Club and the Bob Marshall Alliance. They con- Secretary Watt personally delivered tend Watt was right in closing a letter to Chairman Udall stating the wilderness, despite his he would comply with the Commit- convictions.37 tee's resolution to close the Bob Marshall, despite serious misgivings With the Bob Marshall temporarily about the constitutionality of the protected, the action shifted to New action. Then came charges in the Mexico where, for the first time, press that Watt had retaliated local Interior Department officials against Udall by threatening to stop had actually approved a mineral

10 lease in the Capitan Wilderness, resolution passed overwhelmingly which had been created by the New (41 to 1), whereas a resolution by Mexico Wilderness Act of 1980. Phil Burton of California to ban immediately all leasing in his State When this news reached the Sierra lost by one vote. (A failure to coor- Club's Washington Office, the staff dinate closely with Udall was proba- bly the reason Burton's resolution members at first were preplexed over 4° how to deal with a threat to a rela- did not pass.) Secretary Watt then tively new and obscure wilderness promised to delay issuing any leases area. But then they discovered they until the end of the 1982 session of had been handed a potential public Congress. Watt continued to main- relations windfall. The Capitan Wil- tain that his hands were tied and derness was not just "any wilder- that he would have to issue leases ness. It was the wilderness where unless Congress passed legislation Smokey Bear had been found and directing him otherwise. In a memo- Smokey symbolized not just the randum to Doug Scott in the Sierra Forest Service but forests in Club's San Francisco office, Tim general."38 Mahoney sounded the optimistic note which was now appearing Manual Lujan (R-NM), the ranking among the environmentalists. Republican on the Interior Commit- tee, did not have the Capitan Wil- Among the positive benefits of derness in his district but did feel a all of this was some of the best responsibility for all the pro-wilderness rhetoric ever to wildernesses in his State. He, like be heard in the Interior Com- his fellow Republicans, had voted mittee ...The level of inter- against the Bob Marshall resolution, est was simply fantastic; the but he now was angry that a lease hearing room was jammed with had been granted by local officials the press and spectators ...It without his knowledge. His first clearly puts a wet blanket on reaction was to propose a resolution the idea of extending the 1984 banning all leasing in wilderness deadline, . areas. After meeting with Watt, however, he dropped this proposal Although we are clearly disap- and settled for an assurance that no pointed that we did not get the leases would be granted by local full withdrawal of all areas in Interior Department officials and the wilderness system, the other that environmental impact state- side must view all of this as a ments would be prepared in all loss as well. Overall we are far cases. This agreement was totally ahead of where we were two inadequate, as far as the environ- weeks ago.4' mentalists were concerned, and prompted Peter Coppelman of The The leasing battle was also stirring Wilderness Society to observe that intense interest in Wyoming, Watts' Watt's agreement to follow existing home State, where there were re- regulations merely meant he had quests to lease in the half-million- promised to "stop beating his acre Washakie Wilderness. Over the wife." years citizens of Wyoming had not shown as much support for wilder- Chairman Udall would not drop the ness as citizens in the neighboring matter and sponsored a resolution states of Colorado and Montana. calling on Secretary Watt to refrain As the most rural of the Western from issuing any mineral leases until States, Wyoming did not have many June 1982 so that Congress would prowilderness urbanites but it did have time to solve the problem. His have a large percentage of its popu-

11 ban was good until July 1983, 6 effort to get legislation to escape months short of the December from these contracts diverted re- deadline. Secretary Watt, however, sources away from the release battle. agreed not to process any leasing It also made it more difficult to as- claims before the deadline because, sert that wilderness designation according to an anonymous high withheld needed timber supplies ranking official; "The American when many companies were trying people have reached a social deci- to turn back supplies they already sion about the wilderness [leasing] had. The industry argued that tim- issue." Thus, the environmental- ber "relief" was a short-term prob- ists finally had succeeded in separat- lem caused by cyclical economic ing the release and leasing issues. conditions whereas wilderness desig- Russ Shay, the Sierra Club's Califor- nation affected long-term supplies.52 nia and Nevada representative, told But this distinction was not always his chapter's members: clear to the public and the environ- mentalists were able to exploit the I remember back a few years industry's difficulties in their media ago when the upcoming 1984 and fundraising campaigns. deadline for new mineral leasing or claims in wilderness areas Both sides were trying to get a looked to me like a sure legisla- Western-State bill through both tive armageddon in which the Houses of Congress, with the kind oil and mining companies of release language they favored. All would overwhelm wilderness the groups agreed that the first suc- supporters. We have turned the cessful bill (not counting the Colo- tables.5° rado and New Mexico bills of 1980) would set a precedent for all subse- According to Mark Reimers, the quent bills because it would be im- Director of the Forest Service's Leg- practical to ask the Forest Service to islative Affairs Staff, the agency follow a different procedure in each viewed "release" and leasing as sep- State. In 1982 the Senate passed a arate issues which did not really af- Wyoming bill that had long-term fect each other.5' The national envi- release supported by industry. If the ronmental organizations, however, House also were to pass a Wyoming saw both as related battles in their bill, industry hoped a House-Senate overall wilderness campaign. They conference would result in a com- felt they had emerged from their promise containing at least some of wilderness leasing victory more con- the provisions they wanted. Chair- fident of their position on the re- man Seiberling, however, had lease question and their ability to enough political support to keep the influence wilderness legislation. The bill "bottled up" in his timber industry, on the other hand, subcommittee. was in a severe economic recession which was hampering its lobbying The environmentalists were concen- efforts on release. By late 1982 a trating their strategy on the three large segment of the industry was largest timber-producing States in concerned less with release than the WestCalifornia, Oregon, and with getting "relief" from Federal Washington. In August 1981 Tim timber contracts purchased when Mahoney outlined the cautious the cost of stumpage was high. strategy which the Sierra Club, with These companies, mostly in the Pa- some modifications, followed over cific Northwest, were selling their the next 2years. products at prices that made it une- conomical to harvest the Federal In the past, we have called our timber previously purchased. The approach the leapfrog' strategy.

14 We moved Cal4fornia first be- standards from the Clean Air Act cause it could best move in the enabled the bill narrowly to pass House and pave the way for out of the subcommittee.57 If the Washington on release. Then, asbill had failed, it would have given Cal(fornia bogs down in the that sign of weakness, which Tim $enate, we would try to move Mahoney had warned about in 1981. the Washington bill through both House and Senate. If By the fall of 1983 there were indi- Washington goes through, the cations that the stalemate over re- odds on Oregon increase. The lease was beginning to break. The success of all three are interre- previous summer Senator Mark lated, and f any of them fail Hatfield had held field hearings on badly, it hurts the others and an Oregon wilderness bill after hav- our overall strategy. ing stayed aloof from the wilderness issue for 3 years. The environmen- .. Passage of the Caljiornia talists had been counting on Senator bill is an excellent start frefers Henry Jackson to push through a to the 1981 House passage], but Washington bill that would break we cannot stop there. We face a the release deadlock. His death in danger that jf any of our state- August 1983 made Hatfield's return by-state bills erupts in contro- to wilderness politics even more sig- versy over on the House side, nificant. the timber industry, as well as Senate leaders and even some Also that summer the Forest Service nervous friends like Representa- testified for the first time on behalf tive Foley, will take it as a sign of a bill (Utah) that contained some of our weakness and the weak- land not recommended in RARE ness of our approach.54 II.In October Deputy Assistant Agriculture Secretary, Douglas Mac- In 1982, Congress passed wilderness Cleery, testified that the administra- bills for Florida (vetoed by Presi- tion would be willing to accept dent Reagan), Indiana, and West "permanent or long-term release' a Virginia, which contained the 1980 softening of the Department's previ- Colorado release language. Senator ous position that only permanent McClure did not oppose these bills release would do.59 because he considered them to be in a different category from the big Forest Service officials also began to western bills and because they were talk to various Senators and Repre- handled by the Senate Agriculture sentatives about certain technical Committee. To the environmental- deficiencies that the agency had ists, however, it was important to found in the 1980 release language. "trickle" a few wilderness bills Of primary importance was the through Congress to show that "the meaning of the word "revision" in system still worked." the "soft" release formula. If a for- est plan were amended, would the According to Scott Shotwell of the released roadless land have to be National Forest Products Associa- reconsidered all over again for wil- tion, the House Public Lands Sub- derness designation or could that committee vote on the West Virginia wait until a whole new plan was bill was especially important.56 Un- written? Senator Jesse Helms asked sure of having enough votes, Seiber- the Congressional Research Service ling postponed two scheduled mark- (CRS) to study the question. Its ups of the bill. A last-minute first report stated that it was quite amendment allowing the Governor possible a court could construe an of West Virginia to suspend certain amendment as being a revision re-

15 quiring reexamination of roadless every hypothetical possibility land. Peter Coppelman, The Wilder- that might conceivably be en- ness Society's counsel, disputed this countered for decades. From a conclusion, which he claimed was strategic standpoint, it is to the based on an inadequate reading of timber lobby's advantage to the Colorado Act's legislative his- continue to seek new 'clarifica- tory. A subsequent CRS study tions' even as old problems are reached the opposite conclusion but explained away. If the problems some legislators had begun to doubt are dismissed, the industry has the adequacy of the "soft" release lost nothing. If they raise new formula.60 doubts about the old language, the lobby is aided in pushing a Senator John Melcher was one of renegotiation. The renegotiation the first Senators the Forest Service would only go in one direction, spoke to about these problems. Mel- towards statutory-length forest cher took a personal interest in the plans. issue and brought it to the attention of Congressman Seiberling, who We much prefer a strategy had been his colleague on the where the other side has to put House Interior Committee in the specjfic new language address- 1970's. Meicher respected Seiber- ing specific problems and we get ling's ability to draft legislation and to pick at their language and its was confident that he would quickly inadequacies rather than guess- grasp the problem and see the need ing in advance what 'clarifica- to modify the Colorado language.61 tions' the Senate might According to Tom Thompson of the accept Forest Service's Legislative Affairs Staff, Senator Melcher helped create The ultimate agenda for the a climate that led eventually to the timber interests is to see that compromise over release.62 (The wilderness is not reconsidered Wilderness Society later thanked for a long time ... They him for keeping the discussion from would like the release language straying beyond the bounds of the to thwart any legal challenge on National Forest Management Act any grounds to the initial into permanent or long-term Cro well-plans and more impor- release.) 63 tantly, to ensure that the forest plan has a statutory life so that The environmentalists, of course, it cannot be revised by a subse- were aware that these discussions quent Administration ... We were taking place and were afraid would be giving the timber in- that if their congressional allies ac- dustry an advance statutory cepted any of the technical objec- commitment for a plan of Sec- tions, the timber industry and its retary Crowell's choosing congressional supporters would have which we have never seen. opened the door to other conces- sions. In a December 1983 letter the On the same day as this letter was Sierra Club and The Wilderness So- being written, the Oregon Natural ciety expressed their fears to their Resources Council (previously called most strategically placed ally, Con- the Oregon Wilderness Coalition) gressman Seiberling. had filed a lawsuit asking the court to stop the development of any While interest groups have a RARE II lands in Oregon based on right to be concerned about the Judge Karlton's 1980 California de- future, it is impossible to design cision. The Council had threatened any legislation that will cover for 3 years to sue but had been dis-

16 suaded by the national environmen- nobody there, so we sat in the tal organizations who feared a legis- corner of this huge office. We lative backlash that might result in were waiting for ten minutes. permanent release. The Council had He's a master of the psychology finally lost patience when Senator of these sorts of things. And Hatfield did not introduce a bill in then he sort of breezed in and 1983 and decided to go ahead with before we could say a word, he a suit knowing that the Sierra Club said: 'It's Caljfornia release and and The Wilderness Society would I can't tell you everything about publicly disavow it.65 If successful, the bill but it won't be a million the lawsuit would have had, at least acres, a million acres is too temporarily, a severe impact on Ore- much but it will be a little less gon's timber industry. than a million acres with room for some negotiations between According to Tim Imeson, Senator the time I introduce my own bill Hatfield's principal assistant on the and the time we actually mark wilderness issue, the lawsuit did it up and get it out and have "not alter the Senator's timetable" the final bill.' Then we asked but it did give him an argument him if he had consulted with with which to persuade his the House and he said not re- colleagues that an Oregon bill ally.' We tried to warn him that needed to be passed quickly.If the he might have trouble with the Council's lawsuit had come 2 years Senate Energy Committee, that earlier when the timber industry was they had never passed a bill politically stronger, it may have re- with soft release for one plan- sulted in stronger efforts to pass fling cycle and he said 'well, permanent release. But in late 1983, they passed my bill in 1979 and with the Hayakawa permanent re- they'll pass my bill flow. I'll lease bill long dead and Wyoming support Senator McClure and long-term release moribund, the Senator Wallop on their bills Council's suit helped nudge Con- and they better support gress towards a release compromise mine.' 67 acceptable to the environmentalists. By March wilderness bills for New Senator Hatfield had not met with Hampshire, Vermont, Wisconsin, the Sierra Club for several years but and North Carolina had been pre- in February 1984 he granted a meet- pared and were ready for action by ing to Tim Mahoney; Jim Blomqu- the Senate Agriculture Committee. ist, the Club's Northwest Represen- All contained the 1980 soft release tative, and Ron Eber, the Club's language. The North Carolina bill volunteer leader in Oregon, to dis- had been worked out by Congress- cuss his upcoming bill. At that man Jamie Clarke (D-NC), Forest meeting he promised to support the Supervisor George Olson, the North 1980 'anguage. According to Maho- Carolina Department of Natural ney: Resources, and the local Sierra Club and timber industry. The bill easily Eber, Blomquist, and I had pre- passed the House after receiving the pared a long speech to give to support of all of the State's con- Hatfield on how we had appre- gressmen. Senator Helms, however, ciated working with him and had not yet agreed to support it. that release language was very The other three State bills had the important and how we cared unanimous support of their about these several areas. In- delegations. stead we were ushered into his personal office and there was It had been reported that Senators

17 Helms and Melcher would try to Nevertheless, the unwillingness alter these bills so that forest plans of the Agriculture Committee to would run for a fixed 10- or 15-year override the senators from local period during which roadless land states was a victory. The unwill- could not be reexamined under any ingness of Helms and Melcher circumstances. The Sierra Club and to put it to a vote was a victory The Wilderness Society criticized and the unwillingness of Helms this plan as being too "inflexible:' to go it alone in North Carolina although they knew that it was and possibly lose his bill was much closer to the 1980 formula victory. He blinked. All in all than the Wyoming bill, which would this was a very good day for all have put off wilderness reconsidera- of us.71 tion until the second decade of the next century. At the markup session At the end of March the Congres- on March 28, Senators Helms and sional Quarterly reported that Sena- Melcher, as well as Forest Service tor McClure had agreed to accept Chief Max Peterson, said that re- soft release in the Washington bill lease was a national issue and that and that Senator Hatfield was problems in the 1980 formula "pushing just as hard for his bill." needed to be corrected. Senator Pa- The Quarterly predicted that the trick Leahy (D) of Vermont and Ag- "moment of truth" would come riculture Subcommittee Chairman April 472 That moment actually Roger Jepsen (R) of Iowa argued came April 11 in "a dramatic show- that the local delegations should be down" between Senators Hatfield allowed to have language they had and Dan Evans (R-WA) and Sena- agreed on. Senator Orrin Hatch tor McClure. Senator Hatfield ap- (R-UT), said he wanted "hard" re- pealed to the principal of senatorial lease for the Utah bill but favored comity and alluded to his powerful allowing each delegation to have the position as chairman of the Appro- bill it desired. Close followers of thepriations Committee. release question, however, believed it was very unlikely that Congress Now, Mr. Chairman, I think would pass different release formu- unlike any of the other western las. They suspected that the States states at this moment, we are in rights argument would work only a very unique situation in Ore- for the first bill to pass Congress.69 gon in that we have had suits filed that are now being Leahy prevailed and the bills were litigated ... Andconsidering passed out of the committee on a 10 the basic economics of Oregon to 0 vote after Senator Helms had is related to the timber industry, requested that the North Carolina we are in a very urgent situa- bill be allowed to accompany the tion. other three. According to Bill Brooks of the Agriculture Commit- I have a very strong feeling tee Staff, Senator Helms did not that, in relation to the release view this as a serious matter because language, that we're now play- he put holds on the bills until the ing a game of hostage; that one Senate Energy Committee had state that may have a resolution reached an agreement on release.70 of that problem cannot move The Sierra Club's Tim Mahoney, because some other state hasn't however, saw it as an important had a resolution of their prob- event and a signal to Senator Mc- lem. Clure that he did not have enough support in the Senate to pass long- Now, as Chairman of the Ap- term release. propriations Committee, I have

18 tried to accommodate the mem- The final agreement worked out by bers of the Senate in literally Senator McClure and Congressmen hundredsof Seiberling and Udall was much amendments, . .. And I have closer to the 1980 formula than to tried to perform that same help Wyoming long-term release. It did and assistance with senators on not establish any fixed time period this committee. during which the Forest Service was prohibited from reconsidering road- Now, Mr. Chairman, I am a less land for wilderness designation little bit impatient today be- but only referred to the forest plans, cause I've been ready to move which were expected to last for 10 to on this bill for quite some 15 years. And during that period it time, . did not categorically prohibit the Forest Service from managing re- Senator Evans expressed his state of leased land so as to preserve its wil- extreme readiness by referring to a derness characteristics. It only said logjam metaphor used earlier in the the agency need not do so. These colloquy with Senator McClure: "I two points had been the ones the hope patience is one of my virtues, environmentalists had fought most but I must say that if, in fact, the doggedly to retain from the 1980 keg of dynamite is needed, you formula. However, the timber indus- know, my fuse is lit." Senator try and Senator McClure could McClure told Hatfield and Evans claim that they had won several im- that an agreement with the House portant concessions. The definition seemed near. Hatfield and Evans of a revision had been tightened up did not try to force a vote on their to exclude explicitly an amendment bills, but they had made it clear to a forest plan, thus improving the that they would wait only a few "certainty" that a forest plan would weeks more for a resolution. It was run its 10- to 15-year course before being reported that Senator Mc- the wilderness issue had to be raised Clure would run for Senate Major- again. Also, roadless areas of less ity Leader after the November elec- than 5,000 acres as well as those tions, and some observers believed examined but found wanting for that he could not delay much longer wilderness classification in Forest a party colleague as influential as Service unit plans done before Senator Hatfield.75 RARE II were also released in the The final negotiations involved such first forest plans. Senator McClure a profusion of seemingly arcane de- was especially pleased to have won tails that only the most interested this last point because nearly 4 mil- professionals had the stamina to lion acres of land in Idaho had been follow them. Forest Service Chief examined in pre-RARE II unit Peterson acted as a go-between, plans.77 (As of early 1987, an Idaho shuttling proposals back and forth wilderness bill had not been to the House and Senate principals. passed.) Peterson took an optimistic approach, assuring negotiators that The fight over release had come to a they were actually much closer to an welcome end for all involved. The agreement than they thought they path had been cleared to designate were. Scott Shotwell of the National6.6 million acres of National Forest Forest Products Association thought System land as wilderness, the larg- that he played an indispensable role est designated acreage in a single by filling a communications session of Congress since the Wil- vacuum.76 derness Act of 1964. On the other

19 hand, 13.6 million acres were Interview with Tim Mahoney, "released" to regular Forest Service Washington, DC, 4/3/85. Management. Roth, The Wilderness Move- The environmentalists' tenacity and ment, p. 58. the support they had mobilized dur- ing the wilderness leasing debate Mahoney interview. prevented the enactment of long- Ibid.; Doug Scott to John Mc- term release, which had seemed pos- Comb, 6/26/80, Records of the sible after the 1980 election. In the Sierra Club. final stages the Forest Service played a significant role by pointing out Roth, The Wilderness Move- "flaws" in the 1980 release formula. ment, p. 59. Once permanent and long-term re- Ibid., p. 66. lease had died, it was helpful to have had a common technical vo- Dick Barnes, telephone inter- cabulary which both sides could view, 4/23/85. argue over without excessive ideo- logical rancor. John Seiberling to Richard L. Barnes, 6/11/81, House Public During the summer of 1984 Con- Lands Subcommittee, FSHS. gress passed 18 wilderness bills, cov- Interview with Andy Wiessner, ering 12 Eastern and 6 Western Washington, DC, 11/20/84. States. A history of all these bills would tax the reader's patience. In 'TWin Falls, ID "Times-News," order to minimize redundancy, the 4/16/81. author has selected three bills for Western States and three for Eastern Wiessner interview. States to examine. These six bills Interview with Scott Shotwell, were the most controversial of the Washington, DC, 12/4/84. group. Most of the other bills either did not produce as much contro- "Lewiston (Idaho) Morning versy or were largely put together Thbune," 3/18/84. behind closed doors. Consequently, Mahoney interview. they did not yield as much informa- tion as the six selected. Interview with Rupert Cutler, New York, NY, 7/21/83; Notes "Public Land News," 4/30/81. Mahoney interview. Dennis M. Roth, The Wilder- ness Movement and the Ibid. National Forests: 1964-1980 (Washington, DC: U.S. Depart- "Eugene Register Guard," ment of Agriculture, Forest Ser- 11/26/8 1. vice; 1984) p. 57. "Public Land News," Lloyd Meads, speech before the 12/10//81. Western States Legislative For- estry 'Ihsk Force, 8/1/79, Sierra Statement of Peter D. Coppel- Club (SC) records, Forest Ser- man ... on 5. 543and H.R. vice History Section (FSHS). 1568, 6/28/83, The Wilderness Society (TWS) records, FSHS. Interview with Andy Kerr, Eu- gene, OR, 3/11/85. "Steve Forrester's Northwest Letter," 4/30/84. "Forestry Industry Affairs Letter," 4/13/81. Mahoney interview.

20 Marc Leepson, "Protecting the Interview with Mark Reimers, Wilderness," Editorial Research Washington, DC, 10/30/85. Reports, vol. 11, no. 6, Aug. 17, 1984, P. 600. "East Linn County: A Case Study in the Effects of Wilder- Alec Dubro, "Wilderness on ness," Oregon Women for Tim- Trial," "Outside," Feb./March ber, 5/83, SC records, FSHS. 1982. Mahoney interview. Mahoney interview; Casper, WY, "Star-Tribune," 10/10/80. Tim Mahoney to Joe Fontaine, et. al., 8/18/81, SC records, Ibid. FSHS. "Missoulian," 5/10/81. Mahoney interview. "Biffings Gazette," 4/12/80. Shotwell interview. Mahoney interview. Mahoney interview. Interview with Tom Thompson, Ibid. Washington, DC, 12/4/84. Ibid. Ibid. "Wall St. Journal," 8/28/81; "Statement of Peter D. Coppel- "Sierra Club National News man ... on H.R. 3960, Report," 8/31/81. 1/25/84, TWS records, FSHS; interview with John Melcher, "Biffings Gazette," 9/10/81. Washington, DC, 4/26/85. Mahoney interview. Ibid. "Missoulian," 11/20/81, James Thompson interview. Watt to Manuel Lujan, Jr., 11/19/81, SC records, FSHS. Interview with Peter Coppel- man, Washington, DC, Mahoney interview. 1/18/85. Tim Mahoney and John Mc- Tim Mahoney et. al. to John Comb to Doug Scott, 11/20/81, Seiberling, 12/12/83, SC SC records, FSHS. records, FSHS. Denver Post, 1/30/82. Kerr interview. Mahoney interview. lephone interview with Tom Imeson, 4/8/85. Ibid. Mahoney interview. "Los Angeles Times," 2/24/82. Ibid.; interview with Peter Cop- Mahoney interview. pelman, Washington, DC, 9/20/84. Ibid. Mahoney interview; "Los Angeles Times," 9/24/82. "Oregonian," 4/2/84. "New York Times," 1/27/83; Interview with Bill Brooks, "Weekly Bulletin," 12/13/82. Washington, DC, 12/13/84. Tim Mahoney to field represen- Russ Shay to members, tatives, 3/28/84, SC records, 8/13/82, SC records, FSHS. FSHS.

21 "Congressional Quarterly," "Congressional Quarterly," March 31, 1984, PP. 727-28. March 31, 1984, pp. 727-28. U.S. Senate Energy Committee Shotwell interview; interview Business Meeting, 4/11/84, with Max Peterson, Washing- Acme Reporting. ton, DC, 9/15/84. Ibid. Interview with Barbara Wise, Washington, DC, 1/28/85.

22 Chapter II: Oregon Wilderness

Senator Hatfield's role in resolving doing for that movement what Paris the release question made the Ore- had done for the literary world in gon Wilderness bill one of the most the 1920's, offering a "rich stimulat- important of those passed in 1984. ing milieu in which ideas could be But beyond its importance as a cata-planted and could then have suffi- lyst, the bill was unique because of cient time to grow, ferment and the amount of controversy it cre- mature."2 atednot only between the timber industry and environmentalists, as In the 1930's the Forest Service had was to be expected, but among the placed many of Oregon's environmentalists themselves. high-elevation roadless areas in its primitive area system. Most of these For the last 30 years Oregonians became part of the Wilderness Sys- have fought over wilderness more tem when the Wilderness Act was passionately than the citizens of any passed in 1964. In later years wilder- other State. Oregon is the heart of ness activitists began to move their the western timber industry, but attention down the slopes, hoping since the 1950's it has also been the to protect lower elevation areas with home of a growing wilderness move-more trees. The timber industry, ment that has opposed the indus- having exhausted most of its own try's attempts to harvest the remain- supply of old-growth timber, was, at ing pockets of the State's old-growth the same time, trying to move up timber. In 1954 the Sierra Club es- the slopes. These opposite motions tablished its first chapter outside of brought the two groups into conflict California in Oregon. In 1960 the on the middle slopes of the Oregon Cascades Conservation National Forests.3 Council became the second state- wide organization to focus exclu- Both the Forest Service and Senator sively on wilderness.' (The MontanaMark Hatfield saw the potential for Wilderness Coalition was first.) The prolonged conflict over roadless ar- movement was unsuccessful in the eas. Since 1968, Hatfield had been early years because the thriving and in the middle of a fight over French politically powerful timber industry Pete, an old-growth valley in the parried several attempts to expand Willamette National Forest. In 1971 the State's wilderness system. he began to explore the idea of a statewide wilderness bill to perma- However, by the early 1970's the nently settle the wilderness issue. At situation had begun to change. Ore- the same time the Forest Service was gon had acquired a reputation as a beginning its first nationwide inven- place of the ecologically conscious. tory of roadless areas (RARE 1). Governor Tom McCall bolstered this Hatfield decided to defer his plan image by signing the first State law until RARE I had been completed.4 banning disposable cans and by publicly discouraging migration into The final environmental report for the State. In 1976 Robert Wazeka of RARE I recommended that 262,000 the Sierra Club claimed that Eu- acres of land be studied for possible gene, OR, had become the center of wilderness designation. All of these the wilderness movement and was acres were contiguous to already

23 existing wilderness and were thus we were working on French Pete not "new" proposals.5 A Sierra and other areas. You would go Club lawsuit in California resulted in with your laundry list of wil- in an agreement by the Forest Ser- derness areas and they would vice to prepare environmental im- say: 'which of these areas is pact statements before developing most important.' What they'd roadless areas. In Oregon the unit really mean is which of these plan impact statements were being areas is least important and we completed more quickly than other didn't want to answer that and States because the Forest Service we couldn't answer that. To us wanted to resolve the roadless issue there is no least important area. in its most productive National For- And the way you combat that is ests. The Forest Service's unwiffing- to have a group for each area, ness to recommend any new wilder- even a small group because that ness study areas in Oregon and the group is not willing to compro- "fast tracking" of the planning pro- mise and it creates a tension cess convinced some Oregon envi- which prevents somebody from ronmentalists that a new strategy paring down the wilderness was needed if a substantial number list...It was designed to be of roadless areas were to be djfficult. We wanted it to be protected.6 difficult to take an area out.8

Eastern Oregon had the bulk of the As a civil engineer, Joe Walicki was State's roadless areas, but it was a the only Wilderness Society field virtual terra incognita for the Sierra representative hired by Clifton Mer- Club and The Wilderness Society, ritt who did not have a background which were seen as too radical by in natural resource management. conservative Oregonians living east But he more than made up for that of the Cascades. The Northwest lack with his ability to motivate representatives of the Sierra Club people. During 1972 and 1973 he and The Wilderness Society, Doug organized several wilderness work- Scott and Joe Walicki, as well as shops throughout Oregon. These Sierra Club activitist Holly Jones, workshops produced the people and were strong believers in the value of ideas that resulted in the creation of grassroots organizing but they the Oregon Wilderness Coalition doubted the ability of the national (OWC) in February 1974. During organizations to make much head- the first few years of its existence, way in eastern Oregon. In order to the OWC was a true coalition. Its circumvent this image problem, they staff traveled throughout Oregon decided to create a statewide organi- organizing local groups and zation that would not carry the Si- instructing them in the techniques erra Club stigmaan organization of wilderness protection and politi- that would be acceptable to eastern cal action. It was a coordinating Oregonians and would also fight umbrella for all local groups, in- vigorously to protect roadless cluding local chapters of the Sierra areas.7 Tim Mahoney gives another Club, but it did not set policy. Each reason why they felt the Oregon local group retained the right to de- Wilderness Coalition was needed. termine how it would protect the areas it had selected. In 1976 OWC we believed our greatest was seen as having assumed strength in passing a wilderness bill was to have an individual An active, even aggressive role constituency in every area. And in certain areas by organizing Senator Hatfield was the person new groups; putting on state- who had come to mind while wide conftrences and regional

24 workshops focusing on tech- that less than 100% of the road- niques of wilderness preserva- less land base should be tion; monitoring and reviewing retained. Regardless of so-called EIS's and timber sales, creating realities, it is this goal which ad hoc task forces and coordi- will enable us to save maximum nating communication, research Wilderness acreage. This goa4 and educational functions for by rational perspective, is not Oregon wilderness activities. By unrealistic or unattainable.'2 contrast, its policy role has been passive. The member groups of Because of his training in wildlife OWC, which are fully autono- biology, Montieth was instrumental mous, make decisions on spe- in forming a statewide scientific net- cflc wilderness recommenda- work in support of wilderness. He tions and on strategies for was also responsible in large part implementing them. '° for moving the debate over Oregon wilderness away from an exclusive The Coalition was supported by the emphasis on recreational and aes- Sierra Club and The Wilderness So- thetic values. By 1976 Robert Wa- ciety and by contributions from its zeka of the Sierra Club noted that local members. OWC's first coordi- testimony on Oregon wilderness nator was Fred Swanson, a Sierra now focused much more strongly on Club activist who taught a wilder- "the need of certain wildlife species ness course at the University of Ore- for undisturbed habitat; with con- gon and at the Survival Center in cern for critical soils; and above all, Eugene. He left in the fall of 1974 with an understanding of scientific, for Montana and was replaced by historical and ecological values."13 Jim Montieth, a soft-spoken man, who had "given up a promising sci- Montieth and his staff were all in entific career as a wildlife biologist their early or middle twenties and in order to return to fight for wil- were fired by the enthusiasms of derness" at a salary of $100 a youth. Montieth reported to his ex- month. il After accepting the job, ecutive council that he was working Montieth wrote a letter to OWC's 80 hours a week and was "worrying Executive Council emphasizing his himself sick" over the fate of Ore- strong commitment to Oregon wil- gon wilderness. He said of his field derness: representatives Tim Lillebo and Andy Kerr that, in addition to pos- In early June 1974, I spent sessing the necessary "analytical many afternoons with Montana prowess:' they also felt the wilder- Fred [SwansonJ, for we had a ness issue "in their guts." It took lot to talk about. After about a this kind of commitment to go into week I told Fred I'd be willing the often hostile environment of the to acceptna rather, that I small mill towns of southern and wantedthe OWC Coordina- eastern Oregon to orglnize for wil- tor's job, if the purpose was to derness protection. save all the de facto land, and more. He looked me in the eye For several years after RARE I and agreed. OWC claimed it had stalled the de- velopment of roadless areas but That is not a commitment I members felt their delaying tactics made to you, or even to Fred, eventually would fail unless more so much as it is made myself drastic action were taken. By 1977 This wilderness resource we deal Jim Montieth began to believe that with every day is part of us. No only a national wilderness lawsuit OWC staff person has ever felt could save Oregon roadless areas.

25 We believe that the only way we direction in which the staff seemed can insure that the majority of to be taking the Coalition. There de facto wilderness will have were allegations that the office was even a remote chance of remain- not running smoothly and that the ing wild is to meet the problem staff were overstepping the bounds nationally (or at least regional- of their authority by attempting to ly) in the courts. To date, land set policy. The staff members, on use plans, especially the treat- the other hand, ofter chafed at ment of undeveloped areas, their inability to make policy be- have been totally inadequate. cause they often saw problems com- We feel that our legal case ing before they were evident to the against land use planning will local group. They also believed the never be stronger Executive Council was too conserva- tive and too willing to compromise. Without a nationwide suit Montieth later said that the "prob- which legally challenges the pro- lems which developed in the 1980's cess being used to destroy wil- stemmed from the period 1976 to derness, conservationists stand 1978. It was a shock to them there to lose most roadless areas to was so much wild land out development. Given our limited there."16 resources, if bad decisions are not challenged in the courts re- In 1978, in midst of RARE II, the gionally or nationally, we have Executive Council attempted to oust no method to stop the destruc- Montieth but was unable to per- tion of perhaps 90% of the wild suade a majority on the Governing lands. National court action, Council. Montieth prevailed in a 2 like the 1972 suits, will give us to 1 vote. The animosity created by the de facto wilderness to work this split, which was essentially one with in five years. Where would between the Sierra Club and the we be now if the '72 suit hadn't OWC staff, persisted and colored been filed? the future relations between these two organizations. The Sierra Club The tragedy of the situation is leadership in Oregon thought that that if we could hang onto the OWC was politically naive, while undeveloped areas for ten years, OWC prided itself on its Indian and they would be ours. Even the sportsmen constituency and felt that timber industry admits that time the Sierra Club was an "elitist west- is on the side of wilderness ern Oregon recreation group" popu- preservation.'5 lated by the "wine and brie set."7

After its 1972 lawsuit the Sierra OWC was convinced they were Club had become increasingly wary charting a new course for Oregon of another national lawsuit because wilderness, one that avoided "left- of fears it would provoke a timber wing urban anti-hunting groups" industry and congressional back- and sought out new constituencies lash. Montieth's advocacy of a law- to bring the wilderness movement suit began to open a rift between more in line with basic western li- the Sierra Club and the OWC staff. festyles. They also believed they had OWC's confrontational approach a mission to desanctify the wilder- and sometimes abrasive lobbying ness idea. Wilderness to them had tactics had made Montieth a contro- become a more commonplace cate- versial figure in Oregon. The gory, one that was to be used to OWC's Executive Council, made up prevent mismanagement by the For- primarily of Sierra Club members, est Service, which they believed was becoming disturbed over the could not be trusted to manage land

26 sensitively under its own authority.'8 really yes or no, but how much In the 1960's and early 1970's the Most folks really don't want Sierra Club and The Wilderness So- areas classjfied as wilderness. ciety had attacked the Forest Service They just think they do. What for adhering to what they consid- they don't want is for public ered to be an overly "pure" defini- lands to be mistreatedthey tion of suitable wilderness land. In don't want poor land husband- Oregon the Sierra Club now found ry The wilderness extremists itself on the receiving end of this have sold the public a bill of criticism when OWC alleged that goods that the only alternative the Club was interested primarily in to unethical land use practices is scenic recreation areas with alpine wilderness. The cultists who vistas.'9 As the Sierra Club saw it- advocate locking up now or lose self cast more and more into the forever are using unethical tac- role of scapegoat and even villain, tics to prevent unethical some of its leaders naturally began practices.2' to believe they bad created a Fran- kenstein monster when they formed In 1979 Senator Hatfield introduced OWC in 1974. a 600,000-acre wilderness bill that quickly passed the Senate but Of the 3 4 million acres of land stalled in the House because power- studied in Oregon during RARE II, ful Congressman Al Ullman the Forest Service recommended (D-OR), Chairman of the House that 370,000 acres be considered for Ways and Means Committee, wilderness designation. The Sierra wanted less wilderness than Hatfield Club and OWC were deeply disap- proposed while Jim Weaver wanted pointed over this figure. OWC also more. That deadlock alone would charged that the agency had failed have been sufficient to block the bill to study another million acres of but in addition the Sierra Club and land that should have been part of The Wilderness Society opposed its RARE 11.20 The environmentalists permanent release provision. An- blamed these results on the agency's gered over the failure of his bill, alleged timber bias and on the per- which he thought was a generous sonal actions of Regional Forester improvement over the RARE II rec- Richard Worthington. When he re- ommendations, Hatfield "remained tired in 1982, Worthington expressedinaccessible to Sierra Club lobby- his strong disapproval of the tactics ists" for the next several years. In of the wilderness movement. Im- 1981 he was reported to have said plicit in this farewell statement was that "Mr. Weaver and company a rebuttal of OWC's argument that are not going to have an Ore- the only alternative to wilderness gon wilderness bill in this Con- was Forest Service mismanagement: gress."22 This was an indication that he would no longer take the Many wilderness demands are lead in formulating a statewide bill entirely unethical. They conflict but would wait for the House to with any sound, esthetic or bio- settle its differences before returning logical value; yet they are trum- to the issue. Despite Hatfield's peted as being in the public in- seeming passivity, all the principals terest. In reality classification of in the struggle over Oregon wilder- land as wilderness means lock- ness knew that in the final analysis ing up large acreages for the usehe would be the arbiter of the Ore- of very few people. It is entirely gon wilderness bill. contrary to basic good govern- ment when carried beyond mi- Over the years Senator Hatfield had nor amounts. The issue is not shown an independent attitude to-

27 wards wilderness, which was not million acres and that the final surprising considering the economic bill would be somewhere in importance of the Oregon timber between.26 industry. He had been elected to the Senate in 1966 and thus had been involved in the creation of every After the failure of Hatfield's 1979 Oregon wilderness since the passage bill, OWC was anxious to see a new of the Wilderness Act. But he had bill introduced. But here it ran into not always felt comfortable with a disagreement with the Washing- wilderness classification, proposing ton, DC, offices of the Sierra Club instead on several occasions the cre- and The Wilderness Society, which, ation of an intermediate for strategic reasons dealing with "backcountry" designation that the release question, thought it was would allow more management flex- more important to promote a Wash- ibility than the wilderness designa- ington or a California bill. OWC tion. He also leaned more towards reluctantly decided to accede to the what the environmentalists called an national organizations' wishes but "anthropocentric" view of wilder- began to become concerned that nessemphasizing scenery and rec- Oregon might somehow be sacri- reational use over biological and ficed in the national battle over re- ecological values.23 OWC saw that lease. Tim Mahoney's statement to one of its principal tasks was to Andy Kerr that an Oregon bill convince Hatfield of the necessity would be "tough" reinforced that of wilderness classification for the fear.27 Throughout the debate over protection of fisheries, watersheds, release, OWC maintained that it was and wildlife, especially in eastern Oregon where recreational demands an arcane issue that had little rele- were not as great as in the western vance for Oregon because the Forest part of the State. They "respected Service and timber industry would and even feared" Hatfield's staff quickly develop all the released assistant Tom Imeson "because of roadless areas no matter what kind his competence" but they knew he of statutory language was would give them a fair hearing. adopted.28 The timber industry's position was that no more or perhaps very little The Sierra Club had four main rea- new wilderness should be created. sons for delaying the introduction Governor Vic Atiyeh's proposal of of an Oregon bill: (1) Hatfield's 60,000 acres was as far as the indus- position on release was unknown try as a whole would go.25 That after his statement following the hard-line stance made it difficult to 1980 election that the issue might be negotiate with the industry. Accord- reexamined; (2) the Club did not ing to Imeson: know where Democratic Congress- man Les AuCoin stood on release. The timber industry still put up As a member of theHouse Appro- a lot of resistance to a wilder- priations Committee, he was power- ness bill. For them the common ful and had a reputation as a good denominator was that there coalition-builder but he had cospon- should be very little new wilder- sored the 1979 national wilderness ness. Therefore, it was hard for bill and had not yet endorsed the them to get together on a bill. Colorado release language; (3) Con- They could never get a unified gressmen AuCoin and Weaver "did position near 600,000 acres, al- not work real well together"; and though I told them that the '79 finally (4) most of the proposed wil- bill was 600,000 acres and the derness areas were in the district of House bill (of 1983] was 1.2 the new Republican Congressman

28 Denny Smith, who strenuously op- standard bearer but even that rela- posed them.29 According to Tim tionship was occasionally strained Mahoney: when Weaver did not act as OWC thought he should. In late 1980 We were cautious about pushing Weaver spoke at a political fund- an Oregon bill because we were raiser attended by OWC and Sierra not sure where AuCoin and Club members. A Sierra Club mem- Hatfield stood on release. We ber reported on the meeting and its only wanted to work on an Ore- possible consequences. gon bill when we got a signal Unfortunately, Jim got carried from Hatfield or when AuCoin away with the euphoria and indicated he understood release gave wilderness a 'blank check' and would work with Weaver- The eleventh command- for the next session. It did not pass unnoticed, as several peo- ment of the wilderness move- ment is that you don't speak ill ple have commented about of someone else's wilderness or it. get in the way of their efforts to Though I doubt jf we will feel protect it. For instance, you repurcussions too soon, it is don't make a deal for Oregon something that we should be that hurts Montana.3° aware of Since when we do re- open negotiations with OWC, Congressman Weaver was OWC's we're bound to have Jim quoted strongest supporter in the Oregon back to us. I talked to Greg delegation. According to his former (SkilmanJ about it this staff assistant, Greg Skillman, he evening,... he sees ways had an "almost metaphysical" belief around it, i.e. Jim meant 'legiti- in the value of wilderness as a ge- mate' wilderness proposals, and netic preserve.3' He had opposed that 'we always have to deal Senator Hatfield over the French with Mark Hatfield. ' However, Pete area after his election to Con- I can also possibly see the SC gress in 1974 and in 1978 had en- (Sierra Club] being used as a gaged in long and difficult negotia- scapegoat, f we continue to tions with the Senator over the clash with OWC over the viabil- Kalmiopsis area in the conference ity of some of their proposals.34 committee for the Endangered American Wilderness bill. They saw In 1981 Weaver on his own initiative the wilderness issue differently and introduced a bill capping the total did not have a close working rela- amount of new Oregon wilderness tionship. Congressman Seiberling at a figure that would not have sub- respected Weaver for his strong ad- tracted more than 3 percent from vocacy of wilderness because he rep-the National Forests' total allowable resented a district where timber in- cut. One of the purposes of this bill dustry was very strong.32 Until the was supposedly to show the rela- 1982 election, Weaver had been op- tively small impact that wilderness posed in the campaigns by lumber- withdrawals actually would have on men from the southern part of his the Oregon economy. Weaver did district and in 1978 had been tar- not want to pass the bill but geted by the Republican National intended to use it as a vehicle to Committee as the third most impor- introduce a bill based on the results tant Democratic congressman to of these hearings. The Sierra Club defeat. According to Skillman, his and OWC drew up a list of wilder- boss "had stretched his district to ness areas containing 1.9 miffion the limit" on the wilderness issue.33 acres that fell within the limit.35 OWC considered Weaver to be their OWC had raised its hopes in 1981.

29 The bill is ready to move for frustration at not getting a wilder- several reasons ..First, hesi- ness bill from Weaver.38 This frus- tation about its introduction hastration worked both ways, according essentially evaporated. Key play- to Greg Skillman: "Weaver saw ers in Congress, such as Repre- himself as taking all the risks. He sentative John Seiberling and could never get OWC to level on Senator Mark Hatfield, are numbers The Sierra Club was more flashing signals that now is the willing to compromise and time. The Oregon bill is now a prioritize." OWC eventually sup- priority for national conserva- ported Weaver in his successful re- tion organizations, who previ- election campaign. ously had ftlt that a Washing- ton State bill (or others) should On October 22 the District Court be moved first. The pending sustained Judge Karlton's 1979 deci- death of the timber industry's sion that RARE II was inadequate, national release bill has contrib- which increased the likelihood that uted to the 'green light. 'And many timber sales on Oregon's Na- current efforts to write 'bail- tional Forests would be blocked. By out' legislation for segments of this time, Congressman AuCoin, the timber industry because of mindful of the potential danger to poor market conditions have Oregon's economy, had promised he produced apolitical situation would support Colorado release. which will allow (even require) After the election he and Weaver an Oregon Wilderness bill to introduced a million-acre bill in the begin its journey thmugh Houselameduck session. AuCoin had de- of Representatives.36 vised the idea of linking the wilder- ness bill with a contract relief sec- The failure of this optimistic fore- tion for some purchasers of Federal cast to come to pass in the regular timber who were losing money be- 1982 session of Congress made cause the timber they had purchased OWC impatient and fearful that a few years previously was too ex- more delays would result in the loss pensive to harvest.4° Hatfield had of many roadless areas. agreed to support the bill if AuCoin could get it through the House. The delays were also causing prob- Hatfield planned to add contract lems for the Forest Service, whose relief in the Senate. At the last allowable timber cut was based on minute the National Forest Products all the lands not recommended for Association decided to support the wilderness in RARE II. The Forest bill because of the agreement on Service had delayed cutting in con- contract relief. Congressman Denny troversial areas, but this restriction Smith felt undercut by this decision posed the danger of overcutting on but was still able to arouse enough other parts of the National Forests. opposition to prevent the bill from The agency very much wanted to gathering the two-thirds majority have a bill to rescue it from this di- needed under the suspension of lemma and to curtail the many ap- rules procedures that had been cho- peals, which were hampering its sen to expedite passage of the bill in activities.37 the restricted time period of the la- meduck session.41 The Sierra Club For the first time since his election had been rather pessimistic about to Congress in 1974, Weaver was the bill's chances, believing that Au- opposed by a moderate Republican Coin was not aware of all the obsta- from Eugene, and OWC briefly cles in the way of passing any wil- considered the idea of supporting derness bill with Colorado release the Republican candidate out of and burdened by the controversial

30 contract relief provision. But its lob- east of Eugene, and Boulder Creek byists had worked for it and were in southern Oregon. bitterly disappointed when it nar- rowly failed to pass. According to OWC, which recently had renamed Andy Kerr, this defeat further wid- itself the Oregon Natural Resource ened the breach between OWC and Council (ONRC), had originally the Sierra Club because "Doug wanted 400,000 acres of wilderness Scott likes to be with a big winner" in the North Fork John Day. This and feared bad consequences would was an important fisheries area in follow from the bill's defeat.42 eastern Oregon and was strongly supported by Indian tribes. The Having already absorbed their share House bill had halved their pro- of criticism for having introduced posaL an Oregon wilderness bill, Oregon's Democratic congressmen, AuCoin, The John Day was believed to con- Weaver, and Ron Wyden, wanted to tain important mineral deposits and pass a new bill as soon as possible in the years since 1979 several large in the 1983 session. Oregon had politically sophisticated companies been redistricted and had gained a had become interested in its poten- new Republican Congressman, Bob tial. Eastern Oregon was economi- Smith, who represented much of the cally depressed, and Hatfield area originally held by Denny Smith wanted to protect the region's eco- whose district had been moved west- nomic future.Fisheries were also ward. Bob Smith was an experi- important to the region. At first enced state politician but during his Hatfield and his staff proposed to campaign he had run on a platform designate as wilderness a relatively of no more wilderness, which meant small core area of 40,000 acres adja- that he too "was cut out of the cent to the John Day River and process." In April the House place another 95,000 acres in a spe- passed a 1.2-million-acre bill, cial fisheries management zone. In 200,000 more acres having been November 1983 Jean Durning, The added when the bill was in the Wilderness Society's new Northwest House Public Lands Subcommittee. representative, reported on a meet- At first Senator Hatfield wanted to ing she had with Tom Imeson con- proceed with a Senate bill but then cerning the area: decided Oregonians deserved "an- Tomisconvinced of the neces- other shot" at public hearings be- sity to save its wild fish runs. cause the issue was so controversial. But he believes that these can During the summer of 1983 Hat- be saved even Lf occasionally field and his staff, especially ibm selective timber harvestisal- Imeson, held hearings and talked lowed, perhaps with no roads. with all the major interests involved. The amount of timber available He worked closely with local Forest probablyisless important than Service personnel who responded to the perception of northeast Ore- his many "what if" questions about gonians that nobody listens to boundaries and resource values." them and that a massive Imeson visited virtually all of the amount of thefr land is being proposed wilderness areas.' Areas locked away from them.. arousing concern and controversy The conflict on the North Fork included the North Fork John Day John Dayisnot a recreation in eastern Oregon, Drift Creek on conflict. itistimber (or peirep- the Oregon Coast, Hardesty Moun- tion) ve,us fish.47 tain 25 miles southwest of Eugene, Middle Santiam in the Central Cas- That compromise pleased neither cades, Waldo Lake about 60 miles the environmentalists nor the timber

31 industry. Eventually 120,000 acres their own representative in Con- were put into wilderness. (Imeson gress has stated there will be no credits ONRC and The Wilderness job loss. In the late 1970's, con- Society as the groups primarily re- cern about the amount of avail- sponsible for the creation of this able timber supply caused com- important wilderness area.) The panies in the area to bid prices Elkhorn Mountains, part of for Forest Service timber sales ONRC's original John Day to unprecedented levels. Only proposal, were dropped because, the economic recession has according to Tom Imeson, they were given a brief respite to the com- not essential for the protection of petition for this timber. If the fish.48 Their loss distressed ONRC. Oregon Wilderness Bill is en- acted as proposed, it's only a The Middle Santiam is a 30,000- matter of time that competition acre valley of low-elevation, old- for available timber forces one growth timber on the Willamette large mill or two smaller ones National Forestone of a handful out of business.5' still remaining in Oregon It was heavily roaded on its periphery and The area also became a sore point had some clearcut patches inside between the Sierra Club and ONRC it.49 Its location, in traditionally and illustrated their contrasting po- Democratic Linn County, part of litical styles. The Sierra Club's vol- Weaver's district, made its fate a unteer Oregon chairman, Ron Eber, sensitive issue for him.5° The House felt that Hatfield was serious about bill had put 25,000 acres into wil- his opposition to Middle Santiam derness. Congressman Weaver main- and would stiffen his resistance if tained that wilderness designation confronted with pressure tactics. for the Middle Santiam would not Tom Imeson asked the Forest Ser- harm the county's economy because vice for high, middle, and low wil- its mills had enough supply to last derness options.52 When Imeson for several years and could eventu- told Eber that Hatfield might be ally expand their radius of opera- willing to talk about the area, Eber tions when that supply ran out. believed he had been offered per- Women for Timber and other local haps the only opportunity he would organizations hotly disputed that get to include at least some of the contention, claiming that at least Middle Santiam. He returned to one big mill would close if the Mid- Oregon and relayed this message to dle Santiam were "locked up." They the group lobbying for the area.53 pointed to gravel roads and a few Its leader indicated his group was clearcuts within the area as evidence flexible on boundaries. When that it did not qualify for wilderness ONRC heard about these discus- designation. sions they charged that Eber had The area is not typical of what unnecessarily compromised the Mid- the majority of wilderness users dle Santiam and that no deal should want. Brush under the second have been made before the House growth trees and rotting logs members had negotiated with under the old growth make the Hatfield.54 area virtually impossible except by established trail. This is not Several years earlier, Jim Montieth a high alpine fir type that wil- had been deeply impressed by a derness users seek, but instead brief meeting with Congressman Al good, productive Forest. Ullman over a land-use issue in eastern Oregon. Ullman had told .. Most disturbing topeople him on that occasion: "Don't you of these communities is that know the rules of the game? I have

32 to move your line." Montfeth drew either Hardesty or Waldo Lake and from that encounter the lesson not Weaver picked the larger and higher to compromise until absolutely nec- quality Waldo Lake. After the pas- essary, which was usually at the end sage of the bill, Hardesty was on of the negotiating process." local front pages after an anony- mous group caffing itself the "Har- Jean Durning was also deeply in- desty Avengers" drove spikes into volved in negotiations over the Ore- trees in an attempt to prevent log- gon bill, but she sometimes felt that ging. she was forced to spend more time mediating between ONRC and the Drift Creek was another Sierra Club than she did working low-elevation old-growth area that with the congressional delegation.56 at one time divided ONRC and the Sierra Club. It was the only poten- Tom Imeson felt it had been possi- tial wilderness area located in Au- ble to reach a compromise on Mid- Coin's district. He opposed its in- dle Santiain (eventually 7,500 acres clusion, which made him vulnerable were included) because it was a to charges from Bob and Denny "symbolic issue"; only Weaver Smith that he was willing to create among the delegation members felt wildernesses everywhere but in his deeply about it. Imeson contends it own district. In 1980 the Sierra was only the Sierra Club's prodding Club asked one of its members to and willingness to compromise that evaluate Drift Creek's wilderness resulted in the inclusion of some of potential. While driving to the area, the area.57 Of course, it had been he looked on a map and discovered more than a symbolic issue to he was already in it. Shocked by this ONRC, which for years had been discovery, he concluded that Drift talking about the need to protect as Creek did not have a core large much old growth as possible, and enough to qualify it for wilderness they deeply regretted the loss of designation.6° But like Hardesty most of the Middle Santiam. Mountain, it had a large number of supporters, eventually including the Hardesty Mountain is a popular Sierra Club, and was backed by the recreation area within a 45-minute Portland newspapers. Drift Creek drive of Eugene. It is in the midst had not been in the House bill. of a heavily developed region, most Hatfield wanted his proposal to be of the surrounding tracts of land unique in some way. Hatfield felt having been logged and roaded. To Drift Creek had enough support to several Sierra Club members, such overcome AuCoin's objections and as Holly Jones, Hardesty was not ofthus it became the only area in the wilderness quality and was seen as Oregon Wilderness Act that had not more of a "bargaining chip" than a been in the 1983 House bill.6' legitimate proposal.58 Greg Skillman of Weaver's staff once told some Until the Oregon Wilderness Act ONRC representatives that if they was passed, the Umpqua National wanted Hardesty, they should also Forest in southern Oregon did not on the same grounds ask for Spen- have any wilderness areas. It then cer's Butte, a hill in the middle of got three, including Boulder Creek, the city of Eugene. The ONRC which had generated 22,000 members did not appreciate his sar- responses during RARE II, the casm and from then on "they didn't most of any area in the country. like me so much." Hardesty did, Most of these responses favored however, have many supporters. In nonwilderness and thus the Forest the final negotiations over the bill, Service had not recommended it.62 Hatfield offered Weaver a choice of For several years a small group of

33 environmentalists associated with ventory so that we demonstrate ONRC, known as the Umpqua Wil- to the public, the press and pol- derness Defenders, had fought for iticians an act of self-defense. wilderness in an area heavily depen- We need to provide compelling dent on the timber industry. At least evidence that our action was one of the leaders of the group had taken because our backs were to drop out when confronted with against the wall, that we were the threat of an informal economic being irreparably and irrevers- boycott of the family business.63 ibly harmed on a grand scale. Boulder Creek was also coveted by With the Bumpers agreement in the timber industry and was one of place, none of the most popular the few areas that Arnold Ewing, Wilderness proposals (1.2 mil- executive vice president of the lion acres, the ones currently in Northwest Timber Association and HR 1149) are threatened. If we a wilderness recreationist, regretted was in the final bill, believing it was filed now, it is possible the pub- much more suited to be a "working lic would misread our action. It forest." is even possible, although un- likely, that a judge might dis- Boulder Creek, Drift Creek, and miss our complaint as North Fork John Day were three of ungrounded. the most notable successes for ONRC's brand of wilderness poli- When Hatfield did not introduce his tics, areas without great scenic at- bill in the fall and time ran out in tributes but valuable for their eco- the 1983 session, Montieth could no logical and wildlife attributes. longer use the now-expired Bumpers Agreement to dissuade his board. In early 1983 ONRC's Council of The House bill was dead until the Governors had directed Jim Mon- next session. Consequently, the tieth to prepare a statewide lawsuit Bumpers Agreement was no longer based on the 1980 California deci- in effect. With the Sierra Club's fi- sion in order to stop all develop- nancial backing, Oregon environ- ment in Oregon RARE II roadless mentalists had filed two site-specific areas. When the House bill passed lawsuits. They had lost in the case in April, its 1.2 million acres were of the Bald Mountain Road on the temporarily protected by an agree- Kalmiopsis, which had not been ment worked out by Senator Dale covered by the Bumpers Agreement Bumpers and the Department of because it was not in the House bill Agriculture that delayed develop- in deference to Senator Hatfield, ment activities in areas undergoing who had opposed its inclusion in wilderness consideration by Con- the 1978 Endangered American Wil- gress. Montieth convinced his board derness Act. that suing while this agreement was in effect could be misinterpreted by The direct-action environmental the public. He undoubtedly was alsogroup known as Earth First was thinking of the national organiza- conducting a delaying-action block- tions' strong opposition to statewide ade of the road, which was generat- lawsuits when he wrote to his board ing publicity and some money but that: was not stopping the development feared by ONRC. In the past ONRC In order to actually file the legalhad used the threat of a suit to get complaint, we must have an action from politicians and the na- obvious and blatant threat to tional conservation organizations the three million acres of road- but now some were claiming that less lands in the RARE II in- ONRC was bluffmg. Andy Kerr and

34 other ONRC staffers felt they had A RARE H suit may provide no alternative but to file a suit. the neces.ary. incentive, since the 'locking up' of three million Mike Anderson of the Umpqua wil- acres will be anathema to them derness Defenders told Jim Mon- [the timber industryJ, and the tieth he knew of an attorney, Neil only way to 'unlock' those Kagan, in Roseburg who would take lands is to pass legislation. on the case. On December 2 ONRC Since the industry, for the time decided to sue.67 The national con- being, has much more timber servation organizations and mem- than they can use, they may still bers of the Oregon delegation were wish to wait before settling on informed a day or two before the RARE II. The lawsuit is the filing. best catalyst we can provide, short of total capitulation on The lack of much notice angered some, especially Congressman Au- the acreage. If it's not an ade- Coin, who was in a close reelection quate incentive for the industry, fight with a timber company execu- so belt tive. Greg Skillman believed that "the idea of a lawsuit was a trump Even though it doesn't include card. If you play it, it's all the roadless lands in Oregon, the RARE II lawsuit will bring over... We had a day warning about it. That was the last straw in needed perspective to HR 1149, a deteriorating relationship." The and alert the public to the fact Sierra Club and The Wilderness So- that it is a compromise ciety attempted to dissociate them- bill ...They [the House selves completely from ONRC's membersJ should feel less pres- suit. The National Audubon Soci- sure to compromise on 'their' ety, whose local chapters in Oregon 1.2 million acre bill jf they re- had been working closely with member we're not satisfied with ONRC, joined in the suit. (Brock it either.7' Evans in the Society's Washington Office was the only top official with a long background in national wil- Before Hatfield unveiled his plan in derness politics and at the time of February 1984 there were reports the lawsuit he was preparing to that 1 million acres was the "magic launch a congressional campaign in number" his bill would not exceed. Washington State.) 69 According to At a summer field hearing he was Andy Kerr, the Sierra Club and The reported to have said the bill would Wilderness Society did a "tremen- probably be somewhere between dous job of damage control" by 600,000 and 1 million acres. At effectively distancing themselves about the same time one of his staff from ONRC's actions and by con- assistants said the bill would be vincing political leaders they were about 900,000 acres. However, it not part of a plot to undermine on- was Tom Imeson's assumption that going political negotiations.7° there was no magic number because that was "too crass" a way to deal Montieth explained to his members with the issue, which he thought I that one of the reasons ONRC had should be approached based on the decided to sue was because other merits of the individual areas.72 But groups were planning to file and if ONRC concluded from conversa- they did, ONRC would be "per- tions with congressional staffers that ceived as the momentum behind it." an agreement had been reached not He went on to explain the political to exceed 1 million acres.73 They rationale behind the suit. began to dig in their heels against a

35 reduction of what they thought was recruited local groups to support already a modest 1.2-million-acre almost all of these areas and thus it House bill. was impossible for them to engage in political negotiations that ap- When Hatfield told the Sierra Club peared to be "selling them out." leaders at his February meeting that The Sierra Club, which was more he would introduce a bill close to 1 willing to "prioritize:' felt that million acres, Ron Eber was "aston- ONRC was "setting up their mem- ished" because he thought it would bers for a big loss" that they could be much lower. (His enthusiasm was then blame on the Club and Con- later tempered when the Senator gressmen AuCoin and Wyden.77 included a lot of "backcountry" in ONCR had wanted a conference the bill.)' In the fall of 1983 Tim committee which they thought Mahoney had told Hatfield's staff might have increased the acreage by that the Sierra Club would not press as much as 100,000 to 150,000 for a conference committee between acres.78 The Sierra Club was very the House and Senate if the Sena- anxious to avoid a conference be- tor's bill was at least "moderately cause they were afraid that Senator good." The 950,000-acre bill, in- McClure would be involved.79 Ron cluding the backcountry Oregon Eber believes that even if a confer- Cascades Recreation Area and John ence had been held it would have Day Fish Management Zone (later resulted in an increase of only about changed to wilderness), lived up to 30,000 acres, "which certainly can- that description. Moreover, the Si- not be considered a capitulation."8° erra Club was very pleased with Hatfield's role in breaking the dead- Congressman Weaver had not ac- lock over release language. They cepted Hatfield's bill and at the last stuck by their agreement, which ef- minute was able to get two final fectively excluded them from most changesthe addition of the rest of of the final negotiations.75 the Grassy Knob area and the sub- stitution of Monument Rock for Hatfield stated that as Chairman of what was believed to be the less the Senate Appropriations Commit- threatened Glacier Peak area. Look- tee he would have no time for a ing back on the tortured history of conference committee. He agreed to the bill, Tim Mahoney believes that listen to requests from the House all the participants played essential but asserted that his bill would have roles in its passage: to be accepted essentially as it was if the delegation wanted a wilder- Seiberling was the go-between ness act before the 1984 election. at the end. The delegation was The Wilderness Society and the Si- not getting along. Hatfield erra Club took him at his word, as made two last minute changes, did Congressmen AuCoin and Wy- adding Grassy Knob in Weaver's den who accepted his bill, which District, and switching Monu- brought vehement charges from ment for Glacier after Weaver ONRC that they had "capitulated." asked ONRC to choose, the (They said they wished they had only time in the whole process gotten 1.2 million acres but that was where ONRC had made a "just not to be.") 76 choice. It seemed each person or group believes he was the key The bill's final months were painful in the final resolution. AuCoin for the ONRC staff. For years they believes jf he hadn't worked had proclaimed their goal of pro- with Hatfield in that earlier pe- tecting all of the 3.4 million acres of riod, Hatfield would not have RARE II roadless land. They had gone for soft release and jf he

36 had not endorsed the Hatfield Kerr interview. bill, it would have fallen apart at the last minute. Weaver be- Mahoney interview. lieves that if AuCoin had been Interview with Clif Merritt, more hard line we could have Denver, CO, 3/15/85; Wazeka, had a better bill. If Weaver had "Organizing," p. 51. not hung out in the end, we could not have gotten Monu- Wazeka, "Organizing," P. 50. ment or Grassy Knob and he's right and AuCoin is right. I Ibid., p. 51. think they're both right. ONRC Jim Montieth to OWC Execu- believes that if the Sierra Club tive Conunittee, 5/8/76, Holly had been more confrontational Jones' Files, FSHS. we could have had a bigger bill and if we had called for a con- Wazeka, "Organizing," p. 50. ference we could have jerked Hatfield up a little further. Jim Montieth to OWC Execu- They believe because they didn't tive Committee, 5/8/76. give up, they got Grassy Knob and Monument Rock and Jim Montieth to Sierra Club National Wilderness Commit- maybe they could have had oth- ers. They're probably right. But tee, 2/15/77. we believe we never would have Interview with Jim Montieth, reached that point jf we hadn't Washington, DC, 4/3/85. worked the bill the way we did. Despite all the in-fighting that Kerr interview. took place in Oregon within the delegation and the environmen- Ibid. tal community, it worked in al- Ibid. most a textbook way, having both inside and outside players Montieth interview. and hardline and softline people who were able to get the bill Richard Worthington to Forest through. The hardliners were Supervisors and Directors, able to improve it over what the 12/30/81, SC records, FSHS. softliners could get and the soft- liners were able to keep the ma- "Steve Forrester's Northwest Newsletter," 7/27/81. chinery running.8' Notes Kerr interview; Imeson inter- view; "Oregonian," 7/24/83; Robert T. Wazeka, "Organizing "Wild Oregon," Fall 1984, p. 7. for Wiilderness," Sierra Club Bulletin, 10/76, P. 50. Montieth interview. Ibid., p. 50. Interview with Arnold Ewing, Western Oregon Timber Associ- Ibid., p. 49. ation, Eugene, OR, 3/11/85. Imeson interview. Imeson interview. OWC/YCCIP application, n.d., Kerr interview. Holly Jones' Files, FSHS. Ibid.; Mahoney interview. Jim Montieth to Sierra Club National Wilderness Commit- Mahoney interview. tee, 2/15/77, Holly Jones' Files, FSHS. Ibid.

37 Interview with Greg Skiliman, Eber interview. Eugene, OR, 3/12/85. Wendell Wood, president of Ibid. ONRC, to the Oregon Sierra Club, 3/19/84, SC records, Ibid. FSHS. Rick Battson to Steve Levy, Montieth interview. 10/17/80, SC records, FSHS. Interview with Jean Durning, Jim Montieth to Forest Wilder- Washington, DC, 3/27/85. ness Leaders, 2/13/81; telephone interview with Ron Imeson interview. Eber, 3/18/85. Interview with Holly Jones, Eu- Jim Montieth to Oregon Forest gene, OR, 3/12/85. Leaders, 12/22/8 1, SC records, FSHS. Skillman interview. Interview with Gerald Williams, Durning interview; Eugene, OR, 3/24/86. "Oregonian," 4/2/84. Interview with Steve Evered, Imeson interview former aide to Les AuCoin, Washington, DC, 3/27/85. Interviews with Jack Wright and Dick Schwarzlender, Roseburg, Skilhnan interview. OR, 3/25/86. Evered interview; "Eugene Interview with Mike Anderson, Register-Guard," 12/17/82. Washington, DC, 3/27/85. Mahoney interview. Ewing interview. Kerr interview. Jim Montieth to Governing Council Members, 4/12/83, SC Mahoney interview; "Steve For- records, FSHS. rester's Northwest Letter," 6/11/84. Kerr interview. Interview with Rolf Anderson, Anderson interview. Eugene, OR, 3/24/86. Skillman interview. Imeson interview. Mahoney interview. Ibid. Kerr interview. Jean Durning to Peter Coppel- man, 11/3/83, Peter Coppel- Jim Montieth to Tim Wapato man's files, FSHS. et. al, 12/2/83, SC records, FSHS. Imeson interview. Imeson interview. Interview with Mike Kerrick, Eugene, OR, 3/24/86. Montieth interview. Skillman interview. Eber interview. "East Linn County: A Case Mahoney interview. Study in the Effects of Wilder- ness," Oregon Women for Tim- Evered interview; "Wild Or- ber, 5/1/83, SC records, FSHS. egon," Fall 1984, p. 22. Kerrick interview. Eber interview.

38 Kerr interview. 80. Eber interview. Mahoney interview. 81. Mahoney interview.

39 Chapter III: California Wilderness

In 1979 it had seemed that the Cali- Burton was not himself a nature fornia wilderness bill would break enthusiast, it having been said of the deadlock over roadless areas. In him that he only went outside to the 1970's California wilderness ac- smoke, but he considered wilderness tivists had been involved in several a worthy liberal cause for which to of the decades most important fight. Burton represented many Si- events, including the 1972 Sierra erra Club members in San Francisco Club suit and the 1979 State of Cal- and over the years had come to rely ifornia suit against RARE II. The on the judgments of the organiza- California bill seemed to offer sev- tions' professionals, especially Tim eral advantages. California bad the Mahoney and Russ Shay. He ac- largest amount of remaining road- cepted their statements that certain less land, it was the home of the areas were suitable for wilderness Sierra Club, and it had Senator designation. Jim Alan Cranston, a strong supporter Eaton of the California Wilderness of the wilderness movement. Per- Coalition remembers that once sev- haps most importantly it had Con- eral wilderness activists met with gressman Phil Burton, a legislator Burton to lobby him on the merits of legendary proportions, who was of the Ishi roadless area, which they eager to put all of his considerable described at length in glowing and energy and ability behind a strong loving terms. Burton appeared to be wilderness bill. In 1978 he had se- taldng copious notes. After the cured passage of a mammoth $1.8 meeting Eaton glanced at Burton's biffion national parks bill, some- note pad and saw only the laconic times called Burton's Park Barrel "Ishigood" surrounded by Act. Even adamant foes of the Fed- doodles.2 Burton, however, was eral ownership of land supported solely responsible for legislative the bill when they discovered that strategy, much of which was stored Burton had allowed their districts to in his head, so that even his aides participate in its benefits. After did not know what deals he was Burton's death the Los Angeles making and were sometimes puzzled Times related one example of his by obscure references to matters ability to disarm political they knew nothing about. On rare opponents: occasions, he irked his wilderness supportersthe decision to insert a Congressional veterans recall clause in the 1979 bill permitting that even Former Rep. Robert mining in one proposed wilderness Bauman (R-Md.), who would area was one such irritantbut on stalk the House floor and stall the whole wilderness activists had bills that would convert private great admiration for him and could lands to public, allowed Burton only "scream" a little when his leg- to proceed with the huge mea- islative dealing forced a momentary sure after Burton arranged for deviation from their line.3 quick passage of legislation naming a monument after Bau- Burton's approach was quite differ- man's GOP mentor, Rogers C. ent from that of his friend John B. Morton.' Seiberling, who enjoyed wilderness

40 outings and often reached his own Mount'ins and Trinity Alps, two of conclusions about wilderness suit- the largest roadless areas outside of ability. When the two contrasting Idaho. Citizens of ThnitSiskiyou, personalities metthe gruff, gravel- Humboldt, and Del Norte Counties voiced, bulky Burton and the quiet- were the Californians most directly er, more refmed Seiberlingit was affected by large wilderness propos- often an occasion for mirth, as Tim als. Mahoney recalls. After World War lithe timber in- Burton really loved Seiberling. dustry boomed in northern Califor- He respected him and called nia as many loggers from Oregon him the 'Boy Scout' and the moved their operations into the re- 'Patrician. 'He would say 'you gion to harvest its relatively patrician, good to see you untapped National Forests. Many again, John' and he'd say 'well immigrants moved into Humboldt, f we want to get this wilderness Siskiyou, and Del Norte Counties to fboundaryJ line, we'll have to take advantage of the new opportu- find some way to hold the Con- nities. There was a smaller migra- gressman to it. 'And Seiberling tion, however, into Trinity County, who knew the wilderness issue which retained a much higher per- but didn't think politically the centage of "pioneer" families who way Burton thought would say valued the relatively undeveloped something like 'well, he should state of their environment. The peo- be appreciative because we just ple who did migrate to Trinity were, passed out his little private bill in large part, from southern Califor- last week. 'And Burton would ma and came there to enjoy the ar- exclaim in feigned outrage, ea's natural environment. Trinity 'What, you did what? You County was also different from its passed his bill. John, tell me neighbors because although timber you didn't pass his bill. 'And was cut there, most of it was pro- Seiberling would say, 'well, Phil cessed outside its boundaries. Con- you voted for it. 'Burton ,e- sequently, many of its residents were plied, 'John, I'd vote for any- not dependent on the timber indus- thing you asked me to vote for try and relied instead on more tradi- but let's say there was a mis- tional occupations and the burgeon- take. Let's try to hold it up be- ing recreation business for their fore it gets to the floor. Let's livelihoods. These two factors made say you made a mistake and I Trinity County much more favor- won't let you pass it.' One time ably disposed towards wilderness Seiberling had arranged one of than its neighbors.5 The County was his field trips to Caljfornia and destined to play a pivotal role in had gotten helicopters to see thenegotiations because the bulk of the areas and Seiberling said Phil, million-acre Trinity Alps area lay I really thought you might like within its borders. to go along' and Phil answered, 'John, be serious, John.' Sei- By the early 1980's the boom had berling responded, 'Well, Jar- gone out of the northern California ranged for some extra large heli-timber industry. Congress, and espe- copters. ' Burton replied, 'John, daily Phil Burton, had created the give me a break, John. ' It was Redwood National Park in 1978, very funny to watch them.4 displacing many industry workers and removing a substantial amount Much of the controversy over Cali- of timber from the region's potential fornia wilderness was centered in base of supply. The Redwoods Act the northern California Siskiyou had promised to make good that

41 deficit by increasing harvests from ion because wilderness became an the Six Rivers National Forest. In issue in subsequent local elections 1977 Governor Jerry Brown asked and the officials responsible for cre- representatives of the environmental ating the committee were reelected. organizations and the timber indus- The Thnity County position became try to sit down and see if they couldthe biggest thorn in the side of the reach an agreement over wilderness timber industry because as William allocation in northern California. Dennison, who replaced George John Amodio, at that time a Sierra Craig as director of the Western Club volunteer in northern Califor- Timber Association, has said, nia, believes his side was on the "Here was a heavily timbered verge of striking a good bargain county that wanted a lot more ("perhaps better than we got in wilderness."(On the other hand, 1984") when RARE II was as Regional Forester Zane Grey announced, ending the negotiations. Smith points out, most of the other But George Craig, former Executive California counties accepted RARE Vice President of the Western Tim- II and did not want increases.10) ber Association, recalls that they had not been close to a settlement Congressman Burton accepted the and could only agree that Forest Trinity County "compromise" and Service road standards were "too refused to alter it in his bills despite high." Craig, who spent much of the wishes of some environmental- his last decade with the association ists, such as Jim Eaton, who wanted fighting over wilderness and retired more wilderness acreage in the primarily to escape its headaches, southern part of the county. The observed that his group and the en- "compromise" held throughout the vironmentalists had totally different 5-year history of the bill and all of value systems: "It's appalling to me it became wilderness in 1984 with that twenty percent of the national the exception of Pattison Mountain, forests, much of it commercial for- which ironically had been one of est land, in California are in the only two small portions of the Thn- Wilderness System." The discrep- ity Alps that the Forest Service had ancy in their recall of the negotia- initially proposed for wilderness tions is perhaps a reflection of these designation Another reason for the opposing values and their effects on ultimate success of the compromise perception and memory.6 is that Trinity County environmen- talists had a direct pipeline to Andy When RARE II was announced, the Wiessner, Seiberling's Counsel on Trinity County government the House Public Lands Subcom- appointed a "philosophically mixed mittee, and thus to Seiberling him- 9-member committee" to make wil- self who in 1979 had singled out derness recommendations for the Trinity County as a "microcosm" county. The committee eventually that exposed the defects of RARE concluded that nearly half of the II. Some leaders of the California Trinity Alps roadless area be placed wilderness movement occasionally in the Wilderness System, which fretted that such secret communica- compared with an initial Forest Ser- tion could disrupt negotiations by vice recommendation of 17,000 upsetting their chain of command acres.7 The timber industry later but in the case of the Trinity Alps claimed that the committee had everything eventually worked to been skewed against it and that its their advantage.'1 (Both Jim Eaton two representatives on it had not and William Dennison credit been "well informed."However, it Wiessner with having played an im- is most likely that the committee portant role in the history of the represented the majority local opin- California bill.)'2

42 The environmentalists did not do fisheries resources and were backed quite as well in the Siskiyous, a!- by the fishing industry. though they fared much better than the timber industry had hoped they In 1979 Johnson introduced a Cali- would. Citizens of Humboldt and forma wilderness bill of 1.2 million Del Norte Counties were on the acres based on the Carter Adminis- whole not in favor of a large Siski- tration's final RARE II recommen- yous Wilderness because of the tim- dations. Timber industry representa- ber industry's difficulties and the tives had asked Johnson to sponsor effects of the creation of Redwood a bill of approximately 400,000 to Park, although environmentalists 600,000 acres but Johnson advised believe local opinion was beginning them that such a bill would be unre- to move in their direction. The Pa- alistic in view of the Carter Admin- cific Coast Federation of Fisher- istration's proposal. The industry men's Associations supported a relented but considered the Johnson large Siskiyous Wilderness but that bill to be their final compromise support was tempered by the fact and throughout the next 5 years did that its affiliate in Del Norte not publicly deviate from that County believed the Forest Service position.'6 In 1982 the timber indus- could adequately protect its try formed a coalition with the min- resources in the absence of a desig- ing and outdoor recreational vehicle nated wilderness.'3 The environmen-associations, which opposed the cre- talists had originally pushed for a ation of any more California wilder- 400,000-acre Siskiyous. Burton had ness. This alliance made it virtually decreased that to 160,000 acres out impossible for them to change their of deference to local Democratic position, even if they had wished to Congressman Harold "Bizz" John- do so. son. Johnson was a 20-year veteran and chaired the House Public Burton upstaged the industry by Works Committee and was thus a introducing the first bill a day politician to be reckoned with.'4 ahead of Johnson. The Sierra Club Johnson was defeated in 1980 and was nervous that Burton would in- was replaced by Republican Con- troduce a very large bill containing gressman Norman Shumway who a long list of areas that might ap- would not negotiate with Burton pear to substantiate the timber indu- and was not intimidated by his stry's charge that environmentalists reputation.'5 No longer feeling were insatiably greedy. His approach bound to his agreement with John- was to introduce a simple but large son, in 1983 Burton increased his bill by referencing all the Carter Ad- Siskiyous acreage to nearly 200,000. ministration recommendations in The 1984 act designated 153,000 California, all the areas that acres, a disappointment for the en- remained in further planning in vironmentalists but considered a those recommendations, and all of disaster by the timber industry. the areas enjoined in the 1979 Cali- fornia lawsuit over RARE II. The The history of the Siskiyous is simi- result was a 5.1-million-acre bill. lar in several respects to that of the Burton of course was not serious North Fork John Day in Oregon. about designating virtually all of They were both about the same California's national forest roadless original size and were subsequently land but it was a characteristic tacti- reduced in area by roughly the same cal stroke designed to leave his out- percentage. Oregon Indians sup- maneuvered opponents muttering in ported the John Day as California their cups. In 1980 Burton intro- Indians supported the Siskiyous. duced his first "real" bill of 2.1 mil- Finally, both areas had important lion acres, which contained the first

43 release language. The Sierra Club be made to agree to an accept- had not wanted this language, but able Siskiyou wilderness area, they were forced to concede when and he alternately pressured and Burton pointed out it was absolutely cajoled Clausen for months to necessary to pass a "good" bill. Ac- get him to agree... cording to Tim Mahoney, Burton's strategy was to In the case of Charles Pasha- yan, local negotiations began in ..assure that he had an ab- the Fresno area between the solute majority in the Interior timber industry and the conser- Committee, so that he could vationists over the fate of the overrun any possible amend- San Joaquin area and in partic- ments to his negotiated pack- ular for an area on the lower age, and furthermore to have an west slopes of the San Joaquin overwhelming majority on the called Pincushion. There, the floor, so that he could take his local timber industry and con- bill up under the suspension servationists agreed on a series calendar ...Finally, when of boundaries which Pashayan Burton negotiated with some in the end reluctantly Members, he did it one-on-one, endorsed... and knew no bounds as to trad- ing stock, so that it was very In Bill Thomas' district, which djflcult for one Member to included Golden Vout, another know what another had negoti- controversial timber! wilderness ated... conflict, conservationists worked out a large, complicated With regard to the Republicans, agreement with Congressman the first one that he went after Thomas which ultimately was was Robert Lagomarsina a written up and signed by member of the Interior Com- Thomas and Joe Fontaine of mittee and a man who Burton the Sierra Club. The agreement had worked with frequently on called for the creation of, the Parks among other things, a South Subcommittee... We learned Sierra wilderness which was im- that this meant that Lagomar- mediately contiguous to Golden sino would call the shots exactly Thout but was given a separate for every area in his district, name so opponents of the bill which included a large hunk of could not accuse us of expand- the Los Padres National For- ing the very controversial ar- est... ea... The second Republican that On the Democratic side, the key Burton would go after was Don was Bizz Johnson or "the Clausen, whose district ran up Bizzer," as Phil referred to him the north coast of Caljfornia in our meetings. Again and and contained the newly again, Phil would say, "I gotta expanded Redwood National have the Bizzer." The problem Park. Clausen's district con- for us was that Johnson's dis- tained the western half of the trict extended over from the Siskiyou Mountains area, prob- Lake Tahoe region all the way ably the most contentious tim- north to the Oregon border. It ber! wilderness debate in the contained the east side of Siski- Caljfornia bill. Burton seemed yous, the popular Granite to be confident that with Chief Ishi near Chic4 as well enough pressure, Clausen could as all of Thnity County. Burton

44 had decided beforehand that the provoked the timber industry's reex- negotiated Thnity County was amination of release language. going to be in the final bill, no matter what, and all other areas The timber industry began in that district were going to backing off its position on re- take second place. Like Clau- lease after House passage of the sen, the negotiations with "the Calj[ornia Wilderness bill. Bizzer" were long and arduous. While the big national timber Area after area were conceded industry groups never endorsed to Johnson, despite our pleas.'7 the California language per Se, I felt that they used the release argument primarily as an excuse Senator Cranston was up for reelec- to oppose the California bill, tion in 1980, and Burton had taken which contained acreage which several potential ski areas out of his at least the major timber orga- proposed wilderness in order to pro- nizations of the Northwest felt tect Cranston from criticism by the was excessive. Perhaps they ski industry. (Developed skiing is were seeing whether they could prohibited in wilderness.) A few tinker with the release language years earlier Cranston had been at- in trade for the large California tacked for his part in stopping the acreage or more likely, they just Disney Enterprise's planned ski re- didn't want a California bill and sort in Mineral King and skiing had decided that unwillingness to become a sensitive issue for him.'8 deal on the release question was Despite Burton's apparent solicitude a good pretense for killing the for the industry, he was attacked by thing off 20 its national trade representative who did not think he had done enough. In later bills Burton retaliated by In 1981 Burton passed out his bill putting back into his bill the Sheep again but in the meantime Senator Hayakawa had stiffened his resis- Mountain area, the most important tance and was now the sponsor of of the potentially good ski areas. According to Jim Eaton, this feud the industry's nationwide release had little real impact because the skibifi. When Senator Henry Jackson "deal had already been cut" on the was chairman of the Senate Energy local level.'9 Committee he had established an informal principle of moving state- Senator Cranston did not want to wide bills only if they were introduce a bill before his election; supported by both Senators from however, he promised to introduce that State. Senator McClure contin- one in the lameduck session in No- ued that tradition.2' Consequently vember. The Republican capture of the California bill was not given a the Senate in the 1980 election upset Senate hearing. Doug Scott of the that plan. Republicans were not Sierra Club could only plot strategy about to let Democrats pass bills in and vent his frustration over Sena- a lameduck session when they tor Hayakawa's position: would soon be in the majority. Re- publican Senator S.I. Hayakawa was Once we have a California wil- opposed to any California wilder- derness bill passed by the House ness bill, which meant that Califor- and resting in the Senate, we nia, like the other RARE II States, a,in the face-down between would be embroiled in the debate what we want (that bill) and over the release question. Writing in what we do not want (Senate December 1980, Tim Mahoney cred- action on S. 842) (nationwide ited the California bill with having releaseJ. Caught straight in the

45 middle is our least favorite 1982 like Senator Hayakawa, he was an Senate candidate, S.I. Haya- experienced politician. After his kawa. election, he stated that passing a RARE II bill was one of his first Those circumstances suggest to priorities. Environmentalists were me that we ought to be thinkingencouraged. They reminded Wil- about doing a large-scale mailer son's staff that his predecessors in Californiaperhaps to our (Senators Murphy, Tunney, and Ha- entire membership (bulk rate). yakawa) had been "lightweights" who had only lasted one term and The point would be to isolate that Wilson could break that trend and raise hell with Hayakawa, by helping to pass a "good" wilder- hitting him in both directions: ness bill.23 Of course, they were for what he is doing with S. 842 aware that Wilson had statewide and what he is not doing with constituency that included more the House-passed Burton than wilderness enthusiasts and that bill... substantial contributions to his cam- paign had come from the ranks of If we do this, the earlier the their industry opposition. They were better. ..We'll have potential prepared for hard bargaining from for shaping the confrontation Wilson and anticipated the loss of with Sam, fixing that confronta-some acreage from the Burton bill. lion in the minds of our people and the press, so that it will Burton's 1983 bill totaled 2.4 million haunt him all through the next acres, up 300,000 acres from the year and a half! A key point is previous bill. Most of this new acre- to develop a format and a text age was in the district of Republican which puts Sam on the defen- Congressman Shumway who had sive to the maximum extent.22 replaced Bizz Johnson. Don Clau- sen, the ranking Republican on the Hayakawa had earned a national House Interior Committee, had reputation in 1969 for taking a hard been replaced by Democrat Doug line against student protestors at Bosco. Clausen had reluctantly sup- San Francisco State University of ported the previous Burton bill but which he was president. He was well Bosco was concerned about the known for taking strong positions amount of proposed wilderness and then refusing to budge from acreage in his district and during them. Most observers suspected he the next 2 years attempted to get would not run for reelection in some reductions. (All of the other 1982. Environmentalists could only Democrats in the delegation sup- wait for the election of a new Sena- ported Burton's acreage.) Burton tor. had managed to pass his previous bills without opposition from other The environmentalists supported members of the California delega- Governor Jerry Brown in the 1982 tion, but the political situation had senatorial campaign but were not changed in 1983. Much of Burton's distraught over the election of Re- power within California stemmed publican Pete Wilson even though from his ability to dictate congres- he had been backed by the indus- sional boundaries during redistrict- trial groups opposing the Burton ing. Representatives, especially Re- bill. As a state legislator, Wilson publicans who feared that they had sponsored bills protecting Cali- might be "redistricted out of exist- fornia's coastline and had estab- ence" had to heed Burton. Califor- lished development planning for San nia had been redistricted in 1982 Diego while mayor of that city. Un- and the Democrats had gained

46 seats. Most of the remaining Repub- negotiated solution, ... This licans considered that their old deals freed up Congressman Pashayan with Burton had expired. In a move to more actively oppose the bill that perhaps Burton alone was ca- in 1983. pable of carrying off, the roadless areas had also been redistricted. This complicated matters in the Tim Mahoney describes the some- south Sierra area, where contro- what confusing effect that action versy between the offroad vehi- had on the political situation fol- cle enthusiasts and conserva- lowing the election. tionists erupted over the Monache Meadows area. Con- Burton said, 7 wasn't sure what gressman Thomas, who stood to do with these roadless areas by his old agreement, no longer in the redistricting. I thought represented the area. Congress- I'd shuffle them around and man Pashayan was more vocal mix things up and see what in opposition to areas that had happened. Maybe it wasn't such previously been in his district a good idea. 'Everybody had and to areas that had previously djfferent roadless areas. Shum- been in Thomas' district. Where- way's district moved from cen- as in southern Caljfornia, the tral to northeast California. old proposals were just adopted [Gene] Chappie's (R) distriët in the new Congress with virtu- which used to have lots of road- ally no peep from the newly less areas in northeast Califor- elected or newly redistricted nia, now hardly had any. Congressmen.25 [Charles) Pashayan's (R) district had been moved from the cen- In April 1983, Congressman Burton tral to the southern end of the died at age 56 of a stomach rupture. Sierra. [William] Thomas (R) His death left environmentalists mo- had been shoved from the mentarily dazed; most of the strat- southern end of the Sierra out egy for the bill had been in Burton's of the Sierra completely. There head. They feared that his deals are no people in the mountains would unravel now that he was no so you run the lines any way longer around to guarantee them. you want. Shum way had not Patti Hedge, who had recently been made any deals in his district; appointed The Wilderness Society's they dated from "Bizz" John- California representative, realized son. [Richard] Lehmann (D) that she and her colleagues would and [Tony] Coehlo (D) were fi- have to increase their efforts to fa- ne. .. The Republicans wanted miliarize themselves with the road- to fight except for [Robert] La- less areas and to work with the gomarsino (R) and [Ed] Zschau press and Congressional delegations. (R). All of the major California newspa- pers supported a large wilderness Another change concerned the bill, which was due in part to The timber industry officials who Wilderness Society's efforts.26 had negotiated the lines on the Pincushion area. Thefr parent Congressmen Udall and Seiberling company, the Bendix Corpora- took over the floor leadership of the tion, had swallowed or been bill, which passed by a large majori- swallowed by another company ty, opposition having been muted by in a corporate takeover, and the the fact that the bill was interpreted new management of the mills in as a memorial to Burton, who had the Fresno area were no longer been dead for only a few days. Af- sympathetic to working on a ter House passage of the bill, Udall

47 quipped: "Leave it to Phil Burton to Seiberling had been leery of the make the most of his own iholumne River inclusion, con- demise." 27 These and similar re- cerned, as was Sala Burton, marks reflected respect for a man that it would alienate Coehlo. It whom former Senator Gaylord Nel- was not that they were so con- son (now president of The Wilder- cerned that Coehlo himself ness Society) called "an authentic would defeat the entire package, legislative genius." 28 but that House Republicans, led by Shumway and Pashayan, The environmentalists were fortu- would still repudiate the pack- nate that Burton's wife, Sala, as- age, and that any disaffection sumed his seat. She was familiar by Coehlo would gain them with the negotiations over the bill enough control to shoot the bill and made its enactment her first down in the Ho use.3' priority, taking on the task of sell- As a result of the political problem, ing the House-passed bill to Senator friction had developed between wil- Wilson. She was on good terms derness and river activists. Some with Congressmen Udall and Seiber-wilderness activists feared that a bill ling and during the next year played "burdened" by the 'll.iolumne's po- an important role in facilitating ne- litical difficulties would be compro- gotiations with Senator Wilson.29 mised or might even be defeated. The "river people" were smarting Earlier in the year Senator Cranston over the fact that the national envi- had introduced the first Senate bill. ronmental organizations had It was identical to Burton's bill, ex- blocked a 1982 Wyoming wilderness cept for one novel featurethe des- bill that Senator Malcolm Wallop ignation of 45 miles of iliolumne had attached to a rivers' bill protect- River in central California as a Wilding the 'Ibolumne without first hav- and Scenic River. The 'Ttirlock and ing consulted their organization. Modesto County Irrigation districts When John Amodio joined the Tuo- had wanted more dam construction lumne River Trust, a spinoff of the on the river for hydroelectric gener- Friends of the River, he found that ation. They were opposed by the some of his friendships with wilder- Friends of the River, an organiza- ness activists had become a little tion of river enthusiasts and profes- strained, with Andy Wiessner re- marking once in jest, "You better sional river runners who hired John 32 Aniodio to direct a campaign to not go north of Mann County." save the iliolumne. The Friends had With both the House and Senator just lost a battle over the damming Cranston behind large wilderness of the Stanislaus River, and their bills, Senator Wilson now held the employment of Amodio, a veteran "shotgun" over the fate of the road- of California environmental battles, less areas and the 'Tholumne River. indicated their determination not to Wilson had held off meeting with lose the 'fliolumne, touted as one of the interest groups until the spring the best white water rivers in the of 1983. During the summer his West. The 'Iliolumne was a sensitive staff and Cranston's staff began to issue for California Democrats; the talk. The nervous anticipation sur- interested irrigation districts were rounding Wilson's first foray into represented by Tony Coehlo, the wilderness politics was described by chairman of the House's DemocraticPatti Hedge in a letter to Wilderness Congressional Campaign Commit- Society headquarters. tee, who opposed Wild and Scenic designation for the river.30 Accord- The first go-round of the ing to Tim Mahoney: Cranston- Wilson agreement is,

48 on the one hand, cloaked in 'bottom line' is 1.9 secrecy; on the other, naturally, million-acres; Wilson's is 1.8 it is the subject of constant ru- million. Actually, the difference mor. Curiously, no one has is probably greater than this. I asked directly is there an agree- imagine there are wide djffer- ment?' As though eager to play ences in which areas are 'in or a part in an inner conspiracy, out'... the grassroots folks call and ask the likely fate of 'their' Senator Wilson also met with proposed wilderness area, thefr Assistant Secretary John Cro- language couched to protect well to brief him. Crowell's re- each of our roles in this process. action was that we don't need a I do think everyone understands bill badly enough to give away we have a very difficult course the farm. Crowell has no feel yet before us and at this junc- for whether or not the President ture we have only an agreement would consider a vetoifan un- between Cranston and Wilson acceptable bill passes. to take one more step forward. Burroughs (and Wilson) is not Unfortunately, the future looks overly optimistic that ominous with Jim Burroughs, agreements can be reached with Wilson's aide, frequently scoot- Seiberling. If not, he'll drop the ing over to ask Andy Wiessner bill for this session.34 if it would be acceptable to make this or that deletion, all in In the fall of 1983 Jim Burroughs, an attempt to get another Cranston aide Kathy Files, Andy 100,000-acre reduction in the Wiessner, and Jean Toohey, the mi- bill. Everyone is holding firm nority counsel for the House Public during this phase of negotia- Lands Subcommittee, met several tions, explicitly stating no more times and worked out a 1.9-million- cuts.33 acre compromise. The environmen- talists believed that this agreement The Forest Service was also keeping had the support of both Senators a close watch on the progress of but when it was brought to the tim- negotiations. in September John ber industrit was strongly Chaffin of the San Francisco Office rejected, causing Wilson to disasso- wrote a memo to Regional Forester ciate himself from it. Having been Zane Grey Smith describing a recent brought down to 1.9 million acres, meeting among Wilson, Cranston, the environmentalists feared they and Seiberling. would be subjected to a "second bite" strategy. The timber industry Jim Burroughs of Senator Wil- had found nothing encouraging in son's staff discussed a 1.8 the negotiations; despite the dele- million-acre 'compromise' about tion of some areas, all of the areas 10 days ago to interested groups that primarily interested them were here in California. The Cham- still part of the compromise ber of Commerce group gave proposal. him no commitment of support, though Burroughs feels he has In February 1984 Wilson announced pretty well accommodated other his support for a bill containing interest groups. 1.69 million acres. This bill also placed the Tuolumne River in Wild Last week Senator Wilson, and Scenic status. The Friends of Cranston, and Congressman the River had been very successful Seiberling met. Seiberling's in generating a large volume of mail

49 to Wilson and in getting favorable the River became panic stricken be- newspaper editorials. Indeed, pro- cause if the Tuolumne were not tecting the ibolumne had become saved it was in fairly immediate the single most prominent issue in danger of being dammed. To many California and at times appeared to it had seemed that the Tuolumne be outdistancing the wilderness bill had been the "caboose" riding on in the public's attention. Cynics the wilderness train but now that speculated that Republican support the bill was in danger of being de- for the ibolumne was readily forth- railed, the river people wanted to coming because it was their chance get off. They asked Wilson to pro- to hurt Tony Coehlo, the "Democrat ceed with a separate iliolumne Republicans love to hate." 36 In ret- bill.38 Then in a final flurry of ne- rospect it seems likely that this was gotiations, essentially a trade of not the only motive, given the large acres for areas, the final deal was outpouring of popular support for made. Senator Wilson would get a the ibolumne. 1.8-million-acre bill (i.e., his "bottom line" as described in the After Wilson's announcement it Forest Service letter of September seemed obvious that he was posi- 1983), whereas Senator Cranston tioning himself for a compromise at would be allowed to pick most of 1.8 million acres, midway between the areas. As a result, although the the 1.9-million-acre staff proposal 1.8 million acreage appeared to be a and his 1.69-million-acre bill. The sharp drop from Burton's 2.4 mil- question to be decided was which lion acres, the environmentalists got areas would be included in the final most of their principal areas. In total. The necessity for reductions addition, the bill kept 1.7 million from the Burton bill acreage led to acres in "further planning" status. some painful discussions within the The bulk of this acreage was located environmental community. Patti on the Inyo and Los Padres Hedge remembers meeting with Da- National Forests where timber val- vid and Ellen Drell, principal local ues were relatively low, reducing the supporters for the Yolla Bolly's ad- probability that these areas ditions, an area also of prime con- ultimately would be developed. The cern to the timber industry. Hedge, environmentalists' biggest disap- who was not personally familiar pointment was that they did not get with the area, asked them what kind more in the Siskiyous.39 However, of compromise boundaries they they retained all of the contiguous would consider. Ellen Drell refused Pincushion area, a commercially to be drawn into any compromise timbered forest on flat terrain. (The and angrily retorted: "We don't Minarets and Pincushion now make have to be tainted by the compro- up the Ansel Adams Wilderness.) mise. You do." They were soon rec- According to Tim Mahoney: onciled but Hedge, a relative new- While the final bill as a whole comer to the wilderness movement, was smaller, a lot of the areas learned an important political les- that Burton really worked hard sonall the participants had their at, getting us great boundary own roles to play if a bill was to be lines, stayed in the bill. The passed.37 numbers are deceptive. We won the battle very much.4° Negotiations dragged on into Au- gust 1984 after four other western The Forest Service had been wilderness bills bad been enacted. involved by providing maps and re- Senator Wilson had threatened to source information but had left the let the bill die if he did not get acreage decisions to the interest some concessions. The Friends of groups and politicians.4'

50 The timber industry reacted to their Interview with Jim Eaton, Berk- loss of valuable timbered areas by eley, CA, 3/8/85. refusing to endorse the bill, as their counterparts had done in the other Interview with Russ Shay, Western States. The California Min- Washington, DC, 2/6/85. ing Association was especially angry Mahoney interview. and wrote Wilson a letter of bitter reproach.42 In January 1984, a dis- Eaton interview. appointed William Dennison, antici- pating the final outline of the wil- Interview with George Craig, derness bill, told his members why San Francisco, CA, 3/7/85; In- he thought they had lost: terview with John Amodio, San Francisco, CA, 3/6/85. In utilizing the wilderness issue Roth, The Wilderness Move- as the basis of the socio- ment, p. 59. political process you will un- doubtedly realize that the com- Interview with Bill Dennison, petition for our natural re- San Francisco, CA, 3/7/85. sources is based on differences in values. How those values are Ibid. expressed and interpreted can Interview with Zane Grey make the dWerence in the final Smith, San Francisco, CA, outcome of most political bat- 3/20/86. tles. The preservationists have learned to convey their percep- Eaton interview. tion of values in a manner that many individuals can relate to Eaton and Dennison interviews. even though they may not fully understand or care to know of Del Norte Fishermen's Market- the indirect and direct economic ing Association, n.d., Bill Den- ramWcations. The other na- nison's files, FSHS. tional forests users, cattlemen, Mahoney interview. timber industry, recreational groups, etc., have often relied Shay interview. upon statistics, that although factual are not appealing and Dennison interview. often not understandable to the 'public' nor to political leaders. Letter from Tim Mahoney to These diversified groups have author, 11/11/86, FSHS. learned the folly in this ap- Shay interview. proach the hard way: through political restrictions and land Eaton interview. withdrawals for single-purpose often under the guise of envi- "Wilderness Record," Davis, CA, November-December 1980, ronmental protection. The Cali- SC records, FSHS. fornia Wilderness Bill pending Senate review offers a still Mahoney interview. greater threat to those who see need in use of the national for- Doug Scott to Russ Shay, est land for other than wilder- 7/31/8 1, SC records, FSHS. ness experiences.43 Shay interview. Notes Mahoney interview. 1. "Los Angeles Times," 4/12/83. Ibid.

51 Interview with Patti Hedge, San Dennison interview. Francisco, CA, 3/5/85. Shay interview. "Los Angeles Times," 4/12/83. Hedge interview. Ibid. Amodio interview. Hedge interview. Eaton interview. Amodio interview. Mahoney interview. Letter from Tim Mahoney to author, 11/11/86, FSHS. Smith interview. Amodio interview. Ray Hunter to Pete Wilson, Patti Hedge to Bill ilirnage, 4/12/84, FSHS. 9/6/83, Peter Coppelman's William Dennison, Executive files, FSHS. Seminar Series, 1/17/84, Bill John Chaffm to Zane Grey Dennison's files, FSHS. Smith, 9/27/83, FSHS.

52 Chapter IV: Wyoming Wilderness

The timber industry was the envi- ernment in their lives. Before RARE ronmentalists' principal adversary in II nearly 20 percent of Wyoming's California and Oregon. In WyomingNational Forest land had been they confronted the oil and gas in- placed in the Wilderness System.1 dustr Wyoming is the least popu- In the late 1960's Wyoming began to lous Western State, the only one still experience rapid social and represented by a single Congress- economic change. In the arid south- man. Until the 1970's the principal western corner of the State, oil and businesses were ranching, outdoor gas companies began to make dis- recreation, and tourism. Most coveries in the Overthrust Belt, a Wyomingites had traditionally been geological formation of uplifted and suspicious of the Federal Govern- convoluted sedimentary rocks capa- ment and had chafed at the fact ble of storing oil and gas that that 56 percent of their land was stretches from Mexico to Canada. managed by the Forest Service and As RARE II was being conducted, the Bureau of Land Management. companies were making discoveries In the late 1940's and early 1950's farther north in the wilderness envi- Wyoming led an effort to transfer ronment of the Greater Yellowstone Federal grazing land to the States or Ecosystem, a 4-million-acre expanse at least to acquire statutory vested of National Forest land surrounding rights in its use. From 1979 to 1981 the 2-million-acre National Parks its legislature participated in the so- ('llowstone and Grand Teton). The called Sagebrush Rebellion, another Palisades roadless area west of Jack- attempt by several Western States to son was covered with leases and gain control of Federal land. lease applications and just outside of Jackson in the Little Granite Lacking large cities, Wyoming did Creek section of the Gros Ventre not have the kind of strong urban roadless area, Getty Oil had been wilderness movement that was granted a lease for oil and gas.2 found in most other Western States. In 1980, the Sierra Club had 325 Development-oriented Wyomingites members in the entire State. Unlike and some recent inunigrants to the its northern neighbor, Montana, State welcomed the economic op- which was also primarily rural, Wy- portunities created by the oil and oming had not been dominated by gas boom. Environmentalists and the mining industry in the 19th and some ranchers, who feared it would early 20th centuries and thus had disrupt their traditional lifestyle, not developed an indigenous conser- were not so pleased. Oil companies vation movement in reaction to east- and even environmentalists agreed ern mining interests. Nevertheless, that a major oil and gas find would many Wyomingites valued their open up the region's National For- State's spectacular scenery and wild- ests to a deluge of further explora- life and wanted to keep the environ- tion and driffing. In 1980 Reid Jack- ment the way it had always been, son, the supervisor of the even if that goal occasionally con- Bridger-Teton National Forest, flicted with the wish to minimize which was at the center of conflict the intrusions of the Federal Gov- in northwest Wyoming, recognized

53 what seemed to be the inevitable However, I don't think any Na- logic of the law and was quoted as tional Bill is going to pass, at saying, "There is no way we are go- least, not the Senate.... De- ing to say no." spite the advantages for some areas where politics are against The final RARE II proposal recom- us but Nature has been bounti- mended that 995,000 acres of Wyo- ful, I foresee things being ham- ming roadless land be placed in the mered out on a case-by-case Wilderness System. As it turned basis and in a local out, this was a relatively generous context figure that at the time outstripped the majority view in the State. The Thus we will be counting on outside support to defeat pro- 1984 act included 884,000 acres and posals for smaller areas than only came about after several years the Forest Service has recom- of pressure on the State's congres- mended . sional delegation by State and na- tional environmental organizations National role looks like a two- and Congressmen Udall and Seiber- pronged approach to me: one of ling. The Wyoming Wilderness Act supporting and working with was the only bill passed in 1984 in Congressional delegations from which the final acreage was higher whom we can expect acceptable than the State delegation had want- proposals, while at the same ed. After RARE II most environ- time firming up our stronger mentalists opposed a national wil- allies and keeping their staffs derness bill. However, in Wyoming, informed of those directions Phil Hocker, a prominent Sierra from which we can anticipate Club member and Jackson archi- unacceptable legislation to orig- rsee tect, saw some benefits for Wyo- inate ... so that they can ming wilderness in a national bill, that it receives merqful last although he doubted it would ever rites,' as our former Representa- pass. In a letter to Dick Fiddler, the tive, Mr. Roncalio, said last year chairman of the Sierra Club's Forest of an unacceptable bill.4 Service Wilderness Steering Com- mittee, he outlined the basic strat- The area of greatest concern to the egy that Wyoming environmentalists environmentalists was the Gros Ven- were to follow during the next 5 tre in the Bridger-Teton National years: Forest near Jackson. In the early 1950's, wildlife biologist Olaus Mu- Like most Wilderness activists, ne was the principal advocate for I have a local axe to grind. the protection of this area. Murie Mine happens to be areas which was a founder of The Wilderness are closely related to Yellow- Society and the world's foremost stone National Park and the authority on elk. He turned down Region it abuts the job of executive director of the Society in the early 1940's because This seems to me to be an area he did not want to leave Moose, where a National Bill would be WY, in the Grand Tetons and give very helpful; there is no way theup his study of elk. The job was Wyoming delegation is going to then given to Howard Zahniser. support anything like the amount of wilderness which Murie had discovered that the needs to be set aside to com- half-million-acre Gros Ventre was an plete the job in the Yellowstone essential calving ground for the fa- area. mous Jackson Hole elk herd. When

54 he heard that the Forest Service was Granite Creek were placed in the considering building some roads in Wilderness System the lease would the area, he informed the agency of become moot because the cost of his findings. The Forest Service exploiting it would be prohibitive took his advice and dropped its and Getty would be forced to ex- plans. According to Clifton Merrit, change its lease for one elsewhere.6 long-time wilderness advocate and friend of Murie: "The Forest Serv- The Wyoming delegation's first ice listened and did not put roads draft Senate bill in 1982 placed in. Here is an instance where people 157,900 acres of the Gros Ventre in in the Forest Service paid close at- wilderness and excluded Little Gran- tention to what the conservationists ite Creek. During the next 2 years were saying."The Gros Ventre wasthe environmentalists' principal ob- not given any formal administrative jective was to augment that acreage. protection, the Forest Service having In 1983 the delegation increased the essentially completed its primitive acreage to 225,000, which the envi- area system in 1939. Instead, it be- ronmentalists still thought was far came part of the millions of acres too low. The environmentalists had of National Forest land that were reduced their proposal to 340,000 not developed either because the acres. In September 1983 Andy Forest Service chose not to do so or Wiessner communicated to his boss, because there were no economic in- Congressman John Seiberling, the centives to open these areas up. environmentalists' strong feelings about this area. By the end of the 1970's oil and gas exploration in the Overthrust Belt, Of the 340,000 total acres in- which encompassed part of the cluded in this proposal, 280,000 Gros Ventre, began to provide in- were recommended for wilder- centives. The Gros Ventre consisted ness in RARE II. However, the then of almost 400,000 acres, all of entire 340,000 acres is a 'must.' which the environmentalists wanted The additional acres comprise designated as wilderness. During critical wildlVe habitat on the RARE lithe Forest Service recom- southern flank of the Gros Ven- mended 256,000 acres, increased to tre Mountains and equally im- 280,000 acres in the final Adminis- portant elk and bear habitat in tration proposal. Acreage with the Klondike Hill/Tosi Creek strong oil and gas potential in the area in the southeast. This is southwestern part of the area was the country that Doug Crowe of excluded from the recommendations Wyoming Fish and Game indi- but not the Little Granite Creek sec- cated during our 1979 trip was tion outside of Jackson where Getty 'perhaps the finest remaining Oil had already obtained a lease in unprotected wildljfe habitat' in one of the Federal Government's oil Wyoming. There is not a 'frivo- and gas lotteries. (For a nominal lous' acre in this 340,000 acre fee, a company could get a lease in proposal. It includes Senate ex- the lottery and then if it made a cluded lands in Little Granite find would pay the Government roy- Creek (it should be designated alties of 12.5 percent.) The State of wilderness, court can decide Wyoming contested this claim based lease issue, with exchange jf on an obscure State law never before Getty is found to have com- invoked. The Department of the pensable rights), adjacent to the Interior, which had originally issued National Elk Refuge, as well as the lease, reconsidered it. Getty Oil the country mentioned above. had a strong legal case, but the en- In order to accommodate tim- vironmentalists felt that if Little ber interests, it excludes roughly

55 2/3rds of the 8.6 MMBF Jack did not qualify as wilderness be- Creek timber sale. cause of the lingering evidence of past human activities in the area.9 Many more details of the pro- posal can be provided, if neces- This was one of the few Wyoming sary. However, there should be areas where the timber industry was no bill without this proposal.7 the predominant industrial interest. The large Louisiana Pacific mill in The oil and gas industry was dis- Dubois had exhausted much of the mayed by the Wyoming delegation's timber supply in the Wind River decision to add acreage in the Gros Ranger District and knew that it Ventre, as well as other areas in the eventually would need the DuNoir's State, and kept its relatively quiet timber in order to survive. Bob Bak- but persistent pressure on. The final er, Louisiana Pacific's forester, was bill created a 287,000-acre Gros Ven- one of the environmentalists' most tie Wilderness by splitting the dif- vocal opponents, contending that ference between the delegation's most Wyomingites did not want any 225,000-acre proposal and the envi- more wilderness.'0 ronmentalists' 340,000-acre "com- The environmentalists conceded that promise." In other words, after 3 Louisiana Pacific would need Du- years of bargaining both sides had Noir timber but argued that even if agreed to what was essentially the the company harvested all of the 1979 Carter Administration recom- timber, it would only delay the inev- mendation. itable end of its supply in this slow- The environmentalists' second ma- growing lodgepole pine region. jor priority was the DuNoir area in According to Bruce Hamilton, the the Shoshone National Forest at the Sierra Club's Northern Plains Repre- southern end of the Greater Yellow- sentative, the absence of the DuNoir stone Ecosystem. The DuNoir had been left out of the Washakie Wil- from the delegation's 1982 bill was derness in 1972 but as a compro- the first "red flag" warning that the bill was seriously deficient. But even mise had been placed under a spe- though the DuNoir was an area be- cial management provision that in effect gave it protection equal to loved by many environmentalists, that of the Wilderness Actthe interest in it occasionally waned. Because it was already protected, main difference being that it would they thought it might be used as be politically easier to remove the "trading stock." 12 In 1983 special management protection than Wiessner advised Seiberling of the it would have been to declassify the DuNoir's importance but also of the area as wilderness.8 environmentalists' willingness to In 1978 Senator Clifford Hansen compromise. had prevented retiring Congressman Teno Roncalio from putting the Du- 28,800 acres are already pro- Noir into the Wilderness System. tected as a wilderness study area Assistant Secretary Rupert Cutler actually a special management had supported its designation but area by virtue of Teno's 1972 his successor, John Crowell, favored [Roncalio] bill. .The only the designation of the upper Senate-passed bill follows elevation 11,000-acre portion of the [former Senator] Hansen's lead 29,000-acre DuNoir. The opinion of and protects only 11,100 acres. some Forest Service personnel had At a minimum, there should be changed over the years, but the pre- wilderness for 28,800 acres. Wy- vailing belief was that the DuNoir oming Fish and Game strongly

56 supports this because of the in- water rights lawsuits. The Club fi- credible elk and other wildljfe nally relented and agreed to accept values statutory language preventing the wilderness act from interfering in If the DuNoir means the difference any way with the Cheyenne water between a bill and no bill, there projects. Bruce Hamilton concluded should be no bill without the Du- that the Cheyenne Water Board was Noir. Another compromise option the only interest that had gotten might be to leave the DuNoir in its everything it had wanted and that presently protected state (i.e. neither "one day we'll have either a dry wil- wilderness designation nor derness there or crazy language our release).'3 grandchildren won't understand." The decision on the DuNoir was not made until the very end of the ne- The delegation's 1982 draft bill in- gotiations. Seiberling and the Wyo- cluded 475,000 acres of wilderness, ming delegation agreed to maintain increased the next year to 630,000 the status quo and leave the DuNoir acres. Seiberling informed environ- as a special management area. mentalists that they could "reason- ably" ask for a little less than half a Environmentalists had proposed million additional acres.'6 The final designation for three areas about bill had 250,000 more acres than the 100 miles from the city of Cheyenne 1983 draft bill. In other words, the but had been opposed by the city's two sides split the difference, as Board of Public Utilities, which they had done in the specific case of feared that wilderness would inter- the Gros Ventre. Measured in terms fere with their water projects in the of individual areas, the environmen- Medicine Bow National Forest. talists did fairly well. Wiessner's Consequently, the delegation had 1983 memo to Seiberling listed seven not included these areas (Huston priority areasDuNoiz, Gros Yen- Park, Encampment River, and tre, Huston Park, Cloud Peak, Platte River) in its bills. Wiessner's Platte River, West Slopes ibtons, 1983 memo to Seiberling asserted and Palisades.17 All of these were that these popular areas were essen- included in the act at close to the tial because they would be the only acreages requested by the environ- wilderness areas on the Medicine mentalists, except for the DuNoir, Bow National Forest, located in the as already discussed, and the Pali- most heavily populated part of the sades, which remains a Wilderness State. Study Area because of the large lie proposed that language could be number of pending leases and lease included to insure that wilderness applications. designation would not interfere with the water projects. The Cheyenne The environmentalists' biggest losses Water Board agreed to withdraw its came in several areas in the south- opposition to these areas if it could western part of Wyoming. This part get special language assuring them of the State had many sheep ranch- they could continue to develop em, and there was very little local planned projects.'4 During the fmal support for wilderness. Even though days of negotiation over this bill, environmentalists such as Bruce Ha- the water rights issue became for milton, considered the areas to be the Sierra Club "the single biggest very "deserving," they could not obstacle to a Wyoming wilderness overcome the fact that there was bill" because they feared it might little statewide sentiment for or establish a precedent that could be against them.'8 Consequently, in the used to override future wilderness final bill no wildernesses were cre-

57 ated south of the Gros Ventre in the Roth, The Wilderness Move- western half of the State. ment, pp. 16-19. Notes Hamilton interview. Congressional Record, Feb. 22, Casper, WY, "Star-Tribune," 1983, S1434. 5/26/84. Lander, WY, "High County Hamilton interview. News," 10/14/83. Ibid. "The Washington Post," 5/27/80. Wiessner to Seiberling. Philip Hocker to Dick Fiddler, Hamilton interview. 8/14/79, SC records, FSHS. Ibid. Interview with Clif Merritt, Denver, CO, 3/15/85. Wiessner to Seiberling. Interview with Bruce Hamilton, Ibid. San Francisco, CA, 3/4/85. Hamilton interview. Andy Wiessner to John Seiber- ling, 9/21/83, FSHS.

58 Chapter V: Three in the East

The passage of the so-called Eastern and of green jung/ed forest is Wilderness Act of 1975 (it actually unique. Nearly everyAody says has no name) put an end to a long- that. Fishermen and hikers standing debate. This act established come back from that region up- that areas that had once been cu- lifted. Those great somber tover or otherwise had felt "the im- pools, cascades of sheer gleam- print of man" could enter the Wil- ing foam, gigantic massfs lying derness System if they were on the athwart the stream and way to recovery. It affirmed legisla- encrusted with lichens and over- tively what Ernest C. Oberholtzer lain with moss, those ancient of the Quetico-Superior Council hemlocks rising like verdant (associated with the Izaak Walton obelisks from jungles of rhodo- League) had said in 1942: "I dendron and yellow birch are wouldn't exclude an area, where, overwhelming. There is some- given other requirements, nature, by thing primordial about it which being left alone, can restore blem- can not be balanced against dol- ishes... Thedesignation isn't so lars nor equated in board fret. much for honoring the area as it is for insuring the public opportunities If this area had existed in the for primitive experience." 1 western forests, Robert Marshall or John Sieker (Marshall's suc- One of the principal champions of cessor as Director of the Forest eastern wilderness was Harvey Service's Division of Recreation] Broome, a native of Knoxville, TN, would have requested it long who helped found The Wilderness ago. In the East, the situation is Society and later served as its presi- dWerent. Such values have to dent. When he was most active in be fought over.2 the 1940's and 50's, there seemed little hope that eastern wilderness It seems reasonably clear from Wil- areas would be preserved. In 1947 derness Society records that in the he shared his concern with Forest early years most of the Society's Service Regional Forester Herbert leadership did not seriously contem- Stone, in a letter about the Big San- plate the possibility of creating east- teelah, an area owned by a lumber ern wildernesses. In 1952 there was company next to the Joyce Kilmer a hint a change was beginning to Forest. The Forest Service had occur. George Fell of the Society wanted to purchase it but had not wrote to Dr. W.J.M. Harkness of received funding. Broome urged the Canadian Division of Fish and Stone to prevent the company from Wildlife in Toronto that the Society building a logging road across Na- considered wilderness areas to be tional Forest land, even though the those "retaining their primeval envi- company had an easement until ronment or influence, or to areas 1951. remaining free from routes which can be used for mechanized trans- There is every evidence that it is portation." He then added that the an extraordinary remnant of definition was "undergoing an evo- that primeval scene. Its inter- lution' an indication perhaps of play of wild turbulent streams Broome's influence.3 But 8 years

59 later the Society had yet to establish terpreted either as a clarification of a clear policy. Broome wrote to some latent ambiguities in the 1964 Zahniser of his fear that the 1960 act or more consistently as a liberal- Wilderness Bill contained standards ization of standards for wilderness that would have excluded almost all designation. On a strictly legal ba- of the areas in the East. sis, the Forest Service had strong reasons for not recommending the Thanks for yours of December inclusion of eastern areas in the 14 relative to the Glacier Peak Wilderness System from 1964 to and Sel way-B itterrot decisions. 1975, as Broome recognized might In my letter of December 10, I be the case in 1960. From a social was making the point that it perspective, however, the agency ran seemed to me that Forest Ser- against the drift of public opinion vice was utilizing the standards when it initially sought to deflect in the latest draft of the Wilder- passage of the 1975 act by promot- ness Bill in defining the bound- ing a "wild areas" system for the aries of these two areas in re- East that would have been distinct classification. from the Wilderness System.6 Assuredly I agree with both you Many eastern wilderness activists and Olaus fMurieJ that we were encouraged when RARE II should strive for the largest pos- was announced, because it meant sible wilderness areas even in- that for the first time the Forest Ser- cluding some non-conforming vice would inventory eastern road- uses and substandard lands, less areas and study their potential which could be eliminated in for wilderness designation. The time and with time. movement for eastern wilderness had temporarily slowed a bit after However, I do believe we are in the passage of the 1975 act. In No- a bit of a dilemma in sponsor- vember 1977 The Wilderness Society ing standards in the Bill which proclaimed in a policy statement to some extent we disregard that "omnibus legislation is essential when we seek inclusion of sub- since most of the eastern areas lack standard lands and the local Congressional support non-conforming uses. For can- needed for individual or even state- dor's sake, I think we should wide omnibus bills."Implicit in recognize this dichotomy in our this statement was the recognition dealing with the Forest Service.4that even more than its western counterpart, the eastern wilderness Zahniser wrote a marginal note on movement was an urban phenome- the letter indicating he did not fully non. Eastern roadless areas had share or perhaps grasp Broome's many more private "inholdings" concern. He referred to the section than those in the West and in gen- of the bill that permitted grazing eral existed in closer proximity to and other "established" uses. But rural residents who were wary of neither that section nor the rest of anything that might restrict their the bill explicitly provided for the traditional use of the National For- inclusion of Broome's ests. Nevertheless, the Society could "substandard" areas.5 The 1964 not devote much of its resources to Wilderness Act did not differ in its an eastern omnibus bill because of formulation of wilderness standards the ongoing RARE II study and the from the 1960 bill. But a strong effort to pass the Alaska Lands bill. grassroots movement for eastern One of the advantages of RARE II wilderness compelled Congress to for eastern wilderness activists was pass the 1975 act, which can be in- that its hoped-for wilderness recom-

60 mendations from the Forest Service wins. Perseverance, determina- could be used to counteract local tion, stubbornness, undying resistance, which had resulted in the persistencecall it what you loss of half of the original acreage likeis what wins in the Con- proposed in the eastern areas act of gress. Before they act, Members 1975. of Congress insist on being sure they are riding with a winner! Virgmia Let's show them!

This was not true, however, in Vir- The 1975 act had created one Vir- ginia, where wilderness activists ginia wilderness area (James River) wanted to pass a bill in 1977 but and four study- areas. In 1976 the were put off by Congress with the Virginia Wilderness Committee pro- argument that they should wait untilposed five more areas totaling the end of RARE II. 45,000 acres out of a total of 1.7 miffion acres of National Forest in Ernie Dickerman, chief Wilderness Virginia. By 1977 they had gained Society lobbyist for the 1975 act, some support from several members retired from the Society after its of the Virginia congressional delega- passage. He moved to a mountain tion and were about to begin work farm in western Virginia where he on a bill when Congress passed the was elected president of the Virginia 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Wilderness Committee (founded in Act. This legislation retroactively 1969). During the next 9 years he placed all Federal wilderness areas also served as its vice-president and created before the amendments un- the editor of its newsletter. Dicker- der Class I air standards, the strict- man was well known for his knowl- est category. Wildernesses created edge of lobbying techniques and after the amendments were to re- imparted that knowledge to several main under the Class II restrictions younger members of the wilderness which apply generally to Federal movement.8 He stressed persistence lands, and are compatible with most and the need to constantly apply forms of industrial activity. The pressure on Congress through letters Westvaco paper and pulp company and telephone calls. He communi- had a large mill in Covington, VA, cated his basic legislative philosophy located within 50 miles or less of to the members of the Committee most of the proposed wildemesses. early in the history of the Virginia The company was disturbed by the Wilderness bill. possibility that a future Congress or Governor of Virginia (who has cer- It is obvious that members of tain powers under the Act) could the Virginia Wilderness Com- place wilderness areas under Class I mittee and all other advocates standards, possibly impeding their of wilderness preservation in plans to expand the Covington Virginia have their work cut for plant. In the company's view clean them. The delay we are running air and wilderness had become irre- into is standard. Because there vocably linked by the 1977 are so many demands on the amendments.1° They would not ac- Congress and its Members, the cept the argument that it was un- general will of the Congress is likely that a future Governor or to do nothing about anything. Congress would threaten their oper- It then becomes a struggle be- ations by changing the standards. tween this negative will of the Westvaco employed several hundred Congress and the positive will people in an economically depressed of the voters to get what the part of the State. Consequently, latter want. The stronger will their objections persuaded local

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