ERIA Research Project Report 2011, No.8
EECONOMIC AND WWELFARE IIMPACTS OF DDISASTERS IN EEAST AASIA AND PPOLICY RRESPONSES
Edited by YASUYUKI SAWADA SOTHEA OUM
ERIA Research Project Report 2011, No.8
EECONOMIC AND WWELFARE IIMPACTS OF DDISASTERS IN EEAST AASIA AND PPOLICY RRESPONSES
Edited by YASUYUKI SAWADA SOTHEA OUM
December, 2012
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents i
List of Project Members iv
Acknowledgement vi
Executive Summary vii
Economic and Welfare Impacts of Disasters in East Asia 1 and Policy Responses Yasuyuki Sawada and Sothea Oum
Part I. Overall Ex-Ante Risk Management and Ex-Post Risk-Coping Mechanisms against Disasters at Community, National, and Regional Levels
Chapter 1 . Approaches towards Effective Disaster Risk Coping Strategy and Regional Cooperation on Disaster 27 Management Yasuyuki Sawada
Chapter 2. Natural Disaster and Economic Policy for ASEAN and the Pacific Rim: A Proposal for a Disaster Risk Reduction 45 ‘Seal of Approval’ Fund Ilan Noy
Chapter 3. On the Design of Regional Insurance Schemes/ 71 Mechanisms for East Asia Hiroyuki Nakata
Chapter 4. Index-based Risk Financing and Development of Natural Disaster Insurance Programs in Developing Asian 95 Countries Sommarat Chantarat, Krirk Pannangpetch, Nattapong Puttanapong, Preesan Rakwatin and Thanasin Tanompongphandh
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Chapter 5. Social Capital in Post Disaster Recovery: Towards a 157 Resilient and Compassionate East Asian Community Daniel P. Aldrich
Part II. Household Level Welfare Impacts of Disasters
Chapter 6. Impact of Disasters and Role of Social Protection in 179 Natural Disaster Risk Management in Cambodia Sann Vathana, Sothea Oum,
Ponhrith Kan, and Colas Chervier
Chapter 7. Economic and Welfare Impacts of Disasters in East Asia 205 and Policy Responses: The Case of Vietnam Le Dang Trung
Chapter 8. Impact of the 2011 Floods, and Flood Management in 247 Thailand Nipon Poapongsakorn and Pitsom Meethom
Part III. Disaster Impacts on Production Networks, Urban Management, and Aggregate Regional Economies
Chapter 9. Impacts of Recent Crises and Disasters on Regional 311 Production/Distribution Networks and Trade in Japan Mitsuyo Ando
Chapter 10. Impact of Natural Disasters on Production Networks and 343 Urbanization in New Zealand Brent Layton
Chapter 11. Long-run Economic Impacts of Thai Flooding: 401 Geographical Simulation Analysis Ikumo Isono and Satoru Kumagai
Part IV. Disaster Impacts on Health
Chapter 12. Mental Health Impacts of Disasters in India: Ex-Ante and 425 Ex-Post Analysis Sujata Satapathy
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Chapter 13. Impact of Disasters and Disaster Risk Management in Singapore: A Case Study of Singapore’s Experience in 463 Fighting the SARS Epidemic Allen Yu-Hung Lai and Seck L. Tan
Part V. Disaster Management in Agricultural Development, Food Securities, and Environmental Sustainability
Chapter 14. Impacts of Disasters and Disaster Risk Management in 503 Malaysia: The Case of Floods Ngai Weng Chan
Chapter 15. Impacts of Natural Disasters on Agriculture, Food Security, and Natural Resources and Environment in the 553 Philippines Danilo C. Israel and Roehlano M. Briones
Chapter 16. Emerging ‘Agricultural Involution’ in Indonesia: Impact of Natural Hazards and Climate Extremes on Agricultural 601 Crops and Food System
Jonatan A. Lassa
Chapter 17. Impacts of Natural Disasters and Disasters Risk Management in China: The Case of China’s Experience in 641 Wenchuan Earthquake Yi-Ming Wei, Ju-Liang Jin and Qiong Wang
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LIST OF PROJECT MEMBERS
PROF. FUKUNARI KIMURA (PROJECT SUPERVISOR): Chief Economist, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), Jakarta, Indonesia. PROF. YASUYUKI SAWADA (PROJECT LEADER): Professor, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, Japan. DR. SOTHEA OUM (PROJECT COORDINATOR): Economist, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), Jakarta, Indonesia. PROF. HIROYUKI NAKATA: Fellow, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, and Researcher, University of Tokyo. PROF. CHAN NGAI WENG: Professor, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia. PROF. ILAN NOY: Associate Professor of Economics, University of Hawaii, Manoa, Honolulu, U.S.A. DR. SANN VATHANA: Deputy Secretary General, Council of Ministers, Council for Agricultural and Rural Development, Social Protection Coordination Unit (CARD- SPCU), Phnom Penh, Cambodia. MR. PONHRITH KAN: Social Research Junior Assistant, Council for Agricultural and Rural Development, Social Protection Coordination Unit (CARD-SPCU), Phnom Penh, Cambodia. MR. COLAS CHERVIER: Senior Researcher, Council for Agricultural and Rural Development, Social Protection Coordination Unit, Cambodia (CARD-SPCU), Phnom Penh, Cambodia. PROF. YI-MING WEI: Director, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT), Beijing, China. MS. QIONG WANG: Research Assistant, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT), Beijing, China. PROF. JU-LIANG: Professor, School of Civil Engineering, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei, China. DR. SUJATA SATAPATHY: Assistant Professor, Clinical Psychology, Dept of Psychiatry, All India Institute of Medical Science (AIIMS), New Delhi, India. DR. JONATHAN A. LASSA: Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Resource Governance and Social Change and Associate Research Fellow, Risk Frontiers, Sydney, Australia. DR. MITSUYO ANDO: Associate Professor, Faculty of Business and Commerce, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan.
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DR. BRENT LAYTON: Chairperson, The Electricity Authority, Wellington, New Zealand. DR. DANILO C. ISRAEL: Senior Research Fellow, Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), Manila, Philippines. DR. ROEHLANO M. BRIONES: Senior Research Fellow, Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), Manila, Philippines. MR. ALLEN YU-HUNG LAI: PhD Candidate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP), National University of Singapore (NUS), Singapore. MR. SECK L. TAN: PhD Candidate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP), National University of Singapore (NUS), Singapore. DR. NIPON POAPONGSAKORN: President, Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), Bangkok, Thailand. MS. PITSOM MEETHOM: Researcher, Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), Bangkok, Thailand. DR. SOMMARAT CHANTARAT: Research Fellow, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. DR. KRIRK PANNANGPETCH: Assistant Professor, Faculty of Agriculture, Khon Kaen University, Thailand. DR. NATTAPONG PUTTANAPONG: Lecturer, Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University, Thailand. DR. PREESAN RAKWATIN: Researcher, Research and Development, Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency (GISTDA), Thailand Ministry of Science and Technology, Thailand. MR. THANASIN TANOMPONGPHANDH: Lecturer, School of Management, Mae Fah Luang University, Thailand. DR. DANIEL P. ALDRICH: Associate Professor, Purdue University, Washington D.C., United State of America. MR. LE DANG TRUNG: Research Fellow, Indochina Research and Consulting (IRC), Hanoi, Vietnam. MR. IKUMO ISONO: Economist, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), Jakarta, Indonesia. MR. SATORU KUMAGAI: Research Fellow Sent Abroad (Kuala Lumpur), Economic Integration Studies Group, Inter-disciplinary Studies Center, IDE-JETRO.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report consists of the papers from ERIA’s research project on “Economic and Welfare Impacts of Disasters in East Asia and Policy Responses” in Fiscal Year 2011- 12. It aims to improve our understanding on how the past and potential impacts of disasters on productions, demands, regional development, and welfare captured by income, poverty and health outcomes, and in depth analysis on economic policy implications at national and regional level. This project also aims at creating policy recommendations for reforms at the national level and explores the prospects for regional cooperation framework. All papers presented in this report were presented in two workshops held in Jakarta and Bangkok in 2011 and 2012. We would like to express our appreciation and gratitude, first and foremost, to the members of our project for their scholarly contribution to the completion of this research. We are deeply indebted to Professor Fukunari Kimura, Chief Economist of ERIA, for his intellectual guidance, encouragement, and supports for the research project. ERIA management support is crucial for the completion of this research. We are profoundly grateful for the strong support provided by our Executive Director, Prof. Hidetoshi Nishimura, and all esteem staffs of ERIA, especially Yunita Nababan and Fadriani Trianingsih for their excellent efforts to ensure the successful delivery of the project. Last, but not least, we would like to thank our colleagues, ERIA researchers, for their enthusiasm and participation in our workshops.
Yasuyuki Sawada Sothea Oum
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Natural disasters, whether they occur in advanced or developing nations, can destroy people's livelihoods. Extreme natural and man-made events have recently hit both developed and developing countries. We see vividly the devastating and still ongoing 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear radiation crisis in Japan that has killed tens of thousands of people and resulted in damages of around US$200 to 300 billion. Hundreds of thousands of lives were lost in the Indian Ocean tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, and the earthquakes in central Chile, Haiti, the Sichuan province of China, northern Pakistan, and the Hanshin area of Japan. Disasters are created not only by nature but also by humans. The tsunami disaster in Tohoku was accompanied by a serious technological disaster involving a nuclear power plant's leaking radioactive matter. Economies around the world are still being impaired by the global financial crisis triggered by the 2008 Lehman Shock. Nations in Africa are still at war and involved in conflicts, and terrorist attacks are having serious impacts even on advanced nations. Natural and man-made disasters show distinct trends across the globe: Natural and technological disasters have been increasing more rapidly in frequency, in terms of the average occurrence of disaster per country per year, than financial crises and violence-related disasters. As we continue our ceaseless efforts to recover from different disasters around the world, we are rediscovering the importance of advance preparations, such as drawing up emergency plans, disseminating and teaching emergency knowledge, conducting evacuation drills, constructing early warning systems, and investing in infrastructure. Investments in physical infrastructure have been and will be indispensable as an ex ante risk management policy in strengthening resilience of individuals, households, communities, and a country. These investments include dams for flood control, seawalls and tsunami barriers, cyclone shelters, a barrier to control soil erosion, irrigation systems for droughts, earthquake-resilient houses and buildings, and disaster early-warning systems. Experiences of developed nations in the region such as Japan tell that investments in infrastructure dramatically reduced human and
vii physical losses due to natural disasters. Multilateral and bilateral development partners can play an important role in filling the investment gap in these disaster-mitigation infrastructures in developing Asian countries. While advanced nations can deal with a major disaster by managing their own domestic financial resources, developing nations, which carry diverse risks of major disasters, have weak fiscal groundwork and are less tolerant of such risks. Different disasters come in combination, as was the case with the Great East Japan Earthquake and conflicts in Africa. There are a few emerging innovative ideas to strengthen the complementarities among the market, the state, and the community in the context of disaster management and coping. It is imperative to develop formal mechanisms to diversify aggregate disaster risks at national and regional levels. We may need to elaborate on multi-country risk pooling schemes, i.e., regional funds, to cover sovereign disaster risk. Against natural disasters, regional level index insurance such as the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) and the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI) can function effectively to support the disaster affected country with immediate liquidity in the aftermath of a catastrophic disaster, by using the insurance mechanism in addition to microcredit and microinsurance schemes to enhance the disaster resilience of individual households and firms. While regional index insurance schemes are based on public-private partnership (PPP), the microcredit and insurance programs are supported by informal community enforcement mechanisms. Complementarities among the market, the state, and the community will therefore be vital. In the case of economic disasters in Asia, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) has been and will continue playing an important role. The CMIM is a bilateral or multilateral currency swap arrangement involving pooling foreign exchange reserves, and was designed as an ex post coping mechanism in case of a financial crisis. Further development of Asian bond markets will also be indispensable, because bond markets are composed of a large number of individual bond holders, enabling idiosyncratic risks to be diversified away effectively, and it is generally considered that bond markets provide effective risk-sharing mechanisms. In order to diversify the shocks caused by disasters,
viii developed bond markets can potentially play an important role. To further improve national and regional risk management capabilities, a global system of pooling the risks of the four types of disasters would be effective for both developing and advanced nations wishing to diversify the risks of disasters. In other words, we should also work on the securities and reinsurance markets to develop a global disaster insurance system that would encompass various regional frameworks such as CCRIF, PDRFI, and CMIM beyond disaster types, i.e., natural, technological, economic, and violence related disasters. When we consider the actual form of such a system, there are numerous issues involved. It is not clear, for example, whether it would be an institutionalized system such as a disaster fund, or something more flexible such as a coordination forum. Yet the Asian region has experienced diverse forms of disaster, including floods, typhoons, earthquakes, epidemics, and the financial crises of the late '90s. It is worth pursuing reforms that undertake comprehensive preparations against the risks of a variety of disasters in Asia.
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Economic and Welfare Impacts of Disasters in East Asia and Policy Responses
YASUYUKI SAWADA Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
SOTHEA OUM Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia
1. Background
Natural disasters, whether they occur in advanced or developing nations, can destroy people's lives. There is no preventing the occurrence of natural disasters, whether earthquakes, tsunami, or typhoons. However, it is possible to prevent or at least mitigate damage arising from disasters, both in terms of the number of human casualties and economic impacts, and preparedness is what makes a key difference.
Indeed, at the recent high-level forums in East Asia, such as the 4th East Asia
Summit (EAS) in Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand, held on 25 October 2009, the Fifth
EAS on 30 October 2010 in Hanoi, Viet Nam, the Sixth EAS in Bali, Indonesia, on
November, 2011, and the Seventh EAS in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on November
2012, the leaders noted and reiterated the need to enhance disaster management cooperation for the region. The Special ASEAN-Japan Ministerial Meeting in April
2011 also emphasized the need to strengthen such cooperation through sharing of exercises and lessons-learned as well as conducting training and capacity building programs for disaster preparedness, emergency response, relief, and reconstruction efforts. The Chair’s statement at the 18th ASEAN Summit held in Jakarta,
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Indonesia 7 - 8 May 2011, noted the potential trans-boundary impact of accidents at nuclear plants in the aftermath of the Fukushima incident. They agreed that
ASEAN should engage as appropriate in information-sharing and promote transparency on relevant nuclear related issues in the region. The aim was to achieve the goal of building disaster-resilient societies and move towards a safer community by the year 2015. The 4th ERIA Governing Board Statement on June 3,
2011 also recognized that knowledge sharing and exchange of technologies relating to disaster risk management on a regional basis is essential.
In general, disasters can be classified into four major groups (Sawada and
Shimizutani, 2008). The first type is natural disasters which comprise hydrological disasters (floods), meteorological disasters (storms or typhoons), climatological disasters (droughts), geophysical disasters (earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions), and biological disasters (epidemics and insect infestations). The second type of disaster is technological disasters, i.e., industrial accidents (chemical spills, collapses of industrial infrastructure) and transport accidents (by air, rail, road or water transport). The final two disasters are manmade which include economic crises (hyperinflation, banking crisis, and currency crisis) and violence (terrorism, civil strife, riots, and war).
The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) in Belgium, organizes detailed, long-term time series data on natural disasters per country. The
Center also disseminates data on technological disasters. For economic crises and disasters resulting from the violence of war, Professors C. Reinhart of the University of Maryland and K. Rogoff of Harvard University (both in the U.S.) produce cross-country panel data.
Figure 1 shows the average occurrence of each of the four types of disaster per
2 country per year. We can see that while natural and technological disasters are increasing rapidly, financial crises and war are maintaining stable patterns. Even so, they are not showing any trends toward reducing in frequency. These disaster trends indicate the importance of careful preparations in reducing the damage arising from disasters.
Figure 1: Occurrence Frequency of Four Types of Major Disasters in the World (Average per Country)
Note: Prepared by the author based on the database of the CRED (natural disaster and technological disaster) and the database of Professors Reinhart and Rogoff (economic crisis and war).
According to the World Disasters Report (2010), Asia is the continent most prone to disasters (see table 1). During the past decade Asia experienced more than
2,900 disasters (40% of the world total), affecting more than 2 million people (85%), killing more than 900,000 people (84%) and causing more than US$ 386 billion in damage (39%). Yet, availability of formal insurance mechanisms is quite diversified even across developed countries in the region, not to mention in
3 developing nations. Cabinet Office (2011) reported that the total property losses of the Japanese earthquake tragedy in March 2011 would amount to more than US$ 200 billion or even 250 billion, but according to Munich Re (2012)1 and World Bank
(2012)2, only US$ 40 billion or 16-20% of the overall damage was covered by private insurance. In the case of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of Japan in
January 1995, the insurance coverage rate was even lower (Sawada and Shimizutani,
2008). These figures can be compared with about US$ 13 billion of the US$ 16 billion in total property losses that was covered by private insurance in the case of the February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.
Table 1: Distribution of Disasters by Continent, Total Number of Disasters, People Affected, Deaths, and Damage from 2000 - 2009
Total Number of Estimated Damage Number of Number of People Reported (in millions of US People Affected killed Disasters dollars (2009 prices)) Africa 1,782 306,595 46,806 12,947 Americas 1,334 73,161 32,577 428,616 Asia 2,903 2,159,715 933,250 386,102 Europe 996 10,144 91,054 146,414 Oceania 169 658 1,665 12,612 Total 7,184 2,550,273 1,105,352 986,691 Source: The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2010)
Obviously, the costs of disasters would pose threats to both short and longer term development in the region, by disrupting production and flows of goods and services, worsening the balance of payments and government budgets, derailing economic growth, income distribution, and poverty reduction. Disasters also pose negative
1 http://www.munichre.com/en/media_relations/press_releases/2012/2012_01_04_press_ release.aspx 2 http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/drm_kn6-2.pdf
4 effects on social structures and the environment.
In response to these emerging issues, this study intends to address the impacts of prevailing disasters on aspects of economies such as production, demand, and welfare in East Asia, and to draw economic policy implications at national and regional level. The study will cover the ASEAN +6 economies and will comprise chapters addressing two aspects: first, the past and potential impacts of disasters on production, demand, regional development, and welfare, captured by income, poverty and health outcomes and, second, in-depth analysis on the economic policy implications of disasters at national and regional level.
This project aims at creating policy recommendations for reforms at the national level and explores the prospects for a regional cooperation framework. Results from the study are expected to provide policy indications on how to improve the effectiveness of market and non-market disaster management systems within each country studied, as well as recommendations towards forging a framework for regional cooperation.
2. Overview of Chapters
This report is composed of five parts. First, five chapters discuss general aspects of a variety of ex ante risk management and ex post risk-coping mechanisms for dealing with disasters at community, national, and regional levels. Second, three chapters investigate the household-level welfare impacts of disasters by investigating the consumption poverty effect using household-level micro-data.
Third, disaster impacts on production networks, urban management, and aggregate
5 regional economies are examined. Fourth, two chapters focus on the health dimensions of natural disasters. Finally, four chapters investigate other issues of disaster management, such as agricultural development, food securities, and environmental sustainability.
2.1. Overall ex ante Risk Management and ex post Risk-coping Mechanisms for Dealing with Disasters at Community, National, and Regional Levels.
The general risk management and coping strategies mentioned above imply divided roles of market, state, and community.
Figure 2: The Community, the Market, and the State in the Economic System according to Hayami (2009)
Market State
Competition Coercion
Private goods Global public goods
Community
Cooperation
Local public goods Source: Hayami (2009)
According to Hayami (2009), the market is the mechanism that coordinates profit-seeking individuals and firms through competition using price signals (Figure
2). Naturally, the market has an advantage in matching the demand and supply of private tradable goods. The state is the mechanism that forces people to adjust their resource allocations by command of the government. Typically, the state plays an
6 important role in supplying global or pure public goods. In contrast, the community is the mechanism that guides community members to voluntary cooperation based on intensive social interactions, facilitating supply of local public goods such as the provision of reciprocal social safety nets, the conservation of commons, e.g., village common land and local irrigation facilities and the enforcement of informal transactions.
Previous empirical studies can provide insights into how more effective disaster management can be facilitated by strengthening complementarities among markets functioning using price signals, state enforcement mechanisms, and the community informal insurance mechanisms. According to Kahn (2005), natural disasters occur in advanced and developing nations alike, but when a nation is democratized and has better governance, the number of casualties is drastically reduced owing to disaster risk information that is communicated and shared, well-developed early warning systems and infrastructure and other risk management mechanisms that are well planned to prevent or mitigate the impact of disasters. Since the insurance market for natural disasters is far from complete, the government plays an important role in disaster management and rehabilitation. For example, a report by the World Bank and the United Nations (2010) describes how Bangladesh, where frequent cyclones have affected several hundred thousand people, has significantly reduced the number of casualties by investing in emergency infrastructure such as improving its early warning system, which operates via radio, and building numerous cyclone shelters.
Having noted this, Yang (2008) used data on the world's storms of the past 30-plus years to show that their economic damage has been enormous. That tells us that we should balance emergency information systems and infrastructure that prevent injury to people with market-based insurance systems that prevent economic damage, so as
7 to prepare ourselves for natural disasters. In a study of the Chuetsu Earthquake,
Ichimura, et al. (2006) found that earthquake insurance and public transfers had functioned quite well.
In Chapter 1, Sawada overviews different approaches towards an effective disaster risk coping strategy and regional cooperation on disaster management. He finds that advanced nations can deal with major disasters by managing their own domestic financial resources. But developing nations, which carry diverse risks of major disasters, have weak fiscal groundwork and are less tolerant of such risks.
In order to develop formal mechanisms to diversify aggregate disaster risks at national and regional levels, he suggests the need to elaborate on multi-country risk pooling schemes, i.e., regional funds, to cover sovereign disaster risk. Against natural disasters, index insurance at the regional level, such as the Caribbean
Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) and the Pacific Catastrophe Risk
Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI) can function effectively to support the disaster-affected country with immediate liquidity in the aftermath of a catastrophic disaster. He also discusses the roles of microcredit and micro-insurance schemes in enhancing the disaster-resilience of individual households and firms.
In the case of economic disasters, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) has been and will continue playing an important role. Further development of Asian bond markets will also be indispensable, because bond markets are composed of a large number of individual bond holders, enabling idiosyncratic risks to be diversified away effectively, and it is generally considered that bond markets provide effective risk-sharing mechanisms. To further improve national and regional risk management capabilities, a global system of pooling the risks of the four types of
8 disasters would be effective for both developing and advanced nations to diversify the risks of disasters.
Noy in Chapter 2 discusses operational aspects in facilitating national and regional risk management capacities. He first presents a typology of disaster impacts that distinguishes between direct and indirect damage. He discusses indirect costs in the aggregate by examining variables such as GDP, fiscal accounts, consumption, investment, and the balances of trade and payments, and distinguishes between the short- and long- run.
The chapter concludes by identifying necessary future policy changes, in particular the construction of better and more robust early-warning systems, and suggests that the best way to incentivize disaster risk reduction (DRR) policy is through a dedicated fund- a Global Fund for DRR- that will support this work. Noy proposes that countries should be constantly evaluated for their DRR plans, and given ‘Seals of Approval.’ The evaluation process would allow a ‘grading’ of DRR policy and the allocation of the contingent ‘seal of approval’ for these policies. The positive externality from such a fund, with its associated monitoring and evaluation functions, would enable countries who receive this DRR ‘seal of approval’ to more easily insure themselves explicitly (with re-insurers) or implicitly by issuing
Catastrophic Bonds (CAT bonds) and further enable multi-year insurance. All three developments (re-insurance, CAT bonds and multi-year) will be made easier by having a ‘seal of approval’, since that seal will alleviate investors/insurers concerns regarding the moral hazard generated by disaster-contingent financial support.
In Chapter 3, Nakata identifies the issues that would be central in designing a possible regional insurance scheme or mechanism for East Asia. The main focus is on the risk sharing mechanism for catastrophe risks to households in the region and
9 providing a consistent explanation for apparent anomalies concerning the demand for catastrophe insurance within the subjective expected utility framework. The key finding is that the number of observations would inevitably be insufficient to warrant a robust probability estimate for a rare event. The inherent lack of such a robust probability estimate leads to diverse probability beliefs.
Nakata concludes that a desirable insurance scheme is the one such as an index-based insurance scheme which can eliminate any idiosyncratic shock generated by a catastrophe, given the possible moral hazard issues inherent to indemnity insurance. Moreover, since voluntary subscriptions are likely to lead to insufficient levels of insurance, an insurance scheme with subscriptions by local governments, in conjunction with ex post payments/compensation to the affected households, would be more desirable. However, the underwriting costs for index insurance may well not be low, whether the index insurance will be supplied and priced by insurance suppliers or traded on the capital market.
Chantarat et al. explores, in Chapter 4, innovations in index-based risk transfer products (IBRTPs) in depth as means of addressing important insurance market imperfections that have precluded the emergence and sustainability of formal insurance markets in developing countries, where uninsured natural disaster risk remains a leading impediment to economic development. The Chapter provides an analytical framework for, and empirical illustrations of the design of nationwide and scalable IBRTP contracts, to analyze hedging effectiveness and welfare impacts at the micro level, and to explore cost-effective risk-financing options. Thai rice production is used in the analysis, with the goal of extending the methodology and its implications in enhancing the development of national and regional disaster risk management in Asia.
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Using household level data in estimating basis risk and so simulating contracts’ hedging effectiveness, Chantarat, et al. find that the optimal provincial contract, based on basis risk, minimizing the combination of moving dry spell and excessive rain spell indices, could result in up to a 25% reduction in the variations of household income available for consumption. The return to scale in terms of cost effective portfolio pricing can be achieved as part of a nationwide, multi-seasonal coverage insurance program.
The transparency of these weather indices and control measures could in fact further promote the possibility of cost effective risk transfers in the international market. Numerical results on the potential impacts on household welfare, agricultural loan portfolios and government of this nationwide program under various market arrangements show that the purely market driven program was found to result in more than 50% reductions in the probabilities of household consumption collapsing to zero, in means and variations of five-year accumulated debt and annual loan default rates. Properly layering insurable nationwide risk, they further found public financing of tailed risk beyond the 20-30% capped to insurer’s payout rates to result in substantial reduction in market premium rates. These in turn resulted in up to twice the impacts of the purely market-driven program, though with substantially smaller budget exposures for the government, relative to the current government program. There could thus be a strong case for public financing of tailed risk in enhancing development values and the market viability of Thailand’s nationwide index insurance program.
Aldrich in Chapter 5 investigates the new mechanisms through which social capital and networks assist with disaster recovery unlike traditional approaches which have focused primarily on factors external to disaster-affected communities.
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These new mechanisms include the choice between “exit” and “voice” in the sense of
Hirschman (1970); elimination of barriers to collective action; and provisions of informal insurance and mutual aid.
Through examples such as the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and the 2011 compound disaster in
Tohoku, Japan, this Chapter seeks to underscore a potentially efficient and cost effective response to crises.
This chapter has suggested a new paradigm for thinking about disaster recovery and for designing emergency management responses. Moving beyond “bricks and mortar” approaches to recovery, it stresses that the ties between residents may serve as a critical engine during what may be a long and difficult recovery process.
Rather than merely responding to disasters as they occur in the future, visionary decision makers in these and other countries should move to embrace a social-capital based approach to policy making. Bringing residents to the forefront and increasing community involvement in planning will ensure a strong future for these important countries.
2.2. Household Level Welfare Impacts of Disasters
This part starts with Chapter 6 by Sann, et al. on Cambodia, who map the pattern of risks faced by the poor and vulnerable in rural areas of Cambodia, where the consequences of natural disaster are posing an increasing threat to their livelihoods. The damage caused by flood and drought is comparable, although the flood of 2011 was the most extensive of recent disasters. The Chapter presents the linking of social protection interventions to address the entitlement failure of poor and vulnerable people suffering from the negative impacts of flood and drought on
12 welfare captured by household consumption. Since the data analyses in this chapter show that ex post supports from the government or NGOs were ineffective, there is a strong need at the policy level to design social protection interventions to emphasize ex-ante instruments rather than the ex post response to natural disasters, focusing on emergency assistance and relief. Cash transfer programs provide direct assistance in the form of cash to the poor. Ex-ante cash transfer programs can play a crucial role in strengthening poor households’ resilience by encouraging them to invest in business rather than spending on food. Microfinance schemes can also facilitate ex-ante income diversification that can bolster households against widespread natural disasters.
Chapter 7, Trung focuses on Vietnam which is located in one of the five cyclone centers on the planet and therefore is prone to many natural hazards. It is estimated that Vietnam is hit by 4.3 storms and more than 3 floods per year. This Chapter provides an evidence-based welfare assessment of natural disasters, and recommendations to policymakers, to help the country move toward effective disaster risk management. More specifically, the Chapter examines the welfare impact of Typhoon Damrey which hit Vietnam in September 2004 using the propensity score matching method applied to micro-data from the Vietnam
Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) 2006. The Chapter finds that the storms greatly affect household welfare and livelihoods captured by rice production, household income, food expenditure, household expenditure and house repairs over the 12 months: While short-term aftermaths are tremendously high, the impact of natural disasters can also persist, bringing down living standards for some time.
Based on a review of existing studies, the chapter suggests an array of recommendations with the hope that they can make positive contributions to the
13 policy-making process in Vietnam, enabling it to achieve its declared goals. The recommendations focus on measures and approaches relevant for national implementation of effective programs such as the National Target Program to
Respond to Climate Change (NTP-RCC) as well as regional collaboration such as adaptation and mitigation framework for South Asia to cooperate in climate change and food security policies.
In Chapter 8, Poaponsakorn analyzes the causes of Thailand’s 2011 flood, its impact on agriculture and household expenditure and income, and the government’s response. He finds that highest recorded rainfall, including five tropical storms, unregulated land-use patterns, and flood mismanagement are the causes of the major flooding in Thailand in 2011. Using 2009 and 2011 Socio-Economic Survey data, the empirical results show that the flooding caused significant negative welfare impact, reducing total household expenditures by 5.7% to 14%. These findings are consistent with the reported negative national GDP growth of 8.9 % in the fourth quarter of 2011. The study also finds that the 2011 floods had a negative impact on the money and wage incomes of some middle income households in the flooded areas.
The Chapter also finds several weaknesses in the current information for flood management. Despite the huge volume of information on the impact of flooding on output and damage to property, no government agency has paid attention to computerizing the flood data-base and information system and strengthening the capability of their information centers. As precautionary policy measures, important ideas need to be urgently implemented, notably construction of a digital elevation map, investment in satellite images, including updated land-use patterns, and the digitization of village boundaries. Moreover, the capability of statistical
14 agencies and agencies responsible for flood management should be urgently strengthened in the following areas: data collection, data base development, data processing and reporting using IT, and human resource development. Secondly, these agencies should be encouraged to communicate and exchange information and ideas with other data users.
2.3. Disaster Impacts on Production Networks, Urban Management, and Aggregate Regional Economy
Ando in Chapter 9 attempts to shed new light on domestic and international production networks in machinery industries, and examines how economic crises and natural disasters affected the networks, mainly from the viewpoint of Japan’s exports.
The Chapter finds that regardless of whether creating a demand or a supply shock, the economic or natural disasters revealed the stability and robustness of production networks in the machinery sectors. In order to respond to massive shocks, firms try to save costs by preserving existing transaction channels for parts and components.
As a result, exports in machinery parts and components tend to be sustained and are likely to recover rapidly even if they are temporarily disrupted. Even the behavior of firms involved in the production networks and suffering from the floods in
Thailand also confirms the existence of strong ‘continuation’ forces, and the deployment of efforts to keep production networks in being, in consideration of the various transaction cost implications of discontinuing a network.
Since once production networks are moved away from the original locations, it is not easy to get them back. It is also important to deal with various concerns in the business environment, lest private firms utilize the crisis as a trigger for removing production blocks to other countries.
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Chapter 10, Layton examines New Zealand’s history of natural disasters and its vulnerability to various types of disaster. The series of earthquakes that affected
Christchurch, New Zealand’s second largest city, between September 2010 and early
2012 is considered as a case study. The significant effects of the events on the population, labor market, reported crime, urbanization and location of businesses and production of the region are also described.
The case study suggests that New Zealand’s arrangements for natural disasters worked well in most regards, given its comprehensive disaster monitoring and management regime. Lessons were also learnt leading to further improvement of the regime. The case study also highlights the advantage of international co-operation in search and rescue, maintaining security for people and property and victim identification in the response to natural disasters. It also suggests that while high rates and levels of disaster insurance ameliorate the financial impact of disasters, they can complicate the achievement of an effective recovery. This is because insurance funds increase the alternatives available to the affected population and investors, in respect of reinvestment and rebuilding the damaged region. The lag before insurers will accept new risks can also create delays and impede the momentum to recovery.
In Chapter 11, Isono and Kumagai discuss the long term economic impact of natural disasters on the countries concerned by using the IDE/ERIA Geographical
Simulation Model (GSM) constructed jointly by Institute of Developing Economies
(IDE) and Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). Using
IDE/ERIA-GSM and short-run forecasts, the authors estimate the seriousness of the flooding in Thailand in 2011 in relation to long term economic performance. Their simulation results show that the negative long-run impacts of the floods will be
16 moderate, because many companies’ first reaction to the floods was to seek relocation of their production site within Thailand.
They conclude that if the Thai government had not offered good recovery measures, such as facilitation measures to help firms move some production blocks from affected provinces, the flood’s negative impacts would have been larger. The government should provide a good disaster insurance scheme, and develop tangible flood countermeasures. However, stimulating R&D activities and innovation is also indispensable. If Thailand had experienced an interruption in R&D activities, and other countries had gone ahead in 2011, the possible negative impacts compared to the baseline scenario would have been much larger.
2.4. Health Dimensions of Natural Disasters
Satapathy in Chapter 12 provides a qualitative analysis of a broad range of issues in disaster psychosocial support and mental health services in India during the past two decades. The Chapter is limited to analysis of the issues in disasters caused largely by natural hazards. The impact of any disaster on the mental health of the survivors is enormous and affects the post-disaster reconstruction process directly and indirectly. Psychological and mental health services and interventions are very much country and culture specific, although the core recovery objectives and principles may remain similar and constant in all countries. The severity of symptoms is directly related to the magnitude and extent of trauma experienced, and the associated factors either aggravating life conditions or supporting the speedy recovery of the survivors in the aftermath of a disaster.
Evidence-based research in India reveals that to overcome the issues of inadequate mental health professionals, absence of institutional mechanisms for
17 service provision and ambiguous financial provisions for the same, the existence of community-based psychosocial support and mental health services has been successful in past large scale disasters. Such community-based services, therefore, would perhaps remain as a viable, more culturally approved and less stigmatizing option available to the country. Nevertheless, the ASEAN countries are still evolving with their own successful models of post-disaster mental health care service provision. And learning from and adapting good practice prevailing in one country may result in expediting their initiatives in this regard. Regular experience-sharing platforms in this region would enable all the countries to overcome many challenges so as to achieve their objectives.
Chapter 13 by Lai and Tan is on Singapore, which is vulnerable to both natural and man-made disasters alongside its remarkable economic growth. They focus on lessons from Singapore’s experience in fighting the 2003 SARS epidemic and discuss implications for future practice and research in disaster risk management.
Singapore’s experience with SARS strongly suggests that risk mitigating measures can be effective only when a range of partners and stakeholders such as government ministries, non-profit organizations, and grass-roots communities become adequately involved. This is also critical to disaster risk management.
Whether all of these aspects are transferrable elsewhere needs to be assessed in future research. Nonetheless, this unique discipline has certainly helped Singapore come out of public health crises on a regular basis. Singapore’s response to the outbreak of SARS offers valuable insights into the kinds of approaches needed to combat future pandemics, especially in Southeast Asia.
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2.5. Disaster Management in Agricultural Development, Food Security, and Environmental Sustainability
Chan reviews flood risk management in Malaysia in Chapter 14. While
Malaysia lies in a geographically stable region and is relatively free from natural disasters, it is affected by flooding, landslides, haze and other man-made disasters.
Annually, flood disasters account for significant losses, both tangible and intangible.
He finds that disaster management in Malaysia is traditionally almost entirely based on a government-centric top-down approach. The National Security Council (NSC), under the Prime Minister’s Office, is responsible for policies, and the National
Disaster Management and Relief Committee (NDMRC) is responsible for coordinating all relief operations before, during and after a disaster. In terms of floods, the NDMRC would take the form of the National Flood Disaster Relief and
Preparedness Committee (NFDRPC). The NFDRPC is activated via a National
Flood Disaster Management Mechanism (NFDMM). The NFDMM is largely targeted towards handling monsoon flooding. Consequently, this mechanism is less than effective and should be re-modeled into something more pro-active.
At the operational level of flood management, the Drainage and Irrigation
Department (DID) is the responsible agency. However, being an engineering-based organization, the DID’s approach is largely focused on structural measures in controlling floods. It needs to embrace a more holistic approach towards flood management via a multi-disciplinary effort. Non-structural measures are easy to implement, less expensive and community-friendly, and need to be employed more widely. There is also a need for greater stakeholder participation, especially from
NGOs, at all levels in the disaster cycle. Capacity building for NGOs, local communities and disaster victims is also necessary. The disaster management
19 mechanism should also adopt more non-structural measures, bring in state-of-the-art technology and cooperate internationally with other countries for addressing trans-boundary disasters.
In Chapter 15, Lassa examines the impact of disasters and climate hazards on
Indonesian agricultural and food crops. The findings are that natural catastrophes have already caused a great deal of loss. Loss accumulation over the last decade has caused significant leakage of central government funds and reduced agricultural production. The average rate of losses during 2003-2008 was 1%. Average area expansion was 2% per annum during the same period. This suggests that expansion is always held back by losses, by as much as 1%. Therefore, hazard mitigation and adaptation strategies are needed for all agricultural crops.
Flood management and water management in agricultural fields should be continuously integrated and sustained. In addition, it has become clear that earthquakes and tsunami mitigation in the agricultural infrastructure should also be considered. Global discourse concerning risk management for future drought, within the context of agricultural adaptation to climatic change, suggests needs for developing drought resistance seeds. Agricultural catastrophe insurance has been barely recognized in Indonesia. Most of the losses are therefore largely uninsured, suggesting the importance of new risk transfer mechanisms such as crop insurance programs. The challenge is to find ways of making such a policy a reality in the future in both the local and the national context.
In Chapter 16, Israel and Briones analyze the impacts of natural disasters
(particularly typhoons, floods and droughts) on agriculture, food security and natural resources and the environment in the Philippines. In general, they found that: a) typhoons, floods and droughts have an insignificant impact on overall agricultural
20 production at the national level, yet typhoons may have a significant negative impact on paddy rice production at the provincial level; b) typhoons such as Ondoy and
Pepeng in 2009 have a significant negative impact on the food security of households in the affected areas; c) households have varying consumption and non-consumption strategies to cope with the impacts of typhoons; and d) the different impacts of typhoons, floods and droughts on the natural resources and environment have not been quantitatively assessed in detail, although available evidence suggests that these are also substantial.
Based on their results and findings, they recommend the following. First, since typhoons may have significant negative impacts on rice production at the local level as opposed to the national level, assistance for rice farmers and the agriculture sector as a whole should be made more site-specific, zeroing in on the affected areas that actually need it. Second, those assisting affected households and areas in overcoming the resulting ill-effects of natural disasters should consider not only consumption strategies, such as the provision of emergency food aid, but also non-consumption strategies, such as the provision of post-disaster emergency employment. Third, while the available evidence suggests that the natural resources and environment sector is significantly affected by natural disasters, it is currently of less concern, as attention is presently focused on agriculture. It may now be high time to provide concrete assistance to this sector, in particular the provision of defensive investments and rehabilitation expenditures to cope with natural disasters.
Wei, et al. focus on disaster risk management in China in Chapter 17. Due to its complicated climatic and geographic conditions and distinct spatial-temporal variations, China is one of the countries which are severely hit by various kinds of natural disasters with high frequency and wide distribution. The Chapter analyzes
21 the impacts of natural disasters on livelihood security of people, agriculture safety, and economic security in the past 30 years. They find a high vulnerability in
China’s economic system to natural disasters. Moreover, climate change will further exacerbate the vulnerability of the social-economic development system to natural disasters.
They conclude that in order to deal effectively with the high risk of natural disasters and build a low disaster risk society, there is an urgent need to implement a comprehensive strategy of disaster reduction for sustainable development. They advocate an integrated disaster risk management approach throughout the whole process of natural disaster management. China faces increasingly complex natural situations for disaster management but has insufficient experience both for creating appropriate institutions and for capacity building. Accordingly, capacity-building for comprehensive disaster prevention and reduction will have to be strengthened, and sustainable development coexisting with disaster risks need be realized, so as to reduce the vulnerability of the socio-economic development system to natural disasters.
3. Policy Implications
There is a set of important policy implications derived from papers presented in this volume. First, informal social safety net mechanisms based on community or local enforcement mechanisms should be strengthened and complemented through market and state involvement. In particular, microcredit and insurance programs should be promoted by government to facilitate consumption smoothing and
22 livelihood sustainability among those affected by natural disasters.
Second, it is imperative to develop formal mechanisms to diversify aggregate disaster risks at national and regional levels. There may need to be increased multi-country risk pooling schemes, for example regional funds, to cover sovereign disaster risk. Against natural disasters, regional level index insurance schemes can be designed through public-private partnership (PPP) such as index type risk-transfer mechanisms sold by private insurer with extreme losses underwritten by contingent loan schemes of international financial institutions and aid donor agencies to complement the lack of re-insurance coverage. Third, to further improve national and regional risk management capabilities, a global system of pooling the risks of the different types of disasters, such as natural and technological disasters, economic crisis, and conflicts, would be effective for both developing and advanced nations wishing to diversify the risks of disasters. It is also worth pursuing reforms that undertake comprehensive preparations against the risks of a variety of disasters in
Asia.
Fourth, complementarities among the market, the state, and the community will be the key. The market is a resource allocation mechanism using price signals, the state is the mechanism based on legal enforcement, and the community is a mechanism based on social norms. Overall safety nets against natural disasters should be provided by an optimal mix of these resource allocation mechanisms.
For example, market-based microinsurance programs could be supported by community and state enforcement mechanisms, and regional disaster funds could utilize insurance market transactions. Overall, however, intra-regional state cooperation is indispensable for East Asia.
Finally, investments in physical infrastructure are indispensable as an ex ante
23 risk management policy in strengthening resilience of individuals, households, communities, and a country. These investments include dams for flood control, seawalls and tsunami barriers, cyclone shelters, a barrier to control soil erosion, irrigation systems for droughts, earthquake-resilient houses and buildings, and disaster early-warning systems. Experiences of developed nations in the region such as Japan tell that investments in infrastructure dramatically reduced human and physical losses due to natural disasters. Multilateral and bilateral development partners can play an important role in filling the investment gap in these disaster-mitigation infrastructures in developing Asian countries.
References
Cabinet Office (2011), Monthly Economic Report (in Japanese, Getsurei Keizai Houkoku), Cabinet Office, the Government of Japan, March 2011. Hayami, Y. (2009), ‘Social Capital, Human Capital, and Community Mechanism: Toward a Consensus among Economists’, Journal of Development Studies 45(1), pp.96–123.
Hirschman, A. (1970), Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ichimura, H., Y. Sawada, and S. Shimizutani (2006), ‘Risk Sharing against an Earthquake: The Case of Yamakoshi Village’, mimeo, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. Kahn, M. E. (2005), ‘The Death Toll from Natural Disasters: The Role of Income, Geography, and Institutions’, Review of Economics and Statistics 87(2), pp.271-284.
Munich Re (2012), Review of Natural Catastrophes in 2011: Earthquakes Result in Record Loss Year. Press release, 4 January 2012, Available at: http://www.munichre.com/en/media_relations/press_releases/2012/2012_01_ 04_press_ release.aspx
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Sawada, Y. and S. Shimizutani (2008),‘How Do People Cope with Natural Disasters? Evidence from the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake in 1995’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 40(2–3), pp.463-488.
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2010), World Disasters Report: Focus on Urban Risk. Lyon: IFRC.
World Bank (2012), Knowledge Note 6-2 Cluster 6: The Economics of Disaster Risk, Risk Management, and Risk Financing, Earthquake Risk Insurance. Washington, D. C.: GFDRR and The World Bank. Available at: http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/drm_ kn6-2.pdf
World Bank and United Nations (2010), Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters. Washington, D. C.: World Bank. Yang, D. (2008), ‘Coping with Disaster: The Impact of Hurricanes on International Financial Flows, 1970-2002’, B. E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 8(1) (Advances), Article 13.
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CHAPTER 1
Approaches towards Effective Disaster Risk-coping Strategies and Regional Cooperation on Disaster Management
YASUYUKI SAWADA Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
1. Introduction
Natural disasters, whether they occur in advanced or developing nations, can destroy people's livelihoods. Extreme natural and man-made events have recently hit both developed and developing countries. Witness the ongoing effects of the devastating earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear radiation crisis in the Tohoku region of Japan, that has killed tens of thousands of people and resulted in damage of around US$200 to 300 billion (Cabinet Office, 2011). Hundreds of thousands of lives were also lost in the Indian Ocean tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, and earthquakes in central Chile, Haiti, the Sichuan province of China, northern Pakistan, and the Hanshin area of Japan. Disasters are created not only by nature but also by humans. The tsunami disaster in Tohoku was accompanied by a serious technological disaster involving a nuclear power plant's leaking radioactive matter. Around the world, economies are still being suffering from the global financial crisis triggered by the 2008 Lehman Shock. Nations in Africa are still at war and involved in smaller conflicts, and terrorist attacks, and the threat of terrorist attacks are having serious impact even on advanced nations. Natural and man-made disasters show distinct rising trends across the globe: Natural and technological disasters have been increasing more rapidly in frequency, in terms of the average occurrence of disaster per country per year, than financial crises and violence-related disasters (Cavallo & Noy, 2009; Kellenberg & Mobarak, 2011; Strömberg, 2007).
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As we continue our ceaseless efforts to recover from different disasters around the world, we are rediscovering the importance of advance preparations, such as drawing up emergency plans, disseminating and teaching emergency knowledge, conducting evacuation drills, constructing early warning systems, and investing in infrastructure. Moreover, we began to realize the importance of risk finance schemes such as individual- and national-level parametric insurance arrangements as an indispensable part of ex ante interventions. How should we protect ourselves and the people of the entire world from catastrophe? In this Chapter, we will summarize different approaches towards effective disaster risk-coping strategies, and regional cooperation on disaster management. This Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set conceptual framework of disaster risk management and coping mechanisms/strategies. Section 3 discusses innovative frameworks such as microcredit, microinsurance, and regional insurance pooling scheme to strengthen ex ante risk management capacities. In Section 4, we summarize policy implications to enhance effective insurance capacities by encompassing schemes against a variety of natural and man-made disasters.
2. Conceptual Framework
2.1. Household-level Strategies
In response to the wide variety of shocks caused by natural and manmade disasters, households have developed and employ formal and informal insurance mechanisms. We classify such uses of insurance mechanisms into ex ante risk management and ex post risk-coping behaviors. First, household risk management strategies are defined as activities for mitigating risk and reducing income instability before the resolution of uncertainties. These strategies might include investments in earthquake-proof housing, an insurance contract subscription, and access to an early-warning system. It has been known that these ex ante management strategies are cost-effective instruments to mitigate losses due to disasters (World Bank and United Nations, 2010). This is driven mainly by the significance of the welfare costs of disaster risks. Using the framework of the Arrow-Pratt risk premium, we can capture the negative welfare costs of risks by
28 calculating how much money households would be willing to pay to completely eliminate income variability. Mathematically, such an amount of money is represented by m which satisfies the following relationship: uy m E[u(~y)] , where u(·) is a well-behaved utility function, ~y is a stochastic income, y is its mean value, and the variable m represents a standard risk premium. Taking a first-order Taylor expansion of the left-hand-side around m=0 and a second-order Taylor expansion of the right-hand-side around the mean income gives:
2 m 1 u"( y)y Var(~y) , y 2 u' ( y) y Coefficient of RRA Coefficient of Variation
This indicates that, approximately, the fraction of average income that a household would be willing to give up can be calculated as half of the coefficient of relative risk aversion multiplied by the square of the coefficient of variation of income. Sawada (2007) shows the estimated welfare costs of risks in India and Pakistan. These results indicate that the welfare cost of risks is at least 10% and can be 30-50% of household income. Since natural and manmade disasters can generate larger income volatilities than these income fluctuations, the welfare costs estimated here may be regarded as lower-bound estimates of the negative welfare impacts of natural or manmade disasters. These figures indicate the importance of ex ante risk management mechanisms and strategies in reducing the welfare costs of disasters. However, it is often difficult by nature to elaborate such mechanisms and strategies because the disasters are typically characterized by rare events, and sometimes even worse, they are unforeseen. Also, disaster risks may be correlated in nature, which could not be diversified away within a region or country. Thus, the aggregated macro welfare cost can be non-negligible. Indeed, Barro (2009) found that macro welfare loss due to disasters can be as large as 20% of welfare. The significance of potential risk management implies two important issues. First, it is indispensable for government to strengthen national and regional level market and non-market insurance mechanisms against natural disasters. Second,
29 risk-coping strategies become important because even if households, communities, and governments adopted a variety of risk management strategies, a disaster can happen unexpectedly, causing serious negative impacts on household welfare. Accordingly, against these unexpected natural disasters, it is indispensable for people to adopt ex post risk-coping strategies which are defined as ex post strategies to reduce consumption fluctuations and to maintain desirable levels of livelihood. In general, the existing literature identifies the following different mechanisms for coping with risk. First, households can employ different market mechanisms, such as credit markets, to reallocate future resources to today’s consumption, insurance market transactions to eliminate losses resulting from disasters, and ex post labor market participation to utilize market returns to human capital. Second, people can adopt self-insurance mechanisms such as consumption reallocation by cutting back luxury expenses while maintaining total calorie intakes and dis-saving financial and physical assets, i.e., utilization of precautionary saving. Finally, households can adopt non-market insurance mechanisms such as public transfers from the government, and informal private aids from networks based on extended family, relatives, and communities. Against unexpected natural disasters, ex post risk-coping is indispensable
2.2. The Market, State, and Community Triangle in Disaster Management and Coping The general risk management and coping strategies mentioned above imply the divided roles of market, state, and community as elaborated by Hayami (2009). As is shown in Figure 1, the economic system is composed of three domains, i.e., market, state, and community, interacting with each other.
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Figure 1: The Community, the Market, and the State in the Economic System: A Framework by Hayami (2009)
Market State
Competition Coercion
Private goods Global public goods
Community
Cooperation
Local public goods
Source: Hayami (2009)
According to Hayami (2009), the market is the mechanism that coordinates profit-seeking individuals and firms through competition using price signals. Naturally, the market has an advantage in matching the demand for and supply of private tradable goods. The state is the mechanism that forces people to adjust their resource allocations by command of the government. Typically, the state plays an important role in supplying global or pure public goods. In contrast, the community is the mechanism that guides community members to voluntary cooperation based on intensive social interactions, facilitating supply of the local public goods such as the provision of reciprocal social safety nets, the conservation of commons, and the enforcement of informal transactions. To address the roles of the market, the state, and the community in facilitating disaster management and coping, it will be useful to classify two different types of risks by the level at which they occur, i.e., idiosyncratic and aggregate risks. Idiosyncratic risks affect specific individuals and/or firms while aggregate shocks affect groups of households, an entire community and region, or a country as a whole. This distinction is important because the geographic level at which risks arise determines the effectiveness of market and non-market institutions in dealing with risk. On the one hand, a risk that affects a specific individual can be traded with other
31 people in the same insurance network through informal mutual insurance and a well-functioning formal insurance or credit market. In the last two decades, micro-development economists have shown that households have, to some extent, developed formal and informal risk-coping mechanisms against a wide variety of idiosyncratic risks (Townsend, 1994). The community-based mutual insurance mechanism can be effective, provided that all the members contribute due informal insurance premiums, according to the principle of reciprocity dictated by customs and norms (Hayami, 2009). The community can enforce the collection of due contributions from community members by means of the reputation/opprobrium/ostracism mechanisms. In short, the community can play an important role in weathering losses caused by natural disasters, if such losses are largely idiosyncratic. Yet, according to the NatCatService data of one of the largest reinsurance companies, Munich Re, the proportion of insured losses of overall losses caused by disasters in the world is quite limited, around 20% on average.1 Currently, formal insurance mechanisms combating natural disasters are quite limited. Indeed, studies based on micro-data show the overall ineffectiveness of formal and informal insurance mechanisms in dealing with natural disasters (Kohara, et al., 2006, Sawada & Shimizutani, 2007 & 2008). On the other hand, a risk that affects an entire region cannot be insured within the region and thus community mechanisms can only function imperfectly. Natural, technological, and manmade disasters are likely to fall into this category of aggregate or covariate risks. As we have seen, efficient risk sharing mechanisms are likely to be absent, especially for a natural disaster as a rare, covariate event. In fact, the extent to which a risk is idiosyncratic or correlated depends considerably on the underlying causes. These risks should be covered by well-designed formal market or similar arrangements backed by the public enforcement mechanisms in which region-specific risks are diversified away across regions. If these mechanisms cannot work properly or are difficult to set, households are forced to insure themselves against shocks by using self-insurance measures. For example, by analyzing a 1998 survey of areas
1 In the formal insurance market, the insurers need international reinsurance markets to pool disaster risks. Yet, it is known that reinsurance markets and trades of catastrophe (CAT) bonds are still thin.
32 affected by Hurricane Mitch, Morduch (2004) found that for 21% of households, the main response to the hurricane was not to use savings, nor to borrow money; the main response was a drastic reduction in consumption. This suggests that these households are constrained from borrowing against shocks. By investigating how victims of the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) earthquake in 1995 coped with their unexpected losses, Sawada and Shimizutani (2005) found that households without borrowing constraints can borrow and/or dissave to respond to damages caused by the earthquake, while those under a constraint are unable to cope with housing losses effectively.
3. Towards Effective Disaster Risk-coping and Regional Cooperation on Disaster Management
To facilitate more effective disaster management by strengthening complementarities among the market functioning under the price signals, the state enforcement mechanisms, and the community informal insurance mechanisms, we can learn insights from previous empirical studies. According to Kahn (2005), natural disasters occur in advanced and developing nations alike, but when a nation is democratized and has better governance, the number of casualties is drastically reduced owing to disaster risk information that is communicated and shared, early warning systems that are developed, and infrastructure and other risk management mechanisms that are well developed to prevent or mitigate the impact of disasters. Since the insurance market for natural disasters is far from complete, the government plays an important role in disaster management and rehabilitation. For example, a report by the World Bank and the United Nations (2010) describes how Bangladesh, where frequent cyclones have affected several hundred thousand people, has significantly reduced the number of casualties by investing in emergency infrastructure such as improving its early warning system, which operates via radio, and building numerous cyclone shelters. Having noticed this, Yang (2008) used data on the storms around the world of the past 30-plus years to show that the economic damage has been enormous. This tells us that, to prepare ourselves for natural disasters, we should balance emergency information
33 systems and infrastructure that prevent damage to people with market-based insurance systems that prevent economic damage. In a study of the Chuetsu Earthquake, Ichimura, et al. (2006) found that earthquake insurance and public transfers had functioned quite well.
Innovative Ideas There are a few emerging, innovative ideas which strengthen the complementarities among the market, the state and the community in the context of disaster management and coping. Here, we discuss microcredit and microinsurance.
Microcredit While it has been rather long known that the remarkable performance of microcredit programs is based on community enforcement mechanisms, multiple roles of microcredit have been identified in the recent literature. Poor households are not just struggling entrepreneurs using microcredit programs for business facilitation. They are complicated households seeking to manage expenses (consumption credit), cope with emergencies (disaster protection), and seize opportunities. Potentially, microcredit programs can play a role in disaster insurance: For example, most micro-finance institutions in Bangladesh introduced a flexible repayment system in 2002, which permits members to reschedule installments during disasters. Also, a Bangladesh microfinance institution, BURO Tangail, initiated a special loan program called “disaster loan” for disaster affected clients in the wake of the disastrous floods of 1998 (Wright & Hossain, 2001). Such a loan program can function effectively as an ex post risk-coping instrument for disaster-affected individuals in poor regions.
Microinsurance Another innovative idea is to use a new microinsurance program called “index insurance” or “parametric insurance contracts” which are written against specific aggregate events such as drought or flood defined and recorded at a regional level (Hazell, 2003; Morduch, 2004; Skees, et al., 2004). This type of insurance pays out on storms that exceed a pre-designated speed, rainfall that falls short of a threshold level, and earthquakes that exceed a certain seismic intensity. It is an excellent system that
34 alleviates the time and costs required by conventional indemnity-based insurance systems to assess damage. As such, index insurance involves a number of positive aspects; they can cover the aggregate correlated events; they are affordable and accessible even to the poor; they are easy to implement and privately managed; and they are free from the moral hazard, adverse selection, and high transaction costs that have plagued traditional agricultural insurance contracts such as crop insurance schemes. The World Bank and other institutions have been piloting weather-based index insurance contracts in Morocco, Mongolia, Peru, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Nicaragua, Romania, and Tunisia. Since natural disasters are typically aggregate events, index insurance is thought to be an appropriate instrument to combat them. Yet, there are three major constraints to designing index-type insurance against natural disasters. First, natural disasters are often characterized by a rare event which makes it difficult to design actuarially fair insurance. Since obtaining historical data on the pattern of natural disasters is hard, it is almost impossible to set appropriate premiums for insurance. Secondly, and related to the first issue, even if appropriate premiums are set, the poor who potentially should demand insurance against natural disasters may find it difficult to recognize the value of index-type insurance against natural disasters. This may be inevitable, because natural disasters are often characterized by unforeseen contingencies by their very nature, and because the poor seem often to be myopic, with high time-discount rates. Indeed, human beings do tend to ignore rare bad events (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989). Moreover, the existence of the “basis risk” with which an individual could incur damage but cannot be compensated sufficiently, will also deter demand for index insurance. This problem has been identified as an inevitable drawback of index insurance because index contracts essentially tradeoff basis risk for transaction costs (Morduch, 2004; Hazell, 2003). Nakata, et al. (2010) utilize a unique survey dataset collected jointly by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) of Japan and the Center for Agricultural Policy in Vietnam (CAP), which they call the RIETI-CAP survey. The dataset is a resurvey of subsamples of the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) 2006 households. They employ hypothetical questions on avian influenza
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(AI), flood (FL), and drought index insurance in Vietnam. According to their analysis of this unique data set, a past experience dramatically increases the probability assessment of the event (10 and 100 times for AI and FL) and willingness to pay (WTP) for the insurance (30% and 50% for AI and FL). A first loss experience tends to have a large impact on the subjective loss probability, and consequently on the willingness to pay for insurance, especially for flooding insurance (both index and indemnity-based insurance). This indicates that it would be less likely for a household with no past loss experience to purchase flooding insurance, even if the insurance premium is actuarially fair in accordance with the loss probability model of the insurance supplier. They also found that people may not behave in accord with the subjective expected utility framework as far as AI insurance is concerned. In other words, it is not clear that the subjective loss probability drives the behavior of the people concerning AI insurance. This is not very surprising, since AI involves mutations of viruses, and so there are possible unforeseen contingencies. This makes it harder to agree on the terms and conditions of insurance.
Index Insurance as a Mitigation Device in Human-Made Disasters Miguel, et al., (2004) use data from 41 countries in Africa from 1981to 1999 to find a robust causality between drought, a type of natural disaster, and conflict, a type of human-made disaster. This signifies that preventative action taken against natural disasters could also prevent conflicts. Today, we are capable of issuing early warnings of drought risk based on rainfall measurements and vegetation indices obtained from satellite images. Accordingly, Miguel (2009) proposes a new type of foreign aid-Rapid Conflict Prevention Support (RCPS), which would reduce the risk of conflicts by using this information to estimate droughts and natural disasters, and by transferring aid immediately. Foreign aid provisions would be targeted to drought or other disaster vulnerable countries beforehand. Indeed, Botswana, Africa’s economic superstar for the past 40 years, has been implementing a Drought Relief Program (DRP). It can safely be said that the drought insurance played an important role in its success (Miguel, 2009).
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Regional Index Insurance Index insurance or parametric insurance can be designed for disaster risk pooling at regional level. One example is the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), which is a parametric, multinational hazard insurance fund for hurricanes and earthquakes that works with the international reinsurance market and was established as the first of its kind in the world. Haiti was a member of the Facility, and after the Haiti Earthquake in January 2010, the government received $7.75 m in earthquake insurance - around twenty times its premium - as soon as two weeks after the quake. While the amount is not necessarily significant, the Haiti government received insurance payouts very quickly, indicating the importance of preparing a new insurance system such as CCRIF. Another example is the Pacific Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance Program which builds on the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI) through a joint initiative between the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC/SOPAC) founded in 2007, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, with financial support from the Government of Japan and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). PCRAFI aims to enhance the disaster risk management and to reduce the financial vulnerability of the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) against natural disasters. It will do this by improving their financial response capacities while protecting their long term fiscal balances. The PDRFI Program provides the PICs with tailor-made advisory services for disaster risk modeling and assessment tools, financial instruments for national disaster risk financing and insurance strategies, and catastrophe risk insurance market development. 2 There are three project components. The first component is institutional capacity-building for disaster risk financing through setting national disaster risk financing strategies, and technical assistance to design and implement their integrated financial strategy against natural disasters. The second component is Pacific
2 Countries receiving technical assistance in disaster risk financing and insurance through the PDRFI Program include Papua New Guinea (PNG), Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Samoa, the Federal States of Micronesia (FSM), Tonga, Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshal Islands, Palau, the Cook Islands, Tuvalu, Nauru, Niue and Timor-Leste. The Pacific catastrophe risk insurance pilot was launched in November 2012 with Vanuatu, Tonga, the Marshall Islands, the Solomon Islands, and Samoa.
37 disaster risk insurance market development, aiming to offer technical assistance to improve disaster risk insurance solutions in the Pacific. The final component is the Pacific Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance (PDRFI) Pilot Program which is piloting natural disaster derivatives aimed at serving as support measures for disaster prevention and disaster mitigation through a Public-Private Partnership (PPP). The Pacific Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance Program is the first of a series of applications of PCRAFI to be developed in disaster risk management and urban/infrastructure planning. As part of Japan’s international cooperation in disaster prevention, the Japanese government announced it would “establish an insurance system as natural disaster support in Pacific island countries” at the 6th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) held in May 2012. Accordingly, this program was established in collaboration with Pacific island countries (governments), the World Bank and private-sector insurance companies. Let us also touch upon preparations for economic crises. The Group of Twenty nations/regions (G20) and other meetings are discussing the installation of an early warning system that predicts and helps to counter the currency and financial crises that have occurred frequently since 1990. But as Rose & Spiegel (2011) points out, current research has not yet developed a sufficiently reliable early warning system. Preparations for economic crises, however, have been enhanced. In 2009, for example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) established a new prevention facility against economic crises. In the East Asia region, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), a bilateral currency swap agreement to be implemented in times of a currency crisis, expanded to a multilateral framework (CMIM) in 2010.
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4. Policy Implications
Advanced nations can deal with a major disaster by managing their own domestic financial resources. But developing nations, which carry diverse risks of major disasters, have weak fiscal groundwork and are less tolerant of such risks. Different disasters tend to come in combination, as was the case with the Great East Japan Earthquake and conflicts in Africa. First, it is imperative to develop formal mechanisms to diversify aggregate disaster risks at national and regional levels (Table 1). We may need to elaborate on multi-country risk pooling schemes, i.e., regional funds, to cover sovereign disaster risk. Against natural disasters, regional level index insurance such as CCRIF and PDRFI can function effectively to support the disaster affected country with immediate liquidity in the aftermath of a catastrophic disaster, by using the insurance mechanism. Microcredit and microinsurance schemes can also enhance the disaster resilience of individual households and firms. While the regional index insurance schemes are based on PPP, the microcredit and insurance programs are supported by informal community enforcement mechanisms. Hence, complementarities among the market, the state, and the community will be the keys to success. In the case of economic disasters, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) has been and will be playing an important role. CMI is a bilateral or multilateral currency swap arrangement pooling foreign exchange reserves, and was designed as an ex post coping mechanism against a financial crisis. Further development of Asian bond markets will also be indispensable because bond markets are composed of a large number of individual bond holders, and idiosyncratic risks can therefore be diversified away effectively. It is generally considered that bond markets form effective risk-sharing mechanisms. In order to diversify the shocks caused by disasters, developed bond markets can potentially play important roles. To further improve national and regional risk management capabilities, a global system of pooling the risks of the four types of disasters would be effective for both developing and advanced nations needing to diversify the risks of disasters. In other words, we should also work on the securities and reinsurance markets to develop a
39 global disaster insurance system that would encompass various regional frameworks such as CCRIF, PCRAFI, and CMIM beyond existing disaster types. When we consider the actual form of such a system, there are numerous issues involved, such as whether it would be an institutionalized system like a disaster fund, or something more flexible such as a coordination forum. Yet the Asian region has experienced diverse forms of disasters, including floods, typhoons, earthquakes, epidemics, and the financial crises of the late '90s. It is worth pursuing reforms that undertake comprehensive preparations against the risks of a variety of disasters in Asia.
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Table 1: Towards Effective Disaster Risk-coping Strategies and Regional Cooperation: A Summary
Wars and Disaster type: Natural Technological Economic Conflicts
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
Overall effectiveness of market and non-market insurance mechanisms
↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Credit and labor market, and Drought Consumption reallocation, Ex post risk-coping: ? transfers insurance labor, and transfers
↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Policy instruments I: (for Early warning Microcredit/microinsurance ? Early warning system each disaster) system
| | | |
Policy instruments II: Global/regional pooling facility?
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References
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Elgar Publishers, Inc. Kunreuther, H., R.Ginsberg, L. Miller, P. Sagi, P. Solvic, B. Borkan, and N. Katz (1978), Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons. New York: Wiley. Miguel, E. (2009), Africa's Turn?, Cambridge: MIT Press. Miguel, E., S. Satyanath and E. Sergenti (2004), ‘Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach’, Journal of Political Economy, 112,(4), pp.725-753. Morduch, J. (2004), ‘Micro-Insurance: The Next Revolution?’, in Banerjee, A., R. Benabou, and D. Mookherjee (eds.), What Have We Learned About Poverty?, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nakata, H., Y. Sawada and M. Tanaka (2010), ‘Entropy Characterisation of Insurance Demand: Theory and Evidence’, RIETI Discussion Paper 10-E-009. Rose, A. K. and M. M. Spiegel (2011), ‘Cross-Country Causes and Consequences of the Crisis: An Update’, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper Series 2011-02, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Sawada, Y. (2007), ‘The Impact of Natural and Manmade Disasters on Household Welfare’, Agricultural Economics 37(s1), pp.59-73. Sawada, Y. and S. Shimizutani (2005), ‘Are People Insured against Natural Disasters? Evidence from the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake in 1995’, CIRJE DP F-314, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. Sawada, Y. and S. Shimizutani (2007), ‘Consumption Insurance against Natural Disasters: Evidence from the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake’, Applied Economics Letters 14(4), pp.303–306. Sawada, Y. and S. Shimizutani (2008), ‘How Do People Cope with Natural Disasters? Evidence from the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake in 1995’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 40(2–3), pp.463–488. Sawada, Y., J. P. Estudillo, N. Fuwa, and K. Kajisa (2009), ‘How Do People Cope with A Natural Disaster? The Case of Super Typoon Milenyo in the Philippines’, in. Cabanilla, L. S and G. P. Carnaje, (eds.), Development, Natural Resources & the Environment, Department of Economics, the College of Economics and Management, University of the Philippines Los Banos (CEM, UPLB). Sawada, Y., K. Nawata, M. Ii, and J.-J. Lee (2007), ‘Did the Credit Crunch in Japan Affect Household Welfare? An Augmented Euler Equation Approach Using Type 5 Tobit Model’, CIRJE Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-498, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, (forthcoming) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. Skees, J., P. Varangis, D. F. Larson and P. Siegel (2004), ‘Can Financial Markets be Tapped to Help Poor People Cope with Weather Risks?’ in S. Dercon (ed.),
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Insurance against Poverty, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Skidmore, M., and H. Toya, (2002), ‘Do Natural Disasters Promote Long-Run Growth?’, Economic Inquiry 40(4), pp.664–687. Strömberg, D. (2007), ‘Natural Disasters, Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(3), pp.199–222. Takasaki, Y., B. L. Barham, and O. T. Coomes, (2004), ‘Risk-coping Strategies in Tropical Forests: Floods, Illnesses, and Resource Extraction’, Environment and Development Economics 9(2), pp.203-224. Townsend, R. M. (1994), ‘Risk and Insurance in Village India’, Econometrica 62(3), pp.539-591. World Bank and United Nations (2010), Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Wright, G. A. N. and M. Hossain (2001), ‘BURO, Tangail’s Approach to Product Development: A Case Study’, mimeographed, MicroSave Nairobi, Kenya. Yang, D. (2008), ‘Coping with Disaster: The Impact of Hurricanes on International Financial Flows, 1970-2002’, B. E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 8(1) (Advances), Article 13.
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CHAPTER 2
Natural Disaster and Economic Policy for ASEAN and the Pacific Rim: A Proposal for a Disaster Risk Reduction ‘Seal of Approval’ Fund
ILAN NOY University of Hawaii
Many of the most destructive natural disasters of the past few decades occurred in ASEAN or other Pacific Rim countries. Even without these catastrophic infrequent events, some ASEAN members are buffeted by repeated and very frequent natural disasters; and many are very vulnerable to future disasters associated with the changing climate. Understanding the impact of disasters on development, on the spatial evolution of income, and the risks that the region faces in terms of future events and their likely consequences all seem to be important components of an understanding of the region’s economy. The chapter employs a typology of disaster impacts that distinguishes between direct and indirect damages; with the indirect costs accounted for in the aggregate by examining variables such as GDP, the fiscal accounts, consumption, investment, and the balance of trade and the balance of payments. These costs can also be further divided between the short- and long- run. These distinctions are used in the discussion that analyzes vulnerabilities in the ASEAN region. The chapter concludes by identifying needed future policy changes, in particular the construction of better and more robust early-warning systems, and suggests that the best way to incentivize disaster risk reduction (DRR) policy is through a dedicated fund, a Global Fund for DRR, that will support this work.
Keywords: ASEAN, Pacific Rim, natural disasters, indirect impacts, global fund.
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1. Disasters in South-East Asia
Many of the most destructive natural disasters of the past few decades occurred in Pacific Rim countries. During the past century for example, the most lethal earthquake (Tangshan, China, 1976), the most lethal tsunami (Aceh, Indonesia, 2004), and some of the most lethal storms and floods have all occurred in Asia bordering the Pacific.1 Other catastrophic natural disasters like the exceptionally strong earthquake in Chile in 1960 that generated a Pacific-wide tsunami, the most destructive natural disaster in modern history in terms of destroyed property (Tohoku, Japan, 2011), or the Mexico City earthquake of 1985, are all examples of how natural disasters play a significant part in the economies of almost all the Pacific Rim countries. Even without these catastrophic infrequent events, some Pacific Rim countries are buffeted by repeated and very frequent natural disasters (e.g., the Philippines experiences, on average, 5.8 destructive tropical storms annually). The countries of the Pacific Rim, as well as the volcanic islands and coral atolls of the Pacific Ocean itself, are also some of the most vulnerable to future disasters that may be associated with the changing climate and most are within the Ring of Fire - the globally most geologically active region.2 Robert Barro has argued that the infrequent occurrence of economic disasters leads to much larger welfare costs than continuous economic fluctuations of lesser amplitude (Barro, 2006 & 2009). He estimated that for the typical advanced economy, the welfare cost associated with large economic disasters such as those experienced in the twentieth century amounted to about 20 % of annual GDP, while normal business cycle volatility only amounted to a still substantial 1.5 % of GDP. For developing countries, which usually suffer from more frequent natural disasters
1The five most lethal events in Pacific Rim nations (1970-2008) were all initiated by earthquakes: China 1976, Indonesia 2004, China 2008, Peru 1970 and Guatemala 1976. In these five events, 585,000 people died. 2The Ring of Fire is an inverted U-shape region, whose Western tip is New Zealand. The region then encompasses the archipelagos of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japan, the Russian Far East, the Aleutian Islands, Alaska, and then down the Western Coast of the Americas all the way to Tierra Del Fuego at the very southern tip of the continent. This region experiences by far the majority of the volcanic activity and earth movements recorded worldwide.
46 of all types, and of even greater magnitude than in advanced economies, these events have an even greater effect on the welfare of the average citizen. Understanding the history of disasters in the Pacific Rim, their impact on development, on the spatial evolution of income, and the risks that the region faces in terms of future events and their likely consequences all seem to be important components of an understanding of the region’s economy. After all, the disruptions in many multinationals’ supply chains that occurred after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake/tsunami and the 2011 Bangkok floods demonstrated persuasively the potentially global impact of these types of disasters – especially for a region whose countries’ level of trade integration within the global economy is very high. I employ a typology of disaster impacts that distinguishes between direct and indirect damages. Direct damages are the damage to fixed assets and capital (including inventories), damages to raw materials and extractable natural resources, and of course mortality and morbidity that are a direct consequence of the natural phenomenon. Indirect damages refer to the economic activity, in particular the production of goods and services, that will not take place following the disaster and because of it. These indirect damages may be caused by the direct damages to physical infrastructure or harm to labor, or because reconstruction pulls resources away from the usual production practices. These indirect damages also include the additional costs that are incurred because of the need to use alternative and potentially inferior means of production and/or distribution for the provision of normal goods and services (Pelling, et al. 2002). These costs can be accounted for in the aggregate by examining the overall performance of the economy, as measured through the most relevant macroeconomic variables. These are GDP, the fiscal accounts, consumption, investment, and, especially important for the comparatively globalized countries of the Pacific Rim, the balance of trade and the balance of payments. These costs can also be further divided, following the standard distinction in macroeconomics, between the short run (up to several years) and the long run (typically considered to be at least five years, but sometimes also measured in decades). I use these distinctions in the discussion that follows.
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2. Data on Regional Disasters
2.1. The Past The Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the Catholic University of Louvain, is the most frequently used resource for disaster data.3 EM-DAT defines a disaster as an event which overwhelms local capacity and/or necessitates a request for external assistance. For a disaster to be entered into the EM-DAT database, at least one of the following criteria must be met: (1) 10 or more people are reported killed; (2) 100 people are reported affected; (3) a state of emergency is declared; or (4) a call for international assistance is issued. Natural disasters can be hydro- meteorological, including floods, wave surges, storms, droughts, landslides and avalanches; geophysical, including earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions; and biological, covering epidemics and insect infestations (these are much less frequent). The data report the number of people killed, the number of people affected, and the amount of direct damages in each disaster. Since biological events are much more anthropogenic, and the data collected on them are much less reliable; we will not discuss these in what follows. We present disaster data for all the countries of the Pacific Rim, but exclude the small island-nations of the Pacific itself.4 The disaster-types we include are earthquakes, temperature extremes, floods, storms, volcanic events, and wildfires. Natural disasters, as defined in the EM-DAT database, are common events. The five worst disasters (in terms of the three measures of disaster magnitude) are given in Table 1. In the Pacific Rim region, the five disasters with the highest mortality are all earthquakes, with a total of almost 600,000 people killed. In terms of people affected, floods in China dominate the list, although aggregate mortality for these is fairly low (about 10,000 people in total). Hurricane Katrina in the U.S., and the Kobe earthquake in Japan were by far the costliest disasters (in terms of damage to
3 The data is publicly available at: http://www.emdat.be/ 4The following are included: Australia, Canada, Chile, China PR, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Japan, Korea (South), Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Taiwan, United States, and Vietnam.
48 infrastructure) until the March 2011 earthquake/tsunami in Tohoku, which dwarfs both disasters with damages estimated at more than US$200 billion, about twice as much as the amount estimated for Katrina.
Table 1: Worst Disasters in the Pacific Rim 1970-2008
Worst Disasters (# of people killed)
Country (year) Type # Killed # Affected Damages China PR (1976) Earthquake 242000 164000 5600 Indonesia (2004) Earthquake 165708 532898 4451.6 China PR (2008) Earthquake 87476 45976596 30000 Peru (1970) Earthquake 66794 3216240 530 Guatemala (1976) Earthquake 23000 4993000 1000 Worst Disasters (# of people affected) China PR (1998) Flood 3656 238973000 30000 China PR (1991) Flood 1729 210232227 7500 China PR (1996) Flood 2775 154634000 12600 China PR (2003) Flood 430 150146000 7890 China PR (1995) Flood 1437 114470249 6720 Worst Disasters (damages in US$ million) United States (2005) Storm 1833 500000 125000 Japan (1995) Earthquake 5297 541636 100000 China PR (1998) Flood 3656 238973000 30000 China PR (2008 Earthquake 87476 45976596 30000 United States (1994) Earthquake 60 27000 30000 Source: author’s calculations from EMDAT.
Table 2: Vulnerability A - Worst Disasters per country # # of large Country Worst Three Disasters (1970-2008)1 killed2 disasters3 Australia wildfire 1983 Storm 1974 Flood 1984 176 0 Canada Storm 1998 Storm 1987 Storm 1975 68 0 Chile Earthquake 1971 Earthquake 1985 Flood 1993 374 1 China Earthquake 1976 Earthquake 1974 Earthquake 2008 349476 84 Colombia volcano 1985 Earthquake 1970 Earthquake 1999 23416 10 Costa Rica Storm 1988 Storm 1996 Earthquake 1991 126 0
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# # of large Country Worst Three Disasters (1970-2008)1 killed2 disasters3
Ecuador Earthquake 1987 Flood 1983 Flood 1998 5525 3 El Salvador Earthquake 1986 Earthquake 2001 Flood 1982 2444 5 Guatemala Earthquake 1976 Storm 2005 Flood 1982 25133 4 Honduras Storm 1998 Storm 1974 Flood 1993 22974 4 Indonesia Earthquake 2004 Earthquake 2006 Earthquake 1992 173986 20 Japan Earthquake 1995 Flood 1972 Flood 1982 6100 10 Korea Flood 1972 Flood 1998 Storm 1987 1558 9 Malaysia Storm 1996 Earthquake 2004 Flood 1970 411 0 Mexico Earthquake 1985 Flood 1999 Storm 1976 1736 22 N Zealand Storm 1988 Flood 1985 Storm 1997 13 0 Nicaragua Earthquake 1972 Storm 1998 Storm 2007 13520 4 Panama Flood 1970 Earthquake 1991 Storm 1988 108 0 Papua NG Earthquake 1998 Storm 2007 Earthquake 1993 2407 2 Peru Earthquake 1970 Earthquake 2007 Storm 1998 67831 6 Philippines Earthquake 1976 Storm 1991 Earthquake 1990 14368 17 Russia Earthquake 1995 Ex temp 2001 Ex temp 2001 2597 3 Taiwan Earthquake 1999 Storm 2001 Storm 2000 2453 2 U. S. Storm 2005 Ex temp 1980 Ex temp 1995 3763 19 Vietnam Storm 1997 Storm 1985 Storm 1989 5231 20 Note: 1 The worst three disasters in terms of the number of fatalities. 2 Measures the sum of fatalities in the three worst disasters experienced in each country. 3 Measures the number of disaster events for which there were more than 100 fatalities, more than a thousand people affected, and damages of more than a million US$ (this is a significantly higher threshold than the one used by EMDAT – we further did not count disasters for which the number of fatalities was unavailable). Source: author’s calculations from EMDAT.
A list of the three worst disasters for each Pacific Rim country and their aggregate toll (in terms of mortality), is provided in Table 2. It provides some limited insight into the vulnerabilities of each country both in terms of the kinds of disasters that are likely to wreak the most damages and how big these damages are likely to be. Not surprisingly, there are very few Pacific Rim countries for which earthquakes are not part of the most dangerous disaster list: these are Australia, Canada, Honduras, Korea, New Zealand, the U.S. and Vietnam. But, after the 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand can no longer be considered relatively earthquake safe, and most predictions are that a large West Coast quake in the U.S. will also dwarf any impact from other American disasters. Thus, past recent
50 experiences is only of limited use in assessing future vulnerabilities in the face of catastrophic but rare events. The last column in Table 2 measures vulnerability differently, by counting the number of large events in the past 40 years. In this case, we adopt a threshold that is ten times higher than the one used by EM-DAT, since the dataset includes many relatively minor events (from a macroeconomic perspective). Using this measure, Indonesia, China and the Philippines stand out as highly vulnerable. Figure 1, taken from Cavallo & Noy (2011), plots the average number of natural disaster events (hydro-meteorological and geophysical) per country in the period 1970-2008. The figure shows that the incidence of disasters has been growing over time everywhere in the world. In the Asia-Pacific region for example, which is the region with the most events, the incidence has grown from an average of 11 events per country in the 1970s to over 28 events in the 2000s. In other regions, while the increase is less dramatic, the trend is similar. However, these patterns appear to be driven to some extent by improved recording of milder events, rather than by an increase in the frequency of disasters. Furthermore, truly large events—i.e., conceivably more catastrophic—are rarer. At this point, there is no credible evidence that the frequency of catastrophic events is increasing, though that is most clearly a possible prediction given the projected evolution of climatic conditions in the next century.
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Figure 1: Frequency of Disasters by Geographic Region
Source: Cavallo & Noy (2011).
2.2. The Future A recent report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2012), the Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation concludes that there will be a “likely increase heat wave frequency and very likely increase in warm days and nights across Europe….likely increase in average maximum wind speed and associated heavy rainfall (although not in all regions)…. very likely contribution of sea level rise to extreme coastal high water levels (such as storm surges)….” (IPCC, 2012).5 While the report is fairly skeptical about the robustness of many of the predictions available in the scientific literature about catastrophic high-risk low-probability natural disasters, it does argue that “For exposed and vulnerable communities, even non- extreme weather and climate events can have extreme impacts”. In its latest comprehensive report from 2007, the IPCC states that: “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases
5By ‘very likely’ the IPCC refers to 90-100% probability, while ‘likely’ means 66-100% probability (IPCC, 2011).
52 in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level” (IPCC, 2007). The IPCC report projects that by the year 2100, average global surface temperature will increase by between 1.8° Celsius and 4° Celsius depending on the success of emissions mitigation strategies.6 The projected increase in sea surface temperatures will potentially impact both the frequency and intensity of tropical storms. Several studies posit that, as global sea surface temperatures rise, hurricanes may become more numerous or intense, the range of hurricanes will increase to the north and south of the current “hurricane belt”, or their location and typical paths will change (e.g., Webster, et al. 2005; Li, et al. 2010; Mendelsohn, et al. 2012;Elsner, et al. 2008; and Emanuel, et al. 2008). More recent predictions than the 2007 IPCC report regarding global sea level rise are considerably more alarming as more information on glacial melting has become available. Rahmstorf (2007), for example, predicts a sea level rise of 0.5 to 1.4 meters by 2100 while Vermeer & Rahmstorf (2009) predict rises of up to 1.9 meters. These sea level rises, besides posing ongoing difficulties to low-lying areas, will certainly also increase the damages caused by storm wave surges and earthquake induced tsunamis. Whatever climate models are used, however, there is wider agreement that the combination of sea level rise and deterioration in coral reef ecosystems will make coastal areas considerably more vulnerable to storms, regardless of whether storms will indeed be more frequent or more intense (or both). The impact of global climate change on the incidence of other types of natural disasters is even less well understood., but there is some preliminary evidence, mostly from model exercises, that droughts and floods will become more common and more severe (e.g., IPCC, 2007). For now, we have no evidence that the incidence of geophysical disasters is likely to change over time or be affected by any of the climatic changes that are predicted to occur. The frequency of large earthquakes appears to be fairly constant with, on average, 17 large earthquakes (magnitude 7.0-7.9) and about one mega earthquake (magnitude 8.0 and above) per
6Different climate models, yield somewhat different results, but the consensus is well represented by this range.
53 year.7 However, as we already observed about the future damages from earthquake- generated tsunami waves, one can easily conclude that even if the probability of geophysical events will not be impacted, the ways in which these natural events will interact with the local economy may clearly change over time.
3. Determinants of Initial Disaster Costs
When evaluating the determinants of disasters’ direct costs, most research papers estimated a model of the form: DISitX it it ; where DISit is a measure of direct damages of all disasters in country i and time t; using measures of primary initial damage such as mortality, morbidity, or capital losses. Xit is a vector of control variables of interest with each research effort distinguishing different independent variables. Typically Xit will include a measure of the disaster magnitude (e.g., Richter scale for earthquakes or wind speed for hurricanes) and variables that capture the “vulnerability” of the country to disasters (i.e., the conditions which increase the susceptibility of a country to the impact of natural hazards).it is generally assumed to be an independently and identically distributed (iid) error term. Kahn (2005) estimates a version of this model and concludes that while richer countries do not experience fewer or less severe natural disasters, their death toll is substantially lower. In 1990, a poor country (per capita GDP< US$2000) typically experienced 9.4 deaths per million people per year, while a richer country (per capita GDP> US$14,000) would have had only 1.8 deaths. This difference is most likely due to the greater amount of resources spent on prevention efforts and legal enforcement of mitigation rules (e.g., building codes). In particular, some of the policy interventions likely to ameliorate disaster impact, including land-use zoning, building codes and engineering interventions are rarer in less developed countries.
7A one point increase in earthquake magnitude entails a 10 times increase in earth movement and a 32 times increase in the amount of energy released, so a 9.0 earthquake is dramatically different from an 8.0 one. For historical information about earthquake frequencies, see: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqarchives/.
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This finding, however, does not imply that higher damages in developing countries are inevitable. The contrast between storm preparedness in Cuba vs. Haiti, or in Burma vs. Bangladesh, clearly demonstrates that even poor countries can adopt successful mitigation policies and that successful mitigation does not only depend on financial resources and the ability to mobilize them. Even in wealthier countries, there are dramatic differences in the degree of preparedness; Japan, for example, has constructed a nation-wide earthquake warning system that successfully managed to stop all high-speed rail a few seconds before the damaging earthquake shock waves arrived in the Sendai region on March 11th, 2011 – no other country has installed such a system. A consistent finding of several studies (i.e., Kahn, 2005; Skidmore & Toya, 2007; Raschky, 2008; Strömberg, 2007) is that better institutions—understood, for instance, as more stable democratic regimes or greater security of property rights— reduce disaster impact. Typhoon Nargis that hit Burma in May 2008 provides a tragic contrast to this insight. Apparently, the Burmese government was warned about the nearing storm two days before it arrived, but did little to warn coastal residents. In addition, the government interrupted post-disaster relief efforts and restricted access by international NGOs to the affected area; more than 138,000 people were killed. Nargis is an extreme case, but other countries that experience periodic storms and flooding, such as the Philippines, also appear comparatively unprepared. Anbarci, et al. (2005) elaborate on the political economy of disaster prevention. They conclude that inequality is important as a determinant of prevention efforts: more unequal societies tend to have fewer resources spent on prevention, as they are unable to resolve the collective action problem of implementing costly preventive and mitigation measures. Collective action difficulties may be overcome in communities whose inter-communal ties are stronger. As Aldrich (2012, in this volume) discusses, when people feel an affinity with their neighbors, organizing them to act communally both in preparing for disasters, mitigating their consequences and reconstructing are all done more easily. Besley & Burgess (2002), using data from floods in India, observe that disaster impacts are lower when newspaper circulation is higher, which leads to more
55 accountable politicians and a government that is more active in preventing and mitigating impacts.8 Compounding this question of accountability is the apparent unwillingness of the electorate to punish politicians who had under-invested in preparedness while failure to provide generous post-disaster reconstruction funds does appear to be an important determinant of post-disaster electoral success (Healy & Malhotra 2009 and 2010). The benefits of generous post-disaster government intervention also appear to be long-lasting (Bechtel & Hainmueller, 2011). Not surprisingly, politicians respond to these incentives, and thus increase their generosity in allocating post-disaster assistance in election years (Cole, et al. 2012). Thus, even in democracies, politicians rarely face the optimal incentives in terms of disaster prevention and/or mitigation. To summarize, while the damage caused by disasters is naturally related to the physical intensity of the event, a series of economic, social, and political characteristics also affect vulnerability. A by-product of this analysis, of course, is that these characteristics are therefore potentially amenable to policy action. In particular, the collective action problems that the literature identifies can potentially be overcome with the design of decision-making mechanisms that take these problems into account. Political incentives are probably more difficult to alter, but robust public scrutiny with the assistance of an activist and investigative media can assist in that process. There is growing awareness among the Pacific Rim countries’ policymakers of the importance of not only mitigation but of reducing vulnerability to the economic pain that is likely in a disaster’s aftermath. In the November 2011 ministerial meeting of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the leaders issued a statement that details these concerns and describes the steps that APEC countries are encouraged to take in order to become more resilient (APEC, 2011). In addition to all these incentive problems that inhibit the desire to act, the resources needed are also typically only provided ex post rather than ex ante. Both private donations channeled through NGOs and public sector resources (from foreign or domestic sources, or both) generally become available only in the aftermath of
8An equally plausible explanation for this finding is that newspaper circulation is a representation of more cohesive communities with higher ‘social capital’ (see Aldrich in this volume).
56 catastrophic events, and are not available beforehand to prevent or mitigate any likely event.
4. Economic Impacts – Are Disasters a Poverty Trap?
A disaster’s initial impact causes mortality, morbidity, and loss of physical infrastructure (residential housing, roads, telecommunication, and electricity networks, and other infrastructure). These initial impacts are followed by consequent impacts on the economy (in terms of income, employment, sectoral composition of production, inflation, etc.). These indirect impacts, of course, are not pre-ordained, and the policy choices made in a catastrophic disaster’s aftermath can have significant economic consequences. For example, by using a non-equilibrium dynamic growth model, Hallegatte, et al. (2007) show that a country experiencing disastrous events may find itself unable to adequately reconstruct and may remain stuck in a post-disaster poverty trap. Thus, while post-disaster policy choices clearly have a direct economic impact in the short run, they potentially also have long-run consequences.
4.1. Short-run The short-run impacts of disasters are usually evaluated in a regression framework of the form: YDISit X it it it ; where Yit is the measured variable of interest (e.g., per capita GDP), DISit is a measure of the disaster’s immediate impact on country i at time t, Xit is a vector of control variables that potentially affect Yit , and it is an error term. Noy (2009) estimates a version of this equation and, in addition to the adverse short-run effect already described in Raddatz (2007), he describes some of the structural and institutional details that make this negative effect worse. Noy (2009) concludes that countries with a higher literacy rate, better institutions, higher per capita income, higher degree of openness to trade, higher levels of government spending, more foreign exchange reserves, and higher levels of domestic credit but with less open capital accounts are better able to
57 withstand the initial disaster shock and prevent further spillovers into the macro- economy. These findings suggest that access to reconstruction resources and the capacity to utilize them effectively are of paramount importance is determining the speed and success of recovery. Raddatz (2009) uses vector autoregressions (VARs) to conclude that smaller and poorer states are more vulnerable to these spillovers, and that most of the output cost of climatic events occurs during the year of the disaster. His evidence, together with Becerra, et al. (2010), also suggests that, historically, aid flows have done little to attenuate the output consequences of climatic disasters.9 Even if aid inflows are typically not substantial enough to assist in complete reconstruction, bigger countries may be capable of engineering the inter-sectoral and inter-regional transfers required to fully mitigate the economic impact of natural disasters (Coffman & Noy, 2010, and Auffret, 2003). The importance of inter- regional transfers was highlighted by the massive mobilization of reconstruction resources following the catastrophic Sichuan earthquake of 2008. The Chinese government spent lavishly on reconstruction, with about 90% coming from the central government and only 10% financed locally in Sichuan.10 The rebuilt infrastructure in the destroyed counties (which were remote and under-developed pre-quake) appears to be significantly superior to its previous state. Therefore, while direct losses may be high in large countries because of the increased wealth exposure, the greater capacity to absorb shocks means that indirect losses may be lower, and/or that the size of the damage may be lower relative to the size of the country. Noy & Vu (2010) further focus on the importance of inter-regional transfers in Vietnam, and find that the post-disaster impact on economic activity across Vietnamese provinces appears to be determined by the provincial ability to attract reconstruction resources from the central government.
9Loayza, et al. (2009) notes that while small disasters may, on average, have a positive impact (as a result of the reconstruction stimulus), large disasters always pose severe negative consequences for the economy in their immediate aftermath. 10 Data obtained from http://www.china.org.cn/china/earthquake_reconstruction/2010- 01/25/content_19302110.htm (accessed on 11/11/11).
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Very little research has attempted to examine household data and determine the effects of natural disasters on household expenditures. An important exception is Sawada & Shimizutani (2008) who examine household data after the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan. They find that, even in a rich country, credit-constrained households experienced significant reductions in consumption, while households with access to credit did not. Further evidence on the importance of credit is suggested by the Rodriguez-Oreggia, et al. (2009) findings of a significant increase in poverty in disaster-affected municipalities in Mexico.
4.2. Long-run Theoretically, the likely impact of natural disasters on growth dynamics is not clear. Standard neo-classical frameworks that view technical progress as exogenous—e.g. the Solow-Swan model with exogenous saving rate sand the Ramsey-Cass-Koopman model with consumer optimization—all predict that the destruction of physical capital will enhance growth since it will drive countries away from their balanced-growth steady states. In contrast, endogenous growth frameworks do not suggest such clear-cut predictions with respect to output dynamics depending on the approach used to explain the endogeneity of technological change. For example, models based on Schumpeter’s creative destruction process may also ascribe higher growth as a result of negative shocks (Hallegatte & Dumas, 2009), as these shocks can be catalysts for re-investment and upgrading of capital goods. Yet the AK-type endogenous growth models, in which the technology exhibits constant returns to capital, predict no change in the growth rate following a negative capital shock; though the economy that experiences a destruction of the capital stock will never go back to its previous growth trajectory. Endogenous growth models that have increasing returns to scale production generally predict that a destruction of part of the physical or human capital stock results in a lower growth path and consequently a permanent deviation from the previous growth trajectory. To date, the empirical work on this question has also failed to reach a consensus. Skidmore & Toya (2002) uses the frequency of natural disasters in a cross-sectional dataset to examine long-run growth impacts of disasters, while Noy & Nualsri (2007)
59 uses a panel of five-year country observations, as in the extensive literature that followed the work by Barro (1997). Intriguingly, they reach diametrically opposing conclusions, with the former identifying expansionary and the latter contractionary disaster effects. More recently, Jaramillo (2009) finds qualified support for the Noy & Nualsri (2007) conclusion. Skidmore & Toya (2002) explain their somewhat counterintuitive finding by suggesting that disasters may be speeding up the Schumpeterian “creative destruction” process that is at the heart of the development of market economies. Cuaresma, et al. (2008), however, find that for developing countries, disaster occurrence is associated with less knowledge spillover and a reduction in the amount of new technology being introduced rather than with an acceleration of these processes. Cavallo, et al. (2010) provide the most recent attempt to resolve this debate. They implement a new methodology based on constructing synthetic controls–i.e., a counterfactual that measures what would have happened to the path of the variable- of-interest in the affected country in the absence of the natural disaster. Using this methodology, they don’t find any significant long-run effect of even very large disasters, except for very large events that were then followed by political upheavals. For these events, they find economically very substantial and statistically significant negative long run effects on per capita GDP. Another possibility is suggested in Coffman & Noy (2012), where the question is the impact of a specific event (a hurricane) on an isolated Hawaiian island. In this instance, the authors conclude that while there was no long-term impact on per-capita variables, this is largely because the disaster led to an out-migration from which the island has never completely recovered (the net population loss was a very significant 15%). Whether this pattern can be observed for other catastrophic events is not well established, though casual observation suggests that these irreversible out-migrations also happened in the case of New Orleans after hurricane Katrina, while in the city of Kobe after the earthquake of 1995 the population did not move away in spite of persistent decreases in incomes (see Vigdor, 2008 and Dupont & Noy, 2012, respectively). There is much speculation that the same will be true for the Tohoku region of Japan that was hit by the March 2011 tsunami.
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4.3. Fiscal Impacts As we observed previously, disasters are likely to generate significant inter- regional transfers and/or international aid. Accurate estimates of the likely fiscal costs of disasters are useful in enabling better cost-benefit evaluation of various mitigation programs and in determining the appropriate level of insurance against disaster losses.11 On the expenditure side, publicly financed reconstruction costs may be very different from the original magnitude of destruction of capital, while on the revenue side of the fiscal ledger, the impact of disasters on tax and other public revenue sources has also seldom been quantitatively examined. Using panel VAR methodology, Noy & Nualsri (2011) and Melecky & Raddatz (2011) estimate the fiscal dynamics likely in an “average” disaster; they acknowledge, however, that the impacts of disasters on revenue and spending depend on the country-specific macroeconomic dynamics occurring following the disaster shock, the unique structure of revenue sources (income taxes, consumption taxes, custom duties, etc.), insurance coverage and the size of the financial sector, and government indebtedness. The implications of these findings for the Pacific Rim region are quite obvious given the high degree of vulnerability of almost all countries in the region. Mexico’s FONDEN (a disaster fund) provides an example of an ex-ante fiscal provisioning for disaster reconstruction, but this, while prudent, amount to a form of self-insurance, which may be very costly in the case of a developing economy with substantial borrowing costs.12 Chile, in contrast, has used some of the funds available in its Sovereign Wealth Fund (the Copper Fund) to pay for reconstruction following the destructive earthquake of February, 2010. Japan, which can easily pursue counter- cyclical fiscal policy, resorted to additional borrowing to pay for the 2011 Tohoku earthquake reconstruction costs. One way to overcome this lack of sufficient explicit insurance is for countries to mutually insure each other. While this is difficult to envision politically within any
11Insurance could be purchased directly (maybe through re-insurance companies), indirectly through the issuance of catastrophic bonds (CAT bonds), or through precautionary savings 12In addition to FONDEN, Mexico is also one of the biggest issuers of CAT bonds. Even so, the provisioning of FONDEN has recently been insufficient to cover the costs of disasters in 2010 (see http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2010/09/16/fonden-mexicos-disaster-fund-exceeds-its-annual- budget/ accessed 11/12/11).
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Pacific-Rim-wide grouping such as APEC, it may be more politically palatable and therefore practical in smaller and more geographically well-defined groupings like ASEAN (or ASEAN+3).
4.4. Disaster as an Opportunity?
Some argue that disasters provide an impetus for change, which can bring on positive economic changes that have long-term beneficial dynamic impact on the economy. Change can lead to “creative destruction” dynamics that entail replacing the old with new technologies and with upgrades of superior equipment, infrastructure, and production processes. The rapid growth of Germany and Japan after the destruction they experienced in World War II is widely used as an example of such beneficial dynamics. Even in these cases, however, empirical research failed to identify a long-term beneficial effect, at best finding a return to the pre-shock equilibrium (Davis & Weinstein, 2002, and Brakman, et al. 2004). Besides the potential ‘creative’ introduction of new technologies to replace the ones that had previously been destroyed, a large natural disaster changes political power dynamics in ways that may facilitate radical change. Rahm Emanuel, Barak Obama’s former chief of staff, was often quoted as saying, “you never want a serious disaster to go to waste . . . it’s an opportunity to do things you could not do before”.13 The evidence to date, however, does not suggest that after accounting for the loss of life and property, one can identify beneficial aspects to the destruction wrought by natural disasters.
5. A Disaster Risk Reduction Fund
Perrow (2007) argues that public policy should focus on the need to “shrink” the targets: lower population concentration in vulnerable (especially coastal) areas, and lower concentration of utilities and other infrastructure in disaster-prone locations. This advice also stems from the awareness that more ex-post assistance to damaged
13 Emanuel, at a Wall Street Journal event (see WSJ, Nov. 21, 2008).
62 communities generates a “Samaritan’s dilemma,” i.e., an increase in risk-taking and a reluctance to purchase insurance when taking into account the help that is likely to be provided should a disaster strike.14 Constructing efficient and timely warning systems is clearly a desirable policy that is less controversial and more easily implementable. The 2004 South-East Asian tsunami, for example, led to an extension of the Pacific Tsunami Warning System to regions of Indonesia and the Indian Ocean that were previously unprotected. Operating warning systems, however, remains a long-term goal, and progress towards it can still be improved in cost-effective ways in most countries. A recent review of progress under the Hyogo Framework for Action adopted by the UN in 2005 concluded that in preparing early warning systems in the Asia Pacific: “achievement[s] are neither comprehensive nor substantial.” (UNISDR, 2011, p. 8). The difficulty of developing an effective early-warning-system should not be underestimated. On April 11, 2012, a powerful earthquake (8.6 on the Richter scale) occurred not far offshore Banda Aceh, the city that was inundated by the 2004 South- East Asian tsunami with about 25 thousand people killed (Doocy, et al. 2007). By 2012, there was an early warning system in place for tsunami hazard in Aceh, but since everyone attempted to evacuate at the same time, roads became gridlocked very quickly as people were frantically trying to flee (Rondonuwu, 2012). There were also wide-spread reports of various operational failures of the warning system in this instance. Luckily, no significant tsunami was generated by the earthquake, but the inadequacy of a system developed specifically to prevent mortality if a repeat of the 2004 catastrophe were to occur was demonstrated quite starkly. Investment in effective mitigation and risk reduction is neither cheap nor easy as it also requires securing an effective response to the warnings that are supplied. Yet, the magnitude of benefits, in terms of life saved per dollar spent, are very large if these systems manage to prevent the very catastrophic disasters that occur all too frequently.15 If early-warning systems are indeed cost effective, why are they not being implemented wholeheartedly? As we discussed previously in analyzing the general
14 See, for example, the discussion in Raschky & Weck-Hannemann (2007). 15Kydland, Finn E., Robert Mundell, Thomas Schelling, Vernon Smith, and Nancy Stokey, 2012. Copenhagen Consensus: Expert Panel Findings. http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Admin/Public/DWSDownload.aspx?File=%2fFiles%2fFi ler%2fCC12+papers%2fOutcome_Document_Updated_1105.pdf
63 underinvestment in preparedness, the answer is most likely political. In many cases, initiating the development of a disaster risk reduction (DRR) policy is clearly needed, and this can probably be best carried out with external support/incentives from the multilateral organizations. The World Bank, in particular, has been working on this front, but a dedicated fund, a Global Fund for DRR (GF-DRR), that will incentivize and support this work can and should result in the optimal allocation of resources for this task. Many developing countries lack coherent planning for disaster preparedness and risk reduction, and the knowledge collected by the international organizations (esp. the World Bank), together with the funds to support this planning, can lead to a very cost effective implementation of a much more global DRR policy. An appropriate DRR policy may primarily involve the funding of early warning systems in most cases, but may also involve other preparatory steps; DRR may mean retrofitting essential infrastructure for earthquakes (especially hospitals and other building where many people reside or work), moving people permanently away from wave-surge prone coastal regions or river flood-plains, or establishing more robust communication networks that will not collapse in the aftermath of a catastrophic event. Beyond costs, the appropriate steps needed depend on the broadly-defined institutional details, the current state of the economy, and predictions regarding likely future disaster risks. Since all three factors (institutions, economy and disaster risk) are inherently local and widely varying, it would be difficult to attempt to devise a universally appropriate policy menu, or to argue for a universal implementation of any specific policy. Preparation of DRR is taking place, but much more needs to be done; especially since economic conditions are changing, and risk patterns are appearing to change as well. Future economic exposure to tropical storms, for example, is predicted to quadruple by 2100, with roughly half of this increase associated with higher population and property in vulnerable areas and half resulting from changing patterns in terms of new predicted storm tracks and storm intensities (Mendelsohn, et al. 2012). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been involved in post-crisis intervention for several decades. The lessons the IMF has learned, in terms of
64 avoiding perverse incentives—e.g., moral hazard and adverse selection—and leading countries to adopt ex-ante sound policies, are as relevant to natural disasters. Essentially, the idea is that countries will be constantly evaluated for their DRR plans, and given ‘Seals of Approval.’ A country whose plans are favorably evaluated will have access to support for DRR projects and in addition will have access to an Emergency Disaster Fund should it be required (one can establish triggers that automatically provide affected countries access to pre-specified sums as grants or concessional loans). The evaluation process already undergoing through the Hyogo Framework umbrella may serve as a good starting point for developing the evaluation and scoring mechanisms that would allow a ‘grading’ of DRR policy and the allocation of the contingent ‘seal of approval’ for these policies. An additional positive externality from such fund with its associated monitoring and evaluation functions, would be enabling countries who receive this DRR ‘seal of approval’ to more easily insure themselves explicitly (with re-insurers) or implicitly by issuing Catastrophic Bonds (CAT bonds) and further enable multi-year insurance. All three developments (re-insurance, CAT bonds and multi-year) will be made easier by having a ‘seal of approval’ since that seal will alleviate investors/insurers concerns regarding the moral hazard generated by the disaster-contingent financial support. While macro-level explicit or implicit insurance has been growing in popularity in the last decade (see the discussion of a rice index insurance in a companion paper in this volume), the vast majority of CAT bonds, for example, are still issued by local organizations in developed countries or specialized insurance companies. Governments, at the local or national level, do not yet appear to avail themselves of these insurance opportunities, and the establishment of a ‘seal of approval’ may be the catalyst that will increase utilization of these new financial tools for handling catastrophic risk.
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CHAPTER 3
On the Design of Regional Insurance Schemes/Mechanisms for East Asia
HIROYUKI NAKATA University of Tokyo
This paper identifies the issues that would be central in designing a possible regional insurance scheme or mechanism for East Asia. The main focus is on the risk sharing mechanism for catastrophe risks households in the region incur. We apply the theoretical observations by Nakata et al. (2010) that provide a consistent explanation for the apparent anomalies concerning the demand for catastrophe insurance within the subjective expected utility framework. The key observation is that the number of observations would be inevitably insufficient to warrant a robust probability estimate for a rare event. The inherent lack of a robust probability estimate leads to diverse probability beliefs. We evaluate the various insurance schemes in terms of social welfare. In doing so, we adopt a measure that is based on the ex post social welfare concept in the sense of Hammond (1981), since the standard Pareto optimality criterion is problematic in the presence of diverse beliefs, for it ignores the regrets or pleasure ex post caused by ‘incorrect’ beliefs. Although the ex post social welfare may have an expected utility form, we only focus on the ex post utility frontier rather than specifying a particular social probability. We postulate that a desirable insurance scheme is the one that eliminates any personal catastrophe state. Keywords: catastrophe, demand for insurance, diverse beliefs, ex post social welfare.
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1. Introduction
East Asia has historically been hit numerous times by catastrophic natural disasters. Last year alone, the region suffered from the great earthquake and tsunami in Japan and the great flooding in Thailand. Whilst it would be impossible to prevent the occurrence of a natural disaster itself, every effort should be made to prevent and limit the level of damages natural disasters could inflict. Nevertheless, some damage or loss from natural disasters is inevitable—especially for catastrophes, which implies the need for an insurance mechanism. Catastrophe insurance or insurance for natural disasters, however, is not very common in practice. The fact that a catastrophe typically incurs a macro risk invalidates the application of the strong law of large numbers, on which a typical insurance mechanism is based. This is the reason why catastrophe insurance is often backed or indirectly supplied by the government. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the demand for catastrophe insurance is often weak, even though the insurance premium is apparently set favourably to the (potential) buyers. This paper examines the issues that are key to design a regional insurance scheme for catastrophes or natural disasters. The presumed target of the possible insurance schemes examined in the paper is the household sector, rather than the corporate sector. Nevertheless, many issues raised in this paper would remain valid for insurance schemes that target the corporate sector. In the analysis, we apply the theoretical explanation for the weak demand for catastrophe insurance given by Nakata, et al. (2010). The key observation of Nakata, et al. (2010) is that rare events by definition take place very infrequently, which implies that no robust probability estimate of a rare event would be readily warranted by empirical or scientific evidence. Thus, diverse probability beliefs would be inevitable, which in turn results in a weak demand for catastrophe insurance. Based on this observation, we compare several insurance schemes that differ in terms of the payment structure and also regarding the subscription structure. To be more specific, we compare conventional indemnity insurance and index insurance with respect to the payment structure, whilst we also compare direct subscription by households, subscription by local governments, and subscription by national governments with respect to the subscription structure.
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Once we allow for diverse beliefs, the welfare evaluation of a regional insurance scheme is not straightforward. Since the standard Pareto optimality is based on the ex ante preferences of the agents that govern their decisions, the standard Pareto optimality is inherently an ex ante criterion. With diverse beliefs, agents would be making ‘incorrect’ decisions or ‘mistakes’, although such ‘mistakes’ are not understood as mistakes a priori by the agents themselves. If we know the true probability, then we may still be able to evaluate how agents are making mistakes, and consequently we may evaluate the insurance schemes with respect to the true probability. However, it is rather unreasonable to assume such knowledge, especially for rare events. Thus, the use of the standard Pareto criterion calls for a significant value judgement, since ex ante preferences do not capture regrets or pleasure arising from the outcomes of decisions made in accord with incorrect subjective beliefs. Such arguments can be found in Diamond (1967) and Drèze (1970), while Starr (1973) introduces the notion of ex post optimality, which is based on realised allocations rather than prospects of future allocations, with which the standard ex ante optimality is defined. Starr (1973) shows that the two concepts do not coincide generically, when beliefs are heterogeneous. Hammond (1981) introduces the notion of the ex post social welfare optimum, which is based on an expected social welfare function, where the expectation is with respect to the social planner’s probability (or the social probability) rather than with respect to the subjective beliefs of the agents. Hammond (1981) shows that the ex post social welfare optimum does not coincide with the usual ex ante social welfare optimum when the subjective beliefs are heterogeneous. However, the choice of the social probability for the ex post social welfare function is not trivial. Thus, it is important to identify the conditions under which a reasonably high level of ex post social welfare can be assured, even when we do not know the social probabilities. In this regard, the absence of personal catastrophe states for everyone would assure a reasonably high level of ex post social welfare, as Nakata (2012) shows in a dynamic general equilibrium model with diverse beliefs.1 Note that the existence of a personal catastrophe state is not very damaging from the ex ante point of view if the agent
1 We use the term a ‘personal catastrophe state’ to describe a state in which an agent is left with an extremely low level of wealth.
73 believes that the probability of such a state is extremely low, which implies that an agent may choose to allow for the emergence of personal catastrophe states. Based on the above observations, this paper therefore compares the various insurance schemes from the viewpoint of the ex post social welfare. In particular, we examine conventional indemnity insurance and index insurance. In doing so, we pay attention to the subscription structure, i.e. direct subscriptions by households, subscriptions by local governments, and subscriptions by national governments.
2. Insurance Demand under Diverse Beliefs
In this section, we first review the three stylised facts regarding demand for catastrophe insurance based on aggregate data. Then, we show that the willingness-to- pay for insurance is almost linear in the subjective loss probability when the loss probability is very small, by numerical examples. By following Nakata, et al. (2010), we then show that subjective loss probabilities may well be very diverse and unstable for rare loss events, which in conjunction with the almost linear property of the willingness-to-pay, provides a consistent explanation for the three stylised facts.
2.1. Stylised Facts about Catastrophe Insurance It is well reported that there are some anomalies regarding the demand for insurance that appear to be incompatible with the standard expected utility framework. First, there is evidence that insurance for catastrophes, such as earthquakes or flooding, is not very widely purchased, even though many policies against catastrophes are subsidised by governments to keep the premiums favourable to the buyers, e.g. earthquake insurance in Japan and the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in the United States.2 In contrast, it is widely known that commonly sold insurance policies such as travel insurance, home insurance and medical insurance, have a substantial mark-up. Yet, many people voluntarily elect to purchase such policies. Hence, insurance for
2 Kunreuther, et al. (1978) is one of the pioneering works that reported this “anomaly.” Also, see Michel-Kerjan (2010) for the history of NFIP.
74 catastrophes is purchased with less frequency compared to insurance for moderate risk (e.g. travel insurance), even if the premium is often set more favourably for catastrophe insurance (stylised fact 1). Furthermore, (a) market penetration is much lower in areas that have historically been less frequently hit by catastrophes, even if the premiums are adjusted to reflect the lower frequencies (stylised fact 2), and (b) market penetration jumps up immediately after a catastrophe (stylised fact 3).3 The above three stylised facts present difficulties in designing a catastrophe insurance scheme that would enjoy a wide subscription. Although it appears that these facts are in contradiction with the model of insurance demand based on the standard expected utility framework, the apparent incompatibility becomes less straightforward once we allow for diverse subjective beliefs. In what follows, we introduce a simplified version of the framework by Nakata, et al. (2010), which attempts to explain the three stylised facts above simultaneously within the subjective expected utility framework.
2.2. The Willingness-to-pay for Catastrophe Insurance Consider an agent who is facing some uncertainty. We assume for simplicity that there are only two states, state 1 (the no-loss state) and state 2 (the loss state), with 0 being the loss in state 2. Let denote the initial wealth of the agent. Then, the final wealth is in state 1 and in state 2 when there is no insurance. Assume that the agent is a risk-averse expected utility maximiser, who makes some probability estimate of the two states; is the agent’s subjective probability of the no loss state. Now, assume that any loss up to ( ) can be covered by insurance with a premium of . With this insurance, the final wealth becomes in state 1 and