Industrial & Labor Relations Review

Volume 62, Issue 3 2009 Article 2

Institutions and Activism: Crisis and Opportunity for a German Labor Movement in Decline

Lowell Turner∗

∗ILR Cornell, [email protected]

Copyright c 2008 Cornell University. All rights reserved. Institutions and Activism: Crisis and Opportunity for a German Labor Movement in Decline

Lowell Turner

Abstract

In recent decades, German unions have rested on their institutional laurels even as the ground has slipped away. This article analyzes two recent innovative campaigns based on grassroots mo- bilization that, the author argues, offer possibilities for renewed union strength. A breakthrough campaign against a militantly anti-union firm in the retail industry demonstrates the potential for a German brand of social movement unionism. The story line and institution-building strategy of this campaign fall entirely outside the framework of traditional German industrial relations. A second, very different campaign, from deep inside that traditional framework, has mobilized union members in Nordrhein-Westfalen (IG Metall’s largest district) for active engagement in contract negotiations and membership growth. Together, these two stories challenge existing perspectives on once stable German industrial relations, point toward inadequacies of prominent contempo- rary theories of institutional stability and change, and suggest constraints and opportunities for a German labor movement in need of strategic reorientation. INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVISM: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY FOR A GERMAN LABOR MOVEMENT IN DECLINE

LOWELL TURNER*

In recent decades, German unions have rested on their institutional laurels even as the ground has slipped away. This article analyzes two recent innovative campaigns based on grassroots mobilization that, the author argues, offer possibilities for renewed union strength. A breakthrough campaign against a militantly anti-union firm in the retail industry demonstrates the potential for a German brand of social movement unionism. The story line and institution-building strategy of this campaign fall entirely outside the framework of traditional German industrial relations. A second, very dif- ferent campaign, from deep inside that traditional framework, has mobilized union members in Nordrhein-Westfalen (IG Metall’s largest district) for active engagement in contract negotiations and membership growth. Together, these two stories chal- lenge existing perspectives on once stable German industrial relations, point toward inadequacies of prominent contemporary theories of institutional stability and change, and suggest constraints and opportunities for a German labor movement in need of strategic reorientation.

t the heart of the European labor move- and codetermination in a framework of social A ment are the German unions, and partnership—on which their power depends. especially the German Metalworkers Union For too long, German unions have rested (IG Metall), a powerful 2.3 million-member on their institutional laurels even as the organization that, more than any other single ground has been slipping away. Beyond the union, sets benchmark standards for collec- traditional institutional approaches, however, tive bargaining in Europe. For more than a innovative campaigns based on grassroots decade, however, German unions in a con- mobilization offer possibilities for a renewal text of global liberalization have confronted of union strength, in processes of both institu- declines in membership, bargaining power, tion building and institutional revitalization. and political influence; most important, they This article examines two such campaigns. have suffered a weakening of the labor institu- First, a breakthrough campaign in the tions—comprehensive collective bargaining retail branch of the service sector, against the militantly anti-union Schlecker drug store chain, demonstrates the potential for a German brand of social movement union- *The author is Professor of International & Compara- ism. The story line and institution-building tive Labor and Collective Bargaining, School of Industrial strategy of this campaign fall entirely outside and Labor Relations, Cornell University. For critical comments on earlier drafts of this article, he thanks the framework of traditional industrial rela- Lee Adler, Martin Behrens, Michael Fichter, Ian Greer, tions in the archetypal German “coordinated Marco Hauptmeier, Chris Howell, Otto Jacobi, Jeffrey market economy.” Raffo, Britta Rehder, Wolf-Jürgen Röder, Wolfgang Second, a very different campaign, from Streeck, and Maite Tapia. The Hans-Böckler-Stiftung deep inside the traditional framework of labor provided generous funding to support the research on which this article is based. institutions, has mobilized union members

Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 62, No. 3 (April 2009). © by Cornell University. 0019-7939/00/6203 $01.00

294 INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVISM 295 for active engagement in contract nego- ties make activist strategies credible and allow tiations and membership growth—another those strategies to gain both leadership and dramatic break with the traditions of German grassroots support—typically as a product industrial relations. In Nordrhein-Westfalen, of internal organizational debate. Unions, IG Metall’s largest district, a new strategic however, may or may not take advantage of orientation offers promise for institutional opportunities. In the end, organizations and revitalization. individuals can and do make unpredictable Together, these two stories challenge ex- decisions that matter.2 isting perspectives on once stable German The argument is framed by a brief look industrial relations, and in so doing point at German labor’s postwar rise and decline, toward inadequacies of prominent contem- followed by contemporary case studies that porary theories of institutional stability and demonstrate potential for renewal. Espe- change. At the same time, they suggest both cially important in this regard are the late constraints and opportunities for a German 1960s and early 1970s, a period when social labor movement in need of strategic reori- movement turmoil threatened the stability entation. of economic, social, and political institutions of all kinds, and a period that demonstrates The Argument: Institutions and Activism in dramatic fashion the significance of social context for the revitalization of unions and Apparently stable institutions, economic, labor institutions. political, and social, have been shaped in past processes of conflict and negotiation, and in German Unions and the Social Movements the present are subject to continuing, often of the Late 1960s and Early 1970s intense pressures that can result in incremen- tal and eventually even transformative change After the horrors of the second World (Thelen 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005b). War, West Germany, with Allied support, for the first time in its history pulled together Little by little, and sometimes more rapidly, 3 institutions may lose their shaping influence the ingredients for stable democracy. One even as actors carry on in established chan- central element was a new structure of unitary nels of interaction. For unions and other unions, sixteen non-competing industrial actors committed to social regulation of a unions to divide up the private and public market economy, institutional erosion can be sectors of the economy, linked together in one debilitating. If institutions are not defended, common labor federation. In negotiations reformed, or revitalized, the anchors that with employer association counterparts, these protect and advance the interests of social unions would in time provide comprehen- actors can drift away. sive collective bargaining coverage to most In a market economy, coordinated or liber- West German workers. Another ingredient, al, labor institutions must arguably be shored the works councils, appeared spontane- up in periodic episodes or campaigns based ously in workplaces after the war, building on grassroots mobilization.1 This necessity, on revolutionary and Weimar legacies, and which on its face may seem onerous or even were formally incorporated in legislation of debilitating, is also a virtue—a resource for 1952 and 1972. Together, comprehensive revitalization that employers cannot match. Such activist, as opposed to traditional, union strategies emerge when actors take advantage 2To clarify, the dependent variable is the emergence of of opportunity located in social context and innovative, grassroots-based union strategies, as opposed to institutional openings. Particular opportuni- their relative success, a related but entirely different ques- tion. Indications of the latter are noted along the way, but the analysis presented here centers on emergence. 3This section is revised and updated from an earlier 1There are, of course, exceptions, as in Scandinavian comparative analysis of unions and social movements countries, where labor institutions are unusually com- in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany prehensive and deeply entrenched. (Turner 2003:36–40). 296 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW collective bargaining and codetermination, movement that had proliferated in the wake of including significant labor representation on the Grand Coalition, but must also be seen as part the supervisory boards of large companies, of the worldwide upsurge in youth protest against became the institutional pillars of strong the Vietnam War accompanied by a neo-Marxist unionism and stable industrial relations in the critique of the international capitalist system. (Berghahn and Karsten 1987:210) postwar period (Markovits 1986; Katzenstein 1987:125–67). Unlike the close relationship between stu- While it may appear to some observers dent and labor protest in France in 1968, the that postwar institution building in West two movements remained quite separate in Germany had little to do with democratic or Germany. Labor unrest took shape in wildcat grassroots mobilization, the opposite is true strike waves of 1969, 1971, and 1973. The (Turner 2003:36–40). Postwar codetermina- result in the unions was shopfloor pressure on tion built on the legacy of the works councils leaders to make more aggressive demands. As that were institutionalized in 1920 as part of Berghahn and Karsten (1987:211) put it, “The a deal to suppress the 1918–19 revolutionary response of the union leaders to the incipient movement of workers and soldiers. After the rank-and-file radicalism was a traditional one: second World War, grassroots efforts by Ger- they put themselves at the head of the move- man workers re-established the works councils ment in an attempt to channel it.” In other that Hitler had abolished in 1933. And a more words, they rode a wave that forced them to strategic mobilization by German unions in incorporate rank-and-file demands, to bring the 1950s undercut employer efforts to turn aboard new shopfloor leaders including, in works councils into “company unions.” some cases, foreign workers, and to push for What prevented union decline in the face stronger union and works council rights in of challenges from a conservative government the workplace.4 And such rights were soon that came to power in 1982, at a time when legislated, in 1972 and 1976 codetermination unions in the United States and United King- revisions, by a Social Democratic government dom, at the dawn of the Thatcher/Reagan elected in 1969 with labor’s support (Thelen era, were already in full retreat? German 1992). The 1972 legislation amended the unions had been revitalized in three signifi- Works Constitution Act and was especially cant ways. The first was institutional. After important for strengthening ties between the disappointment of 1952 codetermination works councils and unions. 1976 legislation legislation that drew sharp lines between increased the numbers of labor represen- unions and works councils, unions mobilized tatives on the supervisory boards of large at the grassroots to run slates of candidates German firms. in works council elections. By the 1960s, in Social movement context was obviously a a process that would only deepen, unions critical factor in the strengthening of labor had largely taken over the works councils, institutions in the 1970s. Necessary, per- in effect turning these legally protected bod- haps, but not enough: other elements of ies to their own purposes. In so doing, the opportunity were also important. A divided unions established two mutually reinforcing federal government, the Grand Coalition of institutional structures for their bargaining 1966–69, followed by the election of the first agenda and influence: comprehensive col- postwar Social Democrat–led government, lective bargaining at the industry level and provided institutional openings for unions codetermination at the firm level. to use shopfloor militancy and political clout The second source of revitalization, espe- to escalate demands—demands that success- cially important for the argument presented fully reformed labor institutions. And finally, here, came with the social movements of the unions engaged in internal debates in a con- late 1960s and early 1970s. In one recounting:

Unrest spread at the shop-floor level, which finally 4A 1973 wildcat strike at the Ford plant in Cologne exploded in a wave of spontaneous unofficial was viewed as a transformative event and still referred strikes in September 1969. Dissatisfaction in to by both works councilors and managers 20 years later the factories was fanned by the left-wing student as the “Turk strike” (author interviews). INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVISM 297 text in which credible strategic alternatives SEIU president John Sweeney to hire social contended. After first blocking grassroots movement activists, launching the organiz- pressure, some unions, including the pattern- ing momentum for what is now the largest setting IG Metall, gave way to suppressed union in North America. For the most part, rank-and-file demands. Those choices, given however, unions in the United States missed new opportunities located in social context the historic opportunity for a renewal of and institutional openings, strengthened the strength, sorely needed in the face of an hand of unions in their successful efforts at escalating employer offensive that would institution building.5 result in a rout by the 1980s. The West German labor movement found new vitality in the social movement context The Crisis of the Contemporary of the 1960s in yet another way. As the social German Labor Movement movements subsided in the 1970s, a cohort of For German unions, 35 years have passed young activists found union jobs in a variety since the last period of social movement of different positions and capacities. By the revitalization. Are successful strategies of 1990s, a “long march through the institutions” recent decades sufficient in an era of global had brought some of them to positions of liberalization and neoliberal governance, power and influence. Such leaders would, when employers and the state are increas- for example, play an important role in the ingly determined to push back union influ- Schlecker campaign described below. ence? Are strong institutions and top-down The revitalization of German unions in strategies enough to ward off decline? Is the the social movement context of the 1960s traditional emphasis on wage policy enough? and 1970s stands in sharp contrast to the The answers have to be negative (compare absence of revitalization in the same period Menz 2005; Schnabel 2005; Streeck 2005; in the United States. For reasons including IG Metall 2008). Union membership den- conservative leadership and cold war anti- sity and collective bargaining coverage have communism, labor leaders in the United declined steadily since the mid-1990s (Visser States to a large extent blocked off unions 2006; Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner 2006; from the social movements and their revi- Bispinck 2008).7 Employer associations, the talization potential (Turner 2003:40–47). union bargaining partners for comprehensive There were, to be sure, exceptions: the collective bargaining, have also been losing Memphis sanitation workers strike in 1968, membership density and the coherence of a for example, in which civil rights and labor unified strategy (Schröder and Silvia 2006:9; movements converged in a path-breaking 6 Thelen and Kume 2006). Unions remain victory; and the willingness of national influential in German society thanks to an entrenched institutional position, especially in the manufacturing industries of the world’s 5 Wolfgang Streeck (2005:141–42) makes the argu- leading export nation. Yet IG Metall was ment that unions used their increased power in the 1960s and 1970s to advance the interests of their own weakened in 2003 in a failed strike effort, members rather than the broader work force and soci- a defeat that can be understood partly as a ety. In this and subsequent bargaining rounds German result of union leaders’ reliance on traditional unions thus placed added burdens on the welfare state, institutions and strategies.8 German unions contributing in the long run to failed economic and social policy (resulting in part from “private use of the public interest”). If this is true, unions can hardly be 7Overall union membership density dropped from faulted for responding to the demands of their members 29.2% in 1995 to 22.65% in 2003 (Visser 2006:45). From to use increased bargaining power to raise wages, as for 1998 to 2006, collective bargaining coverage dropped reasons of internal politics they must do. Like the rest of from 76% to 65% in western Germany and from 63% to us, unions have no crystal ball; and they also used their 54% in the east. For Germany as a whole, 63% of the work political power to expand the universal benefits of the force was covered by collective bargaining agreements welfare state, funded to a large extent through higher in 2006: 54% of these in industry sector contracts and payroll tax receipts made possible by higher wages. 9% in firm-level contracts (Bispinck 2008:7). 6See, for example, the extraordinary documentary 8In 2003, in a collective bargaining campaign demand- film “At the River I Stand,” Newsreel 1993. ing a shorter work week in eastern Germany, to match 298 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW from 2003 to 2008 played a popular but ized bargaining structures collapsed and largely reactive role in defending the welfare ver.di (the consolidated service and public state. And over time, declining membership sector workers’ union) was forced to make can only mean declining influence even as unpopular working time concessions; and unions retain a (weakened) insider role in the absence (with important exceptions) of the institutions of social partnership (Fichter effective strategies to address European and 2003; Greer 2006, 2007). global economic integration. German unions for the most part have Union leaders are aware of and could not developed successful strategies to re- perhaps take some lessons from current orga- cruit new members, from young workers in nizing and campaigning strategies, especially manufacturing to women in retail services the emphasis on grassroots mobilization, in and call centers to young professionals in the American and British labor movements— information technology industries (Schnabel adapted to their own circumstances (Raffo 2005). They have recognized the problem, 2007; Schreider 2007a; IG Metall 2008). Ger- discussed it widely, held conferences, and man unions have far greater resources at their unproductively complained at length about disposal should they move in such a direc- individualistic young workers and passive tion. They have institutional protections that easterners. For the most part, however, they could provide a strong platform for strategic have not moved beyond existing approaches: innovation, in cases where this might make exhorting over-extended works councilors to sense. Those same institutions, however, in sign up members and exploiting situations providing the security of established channels of collective bargaining conflict and political of representation, also provide disincentives protest to bring in new members. Time-tested for innovation (see also Hassel 2007). traditional strategies come up short in the There are good reasons to resist a grass- face of current challenges. roots-oriented shift in strategy: the expense Indications that the German labor move- is great and funds must be reallocated from ment is in crisis are abundant and obvious. somewhere else (and in the German case, They include declining membership den- that “somewhere else” may itself be well sity and bargaining coverage; inability to positioned institutionally); union leaders set consolidate and expand union presence in in their ways must be persuaded or pushed circumstances of continuing economic cri- out; an influx of new members with fresh sis in the eastern part of unified Germany; demands can destabilize an organization failure to organize expanding sectors of the and challenge existing leadership. It may economy such as private services, including be that German unions, with still substan- low-wage occupations such as retail clerks, tial institutional anchors, are simply not security guards, call center employees, and desperate enough to move toward the risky janitors; the high-profile collapse of worker innovations of a more activist model—even and public support for a 2003 strike in if such strategic reforms are necessary to eastern Germany led by the pattern-setting reverse decline (Behrens, Fichter, and Frege German Metalworkers Union; welfare state 2003; Annesley 2006). That some German cutbacks in areas such as health coverage, unions are experimenting with new strategies unemployment insurance, and retirement, indicates that innovation is possible in the actively but ineffectively opposed by unions contemporary context. Will it take broader whose efforts, in spite of alternative proposals, social movement pressure, from inside as well have appeared largely reactive;9 a protracted as outside the labor movement, to accelerate public sector strike in 2006, in which central- the process and provide the force necessary for appropriate institutional reform? Must German unions wait for the unpredictable standards in the west, IG Metall suffered its first major Godot of a new social movement wave? strike defeat in 50 years (see below). 9“Ineffectively” should be qualified by the widely German unions owe their strength, in held view that vast union-led demonstrations may well part, to the effect of past social movements in have set limits on further reform. building and revitalizing institutions. As a re- INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVISM 299 sult, unions remain institutionally anchored tions showed both undercutting of existing within the German political economy—so contracts and violations of law. Union ef- well anchored, in fact, that the urgent need forts on behalf of the employees met with for new strategies may go unmet. The two no response from the company. When the stories that follow illustrate exceptions, in- death of an employee exposed unsafe work- novations that may offer German unions a ing conditions (in this case, no telephone to way out. The first case demonstrates strate- call for help in a life-threatening emergency), gic organizing potential in low-wage private labor practices at Schlecker received national services. The second case shows the poten- attention. In the ensuing eight months, the tial for the revitalization of worker interest union developed a broad campaign that representation in high-wage manufacturing. would bring company abuses to the public The cases involve, respectively, ver.di and IG eye, embolden employees, and force major Metall, the two large unions that dominate concessions on their behalf. the German labor landscape. Details are many, but the essence of the story is this. Schlecker is a nationwide Ger- Institution Building in the German Retail man company consisting of mini-stores, often Sector: The Schlecker and Lidl Campaigns with no more than five employees. As of 1993, the rapidly growing company’s 22,500 Several years before the 2001 merger employees were spread across the country in that created ver.di, Germany’s consolidated 4,250 stores (Huhn 2001:24). The workers service workers union, a remarkable cam- were and are mostly women, many working paign led by HBV (banking, insurance, and part-time, isolated from employees in other retail union) offered an alternative model stores. Schlecker made its profits in part by for contemporary union strategy, bringing paying the lowest possible wages and provid- social movement activism to a German labor 10 ing minimal working conditions. Company campaign. The effort was led by a small practice as of 1994 was to discourage any group of union and rank-and-file activists employee effort to exercise legally mandated employing a range of tactics that together codetermination rights, with works councils amount to what in the United States would present in only a very small number of stores. be called a comprehensive campaign. As the HBV campaign developed, attention The story begins early in 1994 when HBV centered on fighting company abuses in pay officials in the Mannheim office were ap- and working conditions as well as establishing proached by several employees of Schlecker, elected works councils to enforce agreements a nationwide chain of small drug stores, a and negotiate improvements. company with a well-deserved reputation for In response to aggressive company oppo- opposition to any works councils or union 11 sition, including intimidation of employees presence. Pay records and working condi- and the firing of activists, HBV leaders in Mannheim and Heidelberg, led by local 10Ver.di was formed in 2001 by a merger of five unions: union president Anton Kobel, developed ÖTV (public sector, largest of the five merged unions), step-by-step a campaign both broad and DPG (postal and telecommunications), HBV (banking, insurance, and retail), IG Medien (media, printing) sophisticated. In contrast to established and DAG (white-collar). Since then, the merged union German labor practices based on relations of has alternated with IG Metall as the largest German social partnership punctuated by occasional union. In 2007, IG Metall membership was 2.31 million collective bargaining conflict, this campaign compared to ver.di’s 2.21 million (as reported by EIRO built on an explicit logic of social movement online, April 22, 2008—http://www.eurofound.europa. 12 eu/eiro/2008/03/articles/de0803019i.htm). unionism. Key tactics included active em- 11The Schlecker story told here is based on interviews with a number of participants and observers, including Anton Kobel and Uli Wohland, who played leading roles 12Unlike the broader social movements that rise and in the campaign; conversations with labor researchers fall in unpredictable historical waves, “social movement and academic observers; and news reports, documents, unionism” refers to a strategic orientation that privileges and publications such as Huhn (2001); Bremme, Fürniss, activist efforts such as grassroots mobilization and social and Meinecke (2007); Bormann (2008). coalition building. 300 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW ployee engagement, press conferences, legal a regional basis, adherence to collective bar- proceedings, political pressure, and social gaining contract provisions with verification networks that built support from a variety of by the Labor Ministry, and the withdrawal of social actors. Extensive publicity included the legal action against activist employees. In “shaming” of Anton and Christa Schlecker 1995 and the years following, works councils in the courts and in the public realm. The were established in regions across Germany, death of an employee helped expose company not everywhere but in enough areas with practices that drew Schlecker customers into enough employee participation to become an extensive letter-writing campaign and a meaningful workplace bargaining partners. A de facto boycott that cut sales by up to 40% general works council drawn from the regions in some areas. Priests, ministers, politicians, negotiated company-wide agreements with and community leaders declared themselves top management. In 2000, the union and “godparents,” protectors of employees active company signed a multiyear contract (“An- in the campaign. nerkennungsvertrag”), above and beyond the Given the significance of codetermina- sector-wide collective bargaining contract, tion in the German dual system of industrial that provided for regularized company rec- relations, union efforts to support the estab- ognition of works councils. lishment of works councils were especially The picture is not all rosy. In subsequent important. As do American companies in years, Schlecker management renewed union organizing drives, Schlecker fought aggressive efforts aimed at hindering the the union’s efforts not only through threats establishment of new works councils. To to employees who stepped forward as works weaken existing works councils, the company council candidates but also in jurisdictional pressured employees and played works coun- battles. Given the small size of each store, cilors off against each other, encouraging the union demanded that the company sign conflict between pro-company and pro-union a contract that would enable employees to set advocates in the work force (Bormann 2008). up regional works councils covering a number Nonetheless, independent worker interest of stores, with enough employees to make representation remained firmly established representation meaningful. The company in- throughout the company. By 2005, about sisted on works councils for individual stores, a third of Schlecker stores in Germany had effectively stripping each small employee works council representation (see von���� Z�g��- group of any real power in relation to man- lincki 2005:9). As of 2007, about 100 works agement. As part of the broader campaign, councils represented employees throughout the union unilaterally established regional the company, and the general works council works councils, made up of employees in had proven itself a strong bargaining partner several areas of Germany willing to run for for management (Bormann 2008). While election and serve as works councilors even dramatic breakthroughs lay in the past, in the face of continuing company refusal efforts to build more works councils and to recognize the new representative bodies. recruit union members persisted in the face The campaign intensified through the fall of company opposition. of 1994 and winter of 1995. Facing severe What explains the emergence of innovative losses of its customer base and reputation, union strategy at Schlecker? While causation Schlecker’s aggressive opposition gradually cannot be established on the basis of one case gave way to concessions regarding working study, the evidence points toward opportunity conditions and the enforcement of pay structure (in social context and institutional standards. Surrounded on all sides by legal, openings) and actor choice. The social context political, community, union, and employee included two critical elements: the growing opposition, the company finally backed entry of women into the German work force, down. In March 1995, the HBV national especially in low-paid service sector jobs such office in Düsseldorf signed an agreement as retail sales; and the presence of numer- with Schlecker that included recognition of ous social groups, some with backgrounds in works councils established at Schlecker on environmental, peace, women’s, and other INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVISM 301 movements, ready to take up the increas- of employees who approached ver.di for help, ingly salient issue of economic injustice. union research exposed Lidl abuses, includ- Institutional openings included two contrast- ing low pay, violations of law, pressure on ing elements. First, the space for innovation employees not to engage in union activities was wide open: no existing structures of (including the firing of outspoken campaign representation at Schlecker blocked the way, supporters), and shifting ownership patterns nor did entrenched union leadership or set that undermined employee efforts to set up strategy (in a sector that unions had largely works councils. Lidl ranked as the fourth larg- ignored). Second, German labor institu- est retail firm in Germany and was spreading tions—comprehensive collective bargaining, rapidly across Europe in a web of trusts and codetermination, education and training cross-holdings. The size and range of the rights for works councilors—provided a vi- company and its parent group allowed for able basis on which to build, once the union an extensive anti-union repertoire of tactics decided to do this. and at the same time raised the stakes for Finally, HBV leadership in Mannheim union organizing. made the choice in 1994 to throw its energies The union’s comprehensive campaign in- into a major campaign at Schlecker, in a cluded the development of a core of activists comprehensive effort based on the lessons of in the company work force as well as social past social movements. Key “Mannheimers” networks of support. The union brought Lidl had backgrounds in the social movements of abuses into the public sphere with press con- the 1960s and subsequent social justice cam- ferences and the publication of Schwarzbuch paigns of various types. They had the requisite Lidl in late 2004 (Hamann and Giese 2004), inclination and experience and were ready and by 2005 the campaign was in full swing. for the opportunity that presented itself. As at Schlecker, the union framed the issue When HBV merged into ver.di in 2001, in terms of social justice and won backing the new national president Frank Bsirske from religious, human rights, global justice, praised HBV in Mannheim and the Schlecker and women’s groups as well as prominent campaign as a model for future union work individuals from politics and society. Ver. in the service sector.13 In 2004, building on di activists developed the Lidl campaign the Schlecker experience, ver.di launched a explicitly based on the lessons of the earlier similar campaign at a larger target, Lidl, a Schlecker experience; explanations for the chain of supermarkets with 40,000 employees emergence of the new campaign are similar in 2,600 German stores (Schreider 2007b).14 in substance and can be located in social The immediate goal at Lidl was the same as context, untapped institutional possibility in at Schlecker: to set up works councils in the a wasteland of representation, and strategic face of aggressive opposition from an anti- choice (itself a product of organizational union company. In response to the concerns debate inside ver.di). The union committed to a three-year cam- paign. At the end of the third year (2007–8), however, the company continued to resist 13See, for example, an interview with Frank Bsirske called “veni, vidi-ver.di,” Hamburger Abendblatt, March the establishment of works councils. Several 10, 2001, p. 2. hundred employees had joined the union, 14Data supplied by ver.di, December 2005. Infor- many more had gained new awareness of mation on the Lidl campaign comes from a variety of company policies and organizing possibilities, sources, including interviews with campaign leader Agnes Schreider and other ver.di officials; documents and a foundation now existed for potential and web sites such as htpp://lidl.verdi.de, htpp://lidl. future mobilization. Although the campaign verdi.de/lidl/international, and http://lidl.verdi.de/ still lacked a breakthrough similar to labor’s international/english; news reports such as Dougherty accomplishments in the Schlecker case, (2006); the ver.di publication Schwarzbuch Lidl (named significant victories in Stuttgart-Feuerbach for company owner Daniel Schwarz; Hamann and Giese 2004), translated and published in English as the Black and Hamburg in late 2007 and Rennigen Book on Lidl in Europe in 2006. See also ver.di (2007); bei Stuttgart in 2008 reflected local union Röhlk (2008). mobilization, and brought to seven the total 302 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW number of Lidl stores with works council In part, absence of support for the strategic representation (Röhlk 2008).15 innovations of a social movement unionism Thus even as ver.di took major hits in the reflects continuing internal turmoil and nationwide public sector strike in 2006, the staff cutbacks in a vast union, under siege on union made only limited progress in expand- many fronts and still grappling with issues of ing segments of retail sales. While the focus focus and resource allocation in the wake of here is on identifying and explaining the the problematic merger of five very differ- emergence of innovative strategy rather than ent unions in 2001 (Pieper 2007:26). The its relative success, the evidence also points to Schlecker victory stands out as an exception two factors that help explain limited progress in an overall picture of minimal strategic at Lidl and at Schlecker after the initial vic- innovation and campaign success in rapidly tory: intensive counter-mobilization by the growing retail sales occupations in which target company, especially at Lidl, and a weak worker representation is weak or altogether national union commitment of resources and absent (Jacobi 2003; Dribbusch 2005). Key staff. Since unions have no control over the elements of an opportunity structure are first of these variables, at least initially, the present. Expanded union commitment of second is especially important. The successful resources and mobilization is arguably the Schlecker campaign was grounded in grass- missing ingredient. The Schlecker cam- roots mobilization initiated by a local union paign offers a demonstration of innovative, and later supported at national headquarters, potentially successful strategy, there for the aimed at a relatively unsuspecting target. In taking yet largely neglected by national union the face of strategic counter-mobilization leadership. In spite of considerable interest at Lidl, the union required a much greater in grassroots-based strategies, ver.di’s pri- commitment of resources and support. Al- mary efforts continued to follow traditional though some local unions participated en- channels that to a significant extent are no thusiastically, staff could typically direct effort longer adequate to contemporary challenges at the Lidl campaign only as one of several (Annesley 2006; Bormann 2008). assignments. And the same was true at the national level, where resource commitment Institutional Revitalization at IG Metall: for such intensive campaigns is especially Member Mobilization, 2004–2008 important. Even as ver.di designated the Lidl campaign a high-profile priority, only a small After prolonged membership decline and number of union staff were assigned to the a major strike defeat in 2003, the German campaign, and none of them were assigned Metalworkers Union began in 2004 to move on a full-time basis.16 actively toward a new strategy of member en- gagement, a significant departure from past 15While only seven out of 2,600 Lidl stores in Ger- practice. Unlike the Schlecker campaign, many had works councils as of spring 2008, successes in the new approach did not include coalition Stuttgart and Hamburg, in the face of strong company building outside the union. Member mobi- opposition, demonstrated the potential of grassroots lization, however, indicated a significant shift mobilization, led in these cases by determined local activists. toward a more grassroots-based unionism, 16Information supplied by ver.di officials and external directed in part at revitalizing a weakened campaign supporters. As a point of comparison, the yet still substantial institutional base. United Food and Commercial Workers in the United The central union demand in the failed States committed sixty full-time organizers to a supermarket collective bargaining campaign and strike organizing campaign that began in 2007 in Arizona (au- thor interviews in Tempe, March 2008). At 1.4 million of 2003 aimed at bringing work hours in members, the UFCW is considerably smaller than ver. eastern Germany down to the 35 hours- di. Parallel commitments of staff have been made in per-week standard in western metalworking the United States by SEIU in Justice for Janitors cam- contracts. A full analysis of the defeat is paigns and by UNITE HERE in Hotel Workers Rising. To re-emphasize the dimensions of this difference, ver. beyond the scope of the present analysis, but di’s national office as of early 2008 had committed not clearly an aggressive employer strategy that a single full-time organizer to the Lidl campaign. moved beyond traditional social partnership INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVISM 303 relations drove the outcome (Raess 2006). 600,000 members the largest in IG Metall, in Strategic failure, however, must also be laid July 2004.20 Among other things, the union at the doorstep of union leadership.17 The faced two interrelated problems: employer outcome of the strike included not only a undercutting of the established collective bar- retreat from highly publicized bargaining gaining contract, and membership decline. demands but also a collapse of member The new strategy centered on the participa- support for the strike in both east and west. tion of union members in workplace and The union‘s failure to develop a coherent, company-level negotiations. In a context of winning strategy appeared linked to an on- employer demands for further flexibility and going leadership battle following the retire- increased work hours, two member demands ment of IG Metall president Klaus Zwickel, came to the fore: maintaining job security a struggle that intensified after the defeat. and enhancing training rights. Member Jürgen Peters, architect of the failed strike participation was driven in part by an expan- strategy, won a narrow election victory, but sion of company-level negotiations that far only with an agreement on succession for his exceeded the capabilities of union staff. reform-oriented opponent Berthold Huber. The logic unfolded as follows. When firms Arguably more significant for the future of sought to undercut the contract in response the union, however, was the emergence of to competitive pressures, real or alleged, new leadership and strategic orientation in union members joined works councilors and a critical IG Metall stronghold.18 IG Metall representatives in company-level The story begins in a small city called Sie- negotiations.21 Enhanced opportunities for gen, on the outskirts of Nordrhein-Westfalen firm-specific bargaining were mandated in in the industrial heartland of Germany. Be- a three-year agreement between IG Metall tween 1993 and 1999, the local union had lost and Gesamtmetall signed at Pforzheim in 4,000 members. Beginning in 1999, under the 2004.22 When companies left the employer leadership of Detlef Wetzel, the local began in- association or sought modifications of the tensive discussion with works councilors and industry contract, elected work force com- experimented with approaches that in time mittees would insist on training rights and added up to a new strategy to rebuild union employment security in return for short-term membership and renew union influence at concessions on pay and work hours. Bring- the firm level. With an emphasis on member ing in shopfloor leaders made bargaining engagement in firm-level bargaining and the transparent and credible to members, thereby active recruitment of new union members, easing works council legitimacy problems that the strategy yielded positive results. By 2003, result from “co-management” in a period of Siegen became one of a small number of IG concession bargaining (Rehder 2006). Fre- Metall local unions in Germany to round the quently intense negotiations served as a basis corner from declining membership levels to stabilization and the beginnings of growth.19 In large measure as a product of this lo- cal success, Wetzel was elected head of the 20IG Metall district chiefs are elected not by union members but by the national executive board. Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW) district, with 21As members of the metal industry employer as- sociation, Gesamtmetall, most large employers and their employees in metal and electronic industries are 17See Fichter (2003) for a concise analysis of the strike covered by region-wide contracts (patterned nationally). defeat and its consequences. See also Raess (2006). Firms in need can use “opening clauses” to negotiate 18The story presented below is based on a variety of concessions with their own works councils, or they can sources, including interviews with IG Metall officials leave the employer association or join a new association in Dortmund, Düsseldorf, Wuppertal, Cologne, and category that does not require adherence to the sector Frankfurt; conversations with academic observers; IG agreement (Schröder and Silvia 2006). Metall, WSI, DGB, and EIRO web sites; and news articles 22For a summary of the agreement, see http://www. such as Roth (2006), Hildebrand (2006), and Badekow eiro.eurofound.ie/2004/03/feature/de0403203f.html. (2007). See also Viering (2007) and IG Metall (2008). The IG Metall web page for the 2004 Pforzheim (Baden- 19Data supplied by IG Metall, Nordrhein-Westfalen Württemberg) agreement is http://www.bw.igm.de/ district office. news/meldung.html?id=645. 304 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW for the recruitment of new members. Gains campaigns and negotiations, to win their in training rights and employment security support and build union membership and made other concessions more palatable. participation. Together, the regional office The mobilization of participation added a and local branches set member recruitment new element to discretionary company-level targets and monitored progress on a regular negotiation options. basis. NRW leadership summed up its strategy Member and works council engagement as a “member-centered offensive,” with three served another purpose. Because the union key elements (Wetzel 2007): Tarif Aktiv (ac- did not have the manpower to negotiate tive bargaining)—aggressive negotiations at simultaneously on behalf of work forces the firm level, with active member participa- at dozens of firms, works councilors, not tion, to keep firms within the framework of to mention workers, often felt neglected sector collective bargaining contracts, or at by overtaxed local, regional, and national the very least to negotiate acceptable com- union leadership. In a context of economic pany agreements; besser statt billiger (better globalization, employer threats to outsource not cheaper)—a proactive commitment to or relocate production undermined bargain- working with firms to raise product quality ing power and forced works councilors to ac- and productivity, drawing on present and cept concessions (Raess and Burgoon 2006). future work force knowledge and skills, and Training works councilors and members to in some cases bringing in outside experts in fight their own battles raised morale, made production reorganization; and membership settlements acceptable even when conces- growth—the mobilization of works councilors, sions proved unavoidable, and expanded the union stewards, and members to recruit new capacity of works councils and local union members, with membership growth as the offices (Viering 2007). And the agreements, litmus test for the overall success of strategic where companies proved willing, aimed to reorientation. strengthen labor-management collaboration Wetzel and colleagues argued that worker on new bases that offered promise for the participation, aggressive negotiations, job prospects of struggling firms (“besser statt preservation, and new training opportuni- billiger”). The elements of the new approach ties would strengthen membership loyalty added up to a proactive union strategy to to the union. At the same time, the union regain the initiative, close off the low road trained works councilors and members to tempting German employers, and push Ger- build on conflict, negotiations, and accept- man industry along its high-road trajectory.23 able outcomes to recruit new members. A By mid-2005, NRW innovations had at- subjective yet significant aspect of strategic tracted attention throughout IG Metall. reorientation included what Americans Other regions and local offices had also be- might call a “can-do” attitude. After years of gun to experiment with similar approaches. uphill struggle against membership decline Reflecting the growing influence of the new and company-level concession bargaining, IG Metall leaders and works councilors had in many cases become defensive and even 23On the growing competitiveness of German high- defeatist, falling into a rhetoric of blame end products in world markets, making Germany the aimed at employers, outsourcing, globaliza- world leader in exports by 2005 (ahead of the United tion, government policy, individualistic young States, Japan, and China), see, for example, Benoit and Milne (2006) and Landler (2007). Export strength and workers, apathetic members, and free-riding renewed economic growth provided a supportive con- non-union workers. Wetzel insisted on a posi- text for the development of proactive union strategies tive approach from union representatives at of recruitment and engagement. On the other hand, all levels. The task at hand was not to gripe employers expanded employment by hiring contingent and complain but to lead and inspire. The workers (temporary, part-time, and agency-provided) and sub-contracting work, thus limiting the positive ef- role of union leaders at regional and local fects of economic growth for union member recruiting levels, including works councilors elected efforts and arguably increasing the need for strategic on union slates, was to bring members into innovation such as grassroots mobilization. INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVISM 305 member-centered approach, Detlef Wetzel prehensive collective bargaining, vocational was elected national vice-president of IG training, labor courts—continued to provide Metall at the union’s congress in Leipzig in a foundation on which to promote innovative November 2007. In May 2008, an internal strategies. Divisions among employers in document charted the national union’s shift their strategies toward unions, moving more to a member-centered organizing strategy or less away from established relations of so- (IG Metall 2008). Ironically, the paper em- cial partnership, also provided institutional phasized learning from American unions, openings. Institutions thus provided oppor- using English language terminology to call tunity both in openings for innovation and for a shift from traditional top-down, service- established anchors on which to build. This oriented “business unionism” to a “social opportunity structure stands in sharp contrast movement unionism” based on member to the situation in the United States, where mobilization.24 Beyond basic concepts, the unions have exploited openings for strategic new strategic orientation was reflected in spe- innovation but in the more difficult context, cific campaign tactics, targets, and goals—to in many cases, of an institutional wasteland organize, for example, the growing numbers (Turner 2007b). Grassroots mobilization of temporary workers in metal and electron- developed in the German metalworking in- ics industries (Niemann-Findeisen 2008). dustry essentially as a strategy for the renewal What accounts for the emergence of new of insider influence.25 strategy rooted in rank-and-file mobiliza- Where labor institutions retain substantial tion? The most obvious explanation lies with strength, social context may not matter as the rise of new leadership advocating and much. Still, high unemployment and job implementing innovative approaches. Stra- insecurity made workers and their represen- tegic reorientation, however, did not occur tatives increasingly open to new ideas, from out of the blue. Factors such as prolonged both left and right. A sense of crisis fueled membership decline and social policy cut- feelings of helplessness, fear of status loss, backs called traditional union strategies into and rejection of an established order that question. At the same time, institutional and included unions. Extreme right-wing ideas social configurations offered opportunities appeared increasingly attractive to some for innovation. workers, including union members (Fich- Several interrelated developments had ter 2006; Zeuner et al. 2007). The obvious weakened IG Metall’s institutional posi- dangers cried out for new union strategies. tion and in so doing opened the door for In spite of much cynicism within union reformist approaches and new leadership. ranks, the opportunities were there. But it Economic restructuring included the threat took imaginative leadership to see and build and in many cases the reality of business on existing possibilities. The emergence of relocation and outsourcing of production. new strategy grounded in member engage- Collective bargaining coverage declined as ment occurred most noticeably in one region firms defected from employer associations of Germany at a time when other regions or joined a special membership category faced similar circumstances. The decisive that allowed exemption from contract provi- element driving the change was the strategic sions. While the union made modest gains reorientation of Wetzel and his colleagues in in sector contracts after 2004, the Pforzheim Nordrhein-Westfalen. The new approaches agreement also opened the door to countless spread because institutional and social new company-level negotiations. circumstances offered similar opportunity On the other hand, Germany’s legislated elsewhere, waiting to be exploited once NRW labor institutions—codetermination, com-

25See Thelen (2001) for an argument that even in 24For a general perspective on lessons for European apparently stable coordinated market economies labor’s unions from the American labor movement, see Turner influence must be renewed in continuing processes of 2007a. conflict and negotiation. 306 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

Figure 1. Comparison of Schlecker and NRW Campaign Strategies.

Union position Expansion of WIR Focus of mobilization

Schlecker outsiders institution building society

NRW insiders institutional revitalization workplace

leadership made a conscious decision to The differences can be mapped out as shown lead the way. in Figure 1. Given the broader context of contempo- Case Comparisons rary industrial relations, these two cases gen- erate the following hypotheses: where unions The Schlecker and Nordrhein-Westfalen are excluded, they must build institutions cases offer examples of strategic innovation (starting with works councils in the German within a broader context of declining union case), and to do so in the face of employer influence and membership in Germany. opposition they need the support of other The Schlecker campaign stands out as a rare social actors in a comprehensive campaign. victory that offers a potential model for the By contrast, where unions retain a substantial spread of worker interest representation insider presence, rank-and-file mobilization (WIR) in the low-wage occupations of an 26 offers possibilities for institutional revitaliza- expanding service sector. The ongoing tion. Because most union leaders in the re- NRW—and now national IG Metall—strategic cent past have pursued neither strategy even reorientation demonstrates new possibilities where opportunity has beckoned, it is clear to reverse decline in a union stronghold. that the choices made by unions, both local The first is a case of institution building, the and national, are decisive in the pursuit of second a case of institutional revitalization. either institution building or revitalization. Innovative strategy in the Schlecker case In both cases, innovation began from the took shape as “social movement unionism,” ground up, for the Schlecker campaign in while IG Metall’s NRW strategy looked more 27 Mannheim and Heidelberg, for the NRW like an “economic development unionism.” case in Siegen. And in both cases, subsequent regional and national union support proved important: at Schlecker, support was needed 26At Schlecker and in similar campaigns elsewhere, to spread the campaign and confront the firm the first goal is to build works councils, with union mem- at the national level; and at IG Metall, a vital bership growth to follow. Hence the German concept “worker interest representation,” referring both to works factor was the decision of national leadership councils and unions. to elect and support Wetzel as director for the 27Because IG Metall/NRW’s firm-level bargaining pivotal NRW district. By the same logic, the centered on one region, the cumulative effect offered failure to build decisively on the Schlecker a potential contribution to economic restructuring, in what Klaus Dörre and Bernd Röttger (2006:280–83) example for campaigns at other firms in a have referred to as an “old industrial region.” I would growing low-wage retail sector can be traced suggest (and have argued elsewhere) that these two at least in part to the unwillingness of the strategic orientations—social movement and economic national union to commit the necessary re- development unionism—are overlapping but distinct sources. By contrast, the spread of the Siegen types of an innovative “social unionism,” one that breaks with conventional approaches especially in a proactive model to the NRW district, and increasingly mobilization of workers, members, and other social to other IG Metall districts, depended to actors (Turner 2007b). a large extent on growing support from INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVISM 307 national headquarters in Frankfurt. In the a coordinated market economy (Hancké, face of counter-mobilization—for IG Metall Rhodes, and Thatcher 2007:22). as employers defected from sector bargain- At the other pole stands the “hell-in-a- ing agreements and for ver.di as Schlecker handbasket” literature. For the German and Lidl intensified anti-union efforts—the political economy in general and the German sustainability of local innovation required labor movement in particular, the gloomy broader organizational support.28 perspective comes from many different direc- An analysis of the two cases is consistent tions. Economists such as Addison, Schnabel, with an argument that privileges opportu- and Wagner (2006) chart the long decline of nity—located in institutional openings and German unions and offer only minimal hope social context—and the strategic choices for reversal. Others see neoliberal economic made by union actors. In both cases, strate- and political forces sweeping institutions gies were innovative, comprehensive, and aside.29 Kitschelt and Streeck (2003) refer adapted to local circumstances in a flexible to “incremental disintegration” and argue manner. Choice was not a simple matter: that previously enabling institutions have strategic innovation required internal orga- blocked possibilities for reform across the nizational debate, trial and error, and the broad landscape of the German political proactive development of new concepts and economy, in part due to the veto role of tactics such as grassroots mobilization and powerful interests such as labor. Especially coalition building. interesting is a varieties-of-capitalism break- away literature on institutional change that The Literature: identifies incremental deregulation that over Varieties of Stability and Collapse time may amount to transformation (Streeck and Thelen 2005b). Handbasket perspectives Literature on the German labor move- range from free market cheerleading to a ment, and on comparative capitalism more sense of helplessness in the face of inevitable broadly, gravitates toward two poles. The decline. varieties-of-capitalism framework views Evidence can be found to support all of coordinated market economies such as the above views. Yet all too often, the past Germany as governed by a dense network gets extrapolated into the future, although of institutions that is relatively stable (Hall the future is so often full of surprises (the and Soskice 2001b:21–27). To be sure, as collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989; the global global liberalization proceeds and competi- economic meltdown of 2008). We all face tion intensifies, reforms become necessary great difficulty in understanding contem- and adjustments are made. But a central porary events as they sail by in a changing message of the literature is that “the more world economy. The evidence presented things change the more they stay the same.” here points to a German labor movement Institutions interact in mutually reinforcing in decline and the weakening hold of once ways, in patterns of coordination that change strong institutions. Yet the case studies also only slowly. Social partnership may get rocky show possibilities for institution building and and unions may lose some influence, but revitalization, strategies for a renewal of union “German employers cannot bring themselves strength based on “best practice” successes. to dismantle the German model” (Thelen The cases show contrasting possibilities and 1999). Labor institutions retain an essential outcomes in different sectors and regions of stability, even if the position of unions may the economy. be one of “institutional subservience” in Cross-national comparisons typically fo- cus at national or sectoral levels, or in one 28Also relevant here are concepts developed by arena or another of the political economy. Behrens and Jacoby (2004): an “experimentalist” logic at NRW, where power was at least somewhat balanced, compared to a “battlefield” logic at Schlecker and Lidl, 29Thus “Germany’s consensual traditions will wriggle where unions sought to establish influence in the face for a long time before they expire.” Economist, April of powerful company opposition. 27, 1996, p. 55. 308 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

Also important, however, are differences revitalization of labor institutions, as we have within countries (Locke 1995; Artus 2007). seen, may well require periodic grassroots There is, for example, a muted but growing mobilization, especially when hell arrives debate within German unions and among in a handbasket. This is true both where labor academics regarding the appropriate- institutions are strong, as in the NRW case, ness of current U.S. union organizing and and where they are not, as at Schlecker and campaigning strategies for German unions. Lidl. Mobilization efforts, whether led from At first glance, the obvious verdict is negative the top or arising from the grassroots (before (Waldman 2004): the context is different, and combining in a comprehensive strategy, as the institutions make other strategies more they must do for success; Milkman 2006), viable in Germany. I believe that assessment may aim not only to revitalize institutions is too simplistic. In manufacturing, where but to build them as well. works councils are present and a union such Peter Katzenstein’s influential “incre- as IG Metall has a supportive institutional mentalist” perspective on German politics base, the best strategy may be essentially tradi- is pitched at the level of the state and sus- tional: fostering collectively bargained wage taining policy networks (Katzenstein 1987, policy from outside the firm; strengthening 2005). For unions, the relative stability of the bargaining position of (union-friendly) the industrial relations system permits only works councils from inside the firm. But even incremental change, for gains, losses, and here, where unions are strongest, strategic policy influence, and this is true in spite innovation appears essential, if only because of the substantial reforms of recent years. so many firms have demanded concessions. The NRW case fits this analysis: substantial And as we have seen, one of the most promis- yet still incremental innovation within the ing innovations parallels U.S. union efforts established institutional context, with a new in one important way: a renewed grassroots focus on member recruitment and engage- focus on member mobilization and recruit- ment as a means of shoring up union influ- ment (IG Metall 2008). ence at the workplace and in the broader Where works councils are not present and political economy. The Schlecker and Lidl employers refuse to share power, a broader cases, by contrast, illustrate how much of the comprehensive campaign, including coali- German labor market—and society—stand tion building and grassroots mobilization, for all practical purposes outside the existing appears essential (and in the Schlecker case institutional framework. Restructuring in looks very much like the strategies of unions privatized industries such as telecommunica- such as SEIU and Unite Here in the United tions, postal services, and rail transportation States). In private sector services, and es- has also contributed to growing non-union pecially for low-wage occupations, radical segments of the economy. For worker inter- innovations in strategy may be necessary, est representation, radical innovation makes given intense employer opposition. But such sense where incrementalism offers little innovation can also be blocked by the domi- hope. Such innovations in union strategy, nance of traditional union strategy, even as however, as Katzenstein might predict, are that strategy becomes less and less successful. more than likely to be blocked by institutions The interaction between institutions and actors long schooled in strategies aimed and activism is itself an important area for at incremental gains. research that can be informed by compara- Institutions can facilitate or block innova- tive analysis, across firms, regions, sectors, tion, depending in part on how actors choose and nations. The problem is that literature focused on institutions (for example, Hall and Soskice 2001a) and a separate body of 30According to the contentious politics literature, work oriented toward activism, including con- key factors driving the emergence of social movements include resource mobilization, opportunity structure, tentious politics and social movements (for and framing (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1999), ele- example, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1999), ments of a rich analysis largely consistent with the cases do not speak to each other enough.30 Yet the presented here. INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVISM 309 to use the institutions. Just as employers Schlecker/Lidl cases offer an alternative cam- can seize opportunities to weaken unions in paigning approach based on social coalition market-oriented economic and political con- building and rank-and-file activism, yet so far texts, so too can unions seize opportunities limited by both militant employer opposition present in institutional and social contexts and a corresponding lack of union resource for purposes of their own. Policy experts commitment. The unifying feature of both worry that entrenched unions continue to innovations is grassroots mobilization. block much-needed reforms aimed at chronic Arguments that emphasize stability or col- unemployment, labor market rigidities, and lapse each fail to see the potential for strategic economic stagnation—with the implication innovation and a corresponding willingness that unions must to some extent be pushed of workers and their allies to participate out of the way (Streeck 2005). As unions actively in the politics of the workplace. are weakened, however, by aggressive em- Arguments that emphasize institutions as ployer strategies, government policy, and primarily either facilitators or suppressors an economic restructuring that favors the of worker interests also typically ignore the spread of service sector jobs, many of them potential for—and positive effects of—ex- low-wage and lacking any form of worker panded participation (Turner 1996). The interest representation, labor becomes even dialectic between institutions and activism is more defensive in the face of policy reform. more interesting, and in the long run more Because labor protections remain present important, than one-dimensional analyses even as union membership declines, “hell- of economic and social policy reform, social in-a-handbasket” analysis emphasizing union movement mobilization, or organizational blockage implies little hope for real policy behavior in established institutional contexts. reform—especially but not only in a context An emphasis on unpredictable actor of export-led economic growth and centrist choice is troubling to social scientists, and governance. not only to theorists of rational choice. Yet Yet there is no necessary reason why re- a universe of social interaction is complex surgent unions, both in manufacturing bases and messy, defying determinist explana- and in service occupations where unions have tion. Given particular institutions, social been excluded, cannot gain the renewed context, politics, economic circumstances, confidence and power necessary to negoti- culture, identities, and other factors, we can ate policy reform that is both politically and examine causal processes and predict what economically viable (Hoffmann 2006). Con- is likely. No matter how sharp the analysis, temporary debate is dominated by a zero-sum however, organizations and individuals can perspective. On the one hand, the argument and do often surprise us with the choices goes, economic and social policy reform is they make. blocked by powerful interest groups such as labor and thus faces political stalemate. On Future of the German Labor Movement the other hand, politically viable strategies are incompatible with successful economic and For much of the postwar period, German social policy reform. Breaking the stalemate unions made good choices: for institution requires either defeating the unions or bring- building in the early years, institutional ing them aboard to help shape processes of revitalization in the 1970s, and institutional reform. Much will depend on union strategy stability in the 1980s. The unexpected col- (Visser 2007:115). lapse of the East German regime threw many For unions, opportunities for alternative things up for grabs. Western unions moved choices are there. Unions can defend their quickly into eastern Germany along with shrinking bases, weakened yet still capable western labor institutions, transplanted on of fighting successfully against reform, or new terrain in contentious circumstances they can innovate. The NRW case suggests and with shallow roots (Turner 1998). Much a potential for strategic reform based on conventional analysis blames unions for dis- member engagement and recruitment. The couraging investment by pushing wages in the 310 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW east up toward western standards. Unions, growing union-free zone (Jacobi 2003; Royle however, did what was politically necessary 2004; Artus 2007). In part, the future of the in response to the demands of eastern mem- German labor movement rests on an ability bers, with broad agreement from employer to bring worker interest representation to associations. growing low-wage occupational categories In part as a result of prolonged economic in industries such as building services, retail crisis in the east but due also to broader sales, and food service. The Schlecker case economic and political processes of Euro- offers an innovative model for institution peanization and global liberalization, insti- building in campaigns based on grassroots tutions have wobbled in the face of intense mobilization, coalition building, and public challenges. In a context of institutional demands for social justice. This kind of instability, German unions over the past strategy is now on the table, pursued by ver. decade have not adapted well to changing di activists in a recent campaign at Lidl, yet circumstances. Unions have been slow to still awaiting a substantial union commitment move beyond their bases in manufacturing of resources and support. and the public sector. Strategic innovation Even in traditional manufacturing has been all too infrequent. Unions have strongholds, where union roots are deep, by and large reacted defensively in the face the ground has been slipping away as em- of employer demands, membership decline, ployers demand concessions and renege on and economic and social policy reforms. bargaining agreements. If unions cannot In the United States, from the 1970s well hold on where they are strongest, there is into the 1990s, union leaders pretended that little hope elsewhere. Perhaps just in time, New Deal institutions were intact, denied a new strategic orientation has emerged, the crisis of the American labor movement, most prominently (although not only) in continued to export a failed industrial rela- Nordrhein-Westfalen, the largest IG Metall tions model, reacted defensively to employer district. Organized around member mobili- and government attacks, and finally grappled zation, the new approach offers unexpected with existential despair (Fantasia and Voss promise for institutional revitalization. 2004). German unions can learn from the Practitioners—and academic observers— negative American experience while they fail when they cannot break with traditional still have an institutional base on which to perspectives, see only stability or collapse, build (Waldman 2004). They can also draw or become trapped in unreal expectations, on American labor’s crisis-driven innovations denial, or despair. Today unions are reeling, such as grassroots mobilization and coalition in many cases reduced to a defense of existing building, adapted to a German institutional protections and policies, even in countries context (Raffo 2007; Schreider 2007a; IGM such as Germany where labor institutions 2008). remain embedded in much of the political While much of the literature on German economy. Yet opportunity awaits, in changing labor remains rooted in a perspective based institutional configurations and turbulent so- in manufacturing, employment in service cial contexts. Unions for the most part have industries exceeds that in manufacturing and failed to break with tradition, to innovate, to continues to grow as a percentage of the total take advantage of opportunity. They are not work force. Private sector services include a obliged to continue to fail. INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVISM 311

REFERENCES

Addison, John T., Claus Schnabel, and Joachim Wag- Gall, Gregor, ed. 2003. Union Organising. London: ner. 2006. “The (Parlous) State of German Unions.” Routledge. Discussion Paper No. 2000 (March), Institute for the Green, Simon, and William E. Patterson, eds. 2005. Study of Labor, Bonn. Governance in Contemporary Germany: The Semisovereign Annesley, Claire. 2006. “Ver.di and Trade Union Re- State Revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. vitalization in Germany.” Industrial Relations Journal, Greer, Ian. 2006. “Workers of the World Compete! Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 164–79. Unions and Economic Development in the United Artus, Ingrid. 2007. “Prekäre Interessenvertretung.” States and Europe.” Diss., School of Industrial and Industrielle Beziehungen, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 5–29. Labor Relations, Cornell University. Badekow, Helmut. 2007. “Was Bewegt . . . Detlef Wet- ____. 2007. “Special Interests and Public Goods: zel?” Die Zeit, February 15, p. 28. Organized Labor’s Coalition Politics in Hamburg Behrens, Martin, Michael Fichter, and Carola Frege. and Seattle.” In Turner and Cornfield, eds. (q.v.), 2003. “Unions in Germany: Regaining the Initia- pp. 193–210. tive?” European Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 9, Hall, Peter, and David Soskice, eds. 2001a. Varieties of No. 1, pp. 25–42. Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Behrens, Martin, and Wade Jacoby. 2004. “The Rise of Advantage. New York: Oxford University Press. Experimentalism in German Collective Bargaining.” ____. 2001b. “An Introduction to Varieties of Capital- British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 42, No. 1, ism.” In Hall and Soskice, eds. (q.v.), pp. 1–68. pp. 95–123. Hamann, Andreas, and Gudrun Giese. 2004. Schwarzbuch Benoit, Bertrand, and Richard Milne. 2006. “Germany‘s Lidl: Billig auf Kosten der Beschäftigten. Berlin: ver.di. Best-Kept Secret: How Its Exporters Are Beating the Hancké, Bob, Martin Rhodes, and Mark Thatcher, eds. World.” Financial Times, May 19, p. 11. 2007. Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, Contradic- Berghahn, Volker R., and Detlev Karsten. 1987. Industrial tions, and Complementarities in the European Economy. Relations in West Germany. Oxford: Berg. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bispinck, Reinhard. 2008. “Das Deutsche Tarifmodell Hassel, Anke. 2007. “The Curse of Institutional Security: im Umbruch.” Wirtschaftsdienst, Vol. 88,���������������� No. 1 (Janu- The Erosion of German Trade Unionism.” Industrielle ary), pp. 7–11. Beziehungen, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 176–96. Bormann, Sarah. 2008. “Unternehmenshandeln gegen Hildebrand, Jan. 2006. “Der Macher: Bezirksleiter Betriebsratsgründungen—Der Fall Schlecker.” WSI- Detlef Wetzel Gilt als Hoffnung der IG Metall—Schon Mitteilungen, Vol. 1. Jetzt Poliert er das Image der Gewerkschaft Auf.” Bremme, Peter, Ulrike Fürniss, and Ulrich Meinecke, eds. Frankfurter Rundschau, April 28, p. 35. 2007. Never Work Alone: Organizing—ein Zukunftsmodell Hoffmann, Jürgen. 2006. Arbeitsbeziehungen im Rhei- für Gewerkschaften. Hamburg: VSA-Verlag. nischen Kapitalismus: Zwishen Modernisierung und Cornfield, Daniel, and Holly McCammon, eds. 2003. Globalisierung. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Labor Revitalization: Global Perspectives and New Initia- Huhn, Jens. 2001. Die Schlecker-Kampagne: Gewerkschaft tives. In the JAI series “Research in the Sociology of als Soziale Bewegung. Mannheim: Gewerkschaft HBV. Work.” Amsterdam: JAI Press. IG Metall. 2008. “Organizing: Die Mitgliederorientierte Dörre, Klaus, and Bernd Röttger. 2006. Im Schatten der Offensivstrategie für die IG Metall.” Internal union Globalisierung: Strukturpolitik, Netzwerke und Gewerkschaf- document, May. ten in Altindustriellen Regionen. Wiesbaden: VSA-Verlag Iversen, Torben, Jonas Pontusson, and David Soskice, für Sozialwissenschaften. eds. 1999. Unions, Employers, and Central Banks. New Dougherty, Carter. 2006. “In Germany, U.S. Model Is York: Cambridge University Press. Tough Sell.” International Herald Tribune, August 4. Jacobi, Otto. 2003. “Union Recognition in Germany: Dribbusch, Heiner. 2005. “Trade Union Organising A Divided System of Industrial Relations with Two in Private Sector Services: Findings from the British, Recognition Problems.” In Gall, ed. (q.v.), pp. 211–27. Dutch and German Retail Industries.” WSI-Discussion Katzenstein, Peter J. 1987. Policy and Politics in West Ger- paper No. 136 (April). Düsseldorf: WSI, Hans- many: The Growth of a Semisovereign State. Philadelphia: Böckler-Stiftung. Temple University Press. Fantasia, Rick, and Kim Voss. 2004. Hard Work: Remak- ____. 2005. “Conclusion: Semisovereignty in United ing the American Labor Movement. Berkeley: University Germany.” In Green and Patterson, eds. (q.v.), pp. of California Press. 283–306. Fernie, Sue, and David Metcalf, eds. 2005. Trade Unions: Kitschelt, Herbert, and Wolfgang Streeck. 2003. “From Resurgence or Demise? London: Routledge. Stability to Stagnation: Germany at the Beginning of Fichter, Michael. 2003. “The IG Metall Is Dead! Long the Twenty-First Century.” West European Politics, Vol. Live the IG Metall!” American Institute for Contem- 26, No. 4, pp. 1–34. porary German Studies online, August 15. Landler, Mark. 2007. “German Export-Led Economy ____. 2006. “German Trade Unions and Right Extrem- Finds Global Niche.” New York Times, April 13. ism: The Political Attitudes of the Membership.” Locke, Richard. 1995. Remaking the Italian Economy. Paper presented at the International Conference of Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. the Council of European Studies, March 29–April 2, Markovits, Andrei S. 1986. The Politics of the West German Drake Hotel, Chicago. Trade Unions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 312 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. ____. 2005b. “Institutional Change in Advanced Politi- 1999. Dynamics of Contention. New York: Cambridge cal Economies.” In Streeck and Thelen, eds. (q.v.), University Press. pp. 1–39. Menz, Georg. 2005. “Old Bottles—New Wine: The Thelen, Kathleen. 1992. Union of Parts: Labor Politics in Dynamics of Industrial Relations.” German Politics, Postwar Germany. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Vol. 14, No. 2 (June), pp. 196–207. ____. 1999. “Why German Employers Cannot Bring Neimann-Findeisen, Sören. 2008. “Current Challenges Themselves to Dismantle the German Model.” In and Strategies of the IG Metall.” Presentation at the Iversen et al., eds. (q.v.), pp. 138–69. Sixth Annual Meeting of the Transatlantic Social Dia- ____. 2001. “Varieties of Labor Politics in the Devel- logue, IG Metall Training Center, Pichelsee/Berlin, oped Democracies.” In Hall and Soskice, eds. (q.v.), May 29–31. pp. 71–103. Pieper, Claas. 2007. “Der Riese Schrumpf.” Die Zeit, ____. 2004. How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy 27 Juni, p. 26. of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan. Raess, Damian. 2006. “Globalization and Why the ‘Time Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Is Ripe’ for the Transformation of German Industrial Thelen, Kathleen, and Ikuo Dume. 2006. “Coordina- Relations.” Review of International Political Economy, Vol. tion as a Political Problem in Coordinated Market 13, No. 3 (August), pp. 449–79. Economies.” Governance, Vol. 19, No. 1 (January), Raess, Damian, and Brian Burgoon. 2006. “The Dogs pp. 11–42. That Sometimes Bark: Globalization and Works Turner, Lowell. 1996. “The Europeanization of Labor: Council Bargaining in Germany.” European Journal of Structure before Action.” European Journal of Industrial Industrial Relations, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 287–309. Relations, Vol. 2, No. 3 (November), pp. 325–44. Raffo, Jeffrey. 2007. “Organisierungserfahrungen ____. 1998. Fighting for Partnership: Labor and Politics in aus Nordamerika—und aus Nordrhein-Westfalen.” Unified Germany. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. In Bremme, Fürness, and Meinecke, eds. (q.v.), pp. ____. 2003. “Reviving the Labor Movement: A Com- 175–93. parative Perspective.” In Cornfield and McCammon, Rehder, Britta. 2006. “Legitimitätsdefizite des Co- eds. (q.v.), pp. 23–57. Managements.” Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Vol. 35, No. 3 ____. 2007a. “The Advantages of Backwardness: Lessons (Juni), pp. 227–42. for Social Europe from the American Labour Move- Röhlk, Sylvia. 2008. “Die Lidl-Kampagne in Stuttgart— ment.” Social Europe, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Spring), pp. 147–53. Ein Erfahrungsbericht in Sachen Organizing.” Ver.di, ____. 2007b. “Introduction: An Urban Resurgence Bezirk Stuttgart. See also http://lidl.verdi.de/ueber/ of Social Unionism.” In Turner and Cornfield, eds. data/Dokumentation_Stuttgart. (q.v.), pp. 1–18. Roth, Eva. 2006. “Die IG Metall Denkt Um: Mitglieder Turner, Lowell, and Daniel Cornfield, eds. 2007. Labor Stärker Beteiligt.” Frankfurter Rundschau, March 30 in the New Urban Battlegrounds: Local Solidarity in a (FR online). Global Economy. Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press (an imprint Royle, Tony. 2004. “Employment Practices of Multi- of Cornell University Press). nationals in the Spanish and German Quick-Food Ver.di. 2007. Die Lidl-Kampagne: Organisierung, Modell, Services: Low-Road Convergence?” European Journal Zukunft. Berlin: ver.di—Vereinte Dienstleistungsge- of Industrial Relations, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 51–71. werkschaft. Schnabel, Claus. 2005. “Trade Unions in Germany: Viering, Jonas. 2007. “A Lot of Employers Haven‘t On the Road to Perdition?” In Fernie and Metcalf, Reckoned with This.” Mitbestimmung, English-language eds. (q.v.), pp. 213–30. edition, Vol. 8, pp. 44–48. Schreieder, Agnes. 2007a. “Organising and Revitalisa- Visser, Jelle. 2006. “Union Membership Statistics in 24 tion of Labour Movements: Role of Training and Countries.” Monthly Labor Review (January), pp. 38–49. Organisers in Great Britain and Germany.” Master‘s ____. 2007. “Trade Union Decline: What Next? Is thesis, Global Labour Institute, University of Kassel Germany a Special Case?” Industrielle Beziehungen, Vol. and Berlin School of Economics. 14, No. 2, pp. 97–117. ____. 2007b.������������������������������� “Die Lidl-Kampagne—ein Z�ukunftsmo����������- von Zglincki, Claudia. 2005. “Die Schlecker-Kampagne.” dell für Gewerkschaften.” In Bremme, Fürness, and VER.DI PUBLIK, June–July, p. 9. Meinecke, eds. (q.v.), pp. 153–74. Waldman, Cara. 2004. “The Future of German Labor Schröder, Wolfgang, and Stephen J. Silvia. 2006. “Why Relations: Lessons German Unions Can Learn from Are German Employers Associations Declining?” American Failures.” Connecticut Journal of International Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 20, No. 10, pp. 1–27. Law, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 689–72. Streeck, Wolfgang. 2005. “Industrial Relations: From Wetzel, Detlef. 2007. “How to Organize Success—The State Weakness as Strength to State Weakness as Recruiting Campaign of IG Metall.” Presentation at Weakness: Welfare Corporatism and the Private Use the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Transatlantic Social of the Public Interest.” In Green and Patterson, eds. Dialogue, European Trade Union Institute, Brussels, (q.v.), pp. 138–64. March 2–3. Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kathleen Thelen, eds. 2005a. Zeuner, Bodo, Joachen Gester, Michael Fichter, Joachin Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Kreis, and Richard Stöss. 2007. Gewerkschaften und Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rechtsextremismus. Münster: Westfälischer Dampfboot.