d Secur n ity a e S c e a r i e e s P FES Colin Darch A Success Story Gone Wrong? The Mozambican Conflict and the Peace Process in Historical Perspective About The Author Dr. Colin Darch is now retired, but holds honorary research positions at the Human Sciences Research Council, the Democratic Governance and Rights Unit and the Centre for African Studies at the University of Cape Town. Over a forty-year career he has been employed at universities and research centres in Ethiopia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Brazil. between 1979 and 1987 he worked at the Centro de Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane. After his retirement, in 2016 he was a visiting professor at the Universidade Federal de Pernamuco in Brazil, and in 2017 taught at the Universidade Pedagógica in Lhanguene, Maputo. He is the author of various works on African and Mozambican history, including most recently O continente demasiado grande: reflexões sobre temáticas africanas contemporâneas (Recife: UFPE, 2016), the Historical Dictionary of Mozambique (Scarecrow Press, forthcoming) and, with David Hedges, Samora Machel: retórica política e independência em Moçambique (Salvador: EDUFBA. In press). He is also the founder and webmaster of the site Mozambique History Net. Cover Art A RENAMO election rally in northern Mozambique, 1994 Photo by Michel Cahen Imprint: Published by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Mozambique Avenida Tomás Nduda 1313, Maputo, Mozambique Tel.: +258-21-491231, Fax: +258-21-490286 Email: [email protected] ©Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2018 ISBN 978-989-20-8380-3 “Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.” Colin Darch A Success Story Gone Wrong? The Mozambican Conflict and the Peace Process in Historical Perspective CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 5 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 6 Economic Shifts 7 Political Adversaries 8 The General Peace Agreement 9 Renewed Conflict 9 THE STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF CONFLICT AND PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE 11 Ideological “Reframing” in the Transition to Independence 11 The Nature of the Conflict with RENAMO, 1976-1992 13 The GPA as an Attempt at Stabilisation and Reconciliation 15 Incomplete Disarmament and Military Integration 17 The Decentralisation of Political Power and Administration 18 The “Resource Curse” and the Expectation of Windfall Rents 20 Is “Parliamentarisation” Desirable or Possible? 21 CONCLUSION: THE RETURN TO CONFLICT AND ITS LESSONS 23 REFERENCES 25 A Success Story Gone Wrong? The Mozambican Conflict and the Peace Process in Historical Perspective INTRODUCTION The unravelling of the country’s image, especially in the last five years or so, has largely been the Opinion about the devastating sixteen-year consequence of two factors. These are, first, armed conflict in Mozambique and the the dramatic return to low-level armed conflict subsequent quarter century of peace has by RENAMO, now the main opposition party, shifted significantly over time. The war between between 2013 and December 2016, when a the Frelimo Government and the rebel group cease-fire came into effect. The second factor RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana)1 is the revelation in April 2016 that massive and began in 1976, shortly after independence, secret loans had been negotiated in 2013-2014 and ended in 1992 when a General Peace by elements in the state security structures Accord (GPA) was signed. By the mid-1990s, and the ruling party, in complete disregard for Mozambique was widely regarded as a role existing judicial and democratic norms (the so- model for a successful, economically and called “secret debt”). socially stabilising post-conflict society (e.g. FCO 1999; Manning 2002; Phiri 2012). But in the In May 2016, as soon as the existence of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the secret debt was discovered, the international country no longer occupies its former position community, led by the International Monetary as a ‘beacon of hope’ and a rare success story Fund (IMF), cut off a significant part of its demonstrating the effectiveness of models of economic assistance. At the time of writing, post-conflict reconciliation that help to produce with relations between the donor community sustainable economic growth. The Mozambican and the Government in stalemate, economic peace process, and its juridical expression in growth continues to slow, and the IMF is the GPA, is being interrogated anew, and the maintaining its demands for a complete question – unthinkable ten years ago – is being disclosure of information about how the asked, “is peace failing?” in Mozambique.2 secret debt was transacted, alongside cuts in Government spending and a significant restructuring of existing and inefficient state 1 RENAMO (the “Mozambican National Resistance”) is a enterprises. political-military hybrid. It originated in the 1970s as an armed anti-Marxist rebellion against Frelimo’s agenda of The purpose of this paper, in this context, is radical socialist transformation. Most analysts believe that it was cobbled together under Rhodesian sponsorship to analyse the structural roots of the present from various small dissident groupings, and, after 1980, situation, and to identify the key factors in continued fighting with the support of the South African Mozambique’s post-independence history apartheid regime. After the 1992 peace agreement, which have contributed to and perhaps RENAMO was required to transform into a party, but it did not disarm completely. In fact, while operating as the determined the current, ongoing and parliamentary opposition, it simultaneously maintained a destabilising political-economic crisis. small but significant military wing.. 2 The emergence of an Islamist insurgency, called Ansar al- Sunna, in Cabo Delgado, beginning with an attack on Mocímboa da Praia in October 2017, also clearly constitutes a threat to peace. The government has reportedly responded with considerable violence. However, although local figures have blamed poverty and inequality for the phenomenon, it is insufficiently documented at present for detailed analysis in this paper (Fabricius 2017; Hanlon 2018a). 5 A Success Story Gone Wrong? The Mozambican Conflict and the Peace Process in Historical Perspective THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT FRELIMO3 had launched the armed liberation struggle, leading to independence in 1975, The history of armed conflict and violent unrest after ten years of fighting. Within two or three in Mozambique goes back a long way and is years armed conflict was renewed yet again part of the inheritance of colonialism. During when the RENAMO movement launched most of the colonial period, Portugal was its rebellion against the new government, a generally not strong enough to impose any kind rebellion that lasted until 1992. In its first phase, of unitary and organised rule over the whole the conflict was ostensibly a foreign-supported territory of what was to become Mozambique. war of destabilisation against the “communist” Indeed, until the early twentieth century the policies of the Frelimo government, with colonial state was in constant and usually RENAMO conducting, as its primary strategy, armed competition with various powerful local a campaign of terror against rural populations African polities. In the late nineteenth century, alongside sabotage of infrastructure. However, Portugal’s weakness had led to the leasing of over time the rebels began to exploit local vast areas in the northern and central regions dissatisfaction over such government policies as to foreign concession companies, known in forced resettlement into “communal villages” Portuguese as companhias majestáticas (the and to build a base of popular support, Company of Niassa and the Company of especially in the central provinces. By the late Mozambique).The areas under the control of 1980s it had became clear to both sides that these commercial enterprises were notoriously the war was unwinnable militarily, and the lawless, as the main interest of investors was government and the rebels reluctantly sat down the exploitation of commercial resources, not to negotiate a mediated end to the fighting. the imposition of law and order beyond what When the Acordo Geral de Paz (General Peace was minimally necessary. So-called “primary Agreement or GPA) was eventually signed in resistance” by the African population (Ranger late 1992, a multi-party political system was 1968a, 1968b) to Portugal’s long-drawn-out established, and centralised economic planning struggle to impose its writ ended only in 1916- was abandoned. 1918, when the Báruè revolt, in the central province of Manica, over forced labour and As we can see from the above outline, periods military conscription was finally and brutally of peace have been rare in the medium and suppressed by the Portuguese army (Isaacman long view of Mozambican history, and far from and Isaacman 1976: 156-185). The Portuguese being the normal state of affairs. campaign in Báruè was the last of a series of so- called “pacification campaigns” in the late 19th 3 The word “Frelimo” – no longer considered an abbreviation – and early 20th centuries that finally established originates from the acronym FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique or Mozambique Liberation Front). This colonial rule over the whole territory. was a broad front constituted in Tanzania in 1962 with the objective of achieving independence from the Portuguese. But Mozambique did not remain