Number 10
2015
ISSN 2196-3940 INTERNATIONAL Provincial Autonomy: The Territorial Dimension of Peace in Mozambique Natália Bueno, Johannes Plagemann, and Julia Strasheim
A year after the 2014 national elections Mozambican security forces began increasing the pressure on Renamo, the main opposition party and former guerrilla movement, to disarm. Following several attacks on his entourage since September, Renamo lead- er Afonso Dhlakama has gone into hiding. On 19 November the Mozambican president and leader of the ruling Frelimo party, Filipe Nyusi, called for “restraint” in disarm- ing Renamo – thereby exposing an unusual degree of friction between the more radical wing and the moderates within Frelimo.
Analysis The resurgence of violent conflict in Mozambique in 2013/14 raised new doubts about the country’s peace and democratisation process. After a strong showing at the 2014 national elections, Renamo began demanding autonomy for those provinces in which it
won majorities. The governing Frelimo party has rejected these demands.
Renamo presidential candidate and former civil war combatant Afonso Dhlakama EDITION won 37 against Filipe Nyusi’s 57 per cent of the popular vote – to the surprise of ma- ny and amid allegations of fraud. Governing Frelimo have since been in negotiations with Renamo but have rejected calls for Renamo’s participation in government. Since Filipe Nyusi took presidential office in January 2015, Renamo has repeatedly called for subnational autonomy in six provinces with significant opposition support. Although Mozambican provinces are administered by centrally nominated gover- nors, direct elections in 53 mostly urban municipalities allow for some degree of sub- national autonomy. A donor-funded decentralisation process since the late 1990s has also contributed to both the deconcentration of power and some devolution. English Comparative research on territorial autonomy arrangements suggests that such pacts can be a tool for sustainable peace, but that territorial deals should be embed- ded in broader institutional reforms in order to be a viable solution to conflict.
Keywords: Mozambique, Frelimo, Renamo, territorial autonomy, peace
www.giga.hamburg/giga-focus Mozambique since 2013: Peace Unravels caused significant economic losses, including the suspension of foreign direct investment. Conse- Fifteen months after the 2014 peace accord that quently, memories of Mozambique’s brutal civil ended a 16-months military uprising in Mozam- war resurged and old fears were resurrected. bique, the country appears to once again be on the On 5 September 2014 former president Arman- brink of violent conflict. The current political crisis do Guebuza and Dhlakama signed the Accord on started after the 2014 general election. As in past Cessation of Hostilities and thus brought mili- elections, the victory of the incumbent Mozam- tary hostilities to a halt. The signature of the new bique Liberation Front (Frelimo) was overshad- peace agreement represented renewed hope, and owed by allegations of electoral fraud, the misuse allowed for both parties to focus their efforts on of state resources, a lack of transparency, and an contesting the upcoming general election in Oc- “uneven playing field.” The Mozambican Nation- tober 2014. However, the agreement did little to al Resistance (Renamo), the main opposition par- ease the political tensions between the two par- ty and former guerrilla movement, immediate- ties. Even though Renamo voters attended the ly rejected the results despite its own unexpected polls in great numbers, voter turnout was still low strong showing. Afonso Dhlakama, the long-time when compared to the 1990s – only 51 per cent leader of Renamo, has constantly made reference of all eligible voters. The main presidential candi- to the use of force as a last resort to achieve Rena- dates were Filipe Jacinto Nyusi (Frelimo), Afonso mo’s political goals, which has fuelled fears of civ- Dhlakama (Renamo), and David Simango (Demo- il war in Mozambique. Recently, Dhlakama asked, cratic Movement of Mozambique, MDM). Frelimo “Has Frelimo ever accepted to approve anything once again prevailed, with Nyusi securing 57 per without being beaten?”1 cent of the vote. Prior to the 2014 elections, Mozambique had The new leader himself and his transition to experienced almost two years of military confron- power have also caused uncertainty in Mozam- tation because of a disagreement between Freli- bique. Nyusi is native of Mueda Cabo Delgado, mo and Renamo over electoral legislation, the dis- the country’s northernmost province and home armament of Renamo, the integration of Renamo to the Makonde people, who fought for libera- forces into the Mozambican army, and the “de- tion against Portugal. The Makonde represent a politicisation” (despartidarização) of the state. De- strong interest group in the Ministry of Defence politicisation aims at reducing Frelimo’s long- and greatly influenced Nyusi’s selection as a pres- standing hold on the state and the ongoing con- idential candidate. Compared with previous Mo- vergence of state and party matters. Frelimo had zambican presidents, Nyusi has had a very short previously passed new legislation not only lim- political career. He spent a great part of his profes- iting opposition parties’ participation in nation- sional life in the business sector and only entered al and provincial elections but also reducing their politics in 2008, when he was nominated minister capacity to contest elections in most constituen- of defence by then president Armando Guebuza. cies (Manning 2010). In response, Renamo de- Although Guebuza concluded his term in office in manded further reforms of the electoral system, line with the constitutional two-term limit, he ini- including changes to the National Elections Com- tially remained Frelimo party leader. This raised mission (CNE), which had purportedly manipu- doubts about his commitment to the democratic lated past electoral processes in favour of Frelimo. process because, historically, presidents have al- Following an attack on Renamo’s military base ways occupied both posts. Guebuza’s resigna- in Satunjira by national force in October 2013, tion as party leader three months after Nyusi was Dhlakama declared the suspension of the Rome sworn in as president exposed Frelimo’s inter- General Peace Accord. Renamo retaliation was nal friction. According to the newspaper Savana,2 limited mostly to the central provinces, but their even before Nyusi’s inauguration, Guebuza had impact on Mozambican society was severe. Be- declared his intention to hold on to the Frelimo sides numerous casualties, they contributed to the leadership to the dismay of other leading Frelimo destruction of Mozambique’s infrastructure and figures, such as Alberto Chipande.3 This reveals
2 Savana weekly newspaper, printed edition, Maputo, 30 Janu- 1 Savana weekly newspaper, printed edition, Maputo, 26 June ary 2015. 2015. 3 Alberto Chipande is a senior member of Frelimo, Maconde,
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 10/2015 - 2 - that it will be a big challenge for Nyusi to con- The Recent Call for Territorial Autonomy solidate power inside Frelimo, particularly over the remaining guebuzistas, who have adopted a As soon as the general election results were an- radical position towards Renamo’s claims. In the nounced, Renamo declared it did not recognise words of former foreign affairs minister, Leonar- their validity. They alleged that nearly one million do Simão, “poor communication and strong hos- votes had been rigged in favour of Frelimo. To tility characterised the relationship between Gue- remedy the situation, Dhlakama at first proposed buza’s government and Renamo.”4 Under such the creation of a transitory government composed conditions, the emphasis Nyusi placed on equal- of technocrats to rule the country until the next ity and political inclusion in his inaugural speech, elections in 2019. Soon, however, Dhlakama aban- as well as his reiteration of his availability to meet doned the idea and instead began demanding with Dhlakama, indicated a renewed willingness greater autonomy for the six provinces in which to negotiate. he claimed to have won a majority – Nampula, Ni- Nevertheless, the reality on the ground differs assa, Tete, Zambezia, Sofala, and Manica. considerably from the rhetoric and declarations. Dhlakama’s demands were codified in a bill The most recent outbreaks of violence have seen that envisaged the establishment of autonomous an already unstable situation further deteriorate, provinces represented by Renamo in the Mozam- raising concerns about whether Nyusi will be able bican Parliament. The bill called for the immediate to maintain peace in the country and keep the gue- creation of the six aforementioned autonomous buzistas at bay. A first violent incident occurred on provinces, the nomination of provincial coun- 12 September 2015, when Dhlakama’s motorcade cil presidents (presidentes de conselhos provinciais) was met with gunshots in Macossa, Manica prov- according to which presidential candidate won ince. Dhlakama claimed that he was the victim of the most votes in each provinces, and the trans- a Frelimo plot, while Frelimo accused Renamo of fer of 50 per cent of all revenues generated by re- staging the attack. The episode remains unclear, source extraction to the new autonomous provinc- and no conclusive investigation has been carried es. However, on 30 April 2015 Frelimo shot down out – though several news reports confirm a ma- (chumbou) the proposal based on Article 271 of jor battle lasting hours took place and left dozens the Constitution of Mozambique, which states the dead on both sides. According to Professor Lou- objectives of local administration in the country. renço Joaquim da Costa do Rosário, rector of the One senior Mozambican journalist, Tomás Vieira Universidade Politécnica and a mediator in talks Mário, commented, “Once again, the latest elec- between the government and Renamo, some with- tions, held in October, appear not as a fundamen- in Frelimo sought to assassinate Dhlakama be- tal right for every citizen, but as a curse for our fore integrating the remaining Renamo forces in- Nation!”5 to the army (Africa Confidential 2015: 5). After an- From 9 June to 12 June the National Council of other attack on Dhlakama’s entourage in Amaton- Renamo convened in Beira. Despite Dhlakama’s gas, Manica province, on 25 September, Dhlaka- threats, the council decided against the immedi- ma returned to the bush for the first time since last ate use of force and instead insisted on resum- year’s elections. Not even one day after his pub- ing negotiations with the government. The situa- lic reappearance and return to Beira, the capital tion, however, has remained uncertain ever since. of Sofala province, Dhalakama’s house was raided Notwithstanding the significant economic growth and his personal guard disarmed. After 10 hours during the last decades, dissatisfaction with the of turmoil the Renamo leader finally agreed to ruling party is widespread, and inequality is ris- hand over his personal guard’s arms to a group ing – both of which have arguably contributed to of mediators – an unusual concession from a par- social unrest. On top of this, attempts to integrate ty leader whose bargaining power has always pri- former Renamo fighters into the nation’s security marily consisted of the threat of violence. forces have failed and Frelimo membership con- tinues to be essential for professional advance- ment in many businesses and the bureaucracy.
and uncle of President Filipe Nyusi. 4 The interview was conducted by Natália Bueno in Maputo, 5 Savana weekly newspaper, printed edition, Maputo, 19 June August 2015. 2015.
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 10/2015 - 3 - The resulting feeling of exclusion and marginali- istration by transferring responsibilities from the sation unites Renamo’s lower level ex-combatants centre downwards. Currently, districts and mu- and higher ranks.6 This begs the following ques- nicipalities overlap in a number of cases – a fact tion: Can provincial autonomy serve as a lasting that highlights the hybrid character of the Mozam- solution to the political conflict in Mozambique bican decentralisation process (Plagemann 2009). given its history of decentralisation reforms? Since 2009 provincial elections have been held parallel to national elections. In contrast to munic- ipal assemblies, however, provincial assemblies The History of Decentralisation in Mozambique have a merely consultative role. Like district ad- ministrators, provincial governors continue to be A common distinction in the analysis of decentral- nominated by the president. This may create fric- isation processes is that between devolution and de- tion in those provinces and districts in which op- concentration. Whereas devolution refers to the es- position parties have won majorities. The estab- tablishment of autonomous subnational units (e.g. lishment of a centrally nominated state repre- cities or federal states headed by directly elected sentative (representante do estado) to moderate be- local governments), deconcentration merely de- tween the district and the municipality in instanc- scribes the downward transfer of responsibili- es of overlap underlines the state’s unwillingness ties and budgetary discretion within an otherwise to cede control (Weimar 2012: 99). centralised state hierarchy. Moreover, while de- Local elections and, to a lesser extent, provin- volution is meant to increase the democratic ac- cial elections have in the past shown their poten- countability of the local state, deconcentration tial to facilitate opposition parties’ efforts to - in tends to focus on increasing administrative effi- crease their visibility beyond individual munici- ciency by reducing the gap between administra- palities and gain access to the state, which has tra- tive decision-making and the affected population. ditionally been under the tight control of the rul- Following independence in 1975, Mozambique ing party. The MDM emerged as a viable opposi- emerged as a unitary socialist state under Frelimo, tion party following their electoral success in two the former liberation movement. The 1977 Consti- rounds of local elections (2008 and 2013/14). Af- tution established socialist-style centralisation of ter Renamo boycotted the 2013 local elections in the state in which line ministries were vertically the midst of violent conflict, the MDM competed deconcentrated. in all 53 municipalities for the first time. Today, Since the 1994 Constitution came into force Mo- the party controls four municipalities, including zambique has embarked on a gradual decentrali- three provincial capitals and Mozambique’s sec- sation process, albeit one that precludes the possi- ond- and third-largest cities (Nampula and Beira, bility of a federal state. In 1998 local elections were respectively). Given the MDM’s success – and de- held for the first time in 33 mainly urban munici- spite attempts by Frelimo to strengthen its hold palities (autarquias). The number of urban munic- on the local level – further devolutionary reforms ipalities has since grown to 53. Nonetheless, these have not materialised. autonomous municipalities have not replaced ex- Although decentralisation reforms continued isting districts, which have also increased in num- throughout the past decade, not least due to sig- ber (from 123 to 150) and continue to be part of the nificant donor pressure and financial support, the centralised state structure. Despite a far-reaching government’s proclaimed gradual approach has constitutional mandate “to promote local devel- so far prevented the existence of truly autonomous opment,” municipalities’ autonomy remains lim- local governments. Instead, this approach has fa- ited due to a lack of financial independence and a cilitated partial recentralisation (Weimer 2012: lack of distinction between provincial responsibil- 100–101) and has increased complexity of the ad- ities and municipal responsibilities. At the same ministrative landscape due to its lack of a clear vi- time, a process of territorial deconcentration was sion of state structure and intergovernmental re- meant to empower district and provincial admin- lations. This scenario likely reflects disagreements not only between the central leadership and for-
6 According to Tomás Vieira Mário (in Savana weekly newspa- eign donors (largely in favour of devolution) but per, printed edition, Maputo, 19 June 2015) and interviews also within the ruling party itself. conducted by Natália Bueno with Renamo ex-combatants in Maputo, June 2015.
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 10/2015 - 4 - Evidence from Comparative Research on in Figure 2 plots those African countries in which Territorial Autonomy conflict parties signed a peace accord between 1989 and 2006 (in light blue) and those countries Would granting Renamo increased territorial au- in which a peace accord called for territorial au- tonomy be a sustainable solution to tensions in tonomy arrangements (in dark blue). These in- Mozambique? Since the end of the Cold War, ter- clude recent examples of territorial autonomy ritorial autonomy (e.g. federalism or the estab- pacts implemented in Sudan (where enhanced ter- lishment of autonomous provinces) has featured ritorial autonomy for South Sudan ultimately cul- as a prominent component of a number of peace minated in its independence in 2011) and Burundi processes. Such arrangements are typically laid out in peace agreements negotiated by the con- Figure 2: African Peace Agreements and flict parties. Supporters of territorial autonomy Territorial Autonomy Arrangements, deals stress that these institutional arrangements 1989–2006 mitigate fears of exploitation amongst margin- alised groups, address economic insecurities, in- crease efficiency in administration, and satisfy -lo cal demands for cultural sovereignty (Lake and Rothchild 2005). Opponents of territorial auton- omy pacts argue that such deals can create par- allel structures of authority that further weak- en war-torn states, reinforce divisive ethnic iden- tities, and create new instability and secessionist demands (Wolff 2009). As Figure 1 shows, territorial autonomy ar- rangements have predominated in Europe, where they played a key role in peace accords in Koso- vo and Bosnia. In Africa, however, they have been much less frequently employed – featuring in on- ly 15 peace agreements between 1989 and 2006 Source: Own illustration based on data taken from Ott- (about 30 per cent) (Zanker et al. 2015). The map mann and Vüllers (2014).
Figure 1. Percentage of Peace Agreements with Territorial Autonomy, 1989–2006
Source: Own illustration based on data taken from Ottmann and Vüllers (2014).
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 10/2015 - 5 - (following the Arusha Peace Agreement in 2000). willingness to engage in the “depoliticisation” of Nonetheless, continued violence in both these cas- the state in earlier rounds of negotiations. es shows that territorial autonomy arrangements Nevertheless, pressure to decentralisation has are no magic bullet for resolving violent internal been amounting. Venancio Mondlane of the MDM conflict altogether. recently said, “There is no escape from decentral- Countries shaded in light blue signed a peace isation and power-sharing in Mozambique, but agreement. Countries shaded in dark blue signed we have our own ideas about it.” He added that a peace agreement that called for increased terri- although the MDM supported decentralisation, torial autonomy (decentralisation, federalism, or they saw the revision of electoral legislation and autonomous provinces). of the Constitution as a viable alternative to Ren- When do territorial autonomy arrangements amo’s failed legislative initiative7. For them, such contribute to sustainable peace, and what lessons reform would be a long-term process. Indeed, a can be learned from comparative research for Mo- credible proposition for provincial autonomy zambique? Generally, the research suggests that would include meaningful provincial elections for when fully implemented, territorial autonomy ar- a body with legislative powers and budgetary au- rangements are amongst the key contributors to thority and elected provincial governors instead durable peace. For instance, of 33 autonomy ar- of centrally appointed ones. This would effective- rangements struck in peace agreements between ly amount to transforming the unitary Mozambi- 1989 and 2004 across the globe, all 9 deals that can state into a quasi-federal one. were fully implemented were followed by lasting Given Frelimo’s control over the decentralisa- peace; even those countries where territorial au- tion process since the 1990s, its hold on national tonomy implementation was only partly achieved unity for ideological and political reasons, and the were more peaceful than countries without au- reactions to Dhlakama’s proposition, such a radi- tonomy arrangements (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). cal step is extremely unlikely. Consider that on 3 Nevertheless, recent literature stresses that con- March 2015 Gilles Cistac, a prominent constitu- flicts are not automatically more easily resolved tional lawyer and professor at Eduardo Mondlane at the subnational level (Ansorg et al. 2013); on University in Maputo, was shot dead in broad day- its own, territorial autonomy is often an insuffi- light. Although the motives remain unclear and the cient long-term solution to internal conflict. The assailants have not been identified, there appears evidence shows that in post-conflict societies, ter- to be no doubt that this was a political act. After all, ritorial autonomy is most helpful when combined contrary to Frelimo’s claim that Renamo’s region- with other conflict resolution instruments, partic- al autonomy proposal was unconstitutional, Cistac ularly power-sharing deals at the central govern- argued that the Constitution did in fact permit the ment level (Cederman et al. 2015, Wolff 2009). establishment of autonomous provinces despite its commitment to Mozambique as a “unitary state.” Following his assertion, Cistac was ferociously at- Prospects for Territorial Power-Sharing in tacked on social networks. It appeared, as one ob- Mozambique server notes, that “Renamo’s demand [has] hit an especially sensitive nerve in Frelimo” (Darch 2015: Comparative findings suggest that subnational au- 2). The most recent armed confrontations – attrib- tonomy can – under certain circumstances – be an uted by some to Frelimos’s radical Guebuza wing effective tool for consolidating peace. However, – only added to the impression that Nyusi’s concil- evidence from other cases also suggest that grow- iatory tone had reached its limit. ing tensions in Mozambique cannot be resolved by On 30 November 2015 Renamo parliamentary simply granting Renamo territorial autonomy; in- group submitted a partial revision of the Mozam- stead, territorial arrangements need to be embed- bican Constitution as a substitute for the autono- ded in broader negotiations and institutions at the mous provinces bill shot down by Frelimo in late national level. Earlier this year, Renamo’s poorly April. According to Renamo, the Constitutional manufactured legislative initiative demonstrated revision was meant to establish a greater auton- to be wholly inadequate for such an undertaking, and, more importantly, Frelimo did not express a 7 The interview was conducted by Natália Bueno in Maputo, August 2015.
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 10/2015 - 6 - omy of Mozambican provinces (autarquia provin- racy After Civil Wars, Ithaca: Cornell University cial) similar to municipal autonomy by, among Press, 109-132. others, calling for provincial assemblies to elect Manning, Carrie (2010), Mozambique’s Slide into provincial governors.8 As a provisional measure, One-Party Rule, in: Journal of Democracy, 21, 2, the proposed bill ascribed the presidential candi- 151-165. date with most votes in the respective provinces Ottmann, Martin, and Johannes Vüllers (2014), the right to choose the governor. Frelimo’s parlia- The Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED): A mentary group in the Commission for Constitu- new dataset on the promises and practices of tional Affairs, Human Rights and Legality reject- power-sharing in post-conflict countries, in: ed Renamo’s revision. The Commission, howev- Conflict Management and Peace Science 32, 3, 327- er, recommended the creation of an ad hoc com- 350. mission to review the Constitution with the inten- Weimer, Bernhard (2012), Para uma estratégia de tion to further its decentralisation9. Whereas Fre- descentralização em Moçambique, in: Bernhard limo’s ambivalent record in decentralisation re- Weimer (Hrsg.), Moçambique: descentralizar o cen- forms, the governing party’s hold on central pow- tralismo, Maputo: IESE. er and the recent radicalization of the political Wolff, Stefan (2009), Complex Power-sharing and conflict suggested little room for compromise over the Centrality of Territorial Self-governance in Renamo’s demands for autonomous provinces in Contemporary Conflict Settlements, in: Ethnop- the first place, Nyusi’s recent intervention in slow- olitics 8, 1, 27-45. ing down Renamo disarmament may nevertheless Zanker, Franzisca; Claudia Simons, and Andreas have opened a new space for dialogue over subna- Mehler (2015), Power, peace, and space in Afri- tional autonomy as a contribution to sustainable ca: Revisiting territorial power sharing, in: Afri- peace in Mozambique. can Affairs, 114, 454, 72-91.
Literature
Africa Confidential (2015), Insiders detect the hand of former President Guebuza in a spate of at- tacks against the Renamo leader, vol. 56, no. 21, 5-6. Ansorg, Nadine, Felix Haaß, Andreas Mehler, and Julia Strasheim (2012), Institutionelle Reformen zur Friedenskonsolidierung, GIGA Focus Afrika, 6, on- line:
8 See Renamo press release A Perdiz No. 155 (p. 2), downloaded from:
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 10/2015 - 7 - About the Authors Natália Bueno is a visiting researcher at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, a former visiting researcher at the GIGA Institute of African Affairs, and a doctoral candidate at the University of Coimbra, Portugal. Her research interests include conflict transformation, transitional justice, reconciliation, and memory studies.
Related GIGA Research GIGA Research Programme 2: Violence and Security examines different forms of violence and security and their causes in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. As part of the research programme, the Institutions for Sustainable Peace (ISP) project analyses the role of formal state institutions in the regulation of conflict, particularly in societies characterised by divisions along ethnic or religious lines.
Related GIGA Publications Ansorg, Nadine, Felix Haaß, Andreas Mehler, and Julia Strasheim (2012), Institutionelle Reformen zur Friedenskonsolidierung, GIGA Focus Afrika, 6, online:
The GIGA Focus is an Open Access publication and can be read on the Internet and down- loaded free of charge at
www.giga.hamburg/giga-focus