CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE
THE BLACK PRESS VIEWS CARTER'S
PRESIDENTIAL RACE: 1976
A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in
Mass Communication
by
Marva L. Washington
August 1982 The Thesis of Marva L. Washington is approved:
Dif!. Michael' C. Emery/}
Dr. F~lix F. Gutilrrez
Dr. Susan Henry, C~
California State University, Northridge TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT viii
Chapter I. INTRODUCTION 1
Statement of the Problem • 1 Objectives 2 Justification of the Study • 4 Scope and Definitions 6 Summary 6 Notes 8
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 9
Bibliographies 9 Indexes 12 Articles 14 Carter and Blacks 14 Carter and the White Press 17 Media Strategy 18 Black Press 19 Books . ' . 20 Carter Campaign 20 The White Press 25 The Black Press 26 Review of the Literature for Methodology 29 Books 29 Articles 32 Summary 33 Black Press 33 White Press 35 Carter Campaign 37 Methodological Sources 39 Notes 41
III. METHODOLOGY 46
The Topics 46 The Papers 51 Analytical Proposal 51 Limitations of the Methodology 62 Notes 64
iii IV. THE CARTER CAMPAIGN: AN OVERVIEW 67
The Carter Campaign: A Background 67 Building the Carter Image • • • • 70 The Black Press •••• 75 The Press Views Carter . . 81 Notes ...... 89 V. FINDINGS • 92
Pittsburgh Courier •• 94 Carter-Wallace Coverage 94 Florida Primary • • • • • • • • 95 Ethnic Purity 95 Stop Carter • • • • 99 Carter and Blacks • • • • • • • • 99 Black Issues • • • • 101 Black Ministers' Payoff 104 Debates • • • ••• 104 Playboy Interview 104 Andrew Young • • • • • • • • • • • 105 Carter and Black Dignitaries • • • • • • 107 Chicago Daily Defender • • • • • • • • • • 108 Carter-Wallace Coverage •••• 108 Florida Primary • • • • • • • • • 110 Ethnic Purity ••••• 110 Stop Carter 112 Carter and Blacks • • • • • 113 Black Issues •• ...... 115 Black Ministers' Payoff 118 Debates ••••••• 118 Playboy Interview • • • • • • 118 Andrew Young • • • • • • 119 Carter and Black Dignitaries 120 Amsterdam News • • • • • • 121 Carter Wallace Coverage, Florida Primay 121 Ethnic Purity •••••••••••• 121 Stop Carter • • • • 122 Carter and Blacks 122 Black Issues • • • ••• ...... 125 Black Ministers' Payoff 128 Debates • • • • • • . ••• 129 Playboy Interview 129 Andrew Young • • • • • • 130 Carter and Black Dignitaries 130 Black Panther • • • • • • 131 Carter-Wallace Coverage 131 Florida Primary • • • • 131 Ethnic Purity ... 131 Stop Carter 133
iv Carter and Blacks 133 Black Issues • • • • • • • 133 Black Ministers' Payoff •••••••• 135 Debates, Playboy Interview, Andrew Young, Carter and Black Dignitaries •• 135 Los Angeles Sentinel • • • • • • • • • • • 136 Carter-Wallace Coverage, Florida Primary • 136 Ethnic Purity • • • • • • • • • • 136 Stop Carter • • • • 138 Carter and Blacks 138 Black Issues • • • ••• 139 Black Ministers' Payoff 139 Debates, Playboy Interview ••••• 140 Andrew Young • • • • • • • 140 Carter and Black Dignitaries • 141 Washington Post • • • • • • • • • • 142 Carter-Wallace Coverage •••••••••• 142 Florida Primary • • • • • • • • • 142 Ethnic Purity • • • • 143 Stop Carter • • • • • • • • • • 146 Carter and Blacks • • • • • • • • • • • • • 147 Black Issues •• 150 Black Ministers' Payoff 154 Debates • • • • • • 155 Playboy Interview • • • • 155 Andrew Young • • • • • • • 156 Carter and Black Dignitaries • • • • • • 157 Christian Science Monitor ••••• 159 Carter-Wallace Coverage •••• 159 Florida Primary • • • • • • • • 160 Ethnic Purity • • • • 160 Stop Carter • • • • • • • • 161 Carter and Blacks 163 Black Issues • • • • • ••• 164 Black Ministers' Payoff, Debates •• 166 Playboy Interview • • • • 166 Andrew Young • • • • • • • • • • 167 Carter and Black Dignitaries •• 168 Chicago Tribune • • • • • 169 Carter-Wallace Coverage 169 Florida Primary 171 Ethnic Purity . . . . . 172 Stop Carter • • • • 175 Carter and Blacks 176 Black Issues • • 178 Black Ministers' Payoff 184 Debates • • •••• 185 Playboy Interview • • • • • 185 Andrew Young • • • • • • • • • • • • • 189 Carter and Black Dignitaries 189
v New York Times 191 Carter-Wallace Coverage 191 Florida·Primary 192 Ethnic Purity 193 Stop Carter 196 Carter and Blacks 197 Black Issues 201 Black Ministers' Payoff 204 Debates 204 Playboy Interview 205 Andrew Young 205 Carter and Black Dignitaries 210 San Francisco Chronicle 211 Carter-Wallace Coverage 211 Florida Primary 212 Ethnic Purity 213 Stop Carter 218 Carter and Blacks 219 Black Issues 219 Black Ministers' Payoff 223 Debates 224 Playboy Interview 224 Andrew Young 228 Carter and Black Dignitaries 229 Los Angeles Times 230 Carter-Wallace Coverage 230 Florida Primary 232 Ethnic Purity 233 Stop Carter 236 Carter and Placks 238 Black Issues 240 Black Ministers' Payoff 243 Debates 244 Playboy Interview 244 Andrew Young 246 Carter and Black Dignitaries 247
VI. ANALYSIS 248
Carter-Wallace Coverage 248 Black Papers 248 White Papers 250 Cross Analysis 252 Florida Primary 253 Black Papers 253 White Papers 253 Cross Analysis 255 Ethnic Purity 255 Black Papers 255 White Papers 257 Cross Analysis 262
vi Stop Carter 265 Black Papers • 265 White Papers 265 Cross Analysis • 267 Carter and Blacks 267 Black Papers • 267 White Papers • 270 Cross Analysis 274 Black Issues • 276 Black Papers • 276 White Papers • 280 Cross Analysis 286 Black Ministers' Payoff 288 Black Papers • 288 White Papers 289 Cross Analysis • 290 Debates 291 Cross Analysis • 291 Playboy Interview 291 Black Papers 291 White Papers • 292 Cross Analysis 295 Andrew Young • 295 Black Papers 295 White Papers 296 Cross Analysis 297 Carter and Black Dignitaries • 298 Black Papers 298 vlhite Papers 298 Cross Analysis • 299
VII. CONCLUSIONS 300
The Black Perspective 301 Black Support as Followed Thoughout the Year • 308 Black Strategy • 309 The Black Press Observes Carter 313 Key Issues in Black and White Papers • 314 Black Support Ignited 315 Coverage Comparisons • 316 The Black Press' Role in Carter's Campaign • 318 Carter Campaign: A Political Analysis • 320 Black Press 323 White Press 325 Suggestions for Further Study 326
BIBLIOGRAPHY 328
APPENDIX 335
A. Statistical Data of Selected Papers 336 B. Carter's Popularity Curve 337
vii ABSTRACT
THE BLACK PRESS VIEWS CARTER 1 S
PRESIDENTIAL RACE: 1976
by
Marva L. Washington
Master of Arts in Mass Communication
On 2 November 1976 James Earle Carter, Jr. was elected as the
39th President of the United States. The white press reported that
Carter received support from 96 percent of the black voting public.
Ironically, the majority of the traditional black leaders and organizations did not support the candidacy of the former Georgia gov ernor. The thesis, therefore, studied a frequently overlooked entity, the black press, to determine its views about Carter's candidacy.
The content study analyzed twelve newspapers for one year.
They were the Washington Post, New York Times, Chicago Tribune, Los
Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, Christian Science Monitor, Los
Angeles Sentinel, New Pittsburgh Courier, Chicago Daily Defender,
Afro-American, Amsterdam News and Black Panther. The black newspapers were chosen because they were the most influential black papers in the
viii country and were representative of different parts of the nation. The major criteria for selecting white papers were that they be printed and distributed principally in the same geographical area as the black
papers.
Eleven topics were selected for review: Carter's primary in
Florida; Carter's challenge by George Wallace; the stop-Carter movement; Carter's clout with black individuals or organizations; the
"ethnic purity" incident; Andrew Young as a media personality;
Carter's association with recognized black dignitaries; black issues resulting from the debates; Carter and the black ministers• use of
campaign funds; the Playboy interview; and black issues.
The data showed that the black press• coverage and opinions conform significantly with the opinions of influential leaders and of
its readership. Thus, instead of taking pioneering efforts to shape opinions and guide decisions, the black press conforms to public opinion and adjusts its coverage to maintain the status quo. The white press does a considerably better job in reporting these black events than it did in those years preceding the Kerner Commission's
Report, but it is still handicapped by cultural differences and by a lack of professional black journalists.
Jimmy Carter's black strategy and his campaign organization were his most efficient tools for amassing the black support that he needed. As a result of his having been endorsed by Georgia's most powerful and influential black leaders, he was virtually able to win black support without endorsements from either traditional black orga- nizations or from the black press.
ix CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
This thesis studies how United States newspapers covered Jimmy
Carter's 1976 presidential campaign. It examines both black and white newspapers to objectively uncover the black perspective as evidenced by published feature stories, editorials and columns. This qualita tive content analysis spans an eleven-month period from January 1976 to November 1976.
On November 2, 1976, James Earl Carter, Jr. was elected the
39th President of the United States and several of the nation's news- papers reported that large black voting blocs helped him to win. For example, the Washington Post reported that as much as 96 percent of 1 the national black population voted for Carter, and a study conducted by the Joint Center for Political Studies in Washington, D.C. backed those findings. The report stated in part that black voters over whelmingly chose Carter for he garnered an estimated 5,206,400 or 90 percent of all black votes cast. 2
Thus, election results indicate that most of the nation's black population supported Carter by November 1976; however, whether
Carter had that support throughout the entire campaign is one of the key questions that will be examined here. There are indications that
1 2
the support may have wavered throughout the campaign year and may have dipped severely at times.
For example, division among black leaders existed, as evi denced by sentiments expressed by recognized black dignitaries.
Julian Bond, aide to Rev. ~~rtin Luther King, Jr. and a black Atlanta state senator, and Rev. Jesse Jackson, a nationally recognized and influential black personality, stated emphatically that neither would back Carter. Bond, in fact, committed himself to aid Rep. Morris 3 Udall during the primary stages, and Jackson remained uncommitted.
By November, however, both men endorsed Carter.
"%at occurred in the interim to produce the change? Was the press aware of the attitudinal changes and was it reflected in elec tion coverage? How did Carter reach the main body of the black elec torate? Did black and white newspapers' coverage reflect vacillation on the part of blacks?
Objectives
A qualitative analysis will be conducted to exam1ne several aspects of the campaign and to answer the following questions: (1)
Did black publications ascertain Carter's strategy for obtaining blacks' support? (2) How did the black press observe Carter in vari ous stages of his campaign from the primaries until his election? (3)
How much attention did the white press give to black perspectives?
(4) Were the key issues in the black press covered in the white press and vice versa?
News coverage of Carter's campaign from the Iowa primary in
January 1976 to his election as the 39th U.S. President in November 3
will be studied in the following papers: the Washington Post, New
York Times, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, San Francisco
Chronicle, Christian Science Monitor, Los Angeles Sentinel, New
Pittsburgh Courier, Chicago Daily Defender, Afro-American, Amsterdam
News and Black Panther.
It is hypothesized by the researcher that the black media did not adamantly support Jimmy Carter, especially during the preliminary stages, and that the white media were more active in promoting Carter as the candidate most preferred by blacks. This theory will be studied by examining coverage of events such as Carter's "ethnic purity" statement and newspapers' editorial content during the early pr~mary stages when contenders were more frequently spotlighted.
Several areas related to Jimmy Carter's campaign have been isolated for examination. For convenience and clarification, they are classified as pre-Democratic convention and post-Democratic convention topics, although some overlap. Pre-convention topics are: Carter's primary in Florida on 9 March; the contest between Carter and George
Wallace; Carter and his association with blacks; the "stop-Carter" movement; the "ethnic purity" statement made on 6 April.
Post-convention topics are: Andrew Young's function in the campaign; Carter's association with other black dignitaries; deletion of black newspersons from news panels for the televised debates; the payments to the black ministers out of Carter's campaign funds revealed on 8 August; the Playboy interview, released in September.
The research looks at all of the news and opinion stories, excluding letters to the editor, for the issues outlined above, start ing with the Democratic primaries and ending with the election. 4
The six white newspapers were chosen for the study because (1) they are considered to be the leaders in terms of news coverage; (2) they offer politically balanced coverage; (3) they are published in the same metropolitan districts in which the selected black newspapers are published; (4) they are among the most widely circulated and influential in the nation.
In selecting black papers, several criteria were imposed.
First was that the papers be sold either through subscription or on newsstands, thus eliminating free throw-aways. Second was that they have substantial and preferably nationwide circulation. Third was that they offer full news coverage as opposed to special interest news, such as in those written for religious or fraternal groups.
Fourth was that they be available for thesis research. The selected papers meeting all of the criteria are listed above. Additional information and statistics are given in the Appendix.
Justification of the Study
The study is pertinent for several reasons. First, it should reveal if black papers contain substantially the same campaign infor mation as white papers. Second, the black press frequently has been labeled as secondary news source; therefore, it is important to gauge its news values to determine if its readership would have been as informed as they would have been by reading their white counterparts.
Third, the black leadership did not enthusiastically support Carter, yet black voters overwhelmingly endorsed him. Some black press cam paign coverage may have enhanced his popularity. It is imperative to see what the black press carried at various stages. Lastly, research 5
on black media has been severely lacking and this study should add pertinent information on the topic.
The study is also being undertaken because of a theory advanced by a black newspaper editor/publisher in 1976. The late
Robert S. Allison, editor of the Los Angeles Herald-Dispatch, com mented during the campaign that Carter was created and being "sold" to blacks by the white media. He explained that since there seemed to be immense apathy among the white voting public, the black voter had become more important during the Carter campaign. Allison said that the media had already "run Nixon out of the White House, got stuck with Ford and did not like him, but because of the Nixon coverage, had lost credibility with the public and could therefore do little to eliminate Ford." He concluded that "the white media, therefore, 4 decided to use black voting power by selling them Jimmy Carter."
In his own paper, Allison refused to grant open-ended support to Carter. However, he did not like Ford; therefore, he gave little coverage to the Republican candidate. A few articles were written about Andrew Young, and when black issues were raised during the debates he again printed election news. Did other black editors har bor similar feelings? As Allison suggested, was Jimmy Carter "sold" to blacks by the white media with little cooperation from the black press?
This thesis thus examines how the black press reported information about Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter with special emphasis on whether or not it shared similar perspectives as those of the white press. The objective will be to determine if either the 6
black or white press' news or editorial features may have indicated a
Carter/black amalgamation during election year 1976.
Scope and Definitions
The study has several limitations. It is designed to test neither black press influence nor to study black press power or black press history, although some historical data must be included to provide fundamental background information.
Several terms must be defined. The designations "black press" and "black newspapers" refer to those sources which carry news primarily about and aimed at the black community barring ownership as a factor. "White press," also labelled "establishment press," refers to newspapers which carry news of interst to the general public irrespective of specific racial make-up.
"Black news" is information about black individuals or events.
It can be published by either the black or white press. "White news"
1s primarily information about non-black individuals.
Summary
The establishment press apparently became aware of the
Carter/black relationship by linking his performance as the governor of Georgia to the rhetoric in his new campaign releases. The perspectives and viewpoints of the black press, however, have not been described even though black votes were very crucial. In fact, journalists labeled 1976 as the year of the black voter because election watchers predicted very early in the political race that 5 black voters would be extremely crucial for a Carter victory. 7
Carter's campaign staff strategically mapped out an extensive campaign to obtain needed black votes and systematically tried to convince 6 blacks that Carter was their best choice.
Given Carter's desire to dispel discomforts that blacks may have had about his Southern background, it is theorized by the researcher that Carter must have used the black press as part of his campaign strategy, but this aspect of his political strategy has remained obscure. The thesis, therefore, will examine the black press' role during the 1976 election. 8 ' '
Notes 1 Austin Scott, "Study Puts Carter's Share of the Black Vote at 94 Per Cent," Washington Post, 5 November 1976, sec. 1, p. 10. 2 The Joint Center for Political Studies, The Black Vote Election '76 (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Center for Political Studies, 1977), p. 11.
\1illiam Chapman, "Carter's Florida Base was Pervasive, Survey Shows," Washington Post," sec. 1, p. 1, 11 March 1976. 4 Robert Simms Allison, taken from a series of informal conversations with the author held at the offices of the Los Angeles Herald-Dispatch, Los Angeles, January-November 1976.
5A. Poinsette, "1976: Year of the Black Voter," Ebony, January 1977, p. 83. 6 Jonathan Moore and Janet Fraser, eds., Campaign for President: The Managers Look at '76 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1977), p. 93. CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
~his thesis examines three crucial areas, black newspapers, white newspapers and events related to the 1976 presidential campaign.
It intends to reveal important information about the campaign as a whole, about Carter's relationship with black voters, and about the black and white press' role in the overall political process. There fore, literature has been searched in the following areas: ~(1) his torical data about the black press and its political affiliations;
(2) information about the white press and its traditional role in political campaigns, including data about each paper's past political orientation; (3) information about Carter's campaign, with emphasis on campaign strategy used to attract media coverage and to obtain black support.
Because several excellent bibliographies now exist as guides to literature about the black press, they were the starting point for information in this area.
Bibliographies
The Negro in the United States--A Research Guide by Erwin
Welsch is outdated, having been published in 1965, but it effectively analyzes and reports on the state of the literature at that time. It reviews practically all of the material related directly to the black press as of 1963.1
9 10
The most complete bibliography found on blacks and the media is an unpubhshed work called "A Bibliography of the Press and the
Black Man" by Lawrence Schneider. Although it contains no references printed after 1971, it provides the most comprehensive source listing . 2 to t h at t1me.
The most complete published bibliography on black newspapers and media sources was compiled by Henry LaBrie in 1979. A Survey of
Black Newspapers in America, which was used to complement the Ayer
Directory, contains the most extensive research available on black 3 newspapers' demographics.
Also useful is Black Bibliography, assembled in 1974 by the
University of Utah Marriott Library. It lists under the heading
"Black Press" a total of twelve books and eighteen articles. Unlike the Schneider and LaBrie bibliographies which cover electronic and print media, the Utah bibliography references only articles on print media. It is not a comprehensive listing nor is it intended to be.
It lists only those materials available in the University of Utah l 1"b rar1es.. 4
The Negro in the United States, compiled by Dorothy Porter, is designed to aid students, teachers, librarians, researchers and the general public seeking guidance for studying American blacks. It is a selective rather than comprehensive guide, but is useful because it contains a section on the black press.5
The value of the Black Experience 1n the United States, com- piled by Dennis Bakewell, lies in its listing of the holdings on black studies which are contained in the library at California State Univer- sity Northridge. It references books that were available as of 1970, 11
the first anniversary of the Department of Afro-American Studies at 6 the school, but it does not include major collections on microfilm.
The Negro in America: A Bibliography, compiled by Elizabeth
Miller, is an extensive bibliographical collection. It describes
America's racial attitudes throughout United States history and references many different kinds of material including fiction, biog raphy and psychological and sociological works, including information about the black press. The section on the press is limited, however, and covers a time frame from 1946 to 1965. Eleven books and articles 7 are named.
Black Writing in the U.S.A., compiled by Pat Ryan, lists special library collections on works by and about blacks. It 1s poorly organized and does not contain a comprehensive listing because 8 funds were curtailed before the work was completed.
Black America: A Research Bibliography by Ronald Krash lists basic research materials and also contains sections on printed govern- 9 mental documents and on the black press.
Blacks in America by James M. McPherson, Laurence B. Holland and James M. Banner lists references on the black press among its 10 selections on Afro-American history and culture.
Dorothy Porter's A Working Bibliography on the Negroes in the
United States is out of print, but it contains references on the black press. Many are duplications of material found in other bibliog raphies, and as such the book does not add significantly to the body 11 of knowledge.
The Black Press: A Bibliography by Henry LaBrie is one of the most complete and comprehensive bibliographies on black journalism 12
literature through 1973. It contains citations from black literary material as well as from general-interest books, periodicals, monographs, unpublished theses, papers and newspaper articles. It is 12 an excellent source.
Indexes
Humanities Index and Social Sciences Index contain a wealth of information. Starting with the 1976 editions through the current issue, major emphasis was placed on obtaining data under the following topics: presidents, election, political, black, press, journalism, government, and the press, newspapers and Carter. Volumes between
1974 and 1976 were used to obtain data principally about the black and white press and political media studies. Thus, the subjects searched were limited to black or Negro, government, and the press, newspapers and journalism. Every available index was consulted.
Journalism Quarterly Index is also valuable as a reference.
It contains pertinent information about political research, media studies and black press studies. As with the foregoing indexes, beginning with 1976 through the current 1981 issues the topics searched included press and society, publications; special, minorities and communications, minorities and government. Prior to 1979, there was a de-emphasis on '76 Election related studies, but all of the other topics were pertinent. All volumes were reviewed.
Only the 1976 edition of the following indexes were used:
Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, New Orleans Times Picayne, New
York Times, Christian Science Monitor, Chicago Daily Tribune and
Alternative Press Index. They were needed to assist in finalizing the 13
topics to be studied; thus, additional years were not needed. Addi
tionally the Black Panther Newspaper is indexed in Alternative Press
Index; thus, it was needed only for selecting the research data for
1976.
The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature was also consulted
and again major emphasis was on the year 1976 and beyond. The purpose
of consulting the Guide was to obtain contemporary information carried
in popular magazines about Carter's campaign. The major topics
consulted, therefore, were Carter and campaign. It served as a
supplement to the scholarly indexes by providing a little information
under the topics newspapers, and Negroes or blacks. All volumes prior
to 1976 were also utilized to obtain additional information about the
latter topics. It served as a supplement to aid in gathering data
about individual newspapers.
Public Affairs Information Service Bulletin for 1974 to the
present along with its Cumulative Index for all preceding years was a valuable source particularly for articles about the '76 presidential
campaign. In addition to that topic, information was sought under the
following topics: Carter, newspapers, Negroes or blacks, political
news, press and newspapers and politics.
Phylon's Cumulative Indexes assisted 1n determining if
scholarly data existed about the black press. A search of all indexes
through 1981 issues reveals that a few studies have been done but most were conducted and related to the late-1940s through mid-1950s, which
is considered the heyday for the black press. The few contemporary
works found were instrumental in forming a characterization of the
black press. 14
Articles
As a result of the index and bibliography reviews the follow ing articles and books were uncovered and consulted. They contain the bulk of the data needed for the major study areas.
Carter and Blacks
Time in April 1976 carried an article entitled, "Why Carter
Wins the Black Vote." It proposed a theory repeated periodically throughout the campaign year which said that blacks were not extremely pro-Carter but simply anti-George Wallace, the former governor of
Alabama who challenged Carter for the nomination. Thus to ensure
Wallace's defeat he was endorsed by a few prominent blacks such as
Martin Luther King, Sr. and then-congressman Andrew Young. The article emphatically agrees with one point which will be critically examined within the body of the paper. It states that black support for Carter was not unanimous and vacillated periodically. It also suggests that many blacks may have supported other candidates 13 including Republican incumbent President Gerald Ford.
A New Republic article titled "Why Carter's Big
With Blacks" concludes that George Wallace was the main reason Jimmy
Carter had drawn so strongly among blacks. It further states that
Carter was heavily supported by blacks because of support from the
"rank and file" black Democrats. Andrew Young and Rep. Yvonne Burke, the former Congressional representative from California, were cited as 14 examples.
New Republic later ran another article which showed that
Carter may not have been as big with blacks as was originally 15
reported. Aboard a late-night flight a reporter for the New York
Daily News asked Carter about subsidized, low-income, scatter-site housing in the suburbs. He replied, "I see nothing wrong with ethnic purity being maintained. I would not force racial integration of a neighborhood by government action. But I would not permit discrimina- tion against a family moving into the neighborhood." His "ethnic pur- ity" remarks got Carter into trouble with blacks and northern liberals 15 whose support he needed. The follow-up article "Sticks and Stones," printed after Carter made that remark, reveals that some prominent blacks were not Carter supporters. The article also attempts to 16 explain what Carter meant by the comment.
Newsweek also reviewed the "ethnic purity" incident in an article titled "Blacks and Politics '76." Featured was a picture of
Carter being embraced by Martin Luther King, Sr. The photograph was reprinted that year 1n almost every U.S. publication, eventually becoming the symbol of black support. Carter, after becoming the official Democratic nominee, incorporated the photo in several cam- pa1gn. a d s. 17
A frequently mentioned and often publicized item was Carter's relationship with black minister Andrew Young. Shelton Smith,
Professor Emeritus of American Religious Thought at Duke University, discusses this in his article, "Black Power and Jimmy Carter," pub- lished in Christianity and Crisis. He explains that blacks' identifi- cation with Carter was in the person of Andrew Young and not so much in Carter himself. In essence, he credits Young with being the 18 pu 111ng. power w1t. h"1n t h e carter campa1gn. . 16
Young, unlike other campaign unknowns, gained press space and was consulted for his opinions, which he offered in an article in The
Nation titled "Why I support Jimmy Carter."
The skillfully written article tells of Carter's moral and personal religious convictions. He paints a picture of a man coura geous enough to be a Navy submariner, yet humble and compassionate enough to "learn love from his mother, one of the truly great women of our time." He disassociates Carter from the old South and firmly establishes him within the context of the new progressive South. He discredits George Wallace and makes sure to associate Carter with ele 19 ments with which blacks could identify.
Ebony Magazine's 1977 "Annual Progress Report" said that never
~n the nation's two-hundred-year history have black votes played such a major role in nominating and electing a president. The report attributes Carter's popularity to his early and relentless courting of blacks, his promises to ensure a fair and equitable government, his pledges of sensitivity to the poor and to blacks, and his showcasing of prominent blacks in his campaign.
Only one article was found containing adverse comments about the Carter/black tie. This was in the 17 April edition of The Nation.
Julian Bond, an influential black Georgia state representative and follower of the late Dr. King, contributed "Why I Don't Support Jimmy
Carter." It is designed as an opposing view to the Andrew Young article, but is not a very critical analysis, and has little of the force, convictions or power of the Young article. Instead of giving specific reasons for not supporting Carter, Bond explains why he 17
preferred to support other potential Democratic contenders such as 21 George McGovern and Hubert Humphrey.
Carter and the White Press
How the white press covered the Carter campaign was the sub- ject of a January 1977 Columbia Journalism Review article titled
"Reporting the 1976 Campaign." The series of mini-articles is written by journalists and media critics who take a very dim view of the press' performance.
Sanford J. Unger's title "By Trivia Obsessed" characterizes his feelings about the campaign coverage as does " The Triumph of Junk
News" by James McCartney. Unger is the Washington editor of the
Atlantic Monthly and McCartney is a Washington-based national corres- pondent for the Knight Newspaper Group. In "A View From the Inside,"
Walter Means, a special correspondent for the Associated Press, main- tains that were it not for the televised debates, news coverage would 22 have been worse--"all Playboy and no work."
The series is rounded out with articles by Herbert Gans, pro- fessor of sociology at Columbia University by Knight-Ridder correspon- dent Philip Meyer, who says that reporters fell for the simplest traps laid by partisan sources with biased data, and by Time magazine correspondents Lawrence Barrett and Jay Rosenstein. All conclude that overall coverage was trivial, superficial, and generally very poor.
They feel that the press was skilfully mainpulated by the candidates and that journalists did little to clarify issues for the reading . 23 pu bl ~c. 18
"The Chronicle: Schizophrenia by the Bay" by David Rubin and
William Rivers gives the most complete sketch of the San Francisco
Chronicle. The article serves as a supplement to several books 24 characterizing the newspapers chosen for the study.
Time magazine contained a useful article, "Ten Best American
Dailies," which provided guidance in deciding which papers were to be selected for the study. The author analyzes which papers are considered the ten best white newspapers in the country and why. The article aided this researcher in establishing criteria for papers to . h" h . 25 b e use d ~n t ~s t es~s.
Media Strategy
Churchill Roberts' article "Media Use and Difficulty of
Decision in the 1976 Presidential Campaign" was reviewed only because the '76 campaign was the focus of the study. The findings suggest some of the ways in which the mass media can be used in an election campaign. The article made no specific references to Carter's media strategy but pointed out instead how candidates can achieve the most effective results by means of specified media during various stages in . 26 t h e campa~gn.
"Newspaper Coverage of the 1976 and 1978 Presidential
Campaigns" by John Russonello and Frank Wolf studies changes in the ways that the press covers presidential campaigns. The authors study three newspapers during the last four weeks of the campaign. Two of the newspapers are the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune.
However, the data in their findings could not be adapted for the 27 present study, so the article is valuable only as background. 19
Black Press
Columbia Journalism Review provides a useful article on the black press in its Spring 1970 issue. The article, "The Black Press in Transition," is not a comprehensive study since it focuses primar ily on the two so-called unorthodox circulation giants, Muhammad
Speaks and the Black Panther. The author compares their approach to journalism with that of the more traditional black press and proceeds to name the top twenty-five black newspapers. It provides an update on the state of the black press as of 1970 and aided in determining 28 the criteria for the black papers to be used for this study.
In 1971 Henry LaBrie and William Zima tried to determine by means of a survey which direction the black press would take in future years. Their findings are reported in the article "Directional Quan daries of the Black Press in the United States." They identify and characterize the post-civil-rights-era press as they attempt to learn from black editors what types of approaches the black press should take, what kinds of audiences they attract and what their conceived roles are in relationship to their white counterparts. The article 29 helped formulate the most up-to-date overview of the black press.
After Gunner Myrdal's study, An American Dilemma, was pub lished 1n 1946, James A. Bayton and Ernestine Bell abstracted one aspect of Myrdal's findings about the black press and followed them up with a mini-study. The results are reported in "The Role of the Negro
Press." Since it was completed in 1951, the study is dated but it is one of a few studies which tries to determine the effects that the 20
black press has on its readership. They conclude that black papers
are a minimum factor in influencing black actions and that most blacks 30 react negatively to the black press 1n general.
One black press study completed in 1980 attempts to determine
how the black protest movement may have affected black press
reporting. Charlotte G. O'Kelly studied the relationship between the
black press and several peak protest periods between 1946 and 1972 and
concludes that the black press has changed very little over the years.
According to O'Kelly, the reason that the black press has not changed 31 is that blacks' problems have not changed.
Books
Since Carter's election, the number of books written about
him, his family and the campaign has increased. Those most pertinent
for the study are those containing analyses of this campaign, campaign
strategy, and the white press and black press. Additional sources
utilized contained descriptive material about campaign strategy.
Carter Campaign
Running for President by Martin Schram presents a journalist's
v1ew of Carter's campaign. It outlines his strategy, gives impres-
sions of his campaign platform and includes strategical data about how
he strove for black votes. It additionally highlights unsuccessful
presidential hopefuls and tells why Carter won when the odds suggested . 32 otherw1se.
American Journal--The Events of 1976 by Elizabeth Drew
substantially duplicates the Schram book. Like most of the books written about Carter's campaign, emphasis is placed on why he won when 21 $ •
other more popular contenders were in the race. It highlights cam paign tactic differences and points to the changes in federal election 33 guidelines that aided Carter's victory.
Jonathan Moore and Janet Fraser's Campaign for President is one of the most candid books about Carter's campaign. Carter's cam paign workers and several journalists explain different aspects of the campaign, including how and why certain strategies worked for certain political contenders but not for others. They also delve into the nuances of the decision-making process used by campaign managers, 34 directors and media people.
How Jimmy Won--The Victory Campaign From Plains to the White
House by William Morrow explains how Carter overcame the odds against his victory. It explores the Carter/black relationship and demon strates how Carter's heritage enriched that relationship. The book provides a step-by-step analysis of what Carter did to win, outlining 35 each phase of his campaign.
Essays by five political scientists constitute The Election of
1976, edited by Marlene Pomper. The editor reports the results and 36 probes the political significance of the '76 election.
Dasher by James Wooten is called the story of the roots and the rising of Jimmy Carter, and covers Carter's campaign from a working journalist's viewpoint. Wooten gives great insight into
Carter's folksy, down-home mannerisms and explores how this approach 37 enhanced his relationship with blacks.
The three volumes of The Presidential Campaign 1976 were exceptionally worthwhile sources. Volume I outlines Carter's positions on all issues discussed during the campaign. Its coverage 22
starts with Carter's formal candidacy announcement in December 1974 and ends with the formal campaign opening as his party's nominee in
September 1976. Reprinted material includes texts of major speeches, press conferences, question-and answer-sessions with the media and special groups, position papers and key speeches made as governor of
Georgia and reused during the campaign.
Volume II starts with the campaign opening in Georgia and terminates with Carter's election in November 1976. It contains reprints of campaign speeches, including formal and informal debates with President Ford. Also included is the sole reference to the black media taken from a conference that Carter held with black newspaper editors during the campaign. No other source contained this information.
Volume III covers the actual debates and includes full transcripts of the exchanges between Carter and then-President Ford and between their vice presidential running mates, Democratic Senator
Walter L~ Mondale and Senator Robert Dole. It includes the background and genesis of the debates, reactions to the debates by participating journalists, foreign coverage and plans for debates in future presi- d ent1a. 1 e 1 ect1ons. . 38
The Man From Plains by David Kurcharshy attempts to clarify the mystery of how Carter rose from relative obscurity to Democratic party nominee to President in a one-year span. It also attempts to provide guidelines to help the reader understand and evaluate the man 39 an d h 1s• way o f t h"1n k" 1ng.
Cousin Beedie and Cousin Hot, written by the President's cousin Hugh Carter, was denounced by the President's mother as untrue 23
in parts. It describes life with the Carter clan in Georgia and gives the author's personal impression of the President and what made him 40 decide to runa
White House Watch--The Ford Years by John Osborne profiles
Gerald Ford. The book is resourceful bcause it reveals how Ford perce1ve. d carter ' s campa1gn. . 41
The Invisible Primary by Arthur Hadley concentrates on the political period between one presidential election and the beginning of the next official campaign season. During 1973 to 1975 Carter was 42 st1.11 cons1.d ere d a m1nor, . wea k un known.
Promises to Keep--Carter's First Hundred Days by Robert Shogan evaluates Carter's first hundred days in office by comparing his cam- paign promises with his actual performance during his early White 45 House days. It provides a few insights into his campaign strategy.
The Great Debates: Carter vs. Ford, 1976, edited by Sidney
Kraus, documents and records events and actions that brought about the
1976 Carter-Ford debates, investigates the way in which the electorate used the debates and assesses the effect they had on voting decisions and on the campaign generally. It provides verbatim transcripts of the four debates and presents the research done on the 1960
Kennedy-Nixon debates, pointing sut similarities between both. It also focuses on ethnic voters and explains how black voters became 44 important to Carter's race.
President Carter, edited by Margaret Thompson, presents an overview of the President and his administration by providing in-depth political and biographical profiles of Carter and his staff. It includes an account of Carter's rise from political obscurity through 24
his narrow election victory in November 1976. It also contains a
survey of his major policy initiatives during the first two months of h1s. pres1.d ency. 45
Betty Glad's book Jimmy Carter In Search of the Great White
House gives a thorough analysis of Carter's campaign strategy and his relationship throughout the year with the media. She gives some of
the few available insights into how Carter and the media privately 46 viewed each other.
The Presidency and the Press, edited by Hoyt Purvis, deals primarily with a President's relationship with the media once he takes office. It includes comments by journalists about campaigns they have 47 covered, including the Carter campaign.
PR as in President gives a "mediascopic"-eye view into a cam- paign from television and print angles and describes how media people view the election process. The Presidential Campaign assesses the
effectiveness of the presidential selection process in choosing acceptable candidates, developing issues and giving voters information 48 upon wh 1c. h to b ase rat1ona . 1 d ec1s1ons. . .
Media"Power"Politics by David Paletz and Robert Entman con-
tains some very crucial data about Carter's relationship with the
press during his campaign. The author reveals how presidential candi-
dates can successfully manipulate the media. Additionally, they
demonstrate how media content can affect public opinions, and how it
can undermine attempts by ordinary citizens desiring to participate in . . 49 po 11t1CS.
Media Agenda-Setting in a Presidential Election by David
Weaver, Doris Graber, Maxwell McCombs and Chaim Eyal is a year-long 25
study of the 1976 election which takes a look at the entire presiden- tial election year. It combines several techniques including a content analysis of major newspapers in the cities of Indianpolis,
Indiana; Evanston, Illinois and Lebanon, New Hampshire. Portions of the book pertain directly to the present study. For example, the researchers concentrate on the role that newspapers play in piquing voter interest, exploring campaign issues and exploiting candidates' images. Several issues are isolated and analyzed with respect to voter concerns and me d1a. emp h as1s. . 50
The Making of Campaign Strategy by Marjorie Randon is useful because it describes in detail what is involved in selling a candidate to the public, and Political Campaign Management--A Systems Approach by Arnold Steinberg states some of the fundamental considerations which each presidential candidate must make before and after deciding to run. It explains the concept of strategy and gives examples of 51 tools used by political strategists.
The White Press
The Makers of Modern Journalism by Kenneth Stewart and John
Tebbel is a biographical history of white newspapers in America. It describes each editor's political affiliation and thus the usual political orientation of the papers. All of the papers used for the study are briefly described. The authors review how the editors themselves contribute to their region's histories and how the papers influence historical events. Much of the contemporary material is based upon the authors' personal experience and upon contacts and 52 interviews with editors and publishers. 26
American Newspapers in the 1980's by Ernest Hynds reviews all
of the white newspapers being used for the study and their political
affiliations. The author's intent is to show that a paper's reported
reputation, i.e. liberal, conservative or moderate, affects the
manner in which its stories and editorials are perceived. It gives
excellent descriptions of each paper with insight into each one's
national and international rankings according to several major polls. 53 It also contains the most contemporary analysis of the black press.
The most recent edition of the Ayer Directory of Publications i was used to provide statistical data on all of the papers, including 54 their locations, publication statistics, and circulation figures.
The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass
Media by Edwin Emery and Michael Emery relates journalism history to
political, economic and social progress. It contains descriptions of
the major white newspapers in America and also a small amount of
black press history, but the black press descriptions are
1ncomp. 1 ete. 55
The Black Press
Blacks in Communications by M. L. Stein provides the most
contemporary source about blacks working in the communications media.
It is not an encyclopedia of all blacks engaged in journalism, but
provides a handy reference of the best-known people. It also con-
tains the most complete and descriptive material available about the 56 largest black newspapers.
The most renowned and complete publication to study the black
social structure is Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma. He devotes
__ _j 27
large portions of his book to describing the power and influence that
the black press has had over its readers. Most significantly, he
enhances the theory that the black press is an extremely powerful,
influential opinion leader, making it a potentially crucial element 1n
any political campaign where black votes are sought. He maintains
that most blacks who can read are exposed to the influential black
press. The reseach was published in 1946 and as a result, the 57 1n. f ormat1on . 1s very date d •
Frederick Detweiler's The Negro Press in the United States
gives a brief content description of many black journals, and
information about the black press characteristics. It is a valued 58 research tool.
The Black Press U.S.A. by Roland Wolseley was written to
provide information about the ethnic press at a time when black
citizens and their problems, interests and enterprises had taken on new importance. This brief and excellent history examines the modern black press, describes types of material offered, characterizes past and present reporters and editors, explains training and educational
problems and expounds upon opportunities for black journalists.59
Another useful reference about the black press is Perspectives of the Black Press, 1974, edited by Henry LaBrie. It is the first and only complete collection by prominent research scholars in black
journalism. They attempt to define the modern black press to show that there has been and still is a viable black press in America, to
show that the black press has had a significant impact on social
improvements since its foundings, to establish that the sacrifices 28 " of black editors/publishers have gone unnoted and to demonstrate that alternative mass media are capable of providing a service to a targeted audience. Hence they provide a v1ew contrary to that which had been presented by other sources and thus another perspective of 60 the black press.
The Negro Newspaper by Vishu Oak was originally printed in
1948 with a reprinted version in 1970. Since the reprinted version is not an update, the data presented is very outdated. It gives a critical evaluaton of the press, maintaining that newspapers have already lost a major part of their leadership in molding public opinion. It contains a state directory of black papers including each 61 one's inception year and circulation figures for 1948.
I. Garland Penn's The Afro-American Press and its Editors was published to promote the future welfare of black journalism by telling the story of its editors and pioneers. It contains no current 62 information about the present status of the black press.
Forum for Protest: The Black Press During World War II by Lee
Finkle concentrates on the black press' function during World War II 63 and characterizes the papers during the 1940s.
The Black Vote Election '76, the survey quoted by the
Washington Post immediately following the election, gives statistics on nationwide black voting patterns for Jimmy Carter. It contains information about voting districts and covers both national and reg1ona. 1 e 1 ect1ons. . 64 29
Review of the Literature for Methodology
The study, a content analysis, uses a descriptive qualitative approach. Thus, the literature reviewed focuses on several aspects of content analysis. First, it necessitates defining content analysis.
Then, based upon this definition, it determines how content analysis is characterized, whether or not content analysis is the most appro priate means for accomplishing the study's objectives and possible problems which could result by using a qualitative approach.
Books
Content Analysis in Communications Research by Bernard
Berelson serves as a foundation by presenting the fundamentals of con tent analysis. The present edition is a facsimile of the original book which was written in 1952 and contains updated information rela tive to Berelson's 1952 definition. His original definition of con tent analysis is given, then a chapter is included in which he redefines quantification and justifies using a qualitative analysis.
The book is a very thorough and detailed description of content 65 analysis and how it can be used most effectively.
Content Analysis of Communications by Richard Budd, Robert
Thorp and Ferris Donohew also defines content analysis. Additionally, the authors define at least six developmental stages that an analyst must utilize in order to perform a good content study. Their emphasis is oriented towards the quantitative approach and nothing is said about qualitative studies. It does contain a good bibliography of books and articles which further explore content analysis.66 30
Mass Communications: A Sociological Perspective by Charles R.
Wright focuses primarily on electronic media but defines content analy- sis. It quotes Berelson and labels the key terms of the definition as
"objective" and "systematic." The preface of the book explains that examples of both qualitative and quantitative approach would be given 67 throughout the book, but no clear delineation ever surfaces.
The Analysis of Communications Content, edited by George
Gerber, Ole Holsti, Klause Krippendorff, William Paisley and Philip
Stone, contains a series of studies which grew out of a conference held in 1967 at the Annenberg School of Communications. A new defini- tion of content analysis, advanced by Klaus Krippendorff, downplays the need for quantification by stating that the research methods must be replicable and valid. He states that the qualitative procedure can be equally rigorous and that quantification does not guarantee objectivity. The findings at the Annenberg Conference apparently mark the beginning of greater acceptance for using a qualitative approach . . h 68 ~n commun~cat~ons researc •
Mass Communications Research--Major Issues and Future Direc- tions, edited by W. Phillip Davison and Frederick T. C. Yu, further demonstrates how the qualitative approach can be used successfully
The authors indicate that the total field of communications research has advanced tremendously since Berelson's original study and that one of the marks of that advancement is the successful integration of qualitative and quantitative materials. They conclude, however, that 69 the combined strategies still need considerable exploration.
Methods of Research in Communications, edited by Philip Emmert and William Brooks, contains one chapter devoted to content analysis. 31
John Waithe Bowers extols the virtues of content analysis as the ideal method for conducting psycholinguistics and literary research. He makes no clear distinction between quantitative and qualitative analysis but outlines specific steps involved in any content analysis and warns of certain pitfalls that researchers can stumble into by 70 using the method.
Content Analysis--A Technique for Systematic Inference from
Communications by Thomas F. Carney praises content analysis as a unique technique aimed at improving the quality of inferences made.
He cites a few definitions of content analysis which have been presented over the years by other communications specialists, then he formulates one of his own. The book is one of the most complete on content analysis because he points out the limitations of the tech- nique, how it is best utilized, what it should be used for, what types of questions should be answered quantitatively, and how the current trend of combining quantitative and qualitative approaches can broaden commun1cat1ons. . researc h • 71
Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities by Ole
Holsti is also a frequently quoted and complete source. Holsti's definition of content analysis is quoted almost as much as Berelson's.
He states that content analysis was developed specifically for investigating communications problems and is the most basic tool to be used for such. The qualitative/quantitative problem is explored and the use of a totally quantitative approach is labeled as too restrictive. He also cites problems which are inherent in using a purely qualitative approach, then warns that care must be taken while designing a content analysis so that it will yield the desired 32
information. The book is a very good source and contains a good 72 bibliography.
An Introduction to Content Analysis by Richard Budd and Robert
Thorp explores the differences between quantitative and qualitative methods. This useful handbook contains an annotated bibliography of articles on content analysis. Also provided are research guidelines designed to be used for drawing up and completing projects.73
Articles
"Editorials and Foreign Affairs in the 1964 Presidential Cam- paign" provides an excellent example of how content analysis can be most effective in a political study. The study is arranged similarly to the proposed study in that it examines political content in ten prestigious American newspapers during a presidential campaign. This approach demonstrates an excellent combination of quantitative qnd qual1tat1ve. . ana 1 ys1s. . 74
"The Negro Press 1n the 1948 Presidential Election" by Cecelia
Van Auken can serve almost as a prototype for the present study. A qualitative approach is taken, but the data is obtained through a combination content analysis and survey. The researcher draws out elements in the campaign which affected black interests and examines 75 how t h ey were treate d 1n. e d"1tor1a . 1 an d news content.
"Newspaper Objectivity in the 1952 Campaign" by Malcolm W.
Klein and Nathan Maccoby is another content study dealing with a presidential campaign. Although the method is quantitative, the study demonstrates the type of subject breakdown that could be workable, to determine what crucial elements in a news story should be examined; 33
76 I..e., headlines, editorial content, story locations, etc.
"A Study of Political News in the Major Dailies" is another politically oriented content study which combines quantitative and qualitative procedures. The study is qualitative in that an interpretive narrative is used for news stories to point out certain data and quantitative in analyzing instances of severe disparity in the length and frequency of stories appearing in papers dealing with t h e same 1.nc1.. "d ent. 77
"The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis" by Siegfried
Kracauer is the most detailed article found to explore the merits of using a qualitative content procedure. The article submits three propositions regarding the significance of qualitative interpretations for communications research and justifies each one. The author maintains that an overemphasis on quantification tends to lessen the . 78 accuracy o f ana 1 ys1.s.
"Negro Exposure in Look's Editorial Content" provides an excellent look at the effective use of content analysis for studying editorial material. The study is quantitative but contains many e 1 ements t h at can b e a d apte d to a qua 1 I.tatl.ve. . proce d ure. 79
Summary
Black Press
Information about the black press is catalogued in bibliog- raphies, which makes many of the sources relatively easy to locate.
However, the majority of the bibliographies were compiled between 1970 and 1973, making black press information generated after that time more difficult to locate. A few references containing general 34 journalistic research sources have identified studies on the black press, but very little scholarly research has been completed since
1974.
Relatively few good sources exist, and of those which do exist most were written during the late 40s through mid 50s--which are considered the peak years for the influential black press. For example, Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma, completed in 1946, remains the most comprehensive, most influential and most frequently quoted source. This work along with only one other, also completed during the late 40s, are the only two sources which discuss the political affiliations of the newspapers chosen for the thesis. Both analyses were made prior to the massive 1960s civil rights transition and movement when ideologies may have changed.
Even though the thesis is not a historical study, historical data about individual black newspapers would have been useful. While attempting to locate such data, it became apparent that there is not one published, full length, up-to-date history of the black press available. Roland Wolseley observed in his 1974 essay, '~hy Research the Black Press?" that only a minute handful of black journalistic figures have been the subject of biographies. There has been little research into the effects of the black press and its intended readers, its impact upon black and non-black readers or upon civic affairs.
Its contributions to the civil rights movement have not been probed and most of the work which has been produce? has been done by a few 80 scholars.
One article was located which attempted to show how the black press fared historically during civil rights movements, but since 35 individual papers were not analyzed and since the author's objective was to compare the types of coverages over four different periods, the findings proved irrelevant for the research being undertaken.
Among the few books which address the black press, the majority are dated and few are of high literary and scholarly quality.
One of the foremost scholars in black journalism, Henry LaBrie, observed innumerable times that research is hampered by little or no response and/or cooperation from those persons who can provide the 81 most data. Thus, very little contemporary material exists about the black press.
The study should contribute some information about the black press's role in the political process of electing a United States
President. It should reveal if and how it may have been used by
Carter's campaign planners and reveal a little about its current political orientation.
White Press
In contrast to the relatively meager research that has been done on the black press, white press studies are abundant, very well documented and easy to locate. In indexes and bibliographies, there are volumes of information about such topics as media influence, the press and politics, the press'. role in presidential campaigns and press history. Studies are ongoing, contemporary, very comprehensive, and provide a wealth of information and documentation from prior presidential campaigns, including that of 1976.
When isolating one specific area of white press research which attempts to characterize the specific newspapers to be used in the 36 study, the information is condensed in a very few sources. For example, all of the white newspapers being used for the study are among the oldest and most influential in the United States. Most have volumes of historical data about them, about their editors and about their growth. The majority have been subjected to different kinds of research at one time or another and most have been analyzed in a variety of ways, but few contemporary references have specifically attempted to define their political affiliations. Most of the data was done over a decade ago, especially that dealing with the San
Francisco Chronicle.
The press'. relationship with Carter and its performance in
1976 has come under critical scrutiny, and several books written primarily by media people document that overall media performance was superficial. There appears to be a general consensus among the media personnel that Carter masterminded the art of media manipulation and the one article which addresses the issue in detail concludes that press performance left much to be desired.
The sources have collectively acknowledged that there was little depth to the coverage given to the candidates in 1976, but none attempts to substantiate any variances noted based upon each paper's noted political bias. The content study, therefore, will be the first scientific, comprehensive, comparative analysis of newspaper coverage of several key campaign events. The results will reveal what kinds of coverage Carter received in 1976 by the largest United States newspapers. 37
Carter Campaign
The popular magazines did an excellent job individually of determining how Carter's unfolding campaign strategy included specific material designed to attract a large black following. Throughout the campaign year their pages discussed the role that blacks were playing
1n his campaign. The books confirm that he had definitely made plans to attract a large black constituency and that a black strategy was evident.
Because Carter rose from relative obscurity to become the nation's chief executive in such a short time span, there is an abun dance of literature examining this phenomenon. The books, primarily by media people who covered his campaign, probe into the personality traits of his media staff, critically examine their media strategy, detail what they did to obtain the coverage received and explore how the national press corps made Jimmy Carter acceptable to voters.
Most sources realize that black voters were courted religously by Carter, and several examine the approach Carter took to build his relationship with the grass roots agencies in black neighborhoods and with black ministers. Many scrutinize his "born-again" approach to show how effectively it worked in unifying black strength nationally.
However, the black press'.· function is ignored.
The periodicals further ignore this aspect even in the wake of their attempts to print information from the black perspective. None sought out black press personnel as authoritative sources to obtain an overview about how their readerships may have collectively viewed the
Southern-born candidate. 38
As stated previously, most media personnel have decried the
campaign coverage during 1976. When viewing the media role in
Carter's campaign several writers have stated that the individuals
sent to provide Carter coverage were unable to break out of the cocoon
that Carter's media directors had woven tightly around them. Many
believe that a conflict of interest exists, in that candidates fre
quently provide such benefits as telephone service, typewriters and
even transportation for reporters traveling with them. }funy, however,
criticize Carter for being dishonest with media personnel, and many
think that too many inexperienced reporters were assigned during his
early campaign days. All of these points are expressed innumerable
times in the books written about Carter's campaign. Thus the press'
perspective about Carter's campaign ~s evident.
The black press' perspective, on the other hand, was still
not revealed because, significantly, black reporters were not assigned
by major white newspapers to provide Carter coverage. Carter met once with black editors and publishers during 1976 and he answered ques
tions posed by them. It is not evident, nor can it be determined from
this brief exposure, whether or not he sought their support, as he did with the white press, nor whether or not they supported him. Nor do
studies reveal what information the black press ran about him and if
it even reported information about his campaign progress with blacks
throughout the campaign year.
The thesis will fill several gaps by examining the political
involvement of the black press by systematically determining what the white press carried about key issues to discern if its coverage was fairly uniform nation-wide, and by noting if Carter's campaign 39
objectives to secure black support included the black press as a political tool.
Methodological Sources
The methodological sources uncovered establish that content analysis is the most appropriate method for accomplishing the study's objective. The most valuable references were those which (1) define content analysis (2) characterize how a proper content study should be conducted and (3) attempt to delineate between quantitative and qualitative analysis.
Since Berelson was one of the original communications experts to define content analysis, his book serves as the foundation from which most of the communications researchers drew their data. His theory on content analysis dominated the field from 1952, when his definition was advanced, until 1967, when another definition emerged which contradicted several tenets of Berelson's definition. It was formulated by a group of scholars at the Annenberg conference.
Ironically, even though a popular definition for content analysis did not emerge until 1952, the technique is much older. It is exhibited by the articles found which demonstrate successful applications of the technique. One of the research projects was published prior to 1952 and the only article found which specifically addresses itself to content analysis was also written in the early
1950s.
In 1971 a facsimile of Berelson's 1952 work was published, in which the author incorporated new information and gave an update on successful content research projects.. His original work is still 40
formidable and practically every source contains his original defini
tion as a basis for research and theories. Even his updated theories
are influential.
A few scholars have dominated the field. After Berelson, the
second most frequently quoted is Ole R. Holsti. Holsti's book, writ
ten in 1969, is a much better source for research scholars because,
besides defining content analysis, he carefully states and illustrates how it can be applied to research projects. Included are examples of when or when not to use quantification, and instances of how to
integrate qualitative and quantitative techniques.
Generally scholars recognize qualitative analysis as a useful
research tool, even though some disagreement exists about the
technique. Articles cited above demonstrate how the technique has
been effectively used and provide models for this thesis. 41
Notes
1Erwin K. Welsch, The Negro in the United States: A Research Guide (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966).
2 Lawrence Schneider, "A Bibliography of the Press and the Black Man," 1971. 3 Henry LaBrie III, ed., A Survey of Black Newspapers in America (New York: Ferdinand Teuber, 1979). 4 Black Bibliography (Marriott: University of Utah Marriott Library, 1976). 5 Dorothy Porter, comp., The Negro in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1970). 6 Dennis C. Bakewell, comp., Black Experience 1n the United States (Northridge, California: San Fernando Valley State College Foundation, 1970).
7Elizabeth W. Miller, comp., The Negro in America: A Bibliography (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). 8 Pat M. Ryan, comp., Black Writing in the U.S.A.: A Bibliographic Guide (Brockport, New York: Drake Memorial Library, 1969).
9Ronald Krash, Black America: A Research Bibliography (St. Louis, Missouri: St. Louis Unversity, 1972). 10 James M. McPherson, Laurence B. Holland and James M. Banner, Blacks in America (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1971).
11 Dorothy Porter, A Working Bibliography on the Negro in the United States (n.p.: Xerox University Microfilm, 1969). 12 Henry LaBrie III, ed., The Black Press: A Bibliography (Kennebunk, Maine: Mercer House Press, 1973). 13 "Why Carter Wins the Black Vote," Time, 5 April 1976, p. 17. 14 Ken Bode, "Why Carter's Big With Blacks," New Republic, April 1976, p. 13. 15 Margaret c. Thompson, ed., President Carter (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1977), p. 4. 16 "Sticks and Stones," New Republic, 24 April 1976, pp. 3-5. 17 "Blacks and Politics '76," Newsweek, 26 April 1976, p. 22. 42
18H. S. Smith, "Black Power and Jimmy Carter," Christianity and Crisis, 20 September 1976, pp. 205-06.
19Andrew Young, "Why I Support Jimmy Carter," Nation, 3 April 1976, p. 3Y7. 20 A. Poinsette, "1976: Year of the Black Voter," Ebony, January 1Y77, p. 83. 21 Julian Bond, "Why I Don't Support Jimmy Carter," Nation, 17 April 1976, pp. 454-55. 22 Sanford J. Unger, "By Trivia Obsessed," Columbia Journalism Review 15 (January/February 1977): 16-17; James McCartney, "The Triumph of Junk News," Columbia Journalism Review 15 (January/February 1977): 17-21; Walter R. Means, "A View From the Inside," Columbia Journalism Review 15 (January/February 1977): 21-25.
23Herbert J. Gans, "Lessons 1976 Can Offer 1980," Columbia Journalism Review 15 (January/February 1977): 25-29; Philip Meyer, "Learning to Live With the Numbers," Columbia Journalism Review 1:> (January/February 1977): 29-35; Laurence I. Barrett, '~ow Do You Feel About How You Feel?" Columbia Journalism Review 1:> (January/February 1977): 36-37; Jay Rosenstein, ''What Became of That 'Heavy Vote'?," Columbia Journalism Review 15 (January/February 1977): 37-39. 24 David Rubin and William Rivers, "The Chronicle: Schizo phrenia by the Bay," Columbia Journalism Review 8 (Fall 1969): 37-44. 25 "The Ten Best American Dailies," Time, 21 January 1974, pp. 58-61. 26 Churchill Roberts, "Media Use and Difficulty of Decision 1n The 1976 Presidential Campaign," Journalism Quarterly 56 (Winter 1979): 794-802. 27 John Russonello and Frank Wolf, "Newspaper Coverage of the 1976 and 1978 Presidential Campaigns," Journalism Quarterly 56 (Summer 1979): 360-64. 28 L. F. Palmer, Jr., "The Black Press in Transition," Columbia Journalism Review 9 (Spring 1970): 31-36. 29 Henry LaBrie and William Zima, "Directional Quandaries of the Black Press in the United States," Journalism Quarterly 48 (vlinter 1971): 640-44, 651. 30 James A. Bayton and Ernestine Bell, "An Exploratory Study of the Role of the Negro Press," Journal of Negro Education 20 (Winter 1951): 8-15. 31 Charlotte G. O'Kelly, "Black Newspapers and the Black Protest Movement, 1946-1972," Phylon 41 (December 1980): 313-24. 43
32 Martin Schram, Running for President--The Carter Campaign (New York: Stein and Day, 1977).
33Elizabeth Drew, American Journal: The Events of 1976 (New York: Random House, 1977).
34Jonathan Moore and Janet Fraser, eds., Campaign for President (Cambridge,Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1977).
35william Morrow, How Jimmy Won--The Victory Campaign From Plains to the White House (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1977). 36 Marlene M. Pomper, ed., The Election of 1976 (New York: David McKay Co., 1977). 37 James Wooten, Dasher--The Roots and the Rising of Jimmy Carter (New York: Summit Books, 1978). 38 u.s. Committee on House Administration, U.S. House of Repre sentatives, The Presidential Campaign 1976, 3 Vols. (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1978). 39 David Kurgharshy, The Man From Plains (Barton, Massa chusetts: G. K. Hall & Co., 1977). 40 Hugh Carter as told to Fances Spatz, Cousin Beedie and Cousin Hot (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1978). 41 John Osborne, White House Watch--The Ford Years (Washington, D.C.: New Republic Books, 1977).
42 Arthur T. Hadley, The Invisible Primary (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976).
43 Robert Shogan, Promises to Keep (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Comparny, 1977). 44 sidney Kraus, The Great Debates: Carter vs. Ford 1976 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979).
45 Thompson, President Carter. 46 Betty Glad, Jimmy Carter--In Search of the Great White House (Nw York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1980. 47 Hoyt Purvis, ed., The Presidency and the Press (Austin: The University of Texas, 1976). 48 vic Gold, PR as in President (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1977); Stephen Hess, The Presidential Campaign 44
49 David L. Paletz and Robert M. Entman, Media Power Politics (New York: Free Press, 1981).
50David Weaver, Doris Graber, Maxwell McCombs and Chaim M. Eyal, Media Agenda--Setting in a Presidential Election (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981).
51 Marjorie Randon, The Making of Campaign Strategy (Lexington, Massachusestts: Hershey-Lexington Books, 1974); Arnold Steinberg, Political Campaign Management: A Systems Approach (Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath & Co., 1976).
52Kenneth Stewart and John Tebbel, Makers of Modern Journalism (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952). 53 Ernest Hynds, American Newspapers 1n the 1980s (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1980).
54•81 Ayer Directory of Publications (Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania: Ayer Press, 1981.
55Edwin Emery and Michael Emery, The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1978).
56M. L. Stein, Blacks in Communication (New York: Julian Messner, 1972).
57 Gunner Myrdal, An American Dilemma, Vol. II (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1946), pp. 909-11. 58 Frederick G. Detweiler, The Negro Press in the United States (College Park, Maryland: HcGrath Publishing Co., 1968). 59 . Roland E. Wolseley, The Black Press, U.S.A. (Ames: The Iowa State University Press, 1971). 60 Henry G. LaBrie III, ed., Perspectives of the Black Press: 1974 (Kennebunk, Maine: Mercer House Press, 1974). 61 vishu V. Oak, The Negro Newspaper (Westport, Connecticut: Negro Universities Press, 1948; reprinted., 1970). 62 I. Garland Penn, The Afro-American Press and Its Editors (New York: Arno and the New York Times, 1969).
63 Lee Finkle, Forum for Protest: The Black Press During World War II (Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1975). 64 The Joint Center for Political Studies, The Black Press During World War II (Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1975). 45
65Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communications Research (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1952; reprinted., 1971).
66Richard Budd, Robert Thorp and Ferris Donohew, Content Anaysis of Communications (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967).
67charles R. Wright, Mass Communication: A Sociological Perspective (New York: Random House, 1959).
68George Gerbner, Ole R. Holsti, Klause Krippendorff, William J. Paisley and Philip J. Stone, eds., The Analysis of Communications Content (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1969).
69w. Phillip Davison and Frederick T. C. Yu, eds., Mass Communications Research--Major Issues and Future Directions (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974).
70Philip Emmert and William Brooks, eds., Methods of Research 1n Communications (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970).
71 Thomas F. Carney, Content Analysis--A Technique for Systematic Inference from Communications (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1972).
72o1e Holsti, Conent Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969).
73 Richard Budd and Robert Thorp, An Introduction to Content Analysis (Iowa City: State University of Iowa Press, 1963).
74David S. Myers, "Editorials and Foreign Affairs in the 1964 Presidential Campaign," Journalism Quarterly 47 (Summer 1968): 211-18.
75 cecelia VanAuken, "The Negro Press in the 1948 Presidential Election," Journalism Quarterly 26 (December 1948): 431-35.
76Malcolm W. Klein and Nathan Maccoby, "Newspaper Objectivity 1n the 1952 Campaign," Journalism Quarterly 31 (Summer 1954): 285-96.
77 charles W. Zuegner, "A Study of Political News in the Major Dailies," Journalism Quarterly 33 (Winter 1956): 222-24.
78siegfried Kracauer, "The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis," Public Opinion Quarterly 16 (Winter 1952-53): 6J1-41.
79verdelle Lambert, "Negro Exposure in Look's Editorial Content," Journalism Quarterly 42 (Winter 1965): 657-59.
80LaBrie, Perspectives of the Black Press, 1974: pp. 4-8. 81 LaBrie and Zima, "Directional Quandaries of the Black Press, pp. 641-42. CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
This thesis examines coverage of Jimmy Carter's presidential campaign Ln black and white newspapers from January 1976 through
November 1976 using qualitative content analysis. It focuses on specific events which occurred at intervals throughout the election year. The events are divided into two categories: those which occurred prior to the 1976 Democratic National Convention and those which occurred after.
The Topics
The topics were chosen by a three-way comparison. First, the indexes of four of the white newspapers were scanned for topics related to the Carter campaign. The indexes used were the Chicago
Tribune Index, Los Angeles Times Index, Washington Post Index and New
York Times Index. Abstracted from these were several topics which were common to all papers. Secondly, headlines from the Afro
American, Amsterdam News, Chicago Defender, Pittsburgh Courier and Los
Angeles Sentinel were scanned to determine common topics in the black papers. Both lists were then consolidated to finalize the controlled subjects.
Preconvention topics and a brief summary of their significance are as follows:
46 47
1. Carter's primary in Florida. The Florida primary, held on
March 9, 1976, was a crucial one for Carter. It was imperative that he win for several reasons. In the previous presidential election
year, George Wallace had won massive support from Floridians. Wallace
had already successfully challenged Carter in other Southern states,
and it appeared as if he would defeat Carter in Florida. A win for
Carter was tantamount to a vote of confidence that the South was now
ready to endorse a man more liberal and more representative of the
"new" South. It further meant the demise of George Wallace as a
presidential candidate and the recognition of Jimmy Carter as a
ser1ous. contend er. 1 Here it is assumed that black and white press
should have covered events preceding this important primary.
2. Carter's challenge by George Wallace. Both men had one
common, significant characteristic--they were Southerners. Wallace
had a well-known, well-established reputation as an old-line, con-
servative, unbending, ante-bellum-type segregationalist. Little was
known about Jimmy Carter other than that he hung a portrait of the
late civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. in the state capitol when he was the governor of Georgia. Wallace thus became the embodi- ment of the old South while Jimmy Carter was a personification of the 2 new. An opportunity for comparisons was available to black and white
editors.
3. The "stop-Carter" movement. Jimmy Carter was very sue-
cessful early in the political race by winning practically every
primary that he entered. He was still a relative unknown, however,
and had not completely convinced the established Democratic hierarchy
that he could carry the party to an ultimate victory. The "stop- 48
Carter" movement was, therefore, initiated. Its objective was to encourage other more popular and well-known Democratic potentials to enter the race and directly challenge Carter, ultimately testing his strength and possibly eroding his support. Three Democratic potentials who could have caused a division of black support were former Office of Economic Opportunity Director Sargent Shriver,
California Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. and Minnesota Senator Hubert
H. Humphrey. 3 Some black papers may have endorsed any one of them.
4. Carter's clout with black individuals or organizations.
As the governor of Georgia, Carter appointed many black individuals to influential positions within the government. Throughout his campaign he commented many times that one of his heroes was Martin Luther King,
Jr. Carter made it a point to publicize his association with blacks during his childhood, and his Southern Baptist background created inroads into the black ministerial alliance. It will be noted whether or not Carter obtained publicity, especially in black papers, because . . . 4 o f h~s assoc~at1onse
5. The "ethnic purity" incident. During a campaign address to a group in Indiana, Carter said there was nothing wrong with preserving the "ethnic purity" of some American neighborhoods.
Some individuals viewed the statement as an affront to blacks, interpreting it to mean that Carter supported maintaining segregated 5 communities. As noted, his ties with the "old South" were dis- couraged and this comment had the potential for diluting the support that he was trying to maintain with blacks. "Ethnic purity" caused quite a bit of turbulence, but whether or not it created havoc for the same reasons in both black and white papers remains to be examined. 49
Some of the topics, such as his association with black indi- viduals, remained germane throughout the entire campaign year, but the
emphasis was changed, as will be explained, to his association with
black dignitaries.
Post-convention topics are as follows:
1. Andrew Young as a media personality. Young, a popular
black civil rights leader and former Georgia state representative, 6 emerged as one of Carter's staunchest supporters. He was well
recognized by black and white media personnel and as such could have
obtained publicity for Carter 1n both the black and white press.
2. Carter's association with recognized black dignitaries.
Carter obtained early support from the rank and file black voter, but 7 the black leadership contingency took more convincing. It remains to
be seen if the media recognized the lack of enthusiasm among the black
leadership even though he remained popular with the main body of the voting public.
3. Black issues resulting from the debates. There were three formal televised debates between Carter and the Republican contender,
Gerald R. Ford. One black issue stood out--the controversy over not 8 having named a black journalist to the debate pane1. The black press
carried the information, but it rema1ns to be seen whether or not the white press considerd it an issue.
4. Carter and the black ministers' use of campaign funds. On
August 8, 1976, the Los Angeles Times disclosed that Carter campaign representatives had disbursed funds, or "pocket money," to three black ministers in return for their support during the California primary.
Each minister was asked to influence his congregation and members of 50
9 the nearby community to vote for Carter. How important this issue was to the black press when compared to the white press will be examined.
5. The Playboy interview. The interview subject of the
November 1976 issue of Playboy (released mid-September) was candidate
Carter. The interview received widespread publicity because of state- ments which Carter made that appeared to be in direct conflict with his confessed born-again Christian ethics. Some journalists were outrage d , some amuse d , oth ers d1"d not care. 10 Did the black press speak with unification?
6. A catch-all topic--"black issues." Black issues encom- passed any and all articles, editorials, and columns of black interest relative to Carter's campaign carried either in black or white papers, but which did not qualify by description for any of the established categories. The items were not pre-selected, but were reviewed in conjunction with searching for the other key topics. They were then pulled out to complete the comparative analysis.
By comparing the collected data and determining what papers ran what information and when, it should be possible to ascertain whether or not black press support was given to Carter at the outset of the primaries, and/or at what point that support increased later 1n the campaign when Carter emerged as the front runner and eventual nom1nee. The comparison should help to establish what the black press considered major campaign issues for black readers, and what the white press viewed as important black issues.
Information is to be abstracted from black papers first; then collected data will be compared with that found in white establishment 51
papers published in the same metropolitan districts. This comparison will determine what the white press perceived as major issues for
blacks and at what point white editors decided that Jimmy Carter was
the candidate preferred by black voters.
The Papers
Statistical data were collected on circulation figures, home
offices, ownership and printing methods in order to determine which
black papers would qualify as research material.
In 1974, when the first comprehensive survey was taken, there were 213 black newspapers published in the United States with a total
circulation of over 4.3 m1llion copies. The six papers decided
upon--the Los Angeles Sentinel, New Pittsburgh Courier, Chicago Daily
Defender, Afro-American, Amsterdam News and Black Panther--were among
the most widely circulated black papers in the United States. At that
time the Afro-America and the Black Panther were considered circu-
lation giants. As of 1979 when the last survey was compiled the Black
Panther was no longer published, but the other publications are still 11 among the most popular and widely circulated. All papers are
accessible because they are preserved on microfilm.
The oldest existing black paper is the Amsterdam News which was established in 1907 by James Anderson. It took its name from the
street in Harlem where he lived and today it remains as one of the 12 most important weeklies in the United States. It is one of the few
black papers to have an American Newspaper Guild contract with its
employees. It caters mainly to black middle-class residents within
New York City and its boroughs. Its political affiliaton in recent 52
years has been with the Democratic party. Although it supported
Eisenhower in 1952, it went on to urge voters to elect Stevenson in
1956 and Kennedy, Johnson and Humphrey in succeeding elections. Its
news coverage is heavily local. Editorially, its views now are more 13 vigorous than those of the Afro-American and the Chicago Defender.
At about the same time the Amsterdam News was born the midwest
produced a black newspaper that was destined to become equally for- midable. It was called the Chicago Defender and its publ1sher was 14 Robert Abbott who started it as a flimsy handbill. The four-day
tabloid, which is a part of the Sengstacke newspaper chain, resembles
the New York Daily News in typography and content. It was standard
size for fifty years but became tabloid in 1956. The Defender carries
considerable quantities of UPI copy as well as much Chicago area and midwestern news not often found in the general press. It is moderate
in its political position and liberal on certain problems affecting
the lives of blacks, such as housing, equality in employment oppor-
tun1t1es. . an d e ducat1on. . 15
Another influential black newspaper, the Pittsburgh Courier,
began publication in 1910. It was soon taken over by Robert Lee Vann,
a lawyer, who made it a powerful publication with a circulation of 16 more than 250,000 by World War Ir. It is also part of the
Sengstacke chain and, like the Amsterdam News, allots generous space
to local news and features. It is standard sized and for many years
identified with the conservative viewpoint politically and economi-
cally. It has become a bit more liberal in recent years, and even
called President Nixon's attention to the failure of his administra-
t1on. to g1ve . bl ac k s greater respons1b1l1t1es. . . . 1n . government. 17 53
The Baltimore Afro-American was another black paper that gained prominence during World War II. It became a national weekly shortly after the war. During the war, it employed the first black woman war correspondent, Elizabeth M. Phillips, and among its many contributors was Langston Hughes, the black poet. 18 In 1969 it became the first black newspaper to receive the American Society of Journal- ism School Administrators' annual award. It is standard sized and more closely edited and its pages better planned and coordinated than those of many of its competitors. It gives more coverage to foreign, especially African, news and features a substantial amount of UP! copy. The paper's policy can be called moderate on national racial issues. It ridicules violent tactics advocated by militants and urges constructive efforts to cooperate with whites. It takes a very skeptJ.ca• 1 VJ.ew . o f most Repu bl J.can. a dmJ.nJ.stratJ.ons. • . • l9
The Black Panther, started in the 60s as an organ for the militant Black Panther party, boasted of a circulation of about
110,000 in street sales in 1970 during its peak. Based in Oakland, it is considered an ultramilitant paper which stresses few community activities. It reserves most of its space for stories about oppres-
SJ.on. an d l.nJUStJ.ce. . . . 20 The tabloid-sized paper is not a standard national newspaper such as the Afro American or Chicago Defender. It operates as an organ for a group which relies on volunteer newspaper staff and depends heavily on reports from its ministers of information
J.n Panther chapters. The paper advocates sharp, revolutionary changes 21 in the U.S. government.
Another California-based newspaper is the Los Angeles 54
Sentinel, started in 1934. It is a relatively new paper, especially when compared with the "old" Eastern papers, but it is the largest . . . . R" 22 bl ack paper west o f t h e M1ss1ss1pp1 1ver. The Sentinel is a moder- ate paper although it is strongly outspoken on civil rights. It sup- ports the Democratic Party and covers political news at the local and national levels. Critics call it too sensational with too much crime and sex news displayed too prominently. It is also accused of over 23 publicizing some black citizens while completely ignoring others.
The establishment papers were selected because (1) they are published w1thin the same geographical areas as the black papers, (2) they are locally accessible and (3) they are or have been recognized as leading journals in the industry. Thus, chosen were the Washington
Post, New York Times, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, San
Francisco Chronicle and Christian Science Monitor. All of the papers were rated by a mail poll of editors, publishers, and journalism professors, conducted by public opinion expert Edward L. Bernays. The resulting data concluded that four of those selected for review, the
New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Christian Science Monitor and 24 Washington Post, are the best of all dailies country-w1de.
The New York Times ranks first among U.S. dailies in the
Bernays poll and in a second poll conducted by the Saturday Review.
It also has been included among national and world leaders in other rankings. It endorsed Carter in 1976 and in the past it has supported both Democratic and Republican candidates, although it has been criti- 25 cized by many politicians for its "Eastern liberal" coverage. Not everyone agrees that the Times is always as objective as possible or as effective in its coverage as it could be. Critics suggest that 55 biases are reflected in news columns, that coverage of local affairs is uneven and that national coverage sometimes lacks proper depth.
Nevertheless, its influence on national and world leaders is 26 1.n. d om1.ta . bl e.
The Washington Post, ranked fourth in the Bernays poll, nor- mally avoids direct endorsements, but did endorse Jimmy Carter in
1976. It has been especially noted in recent years for its editorials and investigative reporting. The Post sympathized with dissent move- ments during the 60s and supported the vast black population in the
Washington, D.C. area by employing more blacks than any other U.S. 27 newspaper. Critics have stated that its reporters are permitted to advocate causes in their news stories, its editors do not exercise good news judgment and the paper gives spotty foreign news coverage.
The paper's political staff, however, is credited for being 28 the most knowledgeable in the country.
The Los Angeles Times, second ranked in the polls, developed a strong tradition of conservatism. More recently, however, its image has changed from ultra-conservative to independent and responsible, but some critics still feel this is an unfair assessment. From the late 1880s through the early 1900s, it strongly favored Republicans who at times got more news coverage and editorial support than Demo- crats. This caused critics to refer to it as an unofficial house organ of the Republican party. By the early 1970s the Times had greatly increased its interpretive and background reporting with its editorial pages providing a good balance of columnists as well as thought-provoking editorials and cartoons. 29 It is fact; its average daily size is 106 pages and it carries more advertising lineage than 56
any ot h er U• S • da1 "1 Y• 30 It made no endorsements in 1976 but endorsed
Republican incumbent Richard Nixon in 1972.
The Chicago Tribune ranked ninth in the Bernays and Saturday
Review polls, and had become noted as a voice for a nationalist-
isolationist point of view since the early 50s. It was ultra-
conservative in politics through the early 1960s, endorsing the
Republican party. Critics argue that even though its prejudices are
reflected in its news columns, it is one of the best-written news- 31 papers in the country. The Tribune underwent drastic changes i~ the
late 60s to early 70s, endorsing Democrats Johnson and Humphrey and
vigorously opposing the Viet Nam War. The paper supported Nixon in
1972, but gave regular front-page coverage to McGovern. It endorsed
Jimmy Carter in 1976. The Tribune has always excelled in local inves-
tigative reporting, for which Chicago has always provided ample raw
mater1a. 1 • 32
The San Francisco Chronicle, started in 1865, establ1shed a
strong reputation for public service. It was noted for its extensive
national and international reporting in the 1930s and 1940s, but in more recent years it has turned increasingly to highly readable
stor1es. an d f eatures t h at pro d uce more c1rcu. 1 at1on. . 33
The Chronicle is characterized by its staff of highly literate
columnists, each with a distinctive literary style. It is noted for
publishing many local columns and has at times been referred to as a
"viewspaper" rather than a newspaper. It offers columns from some of
the most provocative writers in the Bay area, including views offered
by political satirist Art Hoppe. Nearly all of the views that the
paper offers are liberal and the only editorial balance is normally 57
seen during election times, then usually in the form of unsigned edi-
torials. Although the editorials frequently sound liberal, the paper has endorsed many conservatives, such as George Murphy in his 1964
Senate bid. In 1976 it endorsed Gerald Ford, thus substantiating one
critic's observation that the Chronicle talks Democratic but votes 34 Republican.
The Christian Science Monitor has been selected in more than
ten national polls as one of the top two or three newspapers in the
United States and one of the top four or five newspapers in the world.
It has pioneered in interpretive reporting and analysis of national
and world affairs. Numerous recognitions and awards document the sue-
cess of the Monitor in carrying out its mission. It has won hundreds
of journalistic awards, including several Pulitzer Prizes, and,
according to various surveys, is read by more world leaders, govern- ment officials, educators and students than any other journal. It is
an international daily newspaper and since its founding in 1908 has
sought to provide constructive, solution-oriented journalism. In the
1970s it emphasized problem-solving journalism that seeks not only to
inform its readers about the issues and problems, but also to analyze
those problems and focus on possible solutions. It does not endorse
po 11t1cal. - cand"d 1 ates. 35
Analytical Proposal
The projected goal is to determine what information was com- municated about Jimmy Carter's campaign in 1976 through the black and white newspapers based upon the topics previously explained. To
achieve this goal a descriptive qualitative content analysis was 58
chosen as the research methodology because it is best suited for obtaining and analyzing the required data.
Content analysis has been defined innumerable times but the definition most frequently quoted and referred to is the one advanced in 1952 by communications research pioneer Bernard Berelson. Berelson wrote that content analysis "is a research technique for the objec- tive, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication." He explained that content analysis was developed primarily by communication specialists for application to communica- tions problems. It is used as a tool by social scientists to deter- mine the effects of language and to objectively and systematically . . . 36 exam1ne commun1cat1ons sc1ence.
Another highly recognized communications expert, Ole Holsti, stated that content analysis opens up for the social scientist and dramatist a wider variety of opportunities for systematic use of the most pervasive form of evidence about human affairs. Content analysis is a multi-purpose research method developed specifically for 1nves- tigating any problem in which the content of communication serves as t h e b as1s. o f 1n . f erence. 37
It has been touted by many other communications scholars as the single system most qualified for conducting communications research, especially when accessibility is a problem or when source materials are likely to be voluminous and complicated or when they 38 contain many different kinds of subject matter. This thesis exem- plifies the foregoing in that accessibility is limited to the few black papers out of hundreds printed annually that are preserved on microfilm. Additionally the method by which each must be reviewed 59
solicits further complications in that different papers must be reviewed to determine diverse types of information upon which infer
ences must be drawn.
Quantitative analysis proves to be inadequate to describe more
involved communications research; thus, an analytical approach utiliz
ing qualitative rather than quantitative procedures is more practi
cal.39 The research is centralized upon the presence/absence mode,
thus the presence or absence or appearances or nonappearances of
information in black and white papers will have great credence. Fre
quencies will have some bearing but will not be as significant as
story positions and other variables. Thus, a quantitative approach is
inappropriate.
Communications researcher Siegfried Kracauer points out that even though there are no radical variations in a qualitative analysis and a quantitative analysis, quantitative analyses are by far stricter
techniques. Qualitative analysis achieves its breakdowns without spe
cial regard for frequencies. Where categories do invite, frequency
counts, quantification is ideal, but for more involved communication
studies such as this, which could reverberate with many latent mean
ings, it becomes unfeasible and almost impossible to yield significant results by means of a quantified procedure.40
Qualitative analysis is still somewhat controversial because some communications reseachers have insisted that quantification is a necessary characteristic for content research. Berelson's 1952 defi nition, as shown above, specifically states that in order for content research to be valid and replicable it must be based upon a frequency breakdown which can be measured mathematically.41 Within the past ten 60 years researchers have begun to investigate how both types of analyses can complement each other as opposed to being analytically diverse.
Kracauer observes that the two approaches do not differ fundamentally from each other and that quantitative analysis includes qualitative aspects in that it originates and culminates in qualitative consid- erations. On the other hand, qualitative analysis often requires 42 quant1. f.1cat1on . 1n t h e 1nterest . o f ex h aust1ve . treatment. Th e research at hand bears out this theory. Quantification 1s evident because specified consistencies must be observed, such as types of data to be abstracted, the amount of data run and the manner chosen for coding, all of which is explained later.
Overall, however, a qualitative approach allows the researched information to be documented, indicating where stories appear, when they appear and how they move within the paper over a period of time.
It provides an added advantage by allowing inferences to be drawn based upon what is or is not deemed significant coverage. For exam- ple, when information is found it will be noted whether or not Carter is the focal point of the story of if he simply received incidental coverage in conjunction with other coverage.
There are three steps in the research process. First, all articles on the topics previously identified will be located in the black papers. This will be accomplished by an issue by issue search since most are not indexed. The Black Panther is the exception because it is indexed in the Alternative Press Index. Therefore, an issue-by-issue search will not be conducted by the Black Panther. The appropriate material will be selected on the basis of the information contained in the Alternative Press Index. The bulk of the black 61
papers are published weekly and they are not as voluminous as their
counterpart white papers, making issue searches possible.
Next, indexes will be used to locate the articles for all of
the white papers except those which have been targeted for control
purposes. These are the Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor
and San Francisco Chronicle. For these papers each 1ssue will be reviewed. As a result, a cross reference will evolve and quality
control will be assured. Newspaper indexes give either a headline or very sketchy synopsis of articles, therefore it is conceivable that vague information could result in articles going undetected. The
control papers will give guidance about the types of information or
subject matter which shall appear within a certain time frame. Thus, data will be sought within the body of given papers at various inter vals if coverage cannot be detected by means of indexed information.
By using this procedure, it will allow the researcher to determine if missing or de-emphasized topics are generated by the newspapers' editors as opposed to having been missed as a result of research error.
Second, each article, editorial and column on the 12 predeter mined topics will be described. (Letters to the editor will be excluded because they do not provide significant research data and only a few appear sporadically in black papers.) Each item found will be separately noted on an index card. Recorded will be the news paper's name, headline classification (i.e., article, editorial or column), page number, date, writer's name and specific topic (i.e.,
"Andrew Young," "Black Issues," etc.). Lead paragraphs will be copied
1n full to establish the story's content and angle, followed by a 62 summary of the entire article. Additional comments will be noted, including observations of terminology which could indicate pro-Carter or anti-Carter biases; expressions denoting opposition to and/or support for his candidacy in straight news articles, columns and editorials; opposition and/or support statements for the candidate himself; related black issues supported or opposed by the candidate; and the amount of coverage devoted to each topic.
Third, items will be arranged chronologically according to topics. Comparisons will be made to determine common elements found in material in black and white papers. Commonly identifiable elements will be determined, relevant patterns described, similarities and dif ferences noted and inferences drawn. The cross-comparison should make clear such trends as when Carter coverage started in both black and· white papers, when black support was given prior to the Democratic convention and when, how and if the black perspective emerged. Post convention coverage will additionally reveal whether the black press found Carter a viable candidate warranting black support.
Weaknesses in the Methodology
There are several weaknesses to be noted in the proposed meth odology. First, even with the cross-reference system, it is still possible that some articles will be missed due to human error. The percentage of error could be improved if an issue-by-issue search could be conducted of each paper, but the volume of material involved makes this idea unfeasible and impractical. Second, even though one aricle may span several topics; i.e., an article on "ethnic purity" may also be used under "black issues," the item will be used only 63 once. This pracice may affect some of the findings. Third, it will not be possible to list each item's title and/or author. In black papers it is common practice not to credit rewritten items, and wire service articles are printed uncredited. Additionally, those articles normally listed as briefs do not have titles. Titles and writers will be credited when given. 64
Notes 1 Jonathan Moore and Janet Fraser, eds., Campaign for President (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977), p. 93. 2 Lucinda Franks, "Wallace's Victory in Carolina is Narrow," New York, 1 March 1976, sec. 1, p. 32.
3 James Wooten, Dasher--The Roots and the Rising of Jinnny Carter (New York: Summit Books, 1978), p. 25. 4 Ken Bode, '~hy Carter's Big With Blacks," New Republic, 10 April 1976, p. 13.
5Ibid. 6 H. S. Smith, "Black Power and Jinnny Carter," Christianity and Crisis, 20 September 1976, p. 205.
\lilliam Morrow, How Jinnny Won--The Victory Campaign From Plains to the llliite House (New York: \Hlliam Morrow and Co., 1977), p. 170. 8. "Black Newsman to be on Ford-Carter Panel," Amsterdam News, 16 October 1976, sec. A, p. 3. 9 Grayson Mitchell, "'Street Money' Proves a Thorn to Carter Staff," Los Angeles Times, 8 August 1976, Sec. 1, pp. 1 and 24. 10 Barry Golson, '~hen Carter and Playboy Spoke in Plains," New York Times, 30 September 1976, sec. 1, p. 41. 11 Henry LaBrie, III, ed., A Survey of Black Newspapers 1n America (New York: Ferdinand Teuber, 1Y79), pp. 5-10. 12 M. L. Stein, Black in Connnunications (New York: Julian Messner, 1972), p. 22. 13 Roland E. Wolseley, The Black Press U.S.A. (Ames: The Iowa State University Press, 1971), pp. 76-78. 14 s te1n,· Bl ac k s 1n· connnun1cat1ons, · · p. 23 • 15 Wolseley, Black Press U.S.A., p. 72. 16 s te1n,· Bl ac k s 1n· c onnnun1cat1ons,· · p. 24. 17 Wolseley, Black Press U.S.A., p. 78. 18 stein, Blacks in Connnunications, p. 25. 65
19 Wolseley, Black Press U.S.A., pp. 74-76. 20 s te~n,. B 1 acks ~n . commun~cat~ons, . . p. 25 •
21 Wolseley, Black Press U.S.A., pp. 85-86.
22 stein, Blacks in Communications, p. 25.
23 Wolseley, Black Press U.S.A., pp. 109-10.
24Edwin Emery and Michael Emery, The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. 653.
25 Ibid., p. 654.
26 Ernest C. Hynds, American Newspapers in the 1980s (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1980), pp. 266-68. 27 Emery and Emery, The Press and America, p. 658. 28 Hynds, American Newspapers, pp. 270-71. 29 Ibid., pp. 288-89. 30 Emery and Emery, The Press and America, p. 627. 31 Hynds, American Newspapers, pp. 278-79. 32 Emery and Emery, The Press and America, p. 654. 33 Ibid. 34 navid Rubin and vJilliam Rivers, "The Chronicle: Schizophrenia by the Bay," Columbia Journalism Review 8 (Fall 1969): 38-41.
35 Hynds, American Newspapers, pp. 287-89. 36 Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communications Research (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 17-18. 37 01e Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 2-3. 38 Ibid. 39 siegfried Kracauer, "The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis," Public Opinion Quarterly 16 (vlinter 1952-53): 63 7. 66
40 Ibid., pp. 637-38. 41 Berelson, Content Analysis in Communications, p. 17. 42 Kracauer, "The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis," p. 63 7. CHAPTER IV
THE CARTER CAMPAIGN: AN OVERVIEW
As a prelude to determining what the black and white press carried about Carter's campaign it was important to examine background information about how the campaign was conducted, what part the press played in the strategy, how the campaign was tailored for the black constituency and the role that the black press should have played.
The first section of this chapter explores the political rules which affected campaign strategy. The second section describes the image Carter wanted the American public to see, introduces the people responsible for assuring that desired image, shows how that image was to relate specifically to the black population and examines the principal media chosen to project that image. The third section explores the historical significance of the black press and describes how it might have been used effectively by Carter. Part four explains how the white news media became involved in Carter's success and what journalists, in turn, thought about the way the press covered the campaign.
The Carter Campaign: A Background
The amount of literature available about Carter's campaign 1s significant, although scholarly articles about his strategy are just beginning to appear. Media personnel and campaign workers have
67 68 written the bulk of the books which outline his campaign. Thus they serve as the major sources for information.
The substance of his campaign included making his name known to potential voters, building a desired image and publicizing his views about key 1ssues. For name recognition he utilized numerous tools including billboards, bumper stickers and buttons. His image campaign was conducted by putting him on television and by promoting 1 issues through press releases to newspapers and supporters.
He apparently considered every aspect of society important because his major problem remained how to overcome his anonymity. He was an outsider with few political inroads, held no political office while running, and was generally unknown outside of Georgia. The latter, however, proved beneficial because it made him a new face at a time when, according to the pollsters and the instincts of poli ticians, the public had grown weary of old faces. Obscurity, however, presented other obvious problems. By the "Catch-22" rule under which the press operated, only well-known politicians command much atten tion, while unknowns tend to stay that way. Thus, if an unknown is to overcome obscurity, he must command the press' attention. Carter had faced that problem in Georgia and overcame it by sheer personal 2 effort, and he became determined to do so again.
In 1976 several major changes went into effect which benefitted all political candidates, but which significantly aided the politically unknown Carter. These changes had a direct bearing upon the manner in which the campaign was conducted and made the campaign 3 dramatically different, albeit complex. 69
Party rules for selecting state delegates underwent major
restructuring. On the Democratic side strict provisions were made for
adequate participation by women and minorities, and adjustments were made for proportional representation in place of the winner-take-all
system. There was a proliferation of state primaries, up to thirty,
which was seven more than in 1972, and almost a doubling of the number
from 1968. Additionally, for the first time federal matching funds 4 were available to pay for campaign costs.
There were also new restrictions on financial contributions
and expenditures and a new regulatory agency, the Federal Election
Commission, on its shakedown cruise. There was even an incumbent
president who had never run for national election before, challenged
tenaciously from within his own party. And at one time there were ten
serious Democratic candidates in the race, with a former presidential
candidate waiting in the wings. All this made it extremely difficult
for candidates to plan and fund their campaigns in 1976.5
Additionally, there were mandatory restrictions placed on
campaign contributions and loopholes that states used to bypass new
rules for electing delegates. vJhat the new rules, restrictions and
regulations amounted to was an increase in time, energy and money for
anyone contemplating running. It called for the formulation of a
different sort of campaign strategy by someone who could afford all
three--time, money and energy. 6
Carter emerged as the strongest Democratic candidate willing
to participate. He pursued a run-everywhere primary approach, part of
an overall campaign strategy he had begun mapping out with determina-
t1on. f our years ear 1"1er. 7 70
Carter had essentially won the nomination in the first three months by establishing himself as the clear leader with wide national appeal, while Birch Bayh, Sargent Shriver, Fred Harris, Milton Shapp,
George Wallace and Henry Jackson were being eliminated. The latter phase of the Democratic primary period was characterized by Hubert
Humphrey's deciding not to run, Udall's tough criticism of Carter and the emergence of stop-Carter drives by means of last-minute entries by
Senator Frank Church and Governor Edmund "Jerry" Brown. All of them had been politically active for awhile and had strong identifiable ties with various party factions. Thus their political styles were a 8 bit shopworn.
Carter was new and different, hence when voters looked around for someone extraordinary, there was Carter. He carefully nurtured that new and different facade and by being a political outsider, he 9 was in complete command of his desired image.
Building the Carter Image
The image that Carter aimed to build was one with which he thought Americans would be comfortable. The mood of the nation in the wake of Watergate and the Nixon pardon indicated that it was ready for a change. Carter's campaign strategy thus built an image which disassociated him with the political matrix that Americans at that 10 t1me. f oun d d'1scom .f ort1ng..
He presented himself to the country as a private citizen never having held a federal office before. He had served once as a governor, but that was not the sort of job experience most voters expected to find in the resume of a presidential candidate. Most of 71
them were accustomed to names and faces familiar enough to venerate or
blame or both. There was a rather deeply held notion that presiden-
tial candidates should serve some sort of Washington apprenticeship;
Carter had none. He was ne1t. h er senator nor representat1ve.. 11
He was, instead, a farmer--a gentleman farmer, perhaps, or more accurately a patrician planter and agribusinessman--but a farmer,
and he talked about it with pride. He inserted it generously into his
campaign literature and posed for publicity photographs and films 1n
the middle of a field with dirt trickling through his soiled . 12 f 1ngers.
Carter had two media experts. Gerald Rafshoon, h1s media director and campaign manager, and Hamilton Jordan, also a campaign manager, were primarily responsible for not only constructing the 13 desired image, but for feeding the information to the right sources.
The first phase of Rafshoon's plan called for formulating a heavyweight program to concurrently project a heavyweight image. The campaign had to infect other Southern states as well as other regions with the Jimmy Carter "good guy" brand of populism. Jordan concurred with Rafshoon's operational concepts and in a personal memo said:
I believe that Rafshoon's overview is excellent. In keep ing with his strategy and sense of timing, it is necessary that we begin immediately to generate favorable stories and comments in the national press. Stories in the New York Times and Washington Post do not just happen, but have to be care fully planned and planted.l4
Thus the print media were introduced as one of Carter's major campaign tools to deliver his messages and build the desired image.
In order to obtain more press space, Rafshoon advised Carter to gener- ate favorable stories in the national press on his administration's 72 accomplishments during his tenure as the governor of Georgia, develop and/or maintain close personal relationships with principal national columnists and reporters, and take full advantage of every legitimate opportunity for national exposure as long as it was couched in terms of what he accomplished in Georgia. He was further advised to make social contacts and to spend evenings or leisurely weekends with specific large newspaper publishers and to foster relationships with 15 political columnists that he knew.
In his six-month schedule leading up to the Democratic pri- maries, the first item on his list was to read the New York Times and the Washington Post daily. He was advised to utilize family connec- tions to create situations whereby he could get to know key people.
He was to generate stories in national trade magazines on specific accomplishments, and in addition to reading the Times and Post, he was to review sections of the 'Hall Street Journal and other national selections. Major magazines such as Time and Newsweek were not to be overlooked, and the Atlanta Constitution was also included as a manda- . . 16 tory scann1ng 1tem.
Obviously, the detailed attention to the media paid off in overwhelming terms and resulted in an array of articles on Carter and his campaign. Newspaper indexes for 1976 average eight to ten pages of Carter coverage, and Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, one of the largest popular periodicals indexes, listed approximately 450 entries on Carter throughout 1976 while his campaign was in full
SW1ng.- 17
There were articles on Carter in magazines of every descrip- tion and size, from those more commonly read such as Newsweek and Time 73
to those more selectively designed such as Religion and Commonwealth.
He was covered in women's magazines such as McCalls, men's magazines
such as Esquire and Playboy, in financial advice magazines and even in
fashion magazines such as Vogue. His name was linked with such issues
as religious freedom, abortion rights, business and union benefits and women's liberation, to name a few. Another reccurring issue was
Carter's relationship with blacks. For example, during 1976 U.S. News
and World Report carried "As Blacks Zero in on Candidates" while,
"Blacks and Politics" and "Carter and the Blacks" appeared at separate
times in Newsweek. As the black theme evolved, Carter's strategy
became tailored to attract black votes because of one highly
significant reason: he was a Southern-born candidate.
Given the history of the United States and the South's
long-held image of being the playground for groups such as the KKK and
White Citizens Council, there conceivably could have been concern
about whether or not blacks would accept Carter. Part of Carter's
image was to project him as a down-to-earth, "good old boy" from
Georgia, but not at the risk of turning off a sizable black . 19 const1 tuency •.
There had been no U.S. President from the Deep South in more
than a century. George Wallace constantly appeared on the ballot but he was not considered a serious candidate. The American South was noted for producing politicians tainted by the region's racial
proclivities, meaning that most of the individuals came to power by manipulating the racial fears and instincts of the Southern electorate and remained in power in the same manner. From that very soil came
Jimmy Carter. Although he appeared neither malevolent nor malicious, 74
he was still a white Southern farmer. That one characteristic was
enough to make him unacceptable as a candidate. Carter's problem,
therefore, was to keep the nation from rejecting him only on the basis
of his Southern heritage. Thus acceptance by blacks was tantamount to
an absolution by the Pope--declaring him free from the past sins of
apartheid, madness and murder that the South had inflicted upon . . 1 20 var~ous rac~a groups.
Carter had one factor in his favor. Blacks have traditionally
voted Democratic because during reconstruction the Northern Democratic
party campaigned extensively for the black votes after the Southern
Republican Party abandoned them. Thus, most black voters started voting Democratic, and this simplified the battle for black votes.
The major problem, however, remained in getting blacks registered and 21 to the polls to vote.
Deputy campaign director Benjamin D. Brown, a black, said that
~n the Florida Democratic primary, the black factor became a very
significant dimension. In order to assure black support the Carter
coalition adopted an entirely new concept specifically designed to 22 organize black Communities to cast their votes for Carter.
Historically, blacks followed the national leadership and
during early 1Y76 there was a very strong movement among national
leaders to have blacks go uncommitted. Carter's strategists developed
their own network of people through a very low-key operation. They
started early, going into communities and convincing leaders that they
should not look for great resources that might come from other
channels but should take the opportunity to select the candidate that 23 the black vote could deliver to the nation. 75
Religious leaders were chosen as the primary contact points since black ministers have been traditionally observed as the best community leaders. Carter thus utilized his born-again Christianity resourcefully to win black ministers' confidence, resulting in ardent criticisms that he simply displayed his religion for political gain, a charge he vehemently denied. But if there was a major one-instant communication with blacks, his religion gave him a link with powerful black leaders such as the Reverend Andrew Young, Reverend "Daddy" King and Caretta King, widow of the slain civil rights leader Reverend
Martin Luther King Jr. All telegraphed the word like a drumbeat through black churches that Carter was a born-again Baptist just like 21 them.
Young's and Daddy King's endorsements contributed greatly to the substantial and often crucial number of black votes Carter received during the primaries. Carter's enemy, Senator Julian Bond, said that Reverend King's and Young's endorsements had been the key.
They made Carter legitimate in the eyes of blacks all over the country, and because of their endorsements the black vote went to 25 Carter. His strategy worked beautifully.
The Black Press
Two factors are evident thus far: Carter used the press extensively during the campaign year and he depended upon black support. Still unknown, however, is whether or not the black press was included as a major part of his overall strategic concept. He obtained support from one influential black sector, black ministers; thus it seems logical that he would attempt to unify support by 76 appealing to the black press, even though many scholars believe that the black press of the 1980s is not quite the powerful force that existed when Myrdal presented his famous American Dilemma treatise during the 1940s. It has undergone great transitions from the 40s and 26 50s when it was touted as a greatly influential entity.
During the late 1940s no other unilateral central agency existed which had the potential to direct opinions as did the black press. Even though each paper was directed through the personal guidance of its editor, collectively they were extremely powerful and influential forces that served to tie national black communities together by telling each reader how he or she should think and feel as a black American. This created a tremendous power of suggestion by 27 1mply1ng. . t h at all ot h er bl acks thoug h t an d f elt s1m1 . .1 ar 1 y.
By the middle 1940s there was a proliferation of black papers.
Some estimates ran as high as 250 to 300 which reached many black households. Their total circulation was estimated at 4,000,000.
Competition increased, however, as white newspapers started giving more attention to black communities. Radio and television provided news coverage and a number of black magazines developed. Thus by the 28 early 1970s its influence and prestige had eroded immensely.
It has declined in number of papers, circulation and the number of full-time employees. Some individual newspapers appear to be doing well financially but the black press generally faces constant financial problems. Black newspapers need more advertising revenue to attract and hold competent staff members and purchase the equipment necessary to produce a competitive product. Moreover, an increasing reliance on white advertisers continually threatens to create a 77 growing credibility gap between the newspapers and some of their constituents. tfuny claim that the black press cannot attract the roots of institutional racism as long as it depends on white
. . f . 1 29 a d vert~s~ng or surv~va •
The outlook for black newspapers appeared uncertain as the
1980s began. Continuing inflation, the threat of newsprint shortages, and an energy crisis cast additional shadows over an already cloudy . . 30 econom~c p~cture.
Nonetheless, many of the theories advanced by Myrdal and others during the late 40s are still applicable to the 70s and 80s black press and based upon those findings, Carter should have found the black press a necessary link in his overall campaign strategy.
Editorial opinions expressed in black papers are similar country-w~de because there is a common cause and common experience shared by most blacks nation-wide. The black press describes the black group to blacks themselves. Each individual is invited to share in the sufferings, grievances and pretensions of millions of blacks 31 far outside the narrow local community.
The black press historically has been a crusading press, an advocate of black rights. Historically the black press also has been short-lived. These two characteristics are implicit in a third characteristic, the tendency of black papers to be irregular or sporadic in publishing frequency. Other characteristics include the general lack of trained journalistic personnel and the dominance ~n . . 32 content o f a dvocatory wr~t~ng.
Today the still primarily weekly black press faces additional quandaries. On the one hand it competes with the faster, more 78 available media--television, black radio and white dailies. On the other hand, it must compete at the editorial level with the more radical-sensational protest journals such as the Black Muslims' 33 Muhammad Speaks.
Researchers over the years tend to agree about several characteristics that collectively exist in black papers which cause serious drawbacks in the credibility of most papers. First, editors tend to sensationalize. Second, they overemphasize crime while at the same time decrying the white media for doing the same thing. Third, they possess an unabashed zeal for crusading ideas. Fourth, they suppress ideas contrary to their own. Last, they feature an extraor 34 dinary display of black society. Generally black newspapers have had the same objectives. Competition between them has been based not on a difference of viewpoint but rather on the speed with which they go into action to pursue certain ends and on the resources they have to put into the effort.35
Scholars and journalists who have studied the black press' structural design state that news selections often seem poor because the newspapers' editors frequently define news to mean coverage of quirks or odd personalities. The news covered is often of the obv1ous type and follows patterns of common gossip. The large leading papers are designed to serve a wide area rather than their immediate local ities. Thus their news selections focus on state, national and international--rather than local--events. Their news features are often culled from press services or clipped from other papers, so each paper tends to resemble the other. 36
Emphasis is normally placed on successes made by blacks in 79 competition with whites. Black churches and fraternal organizations dominate much of the coverage, but articles usually read like a laundry list of whom was elected to what. Social announcements and other trivial details with little hard news value frequently appear, often one to three weeks after their occurrences. Only syndicated columnists attempt to deal with more paramount issues confronting 37 blacks. It has been charged that many black newspapers fill their front pages with crime and violence and their inside pages with publicity handouts and trivia. Much of their advertising appeals 38 generally to superstition or is preoccupied w1th sex.
Since most papers are printed weekly and contain news slanted for a black public, they are used to obtain additional information to that carried by the white press. In general the black press is interested only 1n news that touches blacks and rarely if ever publishes information that has no racial significance.
Current events columns, advice and opinion features, contributed articles and advertising resemble and are patterned after the white press. Overall content and makeup of black papers corresponds closely to that of small-town white newspapers; they are 39 part o f Am er1ca. wh 1"1 e not b ecom1ng . a part o f ma1nstream . Am er1ca..
Approximately 60 percent of the space is devoted to news and opinion in black papers, with ads making up the rest of the content.
To the casual reader, however, it may appear as if a larger proportion of space is devoted to opinion than to news. This is due primarily to the tone of news writing. The editorials as such take an average of 4 percent of the space, but the articles are frequently written in editorial style. Considerable progress has been made in eliminating 80
biases or personal opinions 1n newswriting, but some papers still find
it difficult to be objective in reporting because they believe that
they are giving their readers what they think the readers want to 40 see.
Black publications sit for their own portraits week by week
and month by month by what they put in their columns, but as stated
previously, as with most segments of the American press, there is
little depth to the portrayal. The newspapers devote their space
largely to the transient,. fleeting news. It is a business, but does have a moral function and an obligation to present the black story 41 often ignored by the white press.
Some of the differences between the black press and the white
press affect the way in which one must view the contents of black papers and how features must be interpreted. First, the black press
crusades more frequently than the white press. This characteristic was inherited from the days of the early newspapers which were started as-. propagan d a organs aga1nst. s 1 avery an d oppress1on. . 42
Secondly, news features usually are either personality
sketches, interviews, h1storical accounts, biographies or human
interest stories. The essay is the basic form of much of the content,
thus editorials, columns, and book, movie, record and play reviews are 43 frequently in essay format.
Th1rdly, the black press has managed to achieve influence primarily through biased reporting. Since the black press is angled for the black v1ewpoint, often the news is interpreted by the reporter not necessarily as to how it happens, but how he or she feels that the readers want to see it happen. Emotion-laden words are frequently 81
employed in either conscious or unconscious attempts to prejudice the
reader. In order to please black readers, an editor may not always
report an entire story, but might print items only of interest to
blacks and delete other pertinent information. Positioning a news
story is significant 1n a black newspaper because by putting material
in the front page it is accepted as the way to tell the reader that
the executives of the paper think it is important or significant. And
because of the sensationalistic nature, headlines--often colored 44 banner heads--can both sell a paper and can sell an idea.
During the 1976 campaign year, Carter conducted one meeting with black editors and publishers. However, if he followed the advice
of media advisers Rafshoon and Jordan, he must have included the black
press within his strategic concept because he needed large concentra
tions of black voters to help him win. He had already obtained some
grass roots support, but in order to solidify black support nationally
the only influential vehicle available to him was the black press.
The Press Views Carter
Carter's rise in popularity in 1976 is frequently charac
terized by the favorite anecdote that in early 1976 he was known as
"Jimmy Who?". By late 1976 "Jimmy Who?" was Jimmy Carter, thirty ninth President of the United States, and the members of the press who had virtually ignored him in January found themselves jockeying for positions from which to give him the best coverage.
As evidenced previously, Carter and his media force worked diligently to build a particular image of the Southern candidate. It
is generally acknowledged that he had experts on his team that sold 82 and interpreted Jimmy Carter to the public very well.
Carter's campaign workers and key representatives were well chosen for their positions. They functioned as the connective link between Carter and the media, utilized every means of technology available and functioned exceptionally well as liaisons between Carter and the media. They were survey-conscious, made sure the press was well suppl1ed w1th planted stories and press releases and functioned generally as political brokers bent upon selling one package--Jimmy 45 Carter.
The media expert was Gerald Rafshoon, who was described as the advertising genius behind Carter's campaign. He called himself the
Carter "Media Masturbator." His relationship with Carter as a friend and adviser stretched back to ten years before Rafshoon became the 46 official voice and guiding light for Carter's campaign.
Sa1d Rafshoon, "I was impressed by how bad Carter's advertising was!" He therefore put together a new action concept for selling the Carter image and presented it to Carter's advisers. It originally was rejected. Carter, however, liked it, overruled his advisers' objections and the Carter-Rafshoon affiliation was 47 formulated.
The second person who shared the credits for Carter's media success was his press secretary, Jody Powell. He was viewed by fellow journalists as "a good ole boy, easy to be around and to banter with, witty, unflappable and relaxed. He shared the media's propensity for hefty doses of alcohol, nicotine, coffee, profanity, humor and sex.
He translated Carter well. 1148 83
As a result of the efforts of these two men, the press ended up with an extremely important role during the 1976 campaign. The media blitz was successful for Carter and he obtained his ultimate goal--winning the presidential election.
The media, on the other hand, were not pleased with its own performance during 1976 nor with Carter's relationship with them.
Their overall disappointment with the election coverage has been noted several times as most exemplified by the following comments advanced by one journalist:
Covering Jimmy Carter was not an easy thing. He was not softer on issues or more vague on issues than other candidates in this or any other year; he was about the same as the rest. He did give some speeches devoted to specific issues: farm policy, economic policy, Middle East policy, small business administration, nuclear proliferation, women's rights, senior citizens, health care. But most of the time, he gave his standard stump speech (which did contain general positions on a number of issues). And when he was asked questions by reporters seeking to break new ground in one area or another, the answer would usually be a recitation of his position almost word for word as it was contained in his stump speech or one of his issue speeches.49
Another journalist explained that his media staff kept the press informed either through notices attached to an announcement board or by mimeographed handouts which gave his daily schedule, advanced copies of his speeches or contained trivia such as names of his visitors, issue papers when he was governor, photo opportunities and press conferences and interviews. Carter's aides tried to get reporters to focus on certain events and to interpret them in ways most conven1ent. to campa1gn. o b.Ject1ves. . 50
Throughout the primaries they worked at influencing jour- nalists' views about the political field and how Carter was advancing w1thin it. Their first important technique was the strategy leak. 84
Jordan, Powell and other insiders would take reporters into their confidence about long-term strategies and sometimes give reporters a peek at a strategy memo, thus heightening the suspense and the value of 51 the information by keeping it "secret."
Carter's organization also knew how to position the candidate to secure the most beneficial coverage. Early in the campaign Carter had to take media attention when and where he could get it. After
January the balance began to shift as Carter attracted a large press review, and particularly after the New Hampshire primary when access to
Carter had become a valuable commodity. With demand high, Carter's staff controlled the supply. By the Florida primary Carter was in such demand that he could obtain media attention almost any time he wanted l•t • 52
The genius of Carter's media effort was evident in how he molded himself into an attractive and newsworthy candidate. Carter's early anonymity was a big advantage. Having had no national track record, he came into the presidential race without a field image or label. This allowed him to introduce background information on himself an d t h us ma1nta1n. . me d.1a contro 1 • 53
Although the coverage that Carter received in the national media was highly favorable, he was the target of some very critical reviews by media personnel. His most devastating coverage appeared during the "ethnic purity" episode when he was chastized by the public and press alike for his remarks about keepng American neighborhoods
"ethnically pure." The second issue for which he was lambasted was over his remarks given to Playboy, which many reporters felt was his most extensive interview during the entire campaign year. The working 85 press' major complaint, however, and the one for which he was most 54 rebuked, was over his "fuzziness" on the issues. Media expert
Rafshoon disputed such accounts and said that from the beginning
Carter's advertising probably had been more issue-oriented than that . d 55 o f any cand ~ ate. The working press disagreed.
The press, in reviewing its own performance, expressed pangs of guilt for allowing the candidate and his staff the opportunity of maintaining almost absolute media control. Stated one journalist,
"the year 1976 deserves to go down in history as the campaign year in which 'junk news' came into its own." Critics argued that news organizations overplayed faults and fluffs and underplayed really 56 important distinctions between the candidates.
A news analyst observed that Carter was a supurb news strate- gist during the 1976 primaries--"among the best since John Kennedy."
His aides understood which media organizations mattered and how to exploit the determinants of the media's campaign news to counter the natural conflicts between the candidate and the press. The press seemed anxious only to unearth trends and failed to dig deeper into 57 the heart of the campaign.
Syndicated columnists and assigned reporters who follow·ed
Carter's campaign collectively derided the manner in which individuals were assigned to cover the candidates and stated it was a contributing factor to the shallow job that the press did in 1976. The system of coverage tended to color the journalists' perceptions of the campaign.
The candidates and reporters were working, traveling and joking together and both shared an interest in getting publicity--the reporters so that they could advance their own exposure in their 86 medium and thus further their careers, the candidates so that they could win their elections. So the candidates encouraged and "helped" the reporters by providing the routine necessities such as telephones, space to write and transportation (which was organized by the campaign and then billed to the reporter's paper or network). They also gave them stories, arranged for interesting events, provided background on the campaign strategy and the private lives of the candidates and 58 scheduled interviews.
In 1976 the political reporters experienced that by being invited to travel on the campaign plane they became trapped in a cocoon which distorted their perception of everything that happened in the campaign because they could not see the broad dimensions. In
Carter's case another factor heightened the symbiotic relationship with reporters. Because he had been unknown, he had initially been assigned many young journalists--many of whom were also Southerners.
Th1s encouraged press biases very early in the election year and 59 virtually gave Carter the media control he sought.
Despite the overall good press coverage Carter had secured and the skill he and his aides showed in bringing it about, he had an ambivalent attitude toward the media. Carter and his close associates displayed a certain defensiveness about the media. When members of the press corps wrote stories he did not like or pushed him too hard in press conferences, Carter and his staff openly confronted them. On occasions reporters were belittled in front of their colleagues and 60 Carter himself showed irritation or deeper anger.
Carter viewed members of the news media as a peer constituency
1n their own right. He saw individual reporters as mechanical 87 conduits--a special audience which, if influenced, could bring pol1- tical benefits. He wanted the vote and commitment of the individual reporter as much as he wanted that of his or her general audience. He complained about the press incessantly asking questions on the "nuts and bolts" of the campaign. But he never failed to reply to them, sometimes in exhaustive detail. Carter talked technology. He was not a political organizer as much as he was a mechanical specialist, putting nuts and bolts together. By instinct and training he was impelled to reply to reporters' questions about the bows and whys of constructing a political campaign and did so with the fervor for deta1 "1 o f an eng1neer. . 61
Given the 1976 news media's absorption 1n the technology of the campaign, this Carter penchant led to what informed campaign watchers considered absurd dialogues between reporters and the candi- date. It prompted one political observer to note, "Never was so much that meant so little presented in such technologically perfect fashion to such a widely yawning public. 1162
Without a doubt, newspapers played an important role in focusing voter attention on Carter. His image fluctuated during the year but the press was the one major campaign instrument that sent this relative unknown to Hashington. All of the large national papers lent a hand in strengthening his political position and in increasing his credibility as a serious and strong presidential contender.
Hundreds of articles emerged in white papers across the country, but there is scant information available relating the black press' involvement. On October 2, 1976, Carter met with repre- sentatives of the black press at the National 4H Center in Chevy 88
Chase, Maryland. A transcript of his remarks revealed that he held a brief question-and-answer session. His comments focused on the human-rights achievements accomplished by the Kennedy-Johnson adminis tration, and about the backlash suffered in later years under the
Nixon Republican administration. Press corps members questioned him about such issues as welfare, civil rights, his proposed changes to the welfare system, black elected officials, unemployment and the 63 failure of black newspapers to obtain more federal advertising.
It is difficult to determine from such a brief exposure if these were considered crucial issues for the black press and whether or not they supported Carter's campaign. The research, therefore, intends to examine what the black press said about the Southern candidate. 89
Notes 1 Marjorie Randon, The Making of Campaign Strategy (Lexington, Massachusetts: Hershey-Lexington Books, 1974), p. 7.
2 Robert Shogan, Promises to Keep (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1977), p. 28. 3 Jonathan Moore and Janet Fraser, eds., Campaign for President (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977), p. 1. 4 Ibid.
5Ibid.
6Ibid., p. 2.
7Ibid.
8 James Wooten, Dasher--The Roots and the Rising of Jimmy Carter (New York: Summit Books, 1978), p. 25.
9Martin Schram, Running for President--The Carter Campaign (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), p. 52. 10 Wooten, Dasher, p. 25. 11 rbid. 12 Ibid. 13 Schram, Running fgr President, P· 52. 14 Shogan, Promises to Keep, P· 21. 15 Schram, Running for President, P· 52. 16 Ibid. 17 Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1976-1977). 18 "As Blacks Zero in·on Candidates," U.S. News and World Report, 2o April 1976, p. 21; "Blacks and Politics '76," Newsweek, 26 April 1976, p. 22; "Carter and the Blacks," Newsweek, 19 July 1976, p. 29. 19 Wooten, Dasher, p. 2o. 20 Ibid.
21 Ibid. 90
22 Moore and Fraser, Campaign for President, p. 93.
23 Ibid. 24 william l1orrow, How Jimmy Won--The Victory Campaign From Plains to the White House (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1977), p. 170. 25 Ibid. 26 Ernest Hynds, American Newspapers 1n the 1980s (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1980), p. 110. 27 Gunner Myrdal, An American Dilemma, val. II (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1946), p. 909. 28 Hynds, American Newspapers in the 1980s, p. 110.
29 Ibid., pp. 110-11. 30 Ibid., p. 113. 31 Myrdal, American Dilemma, p. 910. 32 Henry LaBrie and William Zima, "Directional Quandaries of the Black Press in the United States," Journalism Quarterly 48 (Winter 1971): 640. 33 Ibid., p. 641.
34vishu V. Oak, The Negro Newspaper (Westport, Connecticut: Negro Universities Press, 1Y48; reprinted., 1970), p. 84.
35Henry G. LaBrie III, ed., Perspectives of the Black Press: 1974 (Kennebunk, lfuine: Mercer House Press, 1Y74), p. 69. 36 Oak, Negro Newspaper, p. 86. 37 Ibid. 38 Hynds, American Ne"1spapers in the 1980s, p. 112. 39 Myrdal, American Dilemma, p. 919.
40 Oak, Negro Newspaper, p. 90. 41 Myrdal, American Dilemma, p. 909. 42 Roland E. Wolseley, The Black Press, U.S.A. (Ames: The Iowa State University Press, 1Y71), pp. 168-170.
43 Ibid., p. 167. 91
44Ibid., p. 169.
45 Morrow, How Jimmy Won, p. 206. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid.
49 schram, Running for President, p. 308.
50 Betty Glad, Jimmy Carter--In Search of the Great White House (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1980), p. 283. 51 Ibid.
52Ibid., p. 285.
53 Ibid., p. 286.
54David L. Paletz and Robert M. Entman, Media·Power·Politics (New York: Free Press, 1981), p. 37.
55Laurence I. Barrett, "How Do You Feel About How You Feel," Columbia Journalism Review 15 (January/February 1977): 36.
56 Sanford J. Unger, "By Trivia Obsessed," Columbia Journalism Review 15 (January/February 1977): 17.
57 Paletz and Entman, Media·Power·Politics, p. 34.
58Glad, Jimmy Carter, p. 299. 59 Ibid.
60Ibid., pp. 300-01.
61 vic Gold, PR as in President (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1977), p. 215. 62 James McCartney, "The Triumph of Junk News," Columbia Journalism Review 15 (January/February 1977): 17.
63u.s. Committee on House Administration, U.S. House of Representatives, The Presidential Campaign 1976, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 36. CHAPTER V
FINDINGS
The topics are presented as follows: Carter's challenge by
George Wallace, the Florida primary, the "ethnic purity" incident, the
"stop-Carter" movement, Carter's clout with black individuals or organizations, black issues, the black ministers' incident, the debates, the Playboy interview, Andrew Young coverage, and Carter's association with black dignitaries. The established order was based upon the time periods in which each issue chronologically appeared in the papers.
The bulk of the articles on Carter and Wallace appeared from
January through March, almost simultaneous with the coverage on the
Florida primary. The "ethnic purity" remark was made in April, thus producing the greatest volume of related articles and editorials during April and May. "Stop-Carter" articles appeared intermittently from January through May, as did Carter's association with black individuals and dignitaries. Black issues were also interspersed throughout the election year, but the bulk appeared between March and
July.
The black ministers' story was printed in August, the debates were conducted from the month of September through October and the
Playboy issue started in the latter part of September. The articles on Andrew Young appeared a.t intervals throughout the year. A few
92 93 profiles were done after the Democratic primary, but the major coverage was done between August and October. As more black officials began to endorse Carter for president, additional articles about them appeared with a majority occurring after the Democratic Convention. 94
Pittsburgh Courier
The Pittsburgh Courier was the first black paper reviewed because it contained more of the wire service coverage and more of the syndicated columns by black writers than other black papers. Thus, much of its material was duplicated ~n other papers.
Carter-\vallace Coverage
The Courier began its election-year coverage on 13 March with
Wallace's challenge on page 1 in a story titled "115 Local South
Leaders Balk at Wallace Race." The unflattering article labeled
Wallace a political "trickster" who would bring a police state to
America. The paper urged that Wallace, his ideas, and his candidacy be rejected by black voters.
On 20 Harch the second Wallace article appeared. The page 2 column was written by Louis Martin, a frequent Courier contributor, for his "The Big Parade" series. He applauded Carter's victory in
Florida in the column, "Gov. Wallace Receives a Hessage." Even though he lauded Jimmy Carter and called him a "giant killer" for delivering what he considered a devastating blow to Wallace's presidential ambi tions, Hartin's opinions reflected more personal joy over Wallace's defeat than overall jubilation because of Carter's victory.
On 27 Harch the last Wallace story was carried on the front page. It was written in conjunction with a series of items about
Carter's preparations for the Florida primary. The title of the article by Sara Fritz was "Young Critics Pop Wallace's Balloon." A group of freshmen from the University of Alabama Law School took 95 credit for limiting Wallace's strength during the early Democratic presidential primaries. They circulated a fact sheet about Wallace's voting record among very influential voters which in turn contributed to Wallace's downfall and to his defeat in Flordia.
In summary, the "Carter-Wallace" coverage was very brief.
There were a total of three items all appearing during the month of
March. The two articles appeared on the front page. Neither anti-Carter nor pro-Carter sentiments were evident since the primary focus was on opposition to George Wallace's candidacy. The one colunn did mention Carter but without evidence of endorsement. Black perspectives relative to Carter could not be ascertained.
Florida Primary
The only news story devoted to Carter's Florida campaign was a front-page UPI release on 27 March. It was headl~ned "A Blender Pro duces Carter's Power" and written by Gregory Gordon. The article gave the first insight into Carter's previous primary victories and noted that he was now the leading contender ~n the '76 Democratic primary race.
This one article about the Florida primary still did not reveal the black perspective. It gave the first hint that Carter was successful because of unusually large black support but it was still not evident if, in fact, blacks were endorsing his candidacy.
Ethnic Purity
"Ethnic purity" coverage started with a page 2 article head lined "Carter Apologizes Over Incident." The wire service release was run on 17 April, the week after Carter made the comment. The lead 96 carried his apology, followed by an explanation about the circum stances surrounding the controversy. The article quoted Carter extensively as he explained why he chose the term "ethnic purity."
Also included in the article was a statement by Andrew Young, described as Mr. Carter's foremost advocate in black communities, who said the phrasing was a "disaster for the campaign" and that Carter could lose black support. It also observed that Carter changed his position on the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill and now supported the measure.
"Ethnic purity" coverage continued with an article about Rep.
Morris Udall, one of Carter's opponents and primary contender for black support. In the page 1 release on 24 April, Seth King wrote,
"Udall Backs Carter's View on Housing." Udall said he and Jimmy
Carter held roughly the same "technical" positions on open housing.
However, he chastised Carter for his choice of words. He said
Carter's remarks were not racially motivated.
One page 2 of the same issue the article "King Rights Leaders
'Forgive' Carter for 'Ethnic Purity' Histake" by lhlliam Cotterell appeared. Rev. ~~rtin Luther King, Sr. was quoted extensively. He said he forgave Carter and accepted his apology to the nation. In the meantime, Georgia State Representative Rev. Hosea Williams, who dis agreed with King, led fifty picketers in an anti-Carter drive while the rally was in progress.
On 24 April three additional articles were written about
Carter's "ethnic purity" remark as it shaped up as a major campaign issue. The first, a brief untitled page 3 UPI story, said that 97
President Ford preferred using the term "ethnic heritage" and opposed federal intervention to integrate established neighborhoods.
The two additional items were columns written by regular con tributors. The first, "Forgive, Forget, Jimmy Carter's Goof," by
Ethel Payne, appeared on page 5 and lambasted contenders Henry Jackson and Morris Udall for trying to capitalize on Carter's mistake. She was impressed by Carter's apology and stated that the other two aspirants had never attempted to address black-related issues until
Carter's ethnic mistake. The second, by Walter Lowe, Jr. in his weekly series "In Search of a Way," virtually restated Payne's remarks. He complimented Carter for apologizing and for considering black concerns important enough to warrant his attention. He accused
Carter's two major critics, Jackson and Udall, of benign neglect.
Th1s column appeared on page 4.
The 1 May edition exposed further aspects of the "ethnic pur ity" incident in the article "U.S. Can't Handle Ethnic--Expert Says."
It attributed the U.S.'s preoccupation with Carter's statement to the fact that Americans were uncomfortable in dealing w1th different cultural groups. The uncredited page 4 article then proceeded to summarize the "ethnic purity" flap.
"Ethnic purity" was mentioned practically as an afterthought in Louis Martin's 1 May, page 5, column "vlhites Who Help Blacks, Help
Themselves." During the prev1ous week, the Supreme Court had ruled that public housing could not be barred from suburban areas and Carter hailed the ruling as significant. Martin noted Carter's approval, then compared his political theories with those of George Wallace. 98
Martin extolled the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as the undisputed factor that helped Carter by providing him with a legion of eligible black voters.
National Urban League president Vernon Jordan, Jr. uttered the sole negative commentary about Carter's "ethnic purity" remark on
8 May in a page 5 personal view, "The Coining of New Racial Code
Words." He expressed great displeasure, not only with Carter for using the phrase, but with his political counterparts and with the media which, according to Jordan, insincerely denounced the phrase.
He stated that the basic position on integrated housing as taken by candidates Jackson and Udall and by President Ford, who preferred to use "ethnic heritage," were all the same as Carter's. The column advocated implementing more open housing.
On 29 ~fuy Vernon Jordan, while in South Bend, Indiana to rece1ve an honorary degree, reiterated his remarks and announced that the word "ethnic" had become a new racial code word. The page 5 title article was the last information about the ethnic issue.
In summary, the Courier ran a total of n1ne items on the
"ethnic purity" incident. Even though it was the most extensive and comprehensively explored issue, coverage did not begin on the front page. It became a front page item by the second week. Coverage started on 17 April and ended on 29 May. Seven of the nine items supported Carter and several of the columnists lashed out against
Carter's critics. Blacks' support for Carter was becoming evident and several nationally known black dignitaries were linked with Carter's campaign. The two regular contributors, Ethel Payne and Walter Lowe,
Jr., also influential black columnists, expressed very similar view- 99 points which in essence set the trend for black newspaper coverage nationally. They stressed that Carter should be vindicated and implied that blacks should support his efforts.
Stop Carter
The paper ran no "stop-Carter" coverage. However, it did review Governor Edmond G. Brown Jr.'s activity in the campaign. It will be reviewed under the topic "Black Issues."
Carter and Blacks
The first item about Carter's clout with blacks was ~n actu ality abuot his rival Sargent Shriver's clout with blacks. The column's significance, however, rests with the fact that it was the first time that Carter was recognized by the paper as a serious con tender. Shriver at this point was the more favored candidate, as evidenced by the title of the column, "Sarge Shriver Has Kept the
Faith." It appeared in late January on page 2 and was written by
Louis Martin. He said that Shriver had obtained such strong support from blacks in Mississippi that he edged out Jimmy Carter for the second spot; however, he was beaten by Governor George Wallace. He attributed Shriver's popularity to his administration of the anti poverty Office of Economic Opportunity program and to his family ties with John F. Kennedy.
On 6 March, on page 13 of the Women's Section, the first indi cations appeared that blacks might support a Carter candidacy. In the wire service article, New York Representative Shirley Chisolm said that she might endorse the former Georgia governor. However, she made 100 it clear that Senator Hubert Humphrey was still her favorite. She indicated that she would conditionally support Carter if he appeared on the ticket as Humphrey's running mate.
On 27 March a brief page 1 wire service story was the first to recognize that blacks helped Carter achieve a primary victory. It was called "Blacks Helped Carter Hin" and reported that Jimmy Carter was the runaway winner in the Illinois Democratic primary because he piled up landslide margins among Chicago black voters.
On 3 April Carter's deliberate pitch for black votes became evident 1.n the page 3 article, "Carter Talks About Feelings Toward
Blacks" by Matthew C. Quinn. Carter presented personal theories about the civil rights movement, then Quinn highlighted some of his achieve ments towards improving black/white relationships. Carter expounded upon a few of the experiences he had had while growing up with blacks in the South.
In a page 2 article appearing on 17 April, Mike Leinsilber wrote "How Carter Woose the Black Votes." It highlighted his trip into a black church in New York during which Carter took the oppor tunity to flaunt his record of black political appointments made while he was governor of Georgia. In the same 17 April issue, on page 5 a survey title by the Joint Center for Political Studies in Washington,
D.C. was reported which said that the decided preference among black
Democrats was for the Southern born candidate, Carter.
A very skeptical Louis Martin wrote "Carter Hit Winning Run" for his "The Big Parade" feature on the 19 June editorial, page 5.
Martin commented on Carter's primary victories, then surmised that if he planned to continue to place his faith in a massive black voting 101
bloc for the November election he might be disappointed. At the time
the column appeared, only 55 percent of eligible black voters were
registered. M~rtin speculated that unless the black voter registra
tion and turnout improved drastically, Carter's nurtured relationship with blacks would have been all for naught.
On 21 August the paper declared in the article "Black Vote
'Margin of Victory' for Dems" that because of Carter's immense popu
larity with the blacks he would obtain a large contingency of black votes irrespective of whom the Republican candidate would be. It was a front-page item.
In summary, seven items were run about Carter and the clout he had with black individuals. The coverage started in January and ended
in August. Over that time frame several trends were noted. Starting
in January when Sargent Shriver was still in the race it appeared as
if he might emerge as the favored candidate. By early March it was hoped that Humphrey w·ould still enter the race but by late l1arch
Carter began to emerge as the candidate most preferred. The first article showing Carter's growing popularity with blacks was the only
page 1 feature. The articles which ran later in the year all reveal his direct strategy to obtain black votes.
Black Issues
The first black issues item surfaced on the second page of the
15 May issue in "Black Democrats Quiz Candidates" by Askia Muhammad.
A black caucus convention was held 1n Charlotte, North Carolina, in which almost all of the Democratic contenders appeared. Wallace was not invited. California Governor Jerry Brown became a significant 102 factor because, even though none of the candidates was endorsed by the convention, Brown won major support from some previously uncommitted delegates.
On 26 June, Walter Lowe, Jr., in his 11 In Search of a Way" opinion series, started a five-week expos~ on candidate Carter. The first was a page 6 item on "Carter on Jobs and Unemployment." Lowe compared Carter's viewpoints about unemployment with those of Gerald
Ford and Ronald Reagan, concluding that Carter's position was by far the better for blacks.
On 3 July, the second in the series appeared on page 6. The title was "Three Good Issues," identified as welfare reform, food stamps and health and child care. Lowe stated that Carter's thinking was the most progressive of any presidential candidate with the possible exception of the candidate of the Socialist Party. Carter's appeal to black Atlantans for support was also covered on 3 July in the UPI release, "Carter's Spirited Talk Touches Atlanta Blacks." It appeared on page 2 as a news brief.
On 10 July "In Search of a Way" continued on the editorial page with "Carter on Two Topics: Discrimination, Integration." First
Lowe explored Carter's busing stand, then his equal employment oppor tunities, fair housing, and voting platforms, after which he concluded that Carter's liberal approach to all of the foregoing issues made him a pro-integration advocate.
"In Search of a Way" on 17 July explored "Carter on Crime
Control, Government Spending, Taxes." Lowe examined several issues which reflected Carter's attitudes towards civil liberties. The areas covered were gun control, deterring violent crime, administration of 103 justice, drug laws, the Equal Rights Amendment, the tax structure, tax loopholes, domestic monetary policy, government spending, a1d to cities and economic planning. This feature ran on page 6.
The 24 July article titled "Carter Naive on Foreign Policy" was the first to speculate on Carter's limited potential. Lowe admitted that the picture painted of Carter thus far had been good, especially on minority issues. He predicted, however, that because
Carter took such a sincere, honest approach to all situations, he may not be as strong in international affairs as a U.S. President should be. This item appeared on page 6.
Also on 17 July an article apeared on page 4 headl1ned "Black
Connections at Convention both Trivial and Significant." Writer Jim
Martin provided a capsulized summary of the contributions that some blacks had made towards Carter's nomination during the National
Democratic Convention. He also stated that the Rev. Jesse Jackson attempted to lobby for the nomination of Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley as the party's vice-presidential candidate.
The last black issues article was a front page news item on 7
August. Shortly after Carter was nominated as the Demoocratic candidate, a black Plains neighbor became embroiled in a controversy with his landlord over having to vacate a ramshakle house. The house was being razed because, according to the black tenant, A. Z. Pitman,
Carter's campaign workers complained that it was an eyesore to the community. Carter was sharply criticized for refusing to intervene.
The story l-las titled "Black Neighbor of Jimmy Carter's Ousted From
Home."
To summarize, there were eight black issues items, two 104 appearing on the front page. Walter Lowe's series "In Search of a
Way" dominated the black issues section. His approach indicated that he was pro-Carter. There were no "stop-Carter" features but the black caucus convention in Charlotte, North Carolina, which became enamored by California Governor Jerry Brown, was covered. Some other papers noted that Brown was introduced as a last-minute hopeful to dilute
Carter's strong black support. The Courier did not mention this. The story about Carter's neighbor in Plains became a major news item in many black papers including the Courier.
Black Ministers' Payoff
On 21 August the only article about the payments made to black ministers appeared. The UPI story by Wesley Pippert, "Carter Admits
Pay to Clerics," ran on the first page. Carter predicted he may have been grazed politically. He hastily dispelled any fears that the practice was widespread and indicated that overall the majority of payments made to black or white campaign workers were used honestly.
The story focused completely on Carter's political vulnerability. In contast, many other papers explored the ministers' roles or the wide spread practice of this type of contribution.
Debates
There was no debate coverage.
Playboy Interview
The Playboy interview was mentioned for the first time on 2
October in a page 6 column by Phillis Hobson called "Uncle's 'Sin'
Only Matched Carter's." Her most worthwhile comments were found in 105 the lead paragraph where she stated that Carter's admissions about sin, sex and temptation reminded her of her uncle Jasper. The rest was an anecdote about Uncle Jasper's antics. She concluded by saying
Uncle Jasper was not angered by the press' treatment of the Playboy interview.
On 9 October a page 6 column defending the Playboy interview appeared. In the critique, "Lust, so What?" Louis A. Fitzgerald, Jr. commplimented Carter for being open and honest about his feelings. He declared that Carter should be judged by his deeds and not by his thoughts.
Dr. Benjamin Mays gave his views about the Playboy article in his page 5 column, also titled "Lust, so What?" on 30 October. Mays concluded after reading the article that vast amounts of the publi cized passages had been taken out of context and blown out of proportion. He felt that Carter was keen, articulate and above all honest.
In summary, the three columns on Playboy revealed that there was total support for Carter. No straight news coverage appeared, so readers had to consult some other source for background information.
The given information would not have been sufficient to determine what the controversy was about. The writers collectively portrayed Carter as honest and candid.
Andrew Young
On 10 July, Andrew Young's involvement became evident. In a front-page UPI release, "Carter on Two Topics: Discrimination and
Integration," Young told the National NAACP convention that Jimmy 106
Carter was going to bring new perspectives to racial justice problems.
A 31 July page 6 editorial on "Carter and Young" discussed
Carter's public acknowledgement of his indebtedness to Andrew Young.
The editorial credited Young with getting the word out through the
black communities and assuring them that Carter could be trusted.
Ethel Payne, associate editor for the Sengstacke Newspapers
Association, conducted an exclusive interview with candidate Carter which was printed just below the banner headline on page 1 in the 28
August issue under the title "Jimmy Carter Tells His Story." It smn marized how he planned his strategy to obtain minority votes by
launching a massive voter registration drive headed by Andrew Young.
He also talked about unemployment, the FBI, the black ministers' pay ment incident and quality education. He complimented Young for the
job he was doing and highlighted his future responsibilities and duties as his principal spokesman in black communities.
On 4 September Ethel Payne wrote "Speaking of Candidates," a personal observation and follow-up on the preceding Carter interview.
She reiterated the fact that the Democratic Party planned to spend
$2 million on a voter registration drive aimed at minorities. She also stressed that Andrew Young was national coordinator for the drive, and therefore urged a heavy black turnout. She predicted that the drive would be successful because of Young's efforts. This item appeared on page 5.
On 18 September Andrew Young entered the picture again in an article "Jimmy Carter, Busy Wooing Black Voters" by Matthew Quinn.
Young gave an overview of how he intended to conduct the voter 107
registration drive. He particularly emphasized to blacks that they must register to assist Carter.
Andrew Young defended the black caucus decision to endorse
Jimmy Carter and called President Ford "dumb" in the 30 October page 2
article "Young Defends Black Caucus: Picks Carter" by Phillis Hudson.
In summary, with six articles printed on Andrew Young, the
Courier contained the most extensive Young coverage. However, Young
was never personally profiled. Rather, his function within the Carter
campaign was the focal point for all coverage.
Carter and Black Dignitaries
The Courier carried no coverage of Carter's association with
black dignitaries but included an abundance of photographs of Carter
with influential blacks. They were not reviewed for this study. 108
Chicago Daily Defender
Carter-Wallace Coverage
On 9 February George Wallace entered the picture. In an untitled editorial carried on page 11 the editor said that for years
Wallace had dominated the political scene in the South and was parti cularly strong among those opposed to racial integration. He was now being challenged. Carter, ironically, was never mentioned by name and there was no indication of whether or not the paper advocated supporting him.
A UPI article about Rep. Shirley Chisholm's pledge to support
Carter appeared on page 4 on 16 February. The untitled article's greatest stress, however, was on Chisholm's distaste for George
Wallace. She indicated that Carter was the only "Southern" candidate that she would support.
On 1 March in the wire service release "llS Local South
Leaders Balk at Wallace Race," Wallace's candidacy was condemned and he was labeled a political "trickster" who would bring a police state to America. The dateline on the page 21 article was Birmingham,
Alabama.
Carter's upset win over Alabama Governor George Wallace occupied a sizable amount of space in a page 2 article on 10 ~~rch which hailed Carter's w·in in Florida. The paper said that Carter's victory was a victory for the "new South" and that Florida was an indication that Wallace could no longer be expected to automatically 109 win the large blocs of Southern delegates. It declared Wallace politically dead.
On 22 March a page 11 untitled editorial pointed out that
Carter had the edge over Wallace for Southern votes but cautioned blacks to challenge Carter on black issues. It stated that he may be skirting the issues and that "no candidate from whatever camp is going to bamboozle the black voter with empty promises of pie in the sky in the sweet by and by."
Two articles on George Wallace appeared in the 23 March edition. The first, on page 2, was a Washington-datelined UPI release titled "Wallace Campaign Funds Drop." The second, another UPI release, appeared on page 3 and read "Race Issue Dead; Wallace Told to
Quit." It quoted the Montgomery Advisor which editorially suggested that Wallace bow out of the Democratic presidential race because he no longer had a broad constituency based upon racial issues.
On 24 March "Carter KO's Wallace Again" appeared on page 2 and spotl1ghted the fact that Carter's position on racial integration contrasted sharply with that of George l-lallace' s. The wire service report stated that Carter's "new South" politics were more viable than
Wallace's "old South" rhetoric.
In summary, the seven Carter-Wallace articles were distinctly anti-Wallace but at the same time they were not pro-Carter. It is evident that they were happy to declare Wallace politically dysfunctional but were not sure that Carter would be the panacea to solve crucial problems that blacks still faced. The paper was not yet ready to endorse Carter. 110
Florida Primary
Very little information about the Florida primary was
featured. There were several pictures taken of Carter as he
campaigned for black votes in Florida but the only two articles
appearing were a 15 March, page 7, UPI feature "Young Critics Pop
Wallace's Balloon" by Sara Fritz and another UPI article on 16 March
on page 10 by Gregory Gordon titled ''A 'Blender' Produces Carter's
Power."
Ethnic Purity
The "ethnic purity" issue was ushered in on 12 April when the
paper ran a page 4 UPI release, "Carter Flap Won't Die." Carter was
quoted as having asked the press to drop the ~ssue because he had
apologized and some black leaders and most black voters accepted the
apology. One Carter opponent, Sen. Morris Udall, was quoted along with two black non-Carter supporters, Georgia Rep. Jul~an Bond and
Rev. Jesse Jackson. Udall and Bond's remarks were devastating while
Jackson's were neutral and noncommital. He expressed concern over
Carter's concealed feelings towards blacks.
On 13 April an editorial ran on page 8 headlined "Carter's
Ethnic Purity" which provided background data about the incident. The
editor said that black criticism was mounting and added that a
telegram sent to Carter from Congressman Andrew Young called the
remark a "disaster for the campaign."
"Black Leaders Forgive Carter" was the title of a 14 April,
page 4, article which revealed that the Rev. }~rtin Luther King, Sr.
and other civil rights leaders had pledged to continue their support 111
for the Carter campaign. The article (no reporter given) contained a
laundry list of black personalities who supported Carter and who also
praised him as a "big man" because he rendered an apology. Mentioned
briefly was that Rev. Hosea Williams and a few followers had picketed
the rally and were not going to pledge support.
On 15 April another wire service article was carried on page 8
called "King Rights Leaders 'Forgive' Carter for 'Purity' Mistake."
It was almost a duplication of the article carried on 14 April.
Added, however, was the only data referenced on the "stop-Carter" movement. Carter was quoted as having said that he was the target of
opposition from the Democratic Party. He called it a Jimmy
Carter-versus-everybody campaign.
Besides duplicating many of the w~re serv~ce features that were carried by other publications, most notably the Pittsburgh
Courier, the Daily Defender carried features by many of the same black
columnists. Walter Lowe, Jr. was one and as a result, all of his
columns were reprinted. The column "Big Foot, Small Mouth--Thanks for
the Apology, Jimmy" was duplicated on IS April on page 16.
On 21 April Rev. Jesse Jackson of operation PUSH, a
Chicago-based civil rights organization, was quoted as having said
that Sen. Hubert Humphrey was the best of the potential nom~nees. In
the page 9 commentary "Jesse Rates Candidates, Humphrey on Top,"
Jackson rated Sen. Henry M. Jackson as the worst Democratic contender with Jimmy Carter next to the last. He considered Rep. Morris Udall
second best. Carter's "ethnic purity" remark caused him to lose
ground with Jackson. 112
Also on 21 April on page 8 an editorial appeared called
"Ethnic Blunder." It concluded that time would be the only factor to
tell how well Carter would overcome the residual effects of his
slip-of-the-tongue comment about maintaining "ethnic purity" in residential neighborhoods. It concluded that he lost support not only among black voters, but also among white liberals, and that it would be reflected in future primary races. On 18 ~~y on page 4 a reprint of "Hits Ethnic as New Racial Code Word" by Vernon Jordan appeared.
To summarize, in spite of being a daily publication, the paper
started its "ethnic purity" coverage after Carter had apologized.
Then it recapitulated the entire incident for its readers. Much of
its coverage consisted of wire service releases, which means that it duplicated a number of other publications. It did introduce Jesse
Jackson's views, which none of the other publications carried. It carried seven ethnic-related articles.
Stop Carter
Gov. Jerry Brown earned space on 24 May in a page 3 article
"Brown v1oos Blacks in Oregon." Brown conducted a campaign rally in one black community designed as a direct challenge to Jimmy Carter.
This item is being treated as a "stop-Carter" item because it focused on Gov. Brown's direct challenge to Jimmy Carter as a ploy to dilute his black support. The paper implied in a few places that an actual
"stop-Carter" movement might have been in existence, but it never printed any material referring to the organized movement. It was aware, however, of Jerry Brown's activities as they related to the
Carter campaign. 113
Carter and Blacks
On page 3 on 18 March black votes were first noted as a major factor involved in Carter's success. He swept the Illinois primary and, as the title suggested, "Blacks Helped Carter Win." The UPI article, "Carter Talks About Feelings Towards Blacks 11 by Matthew C.
Quinn, was printed on page 8 on 22 March.
Anti-Carter speeches by Julian Bond dominated the coverage during the opening days of April, as seen 1n the article "Bond Hints
Carter Lied, 11 printed on page 3 on 5 April. Bond insisted that Carter asked for his help on his attempt to secure a vice-presidential nomination in 1972. Carter disputed the claim, saying that he had never sought Bond's help. Bond adamantly fought against Carter's nomination and attempted to sway black support away from Carter. In the same issue on page 5 the paper ran 11How Carter vloos Black Votes 11 by Mike Fernsilber.
On 8 April a page 13 editorial appeared on 11Carter on the
Black Vote. 11 The writer concluded that Carter had outdistanced his
Democratic rivals through his impressive 11vote-getting magic. 11
Carter's effort to deal openly with black issues was the vote-getting magic wand he waved. On 19 May, Alex Seith's perspective, "Politics
1976: 'Experts' Wrong," was reprinted on page 20.
An editorial, "Carter and the Black Vote," printed on 9 June on page 11, said that the gravitation of black voters toward Jimmy
Carter's campaign was causing concern among Republicans. The
Republican Party was mystified by the attraction and worried because of the size of the black constituency. The writer concluded that 114
Carter talked the language that black voters understood. Blacks were even willing to forgive the ethnic blunder.
An article on 4 August on page 3 focused on attorney Tom Todd, a veteran civil rights leader, who claimed that Carter was getting black votes too easily and too cheaply. In the article, "Todd Zaps
Carter," the attorney speculated that blacks were being taken in by a big smile and a few generalities. He insisted that blacks needed to become more demanding.
In the 7 October edition on page 12 a column in Walter Lowe,
Jr.'s series, "In Search of a Way," was devoted to the topic "This
Time There 1s a Choice." This pro-Carter view asserted that to assume that there was no difference in the racial attitudes of presidential candidates Carter and Ford was a fallacy. Lowe stated that Carter had addressed himself to the economic, social and racial problems of blacks in every address and public statement that he had made. He insisted that it was not a plug for Carter, but a plug for the right and duty to vote.
Carter earned space on 20 October because of a black campaign worker. The page 16 article titled "Black Female Volunteer Praised by
Carter Camp" was a public relations release. The spotlight was on a black Carter campaign worker.
On 26 October the famous picture of Carter with the Rev.
Martin Luther King, Sr. was featured. Its purpose was to urge indi viduals to get out and vote.
To summarize, in its ten items about Carter and blacks, the paper still indicated little pro-Carter sentiment. The coverage was 115 balanced and this was the only publication to approach Julian Bond for comments, although he only skimmed the surface and never delved into his personal reservations about Carter. They were aware of the fact that Carter was attracting monumental black support. Towards the end of the year a bit more pro-Carter coverage was evident.
Black Issues
The first black issues item was noted in a page 2 feature on
16 March titled "Black Group Seeks Presidential Hope" by Rick Van
Sant. The National Black Political Assembly met to hold its national convention and nominated several prominent blacks as party presi dential candidates.
The next black issue did not appear until 3 May when "Candi dates Vow Action on Jobs" was printed on page 4. The four maJor
Democratic presidential contenders appeared before a black convention being held in Charlotte, North Carolina and pledged their support to black interests. All claimed that they had solid records of help in minorities, but none would commit himself to choosing a black as his running mate. They promised to channel their support to black issues, particularly busing and jobs.
On 18 May in Wisconsin Carter was criticized by supporters for failing to name one black as a delegate to the National Democratic
Convention. In the page 4 article, "Snubbed Blacks in Wis. Blast
Carter on Delegates," it was pointed out that the black electorate made Carter a national figure and that they should not be left out of the decision-making process.
Walter Lowe, Jr.'s series, "In Search of a Way," was also 116 carried by the Daily Defender. "A Closer Look at Jimmy Carter" was run on page 16 on 10 June, and "Carter on Jobs and Unemployment" was carried on page 12 on 17 June. Several other articles in common with several publications were printed throughout the month of June. They included "Carter's Spiritual Talk Touches Atlanta Blacks" by Wesley
Pippert, printed on page 2 on 21 June; "Carter Lauds Integration," a
UP! release, run on page 4 on 24 June; and "Carter Good on Three
Issues" by Walter Lowe, Jr., printed on 24 June on page 18.
On 1 July the column "In Search of a Way" continued with
"Carter on Discrimination, Integration" on page 20. The vice-presi dential controversy came to the forefront in an 8 July page 4 article,
"Jesse Urges Bradley for Veep." In an open letter to Carter the Rev.
Jesse Jackson urged him to name Hayor Tom Bradley as his choice for vice president. "In Search of a Way" also continued on 8 July with
"Carter on Crime Control, Government Spending and Taxes. 11 It appeared on page 18.
On 14 July convention coverage continued with another article on the vice-presidential controversy. There were two related articles, "Bradley Rejects Bid to be Veep" and "Dellums to Snub
Carter." The first article was a follow-up of an earlier item which speculated that Carter would consider a black as his running mate.
Tom Bradley declined to seek the Democratic vice-presidential nomina tion. This item appeared on page 4.
The second article spotlighted California Representative Ron
Dellums, who said that he expected to be nominated for the vice presi dency. He thought liberals were dissatisfied with Jimmy Carter and said that he did not expect to support Carter in the general election. 117
This item was run on the same page.
"In Search of a Way" continued on 15 July with "Carter Naive on Foreign Policy?" In the same issue was "Jimmy Carter Tells How He
Hopes to Win" by Ethel Payne. Payne said that Carter's v1ctory strategy for the White House was to run flat out with a special target for blacks, other minorities and ethnics. Andrew Young was mentioned as an early Carter supporter who would have a key role in the campaign as leader of a massive voter--registration drive. The article appeared on page 4.
On 26 July an editorial on page 9 was titled "What About Black
Issues?" The writer advised taking a "wait and see" attitude about how Carter would react to black issues. There were misgivings in the air about Carter's position on consequential black issues. Carter won the support of key black political figures too easily and it became questionable how a white man from the deep South could shed the mores of the South 1n a time when race relations issues were raised.
Because the Defender is published daily, it managed to include one black issue prior to the election not carried by any other black paper until after the election. On 1 November four blacks were barred from worshipping at Carter's church in Plains. This incident domi nated the news on 1 and 2 November. The issue appeared on the first page and captured banner headlines, becoming the only issue to have garnered front-page space. On subsequent days it moved to pages 2 and
3. Statements of remorse were expressed by the candidate. A black
Republican who had never forgiven Carter for the "ethnic purity" incident said that he was glad the church incident occurred because it could help blacks ultimately decide between Carter and Ford. 118
To summarize, 1n the eighteen topics explored, most of the same black issues resurfaced. The Defender did not include any coverage on A. Z. Pittman, which was surprising since so much of its coverage was anti-Carter. It did, however, manage to include Carter's church controversy prior to the election. The other black papers carried the information a week following the election.
Black Ministers' Payoff
Wesley Pippert's article on "Carter Admits Pay to Clerics" ran on page 2 on 9 August. On 10 August a Defender staff member wrote
"Clerics Here Debate Carter Pay." Local Chicago ministers were asked to comment on the actions of the black ministers in California who received $5,000.00 1n campaign funds. Most expressed displeasure about the incident and about the language that some of the California ministers used. The page 4 article was the last printed about the ministers. The entire focus of this one article was on the ministers with no references to Carter or the speculated m1suse of campaign funds. There was local coverage generated and good follow-up.
Debates
There was no debate coverage.
Playboy Interview
On 21 September the Playboy issue surfaced on page 2. In the
article, "Carter Can be 'Touched,"' a capsulized version of his
comments was printed, and on 27 September the Playboy coverage was
concluded by a duplication on page 20 of the column "Lust, So What?"
by Louis Fitzgerald, Jr. Thus, the Defender practically ignored the 119
Playboy incident. Ironically, the two articles that were printed were largely pro-Carter.
Andrew Young
Andrew Young coverage started on 16 March on page 5 in "Young
Renews His Support of Carter." Young had originally planned to support Carter only until he defeated Wallace in the Florida primary, but he decided to reaffirm his support for the Southern candidate.
Young was quoted at length as he explained why he made his decision.
Young reentered the picture on 1 July in the page 5 article,
"Young Lauds Carter at NAACP Meet." Young told the convention that
Jimmy Carter brought a new perspective to the problem of racial justice. On 12 July both Carter and Young received coverage in the page 5 article, "Young to Nominate Carter at Confab." Young,
Georgia's first black congressman since Reconstruction, was slated to make the nominating speech for Carter. He was called a key figure for lining up black support.
On 22 July on page 17 the paper duplicated the article,
"Carter and Young." In the 25 August edition on page 7, "Young to
Head Voter Registration Campaign" appeared. On 4 October "Rep Young to Address Clergymen" was run. It was an announcement that he would be a featured speaker at a local church. The page 21 article commented that Young was currently serving as an adviser to and sup porter of Jimmy Carter.
On 7 October Andrew Young earned more space on page 4 in "Rep
Young to Talk at UPI Confab." The comment was made that Young was
Jimmy Carter's closest adviser and earliest supporter. Most of the 120 feature was about Young's background and his civil rights work. On 12
October the article "Young Defends Black Caucus; Ok's Carter" by
Phyllis Hudson ran on page 2.
In summary, the Defender's coverage on Andrew Young was among the most extensive of all the black papers. It followed his activi ties throughout the year and brought out the fact that he was making the nomination speech for Carter. That fact had been overshadowed in other black papers by the black vice-presidential controversy.
Carter and Black Dignitaries
On 29 March the story, "Rights Lawyers Back Carter," appeared on page 5. It also appeared in several other publications. 121
Amsterdam News
Carter-Wallace Coverage, Florida Primary
The Amsterdam News carried no coverage of either the Florida primary or George Wallace.
Ethnic Purity
"Ethnic purity" entered the picture on 17 April 1n three opinion pieces. The first, a satirical article on page 4 titled
"Another Angle" by James L. Hicks half-heartedly supported Carter even though Hicks insisted in several places that he was not a Carter
"fan." He hastily added that he did not endorse the other candidates either and that Carter was the most sincere of those running. He commended Carter for having the "guts" to speak his mind on national television.
The second article, on page 5, was a biting description of why
Carter chose to use the term "ethnic purity" to this particular pre dominantly white audience. In "Pure Hypocrisy" H. Carl McCall main tained that prior to Carter's remark the Ku Klux Klan and the emer gence of George Wallace on the political scene had been the only reminders of blinded bigotry to have appeared in South Bend, Indiana.
He accused Carter of trying to pit both sides against the middle and of try1ng to be all things to all people.
The third column, on the same page, titled "Carter is Still
Apologizing" recounted the entire ethnic incident and mentioned
Carter's apology. Technically, it was not an opinion piece even though it appeared on the editorial page, because Carter was quoted 122
extensively, as was Andrew Young and Vernon Jordan. It was reported that Young had called the use of the term "a disaster for the campaign" and that several other black leaders felt hurt by the remark. The only other ethnic-related item to appear was a 1 May page
5 appearance of Vernon Jordan's "To Be Equal."
To summarize, the paper condensed all of its ethnic coverage into a few opinion pieces and never treated it as a full news item.
Four items appeared.
Stop Carter
There was no "stop-Carter" coverage.
Carter and Blacks
Carter's growing popularity among blacks was recognized as early as 7 February when the paper ran an article on page 4, section
B, titled "Carter Gaining Black Support" which acknowledged his grow ing renown. The former governor of Georgia not only had the support of New York City blacks, but also was backed 1n his home state by blacks like Congressman Andrew Young and the Rev. Martin Luther
King, Sr.
By 3 April after the Florida primary, Carter coverage moved to section A, and on page 3 the article "Blacks Endorse Carter" was printed. Two leading black elected officials from Brooklyn and Queens endorsed Carter for President and credited Congressman Andrew Young and the Rev. King, Sr. as the primary motivating forces behind their decisions.
Mrs. Carter traveled to Harlem on behalf of her husband and it was the subject of the report "Carter's Wife in Harlem" in section C, 123
page 11, of 3 April. Not s1nce Eleanor Roosevelt had a possible First
Lady visited Harlem to ask the black residents for help.
Carter was the subject of a 19 June article by Charles
Kenyatta called "Why the Presidency 1s Never a Real Battlefield."
Half opinion, the article criticized all presidential hopefuls but called Carter a particularly poor candidate because if Carter had it in mind to deal with conditions of the very poor, he was doomed to failure before he even started. Carter made the same mistake as other presidential hopefuls by soliciting the aid of the black elite such as
Congressman Andrew Young and the Rev. Martin Luther King, Sr. Their presence had never changed living conditions of the poverty-stricken, and their endorsements could hardly expect to make any differences to the poor.
On 10 July Carter obtained publicity in a page 3, section A, article about a Bronx bus driver who had grown up in Plains. The title of the article by Sandy Satterwhite was "Bronx Bus Driver
Recalls Boyhood Days With Jimmy Carter." The driver recounted memo ries with the Carter clan and life 1n Georgia.
In a front-page article on 10 July, Simon Anekwe reported that after Carter had met with the Council of Black Elected Officials of
New York State, the group unanimously endorsed his candidacy. The headline was "Black Elected Officials Endorse Carter for President."
Carter, during a question-and-answer session, satisfactorily addressed questions about civil rights and equal opportunity legislation.
On page 5, section A, 17 July, Jim Greene dealt with "Black
Political Power, 1976; Other Side of the Coin." The rambhng article 124
dealt with several topics, including the black vice-presidential
controversy, the Republican Party's abandonment of blacks and the
importance for blacks to register and then to vote. He also said that
Carter had managed to win black votes and massive support without
endorsements from black leaders. Black voters made Jimmy Carter's name a household word. In fact, he was so respected that he could have made George Wallace his running mate and still have the black vote in his hip pocket.
On 14 August the paper ran a column by H. Carl McCall titled
"No More White Knights," which declared that for most blacks Jimmy
Carter was their declared candidate. Public opinion polls showed him
running 2 to 1 ahead of any potential Republican candidate. McCall
dubbed 1976 a Democratic year and praised Carter, indicating that the
religious ties that blacks maintained with him was the reason they
felt a particular closeness to the Democratic candidate.
Carter's trip to Harlem was the subject of a page 10, section
A, report on 23 October. In the article "Harlem: 'We Want You'
Carter 'I Need You,'" Simon Anekwe stated that Carter received a warm
reception as the first presidential candidate to visit Harlem since
Hubert Humphrey in 1968.
In a front-page article on 16 October, "Carter Leads in Black
Poll," the nation's only black pollster discovered that Carter led
Ford nationally among black voters by a margin of more than five to
one.
Blacks' importance to Carter's campaign was the subject of a
23 October article, "Carter Speaks to Liberals, Blacks," which
appeared on page 10, section A. Carter was the first Southerner to 125 address the New York State Liberal Party and parts of his message had special relevance for black Americans. Portions of his speech had been exerpted from answers that he had given to questions at his meeting with black reporters and publishers in Chevy Chase, Maryland.
He acknowledged his debts and gratitudes to blacks and pledged "repay- ment."
Carter's second trip to Harlem was highlighted in the final article which appeared on page 5, section A, on 30 October. H. Carl
McCall wrote "Carter Comes to Harlem" and gave Carter a strong endorsement. He urged people to forget the candidate's Southern background and vote for him, reminding readers that Carder did not forget blacks, so the favor must be returned.
In summary, the paper never clarified what Carter's relation ship to blacks was, even though it indicated that he was popular with blacks nationally. It ran twelve reports, none of which defined
Carter's black strategy. Much of the news and views was local, but the paper apparently could never decide upon the best approach to take l-7ith Carter.
Black Issues
The first black issues items appeared in section A, page 5, on
3 April under a collective headline, "Presidential Candidates Sidestep
Crucial Issues on Blacks," by Simon Anekwe. Several articles were written with subtitles, such as "Black Votes Playing 'Wait and See'
Game" which outlined positions by the major Republican and Democratic contenders about their views on black issues. Another article was called "Blacks Who are Lined Up" and included a list of prominent 126 blacks catalogued under the names of the major candidates which each supported.
Since many black leaders did not support Carter, they ques tioned whether or not Carter would impose any vendettas against them.
The premise was explored in the article '~ill Carter Support Blacks
Who Won't Support Carter?" by Simon Anekwe. Sen. Julian Bond, one of his arch-antagonists, was particularly concerned about the type of problems Carter could conceivably create for him and for others in his position. The article was carried on 24 July on page 2, section A.
Carter's refusal to select a black vice-presidential running mate remained a point of disagreement in the 24 July article, "Blacks
Who Don't Support Carter," by Simon Anekwe. The somewhat mistitled article, which appeared on page 11, section A, reported efforts by
Congressman Ronald Dellums to nominate a black vice-presidential candidate at the Democratic National Convention.
In the religious section, section C, page 3, on 24 July the article "Carter Heets With Ministers Pledges Priority to Poor" by
Zamgba Brown appeared. Shortly after Carter was nominated as his party's choice for President, he met with a city-w~de coalition of black clergymen and pledged, if elected, to give top priority to the plight of the nation's poor people. The clergymen told him that they could no longer rema~n silent while a large segment of humanity continued to be enslaved and trampled under by poverty.
The Charlotte conference was focused on in a page 9, section
A, 8 May article, "Presidential Candidates Shun Idea of Black V.P." by
Annette Samuels. The article was similar in content to other papers' 127
articles about the conference. Four of the Democratic hopefuls attended the conference to participate in the two-hour presidential forum designed to question each candidate on issues important to the black connnunity.
On 15 May another black issue item appeared on page 3, section A. The controversy over Gov. Jerry Brown's relationship with
Lt. Gov. Mervyn Dymally came to the forefront in "Gov. Jerry
Brown--The Consistent Inconsistent." Brown was called the most incon sistent politician ever seen and also somewhat of a mystery. He was trying to win black votes, yet he barely spoke to his black lieutenant governor and had not tried to stop the movement designed to get
Dymally indicted on "some trumped-up election fraud charge."
The issue over whether or not Carter would choose a black running mate was the major subject of the 17 July front-page article,
"Barbara Jordan Stops Move to Draft Her." Even though early political and financial support by blacks had opened the way for him to seri ously consider naming a black vice-presidential running mate, Carter did not name a black individual.
The vice-presidential controversy continued in another front-page article on 17 July titled "Jackson Pleads for Bradley."
PUSH's Rev. Jesse Jackson pleaded for support for Los Angeles Hayor
Tom Bradley to be named as a possible running mate for Carter.
The black caucus met with Carter to resolve a conflict and the event was reported on the same page on 17 July in the article, "Carter
Pleases Caucus." Several hotly disputed items had been resolved.
A column on 11 September on page 5 in section A by Samuel K.
Roberts explored "Religion and the Carter Campaign." l~hen the Demo- 128 cratic Convention closed, anomalies abounded. The first was that the father of one of the greatest moving spirits for freedom for blacks in modern history gave the benediction or "invoked God's blessing" at a political gathering over which presided the descendant of Southerners who had owned slaves. The second was that blacks were in excess of 20 percent of the ranks helping to cheer on the keynote address of the first black woman to address the convention of the Democratic Party.
It was the same party whose chief preoccupation had once been filibus tering in attempts to stifle attempts to pass meaningful civil rights legislation.
In summary, the paper covered the Charlotte conference and brought out Brown's relationship with Dymally, but did not explain how
Brown fit into the overall scheme. It highlighted the concerns of nonsupporters and Dellums' attempt to nominate a black for vice presi dent. Barbara Jordan was mentioned for the first time, and the attempt to draft her for the vice-presidential position was noted.
Eleven articles were run.
Black Ministers' Payoff
On 18 September a critical article appeared in section B on page 11 called "Jimmy Carter: Savior or Hypocrite." Rev. Carlton
Coleman, while alluding to the ministers' payment incident, said blacks were already "in his pocket," but some of those blacks were not aware that they were not included in the overall political process.
If Carter did not obligate himself to black causes, then the support given to him by Dr. King and Andrew Young was wasted. He declared that he did not support Carter and continuously referred to him as the 129
son of a Baptist slave master. He also criticized Carter's desire to
grant amnesty to draft dodgers. Thus, the paper did not report on the
payment in the same manner as other papers. It gave no background
data and the one article was more a critical analysis than a news
article.
Debates
On 16 October in section A, page 3, the paper carried "Black
Newsman to be on Ford-Carter Panel." The president of the League of
Women Voters was queried about the absence of black journalists from
previous debate panels. She assured the paper that there would be a
black reporter on the final panel. He had not been named at press
time, so the name was not revealed. In this one brief article the
paper got to the heart of the issue.
Playboy Interview
A comment sandwiched between parts 5 and 6 on 2 October con
stituted the only coverage of the Playboy interview. The writer sar
castically remarked that the interview "blew the Democrats' lock on
the state of Texas" because of the remarks that Carter made about
Lyndon Johnson. The writer said that the really big furor was over
Carter's admission of illicit "lusts." It was termed a "pornographic week" for Carter--"an obscene spread in Playboy and naked stupidity on
T.V." (The latter remark referred to the first debate he held with
Ford.) Thus, the entire Playboy incident was virtually ignored. 130
Andrew Young
The only article on Andrew Young appeared 1n section C, page
30, on 28 August under the title "Young Heading National Voter Regis tration Drive." It was a duplicate of the announcement which was run in other papers stating that Andrew Young was selected to head the national vote drive. Young was mentioned several other times under other headings as being Carter's major supporter and driving force in black communities. However, only one item was run on him and it was in conjunction with the voter registration drive.
Carter and Black Dignitaries
The Rev. Martin Luther King, Sr. captured the spotlight on 27
March when the paper ran "Daddy King Campaigns Here for Carter" by
Simon Anekwe in section A, page 2. In a campaign speech, King said that blacks would get some of their problems solved if they voted for
Carter. He hailed Carter as one of the finest men he had known, calling him a very accessible governor and a non-racist.
An article appearing on 17 July highlighted a black campaign worker and earned Carter space in section A, page 3. In the article,
"Ben Brown, Black Magician in the Carter Hachine," it was reported that for the first time in the history of American politics, a black man was named deputy campaign director with real responsibilities and an important role on the campaign team. However, the article about
King was the only one that highlighted him separately. He normally appeared only when the ethnic incident was mentioned. 131
Black Panther
Carter-Wallace Coverage
The Black Panther ran no presidential news coverage during the months of January or February. The first article appeared on page 11
in the 6 March 1ssue. It was about George Wallace's bid for the presidency and titled "Southerners Initiate Anti-Wallace Campaign Urge
Widespread Rejection of Wallace Bid for Presidency." It was areca pitulation of articles which appeared in other publications and said that Wallace was a political "trickster" who would create a police state. The one article was similar in approach as to other black papers. It was anti-Wallace in nature, but it expressed no support for Carter.
Florida Primary
There was no coverage on the Florida primary.
Ethnic Purity
Carter came into prominence on 17 April after his "ethnic purity 11 statement was made. In the page 11 article called "Demo.
Candidate Jimmy Carter Preaches 'Ethnic Purity'" it was said that black politicians and leaders across the country bitterly condemned
Jimmy Carter for his "racist comment." It was further speculated that he was making an attempt to appeal to "Archie-Bunker-type whites" since he had obtained support from Georgia Govenor Lester Maddox right after he made the statement.
On 24 April a biting editorial on page 2 titled "Ethnic .I Purity" stated that black people had clearly demonstrated they were 132 tired of "double-talking white politicians like Jimmy Carter." The writer also criticized the "so-called black 'leaders'" and asked if they had lost their collective minds by continuing to support Carter.
It called for an end to "Jimmy-Carter-style politics."
Along with the foregoing editorial was an article, "Black
Leaders Mount Campaign Against Carter's 'Ethnic Purity' Remarks," which appeared on page 7. Featured was the famous Carter-King photograph with a condemnation of King and other rights leaders for forgiving Carter. They were branded sell-outs. Hosea Williams was quoted extensively, as was California Congessman Ronald Dellums, who labeled Carter vulnerable and on the defensive.
"Ali Praises Carter and Ford; Plays With Susan Ford" was the title of an 8 May article which criticized heavyweight champion
Muhammad Ali for declaring that he liked "ethnic purity sloganeer"
Carter. It criticized Ali and declared that he seemed ready to join the list of other prominent "sell-outs" supporting Carter. The unnamed author expressed dismay that all of the blacks seemed to have ignored the "blatantly racist public statement" (referring to Carter's ethnic comment) made by Carter. The article appeared on page 23 1n the sports section and the bulk of its contents was about Ali's pending match with Jimmy Younger.
On 5 June the paper ran its list of recommendations for the
June primary in California and it endorsed California's Governor
Brown. The governor, they claimed, represented a fresh change on the national political scene. It also questoned whether or not Jimmy
Carter's "ethnic purity" comment was just a slip of the tongue. This article wsa run on page 13. 133
"I'm a Redneck" was the title of a page 2, 31 July, editorial
about Jimmy Carter. It was based upon a remark supposedly made by
Carter in 1970 during his campaign for the Democratic nomination for
governor. References to Carter's "ethnic purity" comment and
allusions to his record as Georgia governor suggested that he indeed was a "redneck." It was hastily pointed out that he had welcomed
George Wallace to speak before the Georgia State Legislature.
In summary, the Panther was the only paper besides the
Chronicle to give Rev. W'illiams full coverage. It was the only paper
to criticize black leaders for their continued support, but it never
clarified the issue for its readers.
Stop Carter
The Brown endorsement could be viewed as a "stop-Carter" ele ment since Brown was supposed to have diluted Carter's black support.
Six items apeared. There were no "stop-Carter" items run other than
that described above.
Carter and Blacks
The paper chose not to publicize Carter's popularity with
black individuals.
Black Issues
Panther reporter Elaine Brown, after attending the National
Democratic Convention, submitted the first black issues article on 24
July. Her front-page article, "The Democratic Party Has Abandoned
Black People," contained major criticisms about the number of black
delegates which had greatly decreased from 1972. She also claimed 134 that the blacks who were present were led by a "new breed of Uncle
Toms like Andrew Young and Jesse Jackson." She advocated that blacks and other "disenfranchised" people abandon the party and build a political network of their own.
On 7 August the Black Panther devoted most of page 5 to the feature on a black Georgia man who had been evicted from his home in
Plains. The title was "Jimmy Carter's Black 'Neighbor' Evicted;
86-year-old Black Man Forced to Move." It ended with the comment that
"ethnic purity" had struck again.
The Panther started a six-part series entitled "Behind the
Smile" on 14 August. The articles by Robert Shrum, a speechwriter who quit the Carter campaign, were reprinted from New Times magazine and were personal accounts of Carter's campaign activities. The author had quit the campaign in a pique after nine days because of what he called "hypocrisy and lies, 11 and the articles reflected his misgivings towards Carter. The paper devoted a great deal of space to the articles over the six-week run, but in total they conributed very little insight into the campaign itself. Jl1ost were reflective of
Shrum's personal vendetta against Carter and his staff.
The final black issue feature was an article called ''Working for 'Mr. Jimmy'; Blacks in Plains, Georgia Labor for Carter Clan."
Several interviews were conducted with black domestics who told what it was like to work for the Carter family since his nomination for
President. The article appeared on page 7.
To summarize, only in the four-article black issues segment was Andrew Young recognized as a major Carter supporter, even though he was criticized for this support. The A. Z. Pittman story finally 135
gained major press space and the only additional information was the
series "Behind the Smile."
Black Ministers' Payoff
The issue over the black ministers was addressed in the
editorial "Tainted 'Halo"' on page 2, 14 August. It reported that
Carter had paid only $5,000 in "street money" to buy black votes but
over $150,000 was missing and had to be returned. It was estimated
that as much as $300,000 may have been used illegally. The editorial
concluded that his attempts to use the black church were "the height
of arrogance and ruthlessness."
On 21 August on page 2, preceding part 2 of the series "Behind
the Smile," the editor recapitulated the events of the previous week.
He said that it had been a "telling week for Carter" in which he
attempted to "buy the black vote through 'street money' donations to
black clergymen."
Thus, in true Panther style, the editors attached a different motivation to Carter's actions. As with one other paper, it claimed
that Carter did not pay enough.
Debates, Playboy Interview, Andrew Young, Carter and Black Dignitaries
The Panther's coverage ended with the ministers' incident.
There was, therefore, no coverage on the debate issue, Playboy, Andrew
Young, other than what was noted previously, or Carter's clout with
black dignitaries. 136
Los Angeles Sentinel
Carter-Wallace Coverage, Florida Primary
There was no coverage on George Wallace nor on the Florida
Primary.
Ethnic Purity
The famous King-Carter photograph was run on page A-4 ~n the
15 April edition. The caption explained that the embrace and a strong handshake were King's way of saying that Carter was being forgiven for his "ethnic purity" faux pas. It marked the beginning of the ethnic
purity coverage.
On the same page were comments by President Ford about
Carter's ethnic terminology. Within the body of the article, titled
"Ford Espouses 'Ethnic Heritage'" by Aldo Beckman, was a comment about
Andrew Young's role in maintaining black support for Carter. Young was the catalyst holding Carter supporters in place. Young chastised his candidate publicly but "he did not split." Young traveled around the country saying that Carter was still his man. He often traversed
in the footsteps of Julian Bond who was saying Carter never was his
candidate and now everyone knew why.
The ethnic coverage continued in the form of opinion pieces on
22 April. On pages A-6 and A-7 two of the Sentinel's frequent con tributors, Bayard Rustin and A. S. "Doc" Young, criticized Carter on his poor choice of words. In "Rustin's Roost," under the title "The
!leaning of Ethnic Purity," a brief background of information on the
statement was given. The apology was noted but then Rustin said that his remarks remain deeply disturbing despite the apology. Since 137
Carter had prided himself on being the candidate most careful and
prec1se 1n his syntax, it was difficult to believe that the phrase was
simply a slip of the tongue.
Young's comments were more biting and cynical. He asked "What
do you make of him? Is he the Great White Father or the Great White
Fink?" He labeled Carter's remarks and apology as "ridiculous" and
"totally derogatory."
In the same issue in part B, page 7, the article "NAACP Offi
cial Blasts J. Carter" was run. The article led with a statement by
an NAACP director who was attending the organization's regional con
ference. His criticisms were similar to those presented in both of
the previous columns. The article concluded, however, with infor mation on the three-day NAACP conference with no further comments
about Carter.
On 29 April editor Ruth Washington contributed "1-lill We Be
Political Footballs in 1976 Game?" She commented that political
candidates and blacks were increasingly growing apart and Carter's
ethnic statement did nothing to mend the rift. She assailed Carter
for his use of the phrase, then urged voters to look closely at the
candidates rather than following traditional party lines.
Vernon Jordan's "To Be Equal" commented on the controversy
over "ethnic purity" on 13 May. The Urban League director wrote "New
Racial Code Words: So, What Else is New?" in which he took the stand
that Carter's remarks disturbed many people, including himself. But
he stated that even though the phrase was not encouraging, neither were the rash of denunciations by other candidates who shared the same 138 basic position as Carter. It was all a political ploy in which the status quo on open housing would remain the same. Only a new code word, "ethnic heritage," would be applied.
In summary, with seven items printed, the Sentinel's coverage amounted to little more than a series of critical comments, primarily by local contributors. It appeared as if they addressed the issue not because they wanted to, but recause they were obligated to. Until this time Carter had been a nonentity.
Stop Carter
There was no "stop-Carter" coverage.
Carter and Blacks
The first time either the election or the presidential candi- dates was mentioned was on page A-7 in an 8 April article by Lin
Hilburn titled "Black Voters and the Presidential Campaign.;; Hilburn proclaimed Jimmy Carter the front-runner and mentioned that he had read about his campaign, followed his candidacy and was favorably impressed. He questioned whether or not blacks should give him full support because, even though Carter received favorable ratings, he had made no sound commitments. He took an objective look at all of the declared and undeclared candidates and concluded that he still had great "love and warmth for Hubert Humphrey."
The UPI release, "Jimmy Carter 'Preaches'" by Wesley Pippert, was run on page A-5 on 24 June as it had appeared in several other publications.
On page A-3 on 22 July, the Sentinel found a black former "F . d neighbor of Carter's and reported the story in the article r~en 139
Recalls Jimmy Carter." Carter's neighbor, Fanny Johnson, recalled her days with Carter when they both lived in Plains.
The Sentinel conducted a private poll of five hundred citizens living in South Central Los Angeles, a predominantly black community, and discovered that 90 percent of them thought Carter would win the
November election. In the article "Residents Endorse J. C." on page
A-2, 29 July, reporter Carl Coates found that the survey participants ranging from ages eighteen to ninety supported Carter's candidacy.
Bayard Rustin wrote "Blacks Can Get Things Moving in Right
Direction" on page A-7, 21 October. He said that in a race that is extremely close, there were clear and unmistakable differences between the presidential candidates. On every important issue from cities to taxes to health care, Carter was obviously superior. It was the only article in which clear support for Carter was shown.
In summary, the paper ran six articles on Carter's popularity with blacks. The Sentinel recognized that Carter was popular with blacks but never clarified '"hy. It still did not grant him any support until near the very end of the year.
Black Issues
The paper did not run any coverage that would come under the heading of black issues.
Black Ministers' Payoff
On 19 August the ministers' incident appeared on page A-6 in the form of a column by Stanley Robertson. In "'Street Money' Not
New" Robertson said that the practice of handing out money to obtain votes was a common practice. He expressed surprise that the Carter 140
campaigners chose ministers as the link to the black community because the black church had lost its force as a determinant in how blacks would vote. Several other political candidates had used similar tactics, including John Kennedy and Richard Nixon. This one article followed a trend noted in black papers in covering the ministers'
incident. They tended to absolve the ministers of any fault and treat the payment as a common occurrence.
Debates, Playboy Interview
The Sentinel did no stories on the debates or on the Playboy
interview.
Andrew Young
Andrew Young received considerable coverage 1n the Sentinel
starting on 6 May on page A-8. In "Andy Young Visits" his itinerary was given, along with the announcement that his appearances were made on behalf of Jimmy Carter for President.
A follow-up on Young's visit was reported in the 13 May article "Carter Will Win--Young" on page A-11. Young said that Jerry
Brown should not feel rejected if Carter were to beat him in his home state's Democratic primary. He mentioned that "ethnic purity" was an unfortunate statement, but was not a deliberate attempt by Carter to back down on his race relations record.
Sentinel reporter Jim Cleaver's regular feature, "Kleaver's
Klippins," devoted most of its space to Andrew Young's visit on 3
June, page A-7. In the column, "A Look at Andy Young's Visit to
L.A.," Cleaver said that he had been skeptical of Carter's campaign primarily because of the ethnic statement. Young met with members of 141 the black press during his Los Angeles visit, and as a result Cleaver was slowly becoming a convert. He cited Young's colorful history in civil rights and credited him as being the driving force behind most of blacks' support for Carter.
"Young Chosen to Get Out Vote" on page A-9, 26 August, wrapped up the Young coverage. The article announced that Andrew Young would head the national voter registration drive with an objective of adding a million new votes to the roster.
In summary, the Sentinel ran four articles about Andrew Young and followed his involvement in Carter's campaign from fairly early in the year. He met with the black press in Los Angeles and performed a parallel role to that of Carter's media managers and the white press.
The paper gave one of a few indications that Carter sought support from the black press. His civil rights record seemed to be a mainstay in garnering press coverage.
Carter and Black Dignitaries
The Sentinel did not cover Carter's relationship with black dignitaries. 142
Washington Post
Carter-Wallace Coverage
A Carter-Wallace comparison was the first news carried by the
Post on 5 April in Neal Pierce's article, "The South and the Presi
dency." He pointed out that Wallace, a racist, set the stage for
Carter, a non-racist, to be accepted in the North. The article exten
sively compared the "old southern" style politics of George Wallace with the "new southern" rhetoric of his Southern opponent. Carter's
non-racist posture dominated the scope of the article, which appeared
on page 19.
In summary, the Post, in the comparison, highlighted in one
article the three most frequently repeated themes whenever
Carter-Wallace coverage appeared. First, it examined the attitudes of
both men in relation to attitudes on race. Second, it showed how the
South had changed; and third, it pointed out why Carter would be an
acceptable candidate.
Florida Primary
One article about Carter's preparation for the Florida primary
appeared. On 11 March the Post, on the front page, ran "Carter's
Florida Base was Pervasive, Survey Shows: He Carried Most Social, Age and Ideological Groups" by William Chapman. The content resembled
similar articles carried in several other papers reporting that Carter appealed to an exceptionally broad-based constituency. The information
in the Post, however, was based upon an in-house survey.
In summary, the Florida coverage in the Post did not overlap 143 any of the Wallace coverage as it did in other papers. The Post also gave no analysis about Carter's political strategy in Florida in this article, as other papers did, but it attempts to determine who his principal supporters were.
Ethnic Purity
On 7 April the first report about the "ethnic purity" incident was printed in a page 9 article, "Carter Supports 'Ethnic Purity' of
Neighborhoods," by Joel vleisman. A background was given which included the explanation that Carter had used the term in an interview with the New York Daily News a week earlier.
Morris Udall seized the opportunity to exploit the comment and his critical attack captured page-1 headlines on 8 April in "Carter
Accused of 'Racial Division'" by David Broder. Carter disputed
Udall's remarks and gave his perception of the term. The black view point was not explored.
On 9 April front-page headlines read "Carter Offers Apology for Ethnic Term" by David Broder and Peter Miligus. The black per spective emerged ~n this report which said that the Congressional
Black Caucus and National Urban League had sent telegrams to Carter demanding a full explanation. The article also pointed out that he changed his position on the full employment bill which was pending in
Congress from non-support to endorsement in order not to further jeopardize his current standing with blacks, who heavily supported the bill.
The "ethnic purity" remark continued to occupy the front page as exemplified by the Joel Weisman article "Ethnic Purity Statement 144
Tails Carter" which appeared on 10 April. Carter predicted that no
permanent damage had been done to his campaign as a result of his faux
pas. He believed that blacks were generally satisfied with his expla
nation and supported his position, though not his choice of words.
On 11 April another page 1 "ethnic purity" article was
printed. In "'Ethnic Purity' Flat Focuses on Outsider Jimmy Carter,"
David Broder concluded that Carter's campaign still faced numerous
challenges. Carter had quickly apologized for what he called a seri
ous mistake; had regained support from influential blacks such as Rep.
Andrew Young, who had originally assessed the remark as a "disaster
for the campaign"; but because he was a political outsider was still
vulnerable to any statement that he made.
In section C's editorial pages 6 and 7, "ethnic purity" made
headlines in two 11 April editorials. The first was called "The
Purity Flap," which gave a critical assessment of Carter's two most
ardent opponents' viewpoints on ethnic neighborhoods. Both Sen. Henry
Jackson and Rep. Morris Udall attempted to make a mockery of Carter's
political standing after his ethnic remark. The editorial divulged,
however, that they both shared Carter's philosophy, although their
statements expressing those sentiments had been ignored by the press.
The second editorial was "Jimmy Carter and 'Ethnic Purity'"
which explained ~n detail how the remark came to the forefront as a major political issue. The statement was originally part of an
"obscure remark" made during an interview with the New York Daily
News. A CBS correspondent detected it and asked what he meant by
"ethnic purity" during a press conference in South Bend, again in
Pittsburgh and in Philadelphia. The editorial concluded that the 145 incident was manufactured and perpetrated by the press.
Two columns appeared on 14 April. David Broder's "The Status of the Democratic Front-Runner" cited the "ethnic purity" incident as the first major crisis that Carter had faced. He explored blacks' contribution to the Carter campaign, stating that Carter had made two major changes in the political importance of blacks within the presi dential election process. He used black leaders more extensively and redefined the South, indicating a new relationship between blacks and
Southern politicians.
The second column was co-authored by Rowland Evans and Robert
Novak, t1tled "Jimmy Carter's Tactical Problems." They theorized that the furor over "ethnic purity" had shaken key Carter supporters and advisers more than they were willing to admit. The ethnic problem was tactical, not substantive, since Carter was now placed on the defen sive. Both items appeared on the op-ed page 13 of section A.
On 18 April Joel Weisman described how stress affects presi dential candidates. His column, "An Examination of the 'Ethnic
Purity' Issue," which appeared in section B, page 14, stated that a lot could be learned about the stress-filled political primary by examining in some detail Jimmy Carter's performance on the day he made the "ethnic" comment in.Indiana. Candidates, like presidents, are often required to think and speak under stress. How they react to such stress is often a telling way to assess their potential as national leaders.
"Carter Faces Challenges for Black Vote in PA" by Jules
Witcover on 23 April investigated whether or not Carter's black support had been eroded. Witcover said that the Pennsylvania primary 146 would determine what Carter's standing was in the black community since "ethnic purity" bad become a household word. The article appeared on page 13.
In summary, the ethnic purity coverage uncovered the black perspective in the Post. The paper's eleven-article coverage was com plete and comprehensive. Initially it started as a minor item, but eventually became a major news event. The editorial position taken by the paper revealed a certain amount of empathy for the first-time presidential aspirant. The columns also reflected a certain amount of sympathy towards him. They demonstrated that blacks accepted him but they did not approach blacks for first-hand information.
Stop Carter
The "stop-Carter" drive entered the news picture on 1 May. A page 5 particle contained the first information about the movement's efforts. William Claiborne wrote in "New Jersey Democrats Make Last
Stand to Stop Carter" that last-ditch efforts were being made to get
Hubert Humphrey on the ballot.
On 11 May a page 5 brief read "Udall in Conn. Urges Voters to
Stop Carter." It quoted Rep. l'l..orris Udall as telling voters that it had become imperative to stop Carter in Connecticut or he would be unstoppable.
Carter personally commented in a 13 May item, "Even Loss in
Md. Cannot Stop Him--Carter Contends," by Paul Edwards. The article appeared on page 3 and quoted Carer's response to a question about how
California's Gov. Jerry Brown would affect his chances of winning the nomination. Brown had just won the Maryland primary. 147
The last stop-Carter article ran on page 19 on 20 May.
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak wrote in "A Plan for Stopping Carter" that Hubert Humphrey was still being primed as a candidate, and
Carter's "near disaster" in the Michigan primary was evidence that the stop-Carter forces were still operable.
In summary, the "stop-Carter" coverage never appeared as an organized effort. It was treated by the Post almost second-handedly.
Coverage was not comprehensive. Four items appeared.
Carter and Blacks
Carter's association with blacks and his liberal posture evolved by means of a column on 4 January. In "Jimmy Carter: Fitting the Mood of the Voters" in section F, page 7, Chalmers Roberts com mented that Carter "had a long way to go" but it was possible that he could become the next President. As the governor of Georgia, Carter had hung a photograph of the late Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. in the
Georgia state capitol. This information resurfaced innumerable times throughout the campaign year in the Post and in other publications.
Don Oberdorfer, in his 16 January article, "Jimmy Carter: A
Politician 'Hith a 'Monumental Ambition,"' examined Carter's convic tions to racial integration. He, too, recounted that Carter had hung a portrait of Dr. King in the state capitol and added that Carter enforced a non-discrimination policy in state employment and appointed many blacks to state offices. The article began on page 1.
On 17 March the first article appeared which recognized
Carter's growing popularity with blacks. The article began on the front page. In "Carter and Ford Sweep to Victory in Illinois Race," 148
Joel Weisman indicated that Carter showed particularly strong appeal with blacks in Chicago where Sargent Shriver had hoped to succeed. He conceded that part of the popularity was due to last-minute commer cials over black radio stations and part to the endorsement by Martin
Luther King,Sr.
On 8 April a page 8 article, "Lack of Votes From Blacks Hurts
Udall," by Joel Weisman, mentioned that Carter appeared to be a favo rite of blacks and of blue-collar workers. In fact he had obtained overwhelming support from black voters thus far.
"Jimmy Carter had a narrow escape in the Michigan primary," began an article by Jules Witcover and Joel Weisman on 20 May. In the article, "A Close Call for Carter; Black Vote Gave Him Narrow Edge
Over Udall," the two reporters said that only continued support by black voters in dimensions perhaps greater in Michigan than in any previous 1976 Democratic primary gave the former Georgia governor his narrow edge over Udall. It was a page 1 story.
William Raspberry's column which appeared on page 21 on 28 May attempted to clarify "The Mystery of Carter's Support Among Blacks."
He said "Jimmy Carter, to the mystification, chagrin and sometimes outrage of much of the nation's black political leadership, continues to do very well among the black electorate." It was not just in the
South where some of the support might have resulted from anti-Wallace sentiments, but nation-wide. Non-supporter Julian Bond told Rasp berry, however, that blacks' major identification with Carter had been
1n the personna of the senior Rev. King and not in Carter himself.
Carter's trip into Harlem was the subject of a commentary on
12 June. The title was "A Harlem View: 'I Respect a Good Southern 149
White Man" by Haynes Johnson, who conducted a series of interviews with groups of blacks in a Harlem housing project. Most concurred
that they trusted Carter in spite of his Southern heritage.
On lU October the old South was compared with the new South in
the column "How Different is the South?" by Douglas Cater. Southern
blacks' support for Carter was reiterated. He encouraged that a
philosophy be adopted to increase racial harmony in the future while
stressing that a "no-fault" attitude exist for the past. The article
occupied the bulk of page 1 of section C of the Sunday editorial
section.
The last article on Carter and blacks was run on 26 October and was titled "Blacks Form Crucial Bloc in Election." Using Cook
County in Chicago as a gauge, reporter Robert Kaiser predicted that
the black vote could elect Carter as the next president. Black votes would give Carter an enormous advantage if blacks turned out in cru cial big states and 1n the South. It was a page 1 article.
In summary, in nine items, the Post pointed out crucial aspects about Carter's relationship with blacks. Its coverage spanned the entire year and they sensed very early that blacks would be cru cial if Carter were to win. The paper captured the essence of his black strategy and noted how blacks were used in his campaign.
Because it had the services of a black columnist, it was able to obtain actual rather than perceived data about the black perspective, thus giving a bit more accurate assessment of that perspective. 150
Black Issues
Black issues' coverage began with the Post's black columnist,
William Raspberry. His first column appeared on page 15 in the 10
March issue and was titled, "The Absence of 'Black Issues.'" Rasp berry said that the '7b campaign was conspicuously devoid of black issues. It l>Tas not that the candidates ignored blacks, but that issues could not be decided upon by blacks themselves. He stated that black issues had been so vague that even George Wallace was endorsed in Mississippi and Alabama by influential blacks. The national Caucus of Black Democrats would convene later in the year to iron out what would be considered black issues for the candidates.
Washington, D.C. delegate and Congressional Black Caucus Vice
Chairman Walter Fauntroy took exception to the previously mentioned
Raspberry column and offered a rebuttal on 18 March in the column
"Black Issues." He contended that black issues had been defined as the following: jobs for those willing to work, a redistribution of wealth, and tax reforms to solve the problems of housing, health care and education. This column appeared on page 19.
On 20, 21 and 22 March, the paper carried three short related articles on California Rep. Ronald Dellums' declined nomination for
U.S. President by the National Black Political Assembly.
William Raspberry's feature again focused upon the presiden tial race on 29 March in "Candidates and Blacks." Raspberry conducted an interview with the leader of the National Black Political Assembly who said that the problem confronting blacks and the Assembly was that of total neglect by all candidates, who seemed to pay no attention to 151 black voters. Unfortunately, they seemed to be getting away with it.
He concluded that blacks were unorganized, thus making it possible for candidates to ignore them and take them for granted. This feature appeared on page 19.
David Broder wrote "Questions about Carter" on 31 March. In the page 13 column, he compared a speech that Carter had made about local school integration as it had been given to a white audience with the same speech as given to a black audience. There were vast differ ences between the two and Broder expressed great disenchantment with
Carter, saying that he was disappointed in him, especially since
Carter was quoted as having said that his solid base support had been among the black people of the nation.
On 14 April in a page 1 feature, the Post ran the famous
Carter-King photograph which was printed with the article "Blacks Show
Solidarity With Carter" by Jules Witcover. It was similar in content to coverage in a number of other publications. Carter was endorsed by numerous influential blacks at an Atlanta rally but was picketed by
Rev. Hosea Williams. ~~yor Maynard Jackson and SCLC leader Ralph
David Abernathy were among those who did not attend, thus their loyal ties were questioned.
During May the National Issues Conference of Black Democrats was held and coverage about it started with a 1 May article, "Demo cratic Black Vote Held Vital," by Austin Scott. It was stated that the Democratic Party would be in trouble irrespective of who ran if it did not pay more attention to the needs of black Americans. The article also proclaimed that black votes had shown excitement about none of the candidiates, including Jimmy Carter. 152
The Austin Scott reports continued on 2 ~1ay with the page 9 feature "Blacks Write Own Platform for Democratic Convention." The platform called for Rhode Island's governor to be removed because he allegedly made a racist statement, for the full employment bill to be passed, for stronger support for existing desegregation laws and for support for African liberation.
On 3 May Austin Scott's article "Blacks Question Candidates" appeared on page 1. The four active Democratic candidates appeared before one thousand black Democrats to answer questions about their positions on issues that would affect blacks. The major issues were their policies toward Africa, potential selection of a black running mate and concerns about appointing more blacks to the federal judi ciary in the South. Carter was not questioned about his "ethnic purity statement.
Also on 3 May William Raspberry contributed a column on page
23 about the convention. In "Withhold Black Votes?" he hypothesized that each candidate realized that any Democratic presidential candi date's hopes for victory would be dashed without support from black votes. He conceded that black issues had now been clarified, with unemployment leading the list.
On 4 May Austin Scott wrote a page 4 article, "Blacks Faced
Sharp Dilemma at Convention." One thousand black Democratic politi
C1ans and political activists had never before come together to write their own party platform, and as a result the dilemma they faced when they gathered was a sharp and agonizing one. At the forefront were the issues such as full employment, equal educational opportunities and other matters which greatly concerned blacks. No general consen- 153
sus was formed about which issues should receive top priority.
On 19 June the Post on page 5 reported "Black Party Nominates
Kirkpatrick." It was a follow-up on earlier printed stories about the
National Black Political Assembly's choice for its presidential
nominee. The nomination was turned down by Rep. Ronald Dellums and
Sen. Julian Bond.
In the Sunday magazine section on 24 June, Rowland Evans and
Robert Novak wrote "Carter's Positon on Race." A controversy
apparently arose over the "quotas" which had been placed on the number
of black delegates allowed to participate in convention affairs.
Jimmy Carter was confronted by black political leaders and eventually
yielded to their demands to allow blacks to participate in governing
the party in general. He did not wish to risk a black walk-out.
On 23 August a black issue article appeared under the title
"NAACA Official Blasts Parties on Civil Rights" by Lee A. Daniels. An
NAACP official sharply criticized both the Democratic and Republican
Parties' civil rights planks as examples of "pussyfooting, mealy-mouthing, hate-mongering and platitudining, not worth the paper
they were written on." The Republican Party received the harshest maligning. The article appeared on page 2.
Carter carried his campaign to Mississippi where he was
embraced by two old segregationalist diehards, Senators James Eastland
and John Stennis. They stood should to shoulder with Mississippi's
leading black politicians and Carter was asked about his association with the two well-known civil rights forces. In the 18 September page
4 article '~ith Miss. Democrats in Tow, Carter Cites Civil Rights
Gains" by Helen Dewar, Carter reiterated his often-stated assertion 154 that passage of civil rights legislation was the best thing to have happened to the South. He added that the South outdistanced the North in complying with civil rights laws. Stennis and Eastland agreed.
In summary, the Post contained the most extensive reporting on black issuess. With seventeen items printed, it followed up on the events surrounding the National Black Political Assembly, attempted to define what black issues and concerns were and defined the part that blacks would play in the election. They recognized that black issues were not being addressed by the candidates. Most of its v1ews were expressed through columnists.
Black Ministers' Payoff
The minister story first appeared on page 3 on 8 August. In
"Ministers Reportedly Got Carter Campaign Funds," the Post quoted a
Los Angeles Times story stating that a California minister and three other black clergymen were paid a total of $5,000 to help him get black votes. A Carter campaign administrator predicted that the democratic presidential nominee may have had to return up to $150,000 of his matching funds.
The Post's staff writer Helen Dewar filed a follow-up report which appeared on page 2 on 9 August. In the story "Carter Says
Campaign Funds May Have Gone to Ministers," Carter acknowledged that payments may have been made, but denied that there was anything illegitimate about his actions. He said that he asked his campaign treasurer to look into all expenditures.
"Ministers Group Returns Funds to Carter Campaign" was run on page 8 on 11 August. The black ministerial group in California that 155 received $2,000 from the Jimmy Carter campaign returned the money, explaining that this action was in their best interest in view of the questionable implications that had arisen.
In summary, three articles were printed about the ministers' payment; one more than most publications. Yet, it was not a major news item. It was very well followed through and the coverage was very thorough.
Debates
The Po9~ did not cover the debate item.
Playboy Interview
In a 21 September page 1 article the Pl~ interview was discussed. Playboy was quoted in depth in the article, "Carter on
Sin--Joining Bible and Blunt Talk, Candidate Outlines Beliefs" by
Robert G. Kaiser. The passage about his "committing adultery 1n his heart" was prominently featured. In a related page 4 article in the same edition, his pastor, Rev. Bruce Edwards, and a few other ministers from different churches of the same denomination were asked to evaluate Carter's interview. The title of that article was
"Remarks on Sexuality Draw Mixed Response."
The following day the Post printed on page 12 "Playboy Inter view Assailed, Defended" by Janie Johnson. Carter's remarks about religious morality and adultery in the interview brought criticism from some Southern Democrats, Southern Baptists and Republicans.
Others felt that his statements made him seem self-righteous.
Additionally, on 22 September William Raspberry's column on page 27 concentrated on the interview. In "Carter's Confessions: 156
'What Made Him Do it?'" he said that Carter committed an unaccountable blunder for a man who had shown such fine understanding of the dif ferences between earnestness and candor. He wondered whether or not
Carter had sufficient time left to recover from his gaffe before the election.
The Playboy interview continued to attract attention on 23
September, but another angle had surfaced. Helen Delvar wrote a page 5 article, "Carter Regrets Implied Insults to LBJ in Playboy." Carter had stated in the interview that Johnson had lied, cheated and distorted the truth. After the interview he called Mrs. Johnson to apologize.
The Post ran the last Playboy-related article on page 1 on 27
September when it printed "Evangelicals Seen Cooling on Carter" by
Myra MacPherson. She interviewed one Southern Baptist minister who said that he would not invite Carter to speak to his congregation in view of his remarks to Playboy. The theologian was not sure if he would even vote for Carter.
In summary, Playboy coverage was very brief (only 6 items), but all aspects of the controversy were covered, including his remarks about former President Johnson. The coverage was well balanced and, unlike in some other publications, it was difficult to detect either pro or anti-Carter sentiments.
Andrew Young
The Post mentioned Andrew Young initially on 14 March in the column "Jimmy Carter: Black on the Track--Chicago" by David S.
Broder. Broder recognized that the only noted Georgia politician to 157
deliver an immediate endorsement of Carter's candidacy was Rep. Andrew
Young. After Young's background was briefly reviewed, Broder com mented on the significance of Carter's victory over George Wallace in
the Florida primary. The column appeared on page 7 of section C.
On 5 August Donnie Radcliffe and Jeannette Smyth contributed
"'Grits,' 'Fritz,' and Unity (Almost)" which in spite of its deceptive
title was about Andrew Young. The article was, in actuality, a social
review about a party held by Young for several prominent blacks
interested in discussing the Carter campaign. It ran on the front
page of section B.
"Politics Seen Helping to Fulfill King's 'Dream"' by Marjorie
Hyer returned the limelight to Rep. Andrew Young on 1 October. This
article also appeared in section B. Young told a church seminar that
politics had played a major part 1n helping to breath~ life into the
"dream" of justice and racial harmony that .Hartin Luther King, Jr. had
told civil rights marchers about. With Young's support Carter
clinched the nomination and Young spoke extensively about Carter 1n his speech.
In summary, Andrew Young's coverage produced the ~'s only
analysis of the Florida primary and Carter's strategy. Coverage about
Young was principally personality profiles, none of which appeared 1n
the front sections of the paper. Three articles were run.
Carter and Black Dignitaries
In a 20 June article on page 10 Warren Brown offered "Carter
Special Appeal Among Blacks." He said that the famous photograph of
Carter and King that was circulated nationally was hung on the walls 158 of Carter's Atlanta campaign headquarters. It was King's endorsement, along with support from other widely respected blacks like Andrew
Young, that accounted for the substantially large number of black votes that Carter received. Other appealing traits Carter possessed
included his public embrace of Protestant fundamentals and his understanding of the role of the church as the social, political and
spiritual center of black life. He added that not all blacks supported Carter, because some very powerful, influential persons campaigned against him.
In summary, the one article on Carter's association with black dignitaries focuses on his overall appeal to blacks with some revealing information about why he was popular with blacks. It also recognizd that there was not unanimous support. 159
Christian Science Honitor
Carter-Wallace Coverage
On 26 January on page 1 John Dillin's article, "Carter-Wallace
Showdowns Building Across the South" started the Carter-Wallace feud.
He said that a political showdown was brewing between the two Southern candidates. Carter was offering himself as the "new South" and as an alternative to \-lallace 1 s old segregational ist rhetoric.
John Dillin again focused on the Carter-Wallace rivalry on 25
February. This page 1 story also introduced the black voter as a political factor. In "Wallace, Carter Test for South at S.C.
Caucuses" Dillin commented that black voters were leaning toward an uncommitted stance. The purpose for doing so was to keep their votes available for so-called perennial favorites Sen. Hubert Humphrey and
Edward Kennedy.
John Dillin's coverage of Carter-Wallace and the Florida primary continued to occupy page 1 on 1 ~1arch in the article "Momentum
On Road to Florida, Wallace, Carter and Jackson Jockey for Primary
Showdown." The three candidates v1ere looking forward to the Florida primary to make the winner the clear front runner. It was predicted that a defeat for Wallace would cause a major setback for him.
Wallace's death knell was sounded on 8 April in the article,
"Primaries Reaching 'Last Chance' Stage" by Godfrey Sperling. It was predicted that the primaries had reached the final roadblock stage where Carter would have to be stopped if he was going to be stopped at all. Wallace was now clearly out of contention for the nomination. 160
In summary, the Carter-Wallace coverage in four articles
uncovered three major topics. It started by indicating a feud between
the old and new South was brewing, then it detected the black strategy
as it followed the major primary races and finally it explained the
significance of the Florida primary, noting one "stop-Carter" aspect
as it noted Wallace's demise.
Flordia Primary
John Dillin followed Carter's preparations for the Florida
primary and in his article, "Carter Plan: One Down and Two :Hore to
Go," Dillin predicted that in Florida Carter would face his sternest
test when he faced Alabama Gov. George Wallace. Carter faced a tight
race because Wallace had always trounced every other candidate in the
Democratic primary in that state. However, irrespective of that
outcome, stated Dillin, it would prove that Carter was a viable
Southern alternative to Gov. Wallace. This article was carried on
page 1 on 21 January.
In summary, the ~1onitor in one article accurately analyzed
Carter's Florida strategy and even though the paper eschews endorse ments it recognized Carter as an alternative to Wallace's brand of
Southern politics.
Ethnic Purity
The "ethnic purity" flap entered the picture on 12 April in a front page article by Godfrey Sperling, Jr. called "The Struggle behind Carter 'Ethnic' Flap." He focused upon the meanings that had been attached to the words "ethnic purity." Liberal leaders, according to the paper, expressed the biggest fears. They felt that 161
once Mr. Carter is elected President they would not be able to
influence him. They had fears because none actually knew Mr. Carter very well. Many liberals were seeking to make Carter's statement a
blunder of major proportions with all hopes of keeping him from
getting the nomination. It was not certain that blacks would abandon
or want to abandon him. Black leaders were reported as upset but appeared not to have deserted him. He was remembered by blacks for his achievements while he was the governor of Georgia and he had taken more pro-black positions than most of the Northern candidates.
Joseph Harsch contributed the only ethnic column, "Jimmy
Carter and 'Ethnic Purity,"' on 15 April. He said that the people
"making the most noise" over Carter's "ethnic purity" remarks were the
people who were against him already. The protests came largely from
the self-styled liberals. There were a few sharp questions asked by
black leaders but the mass of American black voters appeared to be
greatly unbothered. The column was carried on page 27.
To stnnmarize, the Monitor practically dismissed the "ethnic
purity" issue as a nonissue. They noted that blacks would not abandon him and that most of the sharp attacks were being leveled by
self-styled liberals. The coverage was concise and to the point. The
Monitor caried only two articles.
Stop Carter
Evidence of the "stop-Carter" drive l-1as noted early by the
Monitor and the first article was carried on page 34 in the 2 February
issue. '"Stop Carter' Move Under Way" by Godfrey Sperling recognized
that the other democratic candidates were attacking Carter for his 162 ambiguity, his fuzziness and his habitual skirting of issues.
On 19 February a follow-up column on the "stop-Carter" movement appeared on page 27. In "U.S. Politics '76--At the First Corner,"
Joseph Hursch said that unless Carter could be stopped, all of the year of campaigning by "Scoop" Jackson would be wasted and that the names of
Harris, Bayh, Shriver and Udall would be forgotten names. He predicted that the "stop-Carter" phase among Democrats could be viewed as both a hazard and an opportunity for Mr. Carter.
Jerry Brown was introduced as a factor in the "stop-Carter" drive on 15 March in the front page article "Brown to Act as Road Block to Halt Carter Band Wagon?" by Curtis Sitomer. It was speculated that
Brown's entrance into the Democratic presidential race was an effort to head off a possible "Carter bandwagon" and to tilt the race back "to left of center."
The "stop-Carter" movement did not die as a news feature in the
Monitor until 4 June when Godfrey Sperling's article, "'Stop-Carter'
Move Builds Within Party" was run on page 4. He simply stated that a nationwide "stop-Carter" movement, also known as a push-Humphrey" operation, was well underway.
In summary, in four items the ~onitor did the most compre hensive coverage on the "stop-Carter" movement. All of the analyses indicated that the movement was party-initiated rather than, as some other papers suggested, public inspired. The Mgnitor named the specific Democratic candidates whom party pundits hoped to pit against
Carter to stop his aggressive drive. They desired to keep him from simply walking away with the nomination. 163
Carter and Blacks
Carter's association and clout with blacks was first observed on 30 June when the paper reported "NAACP Cheers Carter's Name at
Memphis Convention" by Luix Overbrea. The page 26 article said that the NAACP did not specifically endorse Carter but it was apparent that they approved of his candidacy.
The Monitor on 5 July ran ''Next Stop for Democrats: Election
Day" by Godfrey Sperling, Jr. The front page feature said that Carter held a special appeal to blacks who as a group were a crucial factor for a Democratic candidate to win. Southern blacks felt comfortable with him and Northern blacks gave him high grades because he scored well on civil rights issues.
"Carter's Convention Victory--Triumph for South, Too" by George
Moneybun, ran on page 6 on 19 July. For many Southerners, Jimmy
Carter's victory at the Democratic convention was a triumph for the
South, a region whose racial segregation policies had set the South apart and made the choice of a Southerner for President politically impossible. Mr. Carter epitomized the revolution in white attitudes and significantly a black preacher helped lead the revolution. Rep.
Andrew Young was credited with selling Carter to Northern liberals.
In summary, Carter's association with blacks was characterized and confirmed in three articles three different ways. First, he was endorsed by an old established civil rights organization, the NAACP.
Secondly, Northern blacks supported him enough to give him the edge needed to obtain the Democratic nomination. Third, Andrew Young was recognized as a crucial factor in his campaign for black support. 164
Black Issues
The first black issues article appeared on page 3 on 11 March.
In the article, "Black Party May Draft Presidential Nominee," Louix
Overbrea related that the National Black Political Convention planned to meet in Cincinnati to nominate a black candidate for President.
Listed as potential nominees were Sen. Julian Bond, Rep. John Conyers,
Rep. Ronald Dellums, Comedian Dick Gregory and Mayor Richard Hatcher.
On 22 March on page 5 the article, "Black Convention Seeks
Candidate" by Louix Overbrea, said that the convention successfully laid the foundation for forming a new Independent Freedom Party.
Several preferred nominees for President declined the nomination.
John Dillin observed the opening of the black Democratic caucus in Charlotte, North Carolina as he reported on the proceedings on page 6 of the 3 May edition. He stated in the article, "Black
Democrats Air Grievances," that black political leaders threatened to boycott the 1976 presidential elections unless the Democratic party paid more attention to black demands. Mayor Richard Hatcher was quoted as having said that none of the contenders had addressed black needs and two other leaders were disappointed with Humphrey's decision not to run.
On 4 May coverage of the Caucus was continued in the page 1 article, "Blacks Still Wary of Carter" by John Dillin. Black
Democratic leaders viewed Jimmy Carter with a mixture of caution and concern. While thousands of black voters viewed him as an enigma from the deep South. Others worried because Carter failed to endorse several pieces of legislation that were dear to the hearts of many 165
blacks. Jesse Jackson contributed that in his opinion blacks were in a "holding pattern"; umlilling to support Carter yet because of his
"ethnic purity" remark.
A follow-up editorial on the North Carolina conference was also carried on 4 May. The title was "The Black Vote" and the editor rehashed the events of the week-end meeting. Conference leaders
called for presidential candidates to heed black needs. One
encouraging aspect which prevailed was the recognition of the vast
potential of black citizens' potential voting power. The disturbing aspect was the damage that a boycott of the elections could do to the
Democratic party if black grievances were ignored.
The next black issues item to appear was on 15 September on page 36. In an editorial titled "Equal Rights" the editor said neither Ford nor Carter had escaped the justified criticisms by black leaders and that none of the aspirants gave sufficient emphasis to the needs of black Americans in their nomination campaigns. On the issues, Mr. Carter seemed the more likely candidate for blacks despite his "ethnic purity" blunder. The debate that withstood was as to which candidate conveyed beyond words and platforms that he gave a higher priority to equal rights.
In summary, the paper ran s~x black ~ssues items. Many of the
Monitor's articles expressed the same types of doubt and skepticism that many of the black papers expressed in that neither Carter nor any of the other contenders considered blacks' needs and issues seriously.
The Monitor carried the viewpoints of a multiple number of black leaders most of whom stated emphatically that black issues were being 166 ignored by all of the candidates. The views of those leaders who did not support Carter dominated much of the coverage.
Black Ministers' Payoff, Debates
The Monitor chose not to cover either the ministers' payment issue nor the debate.
Playboy Interview
On 22 September on page 1 the coverage started on the Playboy issue. John Dillin contributed "Carter on Sex: Will 'Tolerance'
Backfire?" He said that Carter's campaign was distracted by a controversy which had blown out of proportion over remarks attributed to him in a "free-wheeling" Playboy interview. Altogether it had been the greatest amount of time devoted by him to any publication.
Carter's press secretary said that he was trying to reach a certain audience and that it was in his best interest to do the interview.
In the following issue, dated 23 September, an editorial was run on page 27 titled "Carter's Lapse." The editor stated that
Carter's interview with Playboy sparked adverse reaction which was understandable since "It was in poor taste." Not only did he choose to have his candid comments published in this particular journal, but by using some offensive language which many newspapers refused to print, he seemed to tailor his vocabulary to the "character of the magazine and its distinctive audience."
On 27 September, again on page 1, John Dillin reported "Carter
Fighting to Keep Lead." He said that Ford was narrowing the lead and that much of Carter's troubles were self-generated within the campaign such as his recent Playboy interview. He condemned Carter's use of 167
"earthy" language and noted that his critical remarks about former
President Lyndon Johnson were a most damaging factor. The interview segment about Johnson was reprinted after which it was mentioned that
Carter had sent an apology to Mrs. Johnson.
On 1 October Playboy continued to warrant space. In the page
6 art1cle, "Baptist Leaders Back Carter on Theology" by Tracy Early, it was stated that Carter's theology as expressed in the Playboy interview got full endorsement for the president of his denomination.
It was debated, however, whether or not Carter should have used
Playboy as his torum.
Playboy was mentioned again in an article appearing on
26 October but only as an atterthought. It was cited as an excellent example of the types of blunders which helped to erode Hr. Carter's lead over President Ford.
In summary, the Monitor concentrated on all aspects of the issue in tive items. The coverage was slanted towards determining how the remarks would affect his image and thus his campaign standing.
They concluded that the remarks were theologically sound but they criticized the media that he chose to express his ideas. The editors thought that the interview was in poor taste.
Andrew Young
Andrew Young was cited as Carter's chief supporter as early as
January and he was quoted for the first time in the editorial, "Here
Comes Carter-Again," on page 28 of the 21 January issue. Young's statement was made in protest to an editorial comment printed by the
Village Voice Newspaper in which he defended Carter's candidacy. The 168
Monitor concluded that Mr. Carter's followers apparently saw something in him beyond his stand on issues.
In a 5 May article, ''Who are the Men Behind Jimmy Carter?" by
John Dillin, Andrew Young was profiled and cited as one of Carter's arch supporters. Whenever Carter appeared in black areas Young was with him to urge support. Young said that he was convinced of
Mr. Carter's sincerity towards blacks and pointed to his record as governor of Georgia as sufficient proof. The article was a major feature on page 14.
In summary, the Monitor noted earlier than most publ1cations that Andrew Young was a crucial factor in Carter's campaign but beyond that the coverage was much the same as it was in other publications.
It was limited to only two articles, but direct in that it recognized that Young helped Carter to win overwhelming black support.
Carter and Black Dignitaries
There was no coverage on Carter and the black dignitaries. 169
Chicago Tribune
Carter-Wallace Coverage
''Wallace Runs Behind, Plays Role of Spoiler" written by Louis
Harris, was the first article to appear. It was run on 12 January,
page 4, part 2, of the paper and gave the results of a Harris survey which indicated that WaLlace's candidacy tor the Democratic Party's
presidential nomination was one of the stranger phenomenon in modern
political history. He had a strong Southern following but the Demo
cratic organization in Florida had already endorsed Carter. The com mon presumption was that 1f Carter defeated Wallace in Florida Carter would become a real possibiliity for the Democratic nomination and the
Wallace candidacy would oe finished. But if Wallace won Carter would
be finished. The paper concluded that Carter had a stronger following
outside the South than did Wallace.
On 9 March in section 1, page 2, the paper ran the article,
"Wallace Enjoying a Tour de Force in Florida's Primary" by Jon
Margolis and Eleanor Randolph. Florida was now a three-way race among
Democratic contenders Carter, Wallace and Jackson. Still it was pre dicted that Carter's early start would give h1m the most black votes.
It was also predicted that Wallace would get about 15 percent of the
black vote despite his past segregationalist's views.
Jim Squires on 12 February wrote "Carter, Jackson Vie in
Florida but Rank and File L1ke Wallace." In the page 8 article
Squires concluded that Wallace would take the state while Jackson and 170
Carter split the anti-Wallace vote. He gave Carter an outside chance of coming in second place.
On 10 March the election results occupied the headlines on the front page. Eleanor Randolph contributed "Ford and Carter Win in
Florida's Primary: Reagan Suffers a Setback; Wallace Loses in Sur prise." Randolph stated that Carter was jubilant and surprised that he was victorious over the former Alabama Gov. George Wallace. The article's primary emphasis, however, was on the Republ1can contest.
Jim Squires' article on page 5, also on 10 March, complemented the preceding article but focused upon the Democratic contest.
Wallace had his hopes severely dashed by the loss, said Squires. More importantly, however, Carter's campaign received a great thrust and it appeared possible now that the former Georgia governor could actually win the Democratic nomination.
In summary, the Tribune paid very close attention to the
Carter-Wallace challenge but unlike most papers which compared the two because of their common Southern heritage, the Tribune did it within the context of the Florida primary and its significance to both men.
The analysis that it performed was closely akin to the analysis per formed by the campaign analysts after the November general election.
It inaccurately projected that Wallace would win but accurately deter mined what a projected victory would mean to each candidate. Six articles appeared. 171
Florida Primary
Jerald ter Horst contributed a column on 5 March titled "Will
the South Rise for Carter?" He pred~cted that the Florida primary
would make a difference for the Carter campaign. Carter might not be
the perfect answer, said ter Horst, but he was the only one chal
lenging Wallace. Southerners yearned for the chance to prove that
they were not all racists or "neanderthals." Carter counted on strong
support from the blacks, white-collar workers, professionals and
college-educated groups. The article appeared in section 2 on page 4.
The most consequential comment made in the feature, "Issues
Forgotten as Floridians Cast Votes for 'Images,'" was that much of
Carter's native Southern support came from blacks who gave him 60
percent of their votes. Images rather than issues, and organization
rather than ideology, seemed more important in the Florida race. The
article was a news analysis by Jon Margolis which appeared on page 13
on 11 March.
In summary, the Tribune's two articles on the Florida primary
cemented the Carter-Wallace coverage. The paper also recognized that
Carter received a significant amount of support from blacks. It was very blunt in its characterizations of George \vallace and made no
attempt to tactfully compare his brand of politics with that of
Carter's. 172
Ethnic Purity
On 11 April "Carter in Trouble on 'Ethnic Purity'" by Jim
Squires appeared on page 8 thus ushering in the ethnic controversy.
Squires said of "ethnic purity,"''the words roll off the tongue as
easily as buttermilk and hang in the American mind like an
advertiser's best catch-phrase." When it was first said hardly anyone
noticed, but what Carter was thinking and why he chose those par
ticular words had become a great campaign issue. Carter's phraseology was said to have conjured up the images of "Adolph Hitler's master
race plan." The entire episode gave many liberals the stick they needed to "drive Carter back below the Mason-Dixon Line." Several of
Carter's opponents had seized the opportunity to reveal to black
groups the type of man Carter was. Andrew Young's advice to Carter was noted and it was added that he had promised continued loyalty.
On the same page was "Purity Queries Vex Carter" in which
Carter expressed annoyance at the press' continued questioning about
the ethnic statement. He had apologized for it.
Frank Starr's column on 12 April asked "Will 'Ethnic Purity'
Remark Muddy Carter's Chances?" He felt that it was not surprising
that sooner or later "Carter would put his foot in his mouth." Some
of his prominent black supporters like Andrew Young, while labeling
the remark a "disaster," gave him a second chance and would support him. Even though Carter apologized for the remark to assure black
supporters that he had not abandoned them, precisely what he meant was
still unclear. The opinion ran in section II on page 2.
"The Democratic front-runner in the Presidential sweepstakes 173 has stubbed his toe" was how Mary McGary started her column, ''What
Kind of Cat is Carter?" on 12 April. Her column, printed on page 4 of
section II, and that of Frank Starr were almost identical in content.
She added that Carter was accepted as a courageous advocate of civil rights after he promised to "slay their particular dragon, George
Wallace," but he may not recover from the statement. It conjured up memories of Hitler and Nazi Germany. Andrew Young still defended
Carter while Julian Bond considered Carter a racist and a redneck.
Jim Squires added fuel to the ethnic controversy on 18 April when his column, "If This is 1976, It Must be an Election Year," became a major page 1 feature in section II. Despite his good record on open housing and his liberal stance, Carter was still apologizing for using the term "ethnic purity." His efforts to recover the black vote which had looked like it would be his in 1976 had been hampered by a longstanding feud among Southern black leaders. When Dr. Martin
Luther King, Sr. restated his belief in the ex-governor, the Rev.
Hosea Williams led a group of fifty pickets charging that the truth had come out.
Vernon Jarrett, a black journalist, wrote many features for the Tribune and on 21 April in section II, page 4, his first comments about the ethnic controversy were expressed in his column, "Blacks
Respond to 1 Ethn1c Purity.'" He concluded that blacks would still vote for Carter in large numbers in spite of his comment. Black leaders and voters were disturbed by what could have been interpreted as an exposure of Carter's hidden feelings about blacks, but from com ments obtained from blacks across the country, he had been overwhelm ingly forgiven. 174
Also on 21 April on the same page, another Mary McGary column,
"Carter's 1 \fuen 1 Becomes an 'If,'" further explored the ethnic remarks. McGary said "to Jimmy Carter--love means always having to say you're sorry when something doesn't go down too well." She stated that he was now able to joke about the remark, but his speeches indicated a continued anxiety. His "when" elected had become "if" elected and he had toned down his anti-Washington rhetoric.
The ethnic statement was the subject of a Harris survey and the results were reported on page 2, section IV, on 26 April in the article, "Cloud of Uncertainty Hovers Over Carter" by Louis Harris.
The survey concluded that the American people still had mixed reactions to Carter. They viewed him as a highly intelligent man courageous enough not to make promises simply to get votes, but they felt that he avoided taking stands on issues so that he would not offend anyone. His controversial ethnic remark had not damaged his position with black voters. Blacks nation-wide tended to think more highly of Carter than any other group.
The ethnic controversy received no further coverage until 21
July in section I, page 8, when it was mentioned in the article,
"Jesse Drops Kind \'lords for Carter" by Arthur Sidden. The Rev. Jesse
Jackson opened Operation PUSH's fifth annual convention with kind remarks about Carter indicating a change of attitude on the part of the black leader. Jackson had some caustic comments for Carter right after he made his "ethnic purity" slip in April, but since Carter won the presidential nomination he no longer appeared ominous to Jackson.
In summary, the Tribune was very negative in its ethnic coverage. Much of what was printed in personal columns (which 175 constituted the bulk of its coverage) was anti-Carter. They appeared to exude glee in the fact that he had slipped. Even the original article which reported on his gaffe contained biting personal remarks interspersed throughout. The reports introduced a controversial phrase that some of the black papers adapted--it stated that the remarks conjured up Hitlerian concepts. The more staunchly anti-Carter papers used the phrasing. It ran nine items.
Stop Carter
The first "stop-Carter" item was an editorial run on page 2 in section II on 2 March under the title "Stop Jimmy Who?" Carter's
Democratic opponents were out to deny him the Massachusetts primary.
Carter was hardly a household name at the time and his rivals would be happier if it stayed that way. There were no dazzling names in the race except for that of George Wallace.
Two "stop-Carter" items appeared on 29 and 30 April. The former, an article by Jim Squires and Jon Margolis titled "Backers
Tell Humphrey: It's Now or Never to Stop Carter," ran on the front page. Desperate friends pleaded with Humphrey to enter the New Jersey primary. Most agreed that the options were simple, either enter the primary and risk getting beaten, or stand by and watch Carter walk away with the state's delegation. The latter, a column appearing on page 2 in section IV, was by Jerold ter Horst called "Carter is not in the Clear Yet." The writer, ter Horst, surmised that the outcome of the Democratic race would be if Humphrey decided not to challenge
Carter.
In summary, the Tribume through its three editorial comments 176 and opinion pieces virtually urged Humphrey to enter the race in order to stop Carter's progress.
Carter and Blacks
Carter and black coverage began with the article, "Julian Bond
Views the Candidates" by Vernon Jarrett, appearing on page 4, section
II, on 17 March. He mentioned for the first time that Bond was not a part of the black entourage from Georgia supporting Carter. Bond was skeptical because in Florida he received 70 percent of the black vote while getting 50 percent of the white votes that would have normal~y gone to Wallace. Bond felt that Carter was trying to be a man for all seasons, so he supported Rep. Morris Udall instead.
Carter's dependence upon black votes for support received the attention of Jim Squires on 28 March. The column which was printed on page 6 in section II called "The Candidate from Nowhere" surmised that if blacks went uncommitted Humphrey might be ready to enter the race.
Humphrey always started out with solid black Democratic support and if he entered the race he would directly challenge Carter to a two-man race for black support.
The Louis Harris survey appearing on 5 April in section 2, page 4, reexplored Carter's standing w~th black voters as opposed to his perceived standing were he not challenged by George Wallace. The survey found that if black votes were eliminated, Wallace would lead
Carter in popularity. However, it was obvious that blacks distrusted
Wallace and felt that his nomination would be a very serious threat.
Carter capitalized on that distrust and the resulting black support that he received provided him with the critical edge that he needed. 177
Vernon Jarrett chastised black leaders for criticizing Carter
in his 11 April column, "Black Voters Slighted Again." He said in the
page 6, section II, column that the former Georgia governor was the
only candidate seeking the presidential nomination in either party who
had shown real concern for black voters and black leaders were
introducing doubts about him. The Congressional Black Caucus
expressed public displeasure over Carter's reluctance to strongly
support the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill. The sorry reality
was that none of the presidential aspirants had given any outspoken
support to black caucuses. Julian bond was quoted as having said that
Carter was winning black votes by default.
On 14 May Barbara Reynolds submitted a very thorough analysis
of the Carter/black relationship. She wrote in "Black Vote Responds
to Carter" that while the rank and file black voter breezed along on
the Carter train, many black pol1tical leaders felt left at the
station. Scores of black mayors, congressmen and civil rights leaders
attending the Democratic Caucus had hoped that Carter would falter.
Some had hoped that the Carter train would derail and many kept hoping
for Humphrey to enter the race.· So far, no scheme or event had wrecked Carter; thus, black leaders were forced to begin plotting at which stop they would scramble aboard.
With the total focus on the black leaders who supported
Carter, it had gone virtually unnoticed that the majority of them did
not. Dr. King, Sr. was one of Carter's earliest supporters and his
publ1c pardon of Carter following the "ethnic purity" gaffe had more meaning among blacks than an "absolution from the Pope." Black
leaders still did not enthusiastically support Carter largely because 178
I •
be had by-passed many of them as he had by-passed labor leaders and
obtained black support at a "bargain basement discount." Some leaders
also questioned his civil rights record for, in spite of his hanging a
portrait of Martin Luther King, Jr. in the Georgia Capitol, he spoke
favorably about George Wallace and Lester Maddox, two arch-enemies of
racial integration.
He had obtained no commitments from Roy Wilkins, head of the
NAACP, nor from Vernon Jordan, leader of the Urban League and PUSH's
leader, Rev. Jesse Jackson, who still endorsed Hubert Humphrey.
Reynolds concluded that "Carter, the revivalist, the prince of ambigu
ity, may not be talking the language of black political leaders, but
the black rank-and-file seemed to be getting his message, judging him not on what he said, but what they think he meant." The article was
carried on page 4 of section II.
In summary, the Tribune in its five items did a comprehensive
job of analyzing Carter's relationship with blacks and major black leaders. The angle was clearly anti-Carter and some elements of the
stop-Carter coverage crept in. They clearly indicate that black leaders for the most part did not support Carter even though the rank-and-file did. The paper also reveals how that status evolved.
Black Issues
Vernon Jarrett contributed a vast amount of opinions relative to black issues and the first appeared on 4 February on page 4 of section II titled "Black Politicians Face up to Hurdles." He reported that Sen. Julian Bond had not completely discarded the idea of running for President on a third party ticket, but chances appeared remote. 179
The movement to draft Bond was being sponsored by the National Black
Assembly.
The Black Democratic Caucus received Jarrett's attention on 7
March in "A Meeting Four Years Too Late" which appeared on page 6 section II. He announced that the Charlotte, North Carolina caucus was too late for black Democrats to start planning and extremely late for mobilization of black voters generally. He surmised that Sen.
Henry Jackson was the only liberal running in spite of his blowing the busing issue out of proportion in Boston to obtain white support.
Black issues became dormant until 3 May when the Barbara
Reynolds article, "4 Dems Manage to 'Pass' Black Caucus," was run on page 28 of the first section. Four Democratic presidential candidates appeared before the Charlotte Caucus and received passing grades after a tough grueling on issues concerning black and the poor. Some caucus members admitted privately that the exam was actually weighted to pull commitments from Carter. All scored favorably by stressing their civil rights positions and by promising to appoint black federal judges, but they lost points by failing to promise to appoint a black as running mate. Carter emerged as the overall favorite.
Vernon Jarrett introduced another black issue on 5 May with his column, "Why They're Now Such Good Friends," which ran in section
III on page 4. He focused on a controversy brewing over Jerry Brown's emergence in the campaign, his direct bid for black votes and his sometimes stormy relationship with California's black Lt. Gov. Jarrett said that it was generally known among California's Democratic Party leadership that Brown and Lt. Gov. Mervyn Dymally "recognized a mutual distaste for each other." The caucus had insisted that their 180 reLationship would have to genuinely improve if Brown expected black support. Caucus members felt that Brown was simply using Dymally to obtain that support.
Vernon Jarrett's column on 9 May again focused attention on the Black Democratic Caucus. He wrote "Another Exercise in Ethnic
Futility?\' in which he questioned the extent of the impact that the
Charlotte conference would have on the Democratic presidential nomination and on the platform to be adopted at the convention.
Jarrett concluded tht the conference occurred too late to be influential. Georgia Rep. Julian Bond concurred and did not attend.
Californ1a Rep. Ron Dellums on the other hand disagreed and felt that the conference was significant. The item was run on page 5 of section
IV.
Mary McGory's column on 7 June on page 4, section II, was the only black issues item for June. She wrote, "Suddenly They're the
Best of Pals," in which she profiled the Brown/Dymally feud. She stated that the two politicians had patched up their differences at least until Brown obtained the needed black support to challenge
Carter. Dymally was rounding up black ministers to lure them into
Brown's camp.
Vernon Jarrett's comments resumed on 11 July on page 6, section II, with "Black Delegate Count Declines." Black leaders and later black voters gave Carter his initial credibility as a serious candidate--a Southern candidate who could win. Thus, it appeared contradictory that there were fewer black delegates to the 1Y76
National Democratic Convention than in 1Y72. Jarrett concluded that all would not be 1n harmony for Carter. 181
Jarrett's reports continued on 14 July on page 4, section II.
A potential controversy was brewing between Carter and black Democrats
and in his column, "Carter Satisfies the Black Caucus," Jarrett said
that a confrontation between the caucus of black Democrats and Jimmy
Carter had been resolved. Many nationally recognized caucus leaders
had suffered the humiliation of being defied by Carter's team of
organizers who "invaded their baliwicks and came up on primary day with voter turnouts worthy of seasoned professionals." The majority
of this caucus representation had either opposed Carter or remained
uncommitted until the very end. They now wanted and needed assurances
that they would not be the victims of any retaliatory actions by
Carter. The assurance was given after which they pledged their
support for the Georgia nominee.
Vernon Jarrett continued to report on black issues on 16 July
~n his column, "Conyers Jostles Democrats' Boat" appearing on page 3
of section II. The progressive elements were left out of the
selection for Vice President, therefore, Rep. Conyers, one of the more
outspoken members of the Congressional Black Caucus, recommended
Ronald Dellums for the office. Most of the black leadership was less
than enthusiastic about the idea. Conyers on the other hand said the
nomination was made to underscore the necessities of black, brown and working people. Thus, by using the nomination for Dellums' Vice
Presidency, they could gain a forum where none existed.
Jarrett's report on 18 July, "Blacks Expecting to be
Remembered," appeared on page 6 of sec II. He said that the Jimmy
Carter movement proved that there were hundreds of highly qualified
unknown black men and women who were capable of leadership positions 182 within the Democratic Party. He then quoted black Los Angeles City
Council member David Cunningham who held some strong opinions about
the distribution of influence in the national party's structure.
Jarrett then predicted that changes would occur in party leadership to accommodate a new "black mobia" of graduates from the five black
schools in Atlanta, Georgia.
On 20 July a news article by Barbara Reynolds thrust black
issues back into section I of the paper. Julian Bond was spotlighted
in the page 3 article "Failing to Back Carter Puts Bond on Outside
Looking In." For the first time since Bond rose to fame, he was
forced to the sidelines in national politics. Bond, perhaps the only
influential black in Atlanta politics who did not support Carter, said
that his decision to go with Rep. Morris Udall made him a "lonely warrior."
The A. Z. Pittman story was covered by Eleanor Randolph on 2o
July in the article, "Carter Neighbor is Evicted." Most of the
article quoted Pittman and his wife as they conveyed their sentiments
about having to move. The explanation for the house's demise as given
by the couple was that since Carter was a presidential nominee the
house was no longer wanted in the neighborhood. The story appeared on
page 5 1n section I.
On 11 August Frank Starr commented on the A. Z. Pittman
controversy in his column, "Mr. Carter, Thy Neighbor Across the Street
Needs Love Dear Mr. Carter:" The entire column which ran on page 2
of section II was written as a letter to Carter abut the Pittmans and
their having to move. He admonished Carter for doing nothing to ease
the Pittmans' plight. Apparently Carter had purchased most of the 183 land where the ramshakle house had stood.
On 21 September the visit to Biloxi, Mississippi was mentioned briefly on page 14 of section I. He was greeted at the airport by
Senators Stennis and Eastland, both staunch segregationalists. Carter stood firm that the civil rights laws were the best thing to have happened to the nation.
The next black issue item appeared on 22 October in "Caucus of
Democrats Seeks Black Votes Here." The caucus of black Democrats, a group ot black congressmen, mayors and state legislators appeared in
Chicago as part of a cross-country tour aimed at getting black voters to the polls. The tour's prime goal was the election of Carter as president. This brief item appeared on the front page of section III.
Carter's trip into Harlem was the major topic on a page 5 section I, article, "Dems See Minorities as Key to Presidency" by Jim
Squires. It appeared on 26 October. Carter depending upon large numbers of black voters said blacks had the power to control who won, yet the urban areas' regisration lagged and empathy ran high. Black voter participation appeared greatest in the South and that meant a significant difference for Carter.
In summary, the Tribune addressed many issues that were ignored by many other white papers; for example, they followed Jul~an
Bond's anti-Carter activities closely, and noted Gov. Brown's feud with his lieutenant governor and how he tried to win black support.
They made the A. z. Pittman story a bigger story. Most of there report~ng remained negative. It pointed out that may have been able to obtain black support so easily because blacks themselves had waited too long in their attempts to plan. Black leadership was in a 184
disarray; therefore, Carter could easily bypass them and appeal
directly to the masses who were looking for guidance. The paper ran
sixteen black issues items.
Black Ministers' Payoff
On 8 August the ministers' story broke. It was an AP release,
"Carter Donations Questioned," which appeared on page 2 1n section I.
It reported that Carter's campaign gave donations to black ministers
who supported him in the California primary and paid other "street money" that was not properly accounted for.
The ministers story moved to section IV, page 12, on 9 August
with "Carter Discloses 'Missing' Funds." In the short article,
Carter stated that it was possible that the ministers may have
received the funds but he quickly added that the majority of his black
supporters had "impeccable credentials."
Patrick Buchanan contributed the column, "Gimme That Old-Time
Incentive, 11 on 12 August. He said, "It wasn 1 t just the Old Time
Religion that had those black preachers smiling and shuffling into
Jimmy Carter's revival tent, there was some of the old time boodle as
well--'extra incentives' for the Men of God to r1se in their pulpits
and call down De Lawd's blessing on the endeavor of our Christian
brother Mr. Jimmy." He concluded that the ministers sold out too
cheaply. Consumer movements obtained commitments. Meany and big
labor were given guarantees, education lobbies got their demands and
Democratic mayors were promised protection. All were forms of
payoffs. The column ran in section II on page 4. 185
In summary, as with most papers the ministers' payment was short coverage (three articles) but no follow-up was done and it was not stated that the money was returned. It was not treated as a serious issue and in fact they took a view that was unqiue by suggest ing that the minisiters were not paid enough.
Debates
There was no debate coverage.
Playboy Interview
On page 1, section I, on 21 September the first Playboy article emerged. The headline read "Carter, I'm Human and I'm
Tempted." Carter said that his often-professed religious beliefs would not create a moralistic presidency, and he admitted he had been tempted to commit sins in the past and would probably be tempted again. The interview was quoted in depth.
A second article appearing on page 14 1n section I extended the Playboy controversy. In a short article, "Rosalynn Carter: He
Doesn't Have to Explain," Mrs. Carter gave her views on the Playboy article by confirming that she had never w·orried about her husband 1 s fidelity.
Carter's use of sexual slang concerned a Protestant minister and he expressed his sentiments in a 23 September article, "Carter's
Sex Slang Called Inappropriate" by Neil Mehler. It was concluded that
Carter was espousing standard Protestant theology and New Testament notions in his comments but choosing slang to discuss sex was inap propriate. Theologians said that he should have used legal and 186
clerical terms because his blunt sexual inuendoes were temporarily embarrassing. The article ran on page 6 of section I.
A column about the Playboy interview titled "So, There's a
Luster in the Campaign" by Michael Kilian, also appeared on 23 Sep tember on page 2 of section III. It was satirical in which the
journalist said, "Damn, just when I thought we'd finally got this election campaign under control, someone comes along and blows the whole thing wide open with an astounding new 1ssue. LUST! Not just any old lust, e1ther, but the lust of Miss Lilian's saintly son,
Jimmy." He commented on the entire Playboy interview utilizing the
same type of biting satire throughout.
Sen. Ted Kennedy commented on the Playboy remark on 24 Sep tember in a section I, page 5, article, "Kennedy Shrugs-Off Carter's
Interview," by Mitchell Locin. Kennedy said that Carter's position on restoring the economy was more important to people than the Democratic presidential candidate's views on sex.
Mary McGary's comments on page 4 of section III directed at
Carter's Playboy article also ran on 24 September. In her column, "A
Guided Tour of Carter's Soul," she said that Carter had confessed to
Playboy that he had sinned. However, he never committed adultery but had thought about it. Lust, except for office, had not been an issue in the campaign, she stated, but abortion was. The discussion, how ever, had focused on the consequences rather than the cause.
~~yor Daley inadvertently added fuel to the Playboy con troversy on 25 September. The title of the article was "Angler Daley
Won't Take the Bait, by Robert Davis. Daley had called a press conference to give his opinions on the first presidential debate, but 187 was pressed by reporters to comment on the Playboy issue. His only
comment was "He (Carter) wouldn't have got caught if he had kept his mouth shut." The article appeared in the magazine section.
Carter's remarks apparently created a problem for the news papers and in the column, "Carter's Use of a Vulgarism Poses a Problem for Editors," James Yuenger explained the bind in which editors found themselves. The 26 September feature which was run on page 4 of
section II said that some editors struggled over whether or not to reprint words such as "shack-up" and "screws" as used in the interview.
A second Playboy article appeared on 26 September in section
II, page 6. Jerald ter Horst, in his column, "A Chance to Wink,
Snicker and Grin," said there was one thing to be said about Carter's lust-- it beat tax reform as an attention grabber. The absorbing question for campaign watchers was not what he said as much as why he
said it and where. Carter was trying to show that he was an
"all-right guy." He was going after the macho vote since he had already had the church vote.
On 1 October the Tribune continued the Playboy coverage with
11 the editorial, ••• And Echoes From Playboy," which appeared on page 2 ot section III. It said that if the criticism of Mr. Ford's golf weekends had been overdone so had the criticism of Mr. Carter's interview with Playboy. Carter was vulnerable on only two points, his unfortunate use of certain expressions unbefitting a presidential candidate and his choice of Playboy as a medium for carrying on his campaign. The number of voters Mr. Carter may have lost by the interview was probably greater than the number he might have gained by 188
trying to shed his image of a Southern Baptist.
The Playboy issue moved back to section I on 3 October with a
segment called "Close-up with Jeff Lyon." The name of the piece was
"That Interview With Carter Even has Playboy Shaken Up" and it
appeared on page 24. Most of the article was an interview with Barry
Golson, the assistant managing editor in charge of Playboy interviews.
Golson commented on how he and writer Robert Scheer obtained the
interview.
Playboy disappeared for the next few days and was back at the
forefront on 14 October in a section III, page 4, column, "Carter is
Humble and Devout," by Andrew Greely. He believed that political
figures should keep their sexual fantacies private, thus Carter's
sexual fantasies should have been none of Playboy magazine's business.
The interview could easily cost him the election. Greely interviewed
several individuals in different geographical locations about their views of Carter's Playboy interview and found that most of them
favored his decision to grant the interview.
On 19 October the last Playboy interview item appeared in
section III, page 2. Michael Kilian's column, "Carter Aides Sound a
Bit Play-Boyish in Playboy," concluded that a separate article on
Carter's aides in Playboy was more upsetting than the interview
itself. There was not a great deal of "hot stuff" about Carter but
there was a fascinating anecdote about Carter media advisor, Gerald
Rafshoon and a Georgia state trooper sitting through an adults-only movie and talking about "oral sex."
In summary, the Tribune published thirteen Playboy-related
items. The Playboy issue was more prominent in columns than in news 189
stories. There was no general consensus among columnists other than that Carter should not have granted the interview. Most of the columnists chose to go off on separate tangents and explore different angles. They gave a wide variety of interpretations and several treated the topic humorously. None mentioned the Lyndon Johnson episode.
Andrew Young
The Tribune contained no Andrew Young coverage.
Carter and Black Dignitaries
On 7 April in section III, page 4, Vernon Jarrett wrote
"Blacks for Carter--Insider Tells \\Thy." The comments in the column were attributed to Georgia State Rep. Benjamin Brown. Brown explained that "we" supported Carter because of "our" beliefs in him. The "we" was a corps of distinguished black Atlantians including Dr. Martin
Luther King, Sr., Rev. Ralph Abernathy of SCLC and Rep. Andrew Young.
Barbara Reynolds teamed with Richard Ciccone on 15 August and the final article on Carter's clout with black dignitaries appeared under the title "In Atlanta, They're Redefining Black Power," on page
1, section II. The 1976 presidential season produced a variety of surprises, but few as unique and potentially influential as the emergent role of a score of black Southern political leaders. Politi cal clout among blacks shifted this year to the South and the reasons for it were the candidacy of Jimmy Carter and the unrivaled number of black leaders based in Atlanta referred to as the Atlanta Connection.
In summary, the "Atlanta Connection" was mentioned in several other publications throughout the year. The Tribune was one of a few 190 papers to recognize that this group of black dignitaries existed. It did not explore their contributions in depth and did not reveal any detailed infonnation about who they were. It revealed another aspect of his campaign strategy 1n that he went outside nonnal channels and by-passed the traditionally recognized black leaders, thus attaching a new significance to a relatively unknown segment. Two items appeared. 191
New York Times
Carter-Wallace Coverage
On 29 February the article, '~allace Leading in Carolina-
Precinct Test is First Confrontation with Carter" by Lucinda Franks signaled the beginning of the Carter-Wallace coverage. The article veered away from the actual confrontation and focused primarily on
Carter's dependency upon black support. It was Carter's first bout with Wallace and he had only miniscule black support. If blacks had not remained uncommitted, Carter could have conceivably carried the state. Blacks, however, had adhered to the party's advice and withheld support. The article appeared on page 43 of the first section.
On 1 March on page 32, the Times reported on Wallace's victory
1n South Carolina in "Wallace's Victory in Carolina is Narrow 11 by
Lucinda Franks. It said that Wallace won because blacks decided to withhold support. In fact, Carter had failed to win the confidence of either the Democratic leadership or of blacks. Additionally, many blacks evidently hoped that Hubert Humphrey would enter the race.
Wallace reappeared for the last time in two articles on
13 June. The first was written by Dasher's author, James \.Jooten and was titled "Old South Bows to New as Wallace Meets Carter." Wallace conceded defeat and met with Carter in Alabama to extend his endorse ment. Comparisons were made between the "old" and the "new" South.
The second article on the same page titled "Carter is Arousing
Southern Pride that Crosses Ideological Racial Lines" by Roy Reed, continued the old South versus new South analogy. It denoted changes 192 and pointed to Andrew Young's endorsement of Carter as a significant part of those changes. Other blacks interviewed for the article solidly decried George Wallace by indicating a preference for any candidate including Carter.
In summary, the Times did not do any comprehensive coverages comparing Carter to Wallace and of the information that it did run it considered none of it significant enough for front-page coverage.
Through its comparison it begins to recognize Carter's tie to black voters early in the year. The most significant aspect of the Times' coverage was its discovery of the impace that blacks would have during the election year including mentioning Andrew Young's endorsement.
The article itself did not profile Young. Four items were run.
Florida Primary
Carter's true intentions to win the Florida Primary were uncovered by James Wooten and reported in March in his page 1 article,
"Carter Now Aims to Win Florida." He stated that Carter's previous objective in Florida was simply to slow down Wallace's momentum.
Carter now predicted that he would win in Florida, stop Wallace completely and assure the Democratic nomination for himself.
R. W. Apple, Jr. on 10 March wrote, "Ford Defeats Reagan in
Florida: Carter is Winner Over Wallace 1n Democratic Vote, Jackson
3D." It simply stated that Carter did what he endeavored to do, defeat Wallace. ''He cut Gov. George Wallace of Alabama down to size."
The article was a front-page feature.
Black support for Carter was finally revealed on page 41 on 14
March in an article evaluating that support appeared under the title 193
"Carter's Backers are Reassessing Him" by Christopher Lydon. Having proven himself a "giant killer" said Lydon, Carter was having to prove himself a giant. The people who backed him to beat Gov. Wallace in
Florida were reassessing him as a plausible contender for the Demo cratic presidential nomination. Some black anti-Wallace advocates were still unsure of Carter as presidential material. However, black notables such as Rep. Andrew Young had decided to extend endorsements.
In summary, the Times contained four articles about the
Florida primary. There was one great significance attached to the
Florida primary coverage, the reintroduction of the term "giant killer" in reference to Carter's victory over George Wallace. There were no commentaries or analyses on the impact that Carter's victory had on the overall campaign strategy.
Ethnic Purity
On 7 April the first "ethnic purity" article was printed on page 23. "Carter Defends All-White Areas" read the headline of a story by Christopher Lydon in which Carter was quoted extensively as he emphasized the advantage of maintaining "sameness" 1n communities and pointed out the costs of change and integration. In making his point he used unusually blunt language about social differences and about "black intrusion" into white neighborhoods. Carter appeared puzzled and annoyed by reporters' persistant questions. He commented on his civil rights record and stated that the South was an appropri ate model for racial integration.
The Pennsylvania race obtained most of the attention in
R. W. Apple, Jr.'s 8 April article, "Jackson, Carter and Udall Turn to 194
Pennsylvania," but midway through the article which started on page 1,
the "ethnic purity" incident was recapitulated. Added were Udall's
criticisms of Carter stating that Carter would "enshrine the ghetto forever." It was predicted that the controversy could have cost Mr.
Carter some of his broad based black support. Vernon Jordan, execu
tive director of the Urban League, said in a telegram that he was
"deeply disturbed" by what he described as Carter's "inflammatory
language."
"Carter Issues An Apology on 'Ethnic Purity' Phrase" by
Christopher Lydon appeared on page 1 on 9 April. Carter stuck to his original basic position that he would not arbitrarily use federal
force to change the neighborhood's ethnic character. It was also revealed that Andrew Young told Carter that using the phrase created a
"disaster for the campaign." Carter announced that he intended to
support the Humphrey-Hawkins Employment Bill, thus demonstrating a
shift in his former position on the bill.
In the column,· "The Burden on Carter" by Tom Wicker, printed on 9 April on page 37, he said the Wisconsin and New York primaries seem to have sent Carter a little further along the road to the presi dential nomination but his remarks on the "ethnic purity" of neighbor hoods may prove to be more significant and may outweigh any gains made in either primaries. Although he apologized, the reporter speculated that the remark could destroy his carefully built but exceedingly fragile political position. The remarks threatened not only the black support that he had been getting but could threaten Carter's basic acceptability as a possible Democratic presidential nom1nee. Andrew
Young's remark about the statement's being a "disaster" for the 195 campaign was disputed by Young who said that he had never used the word "disaster."
A viewpoint by Robert Reinhold was run on page 10 on 10 April under the title "Carter Elaborates on His 1 Ethnic 1 View. 11 The events surrounding the ethnic incident were reviewed and in spite of his apology the press still questioned him about the incident.
"Carter Asks Reporters Why Query is Repeated" appeared on page
41 on 11 April. In the short article Carter asked the press corp to explain why he was constantly asked about the "ethnic purity" state ment. He explained that he had apologized for it.
"Ethnic purity11 continued to capture the headlines on 12 April in "Carter is Resting on Family Farm. 11 It was described as a dif ficult week for Carter. Mentioned was the fact that black mayor
Coleman Young of Detroit called the matter a "phony issue." He said that Carter had been reared in a black neighborhood and was proud of it and that black audiences were still moved by him. The article appeared on page 20.
On the same page was 11 Church Defends Carter." Sen. Frank
Church said that too much had been made of Carter 1 s remark about
"ethnic purity." He suggested that Carter be judged on the basis of his record rather than on that one phrase.
In a segment called 11 Presidential Notes 11 on 12 April, the
11 ethnic 11 controversy was continued, in the Christopher Lydon article on page 21, 11After Worrisome Week for the Carter Campaign, A Key Test
Looms in Pennsylvania. 11 A debate arose over whether or not Andrew
Young used the word 11 disaster 11 in his telegrams to Carter. Carter said that Young had not used the word, but the author was unsure if in 196
fact it was a disaster. It was mentioned that several black political
leaders including Mayor Coleman Young and Atlanta Mayor Maynard
Jackson now endorsed Carter.
In summary, the "ethnic purity" incident was not originally
treated as an incident. In fact the first of the nine articles that
the Times produced was carried on page 3. It was very complete and
comprehensive and it quoted Carter's remarks extensively. By the
following day it became front-page material and several aspects of his
comments received detailed attention. The Times' coverage was
thorough and contained several significant points. First, the black
perspective was uncovered and reported. Second the emergence of black
dignitaries as crucial supporters was shown and concern about their
loyalty was very evident. Third, the rift in black leadership which
denoted a lack in unity became somewhat evident. The ethnic reporting
was balanced by several commentaries provided by individuals who
comprehended Carter's remarks and supported him against those who
opposed and criticized him.
Stop Carter
The first stop-Carter article was a front-page item which
appeared on 26 February titled "Carter Target of Liberals After New
Hampshire Gain" by R. W. Apple, Jr. The first signs of a stop-Carter
effort began to emerge among liberal democrats as a result of Carter's
triumph in the New Hampshire presidential primary. Many liberals
considered Carter a threat to their dominance because some groups were
beginning to take him seriously. There was no organized stop-Carter movement in existence yet. 197
The stop-Carter movement was recognized again on 12 March in a
page 12 article, "Liberals 'Stop-Carter' Moves Anger Southerners" by
Roy Reed. A movement by some Northern and Eastern liberals to
"stop-Carter," had begun to open long-hidden cleavages between them and many of their Southern friends. It was the first article to acknowledge the support that Carter had obtained from black leaders including Andrew Young, Martin Luther King, Sr. and Richard Pettigrew, former state legislator from Florida.
On page 20 on 27 April, stop-Carter was mentioned for the last time. R. W. Apple, Jr. wrote "Labor Campaign to Stop Carter Seems
Ineffective." Organized labor had accelerated efforts to stop Carter.
In summary, even though the Times recognized in three articles that some stop-Carter activity was underway, it appears to never have recognized it as an organized movement. Again the most significant aspect was the fact that it realized that Carter was receiving strong black support.
Carter and Blacks
Carter's clout with blacks was initially recognized in a page 1 story by James vlooten. In his 15 March article "Carter's Drive
From Obscurity to Front," he observed that in a speech before an all-white audience in a racially intransigent area of Illinois, Carter did not include the name of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in his list of
American heroes as he had done earlier in a campaign speech before either mixed or black audiences. Carter said that he had forgotten and that he would not omit Dr. King's name again. 198
On 14 April the Carter/King photograph appeared. There was a separate article on the same page (page 20) by Robert Rinhold titled
"Carter Mounts Campaign to Win Black Backing." By dipping into the reservoir of black sympathy that he had built as the governor of
Georgia, Carter hoped to mount a concerted effort to regain his black support. The rally featuring the Rev. King, Sr. was a crucial ele ment. Rinhold also pointed out that support was not unanimous for as the rally occurred a counter demonstration was being led by another black minister, the Rev. Hosea Williams.
On 2 June the Times in a front-page story gave the results of a poll which compared Carter's popularity to Ford's. In "Poll Shows
Blacks Decisive for Carter," by Robert Rinhold, it was stated that
Carter appeared to be leading Ford if the election were held as of
2 June. Carter's popularity with blacks gave him the edge. The
Democrats could traditionally count on heavy majorities among blacks, but Carter's lead was significant because he was a white Southern politician who captured heavy black support even after his "ethnic purity" statement.
A page 33 column on 8 June further explored Carter's popularity among blacks. In "The Southern Connection" William Shannon discussed the South's traditional and historical political rela tionship with the rest of the nation. In the South blacks worked feverishly to end segregation but then racial problems moved North.
As it did the entire nation took on an increasingly Southern char acter. Black voters had veto power over the aspirations of Southern white politicians for a long time and the confidence that blacks placed in Carter demonstrated to the rest of the nation that he was of 199
good faith. The South had finally produced a leader that the rest of
the nation could accept.
"Carter, Tired, But Happy, Chats About Hopes, Plans, Roots,
Faith" by James Wooten appeared on the op-ed page on 16 June. He
compared Carter with other Southern politicians and candidates and
then concluded that the others had not worked hard enough to bring
blacks into decision making positions because most did not understand
poor blacks. The support that Carter enjoyed from such prominent
blacks as Andrew Young and Rev. Martin Luther King, Sr. were not
accidential but cultivated.
On 14 August Paul Delaney contributed on page 19 "Carter
Accelerating His 'All Out' Effort to Broaden his Support Among
Blacks." Several black leaders had been smnmoned to the Carter
Mondale national campaign headquarters in an effort to plan a campaign
exclusively aimed at the black community. The main effort was
designed to speed up the voter registration drive. It was implied
that there were still problems gaining total support from many black
leaders.
The 2 August article was "Carter Confers on Black Support," which ran on page 13 of the 28 August edition. It simply stated that
Jimmy Carter conferred with black leaders on ways to involve blacks
and other minorities in his campaign.
Carter's trip into Harlem was profiled on the front page on
20 October in the article, "Carter, in New York, Seeking Traditional
Party Vote" by Frank Lynn. Carter showed considerable strength in
black areas in the presidential primaries. He therefore, desired to
capitalize on that strength. Several national black leaders persuaded 200 him to campaign in Harlem to counteract the apathy shown towards him
by black leaders in that district.
The Carter/black relationship was further exposed in a column also appearing on 20 October. In "Southern Jews, and Baptists, and
Jimmy Carter" by Eli Evans, it was said that Carter was caught in a nexus of changing images among Jews, Roman Catholics, white Southern
Baptists, and blacks. One of the real secrets of Carter's appeal to blacks was in his native ability to communicate in the idiom of the black church. In the early stages of the campaign when Carter seemed to have been speaking from the pulpit, it was "Daddy" King and Andy
Young--symbols of the black church--that gave him credibility.
Jesse Jackson was quoted ~n an article on 31 October as he urged blacks to get out to vote. He never endorsed Carter but aimed to reverse the trend established in previous election years that had seen fewer blacks participating ~n the electorial process. The Paul
Delaney article, which appeared on page 28, was titled "Blacks Are
Pleased by Election Effort."
In summary, with ten items, the Times contained among the most complete and comprehensive coverage about Carter's association and clout with black individuals. The coverage expounded on various ways in which that support was uncovered. They noted that Carter specifi cally structured his campaign to win massive black backing. The significant feature in this segment was the fact that a Southern leader had been produced that the nation could accept. 201
Black Issues
The 21 March story about the National Black Political
Convention was the first black issues article to appear. The story which appeared on page 42 in the article "Black Political Convention
Begins Petition Campaign" by Thomas Johnson said that an effort was being made to draft Ron Dellums as their presidential candidate since
Julian Bond had rejected the earlier offer.
Another black issue was explored on 15 April in the article
"Carter's Vote Success With Blacks Assayed" by Paul Delaney. Carter's campaign in Chicago 1 s Seventh Ward took him into the ~fonumental Faith
Church. Blacks were questioned about the mystery of Carter's popularity with blacks. Answers included; he was appealing, he could relate and he was easy-going and relaxed in the presence of blacks.
One individual expressed displeasure with the fact that Carter was allowed into black churches to speak. The article appeared on page
18.
Only two articles appeared in May and both were interrelated.
On 15 May Detroit Mayor Coleman Young became the center of controversy which was the subject of the article "Detroit Mayor Telling Blacks
Carter Will End Neglect" by William Stevens. As Young prompted a group of fellow ministers to support Carter, he inadvertently lambasted Rep. Morris Udall, Carter's major competitor, by implying that he was a racist. He asked the ministers whom would they prefer, a man from Georgia who fights to let blacks into his church, or a man from Arizona whose church would not let blacks in the back door? This article appeared on page 11. 202
On 18 May on page 18 Udall took exception to the comments made by Young. In the article "Carter Won't Repudiate Backer's Udall
Remark" by Charles Mohr, Udall called the remark vendictive, but
Carter refused to repudiate a suggestion by Coleman Young that Rep.
Morris Udall was tainted by anti-black dogmas of the Mormon Church.
The conflict over naming a black as a vice-presidential con tender surfaced on 12 July on the front page in the article "Carter
Promises No. 2 Spot Will Go to 1 of 7 Queried" by R. l'l. Apple, Jr.
Two rival black groups united to lobby for their choices for the number two spot at a press conference where they urged Carter to
consider a black contender. Mentioned as possible contenders for the position were Los Angeles Mayor Thomas Bradley and Michigan Rep. John
Conyers, Jr.
In a 13 July article, "Carter Makes Peace With Black Leaders and Renews of High-Level Jobsn by Paul Delaney, a minor controversy
between Carter and blacks was revealed on page 26. Black leaders were angered over reports that Mr. Carter had planned to relieve Basil A.
Paterson of New York of his duties as Vice Chairman of the Democratic
National Committee. Carter retained Paterson and made several other
concessions which satisfied the group.
The A. Z. Pittman story appeared ~n the 30 July edition under
the title, "Black Man's House Near Carter's Razed." It was a short
UP! release which was run on page 6. This story made major headl~nes
~n several black papers.
The first article for September was a black issue article which appeared on page 10 on 18 September under the title "Carter
Accepts Help of Stennis, Eastland" by James Wooten. In Biloxi, 203
Mississippi, Carter went to seek the support of two of the country's most prominent segregationalists, James 0. Eastland and John C.
Stennis. Carter commented on the changes ~n Biloxi stating that there were black policemen and state troopers. The two senators had tried to abort every civil rights bill presented for vote. They both ran and won on segregationalists platforms, but now they endorsed Carter, an avowed champion of civil rights.
On 21 September an editorial was rendered about Carter's endorsement by the two Mississippi senators. In "Mr. Carter Toes the
Line," the editor said presidential candidates cannot afford and cannot be expected to reject the political support of all of those who do not agree completely with them, but even by the most relaxed standards, Carter's "love feast" with the two Mississippi senators stretched the limits of political decency. The editor termed it political hypocrisy and lambasted Carter for seeking the endorsements of the elder statesmen. The article was on page 36.
On 13 October the paper reported on the voter campaign being organized to promote a massive black turnout for the election. In the page 46 article, "Black Democrats Plan Rallies in 14 Key Cities," black Democrats were organizing a voter turnout aimed not only at electing Jimmy Carter, but at helping hundreds of local and state blacks running for offices.
In summary, with eleven items printed, the Times also did comprehensive coverage on black issues. The significant aspect of this coverage was the exhaustive treatment of coverage from the black perspective. It gave great insight into how blacks related to Carter and about the power that they wielded within the Democratic party. 204
The major weakness noted in the Times' reporting was their failure to obtain and report on the black perspective from more of a grass roots level where Carter had amassed great support.
Black Ministers' Payoff
The New York Times ran the first ministers story on page 31.
The brief UP! release appeared on 8 August and was titled "Carter Sets
Inquiry Into Campaign Fund." The Carter camp had ordered an internal investigation into the report that the California ministers had received five thousand dollars in-campaign-funds.
A follow-up story appeared on 9 August on page 13. In "Carter
Denies Knowing of Payments" by Charles Mohr the ministers incident was mentioned briefly. He denied that he or any of his inner circle had known of or condoned payments to black clergymen to get endorsements.
The final ministers report was rendered on page 14 on ll August. The funds were returned and the Times reported on the incident in the article "Carter Drive Funds Returned by Clergy." It was a short UP! release which stated that the Baptist Minister's Union of Oakland and the Mount Zion Missionary District Association had agreed to return the money.
In summary, the ministers story received obligatory coverage consisting primarily of three wire service releases.
Debates
There was no debate coverage. 205
Playboy Interview
Charles Mohr's article, "Carter on Morals, Talks With Candor" which appeared on page 1 on 20 September initiated the Playboy cover age. The article datelined Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, announced that
Carter made several unusually candid remarks to Playboy magazine. The article was quoted extensively, but the major emphasis was on his statements about committing adultery in his heart and about his comments about former Presidents Nixon and Johnson.
On 21 September in a story which began on page 1, another aspect of Carter's interview came to the forefront; his use of common vulgarisms. The paper commented that Carter was unavailable for questioning about the interview. In a brief paragraph in the article
"Carter Proposes a Unified Agency in the Cabinet for Energy Policy" by
Charles Mohr, Jody Powell was asked to explain why Carter chose to use certain terms.
The Playboy controversy prevailed as evidenced by James
Reston's column on 22 September titled "Carter in a Slump." He said that Carter's popularity appeared to be on the wane and pointed out that the Playboy interview was a direct factor in the decline. Reston said that the interview was a remarkable one in that if it were read carefully it was comprehensible and logical, but he concluded that
Carter used poor judgment by discussing adultery and sin with such
"experts" as the editors of Playboy.
On 23 September, "Carter's Comments on Sex Cause Concern" by
Lee Dembart occupied page 1. He felt that Carter's earthy remarks appeared to be generating as much comment as any other issue in the 206 campaign as evidenced by several spot interviews which were conducted around the country. Comments made by several interviewees were included. The author said that a full reading of Carter's interview
clarified the fact that he was speaking within the context of his own religious beliefs, but Demart said that some of his comments were offensive. There were two related articles placed on the same page.
The first was "Mrs Mondale Gives Views" in which Joan Mondale stated that she was sure that her husband had "committed adultry in his heart too 11 and the second was "Apology to Mrs. Johnson." Carter, in another statement within the Playboy interview, said in effect that Lyndon
Johnson had lied to the American people. He apologized to the late
President 1 s 1;.;ridow.
Also on 23 September on page 40 there appeared an editorial on the Playboy interview titled "Bounds of Disclosure." The selection was a critical analysis about statements made by Carter and Ford about their personal and private lives. The author commented that there
should be boundaries beyond which candidates or public officials should not tread when discussing intimate feelings or personal lives.
On the succeeding page 41 William Safire contributed the column "Carter in Playboy." He provided historical documentation that
11 salty language" had been used by previous presidents and had become the trademark of some. He then quoted Mr. Carter's comments from
Playboy and explained that the passage was out of character for the presidential candidate. He felt that Carter's use of a "dirty word" in the Playboy interview was deliberate, too obvious and would backfire. By choosing Playboy magazine as his forum, said Safire,
Carter was trying to counter the critics who proclaimed that he had a 207 holier-than-thou attitude. He examined various newspapers' desires or reluctance to use some of Carter's quotes.
On 24 September Carter's remarks about Lyndon Johnson and that aspect of the Playboy quote was reexamined. In the page 23 article
"Mrs. Johnson Says She Was Perplexed by Carter Remarks," the former
First Lady was quoted as having said that she was distressed, hurt and perplexed by Carter's remarks. He had previously apologized for them.
The Johnson quote continued to haunt Carter and on page 9 in a
25 September article by Charles Mohr the quotation was reprinted. In the feature, "Carter, in Texas, Says He's Sorry About his Criticsm of
Johnson, "he expressed regret about having made the comment. Carter then defended his use of a "vulgarism" and added that it was given within the context of an explanation about his personal principles.
Charles Mohn on page 2 on 28 September made additional com ments about the Playboy article in his feature, "Carter Assails Role of Lobbyists in 'Bloated Mess' of Government." Carter attributed some of his difficulties to what he called an "open campaign." Mohr pre dicted that he would not continue to be quite as open and may cut back on the number of press conferences. Carter said that he did not regret granting the interview and felt that people really got to know the true Jimmy Carter.
On 29 September, the Johnson issue resurfaced on page 2j. In
"Connally Calls Carter Remarks on Johnson an 'Insult'" by Christopher
Lydon, Connally stated that Carter had besmirched the good name of
Johnson and that he should apologize. Connally said that Johnson was the best friend that black and brown people ever had. Lydon specu
lated that Connally's comment was a political ploy. 208
On 30 September the assistant managing editor of Playboy maga z1ne, G. Barry Golson,contributed ''When Carter and Playboy Spoke 1n
Plains." In the page 41 column he explained that in all of the uproar over the interview a few words from the participants would be in order. He enumerated upon when and under what circumstances Carter's remarks were made. He explained that Playboy deliberately made the release available to the press prior to the magazine's general distri bution and chided the media for printing only minute portions of the interview while leaving out other important parts.
On 30 September directly below the preceding column was a defamatory one by l\Tilliam Safire called "The Weirdness Factor." He said that the strange way in which Jimmy Carter handled the adverse reaction to the Playboy interview told much about his character and what sort of President he would be. "He tried to pretend that the most damaging portion of the interview--in which he defamed Lyndon
Johnson and deliberately floated out a couple of vulgarisms to show sophisticates they had nothing to fear from him--was somebody else's doing not his."
In October Playboy continued to make headlines. On 7 October in a Douglas Kneeland article, "Dole Campaigning in South Again,
Sharpens Sallies Against Rivals," he commented that as President,
Carter could not call up some country and apologize if he made a m1s take. He reflected upon Carter's use of "vulgarities" and about his calling former President Johnson a liar. He concluded in the page 39 article that Carter made snap judgments for which he had to constantly apologize. It indicated that he had a serious character flaw.
On 23 October Carter expressed regret at having given Playboy 209 the interview. In the article, "Ford and Carter in Last Debate,
Promise to Put Stress on Issues" by R. W. Apple, Jr., he conceded that he had not known exactly "how to deal with" the furor that was raised by the interview. Carter's brief comments were made in only one para graph of the page 1 feature. Primary emphasis was on the debate.
In summary, the Playboy issue was among the most extensive of all the issues. The coverage started on page 2 and as with most of its coverage the Times quoted Carter at length. The paper was among the first to uncover the controversy surrounding the remarks about
Lyndon Johnson and also briefly examined how his vulgarisms were reported in other national papers. Commentaries were extensive and coverage was well balanced. It carried a total of twelve items.
Andrew Young
On 14 July Andrew Young was spotlighted in "Rep Young is
Carter's Bridge to two Potentially Troublesome Voting Groups" by
B. Drummond Ayers, Jr. Young was called a man who probably under stood and yielded political power more effectively than any other black in the United States. Young was Carter's bridge to the black vote and to an extent, Mr. Carter's bridge to wary white liberals.
The article appeared on page 19.
In summary, there was only one article which covered Young.
It identified the role that Young was to play during the campaign and examined his significance in the overall campaign strategy. Young received incidental coverage several times throughout the election year but this was the only article that emerged in which he was the focal point. 210
Carter and Black Dignitaries
On 6 July some of Carter's black nemeses spoke up in a page 21 article by Paul Delaney called, "Many Black Democratic Leaders Voice
Doubt, Fear and Distrust About Carter." Shirley Chisholm, the popular representative from New York who had originaly said that she would support a Humphrey-Carter ticket, referred to him derogatorily as
"blue-eyed Jinnny." Julian Bond, Georgia representative, called him a
"dragon" and a "liar." Other leaders expressed doubt and uncertainty through expressions such as "redneck" in their conversations about him. The writer concluded however that Carter still had the support of the majority of blacks. ~~ny nationally known blacks still did not endorse Carter and some of those who did held private reservations about his abilities to aid blacks.
In summary, there was only one article which focused on black dignitaries as they related to Carter. It was a hard-hitting article which presented the views of many blacks who were not on the Carter bandwagon. 211
San Francisco Chronicle
Carter-Wallace Coverage
The Carter-Wallace contest received scant attention in a
15 February article about Ronald Reagan. The headline on page 12 where the article began was "Social Security Woes?" On the jump page it had been changed to "Politics: A Southerner Could Become Presi dent." Carter was campaigning in Miami and it was predicted that the
Florida primary would be a contest principally between Jimmy Carter and George Wallace.
The Carter-Wallace feud was reviewed in an extensive article on page 13 on 28 March. The Associated Press story titled "Wallace
Losses May Signal End of Southern Strategy" stated that Wallace's losses caused by Carter may have signaled the beginning of a new era in the region's politics. Southern blacks gave huge majorities to
Carter in Florida and in North Carolina. They may have seen it merely as a chance to defeat Wallace because many black leaders had been less than enthusiastic about Carter himself. In fact, civil rights advocate Charles Evers specifically stated that he opposed Carter's candidacy.
In summary, the Chronicle in two articles covered the signifi cant aspects of the Carter-Wallace challenge; i.e., Florida would be significant to both men and Carter was attracting a significantly large black following. 212
Florida Primary
On 21 January in a front-page article Carter was recognized for the first time as a major contender. The article, taken from the
New York Times news service, by R. W. Apple, Jr. was titled "Iowa
Boosts Carter's Candidacy." It also pointed out that Carter was getting strong support from Iowa's few blacks and that the Florida challenge to Wallace would be his most critical test.
The Florida coverage again dominated the political news on
1 March in a page 5 article, "Carter Says Florida Will Clinch it for
Him." Carter predicted for the first time that he would seek an out right victory 1n the Florida primary. His strategy prior to the announcement was merely to reduce the level of Wallace's 1972 support which would have proven to be a major gain for liberals and moderates in the party. Now Carter wanted it all.
On 7 March the Florida primary continued as the central focus.
The article, which appeared on page 2, was "Showdown in Florida--Now it's Turning Nasty," by W. E. Barnes. Carter did not have to finish first in Florida but he could not afford a weak showing. From the beginning the former Georgia governor had been aiming for vlallace in
Fiorida in what was practically a two-man race since most of the other
Democrats dodged Florida to avoid an expensive campaign and the near certainty of being beaten by Wallace.
On 10 March, page 1, the headline read, "Ford Wins in
Florida--Carter Upsets Wallace." Carter returned to the vanguard of the Democratic presidential field w1th an upset victory over Gov. 213
Wallace. He now saw no other candidate ahead of him ~n the Democratic race. Wallace was undone.
A reprint of a Washington Post article appeared on page 1 on
11 March titled "Survey Finds Carter Got Broad Support in Florida" by
William Chapman. It recognized his emerging support among black voters who voted for him in large numbers in Florida just as they had done the previous week in Hassachusetts. He also appealed to an exceptionally broad-based liberal constituency.
In summary, the Chronicle makes Carter's Florida strategy ev~ dent. It does a good job analyzing Carter's Florida planning and dis covers what the victory meant to his campaign objectives. The five articles emphasized Carter's determination to win in Florida.
Ethnic Purity
"Ethnic purity" coverage started with a page 13 story on
8 April titled "Carter Accused of Racial Campaigning." Democratic contender Horris Udall accused Carter of preaching racial division. A summary of the ethnic incident was given but the article was actually about Udall's reactions to Carter's statement.
On 9 April the incident became a page 1 feature and the focus switched to Carter. In "The Ethnic Remarks Haunt Carter" the candi date apologized for using the phrase "ethnic purity" in his pledge to defend the stability of established neighborhoods. The text also con tained the first comments about Andrew Young's role in the Carter cam paign as he was called Carter's foremost advocate in black communities
North and South. Young excused the contender saying that Carter did not realize how loaded the statement was with Hitlerian connotations. 214
"Carter in Ohio--Still Explaining" was the title of a 10
April, page 6 article, which furthered the ethnic controversy. With
his campaign still off balance from the tempest over his use of the
term ''ethnic purity," Carter carried his campaign into Ohio. He had
to explain himself repeatedly and to recite his record on civil
rights. Comments by Andrew Young were reprinted and Carter took issue
over the fact that the press had reported that Young had called the
remark a disaster for the campaign.
Ron Dellums, a California representative, was quoted in a page
1 item on 11 April, "Study Carter Closely, Dellums l-larns Blacks." The warning was given in view of the ethnic comment in which Dellums cau
tioned blacks to study the candidates more closely instead of "cheaply
giving their allegiance to Carter." Operation PUSH's Rev. Jesse Jack
son said that Carter did not deserve black support because he had not
spoken out on any issues important to blacks.
A Knight News Service article, "The Famous Smile Turns into a
Frown--And an Apology," by Robert Boyd, carried on page 10 of the same
day, continued to delve into the "ethnic purity" controversy. The
article presented a few novel ideas. For example, Carter's position
on preserving ethnic neighborhoods could do him more good among fear
ful white suburbanites than harm among inner-city blacks. The ethnic
affair was really an accident made worse by inept handling and it was
too soon to tell if Carter would gain or lose from it.
On 12 April two short articles were printed on page 8 about
the reactions from two of Carter's opponents on the ethnic comment.
The first was "Sen Church on Carter Fuss" and the second was "Jack
son's New Charges Against Carter." Church said that too much was made 215
of the remark and that Carter should be judged by his record. Jack son, however, charged that the remarks, followed by subsequent apolo gies revealed ineptitude for handling diverse issues.
A black viewpoint emerged on 13 April in an article on page 9 titled "Black Leader Calls Carter a 'Racist.'" Georgia civil rights leader Hosea Williams called Carter a "racist" and asked other promi nent blacks such as Rev. King, Sr. and Andrew Young to withdraw their support. Williams felt that Carter's use of the ethnic term had not been sufficiently explained and that he was not satisfied with his subsequent apology.
On the same day in the editorial section, a follow-up to a previous item about Sen. Church's stand on the "ethnic purity" inci dent was run. "Church on Carter--Some Refreshing" focused primarily on the senator's campaign but the editor commented that Church should be praised for his comments that too much had been made about the
"ethnic purity" incident.
The famous King/Carter photograph appeared on 14 April on page
7 along with the article, "Carter Forgiven by Some." Carter stood flanked by Atlanta businessman Jesse Hill and educator Dr. Benjamin
Mayes at a rally sponsored as a display of solidarity to combat criti cisms about the ethnic remarks that Carter had used. As Carter appeared, however, the Rev. Hosea Williams led a group of demonstra tors outside, protesting the rally.
David Broder's column on page 40 on 14 April examined "The
Carter Record." The very supportive column reminded everyone that
Carter's record should be remembered since he had contributed much to changing the nature of the 1976 elections. The first change was in 216 his relationship with blacks and their standings within the Democratic
Party hierarchy. Blacks had earned increasingly influential roles in the party but had only been sought out for support after the political base had been firmly established by the white community. Carter, on the other hand, used black support to establish his credibility.
Blacks had an out-front role. He also redefined the South for other candidates of both parties and this part of his record should not be overshadowed in view of the ethnic controversy.
The ethnic incident was again explored from the black point of view on 17 April in a page 8 article, "Carter is Called a 'Franken stein,'" by Michael Harris. Rep. John Conyers called Jimmy Carter a
Frankenstein whom he would probably find himself obligated to support for a president. Conyers said that Carter was originally perceived as a way to stop George Wallace, but it now looked as if it would be impossible to stop him. He believed that Carter had revealed his true racial feelings in his ethnic remarks; even so, Carter would make a preferable choice to Ford.
The entire "ethnic purity" incident was recapitulated J.n an
18 April article appearing J.n a magazine section of the paper called
"This World." It summarized the week's events, thus included was information about the controversy's inception and about subsequent reactions to the remarks.
On 23 April a reprint of Mary McGary's ethnic column appeared on page 51. As in other publications it ran under the title "Demo crats Wonder."
The ethnic remarks were studied in a survey and the results were reported on page 6 on 24 April in the article, "Poll Shows 217
Carter's Gaffe Hasn't Hurt Him." The private poll taken for Carter revealed that the "ethnic purity" statement had neither hurt nor helped his prospects in the crucial Pennsylvania primary. Carter had
lost some black support but the loss appeared to have been offset by
the gain in white support.
On 16 May in a column by Jim Bishop "ethnic purity" was
briefly cited as an example of how deep prejudices still ran. The name of the item which appeared on page 3 of section B was "Prejudices
that Still Run Deep 1n the U.S." The phrase would soon die in a limbo of "abrasive words" but those who expressed shock and disgust were
ignorant of the hypocritical side of America. Bishop explored some historical examples of prejudice in the United States including acts against Jews, Polish-Americans and other ethnic groups. He concluded
that when Carter used the phrase "ethnic purity" he was uttering a practical truth.
In summary, the Hitlerian analogy appeared but this time it was attributed to Andrew Young. It also, like the Ne,v York Times, made somewhat of an 1ssue over Andrew Young's supposed statement that the remark was a disaster for the campaign. Some Andrew Young cover age seeped in in other aspects. The Chronicle was the only white publication to include remarks by Rev. Hosea Hilliams as opposed to
simply relating that he opposed forgiving Carter's blunder. They also included remarks by another black, Rep. John Conyers, who revealed that he was indecisive and that some blacks found themselves in a quandary about whether or not they should continue supporting Carter.
A total of sixteen items was printed about "ethnic purity." 218
Stop Carter
"Stop-Carter" coverage began on 27 February. In a page 7
article, "Liberal Democrats Out to Stop Carter," it was stated that
t h e f 1rst• s1gns• o f a II stop-Carter II effort were underway among Demo-
crats as a result of his victory in New Hampshire. A two-fold attack
emerged: one was in Massachusetts where he was prepared to run in an
upcoming primary, and the other was in Washington, D.C. where many
liberal activists considered him a threat to their dominance.
"Stop Carter" appeared again on 12 March on page 6. The
article titled "Demo Liberal Feud--North vs. South" by Roy Reed, was
an exact duplication of another New York Times release. The
"stop-Carter" movement by Northern and Eastern liberals was opening a
long-hidden cleavage between them and many of their ideological
friends in the South. On 3 May on page 7 the "stop-Carter" drive took
on a new significance when Jerry Brown appeared before the Charlotte
conference. The article, "Brown's Pitch to Black Leaders" by Larry
Liebert, focused on Jerry Brown and his tailor-made pitch for black votes. He cited his activities during the civil rights movements and his black appointments to important political positions as principal
reasons why blacks should support him. Many blacks did not regard him
as a presidential contender but considered him a likely candidate for vice president. Rev. Jesse Jackson said that both Brown and Carter may have received a few more endorsements as a result of their
appearances before the conference.
Brown continued as a "stop-Carter" factor throughout the
Baltimore primary and Carter commented on the tactics in the front-page article, "How Carter Sees Brown," which ran on 8 May. 219
Carter said that "powerful political bosses" and "machine politicians" in Maryland and perhaps in Washington, D.C. were using Brown to stop him and achieve a brokered "backroom" nomination at the convention.
Carter discounted Brown as a serious candidate.
In summary, the paper was the only source to have obtained
Carter's view about the part that Brown played in the "stop-Carter" drive. It also indicated that it was an organized movement instigated primarily from within the party. The part that Brown played was as a spoiler to dilute some of Carter's black support. Three articles appeared.
Carter and Blacks
On 3 June a poll taken for the Democratic Party indicated that because of Carter's assurances of obtaining black support, he led
President Ford nationally. In the page 6 article, "Blacks Give
Carter His Lead," it was mentioned that Carter and Ford were equally popular with whites but black support pushed Carter slightly ahead.
Carter had assiduously courted the black vote and exerted massive efforts to counter the adverse effects of his controversial comments about preserving the "ethnic purity" of urban neighborhoods.
Black Issues
On 2 March on page 6 the first black issues item appeared.
The paper carried a UP! reprint of a story that had appeared in numerous black papers called "Students' Analysis of Wallace." A group of University of Alabama law students sent a highly critical analysis of Wallace's promises as a presidential candidate to more than 100
Florida newspapers and television stations. They compared his 220 promises with his actual performance as the governor of Alabama.
The second blacks issue item on 19 March, page 6, was also a well-publicized story. Rep. Ron Dellums was named as the choice of the National Black Political Assembly's executive committee to run for president on an independent party ticket. The headline was "Third
Party Picks Dellums as Candidate." A follow-up feature appeared on page 12 on 21 March titled "Dellums Spurns Blacks' Bid to Run for the
Presidency." It simply reported that Dellums had turned down the nomination and that the offer had been previously made and turned down by Julian Bond.
California Gov. Jerry Brown's relationship with black Lt. Gov.
Mervyn Dymally captured the paper's attention on 1 April on page 7.
The title of the article was "Black Caucus Vows Backing for Brown" by
Larry Liebert. The California legislature's black caucus endorsed
Brown's presidential campaign and promised to help him obtain national black support. However, as a part of the negotiations prior to the endorsement the caucus demanded that Brown act to counter the belief that he had purposely kept Dymally at arm's length.
On 2 Hay the issue concerning Gov. Brown and Lt. Gov. Dymally resurfaced on page 14. In the article, "Blacks Chide Governor for
Ignoring \ Caucus leaders' meeting at the Charlotte caucus warned Brown to "mend fences'' w1th Dymally and other black state politicians or risk losing black support. The Charlotte conference continued to dominate black issues news and on 9 May on page 11 the article, "Black Caucus Likes its New Role-Power" by Bob Hayes and W. E. Barnes, was printed. The 221 conference was billed as an issues conference and a workshop for black Democratic leaders to chart political direction for the election year but it turned out to be more. The mood of the conference was businesslike and efficient. Blacks were slated to occupy positions of greater importance within the party, thus without black support it would be unlikely that any Democratic candidate would win. In a poll taken after the caucus Carter was ranked as the favored candidate, followed by Brown, then Church and Udall. The National Black Political Assembly finally named a candidate for president and it was reported in the article, "Black Group's Candidate for President," on 19 June on page 6. Frederick Douglass Kirkpatrick became the candidate and the nomination was considered the first step in the development of an independent black political party. Ron Dellums and Julian Bond had previously refused the nomination. On 10 July the controversy over nominating a black for vice president was examined. The article on page 5 was titled "Dellums to be Nominated for Veep." Rep. John Conyers planned to nominate Rep. Ronald Del1ums for vice president because, according to Conyers, the nomination would bring to the Democratic ticket geographical balance and representation for urban Americans. The black vice-presidential nomination continued as a major black issue on 12 July in the page 10 article "Behind Dellums' Bid for Veep." In a gesture designed to spotlight liberal issues, the New Democratic Coalition backed Dellums as its choice for vice president. On the following day as the Democratic convention continued, another black issue was exposed on page 6. A group of black political 222 figures were concerned over the rumor that Basil Paterson of New York would be removed as the vice chairman of the Democratic National Committee. In the article, "Carter and Blacks Patch Things Up," it was reported that Carter had made peace with the group and had now received the endorsements of several blacks who had, up until this time, withheld support. On 15 July the spotlight returned to the Dellums nomination. The paper reported in the page 11 article, "Blacks Caucus Won 1 t Back Dellums for Veep," that black Democrats declined endorsement to support Dellums' nomination. The caucus had agreed that the nomination was not in earnest and that Dellums simply wanted to use the nomination mechanism to say things that he felt the Democratic platform failed to say. On 16 July Dellums was nominated and the report was given in the page 7 article, "Dellums' Warning to Democrats." The congressman warned fellow Democrats not to ignore the issues in the drive for victory and called for action on women's rights, civil rights and other issues he felt were being ignored. The issue over Carter's black neighbor being forced to move appeared on 30 July on page 7 in the article, "Carter's Neighbor Forced to Move." It was another reprint of the A. Z. Pittman story that had appeared in several other papers. Another black issues item ran on page 17 on 19 September called "Carter: 'Racial Lines Have Broken Down." The New York Times reprint told about Carter's meeting with Mississippi Senators Eastland and Stennis. The final black issues item made its debut on page 5 on 8 223 October in the article, "Julian Bond Backs Carter," which was a reprint from the Los Angeles Times. It related that one of Carter's prominent non-supporters, Atlanta's black Congressman Julian Bond, had finally joined the Carter camp. In summary, the Chronicle ran fifteen black issue features. It was the only white paper to carry the information about the students' survey that was supposed to have contributed to Carter's demise. The National Black Assembly's meeting was carried and the Brown-Dymally controversy received more attention. They also included significant coverage about the Charlotte conference and about Dellums' nomination for the vice presidency. It was one of a few white sources to mention the Basil Patterson episode that almost triggered a black boycott at the Democratic convention, and they included coverage about the A. Z. Pittman move and the Los Angeles Times reprint about Julian Bond's transition to Carter's bandwagon. Black Ministers' Payoff On 9 August the first of the stories about the ministers appeared on page 1. The article, "Carter Reply on Campaign Fund Loss," pointed out that Carter could not explain where approximately $150,000 in campaign funds had gone. Part of the money could be traced to individuals such as the ministers who were recruited to work for the campaign but who undoubtedly ended up pocketing a good percentage of the funds. Local coverage about the ministers' controversy was given a greater emphasis because the incident involved San Francisco clergy. On 10 August in a page 7 article, 'Walking-Around Money,' Jerry Burns 224 stated almost editorially that it was common practice for "walking around money" to be given out to local leaders to help push a candidate. One San Francisco campaign manager for Carter felt that it was unfair to single out the black ministers because the practice was common in all walks of life. Also on 10 August on the same page it was reported as indica tive by the headline, "Ministers Return $2,000 to Carter," that the funds were sent back to the Carter campaign committee. The ministers thought that the donation was one of several allocations in minority communities to help finance expenditures of campaign workers. In summary, the three articles were principally first-hand interviews and not requoted from the Los Angeles Times as most publications had done. There was supoprt for the ministers position and the coverage was similar to that of other publications. Debates On 9 October on page 5 the Chronicle ran a short item on the debate titled "FCC Official Calls Debates 'A Charade,'" in which Benjamin Hooks, the only black FCC member, commented on the debates. Hooks launched several complaints at the manner in which the debates were conducted and among his critical remarks was that there were no black reporters on the panels of questioners. It was the only time that any white publication had explored this issue. Playboy Interview Playboy coverage started with a front-page story on 21 Sep tember, "Carter Tells of His 'Forgiven• Lust." The famous "lust" quotation was printed, along with a recapituation of the entire 225 Playboy interview and several comments by Jody Powell about Carter's decision to grant the interview. The statement that Carter made about former President Johnson was also printed. Also on 21 September on page 20 was the follow-up article, "Jimmy Didn't Tell Rosalynn." It was another reprint quoting t1rs. Carter's statement that she was never worried about her husband's committing adultery. Playboy coverage continued on 22 September on page 6 with the article, "After Shock of Carter's Interview." In the wire service release the acting Senate Democratic leader Robert Byrd and his Senate Republican counterpart Hugh Scott were asked for their reactions to the Carter interview. Both wished it had not been given to Playboy. Several Southern Baptist clergymen who were contacted expressed similar sentiments. A selected group of women, including advisers to Carter and Ford, were asked to comment on the interview and the results were reported in the 23 September, page 8, article, "Carter Sex Talk--\fuat Women Think." Frank comments on once taboo sex topics by presidential candidates and their w~ves was a sign of changing times and the two advisors agreed. Carter's frank language reflected a modernization of Biblical idioms. The fact that Playboy was used as the forum was no reflection of Carter's policy on the status of women. He had used women in places of responsibility extensively in his campaign. Two other very brief filler articles appeared on the same page as the foregoing article in which the viewpoints of vice-presidential candidate Mondale and his wife were given about the Playboy contro versy. Both were UPI releases which had previously appeared in the 226 New York Times. One was called "Joan Mondale's Stand on Lust," while the other headline read "Mondale Says It's Not a Big Issue." The emphasis was shiftd from his "lust" comments to the Johnson issue on 24 September as the interview controversy continued. The title of the page 6 article was "How Carter 'Distressed' Lady Bird." The Associated Press release related that Carter apologized to the widow of the former president for his comments made in Playboy. The Johnson episode of the Playboy interview continued to be the primary issue in the 25 September article, "Carter Apologizes for Remarks About LBJ." Carter had arrived in Texas to campaign and admitted that he had made a mistake by saying that a Texan had engaged in lying, cheating and distorting the truth. He had first blamed Playboy for "misquoting" him, then later admitted that it was his own fault. This article appeared on page 7. On 26 September several of the Chronicle's personal opinion features contained references to the now-famous interview. Mike Royko's satirical column was reprinted. Chronicle writer Reg Murphy mentioned the interview briefly, which in actuality was only a quotation taken from Mary McGary's column that Carter should have gone "off-the-record with God rather than on-the-record with Playboy." Art Hoppe contributed a tongue-in-cheek report called "Lust American Style" in which he said that in his gallant struggle to prove he was only human, Carter told the readers of Playboy that he was no better than they were. Finally the Nelv York Times feature by Christopher Lydon titled "Carter's Haunting Remarks of LBJ" was reprinted. "Carter's Lusting," by Andrew Tully, appeared on page 45 on 29 September. Tully felt that Carter "goofed" badly for two main 227 reasons. First, he submitted to an interview with a magazine that is "considered naughty by a large number of voters," and, secondly, he gave his views on extramarital sex for which he was never asked. He stated that the interview should be approached not from the viewpoint of morality but from that of pragmatic politics. Carter broke one of politics' vital commandments: never take an unnecessary risk. Playboy continued to dominate coverage into October when the column, "Carter's Goodness Questioned," appeared on 1 October on page 44. George F. Will contributed that Carter said the wrong things in the Playboy interview. Pornography as slickly packaged as Playboy may adorn many coffee tables but it was still offensive to many readers and potential voters. It was a shame that the nation was distractd by such nonsense as his remarks on adultery. Abe .Hellinkoff wrote "What Carter Revealed" on 6 October. It was printed on page 54. The writer had been out of the country and indicated that Carter's comments had been carried in a newspaper in Rome, Italy. He therefore felt "duty-bound" to read the interview for himself after returning to the United States. He found it long and slow-going but thought the remarks about LBJ were more revealing than Carter's "adulterous fantasies." Playboy ended it as an issue with a page 32 article on 9 October, which was another reprint from the New York Times. The item that appeared was "How Playboy Interview Came About" by Playboy staffer G. Barry Golson. In summary, in the seventeen features printed about Playboy the article itself was never quoted directly. Instead, summaries and opinions helped to guide the reader through the controversy. A new 228 angle was added in that it obtained some female viewpoints. Columns dominated, but not many debated, how the interview would affect his standings. Most argued for or against his judgment in giving the interview to Playboy. Andrew Young Andrew Young was spotlighted for the first time in a 4 July article, "Black Backer 'Accountable' For Carter." The UP! article on page 20 quoted black Atlanta Congressman Young who said that the liberal and black communities would hold him "accountable" for Jimmy Carter. He felt that Carter had more empathy and respect for blacks than the Kennedys, Johnson and the 1972 Democratic candidate George McGovern. He "sold" Carter to the liberal and black communities. On 10 July on page 5, Young was again the center of attention after it was announced that he would be among those seconding Carter's nomination. The article, "Black Congressman to Nominate Carter," said the Rep. Young would be the first black Georgia congressman since Reconstruction to have been given such an honor. He had been a trusted political advisor for Carter. Andrew Young gained more media attention on 16 July in the article, "Jimmy Carter's Bridge to the Blacks." It was a reprint of an extensive New York Times article which credited Young more than any other person in the Carter campaign with obtaining significant support from blacks and liberals. If Carter became president, Young would stand a good chance of acquiring more power and influence. The article ran on page 20. Andrew Young's comment about the presidential debates was the 229 subject of the 9 October page 5 article, "A Georgian's Ideas About the Debates," by George Snyder. Young offered a surprisingly bipartisan appraisal of the debate and called it "dull." The article then assessed Young's value to the Carter campaign. He was one of the first black politicians to endorse the former Georgia Governor. In summary, with four articles the Chronicle had a significant amount of Young coverage including the fact that he was seconding the nomination for Jimmy Carter. Many of the black papers carried that item but it was virtually ignored by the white press. They also speculated upon his future role in the administration and obtained a black perspective about the debates him. Carter and Black Dignitaries The Chronicle included no articles per se on Carter's relationship with black dignitaries. Most of his associations with black individuals were covered under other topics. Most notably was during the "ethnic purity" incident when various individuals rallied behind him. Several were named, and many pictures were taken of him with many more. Pictures were not reviewed as a part of the coverage. 230 Los Angeles Times Carter-Wallace Coverage The Los Angeles Times started its election coverage on the first day of the year when the article, '~allace Counting on Smashing Carter in Florida, Winning Massachusetts Race," by Kenneth Reich, appeared on page 12 of section I. The Wallace-Carter challenge began by Wallace's predicting that he would defeat his main Southern rival 1n Florida. By mid-March the Alabama governor predicted that he would knock the former Georgia governor out of ser1ous contention. The Carter-Wallace feud and the impending Florida showdown was the subject matter of the second article on page 27, section I, on 5 January. Carter's conceptual relationship with Wallace was explored in the article, "Carter Gambling on Proving Candidacy in Primaries and Caucuses by March 10" by Kenneth Reich. Carter speculated that his battle with Wallace in Florida would either solidify his position as a front runner or would mark his decline as a candidate. The confronta tion between Carter and Wallace whom many visualized as representatives of the new and old South appeared to be the determining factor for Carter's long-range chances. The potential Carter-Wallace showdown n Florida was explored again in the 21 January article, "Sparse Crowd Applaud Wallace as he Opens Campaign in Hississippi, Florida." A Wallace win was predicted but the margins with which he had won in 1972 were expected to be narrowed. The article ran on page 7 of section I. Carter-Wallace phenomeon received continued attention in the article, "Carter Wallace Face Mississippi Test" by Kenneth Reich. It 231 appeared on 24 January on page 4 of section I. The two men squared off in a Southern state for the first time and it was determined that if Carter could w~n be would deal a blow to Wallace's image of strength in the South, thus assuring for himself an important psycho logical boost for the key Florida primary in which the two Southerners were the most active candidates. The Carter-Wallace coverage continued to dominate the news into the month of February when on 24 February the paper ran the arti cle, "Carter Workers Invade Wallace Bastion" by Kenneth Reich, on page 7, section I. The two men, still preparing for the Florida primary, stepped up campaign activities incessantly and according to Reich, this would be the first time that Wallace would be challenged door to-door in rural areas of Florida. Carter's campaign workers were making every effort to challenge Wallace in his principal territory. Kenneth Reich continued to file reports on the Carter-Wallace aspects of the race as they prepared for the South Carolina primary. In a 28 February article on page 6, section I, '~allace; Carter Only Candidates inS. Carolina Caucuses Today," Reich reported that South Carolina bad traditionally not been one of Wallace's strongest states, but Carter, in a determined effort to permanently handicap him, had set out to soundly defeat him. On page 1 the following day Reich reported that Wallace won the tight race. After the Florida primary the rivalry between Carter and Wal lace subsided in intensity. The final Reich report appeared on 14 March on the front page. The title was "Wallace Campaign Revives old Stand--Race Issues" and as implied by the title the subject was Wallace's attempt to exploit racial issues as a campaign issue. In 232 the wake of his defeat to Carter who received massive black support, Wallace attempted to revert to tougher stands using race as his primary approach. In summary, the Times noted very early in the year that Florida would be the battleground which decided whether or not Carter had a fighting chance at obtaining the nomination. The articles carefully followed the campaign rivalry that existed between the two men. The analysis was very well executed and the full story was developed with equal expertise. It had the most comprehensive coverage of Carter and Wallace. Florida Primary On 10 January in a page 4, section I, article, black politician Julian Bond endorsed Carter only for the Florida primary. Bond said in the article, "Bond Endorses Carter in Florida Primary Race" by Kenneth Reich, that he preferred either former Sen. Fred Harris of Oklahoma, Sen. Birch Bayh of Indiana or former vice presidential nominee Sargent Shriver to Carter. But since the Florida contest would boil down to Wallace and Carter he declared his support for Carter. On page 1 on 10 March Kenneth Reich reported the results of the Florida primary under the title "Ford and Carter Score Major Florida Victories--Wallace Era of Dominance in South Ends." He declared the victory an end of an era of Walla~e-dominated Southern politics. The victory reestablished Carter as the front runner in the presidential race and gave him a new designation as "giant killer" for defeating Wallace in a Southern state that he had dominated during the 1972 presi dential race. Carter got a majority of all the votes cast by blacks. In a separate article on 10 March, which also ran on page 1, 233 the candidates gave their views about the Florida primary. Carter stated in "Inside the Times: Candidates Give Their Reactions" that the Florida win was unbelievable but to beat Wallace was gratifying. Wallace conceded that Carter had won the primary in a "fair fight" but he added that he was proud of his second-place showing. He felt that the press had waged an anti-Wallace campaign. In summary, the Florida coverage, like the Carter-Wallace cov erage, was well developed. One aspect was brought out clearly that was frequently implied in other papers which was Jul1an Bond's support for Carter but only for the Florida primary. The term "Giant killer" was also picked up as was done in several papers. The paper ran three items. Ethnic Purity The first ethnic coverage appeared on 9 April in the article, "Carter Apologizes for 'Ethnic Purity' Phrase," on page 8, section I. Carter apologized for the statement calling it a 11m1stake on my part." A recapitulation of the incident was given and since it occurred many persons, especially blacks, had asked him to explain the implications of the term. Statements that were issued by other candidates appeared. The ethnic controversy continued as the dominant feature and moved to page 1 on 10 April with the Jack Nelson article, "Black Leaders Upset by Carter's 'Ethnic' Remark." Despite Carter's apology the comments became a full-blown campaign issue that could cost him critical black support. The remarks had already caused furor among black leaders trom coast to coast and were the most serious mistake that Carter had made. 234 On 12 April on page 5 of section I, "Black Assails Carter's 'Purity' Apology" by Jeff Prugh, appeared. Carter's ethnic remarks were kept alive when the president of the Southern Conference of Black Mayors attacked not only the infamous quotation but also his subsequent apology. The majors threatened to withhold support from any presi dential candidate until "acceptable commitments" were made to blacks, other minorities and the poor. On 14 April the issue entered another phase when the Rev. Martin Luther King, Sr. reactivated his support for and endorsement of Carter. Several reporters filed stories about different aspects of the issue. First Jeff Prugh on page 1~ of section I reported in the article, "King's Father Backs Carter Amid Protest," about the Atlanta rally in which King forgave Carter for his mistake. He accepted Carter's apology and called for other blacks to continue their support. An adjoining article gave the views that local black politicians expressed about the ethnic statement, Carter's apology and King's endorsement. It was written under the heading "Black L.A. Councilman Endorses Carter, Discounts 'Ethnic' Issue." Los Angeles City Council man Dave Cunningham told the Times that he supported Carter and that the ethnic remark had been misinterpreted. He added that several questions asked of Carter were answered satisfactorily. The first ethnic editorial appeared on 16 April, page 4, in sec tion II called "Blow-up of a Blunder." The editor said it was appall ingly careless of Carter to use the phrase "ethnic purity" but said that he was not a closet bigot and that everyone was aware of that fact. Carter's rivals were upset about his popularity among blacks and as such were quibbling over a non-issue. He felt that Carter had been chastised 235 enough and that the time had come to get back to the real issues. William Raspberry's column on the ethnic issue also appeared in the 16 April edition. It was a duplicate of his column which appeared in the Washington Post for which Raspberry was a frequent contributor. "Ethnic purity" was once again the subject of a column appearing on page 1, section IV, on 18 April. The major feature by Pat Watter titled "Is Carter Biased--A Southern View" said that the clamor over Carter's quote did not mark the first time that his race-relations record had been placed under public scrutiny. The columnist previewed his Southern upbringing and concluded that under the circumstances of his environmental conditioning credit should be given for his relatively good race-relations record and also for his impressive leadership away from the taints of racism. On 24 April the ethnic issue returned to part I on page 10 in the article, "Carter Poll Finds 'Ethnic' Remark Had Little Effect" by Robert Shogan. A private poll indicated that Carter's controversial statement had neither helped nor hurt his prospects for winning his next crucial primary. However, pro-Jackson forces continued to use it as an issue in an attempt to stop him. "Ethnic purity" made its final appearance as an 1.ssue in a Kathy Burke article on 7 May in section I, page 3. The article was called "Julian Bond at USC, Raps Carter on 'Ethnic Purity'!" Georgia State Sen. Julian Bond who had indicated early in the campaign that he was not a Carter supporter criticized Carter heavily because of his ethnic remarks. He called the words offensive but added that he might support Carter over the Republican Ronald Reagan should he become the major contender. He added however that he would have a hard time 236 deciding between Carter and Ford. In summary, in its nine articles, the Times focused primarily on blacks' reaction to the term. It was evident that they supported Carter's subsequent apology and called for the issue to be dropped in the interest of other more pressing matters. It was one of the few sources which tried to outline the issue from the black perspective. It also included black sources as recognized authorities for that perspective but again the paper failed to gather data from the grass-roots level. Their perspectives instead came from more influential black sources. Stop Carter "Stop Carter" became an issue on 8 April when the front-page article, "Jackson Tells His Strategy to Stop Carter" by Richard Bergholz and George Skelton, appeared. In actuality it outlined the strategy planned by Sen. Henry Jackson to 1ncrease his own standings in the presidential race rather than to stop Carter. He indicated that his long-range plan was on target. "Stop Carter" was the focus of an 18 April article, "Labor and Political Bosses Unite in Stop-Carter Drive" by Bill Boyarsky. The front-page article said that Philadelphia political bosses and labor chieftains were summoning all of their energy to stop Carter. The man they had chosen to do the job was Sen. Henry Jackson. Their key choice, Sen. Hubert Humphrey, had announced that he would not seek the nomination. When California's Gov. Jerry Brown entered the race, he attempted to wrestle black support away from Carter and the Times ran 237 a series of articles on Brown's challenge. The first appeared on the front page of the 11 May issue under the headl1ne, "U.S. Ready for Interdependence Brown Contends" by John Dart. Brown, as he spoke to an audience of black ministers, tried to oust Jimmy Carter by refer ring to his track record of appointing blacks to important govern mental positions. It was a minor part of his overall strategy to stop Carter. On 12 May another Brown article appeared on page 3 of section I under the title "Brown Trying to Beat Carter at Own Game Wooing Black Support in State's Primary by Talking to 'Power Source'- Ministers" by William Endicott. In his continued efforts to stop Carter, Bro~m took his "evangelical fervor" to a "significant source of political and spiritual power" in the black communities--black ministers. Brown also capitalized on his own religious background and his friendship with such black leaders as the Rev. r~rtin Luther King, Jr. On 16 May on page 20, part I, Richard Bergholz reported "Brown Believes He Can Still Halt Carter." Brown was still optimistic that the popular votes he hoped to receive in four states would enable him to stop Carter from obtaining the Democratic Presidential nomination. It was the final stop-Carter feature to appear. In summary, the Times, more than any other paper, focused most of its stop-Carter coverage on Brown's challenge. The black strategy for both candidates became obvious. The Times ran five features. 238 Carter and Blacks In an 11 March article by Robert Shogan called "Carter's Appeal Switches to Left" the black voting power was explored for the first time as a crucial factor to Carter's potential success. The most significant of all 1n terms of Carter's political future 1s that he won 63 percent of black Democratic votes. This black support was called Carter's passport to liberal legitimacy since he was the most favored liberal among black voters. The article was run on page 23 in section I. "Black Caucus Skeptic of Carter's Lack of Stand on Jobs Bill" by Richard T. Cooper, on 17 March in section I, page 1~, explored another aspect of Carter's relationship with blacks. Carter met with the Congressional Black Caucus with whom he had hoped to score points, but fell short of his objectives when he did not fully endorse the pending full employment legislation. Caucus members appeared surprised by the e~tent of the black support Carter said he had won in the Florida and Massachusetts primaries. Andrew Young was recognized for the first time as an adamant Carter supporter. In a front-page article on 25 ~furch the Times ran its first major feature on the suport that blacks were giving to Carter. In Kenneth Reich's article, "Carter Victories Signal Shift in South," he concluded that racial issues were fading as major platforms for Southern candidates and that it in actuality contributed to Wallace's demise and to Carter's popularity. Carter's relationship with blacks reached the front page again on 29 March 1n the article, "Carter as Governor: Man of Both Old, New 239 South" by Kenneth Reich. As was reported in many other articles on Carter and his relationship with blacks, he was responsible for hang- 1ng a portrait of assassinated civil rights leader Hartin Luther King, Jr. in the Georgia State capitol. An anachronism existed, however, for outside the capitol ~·ms a statue commemmorating one of history's most virulent racists and Carter never bothered to have the statue removed. Carter was a man of many paradoxes. Atlanta's black elite was profiled in a 1 May article titled "Pascal's Serves Up Politics and Eggs" by Jeff Prugh. The article explored how blacks could make a difference to Carter in spite of the fact that a few influential blacks still did not fully support him. The page 15, section I, article was a major feature but most of its content was devoted to a description of the restaurant and how it had been used for years by black Atlantians as a forum for civil rights discussions and planning. Carter had now replaced civil rights as the maJor topic of discussion. Carter made two appearances in the predominantly black Los Angeles community of Watts. In section I on page 25, the article, "Carter campa1gns at Hospital" by George Skelton, followed Carter as he officiated at a ground-breaking ceremony for a wing at the Martin Luther King, Jr. Hospital. The black audience welcomed him warmly as had other black communities across the nation. His second trip on 24 August was covered by Bill Boyarsky and appeared on page 4 of section I. The headline read "Carter Tells LA Chicanos, Blacks he Backs Drive to Get Out Minority Vote." The Demo- crats for years had been confronted with the problem of getting large numbers of minority voters to the polls. Each election year 240 registration drives were held and some were successful while others were not. When they were successful, however, they proved to be a big plus for the Democrats because black and those of Latin descent tended to vote overwhelmingly Democratic. In summary, there were seven items on Carter and blacks. The Times included one of the few articles printed about Carter and his "Atlanta connection." Other papers commented on this group of black supporters but the Times went into detail to describe who they were and how they assisted in Carter's black strategy. Black Issues On 18 March the activities of the National Black Convention ushered 1n black issues coverage. The page 16, section I, article, "Black Convention Seen Picking Dellums" by Francis Ward, stated that the third national Black Political Convention had opened in Cincinnati and that it was expected to draft Rep. Ronald Dellums as its choice for a presidential candidate. On 20 March the convention's activities were further high lighted on page 3, section I, in the article, "Black Assembly Plans Th1rd-Party Candidacy" by Francis Ward. Spokesmen for the assembly said that a major attempt was being made by various liberal and progressive organizations to support a third-party candidate. The assembly, described as a loose coalition of independent state and local politicians, believed that blacks should back neither the Democratic nor the Republican candidate. ------... ' The Brown/Dymally feud was explored in a 1 April article which appeared on page 24 of section I. Tom Gaff wrote 1n his article, 241 "Brown Commends Dymally's Abilities," that the endorsement was a result of an agreement that Brown worked out with the black caucus to improve his relationships with the black lieutenant governor. The caucus in turn promised its support. Starting on 1 May on page 29 of section I Francis \-lard reported on the Charlotte conference of black Democrats. The first article was titled "Black Democrats Gather to Draft Party Demands." Black Democrats from across the nation opened the three-day conference to decide upon a platform and a presidential candidate to support. Four of the candidates were invited to appear and the platform was expected to include such issues as aid to the poor and minorities, full employment and education. Ward submitted a follow-up article titled "Candidates Forced to be More Aware of Civil Rights, Black Democrats Say," which ran on the front page on 3 May. The caucus of black Democrats ended their meeting without making any endorsements. Summary statements given by each candidate were printed and each was asked if he would name a black individual as a vice-presidential running mate. None of the candidates committed himself. A last article on the National Black Political Assembly appeared on page 10, section I, on 19 June. It was titled "Black Announces Bid for Presidency." Frederick Douglas Kirkpatrick was named as the presidential candidate for what could potentially be the first independent black political party. Both Ronald Dellums (Democrat, California) and Julian Bond declined the nomination. Rep. John Conyers predicted that he would nominate Congressman Ronald Dellums for vice president at the party's national convention 242 and the incident received attention on 11 July on page 11 of sec tion I. The headline was "Dellums Mentioned as No. 2 Man." Julian Bond changed his opinion of Carter and decided to sup port him by October. The decision was the principal subject of the article, "Julian Bond Backs Man He Called Liar" by Jeff Prugh, which ran on page 20, section I, on 8 October. Bond endorsed Carter because he believed that he promised more for blacks than President Ford. However, he reiterated that he was still not entirely satisfied with Carter but simply did not like President Ford. William Raspberry's column, "Carter: Shortest Distance May be a Deviating Path," appearing on 24 October on page 5 of section IV, was critical of Carter's trip to Mississippi to seek the endorsements of its two infamous senators. He felt that Carter was trying to appease and please too many people. The South's white racists may have been willing to forgive his liaisons with Andrew Young and Martin Luther King, Sr. on the grounds that it was necessary to get elected. Blacks, on the other hand, may not readily accept his open courting of Mississippi's two segregationalist senators, Eastland and Stennis. However, they would still vote for him because they had little choice. The Times, on 25 October just prior to the election, introduced a potentially explosive black issue. On page 10, section I, Kenneth Reich reported that Carter stated that if blacks were to apply for membership at his church they would be accepted into full membership. The headline read "His Segregated Church Would Now Accept Black Members, Carter Thinks." Just prior to the election in November the church issue became a crucial item but did not have sufficient time to germinate into a major campaign issue. 243 In summary, with eleven features, the Times' coverage of black issues was among the most comprehensive. The paper covered several key issues that many of the black papers in particular felt were black issues. Gov. Jerry Brown's feud with his Lt. Gov. Dymally was noted and Rep. Ron Dellums' decision to be nominated for vice president was carried. The fact that both involved California representatives may have been the major factor in their decision to carry both stories. The paper did the first item to indicate when Julian Bond switched to the Carter camp and was the only source to question whether or not Carter's church would admit blacks as members. The A. Z. Pittman story was ignored. Black Ministers' Payoff The Times had the distinct priviledge of breaking the black ministers' story and on 8 August on the front page the first of two major features by Grayson Mitchell appeared. In ;;;Street Money' Proves a Thorn to Carter Staff" the ministers were quoted as having said that they did not work for a politician for free and that a large donation was expected if someone were allowed into the church to cam paign. High-ranking Carter campaign officials insisted that the case was an isolated one. The second, a follow-up story also appearing on page 1, ran on 11 August under the title "Ministers Offers to Return Carter Campaign Money." Mitchell said that one of four San Francisco Bay area clergy men offered to return the money to the Carter campaign. Press secretary Jody Powell contended, on the other hand, that there were no grounds for his returning the funds because nothing illegal had occurred. 244 In summary, the Times broke the story but the coverage was short, only two articles. They quoted the men more extensively than other sources. Debates The debate controversy was not covered. Playboy Interview The Playboy interview was first recognized 1n a column on 23 September in section II, page 7, titled "For Carter, Tide Goes Out on Sea of Trivia" by Joseph Kraft. Kraft said that Carter had trans formed himself from a solid favorite into a center of controversy and that the general subject of sexual mores should be taboo for dis cussion by national leaders. He chastised Carter especially for giving the interview to what he called a "raunch publication with bogus pretensions to expressing what it calls a 'lifestyle.'" It was early 1n the campaign, however, so Carter conceivably could still recover. On 24 September Playboy was the subject of another column in section II, page 7, "Lust, But Not Least" by Ellen Goodman. It was a satirical selection in which the author speculated about whether or not the campaign would stumble and fall on the lust issue. Carter's remarks were called "terminal confessionitis," a disease that was currently going around on the political scene. On 26 September Playboy comments continued in section VI, page 5, with excerpts from the interview. The only parts quoted in the editorial, ''What Jimmy Carter Told Playboy Magazine, 11 were the sections where he discussed his religion in conjunction with looking 245 upon women with lust. On the same page there was another satirical selection by Mike Royko which was called "'I, Too, Have Looked With Lust."' It was a tongue-in-cheek look at Carter's Playboy interview. If Jimmy Carter were man enough to discuss delicate matters with Playboy Magazine, said Royko, then others could surely follow his "forthright" example. The first news article about the Playboy interview occurred on 28 September and the issue moved to section I, page 6. Kenneth Reich wrote "Carter Blames Ford for Increase in Poor, Defends 'Adultery' Interview in Playboy," and as implied by the headline, the major emphasis of the article was on Carter's comments about the Ford administration. However, in an extemporaneous answer to a labor leader he defended his decision to grant Playboy the interview, saying that Playboy had a good readership who had the right to know about presidential candidates' thoughts. On the same date in section II on page 5 another Playboy column appeared. In "Carter Now Lusts After the Macho Vote," J. J. ter Horst said that Carter's lust beats tax reform as an attention grabber. Presidential lust, however, had not been raised as an 1ssue for debates betlveen Carter and President Ford and the entire affair would hurt the Carter candidacy. Playboy continued into October as a principal personal opinion issue and on 3 October, section V, page 1, of the paper, carried "Religious Issue Slows Carter Drive" by Kenneth Reich. His statements made in the middle of the campaign appeared to have awakened some of the fears about who Carter was and about what he represented. If the entire interview were read his concluding remarks would be clarified, 246 but his one lust quotation had gotten the most attention and had set the tone about what most voters thought of him. On 9 October Playboy surfaced as a major 1ssue for the final time. In a section I, page 28, article, "Carter's 'Lust' Quote Called Basic Truth" by George W. Cornell, church scholars verified that Carter pointed up a basic truth about human condition. The scholars concluded that he expressed in a basic manner a philosophically sound and accurate theory on theology. They then proceeded to provide an extensive theological explanation about human failings, adultery, lust and sexual motivation through the ages. In summary, the controversy was first introduced by columnists and practically all of its coverage was in the form of columns and editorial opinions. Only two of the eight features were ne,.;rs items. The issue was treated with levity with a few speculating about the effect that it would have on the election outcome. The theological meanings were explored but the other aspect relative to former President Johnson was not broached. Andrew Young Two articles were written exclusively about Andrew Young. The first by Kenneth Reich, in section I, page 2U, on 1 Hay titled "Carter Will Beat Brown Easily, Black Says" profiled Young and pointed out that he was the earliest major black supporter Carter had. Young was following on the heels of Julian Bond who at that time was touring the nation criticizing Carter's "ethnic purity" statement. Young predicted that Carter's standings over favorite son candidate Jerry Brown would easily help him defeat the new arrival. 247 On 11 July the Times ran an extensive interview with Andrew Young on page 1 of section IA. In the article, "Rep. Young Appraises Carter," Young commented on Carter's views and campaign tactics. The interview, conducted in question and answer format, was performed by an unnamed Los Angeles Times' Washington bureau staff member. In summary, the Young coverage was fairly typical except for the in-depth interview. The Times was the only paper which sought his personal views and obtained a thorough briefing about his campaign activities and on Carter's black strategy. Carter and Black Dignitaries The Times did no articles about Carter's clout with black dignitaries. CHAPTER VI ANALYSIS Carter-Wallace Coverage Black Papers In many of the papers the Carter and Wallace coverage over lapped with the Florida primary coverage. Whenever the emphasis was on the two Southern opponents, however, the coverage was reviewed and logged as data about Carter and Wallace. The Los Angeles Sentinel and the Amsterdam News were the only two out of the five black papers that did not carry any coverage about the Southern candidates. The three which did contain material were the Pittsburgh Courier, Chicago Daily Defender and Black Panther. Coverage began on 13 March in the Courier, 6 March in the Black Panther and 9 February in the Daily Defender. All concluded by the end of March. One common element was noted in the coverage by the three papers. All carried the one wire service article which denounced Wallace's political orientations and racial beliefs, labeling him a political trickster who would wreck havoc on America. The Defender carried the information on 1 March, the Panther on 6 March and the Courier on 13 March. The rest of the Wallace-Carter coverage in the black press continued to focus on Wallace with the bulk of it very anti-Wallace. 248 249 The paper carried articles charging that Wallace would create a "police state." They reported when his political funds were depleted and sought out comments about him from black elected officials. All of their remarks were negative. Throughout this time black leaders were urging blacks to remain uncommitted with the intent to render support to a few peren nial favorites. Thus the campaign coverage in the black papers reflected this strategy. In spite of the fact that all of its cover age was anti-Wallace, there was no support evident for any other political candidate including Carter. The Defender referred to Carter simply as another southerner who was challenging Wallace with hopes to end his political dominance in the south. The Courier was the only paper to have contained front-page coverage. In the Defender it was included on the second page, a "second front" which carries material that would normally be placed on a front page. Coverage perspectives on Carter changed from the initial article to the end of coverage. The early coverage reflected the image of a man who was a threat to blacks' existence, who could not be trusted, who was a racist and who was a Southern die-hard. Later coverage reflected upon his demise as a powerful figure in Southern politics and briefly explored the "new south" politics espoused by Carter while remaining uncommitted to him. In addition to the one common element cited previously, three other articles while not carried by every paper, were carried by more than one source. This, in turn, created greater coverage similarities 250 similarities in all of the black papers. For example, they considered Carter as indicative of the "new south" while Wallace was the "old South." They maintained a laissez-faire attitude towards Carter even though they subsequently labeled him as a "giant-killer" for defeating Wallace. The principal difference in coverage rested not in the contents of coverage but in the amount of coverage given. Some papers contained only one item while others ran a multiple number including editorials. White Papers Coverage of George Wallace and Jimmy Carter was carried by all of the white papers. In the Washington Post it started on 5 April, in the Christian Science Monitor on 26 January, in the Chicago Tribune on 12 January, in the Los Angeles Times on 1 January, in the San Fran cisco Chronicle on 15 February and in the New York Times on 29 Febru ary. Most of the coverage ceased by the end of March. The Christian Science Monitor and the Los Angeles Times were the only two to treat their topic as front-page material. The Times ran a front-page article announcing Wallace's demise, while the Monitor carried all of its articles on the front page. The following common elements were evident: (1) they compared Wallace with Carter by utilizing the "old south"/"new south" analogy; (2) they assessed Carter's chances for defeating Wallace in the Florida primary by evaluating his previous performances in primaries in which he was opposed by Wallace; (3) they reviewed what strategy would be needed if Carter were to be successful against Wallace in Florida. 251 The Washington Post and Christian Science Monitor initiated their coverage with a comparison of the "old south" vs. the "new south." Carter's preparations for the Florida primary was the first item reviewed for the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times and the San Francisco Chronicle. The New York Times initiated its coverage with a review of the South Carolina primary in which Wallace defeated Carter. The "old south"/"new south" comparisons evolved the most significant data about the perspectives that each paper took about Carter and Wallace. None gave outright endorsement to Carter but each considered his political position as a viable alternative to that of George Wallace. In making the comparisons every paper focused more prominently upon Carter's "new south" rhetoric. A few publications in reviewing Carter's chances for winning the Florida primary also uncovered his need for black support. The Christian Science Monitor was the most perceptive at detecting that need. In early February it evaluated Carter's performance in the South Carolina primary and attributed his second-place showing to the fact that blacks had remained uncommitted. The New York Times analy sis was similar to the Monitor's. It predicted that Carter could be successful if he could obtain black support. The Chicago Tribune in looking towards the Florida primary also realized that he would need black support but it could not accurately assess how blacks would vote. Therefore, it predicted that Wallace would win and that Carter would split second place with Sen. Jackson. After the Florida primary, the Los Angeles Times and San Francisco Chronicle reviewed the Carter/Wallace challenge from the 252 black perspective and revealed for the first time that Carter had finally received the amount of black votes he needed to defeat Wallace. The Chronicle predicted that the support was only temporary, given long enough only to insure Wallace's defeat. Cross Analysis The Carter-Wallace coverage started and ended in both black and white papers almost simultaneously. Coverage started in white papers first with a 12 January feature in the Chicago Tribune. It started in black papers by 9 February in the Chicago Daily Defender. All of the papers except the New York Times ended coverage in March. The New York Times ran a final article on 13 June. Several similarities exist in coverage in both black and white papers. Both, in their own manner, displayed various degrees of dis approval over Wallace's candidacy. The black press did it through its anti-Wallace coverage. The white papers detected that black were remaining uncommitted during the early primaries. The white papers expressed it by determining what changes in strategy Carter would have to make to win Florida and the black papers remained as noncommitted as their readers. Both the black and white press noted Wallace's demise and final removal as a major influential factor in Southern politics. In its early coverage the black press crusaded against Wallace and urged voters to defeat him. This was the major difference in coverage between black and white papers. The white press grasped the black perspectives by following the results of the South Carolina caucus and the Mississippi primary. They were able to determine that 253 black voters would provide the crucial element for Carter's success. Florida Primary Black Papers The Chicago Daily Defender and the Pittsburgh Courier were the only two black papers to have contained specific coverage about the Florida primary. The coverage was identical because both used the same wire service story. The Courier treated it as a front-page feature while the Defender placed it on page 10. The article analyzed the types of individuals who aided Carter's victory. It was noted that blacks voted for him 1n large numbers but the black press still remained uncommitted about showing any support. Carter's black strategy was not evident in their cover age even though Carter contended that he specifically pursued the black vote in Florida. The black press remained neutral. White Papers Every white paper contained information about the Florida contest. The Monitor's coverage started on 21 January, the Washington Post on 11 March, the Chicago Tribune on 5 March, the New York Times on 1 March, the San Francisco Chronicle on 21 January and the Los Angeles Times on 10 January. The common elements noted are as follows: (1) Carter pre dicted that he would win Florida, thus making known his primary objectives; (2) each paper analyzed what either victory or defeat would mean to Carter's campaign objectives; (3) each identified his major black supporters, and as a result included his clout with black 254 dignitaries and about little Andrew Young. The Christian Science Monitor's coverage did a thorough job of analyzing why Carter needed the Florida victory. The Tribune also included pre-Florida coverage that contained similar analyses. The Washington Post's coverage attempted to assess where his greatest support would come from and along with the Los Angeles Times tried to determine who his primary constituents would be. The New York Times and the San Francisco Chronicle, which carried the Times article, pre dicted that Carter would win in Florida, and, by speculating on the reasons why, described who his principal supporters were. Some elements of the Wallace coverage seeped into the Florida coverage because after Carter's victory most of the papers admitted that Carter was a better alternative to Wallace's "fire-brand" style of Southern politics. The Los Angeles Times and the New York Times adapted the phrase "giant-killer" to relate the ultimate impact of Carter's victory over George Wallace in Florida. Several black perspectives and Carter's black strategy became evident during the white papers coverage of the Florida primary. The Los Angeles Times's interview and coverage of Julian Bond had produced a slightly skewed perspective. The paper discovered that blacks had finally endorsed Carter in Florida but Bond predicted that the endorsement was only temporary--designed to defeat George Wallace--and it would be withdrawn after the Florida primary. The New York Times' coverage was similar. The Washington Post, Chicago Tribune and San Francisco Chronicle, however, simply related that he had obtained the black votes that he needed to win Florida. 255 The San Francisco Chronicle, Christian Science Monitor and New York Times were the only three papers to discover that Carter's Florida strategy was to win the race hands-down and not, as the other papers predicted, to simply make a strong showing. The papers had not yet sensed Carter's black strategy nor the rift that was occurring in black leadership. Julian Bond's comments were accepted as the official stance taken by the total black community; thus, Carter's true strategy remained obscured. Most of the papers, therefore, felt that blacks at this point simply wanted to defeat George Wallace, but they were credited for assuring Carter's victory. Cross Analysis The black papers did very little Florida coverage and took a hindsight view to examine Wallace's defeat. In view of the strategy that Carter devised to obtain black support, it should have received more coverage from black papers. The white press uncovered several blacks' perspective which the black press should have recognized. These included Julian Bond's position, Carter's open solicitations for black support and the pre dicted end of the Wallace era in the event of a Carter victory. Both black and white papers noted who his major supporters were that assured his Florida victory. Ethnic Purity Black Papers The black papers, including the only daily, the Chicago Daily Defender, started coverage one week after the comment was made. The Defender produced information on 12 April followed by the Pittsburgh 256 Courier, Amsterdam News and Black Panther on 17 April and the Los Angeles Sentinel on 22 April. There were several common elements. Each contained a summary which was given as an obligatory gesture to remind rather than to inform readers about the incident. They also featured information about Carter's apology and about Dr. King's subsequent acceptance. The editors assumed that readers were aware of the incident; thus, they directed coverage to other aspects. Most included the statement that the remarks conjured up Ritlerian connotations. Some printed Rep. Morris Udall's critique along with those of other presi dential hopefuls, but at the same time they chastised them for being opportunists and for using the incident to enhance their ow·n ambi tions. Vernon Jordan's statement and remarks about Andrew Young's telegram were also featured. Carter's apology and King's growing role in the campaign received the greatest amount of attention. The Chicago Defender's coverage started with the apology as did the Pittsburgh Courier's. The Black Panther called the apology a failure and virtually ignored it, but not before condemning King's acceptance and branding him a sell-out. Even though several common elements were noted, the approach and emphasis differed from paper to paper. The Chicago Defender high lighted black leaders' comments, Andrew Young's telegram, Hosea Williams' protest and the political implications of the incident. The Pittsburgh Courier adopted a "forgive and forget" attitude so the majority of its coverage surrounded Carter's apology and his sens1- tivity for recognizing his mistake. They excused the remark as an 257 unfortunate blunder and felt that the incident was blown out of perspective because of America's inability to handle racial issues. The Amsterdam News' coverage was all in editorials. Its views reflected Carter as a bigot and remarks were included by many other black dignitaries in an effort to substantiate that prem1se. The Black Panther focued on the black leaders' roles in the incident rather than either on the incident itself or on Carter. The Panther, as did the Amsterdam News, sought statements from several black mayors who at the time were attending the Southern Conference of Black Mayors. They all condemned Carter. The Los Angeles Sentinel's coverage, also all editorials, brought out the fact that Carter's new conversion to support the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill was a direct and positive result of his trying to regain his once strong black backing. Items found in the black papers originated with either wire services, synaicated columnists or in-house editorialists. White Papers When Jimmy Carter initially uttered his phrase about "keeping American neighborhoods ethnically pure" it was practically ignored. It appeared initially in the New York Daily News but a few days later it was carried by.two other publications, the Washington Post and the New York Times. Thus began a principal campaign issue which was eventually covered by every paper. The Washington Post and the New York Times coverage started simultaneously on 7 April. The San Francisco Chronicle picked up coverage, consisting principally of articles from the New York Times 258 on 8 April, followed by the Los Angeles Times on 9 April, the Chicago Tribune on 11 April and the Christian Science Monitor on 12 April. Each paper contained seven distinctly identifiable common ele ments: (1) Each summarized the incident; (2) they carried Carter's apology; (J) opponent Morris Udall leveled ardent criticism at Carter and each paper contained his comments; (4) Andrew Young sent a tele gram to Carter in which he allegedly called the remarks a disaster for the campaign; (5) Urban League President Vernon Jordan sent a telegram to Carter in which he chided him for making the comments; (6) the papers decided to research into Carter's personal history of race relations; (7) each speculated about how the remarks would affect his campaign. Each paper summarized the statements, giving background information explaining the circumstances under which the "ethnic pur ity" phrase was made. The Post's summary appeared on the first day's coverage. It was complete, giving the quotation in its entirety, and was objectively written with no obvious biases or editorial comments for or against Carter's terminology. The New York Times' summary started with a duplication of the Post's coverage, but the writers paraphrased crucial parts. As a result, they interjected such comments as "Carter used unusually blunt language" in stating that he would not change the "ethnic purity of the economic homogeneity of well-to-do suburbs." Almost as an after thought and towards the very end of the article, the balance of the quotation about his not preventing blacks from moving in was added. The San Francisco Chronicle's summary was actually a brief background description as seen by Carter's opponent Udall. Because it 259 described Udall's criticisms of Carter, it was all anti-Carter in perspective. The Los Angeles Times, since its coverage started a few days after the controversy had blossomed, ran a cursory background report within the context of a longer article. The summary was fairly complete and covered crucial points. The Chicago Tribune's summary reflected a definite bias against Carter and his Southern background. The writer went beyond news reporting when he remarked that Carter's comments "rolled off his tongue as easily as buttermilk." The Tribune was the only white paper to prominently emphasize that the words "conjured up images of Adolph Hitler's master race plan." Several black papers featured that statement. Senator Udall leveled the most ardent criticism against Carter for having made the comment. As a result, the second element was not only the criticism but how it was perceived. The Post moved its ethnic coverage to the front page on the day that Udall leveled his attack. The New York Times also treated it as a front-page item. The San Francisco Chronicle's readers received this as their introduction to the controversy since the paper ran Udall's remarks as its first ethnic coverage. The Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune, on the other hand, simply summarized Udall's comments. Carter apologized to his black supporters for having made the comment and all of the papers treated it as a major news item, thus producing the fourth element. In conjunction with the apology, they also printed news about the Atlanta rally where the Rev. Martin Luther King, Sr. pledged continued support, and about the black rift, speci fically that with the Rev. Hosea Williams who advocated disassociation 260 from Carter. As a result of the apology, the Post examined the black per spective. The article pointed out that Carter had been popular with blacks, resulting in his successfully obtaining overwhelming black support. It also observed that he reversed his stand on the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill. Carter had previously opposed it, but as the "ethnic purity" flap escalated he endorsed it. The New York Times' coverage was in a similar vein. It care fully pointed out that Carter would not back down from parts of his original stand in areas such as "not arbitrarily using federal force" to change a neighborhood's ethnic character. The San Francisco Chronicle re-ran the New York Times' article. The Los Angeles Times' sequence of coverage began with the apology; thus, the black perspec tive emerged from the inception. The Tribune exposed the apology through editorials which heavily criticized the Democratic contender. Included were such comments as that "Jimmy Carter sooner or later would put his foot in it seemed obvious" and "Jimmy Carter, the Democratic front runner in the presidential sweepstakes, has stubbed his toe." Andrew Young's involvement in the campaign and his emergence as Carter's major supporter became evident as a result of the telegram that Young sent to Carter immediately following his verbal faux pas. All of the papers stated that Young labeled the statement "a disaster for the campaign," but the New York Times, the first to report on Young's telegram, became embroiled in a dispute over whether or not those precise words were used. Its coverage of the telegram, there fore, was more extensive. 261 Because of another telegram to Carter from Urban League President Vernon Jordan, all of the papers uncovered another facet of the incident. Most noted that there was a distinct division in the black community over whether or not blacks should support Carter. Coverage angles, therefore, shifted to noted blacks, paticularly black community representatives, to obtain input about how black voters col lectively perceived Carter. The Post then cited a host of black indi viduals who had supported Carter prior to the ethnic incident and who pleged continued support. The New York Times coverage was similar. The San Francisco Chronicle did its most extensive coverage during this stage. The paper carried extensive profiles of black elected officials in Sacramento. The Los Angeles Times also reported exten sively on comments by local black elected officials. Both the Chronicle and the Times continued their coverage over a period of several days, presenting the views of many black individuals who either supported or opposed Carter. The Tribune consulted with Jesse Jackson, the leader of the Chicago based Operation PUSH, to obtain a representative viewpoint. The final elements common to all papers were their scrutiny of Carter's race relations record in conjuntion with examinations of his Southern background and speculations about how the remarks would affect his campaign. The Post included speculations from Carter himself that the statement would leave his campaign undamaged. They probed his fra gility as a little-known candidate and theorized that white liberals were more upset than blacks over the remarks. The New York Times reached similar conclusions and stated that continued black support 262 would be vital. The Chronicle in its reporting focused on the major roles that blacks had played in Carter's campaign. It concluded that Carter had been severely wounded by his remarks and produced statements by sev eral black leaders who were obviously not Carter supporters to back up that position. The Los Angeles Times, after concluding that he was undamaged politically, called for the issue to be dropped. The Tribune's approach was similar, as was the Christian Science Mon itor's, whose only story was on how the remarks, in view of Carter's Southern background, would affect his campaign. Cross Analysis While both black and white papers contained identical types of information, they differed enormously in the manner in which the information was given, the coverage angles, the amount of space and the release times. Black aspects surface in white papers after the press learned about the telegrams from Vernon Jordan and Andrew Young. The fact that Carter obviously cared enough to respond to their comments indi cated that blacks played a crucial part in his campaign. It also signaled that, contrary to earlier predictions and beliefs, blacks had not abandoned him after the Florida primary. Initially reactions to Carter's apology were mixed. Most of the white papers viewed it as a character weakness. The black papers, on the other hand, viewed it as a character strength that he was concerned enough about how blacks perceived him to issue an apology. Black leaders' acceptance of the apology and Carter's alliance 263 with ~furtin Luther King, Sr. became controversial items for both black and white editors. In the black papers, two trends emerged. The editors either criticized King and other blacks for accepting Carter's apology carte blanche and endorsing him or, without totally condemning King's action, urged extreme caution in granting continued support for Carter. Only the Black Panther adamantly viewed the move as a "sell out" by black leaders. One angle that most of the white papers adopted was to con spicuously point out the list of black dignitaries who were invited but did not attend the Atlanta rally. The white papers, as well as the black papers, also included the information about the Rev. Hosea Williams. In each instance, except 1n the Black Panther, the Williams news was mentioned near the end and in conjunction with the King story. In the Panther, however, it was given headline attraction and elevated to major new·s status. Both black and white papers had different perceptions about how the remarks would affect his campaign. The white papers predicted at the outset that the remarks would damage his campaign beyond repair. Their assessments changed, however, after his subsequent pr1mary victories indicated that black support was still intact. The black papers, on the other hand, predicted that he would not be affected adversely by his comment and urged that their readers and all blacks give him continued support. They made it clear that black support would be crucial for his continued success. Both black and white papers contacted virtually the same indi viduals for reactions or comments. Most were local black political 264 figures. Both black and white papers gave background data explaining the incident; however, vast differences lay in the ways in which the information was presented. The white papers printed first-hand accounts which contained more complete data. The black papers treated the issue as if readers had already obtained background data. Both black and white papers examined Carter's track record in promoting harmonic race relations. The white papers felt that his Southern background was the distinctive factor that produced his ethnic viewpoint. Black papers took a broader perspective, discounted the Southern background theory and placed the comment within the context of the nation's racial history. Thus, they felt that Carter's terminology simply reflected the American viewpoint of racial tolerance at this time in history. Black papers more frequently quoted the opinion that his comments conjured up Hitlerian principles. The white papers more than the black papers ran the information about Andrew Young's calling the remarks a "disaster for the campaign." In spite of the fact that white papers carried more articles and more extensive coverage, the same common elements were present in both black and white papers. The major differences existed in the angles which each took and in their news sources. The white papers contained first-hand reports while black papers used wire services extensively. The white papers also eventually treated it as a front-page item but black papers did not. 265 Stop Carter Black Papers Stop-Carter coverage in black papers was tantamount to cover age about Gov. Brown's last-minute entry into the presidential race. The bulk of the coverage was reviewed as a black issue item as a result of the angles in which the stories were reported but two papers, the Chicago Daily Defender and the Black Panther, contained coverage which reflected definite stop-Carter aspects. The Defender followed Brown's campaign into Oregon and in so doing revealed Brown's function as a liberal opponent whose sole function consisted of drawing black support away from Jimmy Carter. The paper revealed some of Carter's black strategy as it examined Brown's black strategy. The Black Panther, which was adamantly opposed to Carter, endorsed Brown for President and by so doing gave the stop-Carter aspects practical applicability. White Papers Every paper contained stop-Carter coverage. Coverage began on 2 February 1n the Christian Science Monitor, on 1 May in the Washington Post, on 2 March in the Chicago Tribune, on 26 February in the New York Times, on 27 February in the San Francisco Chronicle and on 8 April in the Los Angeles Times. Only two major trends were noted: First, Gov. Jerry Brown's entrance and impact on the race and, second, the encouragement being given to other Democratic candidates, particularly Sen. Hubert Humphrey, to enter the race and challenge Carter. The objective of 266 the strategy was to have any liberal challenge him so that his black support could be diluted. The focus on black voters came into sharp perspective and remained highly visible throughout the entire stop-Carter movement. It was designed to impact directly upon his black constitutency; therefore, the black perspective was drawn into the coverage. In spite of blacks' crucial significance during this phase, only one paper, the San Francisco Chronicle, obtained first-hand reports from black individuals. Most of the papers finally realized that even with the ethnic faux pas behind him blacks were not deserting Carter as originally believed. The Chronicle further obtained Carter's viewpoint about the movement that was underfoot to stop him. His comments verified the premise that Brown was being used to dilute black support. Several papers felt that the issue was important enough to garner front-page coverage at intervals. The Christian Science Monitor ran it on the front page when Jerry Brown began to challenge Carter. The New York Times upon discovering that there was such a movement in existence, initiated its stop-Carter coverage as a front-page item. It was carried right after Carter won the New Hampshire primary. vfuen the San Francisco Chronicle ran Carter's comments, they appeared on the first page and the Los Angeles Times ran most of its coverage on the front page. The Times viewed Sen. Henry Jackson as a crucial factor initially. Then it included comments that organized labor was behind the stop-Carter drive. It then followed Jerry Brown's involvement when he became a factor. 267 Cross Analysis Stop-Carter coverage in black and white papers indicated vast differences. In black papers stop-Carter became a pragmatic challenge from Brown to draw support for his campaign from within the black communities. During the time frame when most of the stop-Carter items surfaced in white papers there was increased coverage given to Brown and Brown's campaign strategy, which had become tailor made to attract the minority and the Libertarian votes. The white press attempted to speculate upon whether or not there may have been an organized stop- -carter movement underway. Several speculated that it may have been induced by organized labor while others theorized that it may have been part induced. Only Carter himself ever addressed the issue and clarified Brown's position in the stop-Carter movement. Both black and white papers acknowledged that the movement, whether organized or splintered, had one objective: it had to dilute the strong support that Carter was receiving from black and liberal factions. Carter and Blacks Black Papers Carter's popularity with blacks was documented in four out of five black papers. The Black Panther carried no coverage. Coverage started in the Amsterdam News on 7 February, in the Los Angeles Sentinel on 8 April, in the Chicago Daily Defender on 18 March and in the Pittsburgh Courier in the latter part of January. 268 The Pittsburgh Courier initially speculated that Sargent Shriver was becoming the favored candidate among blacks because of his work w1th the Office of Economic Opportunity during the Kennedy admin istration. They noted that Carter appeared to be second favorite. the other papers, after determining that Hubert Humphrey would not enter the race, conceded that Carter was receiving grass roots sup port. By March all of the papers recognized that Carter was becoming increasingly popular with blacks, yet none endorsed him. The papers began to recognize his popularity with blacks after he continued to win primaries with large amounts of black support even after the "ethnic purity" remark was made. After March there was a noticeable increase in the amount of Carter coverage, which indicated that black support was growing and that Carter's black strategy was beginning to work. Papers also began to print more information about black supporters and identified leaders who favored Carter's candidacy. From the beginning of the campaign year through the end several trends were noted and several perspective changes were, observed. Very early in the year, particularly preceding the Florida primary, very little was revealed about Carter's reliance on black support. By mid-March, however, the papers began to realize that black voters were to play a crucial part in Carter's campaign. The angle that was printed did not reveal how well Carter was doing in his primaries but related instead to how the impact of bloc voting could affect the outcome of the election. The black papers used each pri mary's results to demonstrate the power that black voters held, but by doing so they inadvertantly advanced Carter's ambitions. ~9 By mid-year and particularly following the Democratic Con vention, there appeared a proliferation of articles and comments cau tioning voters to study both candidates carefully. Carter's black strategy became very evident and appeared to have induced some skepti cism and doubts about his sincerity. The attitude shift resulted from several conflicting problems which will be examined in the section on black issues. Towards the end of the campaign year all of the papers except the Black Panther decided to endorse Carter and they urged their read ership to vote in large numbers. A few other trends were evident throughout the year as related to the types of articles appearing in each paper. Since the majority chose to give local coverage instead of using w1re service articles, there were few duplications. The Los Angeles Sentinel and the Amster dam News ran coverage about blacks who shared childhoods with Carter. The same two papers also conducted private polls to validate that a high percentage of blacks did favor Carter. The Amsterdam News and the Pittsburgh Courier contained coverage about Carter's trip into Harlem, and, finally, the Pittsburgh Courier, Los Angeles Sentinel, and Amsterdam News urged their readers to go to the polls and vote in large numbers for Carter. The major differences were more apparent 1n the anti-Carter coverage. For example, the Chicago Daily Defender was the only paper to introduce Julian Bond's antipathy, also cautioning blacks to beware of Carter's generalities when discussing 1ssues. The Amsterdam News explored how black leaders had failed to change the status or plight of poor blacks in the past; thus, they cautioned their readers against 270 placing too much faith in Carter's abilities to make any maJor changes simply because he assoicates with those same leaders. The majority of the coverage that Carter received in this sec tion was favorable. Eleven out of the twelve items run by the Amsterdam News were positive. The Los Angeles Sentinel's articles and columns were all pro-Carter. The Chicago Defender, as stated previ ously, did include anti-Carter commments as stated by Julian Bond, and it also included another article by a civil rights lawyer which cautioned blacks to be wary of Carter's fuzziness on the issues. All of the other articles were pro-Carter. The seven items in the Pitts burgh Courier were all pro-Carter. The Amsterdam News and Pittsburgh Courier ran front-page coverage twice. It never reached the front pages of the Los Angeles Sentinel nor of the Chicago Def~nder. White Papers The material on Carter's relationship with blacks occupied a sizable amount of space in all of the papers except the San Francisco Chronicle. The New York Times started its coverage on 15 March, the San Francisco Chronicle ran its one feature on 3 June, the Washington Post started on 4 January, the Christian Science Monitor on 11 March, the Chicago Tribune on 11 March and the Los Angeles Times on 11 lfurch. There were three noticeable trends: (1) Various polls were taken and the ultimate results indicated that blacks favored Carter; (2) As a result of his popularity several decided to explore why he maintained a special appeal to blacks; (3) Most of the papers explored his relationship with his black constitutency while he was the governor of Georgia. 271 The New York Times initiated its coverage of his relationship with blacks when he was Georgia's governor. It ran a poll in early June which verified that he was the favored candidate among blacks, and by late June it explored his appeal to blacks. The Washington Post also started by examining his activities as governor. By May it looked at why he apealed to blacks, and ran a mini-survey by October. The Chicago Tribune poll appeared at the beginning of April. By the end of April, the paper examined his popularity with blacks as the Georgia governor and by early May it reviewed his appeal. The Los Angeles Times examined his appeal to blacks first and reviewed his records as governor. The San Francisco Chronicle and Christian Science Monitor included only one phase each. The Chronicle's coverage was of a poll it had taken and the Monitor examined his appeal to blacks. The rest of the coverage differed substantially from paper to paper. The Chicago Tribune's coverage was the most anti-Carter of all of the papers. The Tribune focused much of its attention on blacks who did not support his candidacy; thus, Julian Bond received his greatest amount of coverage in the Tribune. The paper also speculated on such factors as how Carter would fare in popularity if Hubert Humphrey were to enter the race or if blacks were not anxious to have George Wallace's influence diluted. They pointed out that he had done little to enchance black causes and printed critical remarks by black leaders to substantiate that point. The Tribune vituallly stood alone when it revealed that the leaders of the two odlest and most influen tial civil rights groups, the NAACP and the Urban League, had made no commitments to Carter. It also named othr influential blacks who did 272 not support him. The Christian Science Monitor and Washington Post coverage were more balanced between pro- and anti-Carter coverage. The Christian Science Monitor related that the NAACP did not endorse Carter but that the organization approved of his candidacy. The Washington Post concentrated on those black leaders who, intially leery of Carter, were scrambling to climb aboard his bandwagon. It included Julian Bond on its list and conducted an interview with him. His remarks bad been tempered from his earlier blistering statements. The New York Times' coverage was presented from a unique perspective. It realized that Carter was held in high esteem among the black populace, but it never sought out blacks to obtain the black perspective. Rather, the paper's perspectives were a conglomeration of correspondents' views and those of the candidates. It never dis covered that a rift existed among the black hierarchy. Thus, it stated only superficially that Carter still had problems gaining total support from many black leaders. Reader were never informed about who the leaders were; therefore, they never received the full impact of the division which existed among blacks. Pro- or anti-Carter biases could not be detected. The information contained in the San Francisco Chronicle was insufficient to gauge what Carter's relationship with blacks could have been. The poll that appeared stated that he led in popularity and that part of his standing was due to his popularity with blacks. The black perspective was not shown. The Los Angeles Times' coverage was principally pro-Carter. 273 It included no information about blacks who did not support him. Instead, it concentrated on reporting about the "Atlanta connection," the group of Georgia blacks who formulated the core of his black con stituency. It also chose to concentrate on local coverage and events. His strategy for obtaining black votes became evident in several papers. The Chicago Tribune did the best job of focusing on the strategy that he used. Carter appealed directly to the black populace and bypassed traditional channels of going through the black leadership for support. The ire that the black leaders expressed, which was by the Tribune, was a direct by-product of Carter's black strategy. When the Los Angeles Times featured the information about his "Atlanta connection," it too uncovered an aspect of his black strategy which involved Andrew Young and Dr. King as liaisons to blacks outside the South. The New York Times, Washington Post and Christian Science Monitor's revelation of Carter's black strategy were similar. The New York Times concluded that his appeal and popularity rested with his abilities to communicate through the church and that Young and King were his primary interpreters. The Washington Post expressed similar sentiments. The Christian Science Monitor added one aspect in that it saw Andrew Young's role as an expanded one, reveal ing that he was also Carter's contact with northern liberal. The Chronicle's minute coverage revealed that he took great care to cultivate and maintain black support. It stated that he exercised massive efforts to counter any adverse effects that the "ethnic purity" remarks may have had, but it did n~t reveal any of the strategy used to gain that support. 274 The Washington Post ran only one front-page item abut Carter's relationship with blacks. Very early in the year a profile of his relationship with blacks when he was governor received front-page coverage. The New York Times contained two front-page items. The first was its intial story critically rebuking him for omitting the name of Martin Luther King, Jr. from his list of heroes when he spoke before an all-white audience; the second was its poll in June. The Monitor used its front page to examine his special appeal to blacks. The Los Angeles Times contained two front-page items. The first assessed the support that he was receiving from blacks and the second evaluated his performance as the governor. Cross Analysis The section on Carter and blacks produced several similarities in coverage in black and white papers. Both initiated coverage almost simultaneously, with one black and one white paper starting their articles as early as January. The topic firmly established that Carter was very popular with black voters and revealed his black strategy. Each paper carried the photograph of him shaking hands with Rev. Martin Luther King, Sr. and both black and white papers confirmed his popularity with blacks by means of polls. Both black and white papers discovered that many black leaders did not support his candi dacy and most cited the reason as being his ability to by-pass them 1n order to obtain support from the black populace. Finally, his trip into Harlem was perceived as important by both the black and white press. 275 Several differences in coverage also were apparent. The white press made several references to the black "Atlanta connection." The black press ignored its existence. The black papers more than the white publicized, with great pride, that black voters were directly responsible for Carter's success. The white papers expressed that Carter's success was due to the vast support that he was receiving from liberals and other ethnic groups as well as blacks. Both the black and white press commented about the concern expressed by the Republican party about Carter's success in achieving virtually a total monopoly on black votes. Julian Bond's antipathy to Carter received considerable cover age in white papers but was virtually ignored in black papers. The Chicago Daily Defender was the only black paper to have broached the subject. The black press, in conjunction with its practice of profiling black individuals, sought out several blacks who spent their childhood days with Carter in Plains to submit their personal vie,q points about the candidate. The white papers refrained from following that practice. As an alternative, however, many profiled Carter's tenure as the governor, bringing out the fact that he had hung a portrait of the late Rev. ~~rtin Luther King, Jr. in the Georgia state capital. That information never apeared in black papers. Both black and white papers sensed very early in the year that blacks would support him in spite of his southern heritage. The white papers were basing their speculations on blacks' desire to defeat George Wallace and on past records which indicated that he had a good record and good rapport with blacks when he was the Georgia governor. That speculation was mixed with skepticism because many used the out- 276 spoken Julian Bond's v~ew as a gauge. There it became general con sensus that support would be withdrawn following the Florida primary. When no other liberal candidate appeared, the black press began to note that blacks were rallying behind Carter and remained with him even after the Florida primary. About mid-year, particularly following the National Democratic Convention, the polls began to appear in both the black and white press which served to verify black support. By the end of July and towards the beginning of August, his strategy became evident in white papers. The black papers began to reflect the results of his strategy by urging their readers to support him. By November both black and white papers knew without a doubt that he was the preferred candidate among black voters. This parallel perspective in black and white papers deviated twice. The first was between July and August when several black papers indicated that black leaders were not pleased with Carter, and the second was in late August when many expressed concern over whether or not sufficient numbers of blacks would be registered to vote. Black Issues Black Papers The Los Angeles Sentinel was the only one of the five black papers which contained no black-issues coverage. Coverage started on 3 April in the Amsterdam News, 15 May in the Pittsburgh Courier, 24 July ~n the Black Panther and 16 March in the Chicago Daily Defender. The black ~ssues section was the only section in which 277 specific trends could be noticed in black papers. The following issues were the most frequently reported: the proceedings of the black caucus conference in Charlotte, North Carolina; Jerry Brown's apearance at the conference and the concern expressed by black caucus members about his relationship with his black lieutenent governor; distress and disappointment shown when none of the candidates acquiesced to the demands that a black be considered for the vice presidency; the efforts of two black elected officials to nominate a black for vice president at the National Democratic Convention; the dispute between black caucus members and Carter at the Convention. All of the papers except the Black Panther initiated coverage with the National Black Political Assembly's meeting in Charlotte, North Carolina. The Defender's coverage concentrated upon the group's nom1nee for a presidential candidate. The Amsterdam News and Pittsburg Courier profiled those candidates which were already in the race. The Defender and the Courier ran Walter Lowe, Jr.'s series "In Search of a Way." Thus, their coverage was almost identical. Many differences occurred in spite of the noted trends. The Chicago Daily Defender was the only paper to contain coverage about the blacks who were barred from attending worship services at Carter's church in Plains. The Amsterdam News included an indepth analysis about the role the blacks played during the Democratic Convention, and the Black Panther produced similar coverage when it explored blacks' contributions to the convention. The story about Carter's neighbors forced move was covered by the Black Panther and the Pittsburg Courier, white being ignored in the other papers. The Amsterdam News was the only paper to obtain views of those who did not support Carter. 278 This section's coverage reflected vacillation 1n black atti tudes towards Carter because blacks' responses to him were more directly related to whether or not he supported issues that blacks felt were important. The papers reflected this mixture of pro- and anti-Carter attitudes. The Black Panther's radical philosophy pro duced the largest amount of anti-Carter coverage. The Chicago Daily Defender's coverage ranged from anti-Carter to neutral, including very little pro-Carter coverage. In fact it endorsed Sergent Shriver during the Chicago Democratic Primary. It ended the year with negative coverage about Carter when it ran its story about the barring of the black worshippers. The story also resurrected the "ethnic purity" incident and contained negative comments by black Republicans. The Amsterdam News's coverage was the most balanced and the Pittsburgh Courier's coverage was primarily pro-Carter. The Black Panther started its black issues coverage on the first page but moved it to within the body of the paper during later editions. Even though it considered the Pittman story to be a major one, ironically it was not placed on the front page. It did receive front-page coverage in the Pittsburgh Courier, however. The Defender's only front-page item was on the barring of black worship pers from Carter's church. Black caucus members attempted to pressure Carter into considering a black for his vice presidential running mate and this issue became front-page material twice in the Amsterdam News. The black issues coverage demonstrated that there was no unanimous consent on what the black perspective was. As Carter's dependency on black voters grew, so did the demands for greater 279 concessions. Many black elected officials attempted to make political demands that would have resulted in blacks being placed in more responsible, decision-making positions in the Carter administration. The black press uncovered this power~uggle as it evolved. This was the most clear-cut black perspective. The colmnn "In Search of a Way" presented a limited black per spective. By taking the traditional black issues and examining each one in terms of each candidate's philosophy for solving the particular problem, the author concluded that Carter would best represent blacks' interest. His pro-Carter biases dominated the black issues coverage in both the Pittsburgh Courier and the Chicago Daily Defender. The Defender, however, contained additonal material which provided a balance. The Amsterdam News, realizing that Carter by-passed many black leaders, obtained these leaders' v1ews and revealed the hostile attitudes that many held about Carter. The Black Panther's per spective exhibited overall hostility not only towards Carter but towards those blacks which supported him. Carter's black strategy was very well docmnented. General consensus among all of the papers was that he needed and openly sought black support to continue his successful pursuit of the presidency. Each one focused on various components which served to construct a total view of his black strategy. Even though the over-all picture that was derived was accurate, none of the papers ever stated emphaticaly what that strategy was. Many recognized that he was obtaining support directly from the masses without going through the traditional leadership channels. They recognized the roles that Andrew Young and Martin Luther King, 280 Sr. played in his campaign. A number even sensed Gov. Jerry Brown's function of diluting Carter's black support in the stop-Carter effort, but they failed to clarify this for the readers. The angle that the coverage took served to demonstrate to readers how crucial and important black voters had become. Then, whenever they appealed directly to readers to vote, they became instruments of Carter's strategy rather than observers or analysts. White Papers Each white paper contained an abundance of information about black issues. The Washington Post started its reports on 10 March, the Christian Science Monitor on 11 ~furch, the Chicago Tribune on 4 February, the Los Angeles Times on 18 March, the San Francisco Chronicle on 19 March and the New York Times on 21 March. The following trends were noticed: (1) They covered the National Black Political Convention along with making comments about the invited candidates' appearances before the group; (2) they attempted to define what black issues were; (3) they reviewed the conflict \'lhich arose by Carter's failure to name a black as his vice presidential running mate; (4) they ran the A. Z. Pittman story; (5) they questioned Carter's motives for traveling to Mississippi to obtain endorsements from its two "racist" senators, Eastland and Stennis. The Washington Post started its coverage by trying to clarify what the black issues were. All of the other papers started by reporting on various aspects of the National Black Political Conven tion. 281 As did the Post, the Chicago Tribune exhibited the greatest amount of malevolency towards the Georgian. In the initial stages the Tribune declared that Sen. Henry Jackson was the only liberal in the race, so they felt he would obtain strong black support. By May they began to acknowledge that Carter clearly was the preferred candidate. The Christian Science Monitor upon examining black issues uncovered that blacks were not unamimously in favor of Carter. He failed to support several key pieces of legislation that blacks considered crucial. The Washington Post had difficulty defining what black issues were but eventually produced a list that it stated was important to blacks. After these issues were defined, the paper concluded that black issues were being ignored. The New York Times' coverage was well balanced between pro-Carter and anti-Carter comments, as was the San Francisco Chronicle's which again ran many of the stories previ ously run by the New York Times. The Los Angeles Times' coverage reviewed the more positive aspects of Carter's relationship with blacks. It continuously focused upon Carter's rapport with blacks, showing how he established and maintained his liaisons with the group. It also revealed what blacks began to expect from Carter in return for their continued loyalties. Each paper presented a unique perspective on this issue which deviated from the previously noted trends. This area presented the greatest amount of diversifications in coverage. The papers which contained the most comprehensive coverage were the two which utilized black columnists. They were the Chicago Tribune which had Vernon Jarrett and the Washington Post which had William Raspberry. 282 The Post made the only attempt to clarify and emphatically define the black concerns for 1976. The response was obtained directly from a black source, thus reducing much of the speculation about what the black issues were. The paper also contained the only data to enumerate what demands blacks had specifically solicited in their written petition to the Democratic National Convention. While . the National Black Caucus was in session in North Carolina, the paper presented continuous coverage of their futile attempts to draft black elected officials to represent the caucus as their official presiden tial candidate. They also questioned Carter's decision to seek endorsement from Mississippi's two infamous senators. The Chicago Tribune continued to follow Julian Bond's activ ities throughout the year, thus gaining the advantage of presenting the views of those blacks who did not support Carter. By adopting its anti-Carter position, the Tribune was able to explore such questions as why a white Southerner was able to obtain black support in such massive numbers with such little effort. The Tribune concluded that black leaders had failed to mobilize and guide black voters and that the little effort they put forth came too late, thus allowing Carter to side-step them and appeal directly to the black electorate. The paper scrutinized Jerry Brown's role in the campaign, concluding that Brown was not a serious candidate but was acting as a spoiler to draw away some of Carter's black support. The Tribune also obtained a unique black perspective on this issue and stated that blacks in turn were using this opportunity to forc.e Brown into bowing to some of their demands and long-standing criticisms about his off-handed attitude towards California's black elected officials. 283 When Rep. John Conyers offered to nominate Rep. Ronald Dellums for the office of vice president during the Convention, the Tribune was one of the few white papers to accurately assess the motives behind the ploy and to state that the other members of the black caucus did not approve of their actions. Dellums and Conyers intended to utilize the nomination as a tool to air grievances and to address ideas that each felt the party was ignoring. The Tribune also con tained more coverage about the A. Z. Pittman story than any white paper, reported on Carter's trip to Harlem which was ignored by the majority of the white papers and commented briefly on Carter's Mississippi excursion. The Christian Science Monitor did a good job of following the proceedings of the National Black Political Convention. It followed their attempts to draft a presidential candidate and was aware that blacks were disappointed because more of the issues that were con sidered crucial were not addressed by the presidential contenders. It predicted that the caucus could formulate the basis for a new politi cal party and revealed that blacks would play a crucial role in the pending election. Later in the year, after both parties' candidates had been selected, the paper commented that blacks were unhappy with these selections but would support Carter. The Los Angeles Times' coverage of the National Black Conven tion followed the activities of the California elected representa tives. For example, it reported that Rep. Ron Dellums was nominated and had later declined the nomination as the convention's presidential nominee. It also followed his nomination as v~ce president at the Democratic National Convention but declined to delve into the 284 background to give reasons for the nominations. They also reported about the incident involving blacks' demands that Jerry Brown give greater support to his black lieutenant governor but little detailed background information was provided. The paper reported that blacks had given certain demands to the presidential nominees who spoke before the National Black Convention (which the Los Angeles Times also called a National Black Caucus) but they gave no feedback to indicate that blacks were disappointed with the candidates' responses to those demands. The Los Angeles Times reported on Julian Bond's decision to support Carter and also on Carter's trip to Mississippi. Towards the end of the year it covered another issue not addressed in other papers when they questioned Carter about whether or not black members would be accepted in his church. The San Francisco Chronicle's coverage was closely aligned with that of the Times. It also followed the activities of the California representatives. Thus, its coverage on the Charlotte convention focused on Dellums' nomination as the group's presidential candidate, the Brown/Dymally affair, the group's overall assessment of the candidates, Dellums' nominaton as vice president of the Democratic National Convention, the A. Z. Pittman story, Carter's Mississippi trip and Julian Bond's conversion. The paper provided coverage on one black issue that most of the other pages ignored. During the Democratic Convention black dignitaries became enraged upon learning that Basil Paterson, the vice chairman of the Democratic National Committee, may have been removed. Carter met with the group and reached an agreement about his possible removal and about a few other demands that the group presented to him. Most of the other sources 285 commented on a "controversy" at the convention but the Chronicle was the only paper to give details about the controversy. The New York Times contained very little information about the National Black Political Convention but introduced one controversial item that was ignored by the other papers. Detroit's Mayor Coleman Young, in an address to a group of Northern blacks, implied that Carter's principal liberal challenger, Morris Udall, may have harbored racist attitudes while absolving Carter of any taints of prejudice. Udall, atter issuing a denial, demanded an apology from Young and Carter. He received neither. The issue was dropped in a few days. The other common issues covered included the controversy over naming a black as vice president, the debate over whether or not Basil Paterson would be removed, the A. Z. Pittman story, Carter's Mississippi trip and an added feature about a rally to induce large voter participa tion. Each paper displayed vast variances in what it considered front-page material. The Washington Post's coverage appeared principally in columns. So most was on the op-ed pages, but 1n May two incidents did obtain front-page space. The first aticle was about a rally which was designed to alert blacks to the importance that black votes would play in the pending election. The second reported on the results of the candidates' comments given at the Black Convention. The Christian Science Monitor report on blacks' disappointment with Carter's poor response to black issues ran as a page 1 feature. The candidates' appearance before the black convention appeared on the front page of the Los Angeles Times and the New York Times made 286 blacks' demands for a black to be named as a vice-presidential contender its front-page feature. Neither the Tribune nor the San Francisco Chronicle ran any black issues on the front page. Cross Analysis Several common trends were evident 1n black and white papers. Both contained considerable amounts of information about the National Black Political Convention. Both contained information about various aspects of problems that Jerry Brown had with Mervyn Dymally and about the compromise that the Black Convention worked out with Brown. Both cited the demands made by blacks for a black to be considered as a vice presidential contender. One major difference was noted here. The black papers carried the coverage as a part of their reports on the Black Convention while white papers became more aware of the demand at the Democratic National Convention. The A. Z. Pittman story was covered by both. Hajor differences were also noted in coverage. The Hashington Post, for example, remained the only paper to have questioned what the black issues were and then attempted to specify them. Walter Lowe, Jr.'s columns examined on-going, perennial issues but never stated emphatically if the issues that he addressed were considered crucial for blacks in 1976. None of the other papers defined black issues. The black papers reflected one national mood among blacks that white papers failed to detect. Black voters were crucially important to Carter and he was able to obtain that support by by-passing black leaders. The leaders, sensing this and fearing a total loss of control, attempted to utilize the leverage they had available to gain 287 inroads previously denied or ignored. This explains their demand to have a black named as a vice presidential nominee and the threat of a black voter boycott if Carter did not meet certain demands prior to the Democratic Convention. This mood was also reflected when the black papers reported on the demands placed on Jerry Brown to improve his relationship with his black lieutenant governor and with other black elected officials. The white papers complemented the black papers by addressing the frustration and disappointment that many blacks felt when many of their demands were either ignored or not addressed. The black papers emphasized the demands while the white papers reported on the results. Carter's trip into Mississippi to seek the endorsements of Senators Eastland and Stennis attracted the attention of every white paper but was completely ignored by black papers. The issue of whether or not Carter's church would accept black members occurred so close to the election that it did not have sufficient time to germi nate into a major issue. It did receive scant attention in one black and one white paper. The following picture of the coverage of black issues emerged for the year. Early in the year the black convention was held and the issues were supposed to have been clarified at that time. They were not. By mid-year very little unity had occurred among the black leadership, thus allowing Carter the opportunity to by-pass them, appeal directly to the electorate and gain their support. Black leaders, trying to regain control, presented several demands only to have them either ignored or depreciated by Carter or the Democratic hierarchy. The end of the year was characterized by many holdouts 288 scrambling to back Carter for fear of retaliation. The white papers were more accurate in reflecting the mood of the political hierarchy while the black papers gauged the mood of the black populace. Black Ministers' Payoff Black Papers The black ministers' payment issue was covered by every paper. The Black Panther ran coverage on 14 August, the Chicago Daily Defender on 9 and 10 August, the Amsterdam News on 18 September, the Pittsburgh Courier on 21 August and the Los Angeles Sentinel on 19 August. Each paper presented different interpretations but the cover age carried by the Los Angeles Sentinel, the Amsterdam News and the Black Panther were very critical. The Panther speculated that more money was involved than the $5,000 claimed by the ministers. It was labeled as "street money" by the Panther and the Sentinel. The Amsterdam News never gave an account of the incident but commented upon it editorially. Even though all three gave critical reports, each vented its wrath at different aspects. The Panther leveled its critical comments directly at Carter whom they claimed was trying to buy black votes. The Amsterdam News, on the other hand, faulted the ministers for "selling out" and for placing themselves in Carter's "hip pocket." The Sentinel blamed no one in particular and simply claimed that such payments were commonplace and this incident should not have been singled out for criticism. 289 The Defender and the Courier shared one UP! article so their coverage was similar. The Defender included one additional locally generated report which questioned the motives of the ministers for accepting the payments. The Pittsburgh Courier was the only paper to have placed its coverage on page one. White Papers Every white paper except the Christian Science Monitor contained coverage of the ministers' payments. All of the papers except the San Francisco Chronicle started the coverage on 8 August. The Chronicle's started a day later. The common trends noted '"ere: · (1) background information about payments was given; (2) speculations that greater amounts of money may have been involved were made; (3) that the ministers offered to return the funds was reported. The Los Angeles Times was credited with having uncovered the information. Its first report gave detailed information about the payments, the ministers and their reasons for accepting the money. The Tribune's initial coverage also gave an account of the incident but added speculations that more funds may have been involved than the $5,000. The New York Times and the San Francisco Chronicle's coverage emphasized the possibilities that more funds could have been used illegally. After that they used the payments to the ministers as an example of how the funds may have been illegally disbursed. The Washington Post virtually duplicated the Los Angeles Times' coverage. The Chicago Tribune was again the most critical in its report about the "street money" paid out. The second report was a satirical 290 commentary 1.n which the press concluded that the "ministers sold out too cheaply." The Los Angeles Times, Washington Post and San Francisco Chronicle gave follow-up reports about the ministers' offer to return the funds. The Los Angeles Times and San Francisco Chronicle were the only two papers to treat it as front-page material. The Times ran both of its stories on the front page while the Chronicle ran only the initial story on the front page. Cross Analysis There were several parallels noted in the coverage in black and white papers. Coverage was brief and ran within the same time frames. Three possibilities were evident: (1) they focused on the ministers and faulted them for taking the payments; (2) they focused on the missing funds and questioned the legalities involved and whether or not additional funds may have been involved; (3) they questioned Carter's motives for making the payments. The San Francisco Chronicle adopted a perspective similar to the Los Angeles Sentinel's with coverage that made it appear that such a practice was common during campaigns. The Chicago Tribune's perspective and use of the term "street money" denoted aspects very similar to the views expressed by the Black Panther. Major differences occurred in several aspects. The white papers provided more background information than did black papers. Most of the white but none of the black papers reported that the ministers offered to return the funds. 291 Debates Cross Analysis The one black and one white paper which contained information about the debate controversy were the San Francisco Chronicle and the Amsterdam News. The Chronicle ran the feature on 9 October and the Amsterdam News carried it on 16 October. The Chronicle mentioned the absence of a black newsperson on the debate panel incidentally because the article was about black FCC Representative Robert Hooks. Hooks commented on the panel make up in conjunction with other critical remarks leveled at the debate structure. The Amsterdam News, on the other hand, elevated it to a news feature. It became another aspect of the total demands that blacks made as a result of Carter's dependency upon black votes. The San Francisco Chronicle, even though it contained the information, clearly missed the true black perspective. Playboy Interview Black Papers Three out of the five black papers contained information about the Playboy controversy. They were the Pittsburgh Courier, the Amsterdam News and the Chicago Daily Defender. Coverage started in the Defender on 21 September and in the two other papers on 2 October. The Defender was the only paper to have included background information. The other publ1cations simply gave editorial views. Coverage appearing in the Courier and in the Defender were 292 similar because, in addition to running one common article, each defended Carter's decision to give the interview. The Courier felt that he should be lauded for his honest, open comments in Playboy and the Defender reiterated these remarks. The Amsterdam News, the only one of the three papers to have commented on the Lyndon Johnson aspects of the coverage, took an opposing view and criticized his having given Playboy the interview. No background information was provided for its readers, however. None of the papers included it as front-page coverage. White Papers The Playboy interview was a major issue in the white papers and each one contained substantial coverage of it. The New York Times' reports started on 20 September, the Washington Post on 21 September, the San Francisco Chronicle on 21 September, the Christian Science Monitor on 22 September, the Los Angeles Times on 23 September and the Chicago Tribune on 21 September. The noticeable trends are as follows: (1) Inclusions of comments by theologians about the accuracies or fallacies of his comments; (2) speculations about how the interview affected his campaign standings; (3) reactions to three aspects of the inter view--the "lust" quotation, his comments about Lyndon B. Johnson and his use of various "vulgarisms." All of the papers except the Christian Science l1onitor opened their coverage with the comments that he made about adultery and about "lusting" after women in his heart. The Christian Science Monitor began its coverage with speculations about what the remarks would do 293 to his campaign standings. The New York Times' opening article was well balanced, well written and quoted the magazine interview substantially. The critical analyses were delivered on subsequent days by columnists who took a dim view of the interview and began to critique specific aspects of it. The article which followed examined his slipping popularity and reviewed the parts of the interview which criticized the late President Johnson. The columnists' v1ews became increasingly critical, thus producing a barrage of anti-Carter material. They contained the greatest amount of criticism about his use of "vulgari ties" and explored the dilemma in lvhich some newspaper editors found themselves when attempting to report the contents of the article. The Christian Science Monitor's coverage contained very negative overtones. In its initial coverage it chided him for introducing a distracting element into the campaign which had no effect upon crucial issues. After revielving all aspects of the interview and examining all of the controversy surrounding it, the paper concluded that the interview should never have been granted. The Hashington Post's coverage, on the other hand, gravitated towards more of a pro-Carter stance. In the initial article Carter was quoted in depth from the Playboy interview. That was followed up by comments from theologians who substantially agreed with his views, thus justifying the comments that he had made. The paper did not broach the topic of or question his choice of words or "vulgarities" and it speculated optimistically about the time that he had remaining to recover his popularity before the election. The San Francisco Chronicle's coverage contained a mixture of 294 ~ . pro- and anti-Carter biases. The quotation was never printed but comments by many of his male and female supporters appeared defending the position that he took in the interview. A few satirical columns appeared but more were extremely critical. The Chicago Tribune's coverage was tongue-in-cheek. It dis played no blatant biases for or against Carter but rather dismissed the entire episode. It did share one coverage view first explored by the New York Times when it reviewed how other newspaper editors chose to report on the "salty language" used by Carter in the Playboy article. The coverage in the Los Angeles Times was similar to that of the Tribune's. If the Times had not run columnists' comments, the entire interview would have been virtually ignored. The only black perspective noticed surfaced when critical comments were leveled at Carter for his remarks about Lyndon Johnson. Several papers simply pointed out that Johnson had done more to sup port black causes than many other presidents. A few gave Carter subtle reminders that his success still depended upon his obtaining strong black support. The New York Times started its Playboy coverage on page 1 and continued it as a page 1 item for several days. The final article run was also a page 1 feature. The Honitor ran two of its articles on the front page. As the paper viewed his slipping popularity and when it examined his "earthy language," both articles were placed on the front page. The Washington Post ran its first and final articles on the front page. Both the San Francisco Chronicle and the Chicago Tribune initiated coverage with front-page articles but ran no other articles 295 on the first page. The Los Angeles Times contained no front-page coverage. Cross Analysis The Playboy interview was virtually ignored by the black press but the coverage run paralleled the white press in exploring the "lust" comments. One black paper also made a very vague reference to the comment made about Lyndon Johnson but no details were given. The black press, which was now supporting Carter, defended his decision to give the interview. The papers called Carter honest and courageous for granting Playboy the interview. The white papers displayed mixed emotions ranging from extremely critical to humorous. Columnists dominated the coverage with each picking various aspects of the interview to explore. This resulted in little coverage uniformity. The white papers provided much background information and quoted the interview extensively. The black commented on the interview but gave very little, if any, background information about it. Andrew Young Black Papers All of the papers except the Black Panther ran coverage of Andrew Young. The Chicago Daily Defender started its coverage on 16 July and the Los Angeles Sentinel on 6 May. Most of the coverage centered upon his local visits and itineraries but several common trends emerged. The majority of the papers carried coverage announcing speaking engagements which were 296 usually combined with information about his role in the Carter cam paign. Some commented about the contributions that he had made as an aide to Martin Luther King, Jr. They reviewed comments that he made in a speech before the NAACP Convention. They examined the signifi cance of his selection to nominate Carter at the Democratic National Convention and announced his appointment to head the national voter registration drive. The Chicago Daily Defender was the only paper to recognize that Young intended to continue supporting Carter beyond the Florida primary. Carter's black strategy appeared in the person of Andrew Young. This was clearly evident towards the end of the year when each editor urged voters to turn out in massive numbers, not necessarily to vote for Carter but so that they would not "let Andrew Young down." Not disappointing Young was tantamount to voting for Carter. The Pittsburgh Courier was the only paper containing front-page coverage. White Papers The Chicago Tribune was the only paper which did not contain any separate coverage of Andrew Young. The San Francisco Chronicle did its first coverage on 4 July, the Los Angeles Times on 1 May, the Washington Post on 20 June, the Christian Science Monitor on 21 January and the New York Times on 14 July. The common trends noted are as follows: (1) Each paper clari fied the role that Young was playing in the Carter campaign; (2) they commented on when Young became active in Carter's campaign, recog nizing him as one of Carter's earliest black supporters; (3) they verified that he was the person principally responsible for obtaining 297 the support of blacks and liberals. Coverage did not deviate greatly from paper to paper but a few contained aspects which should be noted. The San Francisco Chronicle included the only article which gave Young's views about the presiden tial debate. The Los Angeles Times was the only paper to state empha tically that Andrew Young and Julian Bond were at odds with each other because, as Young toured the country encouraging support for Carter, Bond either preceded or followed closely behind disputing Young's comments. The Times also did an in-depth interview with him. None of the papers contained any front-page coverage about Young. Cross Analysis Andrew Young coverage was unique because he received more incidental coverage throughout the year in conjunction with other subject matter than he received as a principal subject in his own right. The only common trend found in both black and white coverage was articles which demonstrated his role as the bridge between Carter and white liberals and Northern and Southern blacks. Beyond that similarity, there were no parallels. The black papers, somewhat achievement-oriented, concentrated upon Young's appointment as the national coordinator for the voter registration drive. The white papers, in turn, concentrated on his functions within the Carter campaign, particularly as it related to Carter's black strategy. They also reviewed his background, pointing out his achievements in civil rights. Unlike any of the black papers, the white papers reviewed Young's ongoing rivalry with Julian Bond. In this area the white papers demonstrated that they were 298 aware of what Carter's black strategy was. The black papers, on the other hand, demonstrated a premise expressed by political theorists who stated that blacks' identification with Andrew Young was the crucial element to Jimmy Carter's success. Carter and Black Dignitaries Black Papers The Chicago Daily Defender and the Amsterdam News were the only papers to include articles about Carter's association with black dignitaries. _Both papers included their initial coverage within two days of each other, the Amsterdam News on 27 March and the Chicago Daily Defender on 29 March. The Amsterdam News was the only paper to contain arty separate coverage of Dr. Martin Luther King, Sr., even though he, along with Andrew Young, played crucial parts in Carter's black strategy. It was known that he had a separate network of black workers but most of the papers chose to rely upon photographs of Carter with various black dignitaries rather than upon written transcripts. Therefore, coverage was minute. White Papers The Chicago Tribune, Washington Post and New York Times were the only white papers to include coverage of Carter and black digni taries. The Chicago Tribune's coverage started on 7 April, the Washington Post on 20 June and the New York Times on 6 July. The New York Times' coverage took an adverse point of v1ew. The paper interviewed influential blacks who were not Carter 299 supporters to ascertain why they harbored their particular views. The Washington Post made an attempt to identify pro- and anti-Carter factions. It began coverage by interviewing black leaders who endorsed him but then it commented on those who opposed his candidacy and were campaigning against him. The Chicago Tribune merely concen trated upon his supporters. In one interview an influential Georgia state representative explored the reasons why many of his fellow black lawmakers supported him. Another article alluded to the powerful "Atlanta connection" and explored its role in the campaign. The black perspective surfaced and was more accurately reflected in the coverage that noted those black individuals who opposed Carter's candidacy as well as those who supported his candi dacy. None of the papers included any first-page coverage. Cross Analysis The only similarity which occurred revolved around the cover age related to Dr. King. One of the black papers noted King's appear ance at a rally on behalf of Carter; and several white papers inter viewed King, who was on their list of pro-Carter dignitaries, and explained his function as an ardent Carter supporter. There was very little additional overlapping coverage. The white papers mentioned the "Atlanta connection" again, the black papers did not. Most of the white papers realized that many black officials did not support Carter. The black papers stated nothing about non-supporters. Most of the black papers included an abundance of pictures of Carter with black dignitaries while white papers did not. CHAPTER VII CONCLUSIONS Eight research questions were posed in the introduction: 1. a. What was the black perspective as revealed in both black· and white papers? b. How much attention did the white press give to the black perspective? 2. a. Did Jimmy Carter have black support throughout the elec tion year? b. If vacillation occurred, was it reflected 1n both black and white papers? c. Were black attitude changes detected by both black and white papers? 3. a. Did black and white media ascertain what Carter's black strategy was? b. Could the press have been instrumental 1n helping him to execute that strategy? 4. How did the black press observe Carter in various stages of his campaign? 5. Were the key issues 1n black papers covered in white papers and vice versa? 6. When did both black and white papers realize that Carter was the candidate drawing the most black support? 300 301 7. a. Did the black papers contain substantially the same campaign information as the white papers? b. Did black and white papers supplement each other's coverage? 8. Could the coverage provided by black papers have enhanced Carter's popularity with blacks? The Black Perspective In black papers during the Carter-Wallace phase the stated objective was to defeat George Wallace at all cost. Their coverage openly advocated Wallace's defeat. Yet one shortcoming was evident: Black papers failed to provide an alternative candidate for blacks to support against Wallace. The Chicago Daily Defender endorsed Sargent Shriver during the Chicago primary, but he was not a factor in the Florida primary which was where the Wallace showdown was to occur. The black perspective as related to the overall '76 campaign was not obvious during this stage. In fact, the black press appar ently considered coverage inconsequential because only two of the five papers contained coverage. The white papers' black perspective differed. They obviously realized that blacks were not going to support George Wallace but they could not detect which candidate would become favored. Several hypotheses were formulated by political theorists and election watchers. These included that Wallace would have to be defeated in the South if he were to be stopped; the challenger would need strong support from black voters if he were to become successful; a Northern liberal would have difficulty winning the black support needed and at 302 the same time be able to draw enough support from white Southerners; Carter was the only person in the race at that time who could possibly challenge George Wallace and w1n. The white press, led by the Christian Science Monitor, there fore, began to take a look at Carter and his "new South"-style poli tics and concluded that if he obtained black support he could end Wallace's reign. Based upon this analysis, their black perspective became evident. They questioned several better-known black leaders and discovered that, even though blacks had gone uncommitted during other major Southern primaries and caucuses, they would unite behind Carter to defeat Wallace in Florida. They were also told that the support would immediately be withdrawn, which later proved to be totally inaccurate. The Florida primary coverage in black papers was not much more enlightening about the black perspective than was the Carter-Wallace coverage. Again only two of the five papers contained coverage. They maintained that the objective of defeating Wallace had been achieved by Carter with the aid of massive black support. The white press whose theories proved accurate also determined that the efforts of blacks and white liberals combined to produce Carter, the "giant-killer." They were still under the impression that the support would be withdrawn and attempted to determine again who would gain the support of blacks. The "ethnic purity" incident aided in clarifying the black perspective for white as well as black papers. It can officially be considered the turning point in the campaign year when blacks went from being uncommitted to solid commitment to Jimmy Carter. The black 303 press began to view Carter objectively. After realizing that he was still respected by the black majority, papers spoke out on on his behalf. Whether intentional or unintentional the coverage given by black papers counteracted the coverage in white papers, all of which were capitalizing on his blunder in an attempt to place him on the defensive and expose his weaknesses. It was the first significant news item for the black press and, as a result, each paper contained coverage. With the exception of the Black Panther, his "blunder" delivered black press support into Carter's hands. The white papers found themselves in a quandary because most were still under the impression that support was to have been with drawn following the Florida primary. Thus, when telegrams were sent to Carter from supporter Andrew Young and non-supporter Vernon Jordan in an effort to define the black perspective, the white press' initial reports focused upon the negative aspects. Hence, the controversy arose over whether or not Andrew Young called the phrasing a "disaster for the campaign." As the issue evolved thewhite press became aware that a rift existed between various black factions, which created more than one perspective. It caused them to discard old coverage tactics. Instead of obtaining one viewpoint from a few nationally recognized "leaders," many localized their coverage by contacting black elected officials, where possible, to determine which blacks were and which were not Carter supporters. Since there existed no single collective voice for the "black community" as there had in the past, the white press had difficulties defining the true black perspective. The stop-Carter coverage in both black and white papers split into different perspectives. Again this was not a crucial or major 304 1ssue for black papers because only two out of the five papers ran coverage. The black press at this point began to detect the under lying black power surge as a result of the Democratic Party's and specifically Jimmy Carter's dependency upon black votes. Therefore, their stop-Carter coverage, which in actuality was coverage of Cali fornia Governor Jerry Brown's futile attempt to dilute black votes intended for Carter, demonstrated a practical applicability of the stop-Carter strategic concept. The white press had begun to understand and grasp what was occurring in black communities in terms of the support that Carter was or was not receiving. Political strategists realized that Carter would become unstoppable if the mounting black support were not attenuated. The party still hoped that other more experienced or better-known established members, such as Edward Kennedy or Hubert Humphrey, would enter the race; but when none did, they sought out Governor Brown to give a direct challenge to Carter. Many party pundits were still leery of Carter because as an unknown no one knew his positions, philosophies or capabilities. The black perspective, therefore, shifted to analyzing the importance of black voters to the success of the Democratic Party and more crucially to the success of Jimmy Carter. The segment on Carter and blacks left little doubt about the reciprocal dependency that had developed between Carter and the black voting population. The black press held him in great esteem and in true tradition crusaded on his behalf. For example, the bulk of the papers' coverage was pro-Carter without any hints that many blacks opposed his candidacy. None contained any extensive Julian Bond 305 coverage and many featured strangers who were acquainted with Carter in their distant past. The white press reflected a more diverse perspective because it recognized that along w1th the pro-Carter advocates were many anti-Carter proponents. Thus, Julian Bond was able to express his displeasures more extensively. The "Atlanta connection," which formu lated the nucleus upon which the very foundation of Carter's black strategy rested, was discovered and defined in terms of its qualifica tions and importance to the campaign. Thus, through their coverage of Carter's relationship with blacks, the white papers were able to rees tablish coverage control by determining from which blacks to obtain pro-Carter or anti-Carter statements. In the black issues coverage in black papers, vacillation in the attitudes of his supporters throughout the year was more readily seen. It was logical for this segment to reveal that information because traditionally blacks' support or nonsupport for a candidate had been tied to the extent to which that candidate supported key black concerns. The black perspective was clearly noted and defined in terms of demands that were made of the Democratic Party by blacks throughout the campaign year. Blacks were operating from a position of strength because they were aware that Carter needed black support. The white press was unable to tap into black consciousness during this phase. As a result even though its coverage was exten sive, it was superficial. For example, each paper reported on Carter's Mississippi mission with the possible intent of creating a fury on the scale of the "ethnic purity" issue, yet the black press ignored it completely. The A. Z. Pittman story was exposed by every 306 white paper but became a major issue only in the Black Panther. One white paper even questioned Carter about whether or not blacks would be admitted to his church; this was again ignored until several blacks actually attempted to attend worship services. These were only three of several attempts that were made to define the black perspective, yet it was never brought into sharp focus. The black ministers' payoff incident produced no extraordi narily revealing black perspective in either black or white papers. This was the only section to produce uniform coverage in black and white papers. Black papers again failed to follow up on the outcome of the controversy. The debate item reinforced the black perspective that was uncovered in black papers during black issues coverage. They focused upon the demand made to have blacks involved in crucial aspects of the campaign. The white press stuck with its pattern of obtaining com ments about black viewpoints from black authority figures. The Playboy interview served to reinforce black support in black papers. It was not the major 1ssue in black papers that it was in white papers. It was carried by three out of the five papers. The white papers again uncovered another black perspective 1n another attempt to tap into what it considered a black issue. Several papers noted that the remarks that Carter made about former President Lyndon Johnson could have contained overtones offensive to blacks who report edly revered the late president because of the great strides made in civil rights during his administration. The Andrew Young coverage in black papers served as a critical link to the black community. Just as the white press followed 307 Carter's movements, speeches and itineraries, the black press followed the same practice with Andrew Young. He was considered the most rep resentative of blacks' perspective of the entire campaign because, as the bridge to blacks and as one of Carter's chief spokesmen, Young was as instrumental in formulating strategy as he was in reacting to it and reflecting it. The white press frequently contacted Young to obtain his views about the black perspective. The papers utilized Julian Bond princi pally to obtain the opposing view. Bond was recognized by the white media as Carter's bridge to the black community and to his white 1 iberal s. The black perspective that black papers revealed in their coverage of Carter and black dignitaries was minimal. It served to reinforce the fact that Carter was popular with blacks on practically every socioeconomic level. The white papers received confirmation that a rift existed in black leadership. Therefore, the black perspective that they pre sented consisted of identifying pro- and anti-Carter factions. Fur ther information was given about the "Atlanta connection," defined as a new breed of black professionals who strongly endorsed Carter and were expected to be rewarded with key leadership positions in the Carter administration. They identified many nationally recognized leaders as non-supporters, including the chief officials of the Urban League and the NAACP. 308 Black Support as Followed Throughout the Year Ironically, even though Carter earned massive amounts of black support, the only time that he had unquestionable backing from both pro- and anti-Carter factions was during his attempt to defeat George Wallace in the Florida primary. Prior to that time, as noted in white papers, blacks were uncommitted and were withholding votes. After the Florida primary, held on 9 March, and prior to the "ethnic purity" issue, 6 April, his black support was supposed to have diminished as blacks again assumed a holding pattern in anticipation of another Democratic liberal's entering the race. This theory was advanced by Julian Bond. By April, however, the "ethnic purity" incident caused a significant turn of events. A definite fissure existed within the ranks of the traditional black hierarchy. Some continued to remain uncommitted, some supported other candidates and others, principally local leaders recruited by Carter field forces to provide support, united behind the Southern candidate. (The black ministers' payoff incident further demonstrated this practice.) This trend continued until immediately following the Democratic National Convention when several warnings were issued to blacks by concerned authority figures to beware of Carter's "fuzzi ness." This appeared to have had minimal effect on his supporters. By October several non-supporters, including Julian Bond, began to join the ranks of supporters but a few hold-outs remained, thus deny- 1ng Carter the total wave of support that he had had in Florida. Both the black and white papers detected these vacillations but they were more pronounced in the white papers. For example, white 309 papers, acting as impartial observers, said that blacks were withhold ing votes prior to the Florida primary. The black press made no such observation but declined to cover any of the contenders. When support for Carter became evident his appearances in black papers increased. Therefore, as long as black readers remained uncommitted, the black press remained uncommitted. When their support became solidified behind Carter, the black press supported him with increased coverage. The white press described those blacks who did not support Carter and also revealed if and when they tinally joined his camp. The black papers did not focus on non-supporters, but, by following blacks' approval or disapproval with the manner in which the candi dates addressed black issues, they were able to detect vacillations several times throughout the year. The only significant attitudinal change occurred when Julian Bond decided to support Carter. That was observed by the white press. The two distinctive time periods which marked significant changes in black support were between March and April when the black masses gave Carter initial confirmation that they would support him and between September and October when most of the black leadership hold-outs reluctantly decided to back him. Black Strategy Carter's black strategy evolved as he prepared for the Florida primary in March. In a campaign where tradition was side-stepped and where unknowns dominated, it seemed logical that Carter's black strategy should incorporate similar elements. Therefore, instead of seeking endorsements from the traditional established black hierarchy, 310 he formulated a nucleus of black Georgians, later dubbed the "Atlanta connection," who were skilled in organizational strategy and could tap into an influential community reservoir of the black support that Carter needed. The group was composed of several individuals who were recognized nationally but were not previously considered as part of the established black leadership bureaucracy. Included were civil rights activists Andrew Young and Martin Luther King, Sr., business executive Jesse Hill and educator Dr. Benjamin Mays. The strategy provided the momentum that Carter needed to win in Florida and con tinued to snowball into almost total black support by the November election. The white press was more instrumental in discovering and more proficient in relating his black strategy than was the black press. White papers were able to do so primarily because they obtained opposing views from black non-supporters as well as from black sup porters. They originally determined in February that it would be mandatory for him to gain black support in order to win the state. As he began to pick up the needed support many of the papers began to recognize who his essential black supporters were. None of the traditional black leaders or organizations was named. The "ethnic purity" incident provided additional clarification that he was uti lizing a different organizational tack. Ardent criticisms were leveled by many of the traditional leade~s; i.e., Vernon Jordan of the National Urban League. This led the white press to believe that blacks were upset by his comments. The "support and forgiveness" drive, on the other hand, was launched by his "Atlanta connection," culminating in the Atlanta rally which was not attended by many of the 311 traditional black leadership. The white press also noted that fact. During the stop-Carter movement other aspects of his strategy were revealed. In :t.act the entire movement was aimed directly at his grassroots strength and the strategy adopted by Gov. Jerry Brown would have involved a "Sacramento connection" designed as a duplication of Carter's strategy. Several sources humorously referred to Brown's tactic as "out-Cartering Jimmy Carter," which indicated an awareness of Carter's strategic premise. Brown's copycat strategy ultimately became his undoing. Brown, who was better known than Carter, was sub jected to several demands by black officials who had become wiser after witnessing Carter's tactics. To avoid being eliminated or ignored completely they subjected Brown to specific agreements which would ultimately allow the black leadership to maintain political maneuverability and control. Articles on black issues and on Carter's relationships with black individuals gave the white press the opportunity to further examine his formulated strategy and to scrutinize the "Atlanta connec tion." The black ministers' payments incident inadvertently demon strated some of the tactics employed at grassroots community levels. The media had maintained throughout the year that Carter's religious beliefs gave him an identifiable entree into black consciousness by providing a common vehicle through which blacks could relate to him. Andrew Young, as a part of Carter's "Atlanta connection" and as the national coordinator for voter registration, was a critical press link in his black strategy. The white media quickly ascertained that fact. An accumulated summary of the year's campaign coverage 312 revealed that the white press accurately comprehended and detected Carter's black strategy. Black press coverage, however, did not pro vide the same type of comprehensive data. Rather, black papers reflected the strategy in various places by sensing the moods of blacks at critical times throughout the year. As a result, they remained uncommitted as long as blacks remained uncommitted. ~~en blacks granted full support during the "ethnic purity" phase the black press was in full support. Again the one exception was the Black Panther. The "ethnic purity" incident gave the only revealing hint that opposition existed by blacks such as Rev. Hosea Williams and Urban League Director Vernon Jordan. The black press then overrode their objections by commenting favorably on Carter's decision to apologize and on his strength of character. Nothing appeared about the "Atlanta connection" nor about those leaders who did not endorse him and their reasons. That should have been ideal copy for the Black Panther. How the press may have assisted him in reaching the black masses was difficult to detect through white press coverage but was clearly evident in the black press. As previously observed, the "ethnic purity" incident marked the point when black support became the most pronounced. The press began to endorse him and leveled a barrage of criticism at those who attempted to benefit from his mistake. It was the one factor that transformed the Eastern and Western black papers into united public relations vehicles for Carter. They undoubtedly assisted him in reaching a vast black voting public. Additionally, coverage of Andrew Young to a lesser extent translated into an effective public relations vehicle for Carter. This was 313 notably so just preceding the November elections when each editor urged black voters to go to the polls in massive force so that Young would not fail as the national voter registration coordinator. The Black Press Observes Carter The black press from January through mid-March considered Carter a non-entity. There was no coverage about him during this time. Immediately following the Florida primary he was recognized as the "giant killer" for knocking George Wallace out of the race. In mid-April Carter received his tirst extensive coverage and black readers obtained their first crucial observations of him. The reviews were mixed initially but by late April and into early May virtually all papers were carrying pro-Carter material, although again the Black Panther was the exception. From May until late July coverage remained unchanged, but in early August a combination of the ministers' payment issue and the resurrection of the "fuzziness" complaint produced some negative coverage for Carter. He recovered by September with most of the papers praising him for his unselfishness and honesty for giving the Playboy interview. By November they all (Black Panther excepted) endorsed him. The highest point of support occurred in April and the lowest in August. The Panther endorsed third-party candidates on the Peace and Freedom ticket which was more in keeping with their politi cal philosophy. (See Appendix.) 314 Key Issues in Black and White Papers News reporters and campaign analysts considered only two of the twelve thesis issues to be key campaign issues for white papers in 1976. The first was the "ethnic purity" issue which generated an exhorbitant amount of press coverage and the second was the Playboy interview which stirred the imaginations of columnists who thus ini tiated a vast amount of coverage. One major complaint that the work ing press leveled continuously at Carter was about his "fuzziness" in not clarifying his stand on the issues. While it was not cited as a campaign issue it affected overall press coverage during 1976 and was a source of malcontent. The "ethnic purity" incident was a key issue for black papers as well. Carter not only received a vast amount of coverage but he won the press' support. The "fuzziness" complaint was not a very cru cial factor for the black press but it did have an impact which created some negative coverage for the candidate. The Playboy inter view was virtually ignored and not considered a key campaign issue for the black press. Only the "ethnic purity" issue became conclusively crucial in both black and white papers. The white and black press shared a con cern over the "fuzziness" complaint, but the black press did not bela bor the point and only the white press treated Playboy as a major concern. The black press contained no additional identifiable issues that could be defined as key issues. 315 Black Support Ignited Both the black and the white papers discovered almost simulta neously that Carter would be the candidate to receive the black and Libertarian votes for 1976. This knowledge evolved by early April, or, more specifically, during the unfolding of the "ethnic purity" issue. The white papers sensed earlier that he could receive large black support when they analyzed his early primary strategy and con cluded that he would need black support to win. Also sensing that blacks would support him to defeat George Wallace, they outlined for him the tactics that he would need to successfully capture Florida. By making these projections the white press ascertained very early that Carter would possibly obtain black support but could not gauge the extent of his popularity. Their information was not validated until April, however, because of the misleading information obtained from black non supporters who along with the white press were unaware of the ground swell of black support that was being mustered on Carter's behalf. Thus, both black and white papers discovered in April that he had become overwhelmingly popular with a large percentage of the black population. This revelation dispelled the theory that the white press was instrumental in "selling" Carter to the black populace. Following the "ethnic purity" incident, the white papers began to accurately gauge his popularity with blacks through polls and by interviewing black supporters. This also enabled them to uncover the schism between supporters and non-supporters. 316 Coverage Comparisons Black papers suffered from one major handicap--inadequate financing. This affected publication frequencies and paper volume, which in turn limited the amount of coverage space allowed for any one issue. The space limitaion seriously atfected the amount and depth the editors allowed for coverage. However, even with those recognized handicaps, black papers contained much of the same type of information printed in the white press. Two severely noted shortcomings rested in their failure to provide readers with sufficient background data prior to expanding coverage or giving editorial comments and their frequent failure to follow up on an item. Additionally, because most were weekly publications--the exception was the Chicago Daily Defender- their "news" ceased to be news by the time the papers were published. Therefore, it behooved blacks to read white papers to supplement the information given in the black press. The manner in which black and white papers complemented each other was evident throughout the elec tion year. Initially the black papers started their campaign coverage by crusading against Wallace but they gave no guidance on how that was to be accomplished. The white papers who agreed in essence started to view Carter as a probable alternative to Wallace, thus suggesting him as a solution that the black papers failed to give. Coverage of the Florida primary "ethnic purity" issue, black ministers• payoff and debate issue were most closely aligned. Both black and white papers produced the same or similar types of material. The striking shortfall in black papers remained that they did not 317 supply sufficient background data and failed to provide follow-up where necessary. The stop-Carter issue encompassed to distinct aspects but black papers only revealed one. Black papers addressed themselves to Governor Brown's campaign but failed to explain the overall stop Carter movement or clarify his function within that movement. There fore, white papers provided important information about the entire stop-Carter affair complete with how Brown fitted into the strategy. The articles on Carter and blacks, black issues and Carter and black dignitaries contained parallel coverage in several places and also complemented each other in several sections. Black papers' coverage of Carter and blacks only featured Carter supporters. The white papers supplied a balance by providing profiles about non supporters. While examining his appeal to blacks, the white papers cited his past records as the Georgia governor, his Christian orienta tion and various national in-house polls to document the information that they printed. This supplemented the black papers' proclivity for utilizing private citizens' childhood experiences with Carter and their limited research polls. The black press ran extensive data about Dr. Martin Luther King, Sr. and Rev. Andrew Young, and a few contained a weekly column by Dr. Benjamin Mays, all of whom were iden tified as a part of Carter's "Atlanta connection." But it took the white press to define the connection in terms of its function in the 1976 Democratic campaign. The black press exhibited its most professional and complete coverage in its black issues articles, but it missed one issue that was described in every white paper. Towards the end of the campaign 318 Carter ventured into Mississippi to obtain the endorsements of its two most die-hard "racist" senators, Eastland and Stennis. The trip was not reported by one black paper. Similarly, frequent demands made by blacks of the Democratic hierarchy throughout the campaign year received coverage but their results, especially unfavorable ones, gen erally were not published. Hence, white papers supplied the missing information. Black papers supplemented white papers by accurately gauging the mood of the established black hierarchy that Carter by-passed. The black press supplied so little data about the Playboy interview that it became imperative for readers to resort to white newspapers for more comprehensive information. Andrew Young coverage also differed greatly, with Young's function in the campaign becoming more conspicuous in black papers. Black press coverage of Andrew Young paralleled white press coverage of Jimmy Carter in terms of his movements, speeches and campaign activity. White papers provided more information about his background and the qualifications that made him valuable to Carter's campaign. The Black Press' Role in Carter's Campaign Carter's black press strategy differed tremendously from his white press strategy. He virtually ignored the black press as a group of working professionals but he still obtained very supportive cover age because he was too popular with too vast a segment of the black population to be opposed by the black press. It can be speculated that because blacks knew of Carter from television and white papers, they began their strong support trend in very early primaries only in 319 Southern caucuses where George Wallace was a factor and where the black leadership dictated the black voters remain uncommitted, did he not receive early primary support. During 1976 the coverage that Carter received in black papers was dictated by the black readership. If that readership wholeheartedly accepted Carter the papers were emphatic supporters. This was the case with the Amsterdam News, Pittsburgh Courier and Los Angeles Sentinel. If the readership was lukewarm, the paper, for example, the Chicago Defender, gravitated towards Carter with reservations. If the readership was totally against the established order; i.e., the Black Panther, then Carter received no support. Rev. Jesse Jackson, executive director of the Chicago-based Operation PUSH, was not toally impressed by Carter, and he remained a major influential factor in Chicago. By November, how ever, he endorsed Carter. Carter's popularity reached its peak in April, yet there was no evidence that he approached members of the black press corps for support. It was not until September that Ethel Payne, editor for the Pittsburgh Courier, conducted the only interview given to the black press and thus provided the first indication that black press members had access to him. His joint meeting with black editors and publish ers 1n Chevy Chase, Maryland in October was the final contact noted. It was not possible to measure the effects that black press coverage may have had in advancing Carter's popularity with blacks, since the study was not designed for that purpose. However, it is evident, as his popularity grew with blacks and as the press began to support him and bombard their pages with pro-Carter information, that each had a reciprocal effect upon the other. The coverage provided by 320 the Black Panther was also a contributory factor in making his name a household word in spite of its negative connotations. Once Carter's black popularity became evident the black papers gave continuned support. Following the "ethnic purity" gaffe they applauded his honesty and criticized anyone who admonished him. After he spoke before the National Black Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina he did not receive overwhelming endorsements from the dele gates but the black press conceded that his positions on the issues were in blacks' best interest. Walter Lowe, Jr.'s columns strength ened the fact that Carter's positions on issues were better for blacks' advancement. The coverage given in the aftermath of the Playboy incident lauded him for his courage and honesty. The black press "crusaded" for Carter all year and concluded the campaign year by endorsing him for president and by urging black voters to get out to the polls and vote for him. Thus, the role that the black press played in the 1976 election was defined in terms of Carter's popularity with blacks. The black campaign strategy that he devised was his most successful tool. The black press functioned as a supplementary instrument. Carter Campaign: A Political Analysis In 1976 Jimmy Carter accomplished a feat that very few white politicians had done previously. He managed to garner the support of over 94 percent of the black American voting public while virtually ignoring the traditional black leadership and black elected officials. Carter's accomplishment was due to two major factors. First, blacks were totally unorganized with the leadership hierarchy giving little 321 or no political guidance. Second, those blacks who strongly endorsed Carter were hold-overs from the more conservative, well-respected, established civil rights movement days. Thus, their decision to endorse Carter went unquestioned and unchallenged by the black majority. The Washington Post noted earlier than most of the other pub lications that the North Carolina caucus held within the election year should have occurred two years previously. It was too late to orga nize and to formulate policies because the candidates and the parties had already made their commitments. Carter's campaign strategy, therefore, enabled him to take advantage of blacks' disorganization. He, in essence, became the organizational factor. He sidestepped the more established leadership who, for the most part, distrusted him because of his Southern heri tage but who, as a collective body, hesitated to endorse any candidate. Carter personally went into black communities such as Harlem in New York and Watts in California and he held rallies in black churches across the country while many of the leaders were still quibbling about his sincerity. He, in turn, organized a cadre of community leaders such as the San Francisco ministers who built and maintained enthusiasm for his candidacy at the grassroots level. After becoming the official party candidate, he eventually won endorsements from some of the black elected officials but many of the major civil rights organ~zations denied him endorsements. Carter's biggest asset, however, was the endorsements that he received from two highly influential and very revered black individu als, Revs. Martin Luther King, Sr. and Andrew Young. These two 322 Southern Christian leaders provided the psychological factor that Carter, as a Southerner, needed to assure blacks that he was not reflective of the typical, bigoted Southern political stereotype. They also provided an additional psychological advantage. They kept most of the other outspoken black leaders from leveling a barrage of criticism at Carter, especially during the "ethnic purity" incident when their opposition should have been reverberated across the nation. Among the black leadership and black populace King was well known and well respected. The black leadership was fully aware that they would subject themselves to ostracism and isolation by their peers and their followers if they leveled criticisms at the father of a martyred civil rights leader. Very few were willing to risk that possibility; therefore, most remained silent, albeit non-supportive. Thus, the "ethnic purity" incident which should have alienated the black populace became the solidifying factor which served as the turning point in Carter's campaign to win black support. Carter gained King as a key supporter and more importantly he endeared him self to the black voting public. By issuing an apology he exhibited humility and expressed concern about the possibility of offending a minority population without having _to risk weakening his political position or offending and isolating his majority or white constituency with political promises to further black causes. 323 Black Press The black press of 1976 could have been the black press of 1948 when its contents were originally described by Vishu Oak. Most of the papers still use large, sensationalized banner heads; carry delayed news coverages because roost are printed ~1eekly; print informa tion frequently covered by and taken from other news sources and from wire services; emphasize local news with major emphasis on social and religious events; crusade for favored causes but suppress news and v~ews contrary to the papers' philosophy. It has ceased to be the powerful, influential source initially described by Gunnar Myrdal in the 40s. In fact, the editorial and opinions printed tend to reflect the general consensus of its reader ship as opposed to shaping public opinion. For example, most of the personal comments leveled at Carter during the "ethnic purity" f~asco echoed the comments made by King and Young at the Atlanta rally. Even those which were critical prior to the rally became less critical after. Popular opinion dominated again during the Playboy run when roost of the black papers ignored the issue rather than comment nega tively about it. The white press, on the other hand, carried an abun dance of coverage about several aspects of the controversy and predic ted his possible demise because of it. However, once the decision was made to endorse Carter, their crusading spirit ruled and each editor supported him overwhelmingly whenever any crisis arose. Roland Wolseley theorized in 1971 that the black press empha sized oppression-type coverages and it is still a mainstay. Early 324 news which followed George Wallace's candidacy focused upon those working for his demise; however, none of the papers recognized Carter's capacity to effect Wallace's defeat because the black leader ship had not provided any guidance. However, Wallace represented oppression which made good copy. The white press, however, had to provide information ignored by the black press such as the leadership schism which occurred and the rift which pitted factions against each other. As with the black leadership the black press did not wish to invoke ostracism by criti cizing King's and Young's decisions to support Jimmy Carter. It also refrained from encouraging meaningful debate among black leaders; therefore, Julian Bond's opposition to Carter was virtually ignored in black papers along with every other leader's opposition. In reporting national news coverage black papers virtually mirror each other. There is little competition among papers because most utilize the same columnists, the same w1re service and copy reprints from the same or similar sources, usually popular black maga zines such as Ebony and Jet. The Black Panther offered the opposing viewpoints, however, because its philosophy was so anti-establishment many of its views were fabricated and its editorialized news stories were objectionable for the sake of being critical. In its own way, it too fell within the characterizations applicable to the traditional black press. In 1Y76 the black press was also almost ignored by Carter. He placed a few political ads in most of the major papers just preceding the election. He met with the editors and publishers once and gave one exclusive interview to the Pittsburgh Courier. 325 The black press should have been effective 1n several areas. It would have forced Carter to be less "fuzzy" and more explicit about the types of commitments he proposed making to blacks upon whom he heavily depended for support. Instead it was reticent in reporting and protected his interest by not questioning his motives and by not feeding the right questions to its vast readership to ask. It was more concerned about preventing embarrassment to a few well-known leaders than it was in challenging all of those in leadership capaci ties to defend their positions by acting as leaders. It did not pro tect the public's interest by prodding those leaders to provide guidance to the populace, thus it shares the blame for allowing Carter to usurp what should have been black leadership authority. By not making any early commitments it allowed him to undercut any attempt at organizational effectiveness. The black press should have led; instead it followed. White Press The white press did a creditable job 1n reporting about black 1ssues in 1976. It is commendable that each paper attempted to carry black coverage and they were helpful 1n exposing some crucial black issues that black papers ignored such as the division in leadership and the mounting opposition by black leaders who objected to Carter's candidacy. They all realized that Carter's strategy included captur ing large black voting blocs and the press, in turn, managed to accu rately surmise what his black strategy was. However, because of cul tural and ethnic differences and because of the limited number of black staff writers, white press coverage was frequently superficial 326 and .shallow. The white press had an established precedent for obtaining representative viewpoints from pre-selected and identified black leaders. During 1976 they initially had problems correctly identify ing any one individual as a key spokesperson. They did not realize that the leadership was totally unorganized and was splitting into different factions. As a result, they reported incorrect information several times before discovering that Carter's "Atlanta connection" was the driving force which represented the most accurate viewpoint. It was evident throughout the year that the white press could not comprehend why blacks continued to defend Carter during times when they should have reprimanded him. During the "ethnic purity" incident they looked for signs of desertion only to discover the opposite had occurred. The black populace rallied behind him and they were sur prised. Later in the year when the Playboy interview surfaced the white press isolated one aspect, his comment about former President Johnson, about which they expected a black controversy to occur and again they were stunned when no controversy arose. In 1976 the white press began to focus its attention upon the significance of black voting power and learned that the entire racial group could no longer be represented or characterized by one spokes person. Suggestions for Further Study Based upon the information uncovered by this study, two suggestions emerge for additional study. 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I • APPENDIX 335 APPENDIX A STATISTICAL DATA OF SELECTED PAPERS BLACK PAPERS Circulation Figures City of Date LaBrae A9er Newspapers Publication Founded 1979 1...]1_ Chicago Daily Defender Chicago, IL 1905 25,000 (Daily) 20,691 25,000 (Weekend) Los Angeles Sentinel Los Angeles, CA 1934 34,000 32,884 N.Y. Amsterdam News New York, NY 1909 80,000 53,178 New Pittsburgh Courier Pittsburgh, PA 1910 18,000 16,405 Black Panther Oakland, CA 196 5 100,000 Not (for 1972) (No longer pub.) Avail. WHITE PAPERS Los Angeles Times Los Angeles, CA 1881 1,013,565 1,273,536 ~Sun~ 940,923 Sat San Francicso Chronicle San Francisco, CA 1865 157,709 667,335 ~Sun~ 121,570 Sat Chicago Tribune Chicago, IL 1847 780,626 1,147,699 ~Sun~ 664,600 Sat N.Y. Times New York, NY 1851 841,890 1,403,077 ~Sun~ 664,600 Sat Christian Science Monitor Boston, MA 1908 161,772 Washington Post Washington, D.C. 1877 578,831 809,403 ~Sun~ 538,007 Sat w w 0'\ 337 APPENDIX B CARTER'S POPULARITY CURVE 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% Jan Feb Mar Apr May June Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Carter's Popularity Fluctuation Curve as exhibited by black papers during 1976. Numbers on the left represent the percentage of the black population as gauged by the papers which appeared to support Carter.